A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. / Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Akram, Raja.

2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS). IEEE Computer Society, 2016. p. 1C3-1-1C3-9.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Published

Standard

A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. / Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Akram, Raja.

2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS). IEEE Computer Society, 2016. p. 1C3-1-1C3-9.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Harvard

Markantonakis, K & Akram, R 2016, A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. in 2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS). IEEE Computer Society, pp. 1C3-1-1C3-9. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322

APA

Markantonakis, K., & Akram, R. (2016). A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. In 2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS) (pp. 1C3-1-1C3-9). IEEE Computer Society. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322

Vancouver

Markantonakis K, Akram R. A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. In 2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS). IEEE Computer Society. 2016. p. 1C3-1-1C3-9 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322

Author

Markantonakis, Konstantinos ; Akram, Raja. / A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks. 2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS). IEEE Computer Society, 2016. pp. 1C3-1-1C3-9

BibTeX

@inproceedings{5f8304c100bb49118c7155628fd3eb85,
title = "A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks",
abstract = "Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in existing deployments is a collection of inter-connected avionics equipment supported by wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this simplifies the security management of the network. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless network -- also referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) -- brings a set of new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and security; even for a specific set of well-defined and non-critical tasks. The AWN has to ensure that it provides at a minimum the existing required levels of safety offered by the equivalent wired network. These challenges are underpinned by a necessity to boot the AWN to a secure and trusted state, before it can be used to bridge different parts of the IMA in an aircraft. In this paper, we discuss the security and trust challenges an AWN boot process might face, along with highlighting a potential solution. Finally, the paper evaluates the proposed validation solution that meets the stated security requirements, based on the security challenges discussed.",
author = "Konstantinos Markantonakis and Raja Akram",
year = "2016",
month = jun,
day = "9",
doi = "10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322",
language = "English",
pages = "1C3--1--1C3--9",
booktitle = "2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS)",
publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - A secure and trusted boot process for Avionics Wireless Networks

AU - Markantonakis, Konstantinos

AU - Akram, Raja

PY - 2016/6/9

Y1 - 2016/6/9

N2 - Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in existing deployments is a collection of inter-connected avionics equipment supported by wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this simplifies the security management of the network. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless network -- also referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) -- brings a set of new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and security; even for a specific set of well-defined and non-critical tasks. The AWN has to ensure that it provides at a minimum the existing required levels of safety offered by the equivalent wired network. These challenges are underpinned by a necessity to boot the AWN to a secure and trusted state, before it can be used to bridge different parts of the IMA in an aircraft. In this paper, we discuss the security and trust challenges an AWN boot process might face, along with highlighting a potential solution. Finally, the paper evaluates the proposed validation solution that meets the stated security requirements, based on the security challenges discussed.

AB - Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) in existing deployments is a collection of inter-connected avionics equipment supported by wired technology, with stringent reliability and safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly, then this simplifies the security management of the network. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless network -- also referred to as an Avionics Wireless Network (AWN) -- brings a set of new challenges related to assurance, reliability, and security; even for a specific set of well-defined and non-critical tasks. The AWN has to ensure that it provides at a minimum the existing required levels of safety offered by the equivalent wired network. These challenges are underpinned by a necessity to boot the AWN to a secure and trusted state, before it can be used to bridge different parts of the IMA in an aircraft. In this paper, we discuss the security and trust challenges an AWN boot process might face, along with highlighting a potential solution. Finally, the paper evaluates the proposed validation solution that meets the stated security requirements, based on the security challenges discussed.

U2 - 10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322

DO - 10.1109/ICNSURV.2016.7486322

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - 1C3-1-1C3-9

BT - 2016 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS)

PB - IEEE Computer Society

ER -