Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation. / Engelmann, D; Grimm, V.

Egham, 2006.

Research output: Working paper

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Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation. / Engelmann, D; Grimm, V.

Egham, 2006.

Research output: Working paper

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@techreport{9b42c9f7bc2b4d0d8426f84e11208a4b,
title = "Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation",
abstract = "We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogenous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms, with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.",
keywords = "Multi-Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Experimental Economics",
author = "D Engelmann and V Grimm",
note = "This the shortened version of 'Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights'.",
year = "2006",
month = feb,
day = "9",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation

AU - Engelmann, D

AU - Grimm, V

N1 - This the shortened version of 'Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights'.

PY - 2006/2/9

Y1 - 2006/2/9

N2 - We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogenous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms, with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.

AB - We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogenous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms, with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.

KW - Multi-Unit Auctions

KW - Demand Reduction

KW - Experimental Economics

M3 - Working paper

BT - Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation

CY - Egham

ER -