Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. / Tappin, Ben; Gadsby, Stephen.

In: Consciousness and Cognition, 02.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

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Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. / Tappin, Ben; Gadsby, Stephen.

In: Consciousness and Cognition, 02.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

Harvard

Tappin, B & Gadsby, S 2019, 'Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence', Consciousness and Cognition.

APA

Tappin, B., & Gadsby, S. (2019). Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. Consciousness and Cognition.

Vancouver

Tappin B, Gadsby S. Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. Consciousness and Cognition. 2019 Feb.

Author

Tappin, Ben ; Gadsby, Stephen. / Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence. In: Consciousness and Cognition. 2019.

BibTeX

@article{f47a9b01170b4a97af94ce237be0fe6f,
title = "Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence",
abstract = "A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.",
author = "Ben Tappin and Stephen Gadsby",
year = "2019",
month = feb,
language = "English",
journal = "Consciousness and Cognition",
issn = "1053-8100",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Biased belief in the Bayesian brain: A deeper look at the evidence

AU - Tappin, Ben

AU - Gadsby, Stephen

PY - 2019/2

Y1 - 2019/2

N2 - A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.

AB - A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles.

M3 - Review article

JO - Consciousness and Cognition

JF - Consciousness and Cognition

SN - 1053-8100

ER -