Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay. / Feri, Francesco; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.

In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 23, No. 5, 11.2013, p. 955-1000.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay. / Feri, Francesco; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.

In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 23, No. 5, 11.2013, p. 955-1000.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Feri, F & Melendez-Jimenez, MA 2013, 'Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay', Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 955-1000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9

APA

Feri, F., & Melendez-Jimenez, M. A. (2013). Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 23(5), 955-1000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9

Vancouver

Feri F, Melendez-Jimenez MA. Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay. Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 2013 Nov;23(5):955-1000. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9

Author

Feri, Francesco ; Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A. / Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay. In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 23, No. 5. pp. 955-1000.

BibTeX

@article{958298cad5164f3a9dbd911204fe454c,
title = "Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay",
abstract = "This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that the long-run behavior of the system depends on a fine interplay of the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance.",
author = "Francesco Feri and Melendez-Jimenez, {Miguel A.}",
year = "2013",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "955--1000",
journal = "Journal of Evolutionary Economics",
issn = "0936-9937",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

AU - Feri, Francesco

AU - Melendez-Jimenez, Miguel A.

PY - 2013/11

Y1 - 2013/11

N2 - This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that the long-run behavior of the system depends on a fine interplay of the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance.

AB - This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that the long-run behavior of the system depends on a fine interplay of the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance.

U2 - 10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9

DO - 10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9

M3 - Article

VL - 23

SP - 955

EP - 1000

JO - Journal of Evolutionary Economics

JF - Journal of Evolutionary Economics

SN - 0936-9937

IS - 5

ER -