Contesting Firm Boundaries : Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization. / Doellgast, Virginia; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, Katja; Benassi, Chiara.

In: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, 01.05.2016, p. 551-578.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Published

Standard

Contesting Firm Boundaries : Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization. / Doellgast, Virginia; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, Katja; Benassi, Chiara.

In: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, 01.05.2016, p. 551-578.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Doellgast, V, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, K & Benassi, C 2016, 'Contesting Firm Boundaries: Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 551-578. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915624088

APA

Doellgast, V., Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, K., & Benassi, C. (2016). Contesting Firm Boundaries: Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 69(3), 551-578. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915624088

Vancouver

Doellgast V, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt K, Benassi C. Contesting Firm Boundaries: Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization. Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 2016 May 1;69(3):551-578. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915624088

Author

Doellgast, Virginia ; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, Katja ; Benassi, Chiara. / Contesting Firm Boundaries : Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization. In: Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 2016 ; Vol. 69, No. 3. pp. 551-578.

BibTeX

@article{25828415556744978e0d78625be0a156,
title = "Contesting Firm Boundaries: Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization",
abstract = "This article develops and applies a framework for analyzing the relationship among institutions, cost structures, and patterns of labor–management contestation over organizational boundaries. Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center jobs are compared across 10 incumbent telecommunications firms located in Europe and the United States. All 10 firms moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and domestic and offshore subcontractors. A subset of the firms, however, later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases following negotiated concessions on pay and working conditions for internal workers. Findings are based on 147 interviews with management and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures and associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered through collective agreements and surveys. The authors argue that variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of the cost differentials between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn affected patterns of contestation associated with externalization measures.",
author = "Virginia Doellgast and Katja Sarmiento-Mirwaldt and Chiara Benassi",
year = "2016",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0019793915624088",
language = "English",
volume = "69",
pages = "551--578",
journal = "Industrial and Labor Relations Review",
issn = "0019-7939",
publisher = "Cornell University",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contesting Firm Boundaries

T2 - Institutions, Cost Structures, and the Politics of Externalization

AU - Doellgast, Virginia

AU - Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, Katja

AU - Benassi, Chiara

PY - 2016/5/1

Y1 - 2016/5/1

N2 - This article develops and applies a framework for analyzing the relationship among institutions, cost structures, and patterns of labor–management contestation over organizational boundaries. Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center jobs are compared across 10 incumbent telecommunications firms located in Europe and the United States. All 10 firms moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and domestic and offshore subcontractors. A subset of the firms, however, later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases following negotiated concessions on pay and working conditions for internal workers. Findings are based on 147 interviews with management and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures and associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered through collective agreements and surveys. The authors argue that variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of the cost differentials between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn affected patterns of contestation associated with externalization measures.

AB - This article develops and applies a framework for analyzing the relationship among institutions, cost structures, and patterns of labor–management contestation over organizational boundaries. Collective negotiations related to the externalization of call center jobs are compared across 10 incumbent telecommunications firms located in Europe and the United States. All 10 firms moved call center work to dedicated subsidiaries, temporary agencies, and domestic and offshore subcontractors. A subset of the firms, however, later re-internalized call center jobs, in some cases following negotiated concessions on pay and working conditions for internal workers. Findings are based on 147 interviews with management and union representatives, archival data on restructuring measures and associated collective agreements, and wage data gathered through collective agreements and surveys. The authors argue that variation in outcomes can be explained by both the extent of the cost differentials between internal and external labor and the ease of exiting internal employment relationships, which in turn affected patterns of contestation associated with externalization measures.

U2 - 10.1177/0019793915624088

DO - 10.1177/0019793915624088

M3 - Article

VL - 69

SP - 551

EP - 578

JO - Industrial and Labor Relations Review

JF - Industrial and Labor Relations Review

SN - 0019-7939

IS - 3

ER -