A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. / Engelmann, D; Blanco, M; Normann, H-T.

Egham, 2006.

Research output: Working paper

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A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. / Engelmann, D; Blanco, M; Normann, H-T.

Egham, 2006.

Research output: Working paper

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Engelmann D, Blanco M, Normann H-T. A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. Egham. 2006 Sep 19.

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BibTeX

@techreport{ebaf794fb23c4e4cb4baddb7fb62242c,
title = "A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences",
abstract = "We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality aversion, using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma and public good game) with the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test several hypotheses across games. Our data show that results from within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analysis. The inequality-aversion model has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level.",
keywords = "behavioral economics, experimental economics, inequality aversion, other-regarding preferences",
author = "D Engelmann and M Blanco and H-T Normann",
year = "2006",
month = sep,
day = "19",
language = "English",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences

AU - Engelmann, D

AU - Blanco, M

AU - Normann, H-T

PY - 2006/9/19

Y1 - 2006/9/19

N2 - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality aversion, using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma and public good game) with the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test several hypotheses across games. Our data show that results from within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analysis. The inequality-aversion model has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level.

AB - We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality aversion, using a within-subjects design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential prisoner's dilemma and public good game) with the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test several hypotheses across games. Our data show that results from within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analysis. The inequality-aversion model has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level.

KW - behavioral economics

KW - experimental economics

KW - inequality aversion

KW - other-regarding preferences

M3 - Working paper

BT - A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences

CY - Egham

ER -