Bad governance : How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. / Reinsberg, Bernhard; Stubbs, Thomas; Kentikelenis, Alexander; King, Lawrence P.

In: Regulation and Governance, 27.06.2019, p. 1-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

E-pub ahead of print

Standard

Bad governance : How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. / Reinsberg, Bernhard; Stubbs, Thomas; Kentikelenis, Alexander; King, Lawrence P.

In: Regulation and Governance, 27.06.2019, p. 1-20.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Reinsberg, B, Stubbs, T, Kentikelenis, A & King, LP 2019, 'Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world', Regulation and Governance, pp. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12265

APA

Reinsberg, B., Stubbs, T., Kentikelenis, A., & King, L. P. (2019). Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. Regulation and Governance, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12265

Vancouver

Reinsberg B, Stubbs T, Kentikelenis A, King LP. Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. Regulation and Governance. 2019 Jun 27;1-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12265

Author

Reinsberg, Bernhard ; Stubbs, Thomas ; Kentikelenis, Alexander ; King, Lawrence P. / Bad governance : How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. In: Regulation and Governance. 2019 ; pp. 1-20.

BibTeX

@article{9d0e47f5cdee4e4faee390491d37faf0,
title = "Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world",
abstract = "International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far-ranging policy reforms—so-called {\textquoteleft}conditionalities{\textquoteright}—in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti-corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises can create rent-extraction opportunities and limit the capacity of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental-variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state-owned enterprises exert large detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design of conditionality, which should avoid large-scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak accountability.",
author = "Bernhard Reinsberg and Thomas Stubbs and Alexander Kentikelenis and King, {Lawrence P.}",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
day = "27",
doi = "10.1111/rego.12265",
language = "English",
pages = "1--20",
journal = "Regulation and Governance",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bad governance

T2 - How privatization increases corruption in the developing world

AU - Reinsberg, Bernhard

AU - Stubbs, Thomas

AU - Kentikelenis, Alexander

AU - King, Lawrence P.

PY - 2019/6/27

Y1 - 2019/6/27

N2 - International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far-ranging policy reforms—so-called ‘conditionalities’—in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti-corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises can create rent-extraction opportunities and limit the capacity of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental-variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state-owned enterprises exert large detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design of conditionality, which should avoid large-scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak accountability.

AB - International organizations have become key actors in the fight against corruption. Among these organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintains a powerful position over borrowing countries in its ability to mandate far-ranging policy reforms—so-called ‘conditionalities’—in exchange for access to financial assistance. While IMF pressure can force the implementation of anti-corruption policies, potentially reducing corruption, other IMF policy measures such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises can create rent-extraction opportunities and limit the capacity of state institutions to limit corrupt behavior. To test these mechanisms, we conduct instrumental-variable regression analysis using an original dataset on IMF conditionality for up to 141 developing countries from 1982 to 2014. We find that conditions to privatize state-owned enterprises exert large detrimental effects on corruption control. Conversely, other areas of IMF intervention are not consistently related to corruption abatement. These findings offer policy lessons regarding the design of conditionality, which should avoid large-scale privatization, especially under conditions of weak accountability.

U2 - 10.1111/rego.12265

DO - 10.1111/rego.12265

M3 - Article

SP - 1

EP - 20

JO - Regulation and Governance

JF - Regulation and Governance

ER -