Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique. / Armand, Alex ; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro ; Vilela, Inês.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 110, No. 11, 01.11.2020, p. 3431-3453.

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Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique. / Armand, Alex ; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro ; Vilela, Inês.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 110, No. 11, 01.11.2020, p. 3431-3453.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Armand, A, Coutts, A, Vicente, P & Vilela, I 2020, 'Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique', American Economic Review, vol. 110, no. 11, pp. 3431-3453. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842

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Armand, Alex ; Coutts, Alexander ; Vicente, Pedro ; Vilela, Inês. / Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique. In: American Economic Review. 2020 ; Vol. 110, No. 11. pp. 3431-3453.

BibTeX

@article{df71db1d2efc441c9af357e24a510423,
title = "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique",
abstract = "Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking. ",
author = "Alex Armand and Alexander Coutts and Pedro Vicente and In{\^e}s Vilela",
year = "2020",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1257/aer.20190842",
language = "English",
volume = "110",
pages = "3431--3453",
journal = "American Economic Review",
issn = "0002-8282",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "11",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

AU - Armand, Alex

AU - Coutts, Alexander

AU - Vicente, Pedro

AU - Vilela, Inês

PY - 2020/11/1

Y1 - 2020/11/1

N2 - Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.

AB - Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.

U2 - 10.1257/aer.20190842

DO - 10.1257/aer.20190842

M3 - Article

VL - 110

SP - 3431

EP - 3453

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

SN - 0002-8282

IS - 11

ER -