Characterizing Existence of Equilibrium for Large Extensive Form Games: A Necessity Result. / Ritzberger, Klaus; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

In: Economic Theory, 07.12.2015, p. 1-24.

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Characterizing Existence of Equilibrium for Large Extensive Form Games: A Necessity Result. / Ritzberger, Klaus; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

In: Economic Theory, 07.12.2015, p. 1-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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@article{5dd546b964f04c6ead879399d5792702,
title = "Characterizing Existence of Equilibrium for Large Extensive Form Games: A Necessity Result",
abstract = "What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.",
author = "Klaus Ritzberger and Carlos Alos-Ferrer",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0",
language = "English",
pages = "1--24",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Characterizing Existence of Equilibrium for Large Extensive Form Games: A Necessity Result

AU - Ritzberger, Klaus

AU - Alos-Ferrer, Carlos

PY - 2015/12/7

Y1 - 2015/12/7

N2 - What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.

AB - What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0

DO - 10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 24

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

ER -