An Experimental Test of Career Concerns. / Koch, A K; Morgenstern, A; Raab, P.

Egham, 2005. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

An Experimental Test of Career Concerns. / Koch, A K; Morgenstern, A; Raab, P.

Egham, 2005. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Koch, AK, Morgenstern, A & Raab, P 2005 'An Experimental Test of Career Concerns' Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns., Egham. <http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/unte/249/>

APA

Koch, A. K., Morgenstern, A., & Raab, P. (2005). An Experimental Test of Career Concerns. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.). http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/unte/249/

Vancouver

Koch AK, Morgenstern A, Raab P. An Experimental Test of Career Concerns. Egham. 2005 Dec 17. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

Author

Koch, A K ; Morgenstern, A ; Raab, P. / An Experimental Test of Career Concerns. Egham, 2005. (Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.).

BibTeX

@techreport{574374e6285446b3bc70573604f2faf5,
title = "An Experimental Test of Career Concerns",
abstract = "Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way - which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on, and this explains the dearth of empirical studies. We provide experimental evidence that the signal jamming mechanism works in a laboratory setting. Moreover, subjects' beliefs fit remarkably well requirements imposed by the Bayesian equilibrium concept.",
keywords = "Incentives, Reputation, Career Concerns, Signal Jamming, Experiments",
author = "Koch, {A K} and A Morgenstern and P Raab",
year = "2005",
month = dec,
day = "17",
language = "English",
series = "Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - An Experimental Test of Career Concerns

AU - Koch, A K

AU - Morgenstern, A

AU - Raab, P

PY - 2005/12/17

Y1 - 2005/12/17

N2 - Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way - which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on, and this explains the dearth of empirical studies. We provide experimental evidence that the signal jamming mechanism works in a laboratory setting. Moreover, subjects' beliefs fit remarkably well requirements imposed by the Bayesian equilibrium concept.

AB - Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way - which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers' behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on, and this explains the dearth of empirical studies. We provide experimental evidence that the signal jamming mechanism works in a laboratory setting. Moreover, subjects' beliefs fit remarkably well requirements imposed by the Bayesian equilibrium concept.

KW - Incentives

KW - Reputation

KW - Career Concerns

KW - Signal Jamming

KW - Experiments

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Tournaments, individualized contracts, and career concerns.

BT - An Experimental Test of Career Concerns

CY - Egham

ER -