An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics. / Lim, Wooyoung; Neary, Philip.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100, 11.2016, p. 208–219.

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An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics. / Lim, Wooyoung; Neary, Philip.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100, 11.2016, p. 208–219.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Lim, Wooyoung ; Neary, Philip. / An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2016 ; Vol. 100. pp. 208–219.

BibTeX

@article{2856f6f92a954072b8b866477c25fd4e,
title = "An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics",
abstract = "This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large population coordination game in which two different groups have differing preferences over equilibria. We find that subject behaviour is highly consistent with the myopic best-response learning rule with deviations from this rule that are (i) dependent on the myopic best-response payoff but not on the deviation payoff, and (ii) directed in the sense of being group-dependent. We also find a time trend to deviations, with the magnitude tapering off as time progresses. This is in contrast to much of the theoretical literature that supposes a variety of other specifications of learning rules and both time-independent and payoff-dependent explanations for deviations.",
author = "Wooyoung Lim and Philip Neary",
year = "2016",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010",
language = "English",
volume = "100",
pages = "208–219",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics

AU - Lim, Wooyoung

AU - Neary, Philip

PY - 2016/11

Y1 - 2016/11

N2 - This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large population coordination game in which two different groups have differing preferences over equilibria. We find that subject behaviour is highly consistent with the myopic best-response learning rule with deviations from this rule that are (i) dependent on the myopic best-response payoff but not on the deviation payoff, and (ii) directed in the sense of being group-dependent. We also find a time trend to deviations, with the magnitude tapering off as time progresses. This is in contrast to much of the theoretical literature that supposes a variety of other specifications of learning rules and both time-independent and payoff-dependent explanations for deviations.

AB - This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large population coordination game in which two different groups have differing preferences over equilibria. We find that subject behaviour is highly consistent with the myopic best-response learning rule with deviations from this rule that are (i) dependent on the myopic best-response payoff but not on the deviation payoff, and (ii) directed in the sense of being group-dependent. We also find a time trend to deviations, with the magnitude tapering off as time progresses. This is in contrast to much of the theoretical literature that supposes a variety of other specifications of learning rules and both time-independent and payoff-dependent explanations for deviations.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010

M3 - Article

VL - 100

SP - 208

EP - 219

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -