"Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. / Ahn, David; Oliveros, Santiago.

2010.

Research output: Working paper

Unpublished

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"Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values. / Ahn, David; Oliveros, Santiago.

2010.

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

APA

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BibTeX

@techreport{b5a5f7caa4a94469a8cf903c9067d151,
title = "{"}Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values",
abstract = "Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any nite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more ecient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.",
author = "David Ahn and Santiago Oliveros",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

AU - Ahn, David

AU - Oliveros, Santiago

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any nite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more ecient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.

AB - Consider the problem of deciding a winner among three alternatives when voters have common values, but private information regarding the values of the alternatives. We compare approval voting with other scoring rules. For any nite electorate, the best equilibrium under approval voting is more ecient than either plurality rule or negative voting. If any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information in large elections, then approval voting must do so as well.

M3 - Working paper

BT - "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values

ER -