ASICS : authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems. / Boyd, Colin; Cremers, Cas; Feltz, Michele; Paterson, Kenneth; Poettering, Bertram; Stebila, Douglas .

In: International Journal of Information Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, 04.2017, p. 151-171.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Published

Standard

ASICS : authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems. / Boyd, Colin; Cremers, Cas; Feltz, Michele; Paterson, Kenneth; Poettering, Bertram; Stebila, Douglas .

In: International Journal of Information Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, 04.2017, p. 151-171.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Boyd, C, Cremers, C, Feltz, M, Paterson, K, Poettering, B & Stebila, D 2017, 'ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems', International Journal of Information Security, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 151-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y

APA

Boyd, C., Cremers, C., Feltz, M., Paterson, K., Poettering, B., & Stebila, D. (2017). ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems. International Journal of Information Security, 16(2), 151-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y

Vancouver

Boyd C, Cremers C, Feltz M, Paterson K, Poettering B, Stebila D. ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems. International Journal of Information Security. 2017 Apr;16(2):151-171. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y

Author

Boyd, Colin ; Cremers, Cas ; Feltz, Michele ; Paterson, Kenneth ; Poettering, Bertram ; Stebila, Douglas . / ASICS : authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems. In: International Journal of Information Security. 2017 ; Vol. 16, No. 2. pp. 151-171.

BibTeX

@article{b49e00d23b854330a4771780b0610a38,
title = "ASICS: authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems",
abstract = "Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.",
author = "Colin Boyd and Cas Cremers and Michele Feltz and Kenneth Paterson and Bertram Poettering and Douglas Stebila",
note = "This is the journal version of a paper with the same title published at ESORICS 2013.",
year = "2017",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "151--171",
journal = "International Journal of Information Security",
issn = "1615-5262",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - ASICS

T2 - authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems

AU - Boyd, Colin

AU - Cremers, Cas

AU - Feltz, Michele

AU - Paterson, Kenneth

AU - Poettering, Bertram

AU - Stebila, Douglas

N1 - This is the journal version of a paper with the same title published at ESORICS 2013.

PY - 2017/4

Y1 - 2017/4

N2 - Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.

AB - Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.

U2 - 10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y

DO - 10.1007/s10207-015-0312-y

M3 - Article

VL - 16

SP - 151

EP - 171

JO - International Journal of Information Security

JF - International Journal of Information Security

SN - 1615-5262

IS - 2

ER -