Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games. / Ritzberger, Klaus; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 62, 01.01.2016, p. 5-18.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games. / Ritzberger, Klaus; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, Vol. 62, 01.01.2016, p. 5-18.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Ritzberger, K & Alos-Ferrer, C 2016, 'Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games', JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, vol. 62, pp. 5-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005

APA

Vancouver

Author

Ritzberger, Klaus ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos. / Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games. In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. 2016 ; Vol. 62. pp. 5-18.

BibTeX

@article{d471b6c8cb464db997a9f6cd48c09684,
title = "Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games",
abstract = "This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games.",
author = "Klaus Ritzberger and Carlos Alos-Ferrer",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005",
language = "English",
volume = "62",
pages = "5--18",
journal = "JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS",
issn = "0304-4068",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium Existence for Large Perfect Information Games

AU - Ritzberger, Klaus

AU - Alos-Ferrer, Carlos

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games.

AB - This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005

M3 - Article

VL - 62

SP - 5

EP - 18

JO - JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

JF - JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

SN - 0304-4068

ER -