Ambiguous act equilibria. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 71, No. 2, 03.2011, p. 246-260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Ambiguous act equilibria. / Bade, Sophie.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 71, No. 2, 03.2011, p. 246-260.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Bade, S 2011, 'Ambiguous act equilibria', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 246-260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006

APA

Bade, S. (2011). Ambiguous act equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), 246-260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006

Vancouver

Bade S. Ambiguous act equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 Mar;71(2):246-260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006

Author

Bade, Sophie. / Ambiguous act equilibria. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2011 ; Vol. 71, No. 2. pp. 246-260.

BibTeX

@article{93a3f4df5f48436797ebe69bb8bd2acc,
title = "Ambiguous act equilibria",
abstract = "A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies isused to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of \independent strategies{"} as well as of \common priors{"} are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially different predictions - even for the case with just two players.",
keywords = "Uncertainty Aversion, Nash Equilibrium, Ambiguity",
author = "Sophie Bade",
year = "2011",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006",
language = "English",
volume = "71",
pages = "246--260",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ambiguous act equilibria

AU - Bade, Sophie

PY - 2011/3

Y1 - 2011/3

N2 - A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies isused to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of \independent strategies" as well as of \common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially different predictions - even for the case with just two players.

AB - A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies isused to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of \independent strategies" as well as of \common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially different predictions - even for the case with just two players.

KW - Uncertainty Aversion, Nash Equilibrium, Ambiguity

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.006

M3 - Article

VL - 71

SP - 246

EP - 260

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 2

ER -