Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis. / Decarolis, Francesco; Goldmanis, Maris; Penta, Antonio; Shakhgildyan, Ksenia.

In: The Journal of Industrial Economics, 07.01.2022.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Forthcoming

Standard

Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis. / Decarolis, Francesco; Goldmanis, Maris; Penta, Antonio; Shakhgildyan, Ksenia.

In: The Journal of Industrial Economics, 07.01.2022.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Decarolis, F, Goldmanis, M, Penta, A & Shakhgildyan, K 2022, 'Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis', The Journal of Industrial Economics.

APA

Decarolis, F., Goldmanis, M., Penta, A., & Shakhgildyan, K. (Accepted/In press). Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Vancouver

Decarolis F, Goldmanis M, Penta A, Shakhgildyan K. Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2022 Jan 7.

Author

Decarolis, Francesco ; Goldmanis, Maris ; Penta, Antonio ; Shakhgildyan, Ksenia. / Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis. In: The Journal of Industrial Economics. 2022.

BibTeX

@article{786bfd9ece7d4c5d91cdc80c805690ad,
title = "Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis",
abstract = "Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.",
author = "Francesco Decarolis and Maris Goldmanis and Antonio Penta and Ksenia Shakhgildyan",
year = "2022",
month = jan,
day = "7",
language = "English",
journal = "The Journal of Industrial Economics",
issn = "0022-1821",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bid Coordination in Sponsored Search Auctions: Detection Methodology and Empirical Analysis

AU - Decarolis, Francesco

AU - Goldmanis, Maris

AU - Penta, Antonio

AU - Shakhgildyan, Ksenia

PY - 2022/1/7

Y1 - 2022/1/7

N2 - Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.

AB - Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.

M3 - Article

JO - The Journal of Industrial Economics

JF - The Journal of Industrial Economics

SN - 0022-1821

ER -