Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms : Evidence on technology licensing. / Duplat, Valerie ; Coeurderoy, Regis; Hagedoorn, Johan.

In: Research Policy, Vol. 47, No. 6, 07.2018, p. 1096-1110.

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Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms : Evidence on technology licensing. / Duplat, Valerie ; Coeurderoy, Regis; Hagedoorn, Johan.

In: Research Policy, Vol. 47, No. 6, 07.2018, p. 1096-1110.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Duplat, Valerie ; Coeurderoy, Regis ; Hagedoorn, Johan. / Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms : Evidence on technology licensing. In: Research Policy. 2018 ; Vol. 47, No. 6. pp. 1096-1110.

BibTeX

@article{aa1d539900c740d2b4cb6eb27296a604,
title = "Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms: Evidence on technology licensing",
abstract = "In fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments, licensing partnerships can be powerful levers for market expansion. Research on the management of technology-oriented licenses has nonetheless pointed out the risks of corrosive disputes caused by conflicting interests or misunderstandings among licensing partners. The choice made ex ante on mechanisms for resolving potential disputes is of prime importance in the execution of licensing exchanges. Although the legal literature has widely emphasized the advantages of arbitration towards litigation, public ordering remains the “default” option in managers{\textquoteright} eyes. By adopting a transaction cost economics logic, our study explores the conditions under which licensing partners may prefer arbitration over public ordering during the contractual-design phase. In accordance with our theoretical arguments, findings show that the occurrence of arbitration provisions increases when the coordination orientation adopted by licensing partners is extensive. In situations where both monitoring and coordination orientations are simultaneously extensive, results reveal a greater propensity to prefer arbitration over public ordering. Our research therefore supports the view that corporate decision-makers tend to favor the conciliatory stance and compromising awards typically associated with arbitration, only when exchanges are expected to be highly coordinative. Their preference for arbitration over litigation is magnified when the coordination orientation develops alongside the monitoring orientation. ",
keywords = "arbitration, technology licensing, contract design, dispute",
author = "Valerie Duplat and Regis Coeurderoy and Johan Hagedoorn",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/j.respol.2018.03.015",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "1096--1110",
journal = "Research Policy",
issn = "0048-7333",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contractual governance and the choice of dispute-resolution mechanisms

T2 - Evidence on technology licensing

AU - Duplat, Valerie

AU - Coeurderoy, Regis

AU - Hagedoorn, Johan

PY - 2018/7

Y1 - 2018/7

N2 - In fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments, licensing partnerships can be powerful levers for market expansion. Research on the management of technology-oriented licenses has nonetheless pointed out the risks of corrosive disputes caused by conflicting interests or misunderstandings among licensing partners. The choice made ex ante on mechanisms for resolving potential disputes is of prime importance in the execution of licensing exchanges. Although the legal literature has widely emphasized the advantages of arbitration towards litigation, public ordering remains the “default” option in managers’ eyes. By adopting a transaction cost economics logic, our study explores the conditions under which licensing partners may prefer arbitration over public ordering during the contractual-design phase. In accordance with our theoretical arguments, findings show that the occurrence of arbitration provisions increases when the coordination orientation adopted by licensing partners is extensive. In situations where both monitoring and coordination orientations are simultaneously extensive, results reveal a greater propensity to prefer arbitration over public ordering. Our research therefore supports the view that corporate decision-makers tend to favor the conciliatory stance and compromising awards typically associated with arbitration, only when exchanges are expected to be highly coordinative. Their preference for arbitration over litigation is magnified when the coordination orientation develops alongside the monitoring orientation.

AB - In fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments, licensing partnerships can be powerful levers for market expansion. Research on the management of technology-oriented licenses has nonetheless pointed out the risks of corrosive disputes caused by conflicting interests or misunderstandings among licensing partners. The choice made ex ante on mechanisms for resolving potential disputes is of prime importance in the execution of licensing exchanges. Although the legal literature has widely emphasized the advantages of arbitration towards litigation, public ordering remains the “default” option in managers’ eyes. By adopting a transaction cost economics logic, our study explores the conditions under which licensing partners may prefer arbitration over public ordering during the contractual-design phase. In accordance with our theoretical arguments, findings show that the occurrence of arbitration provisions increases when the coordination orientation adopted by licensing partners is extensive. In situations where both monitoring and coordination orientations are simultaneously extensive, results reveal a greater propensity to prefer arbitration over public ordering. Our research therefore supports the view that corporate decision-makers tend to favor the conciliatory stance and compromising awards typically associated with arbitration, only when exchanges are expected to be highly coordinative. Their preference for arbitration over litigation is magnified when the coordination orientation develops alongside the monitoring orientation.

KW - arbitration, technology licensing, contract design, dispute

U2 - 10.1016/j.respol.2018.03.015

DO - 10.1016/j.respol.2018.03.015

M3 - Article

VL - 47

SP - 1096

EP - 1110

JO - Research Policy

JF - Research Policy

SN - 0048-7333

IS - 6

ER -