Circumventing Cheating on Power Auctioning in Resource Constrained Micro-Grids. / Marufu, Anesu; Kayem, Anne V.D.M.; Wolthusen, Stephen.

Proceedings of the 14th International Conference of Smart City (SmartCity 2016). IEEE Press, 2017. p. 1380-1387.

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Abstract

Decentralized Continuous Double Auctioning offers a flexible marketing approach to power distribution in resource constrained (RC) smart micro-grids. Grid participants (buyers and sellers) can obtain power at a suitable price both at on or off-peak periods. Decentralized CDA schemes are however vulnerable to two attacks, namely - 'Victim Strategy Downgrade' and 'Collusion'. Both attacks foil the CDA scheme by allowing an individual to gain surplus energy that leads to low allocative efficiency, which is undesirable for maintaining grid stability and reliability. In this paper we propose a novel scheme to circumvent power auction cheating attacks. Our scheme works by employing an exception handling mechanism that employs cheating detection and resolution algorithms. Our correctness and complexity analysis demonstrates that the solution is both sound and performance efficient under resource constrained conditions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 14th International Conference of Smart City (SmartCity 2016)
PublisherIEEE Press
Pages1380-1387
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-5090-4297-5
ISBN (Print)978-1-5090-4298-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Jan 2017
This open access research output is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

ID: 28815655