Aspect Perception and the Homeric Inhabitants of Hades

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I hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.
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ABSTRACT

Homeric epic contains many ambiguous images of the entity that inhabits Hades. In one way, Homer gives different names to this inhabitant: namely, νεκύς, ψυχή, and εἴδωλον. In another way, the ghost appears seemingly contradictory. In the *Nekyia*, the shades, at some moments, seem almost human and corporeal: they can drink, run, speak, and recognise the living by themselves. By contrast, at other moments, they are insubstantial, they screech like bats, and they cannot communicate with the living without drinking from a pool of blood. Scholars have suggested that these diverse descriptions are the product of compositional strata, metaphorical models, or poetic license. But few of these studies concentrate sufficiently on how the poet or characters try to make sense of the dead through these ambiguous presentations.

In this thesis, I propose that a phenomenological and psychological model, "aspect perception", can disambiguate these seemingly confusing and contradictory descriptions of the wraith. Coined by Ludwig Wittgenstein, aspect perception is the idea that properties of a stimulus inform our perception of the percept. Wittgenstein uses Jastrow's duck-rabbit image to show how the Gestalt's properties lead us to think that the picture is either of a duck or of a rabbit. Inspired by this study, my aim is to show that the ghost's characteristics impel both the poetic narrator and characters not only to form diverse conceptions of the wraith, but also to describe the shade inconsistently as human and inhuman. In order to demonstrate this, I argue that the inhabitant of Hades is an entity that has opposing qualities. It is a shade that can appear simultaneously corporeal and incorporeal, sentient and insentient. It is these properties, and ultimately this mode of perception, which account for these inconsistencies and ambiguities.

CONTENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS:

I use standard abbreviations for all ancient authors and works: see the list in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, and in Liddell, Scott, and Jones. All references made to the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* are abbreviated to *LfrgE.*

Abbreviations of Wittgenstein's works

BB *The Blue and Brown Books* [1933-35] Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.

LFM *Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939,* from the notes of R. G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies, ed. C. Diamond. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976.

LPP *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47,* notes by P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah and A. C. Jackson, ed. P. T. Geach (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1988).

LW I *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* [1948-9, German-English parallel text], volume 1, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.

LW II *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* [1949-51, German-English parallel text], volume 2, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Ny man, tr. C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

Ms *Wittgenstein's Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998–2000, manuscript.

NB *Notebooks 1914-16* [German-English parallel text], ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, rev. edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).

PI *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th edn, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

PPF *Philosophy of Psychology — A Fragment*, in L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th edn, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

RPP I *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. I. Ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.

RPP II *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Vol. II. Ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C. V. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.

TLP *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London and New York: Routledge, 1961.

INTRODUCTION

Homeric epic contains many diverse presentations of the ghost that goes to Hades. Consider, for example, the way that Homer presents death as a transition from the mortal world to the underworld. The proem of the *Iliad* describes Achilles sending many of the heroes' ἴφθιμοι ψυχαί to Hades. The ψυχαί of Patroclus and Hector also leave the mortal world and travel to the underworld; however, it is not always the ψυχαί who make this journey. In *Odyssey* 9.523-525, Odysseus threatens to send Polyphemus to Hades, deprived of his ψυχή and αἰών. In Theoclymenus' scene with the suitors (20.355f), the prophet sees the suitors' εἴδωλα going towards Erebus. In *Iliad* 7.131, Nestor suggests that it is the θυμός that leaves the limbs and transitions to the other world; and at the beginning of Agamemnon's *aristeia,* 11.52-55, the primary narrator says that it is the ἴφθιμοι κεφαλαί who travel to Hades.

In *Odyssey* 11, the descriptions of the inhabitants of Hades are also diverse. The ghosts, for example, appear as non-human entities: they approach Odysseus with shrill cries,[1] they float like physically-insubstantial shadows,[2] they lack cognitive abilities,[3] and they cannot communicate with him without drinking from a pool of blood.[4] And yet, at the same time, they appear humanlike. The ghosts of Elpenor and Achilles speak to Odysseus by themselves,[5] Achilles runs like his living self,[6] Minos can communicate with the dead, Orion is able to hunt, and Tityus, Tantalus, and Sisyphus receive torture.[7]

The tendency in recent scholarship has been to view these descriptive inconsistencies as the result of poetic licence or metaphorical models.[8] Cairns, for instance, suggests that the inconsistencies are characteristics of a metaphorical process: we give life-like properties (the

[1] *Od.* 11.42-43, 605.
[2] *Od.* 10.495, 208.
[3] Cf. *Od.* 10.493-495, 11.475-476.
[4] *Od.* 11.140-149.
[5] Cf. *Od.* 11.57, 472.
[6] *Od.* 11.538-540.
[7] Cf. *Od.* 11.568-600.
[8] Cf. Vermeule 1979: 29 and Cairns 2003: 65; Heath 2005; Cairns 2014.

known domain, the "source domain") to the insubstantial ψυχή (the unknown domain, the "target domain"). Cairns explains that the "insubstantial ψυχή" is the "official" conception. He argues that this notion is not sustained because we rely on a model of embodied beings to describe the wraith:[9]

> The passages in *Iliad* 23 and *Odyssey* 11 which emphasize the conception of the post-mortem survivor as an insubstantial ψυχή do create a dissonance with other passages in which the survivor has substantial corporeality; but this is a dissonance between a ψυχή that is supposed to be evanescent and one which possesses considerable materiality, not between ψυχή and something else. The 'official' conception of the survivor as an insubstantial ψυχή is not sustained, but this does not mean that it is not intended to be definitive. Any conception of personal survival after death will be vulnerable to the same inconsistency, because the only model of personhood that we possess is based on our experience of living, breathing, thinking, feeling, embodied human beings – the practice of personification has a logic of its own.

But this analysis of metaphorical and poetic devices fails to consider the role of the narrator in these scenes. Cairns' discussion presupposes that the inconsistent descriptions are characteristics of metaphorical mapping and not of the internal narrator's cognitive dissonance. Take, for example, the ambivalence about the wraith's substantiality in the *Nekyia*. It is not the case that the secondary narrator, Odysseus, is making a metaphorical translation when he describes the shades having materiality. On the contrary, when he is in Hades, Odysseus believes, momentarily, that the dead are substantial: he presumes that his

[9] Cairns 2014: §29. Many of Cairns' arguments in this article are repurposed from his 2003 review of Clarke's monograph. In this 2014 version, Cairns looks at the metaphoric value of the ψυχή and the θυμός in both Homer and Plato. On Platonic comments on Homer's ψυχή, see Plat. *Rep.*4.441b-d and *Phd.*94d-e. Also useful is Claus 1981.

mother can be physically embraced.[10] Odysseus *qua* narrator recounts his meetings with the dead by describing what he saw when he was in Hades. It follows then that the descriptions of the shades' physical actions are to be understood as literal in meaning. After all, the narrator is basing his descriptions of the dead on what he believed he witnessed at the time he was in the underworld. The fluctuation between the substantial and insubstantial ghost then needs to be understood as Odysseus' inability to fully come to terms with the state of the dead, not as an imperfect effort to describe an "official conception" of the immaterial wraith.[11]

Cairns also argues that many of the names for the ghost are metaphors for the ψυχή: "there is no reason to assume that, when the dead and Hades are described as νέκυες/νεκροί, given corporeal existence, depicted perceiving, conversing, and showing emotion, they are anything other than ψυχαί. They are, after all, εἴδωλα: very convincing εἴδωλα indeed."[12] In Cairns' view, the inconsistent descriptions of the "life-like" and "witless" dead are attributes of the ψυχή.

Cairns is right that these characteristics of the ghost are attributes of the ψυχή.[13] But the problem is that his analysis fails to consider the epistemological stance of the secondary focaliser. The names for the dead, νέκυες/νεκροί and εἴδωλα, appear exclusively in character-descriptions of the inhabitant of Hades.[14] These may be metaphorical; but it is not clear that the ψυχή is the target domain of these modes of expression. Consider, for instance, Achilles' reaction to the ghost of Patroclus' disappearance in *Iliad* 23.103-104[a] (ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι / ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον). The combination of ψυχή and εἴδωλον suggests that the two conceptions are combined to describe the inhabitant. Notice that Achilles uses

[10] Cf. *Od*. 11.204-208.
[11] On the general topic of immateriality, see Thalberg 1983: 105-113. On immateriality and the dead in Homer see Renehan 1980: 105-138.
[12] Cairns 2014 §28 = 2003: 63.
[13] Cf. *Il*. 23.65f ~ 99-101, 103-107; *Od*. 11.37-43, 141-145.
[14] Cf. *Il*. 15.250; *Od*. 10.518, 526, 536, 11.83, 214, 12. 383; *LfrgE* s.v νέκυς BII.

the noun ψυχή to describe the dweller in Hades. Achilles' ability to use this noun suggests that the ψυχή is not the image in the "target domain," as Cairns' analysis suggests, but the image in the "source domain." In other words, the ψυχή is one conception that the internal focaliser uses to make sense of the entity that exists in Hades. What Cairns' analysis has then failed to consider is how this metaphorical model complements the focalisers' epistemologically distinct attitudes to the dead in Homeric epic.

The purpose of this thesis is to find a model that disambiguates the contradictory presentations of the wraith and that utilises the metaphorical and narratological devices in Homer's presentation of Hades. In so doing, I argue that these metaphors and conflicting descriptions of the ghosts are exercises of aspect perception: the mode of perception in which an observer sees a likeness between two objects by examining their properties. In this way, I suggest that the ambiguities of the wraith emerge, not because of issues of composition or poetic difficulties, but because the ghost, as an incorporeal image of the embodied living person, has a combination of life-like and deficient characteristics. We shall see that the incorporeal ghost has, mysteriously, the stuff of bodily strength. The shades have both sentience and insentience: they fly like a wisp of air and somehow simultaneously express emotions as the living person might. In character speeches,[15] we shall see that the post-mortem survivor that journeys to Hades has the same "I" as the embodied person.

I propose that these properties induce the primary narrator, secondary narrator, and internal focalisers to have many diverse conceptions of the ghost's state of being. In one way, these traits impel these focalisers to rely on various conceptual metaphors, εἴδωλον, corpse, ψυχή, or θυμός, to describe the entity that resides in Hades. In another way, I posit that the narrator of the *Nekyia* describes the inhabitants contradictorily as lively and witless, substantial and insubstantial entities, because his focalisation fluctuates between these

[15] For a more general study on speech presentations in Homer, see Beck 2012.

opposing characteristics of the shade. This aspect perception model, I argue, reveals epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' presentations of the wraith. The former, we shall see, fluctuates between describing the inhabitant as a wraith or as a corporeal being after observing various aspects of the ghost's character. The latter, by contrast, rely on more diverse imagery, such as the metaphors εἴδωλον, ψυχή, θυμός, and corpse, once they have recognised one of the wraith's traits.

As summarised above, scholars have sought to explain away the inconsistent descriptions of the dead by arguing that different conceptions belong to different strata of composition. This is the analyst argument. Aristarchus, Aristophanes, and Zenodotus athetized various descriptions of the dead as later additions because these descriptions seemed to contradict other forms of Homeric accounts.[16] Sourvinou-Inwood suggests that Homeric epic contains "two strands of beliefs" from different historical periods which account for why the dead appear sometimes as life-like and at other times witless.[17] Tsagarakis, similarly, proposed that the reason the dead appear inconsistently as corporeal and incorporeal is because the *Nekyia* contains different historical attitudes to burial rites, inhumation and cremation.[18]

Clarke, however, suggests that these seemingly inconsistent descriptions of the dead were not an amalgam of various cultural or historical attitudes to the afterlife, as Sourvinou-Inwood suggests. Instead, he proposed that these diverse presentations of the wraith were integral to the way in which we understand Homer's conception of Hades.[19] Cairns tries to advance Clarke's approach by applying cognitive metaphor theory to the study of the dead. He argues that, while there is much to be admired in Clarke's thesis, he does not reap the

[16] Cf. Schol. bT ad *Il.*1.3, schol. A ad *Il.* 1.4; Petzl (1969): pt i. passim.
[17] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 78-83.
[18] Tsagarakis 2000: 110-117.
[19] See: Clarke 1999: 208, 211. For a more detailed summary of Clarke's argument and approach, see pages 41-43.

lessons of metaphor theory. He is aware of the approach,[20] Cairns says, but he does not "deal with the role of metaphor in concept-formation in general".[21] One of Clarke's arguments is that there are conflicting conceptions of the dweller in Hades: it is sometimes a corpse, sometimes a ψυχή, and sometimes an εἴδωλον.[22] Cairns suggests, however, that such conceptions are not conflicting: rather, the application of metaphor theory indicates that these images are all designed to make sense of the ψυχή.

There is merit to Cairns' approach: cognitive metaphor theory is integral to the way in which we make sense of abstract objects.[23] The issue, however, is that conceptual metaphors do not preclude Homer from presenting conflicting conceptions of the ghost. On the contrary, cognitive metaphors have the potential to present "rival conceptions"[24] of a subject in the target domain. Consider the introduction to the 1956-1958 live-action *Superman* TV series:[25] two people in distress look up to the sky to see a flying object. The woman shouts "it's a bird," and the man next to her says "it's a plane!" Here the onlookers are using two metaphors to describe the subject in the target domain (Superman): the bird and the plane. The two conceptions are incompatible (a bird is not the same as an aeroplane), and so these metaphors conflict with one another in an effort to describe the target image. Based on this example, we cannot say, as Cairns does, that cognitive metaphors prevent us from seeing two rival conceptions of a subject in the target domain.

[20] See Clarke 1999: 106-109, 109 n. 122.
[21] Cairns 2003: 42, esp. 65.
[22] Clarke 1999: 207-208, 211.
[23] On wider applications of cognitive metaphor theory in Homer, see Horn (2015) and Zanker 2019.
[24] Cairns 2003: 64.

[25] See "'50s Adventures of Superman - Intro." *YouTube*, YouTube, 24 Jan. 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2l4bz1FT8U.

This brief and rather trivial example already indicates a possible compromise between Clarke's and Cairns' approaches. Some of the descriptions of the dead may be metaphorical, as Cairns suggests; but these metaphors signify that there are contradictory conceptions of the dweller in Hades, as Clarke proposes. In fact, in the example above, the bystanders make these metaphors and various conceptions by utilising our proposed model, aspect perception. After all, these two people reach for the images "bird" and "plane" once they notice a property of the silhouetted figure in the sky: the quality of flight.

My original contribution therefore is to advance Cairns' and Clarke's approaches by applying this aspect perception model to the study of the dead in Homeric epic. I suggest that this perceptual phenomenon is capable of explaining how these various conceptions of the dead appear in Homeric epic and how the primary and secondary narrators utilise cognitive metaphors when describing the shade. Clarke's analysis only goes so far in showing us that the Homeric dead, particularly in the *Nekyia*, are highly complex, ambiguous, and indeterminate. My aim is to go a step further than Clarke. I argue that these diverse conceptions emerge because the incorporeal wraith has certain characteristics of the living person. Aspect perception induces the primary and secondary focalisers to recognise these properties and, consequently, to perceive the shades differently. In short, my analysis goes further than Clarke's because I identify the model of perception that allows these different images of the dead to come to the fore, while at the same time developing Cairns' metaphorical approach in two significant ways.

First, Cairns' analysis of metaphor theory does not sufficiently explain how the primary and secondary narrator are able to map various metaphors to the ψυχή in the target domain. By applying aspect perception to the analysis of the representation of the dead, we will see how the properties of the ghost enable focalisers to make metaphorical mappings. In addition, the

aspect perception model will allow us to see that focalisers use contradictory metaphors of the dead by examining different characteristics of the shade.

Second, Cairns' metaphorical model, as I state above, is problematic because it fails to take into account the epistemological values of the focalisers. The phenomenological model I will employ will advance Cairns' approach since this mode of perception will make explicit the differences between primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' views of the dead.

It is reasonable to ask: "what is the significance of examining the contradictory descriptions of the dead?" We might answer that any discussion of the Homeric dead will inform the way in which we make sense of Homeric epic as a whole. For instance, the contradictory presentations of the shade have sparked wider theories about how the epics were composed, about Homer's ontological attitudes, and about the cognitive linguistic devices used in Homeric world-building. Thus Denys Page, in *The Homeric Odyssey,* used the diverse conceptions of the dead as evidence for distinct compositional strata preserved in Homeric epic;[26] Stocking and Clarke have suggested that the imagery of the dead explicates Homer's conception of selfhood;[27] while Cairns uses the imagery of the Homeric dead as one example of how Homer utilises cognitive metaphors in the epics. [28]

But the specific significance of this thesis' examination of the dead is twofold. First, the study will rebut a common analyst position: namely that the dead are incoherent because the poem is made up of diverse compositional strands. We shall see that, regardless of whether we accept the analyst hypothesis, the poet(s) try to present a coherent presentation of the shades by utilising aspect perception. This discussion will thereby seek to settle a long-standing technical problem of how to interpret the confusing descriptions of the shades.

[26] Page 1955: 21-25. Cf. Combellack 1956.
[27] See Clarke 1999: 157-158; Stocking 2007: 61, 67.
[28] See Cairns 2003 and 2014.

Moreover, it will give us more reason to look for coherent meaning in the Homeric texts without needing to be concerned by issues of composition or authenticity.

Second, the study will show that we need to be conscious of the epistemological distinctions between primary narrators and secondary focalisers when examining seeming problems in Homeric epic. This study, in other words, will help us to appreciate the different degrees of knowledge that are available to the primary narrators and secondary focalisers.

Aspect Perception: its uses and its literary applications

A summary of Wittgenstein's model

Aspect perception (also referred to as seeing-as) can broadly be understood as the ability to see something as something else. Ludwig Wittgenstein coined the term "seeing-as"; it was a perceptual phenomenon that dominated most of his philosophical discussions.[29] The first example he draws our attention to in his *Philosophy of Psychology Fragments* is our ability to look at a face and see it as someone else.[30] For example (this is my own example), I might look at a photo of a boy with dark hair and oval glasses and think that it is a picture of Harry Potter. Wittgenstein's most famous example of aspect perception is Jastrow's duck-rabbit image: we can see it either as a rabbit or as a duck.[31]



[29] Cf. TLP 5.5423; NB 9.11.14; BB 162-79; PI II 193-22 PPF §113 - §226; RPP I & II *passim;* LW I *passim;* LW II 12-17.

[30] PPF §113.
[31] PPF §118.

The image of the duck-rabbit does not change, and yet we see it differently. Wittgenstein calls this experience "noticing an aspect."[32] Aspect perception comprises two actions: noticing an aspect and making and internal relation. The way we see an aspect, he tells us, is by making an internal relation.[33] That is to say, we notice an aspect when we recognise an apparent similarity between one object and another.[34] For example, when I see a poster of a boy and perceive it as Harry Potter it may be because I notice apparent similarities between the two children: that they both have long dark hair and oval glasses.[35]

There are two types of aspect perception: continuous seeing-as, and aspect dawning. The former refers to an ability to see the object in just one way. Thus, when we see Jastrow's duck-rabbit, we may only see the picture as a rabbit and nothing else.[36] Aspect dawning, or the "change of aspect", by contrast, refers to the moment that a person sees the image as one thing and then as another.[37] We might, for instance, look at the duck-rabbit image, see it at first as a rabbit, and then as a duck.

There are also two types of aspects: conceptual and optical.[38] The first is an interpretation that is based on knowledge, not on our ability to recognise the properties of an image. Glock states that: "at one end lie 'conceptual' aspects like those of the duck-rabbit,

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[32] Cf. PPF §113, LW I §493.

[33] Ms 138, p. 5a.

[34] Thus, there is an *internal relation* between the pentagram and the human hand when Wittgenstein says in LFM, (p. 73) that "the hand has the same number of strokes as the pentagram has points". Mácha (2015: 12) suggests that "internal" means something close to "apparent". Wittgenstein seems to suggest that internal relations are improper, when he contrasts them what he calls "proper" external relations, see TLP 4.122. See also PPF §247; RPP I §§27, 169; RPP II §§544-5; LW I §§451, 488, 612.

[35] Cf. Mácha (2015: 90) who suggests the resemblance between two faces is an internal relation; though this is more to do with the similar facial shapes than the facial features.

[36] PPF §118. Mulhall (1990: 20.) suggests that continuous aspect perception was Wittgenstein's main interest. Baz (2020: 107) summarises one theory in which continuous aspect perception is said to be the first "state" of perception.

[37] This type of perception is very similar to what Gestalt psychologists commonly refer to as multistable perception, see Schwartz *et al* 2012: 896-905. See also Hans Keller 1951: 401.

[38] On optical aspects, see RPP I 970. On conceptual, see RPP II 509.

which cannot be expressed solely by pointing to parts of the picture-object, but require possession of the relevant concepts."[39] In other words, we can only say that Jastrow's picture is either of a duck or of a rabbit based on our knowledge and mental images of those animals and their shapes.

Optical aspects are interpretations that we get by looking at the parts of a picture. Take Wittgenstein's double cross example:[40]



We may either see it as "a white cross on a black background" or "as a black cross on a white background" depending on the property of the picture we first notice, the black tone or the white tone.[41]

Wittgenstein's aspect perception is both a state of seeing and an act of interpretation. On the one hand, Wittgenstein suggests that seeing is a state that has a duration: a beginning, a middle, and an end.[42] Aspect dawning is fundamentally similar to seeing: there is only so long that we notice the duck-rabbit as a duck before changing aspect and seeing it as a rabbit. On the other hand, Wittgenstein tells us that when we make an interpretation, we may form hypotheses which prove false.[43] By this definition, noticing an aspect is also an act of interpretation. Consider Wittgenstein's face paradigm.[44] We can see a stranger's face as the

[39] Glock 1996: 38.
[40] Cf. PPF §212.
[41] Cf. PPF §212-215.
[42] CF. PPF §248.
[43] PPF §249.
[44] PPF §143.

face of a friend, but we realise that this noticing of an aspect is false: the person I thought was my friend was in fact just a stranger.[45]

Wittgenstein argues that there is a connection between aspect perception and experiencing the meaning of a word.[46] He does this by drawing a comparison between a person who is aspect-blind (a person who is unable to see a change of aspect) and the person who has meaning-blindness (someone who may know that a word has multiple meanings, but will never be able to tell if a word has one meaning or another when he hears the word in isolation).[47] Thus, someone who is aspect-blind cannot switch between perceiving Jastrow's picture as a duck and then as a rabbit. He might appreciate why someone sees the image as a rabbit, but cannot actually see that for himself. A person who has meaning-blindness knows that a word has been used in a certain way, but still thinks that it is strange that someone might use it in that context. Schroeder suggests that "Such a person would feel about language in roughly the way we feel about recently learnt code words".[48] Consider Wittgenstein's example in PPF §263:

> Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; "tower" means bank. I tell him "Now go to the tower!" – he understands me and acts accordingly, but he feels the word "tower" to be strange in this use; it has not yet 'absorbed' the meaning.

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[45] On further similarities between seeing-as and sight, see PPF §248; RPP I §8, 1025; RPP II §§388, 547. On other links between seeing as and interpretation, see PPF §254; RPP I §§27, 169; RPP II §544-5; LW I §451, 488, 612.

[46] Cf. PPF §261.

[47] Cf. RPP I §§202, 232, 239, 242, 247, 250.

[48] Schroeder 2010: 370.

By contrast, the person who can experience the meaning of a word can understand its multiple uses when it is said in isolation. Wittgenstein informs us that a person who hears the word "till" can hear it in any of its meanings: as a noun (a checkout), as a conjunction (until), and as a verb (the act of raising crops).[49] Similarly, the person who hears the word "march" can hear it as an imperative verb, or as a day of the month.[50]

We can already gauge from this discussion why aspect perception is useful for our purposes. The meanings of words and the objects of seeing-as are precisely the types of representation with which this thesis is concerned. In chapter two, for instance, we examine the meanings of the language that the primary narrator uses to present the shade. In chapters three and four, we focus on how the living interact with the dead in a dream and in the underworld. We can use this model to show how the living directly engage with the shades. In short, Wittgenstein's model applies not only to visual images but also language; it is an interdisciplinary model.

Aspect perception, definition and applicability to the thesis argument

This thesis is interested in how the ghosts in Hades can be seen as substantial, as insubstantial, as phantom images, and as the dead men themselves. The main argument of this thesis is that the primary and secondary focalisers have diverse conceptions of the ψυχή because they notice differing characteristics of the shade. This means that seeing-as can work as a model for our argument.[51] After all, aspect perception concentrates on how we see objects differently based on their properties. Köhler argued that we perceive stimuli as organised wholes.[52] Wittgenstein agreed with this, but argued that this organisation does not

[49] PPF ii §8.
[50] Cf. PPF §271.
[51] Cf. LW I 510 and RPP I 961. See also Schroeder 2010: 360. Cf. PPF §247, §254.
[52] Cf. Köhler 1947: chapter 5.

solve the puzzle of seeing an object as something else.[53] He clarifies this in the first volume of his *Last Writings*:[54]

> You *notice* the organisation of an object (an object of perception). Or rather: you *notice* something about its organisation; a feature of this organisation.

When we, for example, look at a triangle with a line at the top ( ), we can see the shape as a whole, but this cannot explain why we might see the shape as a "standing triangle" or as a "hanging triangle".[55] Wittgenstein's example emphasises that we create concept-laden perceptions of aspects once we have noticed a feature of the object we are seeing.[56] For example, I might look more closely at the line on the triangle and be reminded of clothes hangers. This concept in turn makes me think that the triangle is hanging. On the other hand, I might look at it and be reminded of a church spire and think that the triangle is standing up. Both of these conceptions have been gleaned from my ability to see a quality of the shape.

Wittgenstein, however, reminds us that conceptual aspects cannot always be noticed from the features of certain stimuli. It is for instance not possible to take a "bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has fallen over," by looking at its properties.[57] On the contrary, seeing this aspect requires imagination.[58] However, I would argue that, for the most part, noticing a conceptual aspect requires noticing properties of the stimulus. Wittgenstein argues that we cannot say that Jastrow's picture is of a duck simply by pointing at parts of the image, unlike the double cross.[59] This is where I disagree: as a general rule, we notice

[53] LPP 102.
[54] LW I 510.
[55] LPP 102.
[56] Cf. Wollheim 1980: 220; Schroeder 2010:360; Fodor 2014: 561 on the relations between perception and concepts.
[57] PPF §217.
[58] PPF §217. Cf. PPF §114.
[59] PPF §215.

conceptual aspects by recognising a stimulus' properties or features: namely not just its shape, but also its expressions, traits, and behaviours. For example, I may say that Jastrow's picture is of a rabbit by telling someone to look at the indent just above the neck. I might then explain that that is the rabbit's mouth. On the other hand, I might see the duck aspect by recognising that the so-called top ear is larger than the other. I then see that feature as a beak, not as an ear. This property leads me to finally notice Jastrow's duck aspect. The "conceptual aspects" or interpretations we made have depended on our ability to notice different features of the object. Consider also Wittgenstein's face example:[60]

> I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I *see* that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience "noticing an aspect".

This ability to "notice an aspect" depends on our ability to select the properties of the face. For example, the other day, I went to my local opticians and saw a poster of a woman smiling. I recognised that the woman had dyed red hair and oval glasses. When I recognised these features, I thought momentarily that it was my friend Cate (who at that time did have red hair, and a similar pair of oval glasses). My ability to recognise these facial features led me to "notice an aspect": the image is of Cate. However, when I noticed that that woman had different coloured eyes from my friend, I had a change of aspect: "that's not Cate, that's someone else." Another example of this so-called "property noticing" in aspect perception is evident when we examine the "seeing dashes as a face" in Wittgenstein's *Brown Book*.[61] To illustrate, I see a series of dotted lines and I say "that's a face." Someone might ask: "why do you think that?" I explain: "the dots at the bottom form a crescent shape, they look like a

[60] PPF §113.

[61] BB II §16 p. 164.

smiling mouth, the two dots above that are the eyes." I can rely on my knowledge of faces, and thereby notice a "conceptual aspect", by looking at the layout of the dashes and pointing to a particular pattern. Jastrow's duck-rabbit, the double cross, and the dashes all have certain properties that allow us to notice aspects and to see the stimuli as one thing or as another. The aim of this thesis is to show how properties of the ghost induce the focalisers to describe the dead as one thing or as another. Therefore, I restrict my analysis of aspect perception to objects whose properties allow us to see them as one thing and/or as another.

In this thesis, I intend to apply aspect perception to the interpretation of mental images. I argue that characters, both the living and ghosts, have different conceptions or understandings of the ψυχαί because they are working from a mental image in which the shade has characteristics of the living person and from a schema in which the incoming resident in Hades has the same selfhood as the embodied person. Wittgenstein does not "want to say that an aspect is a mental image. Rather, that 'seeing an aspect' and 'imaging something' are related concepts."[62] However, I would argue that the two are so closely related that we are entitled to label the interpretation of mental images as an exercise of seeing-as. Consider Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing-as in geometrical shapes:[63]

> Take as an example the aspects of a triangle. This triangle
>
> 
>
> can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer,

[62] RPP II §543. See also PPF §254.
[63] PPF § 162.

> as an overturned object which is meant, for example, to stand on the shorter side of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, and as various other things.

We can mentally picture this shape just as easily as we can see it.[64] No matter whether we imagine or see this triangle, we come out making similar interpretations. If I imagine this triangle, and I have to describe it to someone, I would switch descriptions in the same way I might change aspect when describing the shape. Thus, I might say that this shape I am imagining looks like a mountain, a wedge, an arrow or pointer. Imaging and aspect perception are both subject to will.[65] Noticing an aspect is an experience where we see differently an object that has not changed. Likewise, the shape which we have imagined does not change, we can still see the triangular shape the same way. However, each time we attempt to describe it, the mental image is different. Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the illustration of a cube:[66]



> One could imagine the illustration appearing in several places in a book, a textbook for instance. In the accompanying text, something different is in question every time: here a glass cube, there an upturned open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the interpretation of the illustration. But we can also *see* the illustration now as one thing, now as another. a So we interpret it, and *see* it as we *interpret* it.

[64] Cf. PI §141. See also §§ 261, 366, 386.
[65] Cf. RPP II §80 ~ §545.
[66] PPF §116.

But we do not just have to look at the illustration in the textbook to interpret it as one thing and then as another. We can easily imagine the cube shape and provide different interpretations of what it might be when I describe my mental image to someone: I can (metaphorically) *see* it *as* an upturned box and as a glass cube. Seeing-as seems to be the basis for understanding more abstract concepts. Consider Lakoff and Johnson's metaphorical principle:[67]

> UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING; IDEAS ARE LIGHT-SOURCES; DISCOURSE IS A LIGHT-MEDIUM

We express our ability to understand information by drawing from the source domain of sight. This means that the experience of meaning and the imaging of objects are understood as a kind of seeing-as. Take this rather trivial example from the *Free Dictionary*:[68]

> Growing up, whenever my mom talked about my cousin being in the Navy Seals, I always *saw* him *as* a literal seal wearing a military uniform.

The boy expresses his understanding of his mother's description as a seeing-as. Seeing-as is a model for understanding the interpretation of language. For instance, I might use Wittgenstein's own example about the multiple meanings of the expression "right turn".[69] I *see* it either *as* an instruction to turn in a certain direction or I *see* it *as* an instruction to turn in any direction "right, turn!". This means that Wittgenstein's seeing-as can be the fundamental basis to understand not just visual objects, but also mental and linguistic phenomena. This gives us the justification to label seeing-as as an interpretation of schema

[67] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 85.
[68] See "see as (something)." *Farlex Dictionary of Idioms.* 2015.
[69] Cf. PI §506.

and information. Let us restructure some of Wittgenstein's examples of seeing-as to help explain how we notice aspects or meanings from schemata. When we remember the word "march" and "till", we can still alternate between their meanings. We can also appreciate the act of noticing aspects from schemata when we examine Wittgenstein's examples of the language-game: "Giving orders, and acting on them." [70] We experience the meaning of these words, or notice their aspects, from schemata. I might act on an order to tell the truth. This order is a cognitive script: I have always been instructed to tell the truth. But each time, my understanding of this script can change: I might *see* this simple order *as* an instruction to make confessions of my wrongdoings, or I *see* it *as* an instruction to snitch on others. Imagine, also, a student, who studies politics and sees on the whiteboard the instruction: write an essay on western democracy and labour unions. The student remembers this instruction and has a mental image of it when he sits down and starts writing the paper. However, he has various experiences of the paper's meaning: he (metaphorically) *sees* the paper's topic differently each time he remembers the instruction. He at first thinks that the essay should be about Margret Thatcher and the coal miner unions. He then changes and thinks that it is about the electoral system in America and the Illinois labour unions.

Another core part of our argument is that characters make diverse metaphoric constructions to describe the dead because the shade has some characteristics of the living, and some of the incorporeal wraith. I propose that aspect perception is the reason why these metaphors come to the fore. In Chapter Two, I will suggest that the secondary focalisers use θυμός, εἴδωλον, and corpse as conceptual metaphors to describe the wraith that appears, in some sense, like the living person, but, in another sense, completely insentient and immaterial. I suggest that the ability to construct metaphors is an ability to "notice aspects" of the ψυχή.

[70] PI §23.

Scholars have examined the similarities between the reception of the metaphor and the use of seeing-as.[71] This is an analytic philosophical approach to the study of metaphor. However, Lakoff and Johnson, who founded conceptual metaphor theory, have since established that metaphors are conceptual modes of expression: they are essential means to describe everyday concepts and activities.[72] When we construct metaphors, we create maps: we use our knowledge of known phenomena (the source domain) to describe abstract concepts, physical sensations, or salient events (the target domain). Thus, with the metaphor THE MIND IS A MACHINE, we use our knowledge of machines (the source domain) to understand how the mind functions (the target domain). Cognitive linguists have attempted to explain what motivates such metaphoric mappings to be created. Lakoff, Johnson and Grady have proposed that "experiential motivations" are the basis for metaphoric constructions.[73] However, Grady since mentions that such experimental motivations cannot explain how we can map the concept of thieves onto the target death in the metaphor DEATH IS A THIEF.[74] Likewise he criticises that we cannot use our own experiences to motivate the creation of the metaphor ACHILLES IS A LION or BRAVE PEOPLE ARE LIONS.[75]

I argue that aspect perception is essential for the construction of conceptual metaphors. I suggest that an internal relation is the essence of mapping. Consider, for example, the metaphor MAN IS WOLF. We use our understanding of the animals (the source domain) – their traits, their habits of survival – to understand the traits of the man in the target domain. But this mapping presupposes that there is an internal relation, an apparent

[71] Cf. Hester 1966, 1967; Ricoeur 1977: 245-254; Davidson 1978: 46-47; Taylor 1989; Kemp 1991; Agam-Segal 2014: 49; Mácha 2015: 187-190. See also Johnson (1981) for a comprehensive overview of the history of classic metaphor theory and its relationship to philosophy. On metaphor and phenomenology more generally, see Yoos 1971 and MacCormac 1982.
[72] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 18-20. On the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphor, see: Lakoff and Kövecses 1987; Gibbs and Steen 1999; Gibbs 2008; Kövecses 2010; Mácha 2016: 93-115, 2019: 2247-2286. See Zanker (2019: 61-165) on conceptual metaphor in Homer.
[73] Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 19, Grady 1997.
[74] Grady 2007: 320.
[75] Grady 2007: 324.

similarity between both the man and the wolf in order for the metaphor to be effective: both must be predators, both survive best in social groups, and both can be aggressive. These internal relations enable us to use the animal as a source to make sense of the target.

Conceptual Blending has since been seen as a model that can explain the meanings of metaphoric constructions.[76] Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, for instance, draw our attention to the metaphor THE SURGEON IS A BUTCHER.[77] The metaphor usually means that the surgeon is bad at his job. By conceptually blending, we are combining two incompatible images to create a new conceptualisation. Thus, in the blend, we project the butchers' sloppy actions onto the fastidious surgeon and thus get the meaning of the metaphor.

However, aspect perception is at the heart of this mapping scheme. Before we can make this blend, we need to see an internal relation, an apparent similarity between the butcher and the surgeon: they both cut bodies, and they dissect and remove parts of the body. The internal relation in aspect perception seems cognate to the generic space in blending theory: both describe what the source and the target domain have in common. However, in most recent studies, the generic space in blending is considered an artifact of mapping.[78] Brandt and Brandt note: "In the case of animal metaphors (like: "Achilles is a lion") the shared structure would be extremely meager; the 'generic' space would contain something like the following: Some agent... The claim to such meager spaces demonstrates how artificial a construct it is."[79] Wittgenstein's internal relation, by contrast, works as a better mapping construct because it highlights more specific characteristics of the source and target: they are both aggressive, they are predators, they are both fearless. In other words, the internal relation helps us to see apparent similarities between the images in the source and

[76] Cf. Fauconnier and Turner 2002. See also Pagán Cánovas 2011; Zanker 2019: 14-18.
[77] Grady, Oakley, and Coulson 1999. Cf. Zanker 2019: 16.
[78] See Oakley and Pascual 2017: 438 §26.8.
[79] Brandt and Brandt 2005: 247 n 26.

target domain, not just artificial ones. For this reason, aspect perception is indeed useful as a mapping device.

Consider also Jastrow's duck-rabbit image. Wittgenstein reminds us that, when we see the image, we rely on our knowledge of the shapes of rabbits and/or ducks to help us notice either aspect. Here we provide an internal relation: we know that the shape of the figure in the picture is apparently similar to a duck and or a rabbit. From this, we provide a conceptual map. We have relied on our knowledge of rabbits and ducks (the source domain, the known domain) to understand the target domain, Jastrow's picture. In other words, reporting and noticing an aspect involve making metaphoric maps and constructions respectively. Take this example from Kemp:[80]

> A child, reclined on a grassy bank, who says of a passing cloud that it is a bird, is not making a metaphor; he is merely exercising his capacity for aspect perception.

When we apply cognitive metaphor analysis to this example, we see the child is noticing an aspect and making a metaphorical construction. It is not possible to separate seeing an ambiguous figure as something else from making a metaphoric construction. On the one hand, the child is familiar with the shape of birds and is able to notice an aspect in the cloud, much like the person who notices the duck and rabbit aspects by knowing the shapes of the animals. On the other hand, the child's description is entirely metaphorical. The child presumably knows that there is a difference between a black bird and a fluffy cloud. When the child says that the cloud is a bird, he knows that it is not an animal but something which resembles an animal.[81] By noticing the bird aspect, the child is making a metaphorical translation: he gives bird-like properties (the source domain) to the cloud (the target domain).

[80] Kemp 1991: 86.
[81] Cf. PPF §235.

This suggests that we will use metaphoric constructions when we report noticing aspects. Consider, for example, Jastrow's duck-rabbit image. When we look at this drawing, we know that it is not literally a rabbit (which has fur) or a duck (which has a yellow beak). When we notice an aspect, what we mean is "that photo *looks like* a rabbit." However, when we report this aspect, we use the metaphorical construction "it is a rabbit." We rely on our knowledge of rabbits' shapes (the source domain) to make sense of the image in front of us (the target domain).[82]

This process of metaphoric mapping is a process of aspect perception. Seeing-as, as we have defined it, involves noticing properties of a stimulus and foregrounding it over others. Thus, for example, when we look at the double cross, we suggest that the white is the foreground of the shape and put the other tone into the background. This is the same process that we use when making metaphoric mappings. Metaphor involves a *selection* from the many available properties of a subject in the source or target domain in just the same way that noticing an aspect can involve selecting properties of the stimulus over others. Consider Kövecses' list of PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS metaphors:[83]

PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS

That man was a *brute*, he spent the little he earned on drink.

You are putting the men down, and they don't like it; they think you are being a *bitch*.

. . . a bunch of *fat cats* with fast cars and too many cigars.

All I could hear was the producer screaming, "What the hell does the silly *cow* think she is doing?"

I've had my eye on her. Stupid *cow*, she thinks I don't know what goes on.

[82] Cf. PPF §216.
[83] Kövecses 2010: 153.

He is a complete *pig* to the women in his life.

Look at the things that have been done by these *swine*.

Tell me what you did with the money, you *swine*.

The *vermin* are the people who rob old women in the street and break into houses.

It is important to notice that these conceptual metaphors emerge because the speaker highlights, or foregrounds, the subject's behaviour to use the animal metaphor. The producer who calls the woman a "silly cow" does so once he recognises and pays attention to a feature of her behaviour: her conduct is inappropriate. Likewise, with the example "I've had my eye on her. Stupid *cow*, she thinks I don't know what goes on", the metaphorical expression occurs because the speaker has noticed a feature of the woman's character: that her awareness is lacking. This process of metaphorical mapping occurs from our ability to exercise aspect perception. That is to say, the writer or speaker manages to make these metaphorical constructions by making an internal relation: he first observes how the characteristics of the subject in the target domain are similar to that of an animal. Cows are for instance considered unintelligent, swine untrustworthy and greedy, and vermin dirty.

Aspect perception and the dead in Homer

There are noticeable parallels between the objects of aspect perception and the contradictory presentations of the dead. Wittgenstein tells us that we notice an aspect when we see, for instance, a likeness between two faces. Achilles, after he wakes up from the dream, notices how the ghost he met was strikingly like the dead man himself (ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει γοόωσά τε μυρομένη τε, / καί μοι ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ.).[84] This means, by Wittgenstein's understanding, that Achilles notices aspects of the shade.

[84] *Il*. 23.106-107.

The dead can switch between talking about themselves, at one moment, as a ghost, and at another moment, as a corpse.[85] Likewise, in the *Nekyia*, Odysseus presents the dead at one moment as life-like and substantial and at the next insubstantial and witless. This alteration seems similar to aspect-dawning: we change our views of what the dead are in just the same way as we switch between thinking Jastrow's picture is of a duck and of a rabbit. In addition, there is a similarity between the observer who reports seeing an aspect and the primary and secondary focalisers who use the metaphors to describe the residents in Hades. For example, we suggested that the bystanders notice the "bird" and "plane" aspects and use these as metaphors to describe Superman flying away. Similarly, when the ghost of Anticleia flies away, Odysseus wonders if what he sees is his mother or an εἴδωλον.[86]

There are also similarities between Wittgenstein's double cross and the folk-model of the dead in Hades. The former is an image that comprises opposing tones, black and white. The shades also appear to have conflicting features. In character speeches, the dead person has opposing properties: it is able to die and be beaten down just like the corporeal being, but it can also travel to Hades like the incorporeal wraith.[87] Notice also that the ψυχή appears to have conflicting characteristics when it appears as an illusory image of the once living person. In the proem of the *Iliad*, the ψυχαί, who are usually characterised as insubstantial and disembodied entities,[88] have the bodily strength of the living, ἴφθιμοι.[89] Similarly, when

[85] Cf. *Il*. 23.71, 75-76; *Od*. 11.71-73.
[86] *Od*. 11.207-215.
[87] Cf. *Il*. 3.332, 5.646, 11.263, 20.294, 21.47-48; *Od*. 3.410, 6.11, 11.276-277.
[88] Cf. *Il*. 5.696-697, 9.408-409, 14.518, 16.856-857, 22.362, 467, 23.99-101; *Od*. 11.222. Insubstantiality is a characteristic both of the ψυχή *qua* life-force soul and ψυχή *qua* wraith. Thus, in *Iliad* 1.3, the sense that the ghost has opposing properties still appears whether we translate ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς as meaning "strong soul" or as "strong wraith". In Chapter One, pages 92-93, we will see that there is a conceptual link between the two meanings of ψυχή. On the meaning of ψυχή in this passage, see note below and discussion in Chapter Two.
[89] Cf. *LfrgE* s.v. ἴφθῑμος on the meaning of physical strength. This commendatory epithet for the ψυχή has puzzled scholars. Apollonius read πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν, similar to *Il*. 11.55 and Hes. *Cat.* Fr. 204. 118 M-W. However, we shall see that Apollonius' reading is syntactically impossible. We shall explore this passage further in the second chapter of this thesis. For discussions of 1.3 see Pagliaro 1956: 21-23, Pfeiffer 1968: 147 and n. 4; Warden 1969: 154-156; Redfield 1979: 101-103; Cairns 2001: 464-466. See Chapter Two for further analysis of this passage.

the shades of Patroclus and Hector depart, they appear to have both sentient and insentient characteristics. On the one hand, the shades have sentience since they can express emotions (γοόωσα) like the living. On the other hand, the shades appear insentient since they fly away like wisps of air (ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη).[90] Odysseus recognises that the ψυχή appears just like his mother yet, conflictingly, the wraith does not have the same cognitive abilities as she once had.[91] So too, when the ghost of his mother evaporates, she disappears like an insubstantial shadow or dream, but still seems corporeal enough to make Odysseus think that she did not stay still.[92]All of this suggests that the characteristics of the shade are opposing, much like the object that can be seen as one thing and then as another. These apparent correlations between the presentations of the dead and the objects of aspect perception encourage us to explore whether or not we can apply seeing-as to the study of the dead.

Aspect perception can also be illusory.[93] We need only look at Wittgenstein's face paradigm to prove this. Even though we see a stranger's face as someone we might know, we realise that this perceptual experience is an illusion. The ψυχή is an illusory image of the dead, an εἴδωλον.[94] It appears just like the once living person, but it is without substance and is merely a spectre.[95] However, Romdenh-Romluc also emphasises that aspect perception attempts to make sense of stimuli that cannot confidently be said to be one thing or another. We cannot, for example, say whether or not the duck or rabbit aspect is a true or false

[90] Cf. *Il*. 16.468-469, 23.880; *Od*. 10.163, 19.454. Here I follow Bortolotti and Harris' understanding of the term "sentience", summarised by Scerri and Grech (2016: 14) as "the capacity to have experiences and react internally to external stimuli." By this definition, the wraith is both sentient and insentient: it has the emotional capacity to react to external factors since it mourns the journey to Hades (sentience). But it is physically insubstantial through its flight and cannot physically experience other stimuli (insentience). On the discussion of insentience and sentience see Bortolotti and Harris 2005: 68-75.
[91] Cf. *Od*. 11.140-144.
[92] *Od*. 11.207-210.
[93] Pace Romdenh-Romluc 2018: 100. She tries to argue that Wittgenstein's aspect perception is not like Meleau-Ponty's Gestalt Perception because the former is not an illusory perception. But this distinction is based solely on Jastrow's duck-rabbit image. Romedenh-Romluc does not consider the other examples of seeing-as in her discussion such as the face paradigm where we, mistakenly, look at someone's face and see it as someone else. For illusory perceptions, see: Travis 2004 and Merleau-Ponty 2013.
[94] Cf. *Il*. 23.72, 99-101, 103-107; *Od*. 11.83-84, 207-208, 391-393.
[95] Cf. *Il*. 23.99-101; *Od*. 11.207-208, 222.

representation. Aspect perception can determine whether seeing something as something else is false or indeterminate. This kernel of truth is precisely the reason why Wittgenstein's model is useful for our purposes. For example, Circe and Teiresias inform Odysseus that the dead are insubstantial and witless.[96] Yet Odysseus is indeterminate as to whether the dead are witless or life-like, substantial or insubstantial. He talks to Ajax as though the ghost can recognise and understand him,[97] and he assumes the ghost of his mother is substantial when he attempts to embrace it.[98] The figures are, in Odysseus' perception, not truth-apt.

There is also a similarity between the dead and objects of aspect-dawning. Consider this example that Wittgenstein provides us:[99]

> I have a theme played to me several times and each time in a slower tempo. Eventually I say "*Now* it's right", or "*Now* at last it's a march", "*Now* at last it's a dance". In *this* tone of voice the lighting up of an aspect is also expressed.

The person alternates between aspects when the quality of the theme changes. This theme has not changed, but the observer notices that the tempo has. This is useful for our understanding of the dead. In the *Nekyia*, for example, the state of the dead reportedly does not change; they are replicas of the once living person but they are in a constant state of floating.[100] However, Odysseus, like the listener, notices that qualities of the shade can change. He can see a shade display emotions. Achilles can, for instance, lament at one moment but be happy at another.[101] If the listener can still hear the melody as something else

[96] Cf. *Od*. 10-493-495, 11.146-149.
[97] *Od*. 11.553-562.
[98] *Od*. 11.207-208.
[99] PPF §209.
[100] Cf. *Od*.10-493-495, 11.146-149, 11.222.
[101] Cf. *Od*. 11.472 and 540.

when the sound quality is prone to change, then we can also propose that the dead, whose qualities of behaviour change, can also be seen as one thing and then as another.

I will argue that Odysseus sees the dead as the living in much the same way as a bystander sees a stranger as someone else. Both notice aspects by looking at visible properties. These properties inform the way they see the person as cognitively active or unconscious. For example, sometimes we can see a resemblance between two faces, and think that the stranger is someone we know. We make the assumption from these visible similarities that the stranger (whom we presume to be someone else) has all the mental and character traits of the person for whom we have mistaken them. Consider as well what happens when we look at someone who is asleep or in an induced coma. For the former, we may hear the person talking in his sleep, we may hear a groan and the sleeper moving. When we witness these behaviours, we, momentarily, perceive the sleeper as awake and cognitive. Similarly, when I saw my grandmother in a coma, I noticed muscle spasms, her eyes sometimes moved around the room, and sometimes she looked at me before she went back to sleep. These qualities led me to perceive my grandmother, if only momentarily, as alert, awake, and mentally functional.

This example of aspect perception is similar to the one that Odysseus has when he is in Hades. Teiresias and Circe inform him that the dead are witless, much like the nurse who informed me that my relative is in an induced coma. But regardless, the life-like qualities urge Odysseus to think that the dead are mentally functional. Notice that Odysseus *qua* focaliser speaks to Ajax as though the ghost is angry because the shade remembered him:[102]

Αἶαν, παῖ Τελαμῶνος ἀμύμονος, <u>οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἔμελλες</u>

[102] *Od*. 11.553-555.

οὐδὲ θανὼν λήσεσθαι ἐμοὶ χόλου εἵνεκα τευχέων

οὐλομένων;… ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δεῦρο, ἄναξ, ἵν᾽ ἔπος καὶ μῦθον ἀκούσῃς

ἡμέτερον· δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν.

Odysseus appears to recognise two features of the ghost's behaviour. He notes that the shade is angry (χόλου) and that it is standing away from him (ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δεῦρο). These traits lead Odysseus to make an internal relation: he recognises that the ghost is angry with him just like Ajax when he was alive. By recognising these similar characteristics, Odysseus "notices an aspect" of the shade: he *sees* the ghost not *as* a witless being incapable of recognising the living (as Teiresias tells him), but *as* a shade that has the same cognitive abilities as the once living person. First, the ghost's anger and decision to stand away from the hero leads Odysseus to the view that the ψυχή of Ajax is angry at him. This in turn impels Odysseus to think that the ghost of Ajax can remember his victory over the armour. In other words, the actions of the shade induce Odysseus to think that the ghost has the capacity for memory. In this way, the focaliser, by recognising these traits, has a change in aspect: he no longer sees the wraith as mentally deficient, but as a being that has all the same mental properties as the living person.

Odysseus presents the dead's consumption of the blood inconsistently. Teiresias informs Odysseus that all the dead must consume this offering in order to recognise him and speak to him.[103] But we note that Achilles and Elpenor do not need to consume the blood to speak to Odysseus. My aim is to argue that this inconsistency represents how Odysseus *qua* narrator shifts from the "witless" aspect to the "cognitive" aspect.

[103] On Teiresias' role as a prophet, see Torres Guerra and José Bernardino 2014.

Vermeule, Tsagarakis, and Heath, however, argue that it is implied that Achilles *does* drink from the blood.[104] The reason, according to these scholars, for the lack of clarity is that the poet wishes to avoid what Heath describes as "mind-dulling repetition."[105] However, I will argue that the narrator does not mention the imbibing because Odysseus *qua* focaliser perceives the dead as cognitively active at the time he interacts with them. We will explore this issue more fully in Chapter Four, but some brief examples can support this argument. Odysseus *qua* narrator suggests that the ghost of Elpenor speaks to Odysseus by itself without consuming the blood ὣς ἐφάμην, ὁ δέ μ' οἰμώξας ἠμείβετο μύθῳ).[106] This life-like presentation of the wraith occurs at the moment Odysseus *qua* focaliser believes that the ghost has the capacity to understand him and to respond to his question (Ἐλπῆνορ, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα; / ἔφθης πεζὸς ἰὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ.).[107] Likewise, the ghost of Achilles is not said to drink the blood when engaging with Odysseus (ἔγνω δὲ ψυχή με ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο / καί ῥ' ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα).[108] Note that the narrator presents the ghost as cognitive and active when Odysseus *qua* focaliser marvels at how the ghost is still as capable as his living self.[109]

What these examples show, I argue, is that Odysseus narrates the *Nekyia* through embedded focalisation – that is, the narrator Odysseus describes the dead through the cognitive filters he has at the time he was in Hades. This is intended to be a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against Tsagarakis, Heath and Vermeule. The defence that these scholars have for their reading is that omission is a narrative device. If we can prove instead that the narrative device – embedded focalisation – is responsible for the way the secondary narrator

[104] Vermeule 1979: 29; Tsagarakis 2000: 108-109 n. 456; Heath (2005).
[105] Heath 2005: 393.
[106] *Od*. 11.59.
[107] *Od*. 11.57-58.
[108] *Od*. 11.471-472.
[109] *Od*. 11.484-486.

presents the dead, then the narrator does not mention the imbibing because the focaliser sees the dead as lively.

A helpful example of this embedded focalisation occurs when Odysseus narrates his encounter with Ajax. Indeed, the secondary narrator presents the view of the focaliser who has exercised his capacity for aspect perception. Consider the overture to Odysseus' speech to the ghost of Ajax in 11.543-546:

> οἴη δ᾽ Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο
> νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης,
> τήν μιν ἐγὼ νίκησα δικαζόμενος παρὰ νηυσὶ
> τεύχεσιν ἀμφ᾽ Ἀχιλῆος· ἔθηκε δὲ πότνια μήτηρ.

Just like the focaliser, the narrator suggests that Ajax's anger and decision to stand away from Odysseus is on account of the ghost recognising him and remembering the competition over Achilles' armour. The narrator, in other words, presents the same view of the dead as Odysseus does when he "notices" that the shade is mentally active. In this way, the narrator's presentations of the dead reflect the focaliser's capacity for aspect perception.

This embedded focalisation means that aspect perception can also explain the inconsistent descriptions between whether or not the dead are substantial or insubstantial. Odysseus *qua* focaliser, for instance, realises that his mother disappears like an insubstantial dream, and yet her movements appear so life-like that he makes three attempts to embrace her. This reflects the focaliser's ability to see the dead as both life-like and insubstantial. With seeing-as experiences, the subject's skills and mental scripts inform the way he

perceives the world.[110] For example I might walk around in a field daily and see rabbits. This experience informs the way I see the rabbit aspect in Jastrow's picture. Odysseus goes through the same seeing-as experience since his scripted actions of talking and engaging with his mother leads him to the perception that she can physically engage with him. This experience can explain why the dead's insubstantiality is so inconsistently represented by Odysseus in the *Nekyia*: the narrator's presentation of the shade represents the way in which Odysseus changes aspect and sees the shade, at one moment, as life-like and, at another moment, as insubstantial. Consider Gestalt Perception, Merleau-Ponty's cognate model of seeing-as, and his example which we shall call the sunlight-stone:[111]

> I see the illusory stone in the sense that my entire perceptual and motor field gives to the light patch the sense of a 'stone on the lane'. And I already prepare to sense this smooth and solid surface beneath my foot.

We may be convinced that the patch of light is in fact a stone. However, when we try to step on it, we realise it is immaterial and see it as a patch of sunlight on the ground. Odysseus and the walker here both face similar perceptual problems: Odysseus' perceptual field makes him see the ghost of his mother as a corporeal being that has the substance to be embraced. However, when he realises, like the observer, that contact is impossible, his view of it changes and he realises eventually that it is a ψυχή that he has encountered.[112] Odysseus, like the observer, uses his knowledge of humans (their substance) so that when he sees the dead appear characteristically human in every other respect, he is misled again and thinks that they do have substance.

[110] See Romdenh-Romluc 2018: 102. This seems similar to what Minchin (2001: 78) refers to as a cognitive script.
[111] Merleau-Ponty 2013: 310.
[112] *Od*. 11.222.

In the course of this thesis, it will be argued that the dead and characters describe the ghost in contradictory ways because they are basing their descriptions on a mental image in which the shade has incompatible properties. Take for example the way that ghost of Patroclus speaks about itself when it demands Achilles to bury his corpse in *Iliad* 23.71:

θάπτέ με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω.

The wraith, at one moment, attaches its "I" to the corpse (θάπτέ με), and at the next attaches it to the ψυχή that goes to Hades (περήσω). My aim is to suggest that these contradictory presentations of the dead are dawning aspects: the dead alternate between seeing themselves as a corpse and as a wraith in just the same way that the observer fluctuates between seeing Jastrow's picture as an image of a duck and of a rabbit. I suggest that the observer and the ghost of Patroclus are similar because they are working from mental images. The observer changes from the duck aspect to the rabbit because he has a mental image of the shape of ducks and rabbits, he knows that their shapes are similar. In the same way, the dead switch between describing themselves as corpses and wraiths because they are working from a schema, a mental model, in which the entity that journeys to Hades has the same identity as the corpse. Take for example this passage from *Iliad* 3:[113]

τὸν δὸς ἀποφθίμενον δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω

Notice that the entity has some characteristics of the corporeal dead man since it can die (ἀποφθίμενον), and some of the wraith which can journey to Hades. This suggests that the wraith and the corpse have, according to this mental image, the same identity relationship in just the same way that the duck and the rabbit have the same shapes. What I shall argue, then,

[113] *Il*. 3.322. Cf. *Il*. 5.646, 11.263, 20.294, 21.47-48; *Od*. 3.410, 6.11, 11.276-277.

in chapters three and four, is that it is this mental image that allows for the ghosts to switch between talking about themselves as corpses and as shades.

We have suggested that we make diverse interpretations, or aspects, of the ghost because the characters are working from a mental image in which the inhabitant of Hades continues to have the same "I" as the living. A parallel of this process of these conceptualisations appears when we consider Fauconnier and Turner's discussion of the mental image (conceptual blend) of the ghost-brother in Spiegelman's *Maus II, a Survivor's Tale*:[114]

> Art: I wonder if Richieu and I would get alone if he was still alive.
>
> Françoise: Your brother?
>
> Art: My *Ghost-Brother,* since he got killed before I was born. He was only five or six. I didn't think much of him when I was growing up. He was mainly a large blurry photograph hanging in my parents' bedroom. The photo never threw tantrums or got in any kind of trouble. It was an ideal kid, and I was a pain in the ass. I couldn't compete. They didn't talk about Richieu, but that photo was a kind of reproach.

Art creates a blend here with the formulation "Ghost-Brother". We note from the input *Ghost* that this sibling is dead, absent, now immaterial, incorporeal, and an object. And yet, the other input of this blend, the input "Brother," makes us imagine the once corporeal, living, breathing sibling. Here we see that Art notices aspects of his sibling from the inputs of this blend. Notice that the subject of the first sentence is the "*Ghost-Brother*"; but, in the epexegetic clause (since), the subject is not the immaterial inhuman ghost; on the contrary,

[114] Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 265.

this is the corporeal being that once lived. How does Art go from imagining his brother as a non-entity to then imagining him as a corporeal material being? Aspect perception seems to be at the heart of this descriptive change. Art focuses on the brother component of the Ghost-brother integration. This consequently leads him to switch aspect: he does not see the ghost brother as a ghost, but as the living person who was once alive. The ghost again takes on the identity of the once corporeal person. When Art says "I didn't think much *of him* when I was growing up", we note that Art is talking about the ghost-brother, the absent brother. However, he assigns the ghost the gender "he" of the once living, breathing sibling. In the next sentence, the blend allows for a different match: Art informs Françoise that his brother is a photograph. Now we see a process by which the brother is imagined differently. He no longer has human features, he is a photograph. Here the ghost input of the blend is given most attention. Art no longer describes his brother as a gendered person but objectifies him: "*it* was the ideal kid." The illusive connotations of the "ghost" input lead Art to *see* his brother *as* a non-person, an entity that is incapable of misbehaving, a photograph that "never throws tantrums or got into any kind of trouble." Art can change aspects, and shift from one conceptualisation to another from the mental image in which the ghost-brother have the same identity relationship. We are entitled to see how the dead in Homer, who also have the same identity as the embodied being, can change aspects and talk about themselves inconsistently as an incorporeal shade, and a corpse.

The discussion above does suggest that there are similarities between the dead in Homer and the objects of aspect perception. Throughout this thesis, I will argue that the descriptions of the dead are exercises of this mode of perception. However, the inquiry of this thesis may seem "question-begging." It may, for instance, seem unjustifiable to seek out a theory of eschatology in Homeric epic. After all, the poems are not centred on making sense of the paranormal. On the contrary, Odysseus needs to talk to the dead, not to explain the

nature of the afterlife. This is a similar problem to the one which Stocking addresses when he talks about his theory of selfhood in Homeric epic. His discussion potentially implies that Homer presents an "ontological theory of the self" in poems which are not "philosophical tracts." Stocking addresses this issue by making the following admission:[115]

> I do not wish to argue that the epics themselves provide us with a theory of the self (for obviously, the poems have nothing to do with the work of theory as such - with the work, that is, of making assumptions explicit, considering rival claims, drawing out implications, etc.). The poems provide us rather with certain images and characterizations of the self which it is our task to theorize. It is for us to make explicit the poems' assumptions about selfhood, to defend a certain version of the way those assumptions fit together to form a coherent whole, and to see what those assumptions and their "fit" consequently imply.

Similarly, I do not wish to suggest that the *Nekyia* or Homeric epic presents an eschatological theory. Rather, the poems provide us with certain presentations of the ghost which it is our task to understand. I will draw attention to the many diverse descriptions of the dead. Moreover, I will maintain that a certain cognitive model, "aspect perception," is the reason that these heterogeneous presentations of the ghosts fit together to form a coherent whole.

However, in order to make this argument, I need to demonstrate that these ambiguous presentations of the wraith are part of an "eschatological folk-model." That is to say, I need to show that these diverse characterisations of the dead are part of a poetic schema, a conceptualisation of the ghost that was deep-rooted in the tradition inherited by Homer. This demonstration will show us that these various presentations of the dead are not the product of

[115] Stocking 2007: 57.

incoherent compositional strands. Rather, they are a series of motifs in a poetic format that present a coherent image of the entity that travels to Hades. The passages we have just examined indeed indicate that the ambiguous imagery of the wraith conforms to these poetic guidelines. Notice that we have just cited six passages in which the ghosts, who resemble the living, are conflictingly deficient in terms of mental and physical substance. These sections of the text do not present the ghost through prescribed verbal expressions; nevertheless, they do present the same fundamental understanding of the shade: namely that the wraith has contradictory features. In going forward, I will need to show that the other diverse characterisations of the ghosts are part of this folk-model of the afterlife. By making this demonstration, I will show that the ambiguous presentations of the dead are employed into the epic to form a comprehensive image of the shade. We will turn our attention to this folk-model in the following section.

The unitarian method and the eschatological folk-model

In the previous section, I proposed that we see a series of different conceptions of the entity in Hades because this entity has conflicting characteristics. This basic argument, however, presupposes that the different descriptions are designed to work together and are deliberately employed within the epic. In other words, I have offered a fundamentally unitarian reading of the text. To defend this, it is now necessary to explain why we should consider these descriptions together, as a comprehensive whole.

Much of my argument is modelled on Clarke's unitarian method of analysis, as discussed in *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer*. Clarke opposes an analyst reading of the text and, in so doing, suggests that the descriptions of the dead are not an "amalgam" of different historical and cultural traditions of "life after death." Instead, he explains that the

images of the dead are so intricately "merged" that it is impossible to isolate the conception of the dead as νέκυς/νεκρός ("the corpse") from the ψυχή ("flitting wraith"). Instead, he argues that the inconsistent descriptions of the ghosts in Hades are "inherent in the tradition inherited by Homer."[116] The νέκυς, according to Clarke, is the name for the dead man "proper".[117] These νέκυες can additionally do the things which the wraith cannot: namely, hunt, run, and physically engage with the environment.[118] The ψυχή is the name for the "wraith": the entity that is physically insubstantial and "flits and wafts along the air."[119] Clarke also suggests that there is "a deeper ambiguity as to whether the inhabitant of Hades is the man himself, or something we could call a wraith."[120] He suggests that ambivalent descriptions of the dead are "combined strands of imagery" that form a "coherent whole."[121] In other words, for Clarke, the "ambivalence" of these descriptions provides "the key to understanding what the afterlife means." Clarke's final interpretation is that the nature of death, in Homer, is as ambiguous and indeterminate to the characters as it is to the scholars examining the text.[122]

Clarke's approach to the Homeric text is insightful and one which I shall adopt throughout this thesis. However, my approach differs in two ways.

First, Clarke suggests that the ambiguous descriptions are merely inherent in the tradition inherited by Homer. By this, Clarke means that different "traditions" are merged together "full of ambiguities and unresolved contradictions." According to him, there are different "types of narrative" that account for the entity in Hades appearing as a corpse or as a shade.[123] By contrast, I suggest that all of these ambiguous descriptions of the dead derive from a single folk-model. Simply, I argue that the ambiguous descriptions complied with a canon

[116] Clarke 1999: 219. For a broader discussion, see 211-225.
[117] Clarke 1999: 191.
[118] Cf. Clarke 1999: 191, 222.
[119] Clarke 1999: 194.
[120] Clarke 1999: 191-192.
[121] Clarke 1999: 208.
[122] See Clarke 1999: 207-211.
[123] Clarke 1999: 219.

that was present in the epic throughout the Homeric oral tradition: namely, that the imagery of the shade needs to be diverse and contradictory in order to articulate the existing folk-theory of the dead (THE INCORPOREAL SHADE IS A DEFICIENT REPLICANT OF THE ONCE LIVING PERSON AND HAS THE SAME SELFHOOD AS THE EMBODIED PERSON) and to present the living characters' inability to understand the ghosts.[124] The problem with Clarke's position is that it opens him up to analyst criticism. After all, a later poet might have wished to introduce a new narrative type not to present a comprehensible image of the wraith, but to make explicit his own conceptions of the ghosts. If we instead argue that these ambiguous presentations of the wraith are part of a single poetic format, then we can say that all of these descriptions, whether "spurious" or "authentic," attempt to adhere to a guideline: that the ghosts *must be ambiguous*. In this way, we can avoid the arguments for "authenticity" and "compositional amalgamation" entirely.[125] In other words, by arguing for the existence of this folk-model, we are justified to suggest that these diverse descriptions of the dead form a coherent concept of the ghosts.

Second, Clarke suggests that there are no epistemological differences between secondary focalisers'/narrators' and the primary narrator's descriptions of the dead.[126] This is a common position also among "pre-Genettian"[127] narratologists.[128] However, I take a fundamentally opposing stance to Clarke. I argue that this Homeric folk-model draws a clear

[124] I use "folk theory" and "folk-model" interchangeably to refer to a mental template, a model or guideline that is used to formulate metaphoric expressions. On this definition, see Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 60; Kövecses 2010: 325-326;

[125] I should note that there is another type of analyst argument available: that some lines were interpolated or removed to smoothe away existing inconsistencies. I will address these arguments when we are presented with a particular textual criticism. I will defend these removed verses, when appropriate, by examining both supporting wider evidence and the way in which a line is syntactically and semantically essential for us to read the passage efficiently.

[126] Cf. Clarke 1999: 138 n. 12, 190 n. 69.

[127] That is to say, narratologists whose analysis predates Genette's studies on internal focalisation (see 1983: 192-194).

[128] See Auerbach 1953: 7. Auerbach calls the unique perspectives of the internal focaliser "subjectivistic-perpsectivistic procedure." This epistemological phenomena, Auerbach argues, is "foreign to the Homeric style". Effe (1975: 135-157) also dismisses this kind of figural narration in Homeric epic. Her arguments are summarised nicely in de Jong 1997: 312-313.

distinction between the primary narrator's and secondary narrator's/focalisers' descriptions of the dead. This eschatological folklore, I shall argue, invites us to examine internal and external focalisers' descriptions separately.

Unitarian analysis and the shifting conceptions of the dead

To commence, I justify my unitarian approach by explaining why we should read the descriptions of the dead as a unified whole. By this term, I do not mean that there existed an "authentic" version of Homeric epic, composed by one poet in the Archaic period.[129] Rather, by "unified whole," I mean that these seemingly inconsistent descriptions of the dead complied with a guiding principle that was embedded in the Homeric poems throughout the oral tradition: the dead, as images of the living, must not only have conflicting properties, but also have many various names. By using such diverse imagery to describe the shade, the supposed later poets were adhering to this guideline when making their putative additions to the *Nekyia* and other parts of Homeric epic.[130] Hence, we need not seek an explanation relating to compositional strata to elucidate the seeming "inconsistencies" in the descriptions of the dead. On the contrary, we shall see that there is good reason to argue that the passages in these type scenes

[129] For a comprehensive explanation of the Homeric Question, see Dodds 1954 and West 2011. See also Kahane 2012. On the analyst and unitarian issues in the *Odyssey,* see Bona 1966. On the unitarian need to explain inconsistencies in Homeric epic, see Scodel 1998(a): 4. On ancient receptions of Homer, see: Heracl. *Homeric Problems.*1.5-7; Plat.*Rep*.2.364d-e; Nonn.*Dion.*25.265; esp. Plut. *On Homer*. 54B 127. Nilsson 1950: 621; Hunter 2004: 235. On the Homeric oral tradition, see Parry 1971; Nagy 1980, 1990: 7-82; Scodel 1998(b); Kahane 2012: 60-68; Wolf (2014 edition).

[130] Sourvinou-Inwood's analyst explanation in fact gives us more reason to read the text as a unified whole. She for instance debunks Heubeck's (1992: 352-353) traditional unitarian reading: namely that *Odyssey* 24 is "authentic" because of the thematic similarities between *Odyssey* 24 and earlier parts of the epic. She states instead that: "the notion that the Continuation picks up themes prepared for in the earlier parts of the poem is far less decisive. For an adequate Continuator would have done precisely that, would have interwoven his composition in precisely such a way into the main body of the *Odyssey*" (Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 97). This argument may discourage us from arguing that the text is "authentic" because of similar themes present in different parts of Homeric epic. Nevertheless, she has highlighted that later poets did not want to break the consistency of the text. Sourvinou-Inwood's discussion greatly informs my understanding of textual "unity", but I will suggest below that the inconsistencies in descriptions of the dead are not the result of a later poet trying to keep to the existing descriptions of the dead but of later poets keeping to an integral motif in this folk-model.

are interpolated. Composition, however, is less crucial since the putative interpolating poets keep to this folk-model and, so doing, ensure the inhabitant of Hades remains an intrinsically ambiguous entity that characters interpret and perceive diversely.

This is clearly evident in *Iliad* 23.65-101 and the *Deuteronekyia* in *Odyssey* 24.1-204. Aristarchus athetised the latter (*Odyssey* 24.1-204) for a variety of reasons, three of which we shall briefly review here.[131] First, Hermes is given the unusual office of psychopomp. Second, the unburied suitors can enter Hades, a privilege which the ghost of unburied Patroclus does not have in *Iliad* 23.71-76. Third, the narrator describes how the dead go past a number of locations which we do not see in the *Nekyia*: the gates of the sun, the land of dreams, and the white rock.[132] The different attitude to burial rites, the unusual locations, and Hermes' unique position as psychopomp might encourage us to argue that *Odyssey* 24 was authored by either a continuator of the *Odyssey*, or a putative "*B*-poet."[133] Despite these different attitudes to death, however, notice that the poet of *Iliad* 23 and the continuator, or "*B*-poet," both draw on the same inconsistent imagery of the dead. On the one hand, the wraiths can interact with each other and resemble the living;[134] on the other hand, they appear as witless flitting shades when they transition from one world to the other.[135] The similarities reveal that both putative poets are committing to a rule in which the primary narrator describes the dead man as a ψυχή who appears *both* witless and lifelike.

Notice also that these ambiguous presentations of the dead are a common motif in character descriptions. Characters present different views concerning the entity that survives

[131] See Stanford (1954: 409-410) on Aristarchus' issues with the *Deuteronekyia* and the scholiasts' objections to his claims. For more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the composition of *Odyssey* 24, see Heubeck 1990: 353; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 94-95f.
[132] On the presentation of the white rock, see Nagy 1973.
[133] On the narratological objections to Aristarchus' interpretation, see page 55.
[134] Cf. *Il*. 23.65-67 and 73 ~ *Od*. 24.14-204.
[135] *Il*. 23.99-101 ~ *Od*. 24.6-9.

death by combining formula-patterns. This structure makes the analyst explanation seem redundant. Consider, for example, Nestor's speech in *Iliad* 7.129-131:

τοὺς νῦν εἰ πτώσσοντας ὑφ' Ἕκτορι πάντας ἀκούσαι,

πολλά κεν ἀθανάτοισι φίλας ἀνὰ χεῖρας ἀείραι

θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

In this passage, unusually, it is the θυμός that journeys to Hades, not the ψυχή. Moreover, the passage contains a unique combination of formulaic phrases. This is, after all, the first and only time we see the formula θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων appear alongside the predicate formula δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω. This strange description led Bruno Snell to two hypotheses: either this description came from a later poet "who did not know the Homeric usage," or, "more likely" it came from a rhapsode "who confused several sections of verses in his memory."[136] Kirk suggests that this combination of formulae is "casual" and "careless."[137] On the contrary, this novel combination of formulaic phrases is a common motif in the characters' descriptions of the dead. Consider *Odyssey* 9.523-524:

'αἰ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην

εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω…

Odysseus threatens to send Polyphemus to Hades, bereft of ψυχή and αἰῶν. Here again we see a contradictory presentation of the entity that survives death. It is not the ψυχή that goes to the underworld, but the man himself. Odysseus, just like Peleus, creates this novel image of the dead by combining formula-patterns.[138] This is one of the rare occasions where we see a privative formula, ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός, and the formulaic phrase δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω occur

[136] Snell 1953: 11.
[137] Kirk 1990: 252 *ad Il*. 7.131.
[138] According to Sourvinou-Inwood, Odysseus combines two formula-patterns to produce a vaunt which contradicts the Homeric narrator's belief about the survivor in Hades. See Clarke 1999: 138 n. 12.

together in Homeric epic.[139] Consider, also, Hector's memory of his near-death experience in *Iliad* 15.251-252:

καὶ δὴ ἔγωγ᾽ ἐφάμην νέκυας καὶ δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο

ἤματι τῷδ᾽ ἴξεσθαι, ἐπεὶ φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ.

This passage is similar to the description we see in *Odyssey* 9.523-524. It is not the ψυχή, but the dead man who makes the journey to the house of Hades (δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο)[140] where he is deprived of a life faculty (φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ.).[141] Hector creates an unusual image of the dead by combining the privative formula φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ with the formulaic variant δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο.[142] Consider, also, Theoclymenus' prophetic words in *Odyssey* 20.355f:

εἰδώλων δὲ πλέον πρόθυρον, πλείη δὲ καὶ αὐλή,

ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον

This passage does not contain an especially unusual combination of formulaic phrases; however, it does suggest that the entity that goes to Hades is an εἴδωλον. At no point in Homeric epic, however, does the primary narrator ever state that the entity who travels to Hades is an εἴδωλον. On the contrary, the primary narrator only calls the entity a ψυχή εἴδωλον when it is actually resident in the underworld (ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων).[143]

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[139] It is not necessarily the appearance of this particular privative formula that is unusual. After all, this formula occurs only in two places, here and *Il*. 16.453. Rather, it is the combination of this privative formulaic pattern and the formulaic description of the journey to Hades that is idiosyncratic. See below.

[140] Cf. *Od*. 12.21. It needs to be stated here that, like in *Od*. 9.523-25, the character uses a formulaic phrase which occurs in only one other part of the epic. The formula δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο occurs only in *Odyssey* 12.21. The privative formula ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός only occurs in one other passage, 16.453. At first, we may think that these formulae were imperfectly inserted into these speeches and are not part of a motif. However, we should not linger over? this point for much longer. The δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο formula is a variation of other formulaic phrases which talk about the being that journeys to Hades. Cf. *Il*. 3.322, 5.646. It is not the formula which is unusual; it is the formula pattern which is novel.

[141] For the formulaic phrase φίλον ἦτορ, see: *Il*. 3.31, 5.250, 364, 670, 8.437, 9.705, 10.107, 575, 13.84, 15.166, 182, 554, 21.114, 201, 389, 425, 24. 50, 24.585; *Od*. 1.60, 114, 316, 2.298, 4.481, 538, 703, 804, 5.297, 406, 7. 269, 287, 8.303, 9.256, 10.198, 496, 566, 12.277, 16.92, 428, 17.514. 18.153, 19.136, 20.22, 22.68, 147, 23.53, 205, 345.

[142] Cf. *Il*. 11.53-55. The primary narrator does hint, at one point, that the being which survives death is corporeal; but this character description is different from the primary narrator's description of the being that survives death. The primary narrator never gives us the same detail as the internal focalisers, who state that this corporeal being is a corpse deprived of life faculties.

[143] *Od*. 24.14.

These passages emphasise that it is a common motif for the shade to appear ambiguously in the epic. This means that there is nothing to be gained by positing different compositional strands of Homeric epic to explain the dead's state of existence. Each passage follows a folk-model whereby the secondary focalisers each present their own unique conceptions of the ghost. In chapter two, we shall argue that these conceptions are reached because of the characters' ability to exercise aspect perception.

Let us now examine how these ambiguities feature in a type-scene. In *Iliad* 23 and the *Nekyia*, we see a fundamentally similar narrative-type in which the living interact with the dead.[144] When we examine these scenes, we shall see that the two secondary focalisers / narrators conform to the rule that the shade is simultaneously witless and life-like. This motif reinforces the principle that these ambiguities do not emerge through issues of composition or cultural amalgamation. Let us examine then Sourvinou-Inwood's analyst argument. She suggests that there is a distinction between the poet's and the internal focalisers' descriptions of the dead in Hades.[145] This is an important observation and one which will be given a great deal of attention at a later point in this thesis. However, this narratological distinction suggests that cultural amalgamation is not responsible for the heterogeneous descriptions of the dead, as she argues.[146] Consider Achilles' speech after the ψυχή of Patroclus disappears:[147]

ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν·
παννυχίη γάρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει γοόωσά τε μυρομένη τε,
καί μοι ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ.

[144] On the broader topic of the hero descending to Hades, see Shapiro 1983: 7-18 and Dova 2012. On ghost stories in antiquity, see Felton 1999. See also Krück 2005.
[145] See Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 78 and Clarke 1999: 138 n. 12.
[146] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 78, 84.
[147] *Il*. 23.103-107.

According to Sourvinou-Inwood, this passage does not reflect Achilles' conversation with the ghost of Patroclus because the shades in *Iliad* 23.72-73 were not witless. As a result, she suggests that verses 103-104 were a character's speculation:[148]

> In *Iliad* 23. 103-107 Achilles expresses that there exists in Hades a *psyche* and an *eidolon atar frenes ouk eni pampan.* This view is not given any special authority in the poem; it is presented as a surmise derived from his limited experience with the dead. But it is interesting that he expresses this view as though it followed from his encounter with Patroklos, while it does not. On the contrary, the shades who prevented Patroklos' shade from crossing the river and entering Hades (*Il*. 23. 72-73) do not belong together with the same concept of witless shades. That is, the latter image was not articulated by a poet in whose assumptions the shades were witless. Thus, in this episode two different perceptions of the nature of the shades are juxtaposed… One context in which this can be made sense of is if we suppose that in the poet's and audience's assumptions shades were "lively", so that nothing problematic registers with regard to the shades' actions as reported by Patroklos, and Achilles' statement that the shades have no *phrenes* was perceived as one character's speculation.

Sourvinou-Inwood speaks as though the contradictory descriptions of lively and witless shades exist between *Iliad* 23.72-3 and 103-107. But these ambiguous presentations of the dead also exist *within* 103-107. Let us consider the latter passage in more detail. Sourvinou-Inwood seems to take φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν to mean that the dead in Hades are devoid of wits and mental substance.[149] If we accept her interpretation, then we see that such inconsistent

[148] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 78.

[149] Much has been written about the meaning of φρένες in *Il*. 23.104[b]. Some suggest the word means intelligence (see Aristonicus and Schol. bT *ad Il*. 23.104; Mazon 1942: 223-224; Rieu 1950: 414. Cf. Eustathius *ad Od.*11.476.), while others claim that it describes the ghost's lack of physical substance (Schol. ZYQX ad *Il*. 23.104; Böhme 1929: 95-96 n 3; Sullivan 1988: 50; Richardson 1993: 178; Zaborowski 2003: 298 n 32.). I will discuss the meaning of this word and this passage in the third chapter of this thesis. However, I feel it is best for now to accept Sourvinou-Inwood's translation in order to provide a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against her analyst stance.

descriptions cannot be, as she argues, the result of an amalgam of different cultural or historical attitudes to the afterlife. For example, in 105-107, the shade of Patroclus seems "lively": Achilles explains that the ghost displayed emotions and could speak just like Patroclus himself. This explanation occurs just after Achilles states, in 103-104, that the dead completely lack mental substance. This juxtaposition means that the two contradictory beliefs, the "lively" and "witless" shades, are intimately linked. This intimacy does not occur elsewhere in other forms of cultural amalgamation. Kirk, for instance, argues that Homeric epic contains a "cultural amalgam" of historical weapons. He is able to make his case by isolating the passages in which the primary narrator describes Mycenaean and neo-geometric armour.[150] Snodgrass observes a number of isolated passages that describe different marriage practices.[151] These isolated sections of the text lead him to conclude that these nuptial customs were "derived from a diversity of historical sources."[152] By contrast, in 23.103-107, the contradictory descriptions appear within the shift of a single line. Such a sudden change means that we cannot separate the belief surrounding the witless shades from the lifelike shades, as we could with the descriptions of nuptial practices and historical weaponry in Homeric epic. Therefore, the contradictory descriptions of the dead cannot be the product of an "amalgam" of various historical and cultural conceptions of life after death. Rather, the sudden shift of conceptions indicates that these ambiguities of the wraith were inherent in the tradition inherited by Homer. We need to understand that the shade is, somehow, simultaneously lively and witless in this scene.

The problem we find with Sourvinou-Inwood's analyst stance is that it is difficult to claim, based on the above argument, that the *Nekyia* is an amalgam of different cultural attitudes to the afterlife. After all, the *Nekyia* and *Iliad* 23.65-107 are structurally similar. Both

[150] Kirk 1962: 179-188, esp.181-182, 188.
[151] Snodgrass 1974: 115 n. 16 and n. 17. On similar suggestions of conflation in Homer, see Gray 1947: 109-121; Sherratt 1990: 807-824.
[152] Snodgrass 1974: 118.

episodes describe how the living internal focalisers interact with the dead for the first time. In addition, both Odysseus and Achilles retrospectively describe their encounters with the ghosts. If Achilles presents the wraith as simultaneously life-like and witless, then Odysseus, in the *Nekyia*, will also present the ghost as both mindless and cognitively active. Moreover, if Odysseus has, like Achilles, never interacted with the dead before his catabasis, then inconsistencies would be expected because the entity in Hades is fundamentally abstract to him. There is certainly every reason to argue that Odysseus does, in fact, adopt the same position as Achilles in *Iliad* 23. Let us consider *Odyssey* 11.37-43:[153]

ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.
νύμφαι τ᾽ ἠίθεοί τε πολύτλητοί τε γέροντες
παρθενικαί τ᾽ ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι,
πολλοὶ δ᾽ οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,
ἄνδρες ἀρηίφατοι βεβροτωμένα τεύχε᾽ ἔχοντες·
οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ᾕρει.

Odysseus, like Achilles in 23.104[b]-107, presents the shades as simultaneously witless and life-like. At the start, the dead appear to have the same emotions as they did in life (παρθενικαί τ᾽ ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι). At 42, however, they make the witless screeching sound that is typical of the ψυχή once it escapes from the dead man.

Aristarchus and modern scholars have often argued that the Nekyomanteion and Catabasis present two different views of the inhabitant of Hades.[154] According to them, the

[153] Alexandrian scholars regarded this passage as spurious because the dead approach the blood in a group, whilst the other dead come one at time. But it is difficult to athetize the passage on these grounds. After all, in the Catalogue of Women, the heroines come to the blood in a group before Odysseus urges them to drink one at a time (*Od*. 11.228f). Agamemnon comes alongside the people that died around him (*Od*. 11.387-389) and Achilles approaches Odysseus with his comrades Patroclus and Ajax (11.467-470). On other objections to this Alexandrian argument, see van der Valk 1949: 258.

[154] The bibliography for this issue is huge. On the analyst stance, see: Wilamowitz 1884: 199-226; Schwartz 1924: 319; von der Mühll 1938: 3-4; Page 1955: 26-27; Kirk 1962: 236-237; Tsagarakis (2000: 123) concludes

former episode is narrated by a poet who believed that the dead were witless and needed to consume blood in order to speak with the living. The latter is by a later poet who thought the dead were lifelike. However, the passage above suggests that the two beliefs of "lively" and "witless" dead were not separate, but intimately linked. After all, within five lines, Odysseus goes from describing the dead as lively, to describing them as witless beings that screech. This passage is, as we stated above, similar to Achilles' description because the dead are described, almost simultaneously, as both lifelike and witless. This suggests that the heterogeneous descriptions were not only part of a folk-model but were also part of a type-scene in which the internal focaliser or secondary narrator sees the wraith as having diametrically opposing properties: cognition and mindlessness. Moreover, like Achilles, Odysseus assigns different names to the survivor (ψυχή, εἴδωλον, and νέκυς) in order to understand the dead man's state of being. Indeed, Odysseus' reference to the dead man as an εἴδωλον reflects how he initially perceives the dead as εἴδωλα (ἦ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ' ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια / ὤτρυν').[155] In addition, both Achilles *and* Odysseus have the same preconception that the survivor is physically substantial. After all, they both rush to embrace Patroclus and Anticleia respectively, only to realise that contact with the dead is impossible.[156]

The similarities between Achilles and Odysseus problematise the suggestion that the contradictory images of the dead are a cultural amalgam of eschatological beliefs. If Achilles tries to comprehend the inhabitant of Hades by providing a variety of ambiguous descriptions of its state of being, then it is plausible that the similarly ambiguous descriptions of the dead present in the *Nekyia* are the result of Odysseus struggling to understand the wraith's state of being. Thus, Odysseus *qua* narrator and Achilles *qua* focaliser both confront the same problem: they have to recount their experiences with the dead by providing diverse descriptions of the

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that the two narratives, the Nekyomanteion and the Catabasis, are responsible for the contradictory images of the dead. See also Schnaufer (1970) for useful discussions on the dead in Homer.

[155] *Od.* 11. 213-214 ~ 11.83.

[156] *Il*. 23.99-101 ~ *Od*. 11.206-208. See Galhac 2017: 84-85 for a comparison of the two scenes.

ghosts. The similarities between the two characters enable us to see that the ambiguous descriptions of the dead are part of a narrative type-scene.

The ambiguities of the wraith were a feature of a folk model that existed throughout the epics' oral transmission. The task in front of us now is to show how aspect perception is part of this poetic format. Moreover, we need to demonstrate how the epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' presentations of the shade are a part of this folk-model. I will now turn my analysis to *Iliad* 23 to demonstrate that aspect perception and the various epistemologically distinct views it induces are part of this traditional folk-model.

The epistemological distinction between primary narration and character descriptions

We have now established that the ambiguous descriptions of the dead are a motif in this folk-model. Let us now demonstrate that aspect perception and the epistemologically distinct views of the dead it produces are part of this poetic canon. We can begin this demonstration by first acknowledging that secondary focalisers/narrators present the shade in ways which are distinct from the primary narrator's descriptions. We have mentioned, though without fuller comment, that it is common for internal focalisers to have conceptions of the dead person which differ from the primary narrator's descriptions. For instance, characters imagine the entity that journeys to Hades is either a ψυχή, εἴδωλον, or θυμός. These diverse descriptions of the dead do not appear in the primary narrator's portrayal of the shade. We can, then, already begin to acknowledge the epistemological differences between primary and secondary narration when we examine imagery related to the dead.

We can begin to see this distinction by comparing the *Nekyia* and *Second Nekyia*. Clarke argues for the "authenticity" of the latter book by providing a comprehensive

comparison of the two episodes.[157] However, impressive though this analysis is, what Clarke's study actually reveals is that there are epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary narrator's presentations of the dead in both Nekyias. He rightly acknowledges at the start of his discussion that "the dead of the *Second Nekyia* are always referred to as ψυχαί, never as νέκυες/νεκροί."[158] But this is also true in *Iliad* 23.65-101. The name νέκυες/νεκροί for the inhabitant of Hades is completely absent in this episode. In fact, this name for the shade only occurs in character speeches.[159] This lexical choice already draws a distinction between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' descriptions of the inhabitant of Hades. We note other lexical distinctions between the primary and secondary focalisers' descriptions of the wraiths' movements. Consider also the bat simile when the ψυχαί of the suitors travel to the underworld:[160]

…ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἔποντο.

ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο

τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεί κέ τις ἀποπέςῃσιν

ὁρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ᾽ ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται,

ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν.

Clarke makes the important claim that this imagery is distinct from that which we see in Odysseus' *Nekyia*:[161]

> The imagery of the bat simile does seem to draw on aspects of Homer's image of the ψυχή, but in its visual precision is unlike anything in Odysseus' Nekuia or in the *Iliad*: this suggests strongly that the poet of the Second Nekuia is drawing on the more baroque image of the ψυχή actually taking on the form of a bird (see Ch. 1, p. 5).

[157] Clarke 1999: 225-228.
[158] Clarke 1999: 226.
[159] Cf. *Il*. 15.250; *Od*. 10.518, 526, 536, 12. 383; *LfrgE* s.v νέκῡς BII.
[160] *Od*. 24.5-9.
[161] Clarke 1999: 227.

This is a useful comparison, but Clarke's analysis overlooks the differences between the primary and secondary narrator's descriptions of the dead. For instance, the precision of this simile suggests that the primary narrator can visualise the journey to Erebus, and describe the wraiths' voices more clearly than Odysseus in his narration.[162] Indeed, Odysseus admits that he does not know how the wraith of Elpenor came to Hades,[163] and also admits to Circe that he is unclear how to journey to the underworld.[164] Odysseus *qua* narrator is only able to say retrospectively that the wraith travels to Hades,[165] after the ghost of Elpenor describes this journey.[166] In other words, the "baroque image" indicates that the primary narrator has a more authoritative voice than the secondary narrator about the journey to the other world. Moreover, notice that Odysseus' simile for the noise that the dead make is less precise: they do not sound like bats that move in a cave, as the primary narrator tells us; but rather sound like birds.[167] In addition, the secondary narrator attributes these sounds not to the ψυχαί, as the primary narrator does, but to the νέκυες/νεκροί.[168] Furthermore, the secondary narrator's acoustic imagery is even more imprecise than that of the primary narrator: Odysseus merely refers to the sound of the dead as an "awful screeching" (θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ).[169]

In fact, one of Aristarchus' arguments for interpolation, which Clarke tries to rebut, suggests that the secondary and primary narrator have access to different knowledge of Hades. Clarke posits that the contradictory topographical descriptions do not prove that the Second *Nekyia* is an interpolation. On the contrary, he observes that the wraiths take a different route from that which Odysseus takes to reach Hades: "Odysseus' route was hardly the usual one

[162] *Pace* Clarke. The absence of this detailed simile in *Iliad* 23.99-101 is irrelevant. We can see that the two primary narrators both use the same word to describe the wraiths' sounds, τρίζω. In addition, both primary narrators grammatically attribute this sound to the ψυχαί. This particular lexical choice and grammatical construction is exclusive to the primary narrator's descriptions and never present in character-descriptions.
[163] *Od*. 11.57.
[164] *Od*. 10.501-502.
[165] *Od*. 10.559-560.
[166] *Od*. 11.64-65.
[167] *Od*. 11.605.
[168] *Od*. 11.605, 632-33.
[169] Cf. *Od*. 11.43 ~ 633.

taken by the dead."[170] This argument may undermine Aristarchus' reading, but it does not necessarily prove that the *Second Nekyia* is authentic. In fact, Clarke reveals an important narratological feature: the primary and secondary narrator have distinct views of the afterlife. After all, secondary narrator cannot possibly describe the same places as the primary narrator, because the two narrators follow different routes to Hades. The two narrators, therefore, have different access to knowledge of the underworld. Clarke's argument, in other words, highlights that the primary narrator and secondary narrator have very different conceptions of Hades.

These are only a fraction of the issues Clarke addresses, and we shall address the other concerns at a later point in the thesis. For now, it is important to observe that the differences between the first and second *Nekyia* are explained by the epistemological variations between primary and secondary narration.

This discussion establishes that there are differences between the primary and secondary narrator's conceptualisations of the dead. We now need to show that these various conceptions emerge because of the shade's novel combination of properties. We now need to show how this characteristic of metaphorical mapping and aspect perception is present in other scenes in Homeric epic. This will enable us to see that aspect perception is part of this folk-model in the Homeric tradition.

I proposed that the ψυχαί's opposing characteristics induce the primary narrator and secondary focalisers to have varied conceptualisations of the ghost. These properties impel the poet to describe the entity as a wraith or as a bodily being. By contrast, these features of the ghost impel the secondary focalisers to see the dweller of Hades as a ψυχή, εἴδωλον, or as a corporeal being. Let us now examine how these properties of the ghost emphasise epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' conceptions. Consider the scene with the ghost of Patroclus and Achilles in *Iliad* 23. Notice

[170] Cf. Clarke 1999: 227.

that the ψυχή has both corporeal and incorporeal properties. The shade after all has all of the life-like and corporeal features of Patroclus:[171]

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο

πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ᾽ ἐϊκυῖα

καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο.

However, at the end of the scene, the wraith appears primeval and disembodied, disappearing like a puff of smoke and screeching:[172]

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν

οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς

ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα.

These properties of the shade impel both the primary narrator and secondary focalisers to have similar, but varied conceptions of the wraith. The life-like characteristics of the shade induce the primary narrator to describe the ghost as the man himself. Notice that the dative masculine pronoun αὐτῷ signifies the once living, breathing Patroclus that had the capacity for speech (φωνήν). After the wraith speaks like Patroclus, the primary narrator uses the masculine pronoun to refer to it:[173]

τὸν δ᾽ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς

In this way, the life-like traits of the wraith induce the primary narrator to describe the inhabitant as the bodily being. These seemingly human properties of the shade also impel Achilles to see the ghost as a corporeal entity. After the ghost of Patroclus speaks to him, Achilles believes that the ghost has the substance to be embraced:

‘τίπτέ μοι ἠθείη κεφαλὴ δεῦρ᾽ εἰλήλουθας

καί μοι ταῦτα ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπιτέλλεαι; αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοι

[171] *Il*. 23.65f.
[172] *Il*. 23.99-101.
[173] *Il*. 23.93f.

πάντα μάλ᾽ ἐκτελέω καὶ πείσομαι ὡς σὺ κελεύεις.

ἀλλά μοι ἆσσον στῆθι· μίνυνθά περ ἀμφιβαλόντε

ἀλλήλους ὀλοοῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο.

It is noteworthy that Achilles makes two references to Patroclus' ability to speak (ἐπιτέλλεαι… κελεύεις) before he comes to the presumption that the inhabitant has the materiality to be embraced (μίνυνθά περ ἀμφιβαλόντε / ἀλλήλους). These consecutive clauses emphasise that Achilles believes the inhabitant is a bodily being after he acknowledges the shade's human characteristics. In this way, the life-like properties of the wraith encourage Achilles to see the entity as the corporeal Patroclus. However, Achilles' presentation of the ghost varies from the primary narrator's modes of expression. For example, it is this entity's combination of living and witless characteristics that results in Achilles' confusion and his subsequent need to call the inhabitant by two distinct names: ψυχή (shade) and εἴδωλον (phantom image). The primary narrator, by contrast, never uses the εἴδωλον as a name for the dweller in Hades. Aspect perception, in other words, is the mode of perception that allows the secondary and primary focalisers to describe the wraith in unique ways. The distinct nature of these descriptions informs us that both focalisers have varied ways of conceptualising the resident in Hades.

The evidence we have collected in both of these sections emphasise that aspect perception is indeed at the heart of the various descriptions of the dead in Hades. Moreover, the discussion above highlights that aspect perception reveals the epistemologically distinct views of the ghosts in primary narration and secondary focalisation. In the rest of this thesis, I hope to show that this model of perception accounts for the other seemingly ambiguous and metaphorical descriptions of the dead.

PART ONE

THE WRAITH AND THE JOURNEY TO HADES.

Chapter One

The coherence of death

Introduction

In the introduction to this thesis, I argued that the diverse presentations of the dead resulted from metaphoric and narratological differences in aspect perception. But this argument fundamentally assumes that these seemingly contradictory presentations of the dead arise out of a coherent conception of the ghost's state of being. Before I can make my argument, I first need to demonstrate that Homer presents a coherent view of death. This will pave the way for us to argue, in the following chapters, that the many presentations of the wraith attempt to articulate a folk-theory of the ψυχή (THE INCORPOREAL SHADE IS A DEFICIENT REPLICANT OF THE ONCE LIVING PERSON AND HAS THE SAME SELFHOOD AS THE EMBODIED PERSON).

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the diverse presentations of a person's death form a comprehensive whole and that death involves a remnant transitioning from the mortal world to Hades. This discussion will be essential not only for justifying this thesis' methodological approach, but also for justifying my basic argument. So far, my argument has been grounded in the assumption that there is a single conception of death in Homeric epic: namely that the ψυχή leaves the body and journeys to Hades when the person dies. But there are various presentations of death in Homer which at first seem at odds with this attitude: that

the ψυχή perishes upon the person's death, and that death occurs when chthonic deities grasp the individual. We will need to show how these images form together to present a coherent whole. By showing that these presentations harmonise with the conception DEATH IS A JOURNEY TO HADES, we are more inclined to argue that the diverse representations of the ghost, in Homer, are efforts to describe a single conception: namely that the ghost has conflicting properties. This, in turn, will allow us to investigate how aspect perception is the model that unites these various presentations of the wraith.

The first part of this chapter aims to examine how the presentations of death as a seizing and as a fated moment are coherent. I begin by explaining where these two representations of death feature in the series of events surrounding the person's death.[174] I argue that there are three stages that the Homeric man goes through when he dies. He begins by entering a process of dying: he starts to deteriorate and begins to lose his faculties.[175] The person dies when he completely loses functionality and his faculties are irreversibly destroyed. There is then the post-mortem existence: the dead man's remains transition from the mortal world to Hades after the faculties no longer function. I will suggest that death as a fated moment and death as a grasp fit in this sequence by representing the moment that the person dies. I will then go on to suggest that these two representations are coherent because they attempt to follow a basic metaphoric schema: SALIENT EVENTS ARE ENCOUNTERS.

For the second part of this chapter, I examine the role of the ψυχή in these death scenes. I argue that the descriptions of its destruction and disappearance complement the conception that the ψυχή leaves the mortal world and journeys to Hades. Specifically, I argue for a metaphoric and metonymic reading of the ψυχή in Homeric death descriptions. My aim

[174] For further useful discussions on death in Homeric epic, see Griffin 1980; Garland 1981; Morrison 1999.
[175] cf. *Il*. 2.106, 4.522-526, 24.742-745.

is to show that the descriptions of destruction are hyperbolic in these various metaphorical constructions. By extension, I argue that these metaphoric constructions do not conflict with the conception that the post-mortem ψυχή journeys to the underworld. This line of argument will help us to demonstrate that there is coherency in Homeric ontological descriptions and that these descriptions, no matter how diverse, all adhere to a single conception of the afterlife.

A way we can begin to argue for a coherent system is by suggesting that Homer presents a comprehensive sequence of events that occur when the person dies. Let me begin by first drawing a distinction between dying and death. I will then suggest that the death scenes involving θάνατος, κῆρες, or μοῖρα present the moments leading up to the death, the point at which the person dies. I will also argue that death as a fate refers to the moment when this lethal embrace occurs.

We can begin by suggesting that dying is a process of losing a life force, and death is the result, the terminal point at which life is completely lost. Temporally speaking, death extends from the moment that the wraith leaves the body and journeys to Hades. Dying by contrast refers to the span of time that the person begins to lose functionality. I define dying in this chapter as the point at which the person begins to deteriorate and begins to lose his faculties.

Death, by contrast, comprises two different stages: the moment at which the person dies (he completely loses functionality and his faculties are irreversibly destroyed) and the post-mortem state (his remains transition from the mortal world to Hades after the faculties no longer function.

We can see this graduation between dying and death in the examples below. Dying is the process of losing functionality. In this dying process, the person can still do some of the living activities moments before his death. Death is the endpoint where all functionality is

gone for good, and the dead man is a mindless corpse. A dying person falls (θνήσκοντες πίπτωσι)[176] yet he can also engage with others.[177] Andromache, for instance, is bitter that her husband died in battle and that he could not reach out to her whilst dying:[178]

ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα λελείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρά.
οὐ γάρ μοι θνήσκων λεχέων ἐκ χεῖρας ὄρεξας,
οὐδέ τί μοι εἶπες πυκινὸν ἔπος, οὗ τέ κεν αἰεὶ
μεμνῄμην νύκτάς τε καὶ ἤματα δάκρυ χέουσα.

Andromache suggests that dying involves her husband having the cognition and awareness to reach out to his wife. We see a similar scene in Agamemnon's narration of his death. Agamemnon, dying with a sword plunged in his chest, is able to raise his hands before striking them on the ground: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ ποτὶ γαίῃ χεῖρας ἀείρων / βάλλον ἀποθνήσκων περὶ φασγάνῳ.[179] Consider also the way in which the θυμός is in the process of leaving the dying man in *Iliad* 4.522-526:

ὃ δ᾽ ὕπτιος ἐν κονίῃσι
κάππεσεν ἄμφω χεῖρε φίλοις ἑτάροισι πετάσσας
θυμὸν ἀποπνείων· ὃ δ᾽ ἐπέδραμεν ὅς ῥ᾽ ἔβαλέν περ
Πείροος, οὗτα δὲ δουρὶ παρ᾽ ὀμφαλόν· ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα πᾶσαι
χύντο χαμαὶ χολάδες, τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψε.

Notice that the dying person still possesses some of his faculties. The present participle ἀποπνείων signifies that the θυμός has not yet departed; the person still retains it, but it is in the process of leaving the individual. Indeed, the victim is seen as having the ability to reach out to his loved ones. Here, we see that dying involves a separation of the faculties.

[176] *Il*. 1.243. On falling in Homeric epic, see Purves 2019: 37-67, esp. 26, 38.
[177] Cf. *Il*. 2.106.
[178] *Il*. 24.742-745
[179] *Od*. 11.424. Cf. Heubeck 1990: 103 *ad Od*.11.422-426.

Death, on the other hand, occurs from the moment the person dies and he thereby loses all functionality. Achilles, for instance, alludes to death when he says that the ψυχή (the *conditio sine qua non* of life) cannot come back either plundered or captured once it has passed the teeth's barrier: ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστὴ / οὔθ' ἁλετή.[180] Hector describes Achilles' death as a loss of the θυμός:[181]

τίς δ' οἶδ' εἴ κ' Ἀχιλεὺς Θέτιδος πάϊς ἠϋκόμοιο

φθήῃ ἐμῷ ὑπὸ δουρὶ τυπεὶς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσαι;

Similarly, death is imagined as a "loss of life", specifically the loss of the αἰών (ἦνερ ἀπ' αἰῶνος νέος ὤλεο).[182] Death is the moment a person is destroyed: the Achaeans will either live or meet their destruction (ἢ μάλα λυγρὸς ὄλεθρος Ἀχαιοῖς ἠὲ βιῶναι.).[183]

We also see that the post-mortem state is signified most clearly when the person travels to Hades: Note Nestor's speech in *Iliad* 7.328-330:

πολλοὶ γὰρ τεθνᾶσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,

τῶν νῦν αἷμα κελαινὸν ἐΰρροον ἀμφὶ Σκάμανδρον

ἐσκέδασ' ὀξὺς Ἄρης, ψυχαὶ δ' Ἄϊδος δὲ κατῆλθον

The Achaeans are dead (τεθνᾶσι), their blood is scattered beside the river, and their ψυχαί have gone to Hades. The primary narrator also states that Patroclus is now dead after his ψυχή left the body and journeyed to Hades in 16.856-858:

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει

ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ' ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

τὸν καὶ τεθνηῶτα προσηύδα φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ

[180] *Il*. 9.408-409.
[181] *Il*. 16.860-861.
[182] *Il*. 24.725. Cf. Brügger 2017: 261 *ad loc*.
[183] *Il*. 10.174. On the unparalleled noun and infinitive construction after ἵσταται, see Hainsworth 1993: *ad Il*. 10-173-174.

The concessive force of the adverbial καὶ indicates that Patroclus is now dead and deprived of mental faculties, so that any attempt from Hector address the corpse is futile. In addition, a person is classed as dead when he resides in Hades (ἦ ἤδη τέθνηκε καὶ εἰν Ἀίδαο δόμοισι.).[184]

Homer distinguishes between the moment the person dies and their post-mortem survival in *Odyssey* 9.523f.:

αἲ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην
εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω…

Odysseus tells Polyphemus that he wishes he could send him to Hades, having deprived him of ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών. The privative ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός stands as a metonym for life lost. The aorist participle ποιήσας emphasises that Polyphemus' journey to Hades is post-mortem and that the life faculty's departure, the moment the person dies, precedes this journey. A similar sequence is evident in *Iliad* 16.453ff.:

αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τόν γε λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών,
πέμπειν μιν θάνατόν τε φέρειν καὶ νήδυμον ὕπνον
εἰς ὅ κε δὴ Λυκίης εὐρείης δῆμον ἵκωνται,
ἔνθά έ ταρχύσουσι κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε
τύμβῳ τε στήλῃ τε·τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων.

The stages of Sarpedon's death are mapped out for us. The formulaic expression λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών is a metonym for the endpoint that Sarpedon dies: these vital attributes have gone, they no longer function and cannot return. After Sarpedon dies (ἐπὴν), the post-mortem events occur: Sleep and Death are imagined to be sent to take the corpse away to Lykia where it will receive a burial.

[184] *Od*. 4.834.

Death as a seizing and death as a fated moment present the endpoint when the person dies. We note from the examples above that a person dies (completely loses his life-faculties) *before* the corpse or remnants journey away. Polyphemus, for example, is imagined to lose his faculties before going to Hades. Similarly passages indicate that a person is seized (killed) or has met his fate before going to Hades. A good example to start with is when Agamemnon kills the sons of Antenor (11.263–4):

ἔνθ᾽ Ἀντήνορος υἷες ὑπ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃ βασιλῆϊ

πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες ἔδυν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

The sons of Antenor go towards Hades after having completed their fate. The aorist participle ἀναπλήσαντες makes it clear that the fulfilling of fate precedes the journey to Hades, in the same way that the person dies before journeying to the underworld. We note a similar construction in *Odyssey* 6.11: [185]

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἤδη κηρὶ δαμεὶς Ἄϊδόσδε βεβήκει

The aorist δαμείς emphasises that the seizing occurs before the victim goes to Hades. These metaphors, death as a seizing and death as fated moment, all seem to occur before the wraith or remnants go to Hades. We note likewise that the faculties leave when the person dies, before the journey to the underworld takes place. This then leaves us to consider that death as a fate and death as a seizing express the moment the person dies.

This evidence allows us to see where these images feature into this sequence. This, at the least, informs us that they are part of a coherent sequence of events. First, the dying person begins to lose his faculties. Second, he dies and thus meets his fate, is seized, and loses all functionality. Third, his remains then journey to Hades.

[185] *Od*. 6.11.



Fig 1. Mapping the distinction between dying and death.

A good example of this sequence is in Patroclus' death. Patroclus begins to lose his functionality; his θυμός is taken away.[186] Yet he still retains consciousness: he is able to speak to Hector and warn him of his death.[187] Death then covers him and Patroclus dies, he can no longer speak: ὣς ἄρα μιν εἰπόντα τέλος θανάτοιο κάλυψε. It is only when his ψυχή goes to Hades that he is considered dead and deprived of all mental faculties.

The coherent presentation of death

The aim of this section is to demonstrate how clashing presentations of death form a coherent whole. I begin this discussion by demonstrating where these conflicting descriptions feature into the coherent sequence that we mentioned above. In the section, above, I suggested that these metaphors represent the endpoint at which the person dies. I here aim to show that these metaphors are coherent because they are interchangeable. That is to say, Homer switches

[186] *Il.* 16.828.
[187] *Il.* 16.843-855.

from articulating death as a fated moment to suggesting death seizes the individual, all in the space of a few lines.

Homer presents salient events diversely. He presents sleep, for example, sometimes as a phenomenon and at other times an agent. Lloyd notes that these representations seem at first "incompatible." However, he argues that the combination of images in a single passage helps us to reconcile these conceptions and to class them as complementary, rather than alternative views of sleep:[188]

> None of these can be considered *the* definitive description of sleep. Each image illustrates the phenomenon under a different aspect, though each, if pressed, would seem to imply a slightly different conception of the nature of sleep. But the fact that no difficulty was experienced in reconciling these different images is shown by the way in which they may be combined in a single passage. They should, then, be treated as *complementary*, rather than as *alternative*, conceptions of the same phenomenon.

Clarke tries to advance Lloyd's argument by stating that presentations of sleep are not only "complementary" but also "indistinguishable."[189] He looks at the soporific god's speech in *Iliad* 14, where Sleep describes how he *pours over* the sleeper (ἤτοι ἐγὼ μὲν ἔλεξα Διὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο / νήδυμος ἀμφιχυθείς)[190] and how he covers Zeus in a soft sleep:[191] ἔτι εὕδει / Ζεύς, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ἐγὼ μαλακὸν περὶ κῶμ᾽ ἐκάλυψα.[192] The indistinguishability between sleep as a phenomenon and sleep as a god leads Clarke to argue that death as a phenomenon and death personified are also indistinguishable:[193]

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[188] Lloyd 1966: 202.
[189] Clarke 1999: 237, further quotes are from pages 237-239.
[190] *Il*. 14.252-253.
[191] Lloyd 1966: 202.
[192] *Il*. 14.358-359.
[193] Clarke 1999: 239.

> This is the principle that must inform our approach to death. We cannot split *θάνατος or* κήρ into two parts and call one an abstract noun and the other a personification: to understand the Homeric realities, we will need to study how individual images take shape in different ways on the shifting ground *between* those polar extremes.

But this kind of argument is difficult for us to make when examining the role of death. Unlike the god Sleep, there is no part of Homeric epic where the chthonic god, Death, speaks about being both a fated phenomenon and a predator that seizes the victim. Rather, we see periphrastic expressions of death: it metaphorically seizes or pours over the person.[194] Clarke notes that he is aware of this problem on page 243: "These roundabout expressions naturally prevent us from fixing the image as sharply as we do when the personal Thanatos walks onto the stage at Sarpedon's death."

My intention is to show that Homer's presentations of death as a fated moment and death as an agent are indistinguishable. Death as a seizing suggests that the victor or murderer brings the victim to this fated moment. Here we see how the two presentations are closely unified. An example of this coherent link appears when we examine the ghost's speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 23.77-79:

> οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων
> βουλὰς ἑζόμενοι βουλεύσομεν, <u>ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὲ μὲν κὴρ</u>
> <u>ἀμφέχανε στυγερή, ἥ περ λάχε γιγνόμενόν περ</u>

The shade tells Achilles that the two can no longer sit together because κήρ, which was given to him when he was born, gaped around him. Notice that κήρ combines the two images of

[194] *Il.* 5.553, 9.416, 11.451, 16.502, 22.361.

death into one. In the first clause, κήρ is the entity that gapes around (ἀμφέχανε) Patroclus.[195] This already suggest that we are bearing witness to the conception DEATH IS A SEIZING. However, in the second clause, κήρ is a predetermined fate. The antecedent of ἥ is the κήρ, the death that is said to be "one's day of death or doom is fixed at birth ".[196] The two representations are so closely connected that they are indistinguishable. Once we have examined the language of this passage, the two images form a coherent understanding of death. Death, for Patroclus is a fated day, and when that day comes, death gapes around him. In other words, death is both a terminal destination and a seizing.

The link between death as a seizing and as a fated destination is made explicit in Hector's dying speech in 22.297ff.:

ὦ πόποι ἦ μάλα δή με θεοὶ θάνατονδὲ κάλεσσαν·
Δηΐφοβον γὰρ ἔγωγ᾽ ἐφάμην ἥρωα παρεῖναι·
ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἐν τείχει, ἐμὲ δ᾽ ἐξαπάτησεν Ἀθήνη.
νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι θάνατος κακός, οὐδ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἄνευθεν,
οὐδ᾽ ἀλέη· ἦ γάρ ῥα πάλαι τό γε φίλτερον ἦεν
Ζηνί τε καὶ Διὸς υἷι ἑκηβόλῳ, οἵ με πάρος γε
πρόφρονες εἰρύατο: νῦν αὖτέ με μοῖρα κιχάνει.
μὴ μὰν ἀσπουδί γε καὶ ἀκλειῶς ἀπολοίμην,
ἀλλὰ μέγα ῥέξας τι καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι.

We see from the adverb θάνατονδὲ in the first sentence that death is a fated destination; it is where the gods are summoning him towards (με θεοὶ θάνατονδὲ κάλεσσαν). And yet we notice a variation of the idea that death is a seizing. Notice that the μοῖρα

[195] Here I follow Clarke that "the κήρ in question is the death which seized Patroclus on the field of battle *before* he made his way to Hades" (Clarke 1999: 249 n. 40.)

[196] Richardson 1993: 174 *ad* 23.78-79.

approaches Hector (με μοῖρα κιχάνει) and evil death stands near him (νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι θάνατος κακός) as he is dying. The personification of death seizing the individual presupposes that it is a being that can approach and stand near the victim. In this instance we see that the personification of death seizing the victim corresponds to the death as a destination. Hector approaching death (θάνατονδὲ κάλεσσαν) and thus dying (in the restricted sense defined above) corresponds to death standing near the individual. It is only when death engages with Hector, and covers over him, that Hector actually dies (τέλος θανάτοιο κάλυψε).

A more subtle articulation of this intimacy between the two image groups appears in *Odyssey* 11.134-136:

θάνατος δέ τοι ἐξ ἁλὸς αὐτῷ

ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος ἐλεύσεται, ὅς κέ σε πέφνῃ

γήρᾳ ὕπο λιπαρῷ ἀρημένον

Teiresias prophesies to Odysseus that he will die of old age (γήρᾳ ὕπο λιπαρῷ ἀρημένον). Death is already indicated as a fated moment. And yet, at the same time, it is an agent: Death encounters (ἐλεύσεται) Odysseus, and it slays him (πέφνῃ). Already this passage shows that the two forms of imagery are intimately linked. We see here that on the day Odysseus is fated to die, death will slay him. This unites the descriptions "death as a seizing and "death as meeting one's fate". Moreover, it suggests that the predetermined day the person dies is the day that death grasps the individual.

So far, we have examined examples of metaphor where death is personified as a being that can grasp the victim and presented as the moment that the person dies. We see these representations also in metonymic expressions as well. When we examine Sarpedon's prospective death in 16.433ff., we see how death as a seizing and death as a meeting of one's fate represent the same moment that the person dies. Consider Zeus' words in 433-434:

‘ὤ μοι ἐγών, ὅ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν

μοῖρ᾽ ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι.

Here the noun referring to death as a destined moment, μοῖρα, is made the subject of a verb of subduing. On the one hand, death is presented as a grasp through a metonym: Patroclus’ ability *to overpower* (δαμῆναι) Sarpedon stands for the moment that Sarpedon dies. We get from the noun μοῖρα that this moment where Sarpedon dies was fated; it was a predetermined moment.

Hera’s words in *Iliad* 16.440 ff. make explicit how these representations all work in the sequence we have proposed above:

αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες.

‘ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ

ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι;

ἔρδ᾽· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσιν·

αἴ κε ζὸν πέμψῃς Σαρπηδόνα ὃν δὲ δόμον δέ,

φράζεο μή τις ἔπειτα θεῶν ἐθέλῃσι καὶ ἄλλος

πέμπειν ὃν φίλον υἱὸν ἀπὸ κρατερῆς ὑσμίνης·

πολλοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο μάχονται

υἱέες ἀθανάτων, τοῖσιν κότον αἰνὸν ἐνήσεις.

ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τοι φίλος ἐστί, τεὸν δ᾽ ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ,

ἤτοι μέν μιν ἔασον ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ

χέρσ᾽ ὕπο Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι·

αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τόν γε λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών,

πέμπειν μιν θάνατόν τε φέρειν καὶ νήδυμον ὕπνον

We first notice that Sarpedon's death is presented as a fated moment. Hera, alarmed at Zeus' proposal to intervene, reminds him that Sarpedon has long since been doomed by this destiny (πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ).[197] She then urges Zeus to let Sarpedon be beaten down under the hands of Patroclus (Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι). Again, we see the intricacy between the representations of death as a fate and as an attack: it is fated that Sarpedon will die by Patroclus' hands. The ability to switch from one articulation to another marks that these two presentations are harmonious. Consider also the juxtaposition between 452-453:

χέρσ᾽ ὕπο Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι·

αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τόν γε λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών,

We see in the first line the metonym that the victor's attack stands for the person's death. But in the succeeding line, we notice that the privative formula we have seen a moment ago also represents Sarpedon's death. The juxtaposition shows us that two distinct images can stand for a salient event: the death of the individual. In other words, death as a grasp corresponds to death as the loss of faculties. We see this correspondence elsewhere in *Iliad* 13.671-672:

τὸν βάλ᾽ ὑπὸ γναθμοῖο. καὶ οὔατος· ᾗκα δὲ θυμὸς

ᾤχετ᾽ ἀπὸ μελέων, στυγερὸς δ᾽ ἄρα μιν σκότος εἶλεν.

Here we see a combination of two different representations: the separation of the faculty θυμός, and the σκότος capturing the individual. The metaphor DEATH IS A CAPTURE corresponds to the point at which the person loses his life faculties. This combination of metaphorical and metonymic presentations also appears in 16.502-505:

ὣς ἄρα μιν εἰπόντα τέλος θανάτοιο κάλυψεν

[197] See Brügger 2017: 209-210 ad *Il*. 16.441.

ὀφθαλμοὺς ῥῖνάς θ᾽· ὃ δὲ λὰξ ἐν στήθεσι βαίνων

ἐκ χροὸς ἕλκε δόρυ, προτὶ δὲ φρένες αὐτῷ ἔποντο·

τοῖο δ᾽ ἅμα ψυχήν τε καὶ ἔγχεος ἐξέρυσ᾽ αἰχμήν.

Here we see a similar combination of presentations. Death fully embraces the individual and covers him. This metaphor, we have already said, suggests that the dying person is now dead. In conjunction with this incorporation, the dead person has also started to lose all vital faculties: the ψυχή and the φρένες both depart. This link also occurs when Anticleia describes her death. She meets her fate (ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον) which we hear later involves her being deprived of her θυμός (θυμὸν ἀπηύρα). Likewise in 11.260-263, Coon's loss of function in the limbs (λῦσε δὲ γυῖα) corresponds to him meeting his fate (πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες). This gives us the impression that the descriptions of separation offer us different perspectives on the moment that the person dies. The close relationship between the metaphorical and metonymic presentations is illustrated by the noun-epithet for death: ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ θάνατος χύτο θυμοραϊστής.[198] Death is characterised as the "θυμός breaker"[199] at the point it ἀμφὶ … χύτο ("envelops") the person. This suggests that the faculties separate in conjunction with death's approach.

The representations of death are diverse, but the examples we have listed do suggest that they are intricately linked and represent the same stage within a coherent larger sequence. We have seen that, when the person is dying, his faculties start to fail and, concurrently, death and its agents are imagined standing around the victim. When the person finally dies, the victor, darkness, death, or gods grasp the victim and, in conjunction, the faculties are seen to make their final departure.

[198] *Il*. 13.544.
[199] Cf. Chantraine 1999: 446 s.v. θὺμος.

We can now say that death as a seizing and death as a meeting of one's fate are both expansions of a conceptual model:

SALIENT EVENTS ARE PRESENTED AS ENCOUNTERS

We have noted, in the discussions above, that death stands close to the victim (νῦν δὲ δὴ ἐγγύθι μοι θάνατος κακός).[200] The person dies the moment that death and its agents seize him.[201] Death, in other words, encounters the victim the moment that he dies. This is presented in other passages as well. Similarly, Odysseus presents death as an encounter: he tells his opponent that death will run him down and that he cannot avoid meeting it (φθῆ σε τέλος θανάτοιο κιχήμενον, οὐδ' ὑπάλυξας).[202] We see that this personification follows this basic cognitive principle when we observe how one avoids death. Sarpedon reminds Glaucus that many κῆρες stand near them, and there is no escape:[203]

νῦν δ' ἔμπης γὰρ κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο
μυρίαι, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι…

Here, Sarpedon imagines a scenario where they will encounter the agents of death and not be able to get away from them. A person who stays alive is the person who avoids encountering death.

Death as a fated moment is also based on this metaphoric principle that SALIENT EVENTS ARE ENCOUNTERS. Odysseus warns Socus that death and destruction are approaching him (ᾦ δείλ' ἦ μάλα δή σε κιχάνεται αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος, *Il*. 11.441). The victim meets fate (πότμον ἐπίσπῃς), sometimes along with death (θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ). Thetis tries to hide Achilles from this fated encounter in *Iliad* 18.464f.:

αἳ γάρ μιν θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ὦδε δυναίμην
νόσφιν ἀποκρύψαι, ὅτε μιν μόρος αἰνὸς ἱκάνοι.

[200] *Il*. 22.300. Cf. *Od*. 18.133.
[201] *Od*. 2.100, 3.238, 4.517, 11.134-136, 13.59-60, 19.145, 22.413, 24.135.
[202] *Il*. 11.451.
[203] *Il*. 12.326-327.

We note that fate (μόρος) is supposed to approach Achilles and encounter him. Fate as well draws a man to meet his death (τὸν δ' ἄγε μοῖρα κακὴ θανάτοιο τέλοσδε).[204] It also leads the victim to meet his killer (ἀλλά ἑ μοῖρα / ἦγ᾽ ἐπικουρήσοντα μετὰ Πρίαμόν τε καὶ υἷας.).[205]All of these constructions seem to follow a principle whereby a salient event is an encounter. This makes our point: that the various presentations of the shade follow a guiding principle.

The discussion establishes that many heterogenous presentations adhere to the same view. First, the representations of death as a fated phenomenon and as an agent signify the person's death. These presentations are also coherent because Homer switches from presenting death as a fated destination to then presenting it as an agent in a space of a few lines. However, more essentially, we have noted that these descriptions all follow a basic conception, a basic metaphoric principle that suggests salient events are encounters. I will now examine the contradictory presentation of the ψυχή when the person dies. In the next section, I will argue that the ψυχή which is dissolved is a product of metaphorical highlighting and so emphasises that the ψυχή no longer functions when it journeys to Hades when the person dies. This will show that conflicting presentations of the ψυχή can present a coherent conception of death. This enables us to argue that the contradictory presentations of the ghost articulate a basic conception.

The coherent presentation of the ψυχή

The aim of this section is to suggest that the presentation of the ψυχή's destruction and departure metaphorically highlight that the ψυχή ceases to function when it goes to Hades. Specifically, I suggest that the ψυχή's dissolution and the privative formula of the ψυχή

[204] *Il*. 13.602.
[205] *Il*. 5.613-614.

departing with the θυμός and μένος all follow a metaphoric principle: THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT. The meaning of the word ψυχή ranges from breath, life that is lost or put at risk, to wraith. I argue that this metaphoric principle is present when the ψυχή means life-force and breath.

Let me begin by first offering a brief overview of the ψυχή's meaning. As well as the name for the resident of Hades, the ψυχή denotes breath and life lost. For example, it is something which a person breathes out when they are unconscious. It is the faculty that is the most valued possession and integral for them to remain alive. These range of meanings occur because the ψυχή has undergone what Cairns refers to as "metonymous extension".[206] We can begin to map out the metonymical process by which ψυχή comes to be seen as a life-force faculty within the individual. We note first that the ψυχή shares it stem (ψυχ-) with ψῦχος and ψυχρός, and the verbs ψύχειν and ἀποψύχειν, all of which, as Clarke convincingly demonstrates, have in common the meanings of "coldness, breath, and blowing."[207] It comes as no surprise then that the ψυχή can be the thing which is breathed out. Andromache for instance *breathes* out her ψυχή in a moment of swooning in *Iliad* 22.466-467:[208]

τὴν δὲ κατ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρεβεννὴ νὺξ ἐκάλυψεν,

ἤριπε δ᾽ ἐξοπίσω, <u>ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσε.</u>

Likewise, Sarpedon experiences a similar syncopal moment in *Iliad* 5.696ff.:

τὸν δ᾽ ἔλιπε ψυχή, κατὰ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμῶν κέχυτ᾽ ἀχλύς·

αὖτις δ᾽ ἀμπνύθη, περὶ δὲ πνοιὴ Βορέαο

ζώγρει ἐπιπνείουσα κακῶς κεκαφηότα θυμόν.

We note from these passages that the ψυχή is the breath that one breathes out and not a life-force in this context. First, both survive even after breathing out their ψυχή. Second,

[206] Cairns 2003: 48 = 2014: §12.
[207] Clarke 1999: 144. For an impressive discussion of this etymology, see Clarke 1999: 144-147.
[208] Cf. Bickel 1926: 52-58 on the ψυχή's swoon.

Sarpedon is able to breathe back in the ψυχή (αὖτις δ᾽ ἀμπνύθη), indicating that he was still alive when it left him. But the ψυχή meaning breath soon becomes a metonym for life. We note first that Homer emphasises the exhaling of breath when a person dies.[209] And indeed, when Achilles tries to explain that his life cannot come back, he says that ψυχή cannot return once it passes through the barrier of the teeth.[210] Here then we see how ψυχή goes from meaning breath to meaning life: it is the ψυχή *qua* life that leaves the mouth never to return.

The word ψυχή has undergone metonymous extension and begins to mean a life-faculty. Agenor makes it clear in 21.568-570 that the ψυχή means life in the person:

καὶ γάρ θην τούτῳ τρωτὸς χρὼς ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,

ἐν δὲ ἴα ψυχή, θνητὸν δέ ἕ φασ᾽ ἄνθρωποι

ἔμμεναι· αὐτάρ οἱ Κρονίδης Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀπάζει.

Agenor explains that Achilles is mortal. He mentions that his skin might be torn by the spear, that there is only one ψυχή in him, and that people say he is mortal. The passage above also indicates that ψυχή is not a quality of life, but it is also integral to the living person. Achilles only having *one* (ἴα) ψυχή in him emphasises that it is not just something which the living person has, but it is the most essential possession for someone that is alive. Here, we see that the ψυχή is a valued property *within* the living person, without which the person cannot hope to stay alive. It stands to reason, therefore, that the ψυχή stands for the faculty that preserves the person's life. One such example is in Hector's dying plea to Achilles in *Iliad* 22.338:

λίσσομ' ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς καὶ γούνων σῶν τε τοκήων

It is Achilles' life that Hector wants his opponent to swear by.

[209] Cf. *Il*. 5.585, 13.398-401, 570-475, 21.181-182.
[210] *Il*. 9.408-409.

However, it becomes difficult to know which meaning of the word ψυχή we see when we examine what happens to it when the person dies. We hear from the primary narrator and characters that the ψυχή separates from the body to journey to Hades.[211] However, there are many descriptions in which the ψυχή is said to be destroyed when the person dies.[212] On other occasions, the ψυχή is said to depart along with other faculties that do not make the journey to Hades. This confusing, seemingly contradictory clash of descriptions has led a number of different scholarly interpretations to develop about the meaning of the word ψυχή. Consider Bruno Snell's suggestion for how to understand the ψυχή in Homeric epic:[213]

> "There is no justification here for assuming two different connotations of psyche, for although we shall have occasion to translate it as 'life', that is not its true meaning. The psyche which is the prize of battle, which is risked, and saved, is identical with the soul which departs from a dying man."

Warden, however, suggests that the ψυχή has two different presentations: when the ψυχή leaves the individual, we are dealing with a "death-description." In this type-scene, the ψυχή simply means "life," and does not have eschatological significance. By contrast, we can say that we are examining what Warden calls a "Totengeist usage," when the ψυχή appears to signify the being that lives a physically insubstantial life as a wraith in Hades. [214]

Thomas Jahn goes a step further and distinguishes three meanings of the word ψυχή.[215] First, the ψυχή denotes "the principle of life, or sometimes life itself."[216] Second, it

[211] *Il*. 1.3, 5.654, 7.330, 11.445, 16.625, 856, 22.362; *Od*. 10.560, 11.65, 24.1-10.
[212] *Il*. 5.296, 8.123, 315, 13.763, 22.325, 24.168.
[213] Snell 1953: 8.
[214] Warden 1971: 95-103, esp. 95.
[215] Jahn 1987: 28-38.
[216] Cf. Jahn 1987: 28-31 §3.1.

is an entity which travels to Hades.[217] Third, it is a being who, once in Hades, is a ghost and represents the deceased person.[218]

Clarke on the other hand, resists such distinctions. He suggests that the ψυχή which is lost at death is the cold breath which the dying man breathes out before he dies, of which the ψυχή as a survivor of Hades is a homonym: "the shade and the last breath relate to the substance of the dead man in distinct and unconnected ways."[219] Cairns also proposes that the ψυχή which is destroyed is the same as the ψυχή which lives on to survive in Hades. [220]

My approach to this problem incorporates elements of all of these arguments. Like Snell, Jahn,[221] and Cairns, I argue that the ψυχή which disappears and the ψυχή which lives on in Hades are the same thing. I similarly, however, agree with Warden that the descriptions of the ψυχή's disappearance are devoid of eschatological content. Nevertheless, I emphasise (this is not a point that Warden makes) that its disappearance and destruction is another way of asserting that the ψυχή leaves the body and journeys to Hades. Warden suggests that there is a "semantic distinction"[222] between the death descriptions and the Totengeist usage. Here I take a different stance: I suggest that the primary narrator is not saying that the ψυχή means something different from the being which goes to Hades when he describes the ψυχή's destruction. Rather, I suggest that the destruction describes a feature of this journey, the moment that the ψυχή no longer functions within the individual when it goes to Hades. This suggestion, if correct, means that there is no difference between the ψυχή which is destroyed and the ψυχή which lives on its life in Hades as a wraith. This analysis will help us to determine that seemingly contradictory descriptions of the ψυχή can articulate the same conception. This in turn will give grounds for our suggestion that the contradictory

[217] Jahn 1987: 32-36 §3.2.
[218] Cf. Jahn 1987: 37-38 §3.3.
[219] Clarke 1999: 205, see also 148. Cf. Cairns 2003: 51.
[220] Cairns 2003: 52-56.
[221] See Jahn 1987: 32 §3.2.
[222] Warden 1971: 95.

presentations of the ψυχή *qua* wraith are compatible and should and present a coherent view of post-mortem survival.

The problem with many of the current studies of the word ψυχή is that scholars do not seem to factor in the epistemological differences between primary and secondary focalisers' descriptions. That is to say, scholars do not seem to distinguish between the external narrator's and internal focalisers' descriptions of the ψυχή. For example, Odysseus' threat to send Polyphemus to Hades, bereft of ψυχή, encouraged Warden to suggest that the ψυχή has two usages, the "Totengeist usage" and the usage in "death-descriptions."[223] But Warden has based an argument on a character's threat; a character who, for all we know, was not fully aware until he went to Hades that the inhabitant of the underworld is a ψυχή.

Clarke's analysis also faces similar difficulties. He suggests that the conception of the ψυχή's extinction as a last breath is "irresistible" if we consider Odysseus' threat to Polyphemus.[224] But this reading can only be "irresistible" if we assume that the poet and the characters have exactly the same knowledge about the inhabitant of Hades. There is, however, no reason for us to make this assumption. The primary narrator, for instance, is fully aware that the wraith exists in Hades, and yet the internal focaliser, Achilles (in *Iliad* 23.103-104[a]), is shocked to find that the wraith exists in the underworld (ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι / ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον). Achilles' speech underlies that the characters are not aware that the ψυχή survives death. This means that we cannot rely solely on character speeches alone to determine whether the ψυχή has two different meanings.

Cairns says that Odysseus' threat was the "one exception" to his hypothesis that the survivor of death is a ψυχή. Cairns attempts to make sense of this passage by supposing that "two senses of the ψυχή – that which animates the individual and that which survives death –

[223] *Ibid.*
[224] Clarke 1999: 137.

diverge, Odysseus emphasizing the former while ignoring its normal relation to the latter."[225] He admits that this reading is "undeniably awkward"; but this special pleading is not even necessary, if we consider that Odysseus does not know (at the time he delivers this speech) what exists in Hades.

This is not to say that Odysseus' speech in *Odyssey* 9.523-525 or other similar passages are unimportant. On the contrary, these speeches give us a great insight into the characters' preconceptions about the survivor in Hades. The problem occurs when we automatically treat the characters' speeches as doctrinal descriptions about what exists in the underworld. These characters have never been to Hades at the time they make these threats. Therefore, for this discussion, we shall keep in mind the epistemological differences between the internal and external focalisers' conceptions of the ψυχή. I should stress also that I am not seeking out a definition of the word ψυχή. Many scholars have examined the semantic value of this word,[226] and it is very possible that ψυχή can have multiple meanings. Rather, my aim is simply to show that these descriptions of the ψυχή's destruction and departure do not support the idea that ψυχή which leaves the person is something different from the ψυχή that goes to Hades.

To achieve this, I will examine the passages in which the ψυχή means "last breath" and "life-force." I suggest that the former meaning is used as a metonym for "life lost", while the latter is an ontological metaphor that presents the loss of life.[227] These various meanings and constructions, I argue, indicate that the ψυχή, either when it means breath or life, is not imagined as dissolved or annihilated when Homer says it is destroyed.

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[225] Cairns 2003: 61 n. 44.
[226] Some very useful discussions on this word are Otto (1923: 23-21); Rohde (1925: chapter 1, esp. pages 4-10); Böhme (1929: 102-106 and 114-126); Regenbogen (1948); Clarke (1999: esp. 53-60); Carins (2003: 45-56).
[227] Here I define an ontological metaphor as a metaphor that makes abstract, non-physical targets knowable by presenting them as physical objects and substances. See Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 48-59) and Kövecses 2010: 38-39.

My argument here intends to expand Cairns' metaphorical approach. Cairns applies a cognitive metaphor model to the study of the ψυχή. In his review article of Clarke's 1999 monograph, Cairns argued that the ψυχή which is taken away is the same as the ψυχή that descends to Hades:[228]

> We have seen that the ψυχή can [mean] more than just the cold breath of death; it can be a valued possession that the individual strives to retain, that he risks when facing danger, and that his opponents seek to take from him as their prize. In this sense, the ψυχή that is in the man is clearly identified with the ψυχή that descends to Hades in the phrase εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν [*vel* δοίης], ψυχὴν δ' Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ (*Iliad*, 5. 654, 11. 445, 16. 625). As in *Iliad* 9. 408-9, 22. 159-61, and *Odyssey* 1. 5 (above), ψυχή here is the life that is the prized possession of the individual or the prize to be won by his opponent; in this case the recipient of the prize is Hades, which is a metaphorical way of confirming that the ψυχή that resides in the person in life descends to Hades in death.

Cairns provides a wealth of evidence to support this notion. However, his analysis does not factor in two important presentations of the ψυχή. First, he does not examine the formulaic passages that describe the ψυχή departing alongside faculties that do not survive the journey to Hades (τοῦ δ' αὖθι λύθη ψυχή τε μένος τε; similarly: θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κεκαδὼν).[229] Second, his analysis fails to consider the passages that suggest the ψυχή is destroyed. This means his interpretation is open to criticism. For these presentations suggest that the ψυχή is dissolved along with the other faculties. Cairns' metaphorical reading, while helpful, is limited by the formulaic passages. In addition, it is easy to look at the passages that portray the ψυχή's destruction and to think that they present an alternative view to the one

[228] Cairns 2003: 54.
[229] Cf. *Il*. 5.296, 8.123, 315, 11.334; *Od*. 21.154, 171.

where ψυχή, meaning life, is given to Hades. Cairns' application of metaphor theory does not explain how we make sense of ψυχή as life that is given to Hades and life that is destroyed.

I instead wish to develop Cairns' model further by concentrating on two parts of metaphor theory: metaphorical highlighting and metonymic constructions. I suggest that the descriptions of the ψυχή's destruction are what Lakoff and Johnson refer to as "brittle object metaphors" – the idea that intangible (mostly psychological) entities are understood as objects capable of breaking. These metaphors, I suggest, are present when we understand ψυχή either as an ontological metaphor for life or as a metonym for life lost. I will first explore how ψυχή comes to mean breath and how it stands as a metonym for life. I will argue that this metonym contains the "brittle object" metaphor. Second, I aim to show how ψυχή as meaning "life" uses the "brittle object" ontological metaphor.

The significance of looking at this "brittle" metaphor is that it does not imply that the ψυχή is actually extinguished or suggest that we are dealing with conflicting conceptions about the fate of the wraith. Rather, the metaphor suggests that the ψυχή *ceases to function* when it leaves the Homeric man. In this regard, the metaphorical construction allows for us to see a coherent presentation of the wraith and the afterlife. Kövecses, for example, observes that the metaphor THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT can highlight and hide what "we can call 'psychological strength'– or, in this case, the lack of it."[230] When I use the metaphor "I am shattered", I am highlighting that I am not able to function; I am exhausted mentally and physically (presumably from editing this thesis). However, by making this metaphorical highlight and using the brittle object metaphor, I am also hiding other aspects of my mental and physical capabilities:[231] that I can walk to my bedroom and that I am capable of recognising it is time to go to sleep. In other words, the ψυχή's destruction as a brittle object

[230] Kövecses 2010: 92.
[231] On the significance between metaphorical highlighting and aspect perception, see Chapter Two.

metaphor highlights that the ψυχή is no longer functioning in the person. In addition, the ψυχή's destruction, as a brittle object metaphor, suggests that Homer is hiding the ψυχή's descent to Hades. In this way, the brittle object metaphor means that the ψυχή exists in Hades.

However, it may seem that we are overestimating the extent to which the brittle object metaphor can express the lack of functionality. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the MIND IS A MACHINE metaphor denotes the lack of psychological functionality. By contrast, the MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT, they argue, does not express the kind of psychological dysfunctionality that we are proposing. Consider the following discussion:[232]

> The MACHINE metaphor gives us a conception of the mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, a productive capacity, an internal mechanism, a source of energy, and an operating condition." The brittle object metaphor is not nearly as rich. It allows us to talk only about psychological strength. However, there is a range of mental experience that can be conceived of in terms of either metaphor. The examples we have in mind are these:
>
> He broke down, (THE MIND IS A MACHINE)
>
> He cracked up. (THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT)
>
> But these two metaphors do not focus on exactly the same aspect of mental experience. When a machine breaks down, it simply ceases to function. When a brittle object shatters, its pieces go flying, with possibly dangerous consequences. Thus, for example, when someone goes crazy and becomes wild or violent, it would be appropriate to say "He cracked up." On the other hand, if someone becomes lethargic and unable to function for psychological reasons, we would be more likely to say "He broke down."

[232] Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 53.

Yet functionality does underpin both of these metaphors. We see this when we examine the MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT metaphorical expressions. “The experience shattered him” brings to mind that the experience has left the person weak, physically and mentally unable to function to normal standards. Likewise, “His mind snapped” presupposes that the person’s mind is not in the proper working condition and is dysfunctional. All of this means that the brittle metaphors “ψυχή destroyed, ψυχή loosed” can imply a lack of functionality when the wraith leaves the person to journey to Hades.

We notice that certain metonymies contain this brittle object metaphor. In the “my heart is broken” metonym, we observe that there is a metaphorical construction: the heart (the target domain) is understood as a physical object that is capable of breaking (the source domain). But the expression itself follows a metonymic principle: PROPERTY FOR SALIENT EXPERIENCE. When we appreciate the role of metaphor in metonymic expressions, we start to read the actions in these idioms less literally. We do not, for instance, believe that a heart is capable of actually breaking. I will argue that the formulaic descriptions of the ψυχή breaking and dissolving are metonyms and that these descriptions are hyperbolic and do not conflict with the predominant conception that the ψυχή travels to Hades.

The ψυχή *qua* breath as a metonym for life lost and the privative formulaic pairings of ψυχή, θυμός, and μένος.

To show that there is evidence that the brittle object metaphor is present in these paired formulas, we need to address these passages head-on. Let us begin this analysis by first addressing the extracts which describe the ψυχή’s destruction. One formula suggests that the ψυχή dissolves along with the μένος when the person dies: τοῦ δ’ αὖθι λύθη ψυχή τε μένος

τε.[233] The meaning of λύω is wide ranging.[234] It describes the action of unbinding,[235] of releasing and setting someone free from confinement,[236] of setting someone or something free for a ransom,[237] of unyoking horses,[238] of settling debates,[239] of destroying something into pieces,[240] and of dissipating vital faculties.[241] Clarke acknowledges that λύθη ψυχή means the ψυχή is dissipated.[242] However, he takes this to mean that it is destroyed. According to Clarke, if the ψυχή and μένος are paired together, then the ψυχή here does not journey to Hades, but is destroyed. After all, if the μένος does not journey to Hades, then there is supposedly no reason to assume that the ψυχή does as well:[243]

> Consider the formula τοῦ δ' αὖθι λύθη ψυχή τε μένος τε (ν. 296 = VIII. I23 = 315), narrating a death: since μένος cannot survive death, the pairing suggests that what is referred to here is not a flight to Hades but the disappearance and extinction of the final breath.

Sullivan similarly says that: "at the moment of death ψυχή either leaves the man and goes to Hades or is itself loosed."[244] Sullivan speaks as though two contradictory presentations of the ψυχή exist, one in which the ψυχή makes a journey and the other where it is simply loosed. But these two descriptions are not necessarily contradictory. We may compare the departure of the ψυχὴ to the other faculties lost at death. Notice that the limbs are loosened at death (λῦσε δὲ γυῖα) just like the ψυχή and μένος (λύθη ψυχή τε μένος). It is

[233] *Il*. 5.296, 8.123, 314. See also *Il*. 17.298.
[234] Cf. *LfrgE* sv. λύω on the verb's extensive semantic range.
[235] Cf. *Il*. 4.215, 14.214, 16.804, 17.318; *Od*. 2.418, 3.392, 5.459, 10.47, 11.245, 13.77.
[236] Cf. *Od*. 4.422, 8.345, 347, 360, 9.463, 10.298, 385,387, 11.296, 12.53, 163,193.
[237] Cf. *Il*. 1.13=372, 20, 29, 10.378, 11.106, 17.163, 21.42, 80, 24.76, 116, 118=146=195, 137, 175, 237, 502, 555, 561, 593, 599, 685.
[238] Cf. *Il*. 8.433, 5.369, 10.480,498, 11.620, 18.244, 23.27, 24.576 ; *Od*. 4.35,39, 7.6, 23.7,11.
[239] Cf. *Il*. 14.205=304 ; *Od*. 7.74.
[240]Cf. *Il*. 2.118= 9.25, 2.135 ; *Od*.12.421, 13.388, 22.186.
[241]Cf. *Il*. 5.176, 7.6, 12, 13.85, 360, 16.332, 805, 17.29, 18.31, 21.114, 425; *Od*. 4.703, 5.297=406=22.147, 14.69,236, 18.212, 238, 242, 341, 22.68, 23.205, 24.345,381.
[242] Clarke 1999: 137.
[243] Clarke 1999: 137.
[244] Sullivan 1979: 32.

widely acknowledged that, for the former, the passage is a hyperbolic metonym for death; it is at no point assumed that the limbs are literally scattered away. Rather, the term serves as a way of expressing that the limbs are now no longer functioning within the individual. By the same token, there is no reason to assume that, when the ψυχή is said to be loosed along with the μένος, the phrase means anything more than simply the loss of working faculties at death. In other words, the ψυχή being dissipated does not contradict the conception that the ψυχή departs for Hades. On the contrary, it metaphorically highlights one aspect of the ψυχή's journey, the point at which the ψυχή no longer functions in the living individual.

Nevertheless, the ψυχή appears to be paired with other life-faculties which do extinguish. We have argued against Clarke's literal reading of the ψυχή's destruction because the formula is a hyperbolic expression, not a literal translation. But we cannot assume that similar privative formulas are so exaggerated. On the contrary, it is very possible to apply Clarke's argument above to other formulaic pairings. Take, for example, *Iliad.* 11.333-335:

> τοὺς μὲν Τυδεΐδης δουρικλειτὸς Διομήδης
> θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κεκαδὼν κλυτὰ τεύχε᾽ ἀπηύρα·
> Ἱππόδαμον δ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς καὶ Ὑπείροχον ἐξενάριξεν.

Notice that the ψυχή and θυμός are paired together as the faculties which leave the individual at death. But the θυμός is never said to travel to Hades. If we went by Clarke and Sullivan's line of argument, it is possible to suggest that the ψυχή also does not make the journey to the other world. In fact, Clarke comes very close to making this line of argument (in 133-137). He notes that this formula "suggests that in death the meanings of these two words are very close to each other, with no decisive dividing line between them" (134). From this, he proceeds to list several examples that show the ψυχή is imagined as the entity that is lost at death and as the entity that someone can take away. He notes that these descriptions are similar to the θυμός's departure. This, in turn, leads him to the suggestion that, if the loss

of the θυμός is imagined as the expiration of the last breath, then the loss of the ψυχή also means the dying air that is breathed out and annihilated:

> Together, the two groups of passages recall the usual pattern for the loss of θυμός: to die is to lose it, to kill is to win it from the foe, and since victory is the foe's death it becomes a sign of the prize for which they struggle. All this suggests that in essence the loss of ψυχή is the same event as the loss of θυμός, the sudden expiration of the last breath (135).

It is true that the ψυχή and θυμός have similar departures since they can leave through the mouth and wound at death.[245] However, we cannot take from this argument the literal understanding that "the loss of ψυχή is the same event as the loss of θυμός, the sudden expiration of the last breath." For, if we were to do this, we would be doing exactly what Clarke criticises Regenbogen of: "emphasizing what seems logical rather than what Homer actually says."[246] On the contrary, the loss of the ψυχή involves the journey to Hades. This much is made clear in Patroclus' and Hector's death scenes:

> ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει
>
> ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ᾽ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

This passage provides the greatest support for our argument: the ψυχή does not just leave the body, never to be heard of again, but makes a departure to Hades. We cannot then assume that the loss of the ψυχή is the same as the as the loss of the θυμός. Clarke suggests that this passage is creative and is made up from the conception that ψυχή is, first and foremost, the last breath. But by looking at other pieces of evidence, we can see that the two

[245] Cf. *Il*. 9.408-409~16.468, 14.518~12.386.
[246] Clarke 1999: 47.

faculties are not to be imagined as extinguished. There is a clear dividing line between the ψυχή and θυμός and this is made explicit in Anticleia's speech in *Odyssey* 11.218-222:

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν·

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,

ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο

δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός,

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

On the one hand (μέν), the fire burns the body *as soon as* (ἐπεί κε πρῶτα) the θυμός left the bones; but *on the other hand* (δ᾽), the ψυχή is in a state of floating [in Hades], having flown away [from the body] like a dream. The syntax of this passage suggests that the θυμός which leaves the individual has a very different fate to the ψυχή. Clarke is the first to admit that this passage "flies in the face" of his interpretation because "an unparalleled distinction would be set up between loss of θυμός and of ψυχή, with the θυμός leaving the bones and the ψυχή going to Hades." Clarke tries to resolve this glaring problem by suggesting that verse 221 is part of a digressive sequence of ideas from 219-221 in which the departure of the θυμός is supposedly not contrasted to the movements of the ψυχή in 222. But, as we shall see in chapter four, this digression cannot work. The particles ἐπεί κε πρῶτα show that 221 is sequentially linked to 220: the fire destroys the corpse *as soon as* the θυμός leaves the limbs. But in 220, a contrast is presented between what happens to the ψυχή and the body through the co-ordinating conjunctions μέν…δέ: these (sinews, bones and flesh) are destroyed by fire as soon as the θυμός *leaves,* but (δε) *(as this cremation takes place*) the ψυχή is already in Hades in a state of floating, having flown away. This means that the fate of the ψυχή is in

direct contrast to the events that happen in 220-221. This, in turn, means that the ψυχή and θυμός are in contrast to one another.

Let us show this contrast more explicitly by demonstrating how the ψυχή has its existence in Hades in this passage:

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

Cairns suggests that this passage "joins the others considered above in reinforcing the view that the ψυχή that is expired on death becomes the ψυχή that dwells in Hades."[247] I agree with Cairns that the ψυχή, which is supposedly breathed out, is in fact the inhabitant of Hades. However, I argue that Anticleia does not even suggest the ψυχή is expired in this passage. Cairns argues that if we assign a perfective meaning to πεπότηται, "is gone", then Anticleia suggests that the ψυχή "is gone" because it has "flown off" (ἀποπταμένη). "Is gone" is a possible rendering of πεπότηται, but it does not make sense in this context. Anticleia is attempting to explain to Odysseus why she flew away from him like a physically insubstantial dream (μοι ἐκ χειρῶν σκιῇ εἴκελον ἢ καὶ ὀνείρῳ / ἔπτατ᾽). We need the stative reading of πεπότηται "in a state of floating" to show why Anticleia is in the same physically insubstantial state in Hades as she was when she flew away (ἀποπταμένη).[248] The polyptoton ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται reveals that the ψυχὴ, which departs from the dead man (ἀποπταμένη), now has its existence in Hades in a similar state of flight (πεπότηται).

Besides, the description of the ψυχή's departure to Hades in 11. 222 is a variation of a formulaic phrase in which the ghost flies away from the body to journey to Hades. Notice that the polyptoton ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται echoes the formulaic description that the ψυχή departs from the body and, instead of evaporating, travels to Hades:

[247] Cairns 2003: 56.
[248] On uses of the perfect, see Wackernagel 1924: 166-171; Chantraine 1953: 197-201; Kiparsky 1968: 35; Ruijgh 1971: §215, §217; Friedrich 1974: S16-22, esp. 16; Sihler 1995: 572-579; Wackernagel 2009: 193. See also Duhoux 2000: 406-414.

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδοσδὲ βεβήκει. This evidence informs us that Anticleia cannot indicate that the ψυχή expires through the perfect or through this formulaic phrase.

Anticleia, in other words, emphasises that the ψυχή which flies away from the dead man (ἀποπταμένη) continues to exist in Hades in a state of flight.[249] This enables us to see that other passages, which describe the departure of the ψυχή from the dead man, indicate that the ψυχή not only departs from the individual but lives on in the other world.

We have now suggested that the ψυχή and θύμος have different fates when the person dies. This suggests that the privative formula, in which the ψυχή and θύμος depart together, should not be taken literally. Indeed, the formulaic pairing suggests that we are bearing witness to a metonym. Consider *Odyssey* 21.152-156:

> ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ τανύω, λαβέτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλος.
> πολλοὺς γὰρ τόδε τόξον ἀριστῆας κεκαδήσει
> θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἐστι
> τεθνάμεν ἢ ζώοντας ἁμαρτεῖν, οὖθ᾽ ἕνεκ᾽ αἰεὶ
> ἐνθάδ᾽ ὁμιλέομεν, ποτιδέγμενοι ἤματα πάντα.

The formulaic expression κεκαδήσει θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς describes the physiological effects that are supposed to stand for the life that is lost. But contained within this metonym is a metaphorical construction where the θυμός and ψυχή's ceasing to function (the target domain), is described as a deprivation, κεκαδήσει (the source domain). This means that the expression does not emphasise a conflicting eschatological view of the ψυχή's fate; it simply highlights that it ceases to function. Other metonyms appear to contain similar metaphoric constructions. Cairns convincingly applies Lakoff and Kövecses' cognitive model of anger to

[249] *Od*. 11.207-208.

Homeric Greek.[250] We note, for instance, that the κραδίη in the Homeric man swells: ἀλλά μοι οἰδάνεται κραδίη χόλῳ ὁππότ' ἐκείνων.[251] Here again, we see metaphoric construction in the metonym: the κραδίη (the target domain) is imagined as a substance that becomes larger (the source domain).[252] We also note a number of instances where Homer follows the principle: A PERSON'S PHYSIOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS STAND FOR A SALIENT EVENT.

In *Odyssey* 11.562 Odysseus pleads to Ajax not to be angry at him by telling him to restrain his θυμός: δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν. This is a metaphorical construction: we understand the θυμός and μένος (the target domain) as animals that can be restrained (the source domain). This adds to the notion that the metonym κεκαδήσει θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς does not tell us that the ψυχή fails to survive the journey to Hades, it simply is a metaphor that presents its lack of functionality in the person.

The ψυχή *qua* life's destruction and the brittle object metaphor

We have argued that the ψυχή's destruction is not meant to be read literally, in light of its metonymic role and formulaic pairing with other faculties. Let us now demonstrate how the ψυχή's destruction is also metaphorical when we understand ψυχή to mean "life."

The ψυχή can be imagined as the life that is taken away from someone (δώῃ καμμονίην, σὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀφέλωμαι).[253] Achilles, for example, strives to take Hector's ψυχή when he chases after him (ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς θέον Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο.).[254] But even then these meanings can overlap. Characters, for instance, imagine that they give the ψυχή *qua* life

[250] Cf. Cairns 2003: 73 n. 67. Cf. Lakoff and Kövecses 1987: 195-221.
[251] *Il*. 9.646,
[252] Cf. Cairns 2003: 72-73.
[253] *Il*. 22.257. Cf. *Od*. 22.444.
[254] *Il*. 22.161.

away to Hades (εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν, ψυχὴν δ' Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ) after having taken it from the person.[255] After all, if the victor can imagine taking the deceased's "life" away, then he can also conceive of giving that life force to another person. Both meanings of ψυχή (wraith and life) have the potential to overlap. Note, for instance, the metaphor in the proem to the *Iliad* 1.3: πολλὰς δ᾽ ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν. The word ψυχάς refers to the ghosts, but it is understood from the verb προΐαψεν that Achilles had taken away these ψυχαί *qua* ghosts from the living before he hurled them to Hades, much like the person who takes away ψυχή *qua* life force. In this way the meanings of life and wraith can be closely interconnected within the word ψυχή.

The evidence above suggests that the concept of ψυχή *qua* life and ψυχή *qua* wraith are similar: both can be understood as metaphorically handled by the victor and both can be given to Hades. However, there are a number of other presentations which give the impression that the ψυχή *qua* life is annihilated once it leaves the body: the ψυχή is destroyed at death (ψυχῆς ὤκιστος ὄλεθρος),[256] and those who die are ψυχὰς ὀλέσαντες.[257] These passages fly in the face of our desire to seek a coherent model of death. For if the ψυχή can be imagined as destroyed at death, then we are to understand that it does not survive the journey to Hades. If it does not survive the journey to the other world, then we cannot say that there is a coherent presentation of the ψυχή or, by extension a coherent view of death. This in turn undermines the main premise of our argument to seek a coherent presentation of the shade.

I argue that these presentations do not actually suggest that the ψυχή vanishes into non-existence. On the contrary, if we pay close attention to the Greek, we see that these are brittle object metaphors that denote the ψυχή no longer functions in the Homeric man. It is a

[255] *Il*. 5.654, 11.445, 16.625.
[256] *Il*. 22.325.
[257] *Il*. 13.763, 24.168. On ὀλέσαντες connoting destruction, see Clarke 1999: 137.

common motif in Homeric epic to talk about a faculty as destroyed or as annihilated when it ceases to function. Take, as an example, Nestor's admission of his age in *Iliad* 7.157. He wishes that he was as young as he was when in battle, and wishes to have continuous strength:

εἴθ᾽ ὡς ἠβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη

Nestor's admission of age informs us that his strength is, at the least, dysfunctional. We learn later from Diomedes that Nestor's strength is conceptualised as something which no longer exists, it has dissolved (σὴ δὲ βίη λέλυται, χαλεπὸν δέ σε γῆρας ὀπάζει).[258] Ares angrily imagines that he could either be dead or be living a strengthless existence after being wounded by the spear (5.885–7):

…ἦ τέ κε δηρὸν

αὐτοῦ πήματ᾽ ἔπασχον ἐν αἰνῇσιν νεκάδεσσιν,

ἢ κε ζὼς ἀμενηνὸς ἔα χαλκοῖο τυπῇσι.

Ares equates his weakness with the idea that he lacks strength completely. The same is true with mental faculties as well. In *Iliad* 15.129, Hera accuses Ares of being deranged of wits and says that his mind and sense of reverence are destroyed: νόος δ᾽ ἀπόλωλε καὶ αἰδώς. Likewise, Paris, alarmed by Antenor's argument, thinks that the gods have destroyed his wits: ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί.[259] All of these expressions are, of course, hyperbolic, but they do emphasise that, in Homeric epic, a faculty is described as non-existent if it ceases to function.

This hyperbolic language is not just a feature of character descriptions, but also of the primary narrator's imagery. Hector loses the strength in his knees and faints:[260]

αὖτις δ᾽ ἐξοπίσω πλῆτο χθονί, τὼ δέ οἱ ὄσσε

[258] *Il*. 8.103.
[259] *Il*. 7.360.
[260] *Il*. 14.438.

νὺξ ἐκάλυψε μέλαινα· βέλος δ᾽ ἔτι θυμὸν ἐδάμνα.

Darkness covers Hector's eyes, and the stone overcame his θυμός (θυμὸν ἐδάμνα), just like with the person that dies. But we note that θυμός' destruction cannot be literal here since Hector does not die until eight books later. Rather, the metaphor of the subdued θυμός makes explicit that it momentarily ceases to function. This brittle object metaphor also appears in the formula λῦσε δὲ γυῖα. As mentioned, we do not assume from λῦσε that the limbs in the person are actually loosened. Rather, we get from this expression that they now no longer are a working body part for the dying man. The same is true when the primary narrator says that the limbs and the heart were loosed (λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ).[261] These faculties still exist in the person, but they now do not work.

All of this suggests that the ψυχή *qua* life-faculty can be presented as destroyed when it leaves the Homeric man. We note that the ψυχή, when it is in the person, performs as a life faculty. This as much is made clear when Agenor says that there is only one ψυχή in Achilles. .[262] However, Clarke maintains that the "basis of the image is its [the ψυχή's] loss".[263] But the ψυχή as a lost faculty does imply that it preserves life when it is in the individual. This suggests that life ceases to function when it leaves the person. We come back to Sarpedon's death when it is imagined that the ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών leave him. When these two have left him, he is considered dead. This already makes explicit the schema "out = dead and a lack of functioning life". This means that the ψυχή's destruction can metaphorically highlight its lack of functionality when the life force is said to leave the body and be given to Hades (εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν, ψυχὴν δ' Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ.).

[261] Cf. *Il*. 21.114, 425; *Od*. 4.703, 5.297, 406, 22.68, 147, 23.205, 24.345.
[262] See Otto 1923: 25, Snell 1953: 9; Adkins 1970: 14, Richardson 1993: 101 *ad Il*.21.568-570; Cairns 2003: 49, Cairns 2014: §17.
[263] Clarke 1999: 59.

Let us now observe how the brittle-object metaphor applies to the ψυχή when it is said to be destroyed. One passage in particular that suggests the ψυχή is not annihilated at death but lives on in Hades is *Iliad*. 22.324-329:

φαίνετο δ᾽ ᾗ κληῖδες ἀπ᾽ ὤμων αὐχέν᾽ ἔχουσι
λαυκανίην, ἵνα τε ψυχῆς ὤκιστος ὄλεθρος·
τῇ ῥ᾽ ἐπὶ οἱ μεμαῶτ᾽ ἔλασ᾽ ἔγχεϊ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς,
ἀντικρὺ δ᾽ ἀπαλοῖο δι᾽ αὐχένος ἤλυθ᾽ ἀκωκή·
οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἀσφάραγον μελίη τάμε χαλκοβάρεια,
ὄφρά τί μιν προτιείποι ἀμειβόμενος ἐπέεσσιν.

It is the throat where the ψυχή is most quickly destroyed. Clarke seems to take this passage as an indication that the ψυχή faces destruction at death.[264] But we see that the phrase ψυχῆς ὤκιστος ὄλεθρος cannot be taken literally. On the contrary, Achilles casts his spear at the throat and it is once the contact is made that the ψυχή eventually departs and journeys to Hades:

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει
ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ᾽ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

This passage provides us with the strongest evidence for our brittle-object reading. The ψυχή's destruction highlights that the ψυχή ceases to function, and hides the shade's journey to Hades: it leaves the person's manhood and youth (λιποῦσ᾽ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην). This evidence enables us to see that there is not necessarily a difference between the ψυχή which dissipates at death and the one which lives on its existence in Hades. Rather, the

[264] Clarke 1999: 137.

descriptions of destruction metaphorically highlight the ψυχή's lack of functionality in the Homeric man.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate how other inconsistent eschatological presentations, in Homeric epic, present a harmonious understanding of what happens to a person when he dies. The aim was to provide more ground support for our main argument that the inconsistent descriptions of the ghosts, in Hades, all should be read as a coherent whole. We have explored several of the ways in which Homer presents death. We have arrived at the conclusion that all of these diverse descriptions adhere to the view that, after the person dies, part of them journeys to Hades.

We first established that these presentations represent a specific stage in a dying process, a coherent sequence. In the introduction, for example, we gave an overview of how death as a seizing and death as a fate present the endpoint that the person dies, and how the descent to the underworld follows. By showing where these contradictory presentations fit into this sequence, we have demonstrated that inconsistent eschatological descriptions, in Homer, can present a coherent understanding of what happens to the person when he dies. This discussion enables us to argue, in the following chapters, the diverse presentations of the wraith are efforts to articulate a coherent view of the ghost that resides in Hades.

Once we examined where these representations of death featured in this sequence, we argued that death as a fate and death as a seizing could not be dismissed as alternative incompatible conceptions. On the contrary, we saw that the death, in one line, is presented as a fated phenomenon, and, in the succeeding line, as an agent that seizes the individual. This

shift from one articulation to another emphasises that the two presentations are intricately linked and are meant to be read as a coherent whole.

We have also established that the contradictory presentations of death are not incompatible but are efforts to follow a coherent metaphoric principle. That is to say, the various representations of death (as a seizing and as a fate) all articulate a basic conceptual model: SALIENT EVENTS ARE ENCOUNTERS. This part of the chapter was particularly important for our argument because it invites us to explore how the diverse presentations of the ghost in Hades follow a basic folk-model: ψυχή-εἴδωλον has some characteristics of the once living person, and some of an insentient being.

In the second section of this chapter, we maintained that the inconsonant descriptions of the ψυχή's destruction do not present an alternative view of death. Rather this presentation metaphorically highlights the point at which the ψυχή ceases to function when it journeys to Hades. We argued that this presentation was a brittle object metaphor. We demonstrated that this metaphor appeared when the ψυχή served as a metonym for life-lost and when it was understood as meaning life.

All of this evidence has given ground for us to investigate how the diverse presentations of the shade can present a coherent view of post-mortem existence. Let us now move to the next chapter where we shall demonstrate that characters attempt to describe a single conception of the ghost by using aspect perception.

PART ONE

THE WRAITH AND THE JOURNEY TO HADES.

Chapter Two

The wraith when it journeys to Hades

Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine the presentation of the shade when it travels to Hades. As noted at the start of the introduction, the shade is presented contradictorily as the remnants of a corpse, as a θυμός, and as an εἴδωλον. I will argue that these presentations capture what Wittgenstein refers to as "aspects". Characters, I suggest, notice these aspects by making a selection, foregrounding (and thereby utilising and highlighting these terms in constructing metaphors)[265] some properties of the shade and hiding others. I will then suggest that, when they foreground these properties, they notice an "internal relation",[266] an apparent similarity between the ψυχή and other entities such as the dead man, the θυμός, and the εἴδωλον. When the secondary focalisers report these aspects, they use the εἴδωλον, θυμός, and corpse as cognitive metaphors to describe the ψυχή. [267]

[265] Utilisation is a specific term in metaphor theory. It describes how some parts of the source domain are used, and other parts are left out. For example, in the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS only certain characteristics are used to describe the target domain. Thus, when we say "he's a pig", the pig in the source domain is used because the pig is characterised as greedy and self-serving, but in this metaphor we leave out the other behavior traits of the animal. Thus we do not mean that the person we call a pig rolls around in dirt and eats apple cores. See Kövecses 2010: 329. On its target domain counterpart, see ch. 1, page 83.
[266] On this Wittgensteinian term, see page 14, and n. 33.

[267] On one word serving as a conceptual metaphor for the subject in the target domain, see Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 85-86 LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE ("I could feel the *electricity* between us", "There were sparks".) LOVE IS MAGIC ("the *magic* is gone"); Lakoff and Kövecses 1987: 198 ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Keep *cool*.") Cf. Kövecses 2010: 153 PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS ("you *swine*… He's a complete *pig*… Those *vermin* steal from homes").

A visual example of this conceptual aspect perception is Rubin's Vase:[268]



When we look at the image, we treat one tonal property as the foreground and the other as the background. If we, for instance, treat the white tone as the foreground, we notice the aspect has a shape. We rely on our knowledge of similar patterns, and realise the shape looks like a vase. When we notice this aspect, we then report it by using the cognitive metaphor: "it is an image of a vase." Aspect perception, here, is an essential component of a mapping scheme. We first make an internal relation: we note the similarities between the white shape and the vase. When we do this, we use the vase (the source domain) to describe the white shape (the target domain). I aim to show that this mapping process is evident when characters notice aspects of the shade.

I structure my argument in the following way. I first establish that there is an internal relation between the character's presentation of the post-mortem survivor and the wraith that descends to Hades. I then suggest that characters use the conceptual aspects, the εἴδωλον, θυμός, and corpse, as metaphors and also use a metaphorical utilisation, a kind of selection that takes place in figure-ground perception we see above. Metaphorical utilisation is when certain features in the source domain are selected to make sense of the target domain. Utilisation of this kind means that other properties of the source domain are hidden. Kövecses

[268] Eilan 2013: 1.

provides a good example of how this utilisation works in ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS:[269]

> Notice that many aspects of our concept of building are not used in the metaphorical comprehension of arguments. Buildings typically have rooms and corridors; they have a roof; they are equipped with chimneys; they can be found on streets or roads; there are people living or working in them; they often have other houses next to them; they have windows and doors; they are built in a particular architectural style; and so on. It seems that all this information remains unutilized when the argument is a building metaphor is applied.

This utilisation is a feature of aspect perception. When we for instance claim to see the cloud as a bird, or see Jastrow's picture as a duck or as a rabbit, we are using metaphorical utilisations. We for instance use the image of the bird, the source domain; but we also hide other properties of the bird, the fact that it squeaks, that it has feathers, and flies away. What we shall claim then is that characters who notice aspects of the shade that journeys to Hades will select certain properties of the image in the source domain and hide others.

In the first section, I establish that there is a schema in which the shade is imagined as having incompatible characteristics. I suggest that the primary narrator presents the incorporeal shade as having some features of the corporeal man (emotions and physical substance). I then examine the character-descriptions of the dead man travelling to Hades. We shall see that, in this schema, the dead person has some qualities of the corporeal dead man, and some of the wraith.

In the second part of this chapter, I will argue this mental image of the shade allows for characters to see the post-mortem resident in Hades as the remnants of the corporeal man.

[269] Kövecses 2010: 93.

Specifically, I suggest that these characteristics of the dead man lead secondary focalisers to see the "corpse" aspect. This in turn allows for Odysseus and Hector to present the residents in Hades as remnants of the corpse.

The third part of this chapter looks at how Theoclymenus sees the shade as an εἴδωλον. I suggest that this noticing of an aspect occurs because the prophet is able to make an internal relation between the qualities of the ψυχαί, as we see in Patroclus and Hector's death scenes, and the εἴδωλον. Specifically, I suggest that he notices similarities between the ψυχή's and εἴδωλον's movements.

In the fourth and final section of this chapter, I examine the presentation of the wraith when it descends to Hades in the *Deuteronekyia*. In this section, the shades go to Hades screeching like bats. A common suggestion is that this is a Mycenaean conception in which the wraith is a winged creature. I will argue that there is no reason to assume that we are bearing witness to an old historical belief about the shade in this passage. I argue instead that the simile in this passage informs us that the primary narrator just sees a resemblance between the ψυχαί and the bats. My aim is to show that the simile in this scene indicates that the primary narrator uses aspect perception to present the dead.

Scholars who have examined Homeric post-mortem existence have sought to determine *what* exactly makes the journey to Hades. There are a numerous number of passages in Homer where it is said that the named individual makes its descent to the underworld. Rohde argues that these passages where the man is said to depart to Hades simply indicate that the ψυχή is a second self, an inward image. He notes however the difficulties in suggesting where Homeric selfhood resides:[270]

[270] Rohde 1925: 6.

> Those who draw from these phrases the conclusion that either the body or the psyche [credited as the positions of Nägelsbach and Grotomeyer respectively] must be the 'real man' have, in either case, left out of account or unexplained one half of the recorded evidence".

Clarke, however, examines the beginning of Agamemnon's aristeia and concludes that "the κεφαλαί of this passage are the dead men themselves: bodily substance is what goes down to Hades as in the standard pattern that we have observed in other allusive or rhetorical passages."[271] By rhetorical and allusive passages, Clarke is referring to the character speeches where, in most cases, the wraith has the same "I" as the bodily being.[272] Cairns, on the other hand, takes the opposing stance:[273]

> It is true that there are many passages in which the named individual is said to make the journey to Hades, but these are compatible with the specification that it is *qua* ψυχή that s/he does so; this is in fact the only specification that is offered - it is never specified that the physical body of the dead person makes that journey. Homer's characters and his audience know that corpses do not descend to Hades; they know that the physical bodies are cremated; but this awareness coexists with beliefs which, taken literally, might be thought to suppose a physical post mortem existence.

Cairns, however, is aware that Odysseus' speech to Polyphemus is the one exception to his view that the post-mortem survivor is the ψυχή.[274] The problem with many of these suggestions is the question on which their analyses are based. By claiming that the corpse or the wraith survives the journey to Hades, these scholars are making arguments against the grain of evidence. For Cairns, it is Odysseus' speech to Polyphemus that goes against his

[271] Clarke 1999: 175.
[272] Clarke 1999: 168-170.
[273] Cairns 2003: 60-61.
[274] Cairns 2003: 61 n. 44.

hypothesis, while Clarke's claim is countered by the evidence where characters suggest that the survivor of Hades is the wraith.

What I hope to do instead in this chapter is to address a different question. Rather than ask "what survives the journey to Hades" I aim to establish how characters come to see the post-mortem survivor in such diverse ways. I argue that aspect perception is the underlying reason for these inconsistent presentations to appear in Homeric epic. Indeed, we see that aspect perception plays an important role in the presentation of the wraith when it descends to Hades in *Odyssey* 24.1-9:

> Ἑρμῆς δὲ ψυχὰς Κυλλήνιος ἐξεκαλεῖτο
> ἀνδρῶν μνηστήρων· ἔχε δὲ ῥάβδον μετὰ χερσὶν
> καλὴν χρυσείην, τῇ τ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ὄμματα θέλγει
> ὧν ἐθέλει, τοὺς δ᾽ αὖτε καὶ ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει·
> τῇ ῥ᾽ ἄγε κινήσας, ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἕποντο.
> ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο
> τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεί κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν
> ὁρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ᾽ ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται,
> ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν.

The use of the simile informs us that the primary narrator *sees* the ψυχαί *as* bats when they descend to Hades screeching. Wittgenstein tells us that we notice an aspect when we see a *likeness* between one face and another.[275] By using the simile, the primary narrator expresses a likeness between the wraith and the bat. The primary narrator notices this bat aspect because there is an internal relation between the way that the dead screech when they move (τρίζουσαι ἕποντο… ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν) and the way that the bats fly in their caves (ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο / <u>τρίζουσαι ποτέονται</u>).

[275] PPF §113.

This is a basic example of how the primary narrator uses aspect perception to describe the visible qualities of the wraith, its movements and its sound. However, most of this discussion examines aspect perception from a different perspective. Apart from Theoclymenus and his vision in *Odyssey* 20.351-358, there is no evidence that suggests that the character looks at the wraith as it descends to Hades and then sees it as something else. What we shall suggest instead is that we can notice aspects from schema, or mental images.[276] We can, for instance, remember a word and have multiple interpretations of what it might be. We know that we have to see an internal relation between two objects in order to notice an aspect.

As we said in the introduction, we can notice aspects from mental images. When we, for instance, have a mental image of Wittgenstein's triangle or cube, we can imagine them, respectively, as a mountain or as a box. When we imagine these aspects, we are making an internal relation: we know that these shapes are similar to the objects we are imagining them to be. When we describe these imaginative aspects, we are forming a metaphorical construction: we are using the mountain and boxes as source images to describe the target shapes.

The folk-model of the shade

Homer presents a default folk-model in which some properties of the living continue to be properties of the ψυχή when it journeys to Hades. The *Iliad* opens with Achilles sending many of the ghosts of the dead soldiers to Hades:[277]

[276] Cf. PPF §254. Wittgenstein reminds us that: "The concept of an aspect is related to the concept of imagination. In other words, the concept 'Now I see it as . . .' is related to 'Now I am imagining *that*'."
[277] A similar construction also appears in *Iliad* 11.55 (πολλὰς ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς). Apollonius took issue with the fact that the ἰφθίμοι ψυχαί made the descent to Hades in 1.3-5 and not the dead men proper. According to Apollonius, Achilles sends not the ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς to Hades, but the ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς in the proem (cf. schol. bT *ad* 1.3. See also schol. bT and A ad 7.330.). However, the issue with this reading is that it does not make sense of the opposition between verses 3 to 4. The reflexive pronoun αὐτοὺς already denotes the corporeal dead men that are left behind. The suggestion that the dead men ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς descend to Hades, *but* the dead men (αὐτοὺς δὲ) are left behind as scraps for animals is syntactically impossible. Apollonius' version might

πολλὰς δ᾽ ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν

ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν

οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι…

The ψυχαί, who are incorporeal, have the physical strength, ἰφθιμοι, of the living person. Warden seems to suggest that the ψυχή means "soul" and that ἴφθιμος in the proem describes the "seedy" nature of the ψυχή.[278] But this seems like an insufficient solution. First, the aorist προΐαψεν marks that the ψυχαί's descent is completed, they are now inhabitants of Hades and thus "wraiths", no longer "souls".[279] Second, there is nothing in the Homeric evidence that suggests ψυχή is associated with the seed or marrow. The word ἴφθιμος does appear predominantly to refer to the bodily strength of anatomical parts of the Homeric body,[280] but it does not make sense that the ψυχή *qua* soul should be associated with strength. On the contrary, ἴφθιμος is never attributed to any other vital-force that sustains a person's life. The word ἴφθιμος does occur in metonymic expressions, whereby the strong part of the body stands for the person himself.[281] But ἴφθιμος ψυχή as meaning "strong souls" cannot be a metonym for the person himself descending to Hades. On the contrary, the reflexive pronoun αὐτοὺς in *Iliad* 1.4 indicates that the person's sense of self is tied to the corpse that stays behind. It does not semantically make sense for the primary narrator to suggest through this metonym that the person descends to Hades, but also remains as a decaying corpse in the mortal world. The accusative ἰφθίμους establishes that this strength is a characteristic not of the heroes (who are in the genitive ἡρώων) when they were alive, but of the post-mortem ψυχαί. The syntagm "physically strong wraiths", although syntactically and semantically

work if we omit verses 4-5, as Zenodotus suggested (Cf. schol. A *ad* 1.4.), but this is hardly a solution. The proem sets up the main theme of the *Iliad,* Achilles' wrath. We need verses 4-5 because Achilles' mistreatment of the dead alludes to his mistreatment of Hector's corpse (Cf. *Il*. 1.3-5, 22.509 and 23. 21.); we need these verses to establish the thematic importance of the *Iliad*.

[278] Warden 1969: 154-156.
[279] Though the two are conceptually linked: see Chapter One and Cairns 2001: 466.
[280] *Il*. 3.336, 15.480, 16.137, 18.204. See Onians (1951: 194) for an impressive catalogue of instances.
[281] See *Il*. 11.55, 23.260.

unusual, seems to conform to the motif that the shade has some characteristics of the living person. Indeed, we see in 16.856f and 22.363f that the ψυχή has the unusual ability to show emotions:

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει

ὃν πότμον γοόωσα λιποῦσ᾽ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

On the one hand, the ψυχή is incorporeal: it flies out of the body, leaving behind all forms of manhood and youth, and, as a result, it appears almost non-human. And yet, on the other hand, the ψυχή has the characteristics of the living: it is capable of showing emotions, grieving for the life it will have once incorporated into Hades.

A variation of this folk-model appears in character speeches. Characters, like the primary narrator, seem to suggest that the post-mortem survivor of Hades has incompatible properties. But whereas the primary narrator suggests that the incorporeal ψυχή has the same characteristics as the living, the characters have a mental image in which the incoming resident in Hades has the same "I" as the once living person. Consider *Iliad* 11.262-63:

ἔνθ᾽ Ἀντήνορος υἷες ὑπ᾽ Ἀτρεΐδῃ βασιλῆϊ

πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες ἔδυν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

The post-mortem survivor that goes to Hades (ἔδυν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω) has the same identity as the corporeal dead man who met his fate (πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες). After all, the subject of the participle ἀναπλήσαντες is the sons who died. Consider also *Iliad* 5.644-646:

οὐδέ τί σε Τρώεσσιν ὀΐομαι ἄλκαρ ἔσεσθαι

ἐλθόντ᾽ ἐκ Λυκίης, οὐδ᾽ εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐσσι,

ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοὶ δμηθέντα πύλας Ἄΐδαο περήσειν.

Here again we see that the there is an identity relationship between the living and the post-mortem wraith. The subject of δμηθέντα is σε, the man who is imagined to be beaten down by the victor, but the infinitive περήσειν also marks that the subject's identity continues

when he is a wraith that makes its descent to Hades. This same continuity of identity is present in *Iliad* 20.294: ὃς τάχα Πηλεΐωνι δαμεὶς Ἄϊδόσδε κάτεισι. A similar image also appears in *Iliad* 3.322: τὸν δὸς ἀποφθίμενον δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω. Both subjects of the infinitive δῦναι and verb κάτεισι and of the participles ἀποφθίμενον and δαμεὶς are the men now dead or beaten down. In other words, the person, who is defeated, is the same as the entity that journeys to Hades. This is also the impression that we get in *Iliad* 16.326-329:

ὣς τὼ μὲν δοιοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι δαμέντε

βήτην εἰς Ἔρεβος Σαρπηδόνος ἐσθλοὶ ἑταῖροι

υἷες ἀκοντισταὶ Ἀμισωδάρου, ὅς ῥα Χίμαιραν

θρέψεν ἀμαιμακέτην πολέσιν κακὸν ἀνθρώποισιν.

The brothers go to Hades (βήτην εἰς Ἔρεβος) after being beaten down (δαμέντε). In other words, the person that is beaten down is the same as the entity that goes to Hades. Likewise, Hector states boastfully that no one (his living self) shall beat him down to Hades: οὐ γάρ τίς μ' ὑπὲρ αἶσαν ἀνὴρ Ἄϊδι προϊάψει.[282] Notice also the way that Andromache speaks about her late husband:[283]

νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν Ἀΐδαο δόμους ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης

ἔρχεαι, αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ στυγερῷ ἐνὶ πένθεϊ λείπεις,

χήρην ἐν μεγάροισι…

The subject that goes to Hades is σύ, Hector, who left Andromache λείπεις as a widow. The participle and the pronoun both indicate that the entity that descends to Hades

[282] *Il*. 6.487.
[283] *Il*. 22.482-483.

has the same selfhood as the embodied person. A similar presentation of the post-mortem survivor appears in *Iliad* 6.420-424:

οἳ δέ μοι ἑπτὰ κασίγνητοι ἔσαν ἐν μεγάροισιν
οἳ μὲν πάντες ἰῷ κίον ἤματι Ἄϊδος εἴσω·
πάντας γὰρ κατέπεφνε ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς
βουσὶν ἐπ᾽ εἰλιπόδεσσι καὶ ἀργεννῇς ὀΐεσσι
εὖδεις, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ.

Andromache imagines her siblings (οἳ… κασίγνητοι) making the journey to Hades. There is no distinction made between the wraith and the dead man proper in this speech. The epexegetic particle γὰρ emphasises that those that go to Hades are the same as those that are killed by Achilles. A similar presentation of the dead person appears in *Iliad* 14.454-457:

οὐ μὰν αὖτ᾽ ὀΐω μεγαθύμου Πανθοΐδαο
χειρὸς ἄπο στιβαρῆς ἅλιον πεδῆσαι ἄκοντα,
ἀλλά τις Ἀργείων κόμισε χροΐ, καί μιν ὀΐω
αὐτῷ σκηπτόμενον κατίμεν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

Polydamas imagines that it is the Argive himself (αὐτῷ) that goes to Hades. Polydamas also makes this point clear when he says that the spear which fatally wounds the Argive (ἀλλά τις Ἀργείων κόμισε χροΐ) can be used as a stick to support the dead man on his journey (καί μιν ὀΐω / αὐτῷ σκηπτόμενον). The condition of the embodied person will be the same as the post-mortem survivor.

This continuity of identity is also evident in burial requests. Achilles, for example, states in 23.50 that he wants Agamemnon and his comrades to get everything that is fitting for a man to have when journeying under the gloom and mist:

ὕλην τ᾽ ἀξέμεναι παρά τε σχεῖν ὅσσ᾽ ἐπιεικὲς

νεκρὸν ἔχοντα νέεσθαι ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα,

The expression ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα is a metonym that stands for Hades.[284] Achilles imagines that the person in Hades has the same "I" as the corpse, since he believes that the inhabitant of Hades will reap the benefits of the corpse. Likewise, he imagines that through burial, the dead man will go to Hades (ἔταρον γὰρ ἀμύμονα πέμπ' Ἄϊδόσδε.).[285] The speakers, in these examples, all have in common the idea that the identity of the living person continues as the wraith in Hades.

We have now been able to establish how there exists, in Homer, a model of the shade that has opposing characteristics. It is an incorporeal being that has some of the corporeal characteristics of the living. We have suggested that a variation of the folk-model appears in character speeches: the "I" of the living person that is beaten down continues to Hades. The onus is now on us to show how characters notice aspects from these mental images. This will be the focus of the next section.

Noticing the dead man aspect

In this section, I explain why characters see a continuity of identity between the embodied living being and the post-mortem survivor. First, I look at how the shades have some characteristics of the living, such as the bodily strength and the basic cognitive ability to show emotions. These characteristics, I will argue, lead the characters to make an internal

[284] Cf. *Il*. 15.191; *Od*. 11. 57, 155. See also *Od*. 10.512, 12.379-383, 11.14-19, 93-94, 12.81, 20.356-357. On the topographical descriptions of Hades' darkness, see Hes. *Theog*. 755-825; Nagy 1973: 139-140; Panchenko 1998: 396-398; Marinatos 2001: 389-390, 397-398; Nakassis 2004: 224-225; Marinatos 2009 185-187. On wider studies on early Greek epic cosmology, see Stokes 1962; Arrighetti 1966; Northrup 1979; Ballabriga 1986; Alford Garth 1991; Johnson 1999; Anghelina 2008, 2011; Grey 2019.
[285] *Il*. 23.137.

relation between the shades' emotions and the emotions that are said to be coterminous with the living person's state of being. This internal relation, I propose, is the reason why the focalisers see the shade as the dead man himself.

In the second part of this section, I examine Odysseus' and Hector's conceptions that the post-mortem survivor is the man bereft of life faculties. I will suggest that Odysseus and Hector have made a specific conception from an ambiguous mental image in which the living person's identity continues when in Hades. Specifically, I argue that both Odysseus and Hector have noticed conceptual aspects from a mental image: the post-mortem survivor has some characteristics of the corpse, some of the wraith. I conclude that the two characters, when they notice this aspect, they select certain characteristics of the source domain image (dead man, deprived of life faculties), and hide the other features of this source domain (that the corpse does not travel to Hades, that it is buried after death, and that it leads a separate existence from the wraith that journeys to Hades).

In the section above, we listed a couple of examples where characters imagine that the wraith which journeys to Hades has the same identity as the man who is threatened with death. Here we shall see that it is the properties of the ψυχαί that induce the characters to see the wraith as the man himself. Specifically, I argue that they see the post-mortem resident in Hades as the dead man himself because the shade has some of the life-like characteristics of the living person. Consider Deiphobus' presentation of post-mortem existence when he vaunts over Hypsenor in *Iliad* 13.414-416:

οὐ μὰν αὖτ᾽ ἄτιτος κεῖτ᾽ Ἄσιος, ἀλλά ἕ φημι
εἰς Ἄϊδός περ ἰόντα πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο
γηθήσειν κατὰ θυμόν, ἐπεί ῥά οἱ ὤπασα πομπόν.

Deiphobus here suggests that Asios' "I" descends to Hades. Not only that, the dead man himself, going to Hades, has mental faculties (γηθήσειν κατὰ θυμόν). How is it that this

character imagines the shade to be the man himself with all of the mental faculties that the living have? We shall argue that this conceptual aspect is noticed from the folk-model that the shade continues to have some of the fundamental cognitive abilities of the living. We see this when the shades of Patroclus and Hector descend to Hades mourning their fate: ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἄϊδος δὲ βεβήκει / ὃν πότμον γοόωσα. This basic cognitive ability invites characters to see the post-mortem resident of Hades as the man himself because there is an internal relation, an apparent similarity between the living and the shade: they can both display emotions. When Achilles, for instance, remarks that his late friend is a ψυχή, he remarks that he is exactly like the man himself because he could speak, lament, and instruct Achilles in exactly the way the living person would have done.[286] This emphasises that Homeric selfhood does not reside in cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, it does suggest that a person's cognitive abilities – the ability to talk, the ability to show emotions – can easily convince a person that they are speaking to the man himself. That being the case, we can argue that the characters get the impression the man himself resides in Hades because they recognise that the shade has some cognitive abilities of the corporeal being.

Stocking introduces the idea that strength is coterminous with the person's selfhood because the word for strength replaces the name for the person.[287] But this kind of argument also means that the Homeric man's sense of self also resides in his mental state as well. Consider, for instance, the presentation of inner thoughts in Homeric epic. In *Iliad* 2.3f, Zeus ponders how he might bring honour to Achilles (ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γε μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα ὡς Ἀχιλῆα / τιμήσῃ, ὀλέσῃ δὲ πολέας ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.). However, in *Odyssey* 20.38-40, it is not Odysseus, but his θυμός that is deliberating:

ἀλλά τί μοι τόδε <u>θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει</u>,

[286] *Il*. 23.107.
[287] See Stocking 2007: 62-63.

ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσω,

μοῦνος ἐών: οἱ δ᾽ αἰὲν ἀολλέες ἔνδον ἔασι.

The θυμός is treated as the real subject of the deliberating, which Homer elsewhere ascribes, as we see in *Iliad* 2, in 20.41 (πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε μεῖζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζω), and elsewhere in the epic to the person himself.[288] This is also the case at the beginning of the *Iliad*. Where we might expect Achilles himself to be the subject of the actions of hurling (προΐαψεν) and placing pain among the Achaeans (ἄλγε' ἔθηκε), it is instead his anger that, personified (οὐλομένην, ἡ), is responsible for these actions. I should stress, I do not take this evidence to mean that Homer presents a Cartesian dualism, but it does suggest that a person's sense of self can be represented by his mental state and emotions.[289] This explains how the living can see the ψυχή as the dead man himself. The folk-model does suggest that the ψυχή can retain some mental characteristics of the once living person as we see in *Iliad* 16.857 and 22.363. This means that there is an internal relation between the ψυχή that has some mental characteristics of the living person and the person whose selfhood is represented by his mental faculties.

Let us now examine how characters can see the incoming resident of Hades as a dead man deprived of life-faculties. In *Odyssey* 9.523-525 Odysseus is about to sail from the island of the Cyclopes, he tells Polyphemus that he wishes he could kill him:

αἲ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην

εὖνιν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω…

Odysseus seems to claim that it is not necessarily the ψυχή which journeys to Hades. Rather, it is the person himself. A similar presentation of post-mortem existence occurs when Hector

[288] *Od*. 2.93 = 24.128, 1.427, 10.438, 11.204, 22.333.

[289] On dualist selfhood in Homer see: Rohde 1925: chapter 1, esp. page 6. On the indeterminacy of Homeric selfhood, see: Snell 1953: 18-22; Fränkel 1975: 80. On the criticism of Cartesian dualism in Homer, see: Clarke (1999); Haines 2005; Stocking (2007). The bibliography on dualism is vast, but see: Descartes (1968) and Mounce 2010: 401-410.

thought that he was going to go to Hades, after he breathed out his ἦτορ in *Iliad* 15.251-252:[290]

καὶ δὴ ἔγωγ᾽ ἐφάμην νέκυας καὶ δῶμ᾽ Ἀΐδαο

ἤματι τῷδ᾽ ἴξεσθαι, ἐπεὶ φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ.

Hector suggests that what goes to Hades is the man himself that is deprived of his life-faculties.

Odysseus' speech, in particular, has been the subject of much debate among scholarship. We have briefly reviewed some of these discussions in chapter one. However, we have only examined how the ψυχή is presented in this character speech, not the post-mortem survivor. But the interpretations that have been offered so far do not sufficiently explain why Odysseus, and even Hector, offer such conflicting views.

Warden, as we said, tries to suggest that the ψυχή has no eschatological significance here and simply means the life that is lost.[291] This seems a correct reading of ψυχή in this context, but it still fails to explain why the monster bereft of his life-force is imagined as going to Hades. After all, the ψυχή *qua* life is imagined to make the journey to Hades (εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν, ψυχὴν δ' Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ). [292]

Clarke welcomes Odysseus' presentation of the incoming resident in Hades and uses it has his main evidence to suggest that what exists in Hades is the bodily form of the living man.[293] But this, as I mentioned, presupposes that Odysseus has the same understanding of the underworld as the primary narrator. [294]

Cairns tries to suggest that two senses of the word the ψυχή are present in Odysseus' threat:[295]

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[290] On the alternative MS reading of ὄψεσθαι in place of ἴξεσθαι, see van Thiel and West *ad loc*.
[291] Warden 1971: 95.
[292] *Il*. 5.654 = 11.445 = 16.625.
[293] Clarke 1999: 137.
[294] See pages 80-81.
[295] Cairns 2003: 61 n. 44.

> Polyphemus is imagined as proceeding to Hades minus his ψυχή; this does exclude the hypothesis that it is *qua* ψυχή that the named individual descends. At the same time, however, it does not go so far as to suggest that the physical corpse descends. To accommodate this passage in my approach, I need to suppose that here, at any rate, the two senses of ψυχή – that which animates the individual and that which survives death – diverge, Odysseus *emphasizing the former while ignoring its normal relation to the latter.*

What Cairns seems to be arguing for is a metaphoric device known as highlighting, where qualities of the target ψυχή are highlighted and the ψυχή *qua* life-force is ignored. But this is, as he says, "undeniably awkward" and a case of special pleading.

What I aim to argue here is that this kind of presentation can be explained as a conceptual aspect. The characters see (imagine) the incoming resident of Hades as the man bereft of life-faculties because they are basing their conceptions on a model, a schema in which the wraith has some qualities of the dead man. Characters are able to make an internal relation between the quality of the person's descent to Hades and the quality of the corpse's condition. This relation allows for Odysseus and also Hector to see the post-mortem survivor as the dead man bereft of life-faculties.

In the section above, we have looked at examples of a mental image where the living person's selfhood continues to exist in Hades. We note that the entity that goes to Hades is also the person whose fate is fulfilled πότμον ἀναπλήσαντες, and who is beaten down (δμηθέντα and δαμεὶς). These presentations lead to an internal relation between the post-mortem survivor and the dead man deprived of life-faculties. As we have noted from the last chapter, the corporeal man's death is presented as the meeting of a fated moment. This internal relation leads to a mapping scheme that allows for Hector and Odysseus to see the post-mortem survivor as the dead man himself deprived of life-faculties. For instance, we see

from Anticleia that she met her fate (ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον) by being deprived of a life-force (θυμὸν ἀπηύρα):[296]

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼν ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον·
οὔτ᾽ ἐμέ γ᾽ ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐύσκοπος ἰοχέαιρα
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν,
οὔτε τις οὖν μοι νοῦσος ἐπήλυθεν, ἥ τε μάλιστα
τηκεδόνι στυγερῇ μελέων ἐξείλετο θυμόν·
ἀλλά με σός τε πόθος σά τε μήδεα, φαίδιμ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
σή τ᾽ ἀγανοφροσύνη μελιηδέα θυμὸν ἀπηύρα.

Likewise, Hera reminds Zeus that it is Sarpedon's destiny to be killed (ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσῃ / ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι) and to be deprived of life-faculties (αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τόν γε λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών).[297] We see that the deprivation of faculties is a periphrastic description of the moment the dead person meets his fate. We may then argue that it is this particular property of the living that invites Odysseus and Hector to see the incoming inhabitant of Hades as the dead man who is without life-faculties.

Tlepolemus uses the aorist participle δμηθέντα to mark that the person who goes down to Hades is now beaten; he is the shell of the man. When a person is beaten down, he is imagined as losing his life faculties: ἐμῷ δ᾽ ὑπὸ δουρὶ δαμέντα / εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν, ψυχὴν δ᾽ Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ.[298] This kernel of truth also appears in *Iliad* 10.452: εἰ δέ κ' ἐμῇς ὑπὸ χερσὶ δαμεὶς ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὀλέσσῃς. Likewise, Hera believes that Sarpedon, beaten down by Patroclus, loses his ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών (ἤτοι μέν μιν ἔασον ἐνὶ κρατερῇ ὑσμίνῃ / χέρσ᾽ ὕπο Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι· / αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τόν γε λίπῃ ψυχή τε καὶ αἰών…).

[296] *Od*. 11. 197-203.
[297] Cf. *Il*. 16.441-453.
[298] *Il*. 5.653-654.

When therefore a character speaks about the being having been beaten down and going to Hades, it is not surprising that Hector and Odysseus imagine this to be the dead man that is deprived of life faculties. Aspect perception is at work here. There is an internal relation between the post-mortem survivor that goes to Hades and the corpse that lacks vital forces. This in turn makes Hector and Odysseus see the post-mortem survivor as deprived of life-faculties.

This means that the corpse can be a useful image in the source domain to make sense of the post-mortem survivor. However, this conceptual aspect suggests that metaphorical utilisation is at work. Odysseus and Hector use the image of the corpse, deprived of life-faculties, to make sense of the post-mortem survivor. However, they select only certain features of this source domain image to comprehend the ghost. The concepts of the dead man, for instance, which are not used in this comprehension of the post-mortem survivor, are that the corpse does not actually journey to Hades, it remains on the earth,[299] it is cremated,[300] it is a carcass that can be feasted on by birds and prey.[301]

In this section, what we have shown is that aspect perception is at the heart of this metaphoric construction. The characters notice an internal relation between the wraith in the folk-model and the corpse. This leads the characters to make a metaphoric translation, using the embodied living or dead person as a source image to make sense of the incoming resident of Hades in the target domain.

Noticing the θυμός aspect

In *Il*. 7.129–31, Nestor talks about the post-mortem survivor as a θυμός:

τοὺς νῦν εἰ πτώσσοντας ὑφ᾽ Ἕκτορι πάντας ἀκούσαι,

[299] See *Il*. 7.328-330; *Od*. 11.53; Od. 24.187.
[300] Cf. *Il*. 1.52, 6.418, 22.510-512; *Od*. 11.220.
[301] *Il*.1.4-5.

πολλά κεν ἀθανάτοισι φίλας ἀνὰ χεῖρας ἀείραι

θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων δῦναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.

The passage has been open to scholarly interpretation. Otto suggested that the θυμός is here used metaphorically meaning that the person's "life" goes to Hades.[302] Bremmer argued that the speech was rhetorical.[303] Clarke and Cairns both suggest that this presentation of the shade manifests from the conception that the person breathes out his or her last breath when he or she dies.[304]

The semantic range of words within Homeric epic makes many of these views seem unlikely. For instance, we see a number of passages where names other than θυμός and ψυχή describe the last breath. For example, Hector talks about his near-death experience as breathing out his ἦτορ: ἐπεὶ φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ.[305] The onus is on Clarke and Cairns to explain why the ἦτορ is never said to journey to Hades, if it is the case that the post-mortem survivor manifests from the last breath. Otto's explanation is not so inconceivable. We note, for instance, that characters imagine ψυχή *qua* life as a faculty that goes to Hades (εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν, ψυχὴν δ' Ἄϊδι κλυτοπώλῳ.).[306] The problem, however, is that characters are then clearly aware that the ψυχή is a life-faculty can journey to Hades, which makes Peleus' suggestion that his θυμός *qua* life goes to Hades seem even more unnecessary and inexplicable on these grounds.

My aim is to suggest that aspect perception is at the heart of this presentation of the shade. What we shall argue is that the θυμός is a conceptual aspect that Nestor presents Peleus as noticing because there is an internal relation between the θυμός and ψυχή.

[302] Otto 1923: 44.
[303] Bremmer 1983: 75.
[304] Cairns 2003: 54 n. 31.
[305] *Il*. 15.252.
[306] *Il*. 5.654 = 11.445 = 16.625. On reading ψυχή as life see Cairns 2003: 54.

Specifically, we will propose that Nestor presents Peleus as seeing the ψυχή as a θυμός because there is an apparent similarity between their quality of flight. We note that the θυμός elsewhere leaves the limbs (ἐκ μελέων θυμὸς πτάτο) in a similar manner as the ψυχή when it flies away (ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη).[307] The ψυχή and the θυμός also depart from the mouth: [308]

Σαρπηδὼν δ᾽ αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀπήμβροτε δουρὶ φαεινῷ
δεύτερον ὁρμηθείς, ὃ δὲ Πήδασον οὔτασεν ἵππον
ἔγχεϊ δεξιὸν ὦμον: ὃ δ᾽ ἔβραχε θυμὸν ἀΐσθων,
κὰδ δ᾽ ἔπεσ᾽ ἐν κονίῃσι μακών, ἀπὸ δ᾽ ἔπτατο θυμός.

In this passage, the link between flight and lacking physical substance becomes clear. The θυμός flies away (ἀπὸ δ᾽ ἔπτατο) in just the way that one breathes out (ἀΐσθων) the life-force. Just like the θυμός in this scene, the secondary focaliser, Achilles, calls the ψυχή the last breath which can never return to the person once it passes the teeth's barrier:[309]

ἀνδρὸς δὲ ψυχὴ πάλιν ἐλθεῖν οὔτε λεϊστὴ
οὔθ᾽ ἑλετή, ἐπεὶ ἄρ κεν ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.

Here we see that the θυμός and the ψυχή are conceptually similar in their ability to leave the person's mouth when he dies. There is further similarity between the two faculties. The θυμός departs from the ῥέθεα (τύψας ἠὲ βαλὼν ῥεθέων ἐκ θυμὸν ἕληται)[310] just as the ψυχή leaves the ῥέθεα of Patroclus and Hector. Moreover, just as the θυμός leaves the limbs (μελέων ἐξείλετο θυμόν)[311] and bones of the dead person (λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός),[312] so too the ψυχή exits through the fatal wound of the dead person:[313]

ὃ δὲ λὰξ ἐν στήθεσι βαίνων

[307] *Il*. 23.880.
[308] *Il*. 16.466-469.
[309] *Il*. 9.408-409.
[310] *Il*. 22.68.
[311] *Od*. 11.201. See also *Od*. 15.354.
[312] *Od*. 11.221. See also *Il*. 12.386, 16,743, 20.406; *Od*. 3.455, 12.414.
[313] *Il*. 16.505.

ἐκ χροὸς ἕλκε δόρυ, προτὶ δὲ φρένες αὐτῷ ἔποντο·

τοῖο δ᾽ ἅμα ψυχήν τε καὶ ἔγχεος ἐξέρυσ᾽ αἰχμήν.

This suggests that the θυμός and ψυχή can be imagined as entities which are both breathed out upon death and leave the mortal wounds (λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός). In addition, the ψυχή and the θυμός are said to be destroyed at death (θυμὸν ὀλέσσῃ)[314] and death is considered the destroyer of the θυμός (ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ θάνατος χύτο θυμοραϊστής).[315] The internal relation between the θυμός and ψυχή means that it is possible for Peleus to imagine seeing the ψυχή that flies away as a θυμός. This internal relation means that the θυμός can be regarded as a conceptual aspect.

The suggestion, however, that there is an internal relation between the ψυχή's departure in Hector and Patroclus' death scenes and the θυμός' flight in 22.68 is called into question when we consider Leumann's and Snell's positions on the meaning of ἐκ ῥεθέων in Patroclus and Hector's death scenes. They suggest that the word means "from the face" or "from the mouth," in Hector and Patroclus' death scenes, but it means "limbs" in 22.68.[316] If ῥεθέων has a different meaning in each of these contexts, then we cannot say confidently that Peleus is seeing the ψυχή as a θυμός based on the apparent similarity between the location from which they both depart.

Clarke attempts to link the θυμός and ψυχή by claiming that the ψυχή means nothing more than the cold breath which a person loses at death. One of the main pieces of evidence he gives to support this interpretation is Patroclus and Hector's death, in which the ψυχή is said to leave through the ῥέθεα. Clarke follows an Aeolic and Attic tragedian interpretation of ῥέθος as "face."[317] Clarke has provided some good arguments against Leumann and Snell's

[314] *Il*. 1.205.
[315] *Il*. 13.544.
[316] Snell 1953: 9-10. See also Leumann 1950: 218-222.
[317] Clarke 1999: 133. On ῥέθος meaning face in the singular see Soph. *Ant.*529; Eur. *HF.*1205; Schol. A and bT *ad Il*. 22.68, Schol. A *ad Il*.16.856; Schol. bT ad 22.362. On the semantic range of ῥέθος see Frisk 1966: 291-294. See Janko 1994 *ad Il.* 16.855-8.

reasons to read ῥέθεα as "limbs." For Snell, ῥέθεα cannot mean "mouth" or "face" in 22.68 since the θυμός is not "expected" to leave from this area.[318] Clarke rightly observes that "the argument of Snell and Leumann depends on the view that θυμός cannot be lost as breath, which throughout this study we have found good reason to reject."[319] Indeed, we have it from 16.468-69 that the θυμός can be conceptualised as something which is blown out of the person. While Clarke's argument does invalidate Leumann and Snell's proposed readings, it does not make the meaning of ῥέθεα any easier to understand as "face" or "limbs." If the θυμός can leave through the person's mouth as well as the limbs, and the ψυχή can depart through mortal wounds as well as the mouth, then ῥέθεα still has an ambiguous meaning which is unlikely to be settled anytime soon. Notwithstanding this ancient problem, the evidence which we have collected does suggest that the ψυχή and θυμός are conceptually similar.

We have argued that Peleus imagines the ψυχή as a θυμός because he has selected the insubstantial characteristics as a focal point, but we need to also suggest that Peleus concept consciously involves the life-like characteristics. We know that the ψυχή, while insubstantial, still has some remnants of consciousness: it can display emotions (ὃν πότμον γοόωσα). The semantic range of θυμός means that it cannot only represent the insubstantial wisp of air, but also be the seat of emotions. A person can feel sorry in the θυμός (χωόμενον κατὰ θυμὸν ἐϋζώνοιο γυναικός).[320] It is the place where anger is stored (καὶ μάλα περ θυμῷ κεχολωμένον).[321] It is also where a person feels sorrow (ἔχω δ' ἄχε' ἄκριτα θυμῷ).[322] We note as well that the ψυχή, while insubstantial, is personified by being said to mourn as it goes to Hades. This means there is yet another internal relation between the θυμός and the ψυχὴ

[318] Snell 1953: 9-10.
[319] Clarke 1999: 134. n 5.
[320] *Il*. 1.429. Similarly 3.139, 6.486.
[321] *Il*. 1.217. Similarly, 2.223, 4.494.
[322] *Il*. 3.412.

since the former is personified. The θυμός can debate (ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός).[323] It is capable of feeling sorrow (ὀλλυμένων Δαναῶν ὀλοφύρεται ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός).[324] Here we see how the θυμός is a conceptual aspect of the wraith that goes to Hades. The internal relation between these two faculties is that they both make a similar departure and both are faculties which can be personified. Peleus then, we can argue, sees the ψυχή as a θυμός because of the internal relation (the apparent similarities) between the two faculties.

Here again, this noticing of an aspect involves metaphoric utilisation. By noticing the θυμός aspect, Peleus is hiding the fact that the θυμός usually does not make the journey to Hades. We are reminded of *Od*. 11.221-222:

ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός,

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

According to Onians, the juxtaposition of these two lines emphasises that ψυχή and θυμός are separate entities.[325] However, it is worth noting that this juxtaposition also indicates just how conceptually related they are. Anticleia here tries to explain to Odysseus the events surrounding the death which lead up to her lack of physical substance in Hades. The juxtaposition does suggest that the ψυχή and θυμός are separate entities: the former just disappears at death whilst the latter survives death and lives in Hades. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition shows that the two entities are faculties which exist inside the person and leave the individual at the point of death.

All of this establishes that there is an internal relation, an apparent similarity between the ψυχή and the θυμός. This again establishes that the θυμός can be a useful image, in the source domain, to make sense of the target ψυχή. As we argued in the last section, noticing a

[323] *Il*. 22.122.
[324] *Il*. 8.202.
[325] Onians 1951: 94.

conceptual aspect involves a kind of selection that we see in metaphorical utilisation. When we report these conceptual aspects, we utilise properties of what we claim to see, and hide others. Here Nestor-Peleus seems to do the same. Peleus hides the other characteristics of the θυμός: that it is dissipates at death, that it is capable of residing in a particular part of the Homeric man, that it can be breathed back inside the man.

Noticing the εἴδωλον aspect

When the suitors laugh uncontrollably and eat blood spattered food, the prophet Theoclymenus makes this remark (20.351–7):

> ᾦ δειλοί, τί κακὸν τόδε πάσχετε; νυκτὶ μὲν ὑμέων
> εἰλύαται κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νέρθε τε γοῦνα.
> οἰμωγὴ δὲ δέδηε, δεδάκρυνται δὲ παρειαί,
> αἵματι δ᾽ ἐρράδαται τοῖχοι καλαί τε μεσόδμαι·
> εἰδώλων δὲ πλέον πρόθυρον, πλείη δὲ καὶ αὐλή,
> ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον· ἠέλιος δὲ
> οὐρανοῦ ἐξαπόλωλε, κακὴ δ᾽ ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀχλύς.

He sees the suitors' εἰδώλα filling the porch and going to Hades. Theoclymenus' speech is the first and only time we hear about the incoming residents of Hades as εἴδωλα. On top of that, the prophet appears to be seeing multiple layers of reality: he notes the suitors are presently in front of him (ᾦ δειλοί, τί κακὸν τόδε πάσχετε), he sees their future as ghosts (εἰδώλων δὲ πλέον πρόθυρον, πλείη δὲ καὶ αὐλή, / ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον), and he sees events that never take place, such as the sun perishing (ἠέλιος δὲ / οὐρανοῦ ἐξαπόλωλε,

κακὴ δ᾽ ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀχλύς.) and the suitors being covered in darkness (νυκτὶ μὲν ὑμέων / εἰλύαται κεφαλαί τε πρόσωπά τε νέρθε τε γοῦνα).[326]

The purpose of this section is to examine Theoclymenus' presentation of the shade and the effects his vision has on his perception of the dead. I will argue that Theoclymenus' vision gives him access to the ψυχαί's journey to Hades in *Odyssey* 24. From there, I suggest that Theoclymenus is able to perceive the wraith as the primary narrator does, but he sees the shade as an εἴδωλον. The reason, I argue, he perceives the shades as εἴδωλα is because Theoclymenus notices an internal relation between the εἴδωλα and the ψυχαί's quality of flight. To make this argument, I first look at the way in which the word εἴδωλον is used throughout the Homeric corpus. I highlight the similarities and differences between the two entities. I then compare Theoclymenus to Achilles and Odysseus, since all three have special access to the world of the dead. I suggest that the quality of flight convinces the latter two that the wraiths are εἴδωλα.

What we can see is that Theoclymenus has access to what the primary narrator subsequently sees: that the ψυχή has some characteristics of the once living person, but is altogether insubstantial and incorporeal. For example, Theoclymenus has the unusual ability to follow the εἴδωλα's journey to Erebus and sees that the sun disappears in this vision:

εἰδώλων… ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον· ἠέλιος δὲ

οὐρανοῦ ἐξαπόλωλε, κακὴ δ᾽ ἐπιδέδρομεν ἀχλύς.

This information anticipates the primary narrator's description that the ψυχαί of suitors go down to Hades, down the dark paths, past the gates of the sun:[327]

Ἑρμῆς δὲ ψυχὰς Κυλλήνιος ἐξεκαλεῖτο

ἀνδρῶν μνηστήρων...

[326] On the ecstatic nature of Theoclymenus' prophecy, see: Dodds 1951: 70; Russo 1992: 124-125 *ad Od*. 20.351-7; De Jong, 2004: 502 *ad Od*. 20.345-86.
[327] *Od*. 24.1-13. On the role of prolepsis in Theoclymenus' prophecy, see Gartziou-Tatti 2010: 24. On Theoclymenus' supernatural ability to see ghost's journey, see Clarke 1999: 150.

αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν: ἦρχε δ᾽ ἄρα σφιν
Ἑρμείας ἀκάκητα κατ᾽ εὐρώεντα κέλευθα.
πὰρ δ᾽ ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,
ἠδὲ παρ᾽ Ἠελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων
ἤϊσαν.

By envisioning the suitors' deaths, Theoclymenus can follow their ghost's Journey to Erebeus (ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον) to much the same extent as the primary narrator can see that the shades go down the dark ways (εὐρώεντα κέλευθα), These correspondences suggest that there is a connection between Theocylmenus' perception of the ghosts as εἴδωλα and the ψυχαί in *Odyssey* 24 who make the descent to Hades. The latter are beings that follow Hermes whilst screeching incomprehensibly: αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν· ἦρχε δ᾽ ἄρα σφιν / Ἑρμείας ἀκάκητα κατ᾽ εὐρώεντα κέλευθα.[328] The task in front of us is to explain how and why Theoclymenus sees these screeching ghosts as εἴδωλα. Clarke presumes that the term is synonymous with ψυχαί (the brackets are my own):[329]

> He [Theoclymenus] calls them empty images, εἴδωλα, synonymous in Hades with *ψυχαί.* With his supernaturally heightened vision, the prophet looks beyond the visible world into the unseen realm of the dead.

There are indeed notable similarities between the two which means it is understandable why we might suggest the words are synonymous. Indeed, the ψυχή and εἴδωλον are both physically insubstantial. After the ghost of Anticleia flies away, Odysseus mistakes what he witnessed as an εἴδωλον.[330] The ψυχή appears physically insubstantial at the moment that it

[328] *Od*. 24.9-10.
[329] Clarke 1999: 150.
[330] Cf. *Od*. 11.206-214, esp. 213-214.

departs (ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται) and so too the εἴδωλον goes through the doors' bolt into a gust of wind when it moves in a dream:[331]

ὣς εἰπὸν σταθμοῖο παρὰ κληῖδα λιάσθη

ἐς πνοιὰς ἀνέμων

Likewise, the εἴδωλα are attributed with having the same witlessness as the ψυχαί in the *Nekyia* (ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ / ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων).[332] This does suggest that the ψυχή and an εἴδωλον are conceptually analogous. But there are also notable differences between the two entities that mean they are not completely synonymous. The primary narrator never calls the shades εἴδωλα; it is always ψυχαί. Indeed, the only time we see the primary narrator use the word is when it appears to be in apposition to describe the ψυχαί in Hades (ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων.). By contrast, living characters, such as Theoclymenus, do not see the two as quite so appositional. Odysseus for example calls his mother an εἴδωλον after she fails to embrace him. Anticleia however corrects him that what goes to Hades is not an εἴδωλον forged by Persephone (ἦ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ᾽ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια / ὤτρυν᾽), but it is the ψυχαί that flies away in the same insubstantial flight as it did when it went to Hades (ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.). In fact, if we look at Anticleia's explanation in greater detail, we see that the ψυχή and εἴδωλον are not synonymous:

ὤ μοι, τέκνον ἐμόν, περὶ πάντων κάμμορε φωτῶν,

οὔ τί σε Περσεφόνεια Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἀπαφίσκει,

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν

[331] *Od*. 4.838-839.
[332] *Od*. 11. 475-476 ~ 10.493-495.

Anticleia clarifies that what Odysseus witnessed, the shade's physically insubstantial flight, was not an εἴδωλον that Persephone created, rather her lack of substance is a condition that occurs when the person dies (αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν). The juxtaposition and the generalising temporal construction (ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν) makes it clear as well that this is not an εἴδωλον, a replica of the person that Persephone creates, but what Odysseus witnessed (αὕτη δίκη) is what happens whenever a person dies. In other words, the ψυχή has the same selfhood as the dead man. By contrast, the εἴδωλον does not have the same identity relationship. For example, Odysseus is aware that εἴδωλα are fashioned by Persephone (ἦ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ᾽ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια / ὤτρυν᾽) and that it is not the person himself (τὸν δὲ μετ᾽ εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληείην, / εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην,).[333] In addition, the ψυχή has its own existence: it automatically flies away to go Hades as soon as the person dies.[334] By contrast, the εἴδωλον is created by a third party. Athena creates the εἴδωλον of Penelope's sister (4.795–8):

> ἔνθ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἐνόησε θεά, γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
> εἴδωλον ποίησε, δέμας δ᾽ ἴκτο γυναικί,
> Ἰφθίμῃ, κούρῃ μεγαλήτορος Ἰκαρίοιο,
> τὴν Εὔμηλος ὄπυιε Φερῇς ἔνι οἰκία ναίων.

Likewise, Apollo is responsible for creating the an εἴδωλον of Aeneas (*Il*. 5.449–53):

> αὐτὰρ ὃ εἴδωλον τεῦξ᾽ ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων
> αὐτῷ τ᾽ Αἰνείᾳ ἴκελον καὶ τεύχεσι τοῖον,
> ἀμφὶ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ εἰδώλῳ Τρῶες καὶ δῖοι Ἀχαιοὶ
> δῄουν ἀλλήλων ἀμφὶ στήθεσσι βοείας

[333] *Od*. 11.601-603.
[334] Cf. *Il*. 7.328-330, 16.856-858, 22.363-365.

ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους λαισήϊά τε πτερόεντα.

It is clear then that the ψυχή is not simply a counterfeit image, an εἴδωλον, it is the same as the dead person. This means that we need to explain why Theoclymenus would see the shades of the suitors as εἴδωλα, if he has the same ability to see the shades' journey as the primary narrator does. Indeed, both the ψυχαί and the εἴδωλα can be physically insubstantial and life-like, but there is no mention in *Odyssey* 24 of their life-like or immaterial state. The reason behind the prophet's perception becomes clear when we consider *Iliad* 23.99-104[a]:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν
οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς
ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα: ταφὼν δ᾽ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
χερσί τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος δ᾽ ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν·
‘ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τι ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον…

Notice that Achilles only realises what he saw was, in some sense, an εἴδωλον after the ghost of Patroclus flies away screeching (·ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς / ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα). The manner in which Patroclus' ghost moves is the same as the suitors who shriek (αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἴσαν). The εἴδωλον indeed, as we have seen above, is created by an external force, unlike the ψυχή which leads its own independent existence. Nevertheless, the sounds, the insubstantial flight, and the life-like appearance of the ghost, leads Achilles to see an internal relation between the ghost of Patroclus and the εἴδωλον that flies away insubstantially and looks remarkably like the living person. In other words, theses apparent similarities between the ghost and the εἴδωλον encourage Achilles to see the shade as a phantom image, despite the fact that the ghost is not controlled by an external force, unlike

the εἴδωλον.[335] By envisioning the ghosts' departure to Hades, Theoclymenus appears to be calling the dead εἴδωλα, that is "images", like Achilles, because he realises that the flight is inhuman and not characteristic of the suitors themselves. Indeed, Theoclymenus can see the shades flying to Hades (ἰεμένων Ἔρεβόσδε ὑπὸ ζόφον), a very inhuman quality indeed. In fact, Theoclymenus is similar to Achilles and also Odysseus: all three witness the ghosts' flight and all three see the shades as εἴδωλα from their movements. It then seems to be that the living characters perceive the ghosts as such because there is an internal relation between their modes of flight. Indeed, the ghost of Anticleia moves away like an immaterial substance, a shadow or a dream. Likewise, Patroclus moves away like a puff of smoke. This is, as we noted above, similar to the εἴδωλον of Iphthime which goes through the door bolt into a gust of wind. In other words, there is an apparent similarity between the flight of the εἴδωλον and the flight of the ψυχή. It is this internal relation that means Theoclymenus sees the suitors' ψυχαί as εἴδωλα. However, by noticing this aspect of the shade, Theoclymenus appears to be metaphorically hiding other characteristics of the shade, namely that the εἴδωλα are usually created by an external force and are not the man himself.

Noticing an aspect or a cultural influence? The simile of the ψυχαί's departure

In *Odyssey* 24.5-9, Hermes waves his wand and the ψυχαί of the suitors, following him, descend to Hades, gibbering like bats:

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[335] A further internal relation between the ψυχή and εἴδωλον appears when we look at wider Homeric accounts. While the ψυχή may not be created by an external force, it arguably can be controlled by one. For example, the ψυχή of Teiresias is given the power of νόος and intelligence by Persephone in *Od*. 10.494-495 (τῶι καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια / οἴωι πεπνῦσθαι). Likewise, in *Od*. 11.385-386, Persephone is able to disperse the ghosts (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ψυχὰς μὲν ἀπεσκέδασ' ἄλλυδις ἄλλην / ἁγνὴ Περσεφόνεια γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων). Cf. *Od.* 11.213-214 (ἦ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ' ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια / ὤτρυν', ὅφρ' ἔτι μάλλον ὀδυρόμενος στοναχίζω). However, there is no evidence in *Iliad* 23 that Achilles is aware that the ghost is controlled by a third party.

τῇ ῥ᾽ ἄγε κινήσας, ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἕποντο.

ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο

τρίζουσαι ποτέονται, ἐπεί κέ τις ἀποπέσῃσιν

ὁρμαθοῦ ἐκ πέτρης, ἀνά τ᾽ ἀλλήλῃσιν ἔχονται,

ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν

In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that this simile was an exercise of aspect perception: Homer presents the shades as bats because there is an internal relation between the way both of them screech. In this section, I aim to suggest that this presentation of the shade does not occur from a cultural model in which the wraith is imagined to be a winged creature. Rather, I suggest that, by using the simile, the primary is just highlighting an internal relation between the sound of the animals and the ghosts. To make this argument, I aim to argue against the view that this simile is connected to the artistic tradition of the winged ψυχή.

The winged-ψυχή seems to belong to an artistic tradition.[336] The earliest recording of the image appears in the 13th century BC Mycenaean Tangara coffin. The imagery here may, prima facie, make us think that this description in *Odyssey* 24 derives from a tradition in which the wraith is imagined to be a winged creature. This is indeed the position which Vermeule takes when she examines the Tanagra coffin:[337]

> One of the big Tanagra coffins shows this image flying tentatively on batlike wings from its coffin house to its new home while the mourners sway and scratch their bloody cheeks

[336] See Vermeule 1979: 65 and fig. 13, 18-19 and figs. 12-13, 58-9 and fig. 14, 111-12 and fig. 27, 9-10 and figs. 4-5, 26 and fig. 19, 31-2 and figs. 23-4, 160-2 and figs. 14-15; Halm-Tisserant, 1988: 223-44; Peifer, 1989; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 325 n. 99, 328, 336-7, 340-1; Vollkommer *LIMC* 8. 1 (1997), Suppl. pp. 566-70, s.v. Eidola. On the Egyptian influence see, Vermeule 1979 74-7; Tsagarakis, 2000: 16; Martin 2016.

[337] Vermeule 1979: 65.

around the body (fig. 23). The leathery flanges of wing along the arms, unfeathered, look like earlier imaginative models for the famed *Odyssey* simile in which the suitors pass to the underworld squeaking like bats, disturbed and fluttering in a huge cavern (xxiv.6)

Clarke is aware that we cannot use supporting archaeological evidence to help us understand the appearance of the wraith.[338] Consider his discussion on page 5 of his monograph:

> The bird-souls on the fifth-century pots are very likely based on a reminiscence of Homer that was little less imaginative than those of modern readers; and there can be no guarantee whatever that a coincidence of imagery between Mesopotamian or Egyptian material and the Greek poets reflects a real connection in the ways that the two cultures conceived of death. To understand this poetry we ought to try to listen as its first audience would have done, and accordingly it is *within* the Homeric corpus that we will look to draw meaning from the key word πταμένη, which is the only real suggestion of birdlike flight in our passage.

Clarke's approach seems sensible: we must look first and foremost at the language of the text, before we resort to archaeological support. But I want to approach this from another perspective. Clarke's aim seems to be to show that the shades' movements are not about wings, but about insubstantial flight. I want, however, to suggest that there is no influence of the artistic tradition when Homer presents the shades' sounds as birdlike. I argue instead that the similes that present these sounds are aspects. I do this by looking at the function of the simile and the presentation of the shades in wider parts of Homeric epic. I suggest that there is nothing which indicates that the winged ψυχή influences this portrayal of the shade.

[338] Clarke 1999: 6.

Cairns acknowledges that the winged ψυχή is not a Homeric conception. Nevertheless, he cites several examples of this artistic tradition. This leads him to suggest that this tradition would have influenced the audience's interpretation of the text:[339]

> There is good reason to believe that the notion of the winged ψυχή extends beyond the Homeric poems and existed at a time before those poems became canonical texts; if it did, then it would have influenced audiences' interpretation of the relevant Homeric passages. The image of the flying ψυχή, as Clarke is right to point out, is not *the* Homeric conception, but it is unlikely to be an occasional elaboration, and the link which it presupposes between the ψυχή that leaves the body and that which is resident in Hades is not an ad hoc one.

In his 2014 article, Cairns maintains the same point that the simile is under the influence of archaeological evidence:[340]

> The mythologizing of the ψυχή as a winged creature that flies from the body and enters the underworld is obviously a metaphor of a more developed sort than those which present it as a valued possession, a prize in a fight to the death, or even just an object in a container. This conception occurs not only in these two passages (regarding Patroclus and Hector), but also in the first and second Nekyiai of the Odyssey. We see the influence of this tradition in the description of the soul's departure at death at *Timaeus* 81d, and, though there are many important differences, it clearly bears at least minimal comparison with the winged soul in the chariot-myth of the Phaedrus. It also forms a link between the Homeric poems and a set of religious beliefs that antedate their establishment as canonical fixed texts, for the image of the

[339] Cairns 2003: 58.
[340] Cairns 2014: §20.

> winged ψυχή, either as a bird hovering in the vicinity of the corpse or as a winged image of the deceased, appears, no doubt under oriental or Egyptian influence, in Greek art in isolated examples from the Mycenaean period and with greater regularity from the mid-seventh century onwards. The image of the flying ψυχή is not the Homeric conception, but it is not just an occasional elaboration either. It enjoys an extensive extra-Homeric existence in art and cult, and the link which it presupposes between the ψυχή that leaves the body and the one that is resident in Hades is regular.

The problem with this line of argument, however, is that even if we were to get an idea of how the audience interpreted the text, it is unlikely they would have got the winged-ψυχή interpretation from the text. The simile in the *Deuteronekyia*, for instance, resembles the ghost's departure in *Iliad* 23.100-101, where it vanishes into a puff of smoke screeching: ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς / ὤχετο τετριγυῖα.[341] In this *Iliad* scene, there is no evidence to suggest that we are bearing witness to the winged ψυχή. It seems much more plausible that the primary narrator is influenced by this epic tradition in which the shade screeches away when it moves insubstantially, than by the artistic tradition of the winged-ψυχή.

Furthermore, the kind of simile that occurs in the *Deuteronekyia* suggests that there is just a similar characteristic between the bats and the ψυχαί, it does not indicate that the wraiths are influenced by winged figures. Notice that there are three components to the simile in the *Deuteronekyia*. The ψυχαί are the tenors of the simile (ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἔποντο), the

[341] *Pace* Heubeck 1992: 859 *ad Od*. 24.5. Nothing in this verse suggests that the sound is the sound of shades' "fluttering". For instance, in *Iliad* 23.100-101, the ghost of Patroclus screeches (ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς / ὤχετο τετριγυῖα) but nothing in this passage suggests that the shade has a murmuring flutter, it after all disappears like smoke. Likewise the bird-like sound in the *Nekyia* (*Od*. 11.43 = 633 ~ 605) is (*Pace* Heubeck 1990: 80 ad *Od*. 11.43) not the sound of the "whirling" or "fluttering", the dead, we only know, move like shadows (Cf. *Od*. 10.493, 11.207) which do not make sounds. Cf. Focke 1943 208. Richardson (1993: 177 *ad Il*. 23.100-101) says it best: "the souls of the suitors are like squeaking bats". On the Egyptian influence of the dead's voice, see Griffith 1997. On cross-cultural comparisons between Homeric and Ugaritic depictions of the dead's condition, see West 1997: 162-164.

bats are the vehicle (ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε νυκτερίδες μυχῷ ἄντρου θεσπεσίοιο / τρίζουσαι ποτέονται), and then we see, in the resumptive clause how the shades are like the bats (ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν).[342] This simile construction merely suggests that the dead and the bats perform the same actions, not that the shades have an exact likeness to the animals as winged figures. Consider, for instance, *Iliad* 17.755-759:

τῶν δ᾽ ὥς τε ψαρῶν νέφος ἔρχεται ἠὲ κολοιῶν

οὖλον κεκλήγοντες, ὅτε προΐδωσιν ἰόντα

κίρκον, ὅ τε σμικρῇσι φόνον φέρει ὀρνίθεσσιν,

ὣς ἄρ᾽ ὑπ᾽ Αἰνείᾳ τε καὶ Ἕκτορι κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν

οὖλον κεκλήγοντες ἴσαν, λήθοντο δὲ χάρμης.

The vehicle and the tenor, in the resumptive clause, do the same actions: The Achaeans *shout terribly* fleeing Aenaeas and Hector in the same way that starlings shout terribly whenever they see a hawk coming. This construction is very similar to the simile we see in the *Deuteronekyia*. However, it is at no point assumed that the Achaeans have the form of starlings; rather it suggests that there is an apparent similarity between their actions. Indeed, the simile in *Odyssey* 24 seems similar to the one that appears in *Odyssey* 22, where the suitors are compared to fish (22.383-389):

τοὺς δὲ ἴδεν μάλα πάντας ἐν αἵματι καὶ κονίῃσι

πεπτεῶτας πολλούς, ὥστ᾽ ἰχθύας, οὕς θ᾽ ἁλιῆες

κοῖλον ἐς αἰγιαλὸν πολιῆς ἔκτοσθε θαλάσσης

δικτύῳ ἐξέρυσαν πολυωπῷ: οἱ δέ τε πάντες

[342] See Richards (1936: 96-101) for terminology.

κύμαθ᾽ ἁλὸς ποθέοντες ἐπὶ ψαμάθοισι κέχυνται·

τῶν μέν τ᾽ Ἠέλιος φαέθων ἐξείλετο θυμόν:

ὣς τότ᾽ ἄρα μνηστῆρες ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοισι κέχυντο.

The only thing in common that the suitors have with the fish, in this simile, is that they are both heaped on each other (οἱ δέ τε πάντες / κύμαθ᾽ ἁλὸς ποθέοντες ἐπὶ ψαμάθοισι κέχυνται… ὣς τότ᾽ ἄρα μνηστῆρες ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοισι κέχυντο). The bat simile in *Odyssey* 24 also shows that the dead and bats are similar only in so far as they sound similar. These are resemblances, but they are kinds of resemblances that seem similar to Wittgenstein's examples of imagination. He tells us that, when we see a triangular shape as a mountain, we are noticing this aspect from imagination, not from a striking similarity between the two.[343] In the same way, the primary narrator notices the bat and fish aspect because, like the triangle, there is an internal relation, an apparent but altogether vague similarity between the suitors and the animals. [344]

This so far suggests that the baroque bat simile is a characteristic of aspect perception, not a cultural influence. However, when we look at other types of similes concerning the dead, we see that aspect perception is at work. Indeed, the bird-like imagery of the shade in Homer can be seen as an exercise of aspect perception, not of artistic influence. Consider *Odyssey* 11.605-606:[345]

[343] Cf. PPF § 162.

[344] In fact, one could even say the simile in *Odyssey* 24 simply highlights an internal relation similar that Wittgenstein notes in LFM (p. 73) where he says that the pentagram and hand have an internal relation, five strokes. This bare similarity is also present in the kind of simile constructions that we see in Homeric epic. Indeed, the bats and the shades are only remotely similar because of their sounds. This is internal relation that allows the narrator to notice a likeness between the ghosts and the animals. This is then a construction of aspect perception, not of cultural influence.

[345] LFM, (p. 73).

ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κλαγγὴ νεκύων ἦν οἰωνῶν ὥς, / πάντοσ᾽ ἀτυζομένων.

In this simile, the κλαγγὴ of the dead is likened to that of bird. Here it is the noise of the dead that is similar to the birds, not their movements. The internal relation that allows Odysseus to see this likeness between the dead and the bird is made clear from the word κλαγγὴ, which communicates the sharp piercing sound of birds.[346] Other passages as well do not suggest that there was any connection between Homer and the artistic tradition. Consider the way the dead approach Odysseus in 11.36-43:

αἱ δ᾽ ἀγέροντο

ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.

νύμφαι τ᾽ ἠίθεοί τε πολύτλητοί τε γέροντες

παρθενικαί τ᾽ ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι,

πολλοὶ δ᾽ οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,

ἄνδρες ἀρηίφατοι βεβροτωμένα τεύχε᾽ ἔχοντες·

οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος

θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ᾕρει.

Heubeck suggests that the dative ἰαχῇ signifies “the fluttering and whirling of the dead, rather than the cries”.[347] But this will not work: nothing in this passage suggests that the shades are fluttering. The verb ἐφοίτων describes human actions,[348] and the phrase ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος is formulaic and describes a living person’s movements from one place to

[346] *Il*. 3.3-5.
[347] Heubeck 1990: 80 *ad Od*.11.43.
[348] Cf. *Il*. 2.779, 3.449, 5.528, 595, 9.10, 12.266, 13.760, 14.296, 15.686, 20.6, 24.533; *Od*. 2.182, 9.401, 10.119, 12.420, 14.355, 24.415.

another.[349] Besides, the dative ἰαχῇ and the synonym ἠχή describe noises.[350] Odysseus is terrified from their sounds as they move around the blood. This again suggests that Homer is following a tradition where the dead are not winged, but life-like and only seem to make certain noises when they move. It is this shrieking noise of the shade that leads both the primary narrator and Odysseus to see the bird aspect.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the various presentations of the shade when it makes its journey to Hades. I have suggested that the presentations of the wraith are conceptual aspects. I have argued that characters have seen the post-mortem survivor as a bodily being, as a θυμός and as an εἴδωλον because they made an internal relation between the properties of the ψυχή and the properties of this entity.

In the first section, I established that there was a folk-model present in Homer in which the primary narrator presents the incorporeal ψυχή as having some characteristics of the living (physical substance or basic cognitive display of emotions). I also suggested that characters have a mental image of the shade, in which the post-mortem survivor has some characteristics of the corpse, some of the wraith. This section helped us to establish that characters, when presenting the shades, were working from a model in which the incoming resident of Hades has some properties of the living corporeal person. This meant that aspect perception was helpful since we can notice aspects from the memory of mental images.

In the second section, we determined that there are three internal relations between the post-mortem survivor as a corpse and the ψυχή. We first suggested that the corpse-wraith

[349] Cf. *Od*. 9.401, 10.119, 24.415.
[350] Cf. *Il*. 4.456, 12.144, 14.1, 15.275, 384, 396, 16.366, 373, 17.266. See also Cunliffe 1924: 194 s.v. ἰαχή; *LfrgE* s.v. ἰαχή.For ἠχή see *Il*. 2.209, 8.159, 12.252, 13.834, 837, 15.355, 590, 16.769, 23.21; *Od*. 3.15. See Cunliffe 1924: 184; ; *LfrgE* s.v ἠχή. See Chantraine 1948: 139-140 s.v. ἰαχή.

conceptual blend is a model that invites the character to see the post-mortem survivor as a being deprived of faculties. We argued that, in this blend, the corporeal being, input, allows for an internal relation, a match, between the figure in the blend and the man who loses his life-faculties. We then suggested that there is an internal relation between the shade that has physical substance and the dead man himself. We suggested that physical strength can be coterminous to the Homeric man's sense of selfhood and that this mental image allows for characters to see the entity that journeys to Hades as the man himself. We also suggested that the shade, having the same basic emotional faculties as the living, allows another internal relation to be made. We for instance saw that mental faculties substitute the name for the person himself and can easily represent the person's sense of selfhood.

In the third section, we examined how the wraith can be imagined as a θυμός. We proposed that this aspect occurred because there were a number of apparent similarities (internal relations) between the departure of the θυμός and ψυχή and between the ψυχή *qua* wraith having emotions and the θυμός being responsible for emotions.

In the fourth part of this chapter, we examined the presentation of the shade as an εἴδωλον. We argued that Theoclymenus' vision resembles a hallucination and that he has access to the primary narrator's knowledge of eschatology. I suggested that Theoclymenus is able to perceive the wraith as the primary narrator does, but he sees the shade as an εἴδωλον. This aspect perception, I argued, occurred because there was an internal relation between the life-like and insubstantial properties of the two entities.

Finally, we examined how the shade is presented as a bat and as a bird. I argued that this presentation was not influenced by the artistic tradition of the winged ψυχή, but because the primary narrator and Odysseus could notice a resemblance between the sounds of the birds and the ghosts' noises. I suggested that it was this internal relation that led both focalisers to see a likeness between the ghost and the animals.

This chapter has established how the mental image of the wraith is imagined in different ways through the ability to exercise aspect perception. Characters call the dead by different names because they can notice different aspects of the wraith. In the next chapter, we shall establish how the living interact with the dead and how they reach these interpretations of the shade by using Wittgenstein's model.

PART TWO

THE INHABITANTS OF HADES

Chapter Three

Iliad 23 and Patroclus' ghost.

Introduction

We have examined how Homer presents the ψυχή that leaves the corpse and travels to the underworld. In the last chapter, I argued that characters have a mental image in which the shade that goes to Hades has the same "I" as the embodied person. The primary narrator also has a conception that the wraith has the same characteristics as the living person. It is this schema that allowed the characters to make an internal relation and see use metaphoric constructions to describe the wraith. In so doing, I suggested that aspect perception was integral to a mapping scheme that allowed us to see the ψυχή in such diverse ways.

In this chapter, I aim to show how this phenomenon of aspect perception is also crucial for Achilles to make sense of the entity when it resides in Hades and for the primary narrator to present the ghost. In order to make this case, I shall examine three topics.

First, I explore the relationship between the dream state and the presentation of the shade. I compare the dream scene in *Iliad* 23 to other dream episodes in Homeric epic.

The purpose of this comparison will be twofold. I first look at the dream scenes in Homer in order to show that the ghost of Patroclus is elusive. Achilles encounters the ghost in a dream and, after he wakes up, describes the condition of the ψυχή. However, Homeric characters, as we will see, speculate that the dreamer does not have the same cognitive capabilities as the waking person and is imagined as easily misremembering the dream when

he wakes up. My aim is to show that Homer presents Achilles and other dreamers as in fact having the same mental capabilities as the person who is awake. This will indicate that Achilles' reactions are the same as someone who is cognitively sound and emphasise that the ghost of Patroclus is intrinsically elusive.

The second purpose of this comparison is to show that the dreamer tries to make sense of the illusory figure in the dream by exercising his capacity for aspect perception. This will establish broadly that aspect perception is at the heart of how characters in Homeric epic try to make sense of illusory entities, such as phantoms or disguised gods. In this way, I suggest that dreams provide a conceptual framework for how the living make sense of the dead in Hades.

In the second part of this chapter, I explore the ways in which the inhabitant of Hades is seen as having both life-like and deficient characteristics. I argue that these characteristics invite both the primary narrator and the living character, Achilles, to provide different conceptions of the inhabitant of Hades. I begin by examining characters' preconceptions of the wraiths. I posit that, in character descriptions, the ghost is a witless flitting wraith. By contrast, the primary narrator's descriptions suggest that the wraith in Hades looks like the living person in appearance and voice. I then go on to explore how the various descriptions of the ghost of Patroclus in *Iliad* 23 are exercises of aspect perception. I defend this perceptual model further by claiming that the ghost's life-like behaviour leads the primary narrator to present the ψυχή as dead man proper. I suggest that Achilles *sees* the wraith successively *as* a corporeal being, a wraith, and an εἴδωλον. I also suggest that Achilles uses the phrase φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν as a conceptual metonym to describe the non-human characteristics of the wraith when it disappears. This metonym, I suggest, has the same cognitive model as Radden and Kövecses' "brain for intelligence" example (CATEGORY FOR SALIENT PROPERTY) since the φρένες is a bodily organ that stands for the animal-like intelligence of the wraith

when it evaporates.[351] I aim to show that this metonymic imagery invites the secondary focaliser who has encountered the dead to *see* the wraith *as* both life-like and witless.

In the third section, I shall examine the role of burial in regard to the inconsistent presentations of the wraith. In this section, we shall see that scholars have often tried to make sense of the heterogenous descriptions of the dead by looking at the symbolic importance of burial rites. Many are of the view that the dead in Hades, who are unburied in the mortal world, are in a liminal state and that, as a result, they retain some life-like qualities and fluctuate between two modes of self-description. That is to say, the unburied supposedly fluctuate between talking about themselves as corpses and then as wraiths because they are in a state of betwixt and between. I will compare the presentations of the buried and unburied dead and I aim to conclude that burial cannot explain the conflicting descriptions of the dead's variously life-like and mindless state of being. In other words, this discussion indicates that burial does not affect or change the ontological state of the dead. This discussion will help us pave the way to show that it is instead aspect perception that explains the many inconsistent descriptions of the dead.

The fourth and final part of this discussion looks at the inhabitants' sense of selfhood. In this section, I shall explore the way in which the inhabitant attaches his "I" indeterminately to the corpse and to the wraith. I shall argue that these contradictory descriptions are aspect changes. Specifically, my aim will be to show that the ghost has the same sense of selfhood as the embodied dead man. I argue that this similarity between the shade's "I" and the embodied person leads the ghost of Patroclus to make an internal relation between the wraith and the corpse. I then suggest that this internal relation means that the ghost Patroclus changes between talking about itself as (i) the wraith that has the same cognitive abilities as the embodied person and (ii) as the mindless corpse.

[351] Cf. Radden and Kövecses 2007: 344.

Many of the examples which we shall examine in this chapter have already been discussed, though briefly, in the introduction of this thesis. However, my analysis there of these pieces of evidence has deferred consideration of some interpretative cruces. For example, I accepted that the phrase in 23.104b (φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν) means that the ghost of Patroclus is devoid of wits. Yet this is a debatable interpretation.[352] We will then need to examine the phrase, Achilles' speech, and the context of the speech thoroughly in order to give sufficient attention to this character's description of the wraith. Although I concentrate on previously analysed passages, I do not wish to repeat my discussion, but I will bring in wider evidence form Homeric epic and more detailed scholarly discussions in order to avoid circular reasoning.

Iliad 23 and the dream state in Homeric epic

In this section, I explore how Achilles interacts with the ghost of Patroclus in the dream scene. The ψυχή rebukes Achilles for neglecting his dead body and for not providing him with a burial. The ghost requests specific burial rites and Achilles promises that he will fulfil the shade's desire. He attempts to embrace the ψυχή, but it evaporates into the earth screeching, and Achilles, waking up, realises that it was just a ψυχή.

At first glance, this dream scene seems to suggest that the ghost is illusory: it can speak like Patroclus, yet it lacks physical substance. Achilles' interaction with the shade seems to be about the same as Odysseus' meeting with the ψυχαί in the *Nekyia*: (i) both the living encounter ghosts for the first time; (ii) both are under the misconception that the ghosts, who are so life-like, can be embraced.[353] This indicates that Achilles behaves as the

[352] See page 49 n. 149.
[353] Cf. *Il* 23.99-101~*Od*. 11.207-208.

living do when interacting with the shade and that the humanlike appearance of the ψυχή is deceptive. But the extent to which the ghost itself is elusive is called into question, when we consider that Achilles' interaction took place in a dream. There are some instances in Homer in which the dreamer is said to lack full waking competence. We hear, for instance, from characters that a person's memory is impaired when in a dream-like state (τοῦ ποτὲ μεμνήσεσθαι ὀΐομαι ἔν περ ὀνείρῳ).[354] Penelope also thinks that it is even more unusual for the dreamer to express emotions (αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ κλαῖον καὶ ἐκώκυον ἔν περ ὀνείρῳ).[355] The concessive force of the particle περ emphasises that the dreamer is cognitively weaker when he is dreaming than he is when awake. Notice also that the dreamers do not necessarily question things which seem startlingly strange to the awake person. For example, Penelope, when seeing the eagle talking to her in *Odyssey* 19.541-550, does not question in the dream how strange it is to encounter a talking animal. This evidence presents problems for our analysis. For if the dreamer, Achilles, is in a cognitively weaker state, then we are left to wonder whether the ghost is an ambiguous entity in itself, or the dreamer is simply witless and unable to realise that the shade is an incorporeal being.

I argue that Achilles, in this scene, is cognitively sound when he is interacting with the ghost of Patroclus. Specifically, I argue that in other dream scenes the cognitive abilities of the dreamer are never an issue. One important example is that Achilles in the dream, unlike Penelope in Book 19, does question the strangeness of Patroclus' appearance in the dream in *Il*. 23.93, which suggests he has his wits about him. Rather, I suggest that the dream, in Homer, is a platform for the living to engage with immaterial entities, such as ghosts, phantoms, and to interact with undercover gods.[356]

[354] *Od*. 19.581, 21.79.
[355] *Od*. 19.541.
[356] Cauer 1923: 530.

Scholars have debated the extent to which Achilles' cognitive and emotional state affects what he sees in his dream. Wilamowitz suggested that the dream represents Achilles' longing for Patroclus.[357] Hundt posits that the dream reflects Achilles' mood.[358] Kessels argues against the suggestion that the dream reflects Achilles' psychic state: "Furthermore it seems improbable to me that Achilles after having made arrangements for the funeral should now receive instructions from the personification of his 'Sehnsuch'. If the dream did really indicate Achilles' psychic state, the words of Patroclus would mean self-reproach for forgetting or postponing the funeral."[359] Devereux, whose approach is overtly Freudian, examines the way in which the shade of Patroclus, in the dream scene, evaporates. He suggests that the "degradation of Patroclus' spectre cannot be due to a growing awareness of the dead man's faults." Rather, the degradation reflects Achilles' growing awareness of his own misconduct."[360] Harris, however, suggests that the dream is a truth-telling one: "When the image of Patroclus gave Achilles instructions about his burial, that was probably thought of as a truth-telling dream (though Homer uses no such expression)."[361]

This psychoanalytic interpretation of the dream, which Wilamowitz, Hundt, and Devereux provide, problematises our suggestion that Patroclus' ghost is intrinsically elusive. After all, if the dream reflects Achilles' psychic state, then the appearance of the ghost is a figment of his imagination, not an accurate reflection of the state of the dead. Fortunately, we do not need to be concerned by these arguments. Kessels, cited above, convincingly dismisses Wilamowitz's and Hundt's notion that the dream signifies Achilles' emotional or mental state. Devereux's argument is also, he admits, "speculative".[362] Psychological

[357] Wilamowitz 1920: 111.
[358] Hundt 1935: 61.
[359] Kessels 1978: 55.
[360] Devereux 1978-1979: 11.
[361] Harris 2009: 128.
[362] Devereux 1978-1979: 12.

reconstructions may not be "impossible," but nothing in *Iliad* 23 suggests the character's cognitive or emotional state changes the dream.

There is, however, an impression that the dreamer is in a cognitively unsound state when dreaming. Consider Heubeck's commentary on the dream scene between Penelope and the εἴδωλον of Iphthime:[363]

> There is a tactic assumption that the sleeper's senses are alive and active; but the dreamer is usually more passive than Penelope is here, though there is some conversation in Achilles' dream; significantly, Achilles, like Penelope, is in a highly disturbed state when sleep overtakes him.

But if Achilles is in a disturbed state when he sleeps, we are left to wonder whether his mental condition is the reason that he has contradictory conceptions of the ghost of Patroclus. According to Heubeck, the conversation in *Iliad* 23.65-107 indicates that Achilles is less passive than other characters in these dream scenes. But this suggestion raises more questions than it provides answers. First, to what extent is Achilles cognitively active and engaged when he interacts with the ghost? Second is Achilles any different from other characters in dreams who, supposedly, are "passive"?

To begin to answer these questions, it would be helpful to compare the dream scene in *Iliad* 23 with others in Homeric epic. Here I will argue that there is no reason to assume that the dreamer in Homeric dream scenes is thought of as cognitively less able when he is in the dream or when tries to remember it. This will help us to establish that Achilles' reaction to the ghost of Patroclus is perfectly reasonable in the dream and an indication that the wraith is

[363] Heubeck 1988: 242 *ad Od*. 4.795ff.

fundamentally unknowable because it has a combination of life-like and deficient characteristics.

The dream state, in Homeric epic, is ambiguous (ἦ τοι μὲν ὄνειροι ἀμήχανοι ἀκριτόμυθοι / γίγνοντ').[364] A person may believe a dream presents truthful information or they might suspect that the dream is deceptive.[365] In Homeric epic, the gods often visit the dreamer in disguise. For example, the god Dream visits Agamemnon, disguised as Nestor, in *Iliad* 2.20-22:

στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς Νηληΐῳ υἱῖ ἐοικώς

Νέστορι, τόν ῥα μάλιστα γερόντων τῖ᾽ Ἀγαμέμνων·

τῷ μιν ἐεισάμενος προσεφώνεε θεῖος ὄνειρος.

Athena, we see, sends an εἴδωλον of Iphthime to Penelope. In *Odyssey* 6.21-24, Athena visits Nausicaa in a dream, disguised as Dymas' daughter:

στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς, καί μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν,

εἰδομένη κούρῃ ναυσικλειτοῖο Δύμαντος,

ἥ οἱ ὁμηλικίη μὲν ἔην, κεχάριστο δὲ θυμῷ.

τῇ μιν ἐεισαμένη προσέφη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη…

This is similar to Achilles' dream scene. The primary narrator mentions that the wraith strikingly resembles Patroclus himself. Here the visitants are supernatural: they are

[364] *Od*. 19.560-561.
[365] Cf. *Od*. 19.560f.

gods or ghosts taking a certain form. Take also *Iliad* 24.679-691 in which Hermes, supposedly disguised,[366] visits Priam in a dream: [367]

ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ Ἑρμείαν ἐριούνιον ὕπνος ἔμαρπτεν

ὁρμαίνοντ᾽ ἀνὰ θυμὸν ὅπως Πρίαμον βασιλῆα

νηῶν ἐκπέμψειε λαθὼν ἱεροὺς πυλαωρούς.

στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καί μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν…

This all suggests that the dream provides a platform for the divine and the supernatural to interact with the living. However, when we examine further scenes, we notice that the dreamers interacting with the divine is modelled on the way in which those with waking competence engage with the gods. This suggests that there is little reason to question Achilles' cognitive competence in his interaction with the ghost of Patroclus. All of these scenes are similar in that the divine being either instructs the visitant to fulfil a task or gives the visitant information. This is a significant point to raise. For it suggests that the visitant, whether asleep or awake, is expected to remember and act on these instructions, or understand the information which has been given to them. This means that the cognitive competence of the dreamer is never an issue in Homer. For instance, Zeus sends the god Dream to instruct Agamemnon to arm the Achaeans.[368] Athena visits Nausicaa in a dream and gives her a series of instructions for her to accomplish when she is awake.[369] Agamemnon is even able to recount everything that happened in his dream.[370] Most

[366] Cf. Gunn (1971: 15-16 n. 15) and Redfield (2013: 5) who suggest that it might be assumed that Hermes comes to Priam in his earlier disguised form that we see in *Il*. 24.347, 348. See also *Il*. 24.461.
[367] On this scene following a formal dream type-scene structure see Brügger 2017: 247 *ad Il.* 24.677-695. See also Lévy 1982: 23-41; Morris 1983: 39 n. 1. Contra Richardson (1992: 347 ad *Il*. 24.677-686) who says that it is "surely not the case" that Hermes comes to Priam in a dream in this episode. Nevertheless, Richardson acknowledges that this episode resembles the build-up to Agamemnon's dream-scene in *Iliad.* 2. On the type-scene in Homer, see Arend 1933: 61-63; Gunn 1971: 15; Morris 1983; Redfield 2013.
[368] *Il*. 2.8-12.
[369] *Od*. 6.21-49.
[370] *Il*. 2.55-71.

impressively, Agamemnon can quote the god's instructions verbatim.[371] In addition, the dreamer is very capable of experiencing emotions. The εἴδωλον of Iphthime, for instance, acknowledges that the dreamer Penelope is in a state of sorrow (εὕδεις, Πηνελόπεια, φίλον τετιημένη ἦτορ).[372] Penelope questions the Iphthime-εἴδωλον's desire to stop this sense of grief:[373]

καί με κέλεαι παύσασθαι ὀιζύος ἠδ᾽ ὀδυνάων
πολλέων, αἵ μ᾽ ἐρέθουσι κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν.

The dreamer believes that she is in the same cognitive state as she was when she was awake. Likewise, in *Odyssey* 20.86-90 Penelope remembers that she felt joy when she thought that the dream figure was Odysseus:

αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὀνείρατ᾽ ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων.
τῇδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ,
τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ: αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
χαῖρ᾽, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὕπαρ ἤδη.

Notice also that the god Dream believes that Agamemnon has the mental faculties to remember everything he has said:[374]

ἀλλὰ σὺ σῇσιν ἔχε φρεσί, μηδέ σε λήθη
αἱρείτω εὖτ᾽ ἄν σε μελίφρων ὕπνος ἀνήῃ.

The god is aware that Agamemnon can retain this information; however, he also acknowledges that Agamemnon is capable of forgetting what has happened in the dream. But the dreamer is only forgetful *after* the dream takes place. This informs us that the dreamer is not necessarily in a mentally unsound state whilst he is dreaming, but rather he struggles to

[371] Cf. *Il*. 2.26-34 and 60-70.
[372] *Od*. 4.804.
[373] *Od*. 4.812-813.
[374] *Il*. 2.33-34.

remember the vision after he has woken up. But, even then, characters do remember the dream. Agamemnon, for instance, remembers his instructions and Dream's speech. Penelope as well can remember the dialogue she had between the eagle and herself and remember the vision of Odysseus. A further clue that indicates the dreamers are cognitively active is the formulaic construction (τίπτέ + δεῦρ' ἤλυθες). The formula appears when the dreamers, Achilles and Penelope, ask the visitants why they have come to see them. Achilles asks the ghost of Patroclus why he came and promises to do everything that it asks in *Il*. 23.94-96:

'τίπτέ μοι ἠθείη κεφαλὴ δεῦρ᾽ εἰλήλουθας
καί μοι ταῦτα ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπιτέλλεαι; αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοι
πάντα μάλ᾽ ἐκτελέω καὶ πείσομαι ὡς σὺ κελεύεις.

Likewise, Athena asks the εἴδωλον the same question and explains that her sister lives far away:

τίπτε, κασιγνήτη, δεῦρ᾽ ἤλυθες; οὔ τι πάρος γε
πωλέ᾽, ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὸν ἀπόπροθι δώματα ναίεις

The construction, at first, suggests that the speakers are not aware that they are dreaming. For example, when Penelope asks this question, she addresses the phantom as her sister (κασιγνήτη). Likewise, Patroclus uses the word κεφαλή, a metonym that stands for the person themself.[375] Both of the characters do not think, at this stage, that these are illusions. However, this is a misconception which the living have as well when they encounter an εἴδωλον or a disguised god. Apollo, for instance, in *Iliad* 5.449-450 fashions an εἴδωλον of

[375] Cf. Clarke (1999: 174 n. 29.) who provides an impressive explanation of the use of this word. Schol. Arn/A argues that ἠθείη κεφαλὴ was a term of address that younger characters gave to older ones. Since Patroclus is younger than Achilles, we might read this name epithet as an indication that Achilles is using language incorrectly and that he does not have his wits about him in the dream. However, there is no reason for us to assume this, it is common in the *Iliad* for Achilles to use Homeric formulae in unconventional ways. This passage is no exception, and an indication that Achilles has the same cognitive capabilities in the dream as he has when he is awake. See Parry 1956; 53-54; Claus 1975; Friedrich and Redfield 1978; Martin 1989: 152-179; and Russo 2020.

Aeneas to deceive the soldiers.[376] Similarly, in *Iliad* 21.600f Apollo disguises himself as Agenor in order to draw Achilles away. This gives us no reason to assume that Penelope or Achilles are somehow less able by asking this question. Moreover, the question also indicates a great deal of awareness from both Achilles and Penelope. The two are aware that it is not possible for these spectres to visit them. Penelope in the dream remembers that her sister lives far away. This shows she is capable of recognising the surreal nature of the dream. Likewise, Achilles seems to show signs that contact with the dead in Hades is impossible when he uses the concessive adverbs καί and περ in his address to the dead.[377]

This suggests that Achilles is not cognitively incompetent when he confuses the wraith of Patroclus with the living breathing person in his dream. Notice also that Achilles does not forget what Patroclus asks of him. He does as he was instructed and gives Patroclus a cremation. Indeed, Achilles' state of mind is never called into question.[378] This indicates that Achilles remembers well enough what he saw in the dream.[379]

So far, we have established that the dreamer is imagined to be cognitively active. The visitor in the dream assumes that the dreamer has the capacity to understand his or her instructions and remember them once awake. This means that there is no reason to question Achilles' mental state when he encounters the ghost of Patroclus. This gives us further

[376] Cf. Kirk 1990: 107-108 *ad Il*. 5.449-50.
[377] See *Il*. 23.19, 179, 24.593.
[378] That being said, the construction in 23.82 suggests that the wraith believes that it is unlikely for Achilles to obey his commands (ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω καὶ ἐφήσομαι αἴ κε πίθηαι). However, doubt does not signify that Achilles is cognitively weak in the dream. The ghost rebukes Achilles that he is forgetful of him (αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ), and that he is careless of him when he is dead (οὐ μέν μευ ζώοντος ἀκήδεις, ἀλλὰ θανόντος) since he has not provided him with a burial. Verse 82 seems to be part of a series of scornful accusations that Achilles is careless of his buried state. The line, then, does not suggest that Achilles is in a cognitively weaker state when he is in the dream. This means that Achilles' confusion of the ghost's state emerges because the shade is fundamentally ambiguous, not because Achilles is cognitively incapable.

[379] See *Il*.23-103-107 ~ *Od*. 20.86-90 on dreamers remembering seeing look-alikes of their loved ones.

license to argue that it is the shade's characteristics, not the cognitive state of the dreamer, which is responsible for the many different conceptualisations of the shade.

In fact, however, *Iliad* 23 is predominantly different from other dream sequences. For instance, the phantom of Iphthime and the god Dream imply that they are not what they appear to be. The phantom and god tell the dreamers that they are messengers of the gods.[380] By contrast, the ghost of Patroclus is not an imposter, but has the same selfhood as the embodied living person. Indeed, the shade is so convincing that it recounts details of Patroclus' childhood.[381]

While this suggests that the wraith has the same selfhood and is not a counterfeit, like the εἴδωλον, we note that *Iliad* 23 is primarily similar to other dream sequences in two ways. One, the visitant is often an illusory image of someone else. Two, the spectre commands the dreamer to act on its instructions when he is awake. This indicates that the dream-scene provides a conceptual framework for the dream episode in *Iliad* 23. But, in the introduction, we have said that the life-like characteristics of the shade induce the living character to see the ghost as the dead man himself. We have argued that aspect perception accounts for Achilles' different conceptualisations of the shade. Since we have suggested that the dream scenes provide a framework for the presentation of the dead, we need to show that characters in other dream scenes utilise aspect perception when engaging with the visitant.

Let us begin by first looking at some of the dream sequences in which the visitant is said to be in disguise. Consider, for instance, Agamemnon's account of the god Dream's appearance in *Iliad* 2.56-71:

[380] *Il.* 2.63-64~*Od*. 4.829.
[381] See *Il*. 23.87-90.

‘κλῦτε φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος

ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα· μάλιστα δὲ Νέστορι δίῳ

εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τ᾽ ἄγχιστα ἐῴκει·

στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καί με πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·

‘εὕδεις Ἀτρέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἱπποδάμοιο·

οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὕδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα,

ᾧ λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλε·

νῦν δ᾽ ἐμέθεν ξύνες ὦκα· Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι,

ὃς σεῦ ἄνευθεν ἐὼν μέγα κήδεται ἠδ᾽ ἐλεαίρει·

θωρῆξαί σε κέλευσε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς

πανσυδίῃ· νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοις πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν

Τρώων· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ ἀμφὶς Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχοντες

ἀθάνατοι φράζονται· ἐπέγναμψεν γὰρ ἅπαντας

Ἥρη λισσομένη, Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε᾽ ἐφῆπται

ἐκ Διός: ἀλλὰ σὺ σῇσιν ἔχε φρεσίν· ὣς ὃ μὲν εἰπὼν

ᾤχετ᾽ ἀποπτάμενος, ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν.

Notice that Agamemnon admits to seeing Dream as Nestor in the first few lines. (ἦλθεν ὄνειρος / ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα· μάλιστα δὲ Νέστορι δίῳ / εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τ᾽ ἄγχιστα ἐῴκει). But he changes aspect when the dream finishes and he acknowledges several character traits of the visitant, traits which impel him to *see* the divine visitor not *as* Nestor, but as something resembling Nestor. First, Agamemnon remembers Dream’s admission: that

it is not Nestor with whom he is speaking, but a messenger of Zeus (Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι). This admission is confirmed when Dream describes the current state of the Gods in Olympus (οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ ἀμφὶς Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχοντες / ἀθάνατοι φράζοντα). Second, Dream demonstrates the inhuman ability to fly away (ὤχετ᾽ ἀποπτάμενος). It is these features of Dream's character, his explanation and his disappearance, that lead Agamemnon to the view that this is a spectre. In other words, aspect perception is at the heart of Agamemnon's ability to realise who visited him in the dream. The same phenomenon is also present in Penelope's dream in *Odyssey* 4. Notice that Penelope is convinced she is speaking at first to her sister instead of a phantom (τίπτε, κασιγνήτη, δεῦρ' ἤλυθες;).[382] But when the εἴδωλον admits that she is a messenger for the gods (ἣ νῦν με προέηκε τεὶν τάδε μυθήσασθαι), Penelope indicates that she is bearing witness to a god: εἰ μὲν δὴ θεός ἐσσι θεοῖό τε ἔκλυες αὐδήν. Again, we see that a feature of the phantom, its speech, impels the dreamer to see the spectre no longer as her sister, but as some divine being that is in contact with the gods. In this way, the dreamer interprets the figures in the dream by utilising aspect perception. If we are then correct in suggesting that dream scenes provide a conceptual framework for the scene in *Iliad* 23, then we can also say that aspect perception is indeed at the heart of making sense of the ghost.

This discussion has shown us that there are fundamental similarities between the scene in *Iliad* 23 and other dream scenes. First, structurally, *Iliad* 23 and certain other dream episodes follow a narrative structure: a divine being visits a mortal and provides him or her with instructions. Second, the dreamers in *Iliad* 23, *Iliad* 2, and *Odyssey* 4 comprehend the figures in the dream by utilising aspect perception. However, we have acknowledged that Achilles and the ghost of Patroclus differ from the other characters in these episodes. Unlike Penelope, Achilles never considers, when he is in the dream, that the ghost of Patroclus is an

[382] *Od*. 4.810.

incorporeal shade; by having the same identity relationship with the living Patroclus, the wraith convinces Achilles that the ghost is a corporeal being that can be embraced. Unlike the other dream visitors, the ghost is able to reminisce about Patroclus' life, as though the shade were Patroclus himself. This means that there is a deeper ambiguity surrounding the identity of the shade which we need to understand. This suggest that aspect perception is employed in the scene in ways which differ from the scenes in *Iliad* 2 and *Odyssey* 4. We have already mentioned that the ghost's capacity to speak like Patroclus convinces Achilles that he is speaking to the dead man himself. Let us now move onto the next section where we shall explore Achilles' and the primary narrator's capacity for aspect perception in further detail.

Aspect perception and the epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and living characters' accounts of the ghost

Scholars have accepted that the descriptions of the inhabitants of Hades are contradictory. However, many have suggested that the official conception is that the ghosts are *witless* and that the life-like characteristics are, by contrast, merely minor inconsistencies. Consider Edmonds' statement:[383]

> The Homeric epics present a mixed picture of what happens to an individual after death, but scholars have focused on one element in that picture as the standard view of the afterlife, not just in Homer but in Greek religion more broadly. This supposedly standard view is that the souls of the dead lack all mind or force; once a hero leaves the light of the sun, only a grim, joyless and tedious existence awaits, with no particular suffering but no pleasure either. Such a view is supported by a few key

[383] Edmonds 2014: 5 §9. See also Edmonds 2013: 252.

passages in the epics: the meeting of Achilles with the shade of Patroklos in the *Iliad*, the meeting of Odysseus with his mother in the Underworld in the *Odyssey*.

Edmonds does not reference the scholars who support this "standard view" of the dead. Nevertheless, he is right to say that scholars standardise the conception of *witless* shades and undervalue the notion that the dead are *lively*. In the introduction, for instance, I began my discussion by first stating how Cairns views the immaterial wraith as the "'official' conception."[384] In addition, Heath, as we have seen in the introduction, tries to explain away the contradiction of the blood ritual in the *Nekyia*. For Heath, Vermeule, and Tsagarakis, the poet leaves out the description of the imbibing because he wished to avoid repetition. But this presupposes that the "witless" wraith is a standard conception of the dead.[385] This same presupposition appears in Brügger's commentary on *Iliad* 24.592-593. Brügger suggests that there are occasional descriptions of the "lively" dead, descriptions which contradict the view that the dead lack mental faculties:[386]

> The lack of certainty as to whether the dead can perceive the living is repeatedly offered as a reservation in Greek literature (Macleod with examples and bibliography); cf. *Il*. 23.19 = 179. At any rate, at 22.389 and *Od*. 11.475f. Achilleus explicitly notes that the souls of the dead lack the ability to think or recall (*Il*. 23.103f. is difficult to interpret, see Richardson *ad loc.*), and in the *Nekyia* Teiresias alone is endowed with reason (*Od*. 10.492–495); the other dead can recognize and talk to Odysseus and display emotion only after partaking of the sacrificial blood (*Od*. 11.147–149, 152–154, 387–391). On the (occasionally contradictory) notions

[384] Cairns 2014: §29.
[385] The *Nekyia* offers the most detailed description of the dead in Homeric epic. For this reason, we shall examine these descriptions of the dead in the final chapter of this thesis.
[386] Brügger 2017: 220 *ad loc*.

surrounding death in Homer in general, Schnaufer 1970, 58–70; Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 78–83, 89–92, 106 f.; Johnston 1999, 7–11.

The scholars whom Brügger cites discuss the contradictory descriptions of the dead's cognitive abilities. When Brügger, therefore, talks about "the "occasionally contradictory" notions surrounding death," he is referring to the inconsistent descriptions of the dead in the afterlife. But the word "occasionally" presupposes that the *witless* dead is the predominant conception. These scholars, however, do not seem to acknowledge that these descriptions come from *characters*. This then begs the question: do these descriptions represent a predominant conception of the afterlife in Homeric epic or, do they represent the characters' views of the dead?

In this section, I provide an answer to this question: these descriptions of the witless dead belong exclusively to character descriptions. We shall see that primary narrator offers a very different image of the inhabitant of Hades compared to the secondary focalisers' conceptions. The former, we see, views the being that lives in Hades as a phantom image of the dead person, "a very convincing image indeed". The wraith can speak, wear armour, and do the very things which the dead person could do when he was alive. It is only when they move that the illusory image is broken and they are seen as flitting wraiths who screech. By contrast, the characters in the epic are of the preconception that the shade is witless.

Let us begin this discussion by first looking at how the primary narrator presents the shade. In *Iliad* 23.65-67, the primary narrator makes it clear that the inhabitant of Hades is a wraith that is the spitting image of Patroclus in terms of appearance and voice:

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ᾽ ἐϊκυῖα
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο.

The ghost wears the same armour and can speak just like Patroclus himself. The image is striking; however, the primary narrator makes it clear that this is merely an illusion when the ghost evaporates from Achilles in 23.99-101:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν

οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς

ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα.

The same image is present in the *Deuteronekyia*. The ghosts who inhabit Hades are now images of the dead men (ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων). It is only when the wraiths move that the illusion breaks and the wraiths appear non-human, shrieking like bats (ταὶ δὲ τρίζουσαι ἔποντο...ὣς αἱ τετριγυῖαι ἅμ᾽ ἤϊσαν). We have already drawn upon these examples in the introduction. However, it is important here to review these examples in order to establish how the characters' descriptions of the wraith differ.

Indeed, secondary focalisers do not necessarily perceive the inhabitant as a duplicate of the once living person. On the contrary, many internal focalisers present the belief that the being is a witless remnant of the once living person. In 22.389-390, for instance, Achilles is of the mindset that the dead in Hades forget one another:

εἰ δὲ θανόντων περ καταλήθοντ᾽ εἰν Ἀΐδαο

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ κεῖθι φίλου μεμνήσομ᾽ ἑταίρου.

This preconception is also evident in Achilles' prayer to Patroclus in 24.592-595:

μή μοι Πάτροκλε σκυδμαινέμεν, αἴ κε πύθηαι

εἰν Ἄϊδός περ ἐὼν ὅτι Ἕκτορα δῖον ἔλυσα

πατρὶ φίλῳ, ἐπεὶ οὔ μοι ἀεικέα δῶκεν ἄποινα.

σοὶ δ᾽ αὖ ἐγὼ καὶ τῶνδ᾽ ἀποδάσσομαι ὅσσ᾽ ἐπέοικεν.

Achilles urges Patroclus not to be angry (μή μοι Πάτροκλε σκυδμαινέμεν). The apodosis might suggest that Achilles views the dead as cognitively active beings; but the protasis reveals that Achilles is unsure whether the dead can learn anything at all. The concessive force of the particle περ (εἰν Ἄϊδός περ) informs us that Achilles thinks it is very unusual for the inhabitants of Hades to learn anything.

Other characters, even those with a heightened knowledge, also present the conception that the wraith in Hades is a witless being. We see this in Circe's description of Teiresias in *Odyssey* 10.492-495:

ψυχῇ χρησομένους Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο,
μάντηος ἀλαοῦ, τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσι·
τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια,
οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσιν.

Circe informs Odysseus that Teiresias' wits remain. She stresses, through the adverbial καί and the perfect τεθνηῶτι, that it is very unusual for the dead to have the mental faculty νόος. This again reinforces the point that, in character descriptions, the inhabitant of Hades is imagined to be deprived of mental substance. The point is again made clear when Circe stresses that Teiresias is the *only one* to have intelligent thought (οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι). Achilles' speech at Patroclus' funeral presents a similar conception that the shade is witless. Achilles bids farewell to Patroclus *though* he is in Hades (χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἄΐδαο δόμοισι).[387] The concessive force of the καί emphasises that Achilles believes it to be futile to address Patroclus: the shade will not understand his words or hear them. Another preconception, from characters, also seems to be that the inhabitant of Hades is physically insubstantial. Circe suggests that the inhabitants of Hades are like physically insubstantial shadows (τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀίσσουσιν). This notion is in keeping with the primary narrator's

[387] *Il.* 23.19 = 23.179.

presentation of the wraith. After all, the primary narrator describes how the shade of Patroclus evaporates like a puff of smoke. But the living secondary focalisers are all of the conception that the inhabitant, once in Hades, does not retain cognitive abilities, but is fundamentally witless.

These examples provide us with our first epistemological distinction between the primary narrator's and living character descriptions. The former's descriptions present the inhabitant as a wraith who has both life-like and non-human characteristics. The latter descriptions come from living characters who, with the exception of Odysseus, are not in Hades and believe the inhabitant to be a witless being. This epistemological distinction is basic and rudimentary. However, upon closer analysis, we see that further epistemological graduations can be made between these two presentations of the ghost. Notice that the majority of these character descriptions are, to borrow terms from Dickie's analysis, "declarative" statements or "conditional" statements.[388] Achilles, for instance, uses the conditional construction in *Iliad* 24 when he suggests that the ghost of Patroclus cannot learn anything in Hades. Achilles also uses the conditional construction in 22.389-391 when he describes how the ghosts of the dead are forgetful.[389] Achilles makes the declaration in 23.103-104 that the shade and wraith exists even in Hades, and Achilles also presents declarative statements and use the concessive καί or περ to emphasise the preconception: the dead in Hades are witless and insubstantial.

What is most intriguing about all of these conditional and declarative statements is that they present a character's uncertainty about the inhabitant of Hades. Achilles in *Iliad* 24, for instance, does acknowledge that the shade in Hades cannot know what he is saying. Nevertheless, he speaks to Patroclus as though the wraith has cognitive abilities. In the

[388] Dickie 2014: 3-8.
[389] Richardson (1993: 146 *ad Il*. 22.389-90) reads the passage as a conditional construction. The particle combination εἰ δὲ seems to signify the same concessive clause as καὶ εἰ does in Classical Greek. Cf. Boas 2019: 558-559 § 49.19-21.

Nekyia scene, Odysseus is aware that it is unusual for the shades to embrace the living in Hades since Circe told him in 10.495 that the shades lack substance. But, despite this briefing, Odysseus still asks why the shade of his late mother cannot embrace him. In *Iliad* 22, Achilles is aware that the dead cannot remember one another, and yet he believes that he will be able to remember Patroclus when he dies. Achilles assumes that the dead lack cognitive abilities; yet this preconception does not discourage him from thinking that he will have the same mental faculties as the living. All of this evidence suggests that secondary focalisers (with the exception of Circe) are uncertain about the condition of the dead in Hades. This uncertainty occurs before and after the living interact with the dead. Achilles' hesitant speech in 22.389 shows us that he is not certain about what happens to the inhabitant of Hades. His speech in 24.594f also suggests that this uncertainty about the dead's cognitive ability persists even after meeting the ghost of Patroclus. If Achilles is still confused about the condition of the dead in Hades, even after meeting the ghost of Patroclus, then we are left to wonder what are the ghost's characteristics that make it persistently ambiguous. For if Achilles is still confused about the inhabitant after speaking cogently with the shade of Patroclus, then it suggests that the dweller in Hades is fundamentally ambiguous and imperfectly knowable to the living.

This so far suggests that living characters preconceive that the resident in Hades is witless, and this also indicates that they are uncertain whether their assumption of the dead's abilities is correct. By contrast, the primary narrator is familiar with the characteristics of the shade: it is an incorporeal shade but it behaves, looks, and acts just like the real person. This again highlights an epistemological difference between the primary narrator's and the living's presentation of the wraith. However, when the ghost starts to engage with the living, the poet's and the living character's conceptions begin to overlap. That is to say, both the poet and Achilles *see* the shade not *as* a wraith, but *as* Patroclus himself.

We have already argued in the introduction that the ghost's life-like appearance and incorporeality make the shade of Patroclus imperfectly definable to both the primary narrator and internal focaliser. The primary narrator, for instance, appreciates that this entity is in the form of the wraith; however, the life-like components of this shade mean that there is an internal relation between the ψυχή and the Patroclus himself: ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο / πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ᾽ ἐϊκυῖα / καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο. These life-like qualities encourage the narrator to describe the shade *as* the dead man proper (τὸν δ᾽ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς). This is a similar aspect that Achilles notices when he engages with the shade of Patroclus. Indeed, after the ghost speaks just like Patroclus, Achilles is convinced that the wraith, with whom he is speaking, is the man himself, the bodily being that can be embraced:

> τίπτέ μοι ἠθείη κεφαλὴ δεῦρ᾽ εἰλήλουθας
> καί μοι ταῦτα ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπιτέλλεαι; αὐτὰρ ἐγώ τοι
> πάντα μάλ᾽ ἐκτελέω καὶ πείσομαι ὡς σὺ κελεύεις.
> ἀλλά μοι ἆσσον στῆθι· μίνυνθά περ ἀμφιβαλόντε
> ἀλλήλους ὀλοοῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο.

Likewise, at the end of his speech, Achilles realises with hindsight that what he interacted with was not Patroclus, but a wraith that looked incredibly like him. He mentions in 23.105-107 that the ghost could speak just like Patroclus himself: παννυχίη γάρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο / ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει γοόωσά τε μυρομένη τε, / καί μοι ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ. Stocking observes how this phrase gives the first impression that Homeric selfhood is tied to the body:[390]

[390] Stocking 2007: 58-59.

> This turn of events prompts a shocked Achilles to exclaim that "there is indeed something in the house of Hades," *ê ra ti esti kai ein Aidao domoisi* (XXIII.103); as to the exact nature of this *psuchê*, however, Achilles can only conclude that it was "amazingly *like* the very self" of his dear friend," *eikto de theskelon autôi* (XXIII.107); which is of course to say that, whatever this fully conscious and intelligent "entity" may have been, it was simply *not* Patroclus – it was *not* the man himself. Manifestly, genuine Homeric selfhood is to be grounded in something other, something more than mere acts of self-conscious intellection.

However, in Achilles' speech, the dative αὐτῷ suggests that Homeric selfhood is represented when the person displays a form of consciousness. For instance, it is the wraith's appearance and voice that convinces Achilles that he is speaking to the corporeal Patroclus: καί μοι ἕκαστ' ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ. All of these characteristics, therefore, entitle the character to notice an internal relation between the wraith and Patroclus when he was alive. This explains why Achilles *sees* the inhabitant not *as* the wraith, but as Patroclus himself prior to its physically insubstantial disappearance in *Iliad* 23.99-101. In this way, the character is utilising aspect perception: the characteristics of the ghost, its voice and appearance, convince Achilles he is speaking to the dead man, not the wraith.

This discussion so far suggests a point of similarity between the primary narrator's and character's presentation of the wraith. Achilles, after waking up, eventually recognises, like the primary narrator, that the inhabitant of Hades is a ψυχή. Likewise, both the primary narrator and Achilles also notice the same aspect when the ghost and Achilles converse: they see the wraith as Patroclus himself. However, we see that Achilles recognises more Wittgensteinian aspects of the wraith than the primary narrator does once he has woken up.

First, notice that, at the end of the scene, Achilles calls the inhabitant of Hades ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον in 23.103-104a. The primary narrator suggests through the formulation ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων (ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί,εἴδωλα καμόντων, *Od*. 24.14) that the ψυχή and εἴδωλον are appositional: there [in Hades] the wraiths, phantoms of those that are dead live. Achilles too sees the names as appositional; but the καὶ in 23.104a, as a connecting particle, suggests that Achilles uses ψυχή and εἴδωλον as two separate names to describe (for Achilles) the ill-defined dweller in Hades: "*there is something in Hades*, a ψυχή and an εἴδωλον".

This interpretation seems sound when we read ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον as epexegetic of the pronoun τι in 23.103.[391] Leaf reads τι as the predicate of the sentence and makes the εἴδωλον surplus to requirement: "the soul is something even in Hades; it is not entirely annihilated."[392] But this interpretation presupposes that Achilles is interested in what exists in Hades, when in fact 105-107 is a personal admission that the wraith was just like Patroclus. These two verses indicate that Achilles is more concerned with his personal encounter with the shade, rather than necessarily the issue of what is annihilated at death.[393] For this reason, I prefer the epexegetic reading because it makes explicit Achilles' shock at the dream. Achilles, prior to the dream, addresses the inhabitant of Hades as Patroclus himself in 23.19 (χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι). However, after the ghost evaporates, Achilles realises what he saw was the wraith that looks like the embodied person (ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ). The reading "something exists even in Hades" emphasises Achilles' astonishment at the wraith's resemblance to Patroclus and that he made contact with the dead. Achilles, in other words, does not know what inhabits Hades, and uses the aspects of ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον (it is a ψυχὴ

[391] On the textual variation τις, its meaning, and the alternative meaning of τι in 23.103, see Richardson 1993: 178 *ad Il*. 23.103-104; Clarke 1999: 209 n. 96.
[392] Leaf 1900 *ad* 23.103-104.
[393] For other criticisms of this reading see Clarke 1999: 209 n. 96, who labels this reading "version (a)".

and an εἴδωλον) as source domain images to articulate the imperfectly definable resident in Hades "something exists in Hades".[394]

Second, we see that the primary narrator and secondary focaliser, who describe the living's encounter with the shade, notice different aspects of the shade when it moves. The primary narrator, for instance, says that the shade evaporates and screeches, but never comments on whether this non-human appearance is a sign of mental deficiency.[395] By contrast, we shall see that Achilles relies on his own preconception of the ghost's mental state, witlessness, to describe the non-human characteristics of the wraith when it evaporates in front of him in *Il*. 23.99-107:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν
οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς
ὤχετο τετριγυῖα· ταφὼν δ᾽ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
χερσί τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος δ᾽ ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν·
'ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τι ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν·
παννυχίη γάρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει γοόωσά τε μυρομένη τε,
καί μοι ἕκαστ᾽ ἐπέτελλεν, ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ.

Achilles attempts to embrace Patroclus in the dream, but the shade evaporates like a puff of smoke and goes into the ground screeching. Achilles wakes up and announces in 23.104b that the shade, while incredibly life like, lacks φρένες (φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν). The meaning of this phrase is obscure. One school argues that it means the ghost of Patroclus

[394] On characters who are familiar with the conceptions ψυχὴ and εἴδωλον, especially in relation to Hades, see *Il*. 5.654, 7.328-330, 11.445, 16.625; *Od*. 11.213-214, 20.355.
[395] Cf. *Il*. 23.99-101 ~ *Od*.24.5-9.

lacks wits and mental substance.[396] The other side of this discussion has argued that this phrase, in fact, suggests that the inhabitant of Hades lacks *physical* substance.[397] The latter reading is tempting because it does not make sense to call the ghost of Patroclus witless when it has conversed cogently with Achilles.[398] I should stress that I do not wish to provide a firm translation of this word as scholars have done; my aim here is simply to ascertain what quality of the shade Achilles is referring to when he uses the phrase φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν. However, Clarke suggests that the two meanings are intricately linked:[399]

> This [phrase φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν] cannot simply mean that it [the ghost of Patroclus] was without wits and intelligence, since what it told him was fully cogent; rather, Achilles must mean that the wraith lacked the concrete substance that a living and thinking man carries in his breast, since only this will explain what happened when he tried to embrace his friend (see also above, Ch. 4, pp. 74—5 with n. 30). But his use of the word φρένες suggests that the vocabulary of physical weakness and mental weakness are bound up together, so that the one is expressed in words that would be equally appropriate to the other.

I fundamentally agree with Clarke that both physical and mental substance are bound up in the meaning of φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν. The contrast between *Od*. 10.495a and 495b (οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι, τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν) does indeed highlight that the mind and body are intimately linked. After all, the opposition can only make sense if mental and physical existence are bound together. This does, at the least, encourage us to think that the mind and

[396] See Schol. bT *ad Il*. 23.104; Mazon 1942: 223-224; Rieu 1950: 414. Cf. Eustathius *ad Od.*11.476; Russo 2020: 218-220.
[397] Schol. ZYQX ad *Il*. 23.104; Böhme 1929: 95-96 n 3; Sullivan 1988: 50; Richardson 1993: 178; Zaborowski 2003: 298 n 32.
[398] Schol. bT argued that the adverb πάμπαν indicates that Achilles meant his wits were not "there completely". This would neatly explain why the ghost, coherent though it is, accuses Achilles of being neglectful when he is making funeral preparations. Sadly, this interpretation will not do since there is no instance where πάμπαν with a negation means "not altogether".
[399] Clarke 1999: 207.

body are also unified in the phrase φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν. But this reading of 10.495, while helpful, does not definitively tell us what the phrase in 23.104b means. We must examine the passage itself to understand the phrase's meaning. Clarke's interpretation of φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν is partially based on his argument that there is a lexical unity in Homeric words. This aspect of his methodology is questionable when we consider the counter-argument presented by Cairns:[400]

> The argument from "lexical unity" (p. 190) that Clarke applies to νέκυς / νεκρός, is precisely the sort of argument that he excludes with regard to the ψυχή. The French "*le mort"*, both "cadaver" and "dead person", is a lexical unity: but though *le mort* can = *le cadavre*, when a Frenchman envisages *les morts* in some form of post-mortem existence he is not necessarily imagining the survival of the cadaver.

Cairns is referring to the lexical unity of νέκυς / νεκρός. However, his argument seems equally applicable to the meaning of the φρένες phrase. There may indeed be a unity between mental and physical strength in 23.104b; but this does not automatically mean that the two meanings are coterminous in character speeches. When a character, for instance, claims that a person is devoid of φρένες, he is not necessarily saying that the person also lacks physical substance.[401] Rather, this word acts as a conceptual metonym to describe the person's mindless state.[402] It follows a metonymic principle: CATEGORY FOR SALIENT PROPERTY.[403] In the English phrase "he has no balls in him" the lack of a body part stands for the person's lack of courage. Similarly, the φρένες appear as internal organs that can be stripped out of the person (ἐκ χροὸς εἶλκε δόρυ, ποτὶ δὲ φρένες αὐτῷ ἔποντο);[404] that are

[400] Cairns 2003: 60.
[401] Cf. *Il*. 6.352, 7.360, 9.377, 12.234, 15.128.
[402] On further reading on the Greek psychology, see Padel, 1992, see also Teffeteller 2003.Also useful is Vernant 1965.
[403] Cf. Radden and Kövecses 2007: 344.
[404] *Il*. 16.504.

enclosed in the chest (ἔνθ' ἄρα τε φρένες ἔρχαται ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ);[405] and that hold other parts of the body together (ὅθι φρένες ἦπαρ ἔχουσι).[406] It is these anatomical parts that can stand for salient events. Thus, Helen accuses Paris of lacking courage by claiming his φρένες do not remain sound in *Il*. 6.352 (τούτῳ δ' οὔτ' ἂρ νῦν φρένες ἔμπεδοι οὔτ' ἄρ' ὀπίσσω). So too, in Alcinous' speech, "ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί" stands for Odysseus' charm.[407] We cannot then say that mental and physical substance are bound together in φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν based solely on the supposed lexical unity of Homeric words. What we can say, however, is that the φρένες is regularly a conceptual metonym that characters use in an attempt to describe salient experiences. Indeed, 23.104b is structurally similar to *Iliad* 14.141 in which Poseidon uses φρένες to convince Agamemnon of Achilles' lack of empathy (ἐπεὶ οὔ οἱ ἔνι φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαί). The similarities between the two passages urge us to read φρένες in 104b as a metonym that also stands for a salient event. Indeed, if we consider the context of this speech, then we can say that φρένες stands for the salient property: the inhuman behaviour of the wraith. This means that the two meanings of φρένες (witlessness and insubstantiality) are bound together within the phrase. Clarke is, for instance, right when he says that Achilles, in 103-104, is reacting to the ghost's evaporation.[408] The phrase ὦ πόποι indeed underlies that Achilles is shocked by the ghost's disappearance.[409] But if Achilles in 103-104 is reacting to the insubstantial nature of the shade's departure, then φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν attempts to describe the witless and insubstantial condition of the inhabitant of Hades. After all, when the ghost disappears, it not only appears physically insubstantial, but also makes a screeching sound:

[405] *Il*. 16.481.
[406] *Od*. 9.301.
[407] *Od*. 11.367. Cf. Heubeck 1990: 100 *ad loc*.
[408] Clarke 1999: 208-209.
[409] Cf. *Il*. 2.272, 337, 8.352, 13.99, 15.286, 20.344, 21.54, 17.171, 629, 20.293, 22. 168, 297, 373.

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ὠρέξατο χερσὶ φίλῃσιν

οὐδ᾽ ἔλαβε· ψυχὴ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἠΰτε καπνὸς

ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα

The ψυχὴ, in other words, appears fundamentally non-human in terms of both physical and mental substance: it shrieks loudly and it disappears like a puff of smoke. The shrieking τρίζω is a characteristic of animalistic behaviour.[410] Achilles here relies on the cognitive metonym φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν to describe this non-human appearance of the wraith. If this interpretation of 104[b] is correct, then the juxtaposition of the so-called "human" and "inhuman" conceptions of the dead exists between 23.104b-105ff. We may argue that the living internal focaliser, Achilles, understands this non-human appearance by making a metaphorical translation. Achilles attempts to describe the non-human cognitive and physical appearance of the wraith (the domain of the unknown, the target domain) by relying on phrases that describe the Homeric man's physiology and mental state (the known domain, the source domain). Aspect perception, here, helps Achilles to make this metaphorical mapping: he is able to make this metaphorical construction after recognising the fundamentally inhuman aspect of the ghost's character. Indeed, the internal relation between the shrieking of animals and the shrieking of the ghost allows for Achilles to *see* the shade not only *as* inhuman, but also *as* witless. Polyphemus, for example, implies that the ram is cognitively less capable than he is.[411] Circe, likewise, suggests that, by transforming Odysseus' comrades into swine, their mental capabilities will also be affected.[412]

[410] Cf. *Il*. 2.314 and *Od*. 24.4-9.
[411] Cf. *Od*. 9.456. Cf. Heubeck 1990: 37 *ad loc*. See Pelliccia 1995: 103-105.
[412] Cf. *Od*. 10.325-329.

A further indication that Achilles uses φρένες to describe the animalistic behaviour of the shade's insubstantial departure appears when we compare *Iliad* 23.103-107 to *Odyssey* 20.87-90:

αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὀνείρατ᾽ ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων.

τῇδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ,

τοῖος ἐὼν οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ

χαῖρ᾽, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὕπαρ ἤδη.

Penelope realises that what she saw in her dream was not actually Odysseus, but something like Odysseus (εἴκελος αὐτῷ), the dream itself. Here the ψυχή and dream are indeed very similar. But whereas Penelope realises she did not see Odysseus but a dream, Achilles realises that he did not see the embodied Patroclus, but a disembodied ψυχή that looks incredibly like the embodied person. Note also that Agamemnon's dream ends with the god flying away (ᾤχετ' ἀποπτάμενος, ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν),[413] much like the ψυχή of Patroclus (ᾤχετο τετριγυῖα· ταφὼν δ' ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς). The only difference between the end of the dream and the ψυχή's departure is that the latter makes the incomprehensible shrieking. This is the distinguishing factor that allows Achilles to realise that he has not had any dream; he has encountered the dead whose insubstantial departure signifies mental and physical deficiency. It is this property then that leads Achilles to describe the dead as witless through 23.104b.

In this way, the properties of the ghost invite Achilles to provide different, fundamentally contradictory views of the dead. The hero describes the non-human characteristics of the ghost by drawing from the source-domain image: the absence of wits

[413] *Il.* 2.71.

(φρένες). This metaphorical description is in keeping with the other internal focalisers who, as we have seen above, view the dead as mindless. And yet, in Achilles' description, the life-like characteristics of the shade are attributed to the ψυχή. This description is, as we have seen, similar to the primary narrator's descriptions of the shade.

What we see, however, is that Achilles changes aspects after the dream. Achilles knows after the dream that the survivor of Hades is a wraith who looks deceptively like Patroclus himself: ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ. That having been said, this aspect changes and Achilles addresses Patroclus again as the man himself in 23.179ff.:

> 'χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισι:
>
> πάντα γὰρ ἤδη τοι τελέω τὰ πάροιθεν ὑπέστην,
>
> δώδεκα μὲν Τρώων μεγαθύμων υἱέας ἐσθλοὺς
>
> τοὺς ἅμα σοὶ πάντας πῦρ ἐσθίει…

Indeed, the referents of σοί and Πάτροκλε is both the deficient corpse, who is engulfed in the flames, and the inhabitant of Hades (καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισι).

We can conclude, for this section, that the epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' descriptions are made explicit from their ability to use aspect perception. For instance, we have seen that the life-like characteristics of the shade (the ghost of Patroclus' ability to speak and appearance) lead the primary narrator and Achilles to *see* the shade *as* Patroclus himself. However, the inhuman characteristics of the shade lead Achilles to change aspects. The shrieking sound of the ghost's departure leads Achilles to notice the "witless" aspect of the shade's appearance. The primary narrator by contrast makes no comment on the shades' cognitive ability when it appears inhuman. We

have also suggested that Achilles sees the shade as an indefinable being in 23.103-104a since he does not see that the ψυχή and εἴδωλον are as appositional as the primary narrator, but as two images in the source domain that describe the indefinable ghost "something exists even in Hades." In addition, we have seen that Achilles changes aspects more frequently than the primary narrator. Achilles after all sees the shade not as the embodied person, but as something that looks like the corporeal being. But when he is about to cremate the corpse, it "dawns" on him that the ghost is the embodied person. In this way, Achilles, just like the primary narrator, has utilised aspect perception to present the wraith in such diverse ways.

The role of burial for the status of the wraith

This section seeks to examine the role of burial in the presentation of the shade. I first explore burial's role in granting the shade access to Hades. I highlight some passages in which the inhabitant of Hades is imagined as being witless and insubstantial. This at first presupposes that there is an orientation schema in which "in" signifies a lack of consciousness, and outside signifies cognition. I then show that these passages and the schema have led scholars to mistakenly think that there is a distinction between the cognitive abilities of the unburied shades (who reside out of Hades) and the witless buried residents of Hades. I argue however that this is a mistaken interpretation and that the ghosts, whether buried or unburied, are broadly thought of as being residents in Hades.

In the second part of this discussion, I will examine how scholars try to apply the concept of liminality to the discussion of the dead. We shall see that scholars try to suggest that the dead's lack of burial puts them in a liminal state, and so they are considered life-like, whilst the buried dead remain witless. I argue that no distinction exists in Homer. This

dismissal of the burial argument will pave the way to show that aspect perception is needed to explain away the inconsistent presentations of the shade.

In the previous section, we examined a few character descriptions in which the inhabitant of Hades is imagined to be a physically insubstantial, witless shade. Achilles, for example, says that the ψυχή και εἴδωλον which is *in* Hades does not have wits or physical substance (ἦ ῥά τι ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι / ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν). In addition, when Achilles presumes that Patroclus is witless, he says that he is *in Hades.*[414] Likewise, he says that those *in Hades* are forgetful.[415] These presentations seem to indicate that there is a non-propositional logic in which "in" equates to being witless and deficient.[416] That makes it tempting to say that the opposing orientation, "out", equates to the opposing condition of being alert and capable. However, if we are to say that, then we are suggesting that the buried and unburied dead have different capabilities in Hades. For instance, we see from *Iliad* 23.71-74 that the unburied dead are not permitted to access Hades. If these dead are not permitted to enter into the other world, then logically they do not belong to the group that are witless and insubstantial. In other words, this passage and the orientation schema indicate that the unburied dead are lively, and the buried dead are not. This reasoning is evident when we look at Pelliccia's brief discussion of the dead (comments in square brackets are my own):[417]

> …perhaps cremation, as a definitive form of exsanguination, prepares the shade for admission to Hades by depriving it of the faculties of consciousness

[414] Cf. *Il.* 23.19, 179, 24.592-593.
[415] Cf. *Il.*22.389.
[416] On this schema, see Johnson 1987: 19-40, esp. 30-31. Johnson uses the example (30) of coming *out* of a sleep to indicate that the "in" orientation can sometimes equate to being unconscious and *out* to being alert. See also Cairns (2003: 49-50) who applies this schema, though in a different way, to describe the function of the ψυχή. See chapter one.
[417] Pelliccia 1995: 104-105.

> etc.[IN = WITLESSNESS]; since the shades are already separated from the bodies, this would seem to be illogical - but by this logic the disposition of the corpse should not have any bearing whatsoever on the fate of the shade, which it explicitly has).

Pelliccia is cautious about accepting this kind of logic, but his argument highlights that this orientational scheme is parsimonious. Johnson, for instance, takes a more confident stance of the in-out schema (my own comments are in brackets):[418]

> Homer knows of some members of the dead, however, who are able to interact with the living precisely because they have not yet crossed the river that Anticleia mentions [OUT = CONSCIOUS AND COGNITIVE]. The dead Patroclus reappears to Achilles and complains that he cannot cross the river and find peace because he has not yet received burial rites. Similarly, the ghost of Odysseus' companion Elpenor, who is among the first to arrive at the pit, and who is able to recognize and speak with Odysseus even without drinking the blood has not yet been admitted into the underworld because his body has not yet received funerary rites [IN = WITLESS].

I have many problems with the suggestion that the buried and unburied dead have different mental abilities. However, the immediate issue is that scholars seem to use the in-out schema to make their arguments. But Johnson in particular has taken the descriptions of Hades too literally. Characters genuinely do not think that the ghost being inside or outside of the gates of Hades affects its cognitive status. Achilles, for example, learns that the ghost of Patroclus needs a burial before it can be admitted past the gates of Hades (θάπτέ με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω). Yet despite learning this, he does not see his unburied friend as somehow more cognitively active than the other shades or as less of a resident of Hades

[418]Cf. Johnston 1999: 8-11.

than the buried dead. Indeed, before the dream and during Patroclus' cremation, Achilles addresses the unburied shade as though it is witless and an inhabitant of Hades ('χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι).[419] Other characters seem to be of the view that Hades encompasses both the region within and outside the gates. For example, Odysseus in the *Nekyia* remains outside the gates of Hades. He sees Minos passing judgement by the gates (ἔνθ᾽ ἦ τοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν, / χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν, / ἥμενον, οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα, / ἥμενοι ἑσταότες τε κατ᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ.),[420] and he sees the shades walking away from him into Hades:[421]

ὣς φαμένη ψυχὴ μὲν ἔβη δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω

Τειρεσίαο ἄνακτος, ἐπεὶ κατὰ θέσφατ᾽ ἔλεξεν·

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτοῦ μένον ἔμπεδον

Yet despite his position, Odysseus still says that he is in Hades (ὄφρα καὶ εἰν Ἀίδαο φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε / ἀμφοτέρω κρυεροῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο).[422] Likewise, Elpenor speaks as though Odysseus is in Hades (even though he is not within the gated area) when he asks for a burial: οἶδα γὰρ ὡς ἐνθένδε κιὼν δόμου ἐξ Ἀίδαο νῆσον ἐς Αἰαίην σχήσεις ἐυεργέα νῆα.[423] Elpenor's words are quite telling, the preposition ἐξ makes it clear that to be out of Hades is to be in the mortal world and away from the underworld. This means that characters do not imagine that the unburied dead lack basic residency in Hades and do not distinguish them from those who reside in the gated region.

[419] *Il*. 23.19 = 179.
[420] *Od*. 11. 568-571.
[421] *Od*. 11.150-152. See also *Od*. 11.628.
[422] *Od*. 11.211-212.
[423] *Od*. 11.69-70.

Nevertheless, scholars have tended to look at the role of burial to explain the seeming ambiguities and contradictions in the descriptions of the ghosts in Hades.[424] The reason, for instance, why some of the dead can talk to Odysseus by themselves, while others cannot, is supposedly because different burial statuses provide the ghosts with different abilities. According to this view, the unburied dead are able to talk to Odysseus because their lack of burial puts them in a liminal position: they are not fully separated from the world of the living, but not fully incorporated into the world of the dead either. As a result, the unburied dead man still has the same abilities as he had when he was alive. Consider the role of the blood sacrifice. Teiresias infers that the ghosts must drink the blood in order to both recognise him and speak meaningfully to him:[425]

> ὅν τινα μέν κεν ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων
> αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, ὁ δέ τοι νημερτὲς ἐνίψει·
> ᾧ δέ κ᾽ ἐπιφθονέῃς, ὁ δέ τοι πάλιν εἶσιν ὀπίσσω.

However, the ghost of unburied Elpenor can recognise and speak to Odysseus without drinking the blood.[426] So too, in the *Iliad* (23.71-76), the ghost of Patroclus, who is also lacking a burial, can speak to Achilles in a dream without needing to drink from a blood offering. By contrast, the buried dead, who are fully incorporated into Hades, supposedly do not have the same cognitive abilities as their unburied peers and, therefore, must drink from the offering.

The problem with this approach, however, is that Homer never claims that the buried dead have different abilities from the unburied dead. For one thing, the ghosts of buried Ajax and Achilles can recognise and speak to Odysseus much like the ghosts of Elpenor at the

[424] Cf. Sullivan 1988: 51; Heubeck 1990: 80 *ad Od*. 11.51-54; Pelliccia 1995: 105; Johnson 1999: 8; Bouvier 1999: 63.
[425] *Od.* 11.147-149.
[426] *Od.* 11.51-59.

beginning of the *Nekyia* and the ghost of Patroclus in *Iliad* 23. These buried dead can apparently interact with the living without needing to consume the blood offering.[427] In addition, none of the focalisers suggest that the unburied and buried dead have different cognitive abilities. In the passage above, Teiresias generalises that any one of the dead (ὅν τινα μέν κεν ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων) will recognise and speak to Odysseus after he or she consumes the blood. Here, the speech implies that all of the dead lack the capacity to recognise Odysseus, not just the buried dead. In addition, Circe claims that Teiresias is the only one to retain his mental faculties, while the other dead are witless, physically insubstantial shadows.[428] She does not distinguish the buried dead from the unburied dead. After Achilles meets the ghost of unburied Patroclus, he concludes that the dead lack the very faculty (ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι πάμπαν)[429] which Teiresias manages to retain (τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσι).[430] Furthermore, the ψυχή of Patroclus suggests that it and the buried dead have the same cognitive abilities. After all, the ghosts in Hades can both recognise that Patroclus is unburied and ostracise him.[431]

This argument suggests that there is no distinction between the state of the buried and unburied dead in terms of abilities. That being said, there is still the temptation to think that burial affects the status of the wraith when it is in Hades. Clarke, for instance, rightly dismisses the suggestion that burial changes the dead's state of being.[432] But despite this, Clarke ends up agreeing that burial does affect the way in which the living view the dead. He

[427] *Od*. 11.471-472, 543-545. On Achilles' burial, see *Od*. 24.35-94. On Ajax's burial, see *Od*. 11.549, *Little Iliad* frag. 3 in Bernabé 1987.
[428] *Od*. 10.493-495.
[429] *Il*. 23.104.
[430] *Od*. 10.493.
[431] *Il*. 23.72-73.
[432] Clarke 1999: 180-189, esp. 186. Cairns refers to the unburied dead as entities that are in a "liminal state". Liminality, as defined by van Gennep (1960: 11), is a transition from a phase of separation (preliminal state) to an incorporation into another (postliminal) state of being. On liminality and the role of burial, see van Gennep 1960: 146-165, esp. 148-149. See also Hertz 2004: 29-76. On further reading of liminality, see Turner 1967, 1974, 1977; Petersen 2011; Thomassen 2014. On applying liminality to the study of the dead in Homer see Martin 2014. See also Hume 2007: 105, 110-112.

argues that Achilles only addresses Patroclus as a wraith because the corpse has now turned to ash.[433] As a result, "the 'I' of the dead man is now firmly assigned to the mythical Underworld.":

> In one sense Achilles' friend lies stretched before him; in another sense he is already in Hades. When the man can no longer be seen in fleshly form, as after burial or decomposition, the unity between him and his body can no longer be sustained, and the dead man continues as himself only if his identity is pinned on the survivor in the mythical Hades.

Clarke's argument at first seems persuasive. Indeed, Achilles does address Patroclus by name before the cremation begins; but this argument presupposes that correlation equals causation. But, just because Achilles calls Patroclus by name before the cremation, and refers to him as a wraith after the burning, does not suggest that the cremation plays any important role in Achilles' perception of the dead man's state of being. After all, Achilles knows before the cremation that the survivor in Hades is a wraith who looks deceptively like the embodied Patroclus himself: ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ. This means that Achilles is in some sense aware that the wraith is a survivor in Hades, but he gravitates to the preconception, in 23.15, that the dweller in Hades is the embodied person when he addresses the corpse as the wraith. Indeed, we see that Achilles' view of the ghost changes after he wakes up from his dream. Achilles imagines that it is now the embodied Patroclus who is about to be cremated that lives in the underworld:[434]

> 'χαῖρέ μοι ὦ Πάτροκλε καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισι·

[433] Clarke 1999: 162.
[434] *Il*. 23.179-180.

πάντα γὰρ ἤδη τοι τελέω τὰ πάροιθεν ὑπέστην,

δώδεκα μὲν Τρώων μεγαθύμων υἱέας ἐσθλοὺς

τοὺς ἅμα σοὶ πάντας πῦρ ἐσθίει…

There is no reason for us to think that cremation plays a role in Achilles' perception of the dead man's state of being. On the contrary, we note that, even after Patroclus' cremation, Achilles views the cremated inhabitant of Hades as an embodied person. We can see this when we re-examine *Iliad* 24.592-595:

μή μοι Πάτροκλε σκυδμαινέμεν, αἴ κε πύθηαι

εἰν Ἄϊδός περ ἐὼν ὅτι Ἕκτορα δῖον ἔλυσα

πατρὶ φίλῳ, ἐπεὶ οὔ μοι ἀεικέα δῶκεν ἄποινα.

σοὶ δ᾽ αὖ ἐγὼ καὶ τῶνδ᾽ ἀποδάσσομαι ὅσσ᾽ ἐπέοικεν.

Notice that Achilles still doubts that the cremated inhabitant of Hades is able to understand him, just like he did when in 23.15 when Patroclus was unburied. This indicates that the burial does not affect Achilles' perception of Patroclus' state of being. Furthermore, Achilles seems to suggest that Patroclus' selfhood, even after cremation, is still tied to what remains of the corpse. The referent of the indirect object σοὶ is the inhabitant of Hades, but it is also still the embodied Patroclus since Achilles can only give the spoils directly to the remnants of the corpse. In *Iliad* 22.512-513, Andromache also attaches unburied Hector's "I" to the corpse and the ghost: ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι τά γε πάντα καταφλέξω πυρὶ κηλέωι, / οὐδὲν σοί γ᾽ ὄφελος, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐγκείσεσαι αὐτοῖς. Andromache does not believe that the burning offering will benefit Hector, since he will not be buried within them. Already this suggests that the dative σοί for Hector is the corpse that is deprived of the offering, and the shade who will not reap the benefits in Hades. In short, Achilles stills ties his late friend's selfhood to the remnants of the corpse, in much the same way that Andromache addresses the unburied Hector as a corpse.

Another issue as well is that the evidence which Clarke uses does not suggest that Achilles sees the wraith differently after the corpse is cremated. Clarke for example cites *Iliad* 23. 220-224 as evidence that Achilles "no longer addresses the man himself, but calls on the ghost which visited him in his sleep" (162):

> οἶνον ἀφυσσόμενος χαμάδις χέε, δεῦε δὲ γαῖαν
>
> ψυχὴν κικλήσκων Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο.
>
> ὡς δὲ πατὴρ οὗ παιδὸς ὀδύρεται ὀστέα καίων
>
> νυμφίου, ὅς τε θανὼν δειλοὺς ἀκάχησε τοκῆας,
>
> ὣς Ἀχιλεὺς ἑτάροιο ὀδύρετο ὀστέα καίων,

But we do not actually know from this passage what Achilles said. On the contrary, the primary narrator is simply reporting the series of libations that Achilles carries out for the late Patroclus. This indicates that the primary narrator is using his own knowledge of post-mortem survival to present Achilles' ritual performances, not that Achilles views the inhabitant of Hades as a ψυχή after the cremation. We might compare this passage to the proem of the *Iliad*, in which the primary narrator reports that Achilles sent the heroes' ἰφθίμους ψυχάς to Hades. But this report does not suggest that Achilles thinks the entity which travels to Hades is a ψυχή; he is after all shocked that the wraith should be in Hades at all ('ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τί ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι / ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον). There is no reason, then, to assume Achilles sees his late friend differently after the corpse is cremated.

In this section, we have examined the extent to which burial affects the status of the dead man in Hades. We have concluded that it does not change the wraiths' sense of selfhood. In the first section, we made clear that the dead, who need a burial to go past the gates of Hades, are still considered residents of the underworld just like the buried dead. We

have also established that none of the characters see a difference between the shades of the buried and unburied dead in terms of cognitive abilities. Lastly, we have indicated that there is little evidence that suggests the living thinks that the wraith's sense of selfhood changes after the corpse has been cremated. This discussion has largely focused on the way in which the living characters perceive the dead. In the next section of this chapter, we will examine how the ghosts perceive themselves and use seeing-as to articulate their sense of selfhood.

The selfhood of the wraith and the changes of aspect

In this section, I examine the way in which the dead in Hades speak about themselves. We shall see that in *Iliad* 23.71-90, the ghost of Patroclus talks about itself as the corpse at one moment, but then as the wraith at another moment. I argue that this contradictory way of speaking occurs because the entity that travels to Hades is imagined to be simultaneously a corpse and an incorporeal shade. I argue that there is, for the wraith, a continuity of identity between the embodied person in the mortal world and the incorporeal shade. I suggest that this similarity of identity makes the shade's selfhood comparable to Jastrow's duck-rabbit image. The duck and rabbit have, Wittgenstein tells us, the same concaves and shapes, and it is this similarity that makes the observer change aspect. Similarly, I suggest that shades are forced to speak about themselves, at one moment, as corpses and then, at others, as wraiths, because the corpse and the wraith have the same identity.

Let us begin this discussion by first examining the verses in which the inhabitants of Hades talk about themselves and the scholarly interpretations of these passages. Where does the "I" of the deceased go after death? An answer to this question appears in *Iliad* 23.71 and 75-76 when the ghost of Patroclus demands a burial from Achilles:

θάπτέ με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω.

Notice that the referent of με is the corpse which needs a burial, but the subject of the verb περήσω is the incorporeal wraith which wanders near the wide-gated house of Hades (ἀλλ᾽ αὕτως ἀλάλημαι ἀν᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ.) after being ostracised by the ψυχαί εἴδωλα καμόντων in 23.72-74. The same strange image of the wraith's "I" that we see in 71 appears at the end of his request in 75-76:

καί μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ᾽· ὀλοφύρομαι, οὐ γὰρ ἔτ᾽ αὖτις

νίσομαι ἐξ Ἀΐδαο, ἐπήν με πυρὸς λελάχητε.

The μοι and the subject of ὀλοφύρομαι and νίσομαι is the wraith, the incorporeal being, but we see in the next line that the referent of με is the corpse. The ghost of Patroclus then requests Achilles to have their bones mixed together in an urn:[435]

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω καὶ ἐφήσομαι αἴ κε πίθηαι·

μὴ ἐμὰ σῶν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὀστέ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ…

Notice that it is not just in 23.71 and 75-76 where the ghost of Patroclus talks about itself as a corpse and then as a wraith. Here in verse 82, the subject of ἐρέω and ἐφήσομαι is the incorporeal wraith; but, in the subsequent line, the ἐμά is the corporeal Patroclus who has bones which Achilles must not abandon.

Sourvinou-Inwood suggests that the unburied shade fluctuates between talking about itself as the wraith and then as the corpse, whereas the buried shade's "I" is coterminous with the wraith:[436]

> It is clear both from the Homeric usage in the relevant passages, and from the beliefs articulated there, that until burial, the "I" of the deceased consists of the shade and the

[435] *Il*. 23.82-83.
[436] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 57.

> corpse; one or the other is identified with "I", depending on the focus of articulation… At burial the corpse is handed over symbolically to the netherworld; first it is consumed by fire and then what remains is sealed away into the earth. What remains of the deceased in the world of the living is a sign marking his grave which… is also a sign of the deceased and the focus of his memory in the world of the living. After burial the "I" of the deceased – if we leave aside his survival in memory – is coterminous with his shade in Hades.

She cites 23.71 and 23.72-73 as her example when she says that the unburied dead man's "I" "consists of the shade and the corpse; one or the other is identified with "I", depending on the focus of articulation."[437] She appears to be making this claim based on the way in which the shade of unburied Patroclus talks about itself as a corpse at one moment but then as a wraith. In 23.72-73, the focus of articulation is the wraith, the being whom the other shades ostracise:

> τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων,
>
> οὐδέ μέ πω μίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐῶσιν,

By "focus of articulation" Sourvinou-Inwood seems to be referring to the way in which the speaker now attaches its "I" to the wraith to articulate how it is banished from the other ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων.

The ghost's speech at 23.71-76 indicates that characters do present different "focus[es] of articulation" when they attach their "I" to the corpse or the wraith; but the other unburied dead contrast their "I" with the corpse and wraith. We see, for instance, that the

[437] Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 57 n 130.

ghost of unburied Amphimedon does not tie its "I" to the body and then to the wraith. Rather, he sees his and the suitors' corpses as parts of their selfhood (24.186–7):

ὣς ἡμεῖς, Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀπωλόμεθ', ὧν ἔτι καὶ νῦν

σώματ' ἀκηδέα κεῖται ἐνὶ μεγάροις Ὀδυσῆος

The genitive ὧν, whether possessive or partitive, indicates that the unburied ghost's sense of selfhood is not coterminous with the body. We see the opposite presentation of the wraith in *Odyssey* 11.64-65. The ghost of unburied Elpenor does not attach its "I" to the shade as we see with Patroclus and Amphimedon; rather the wraith speaks about the ψυχή in the third person (11.64–5):

ἐκ δέ μοι αὐχὴν / ἀστραγάλων ἐάγη, ψυχὴ δ' Ἄϊδόσδε κατῆλθε.

Indeed, the "I" is the wraith for Amphimedon, and the body for Elpenor. This evidence so far suggests that the unburied dead man's "I" is indeterminate, and we cannot claim that this somehow shows that the buried and unburied dead have different ways of talking about themselves. Likewise, just because the buried dead do not fluctuate between the corpse and the wraith in their self-description does not mean that their sense of self is not also tied to the embodied person. Consider, for instance, Agamemnon's description of Achilles' funeral. The attendants have cremated Achilles and now place his bones in the same urn which contains Patroclus' bones:[438]

ἐν τῷ τοι κεῖται λεύκ' ὀστέα, φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,

μίγδα δὲ Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο θανόντος.

[438] *Od*. 24.76-77.

Notice that the ghost of Agamemnon talks to the ghost of Achilles as though the latter's selfhood is attached to the bones even after the cremation. The use of the possessive dative τοι and the present verb κεῖται indicates that Agamemnon still identifies the ghost of Achilles, at the present moment, as someone whose sense of self is tied to the remnants of a corporeal being. If the bones can still be said to belong to the inhabitant of Hades, then the selfhood of the buried dead is still tied to the bodily being. Consider also the ghost of buried Agamemnon's self-description in *Odyssey* 11.424-426:[439]

…ἡ δὲ κυνῶπις

νοσφίσατ᾽, οὐδέ μοι ἔτλη ἰόντι περ εἰς Ἀίδαο

χερσὶ κατ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐλέειν σύν τε στόμ᾽ ἐρεῖσαι.

Notice that the ghost's selfhood resides with both the bodily being and the shade. The dative pronoun μοι and participle ἰόντι indicate that Agamemnon's "I" is attached to the ψυχή that goes to Hades. However, the μοι is also a possessive pronoun with ὀφθαλμοὺς and στόμ᾽, which suggests that the ghost still identifies with the bodily being that has the same corporeal faculties, such as eyes and a mouth. Patroclus' ghost's selfhood also attaches to the incorporeal wraith and the corporeal man in 23.69-70:

εὕδεις, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ.

οὐ μέν μευ ζώοντος ἀκήδεις, ἀλλὰ θανόντος

The perfective force of λελασμένος and the imperfect ἔπλευ indicates that Achilles was forgetful of Patroclus *before* the dream and is *still* forgetful of him as the dream begins. This

[439] On Agamemnon's burial and burial rites, see *Od*.4.584; Aesch.*Ag*.1555, *LB*.90-92, 324-330, 332-335; Soph.*El*.893; NM623 and 624*;* Dickinson (2005). Cf. *Od*. 24.296, in which the closing of the eyes is regarded as a custom for the dead man. See also Alexiou (2002: 5) for the ritual tradition of closing the dead man's eyes.

means that object of the participle, ἐμεῖο, Patroclus' "I", is tied both to the corpse before the dream and to the incorporeal ψυχή speaker. In verse 70, the shade says that Achilles was not neglectful *of him* when he was *alive* (μευ ζώοντος), but in death (ἀλλὰ θανόντος). The genitives ζώοντος and θανόντος are most telling about the ghost's sense of selfhood: the former indicates that the shade's selfhood resides with the embodied living person. On the other hand, the genitive θανόντος shows that the ghost is attaching its "I" to the corpse that is left by the funeral pyre.

This means that burial cannot explain why the ghost attaches its selfhood to both the ghost and the corpse. Are there other ways to make sense of this self-description? Rohde highlights these incongruous modes of expression in the *Iliad* more widely. He acknowledges that, in the proem of the *Iliad*, the "I" of the dead person is attached to the corpse even when the ψυχή descends to Hades. On the other hand, he recognises that the name of the dead person is assigned to the wraith that journeys to the underworld. For Rohde, these ways of talking about the shade underline that the ψυχή is a second self that exists in the body and continues to exist in Hades after the person has died:[440]

> Both the visible man (the body and its faculties) and the indwelling ψυχή could be described as the man's self. According to the Homeric view human beings exist twice over: once as an outward and visible shape, and again as an invisible 'image' which only gains its freedom at death

Rohde in fairness is not discussing the presentation of the wraith we see in 23.71 or 75-76 in particular; however, his second-self model cannot explain why the shade's "I" should be attached to the corpse.[441] Rohde looks at Achilles' reaction to the dream in *Iliad* 23.103f

[440] Rohde 1925: 6.
[441] Rohde 1925: 44 n 3.

which he says "proves the existence of an *alter ego* in man".[442] He seems to interpret this passage by reading the καί, in the locative modifier (καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισι), as a supplementary adverb (my italics): "there *yet* lives *in Hades' house* a psyche and a shadowy image (of man)." This supplementary adverb (there are three in the original German "wirklich auch noch")[443] and the preposition εἰν seem to imply that the ψυχή καὶ εἴδωλον live in the person as an invisible image *as well as* in Hades. But, as Clarke notes, this reading does not work since it "is not Homeric". After all, it is not said anywhere else that an εἴδωλον resides inside the Homeric man.[444] Indeed, the only other piece of evidence that supports Rohdes' reading is a fragment from Pindar, and, even then, Rohde admits that the fragment does not present Homeric views.[445]

The second issue I take with Rohde's interpretation is that it suggests the "second self" and the εἴδωλον of the dead are the same. For example, in page 8, he says that "what the dreamer sees prove(s) the existence of an *alter ego*." But what Achilles sees in the dream does not represent the shade's sense of selfhood. Achilles sees that the wraith of Patroclus has the ability to show emotions and speak just like the living person. But this image of the dead is quite different from the wraith's selfhood which is, at times, attached to the mindless corpse that needs a burial.

Clarke examines 23.71 and argues that the corpse's burial and the entrance into Hades present the same process. According to him, "the two half-line membra juxtapose two renderings of a single event: in the world of mortals he will be given his burial, so that by the same token he will pass into the mythological Hades."[446] He argues the burial and the

[442] Rohde 1925: 8.
[443] Rohde 1898: 8.
[444] Clarke 1999: 212 n 96.
[445] Cf. Rohde 1925: 7. For the debate around this fragment, see Holton 2022: 112–48.
[446] Clarke 1999: 211.

entrance into Hades are "two parallel ways of looking at the same process of going down into the earth and staying in the nether world."[447] However, he suggests that the descriptions of the inhabitant as a corpse and wraith are "irreconcilable" and that the "indeterminacy" is part and parcel of the Homeric conception of the afterlife.[448]

My argument in this thesis, as I stressed in the introduction, is similar to Clarke's. After all, I take the stance that the presentation of the dead is highly ambiguous. However, I would suggest that these contradictory descriptions are not necessarily "irreconcilable" as Clarke would argue. On the contrary, I posit that these fluctuations are what Wittgenstein calls changes of aspect. Wittgenstein, for example, mentions that we change aspects when we notice an internal relation.[449] When we for instance change aspect and see the duck-rabbit image as a duck, and then as a rabbit, we do this because we know that there is an apparent similarity: the two animals both have the same shapes in the picture (the ears as drawn have the same shape as a beak). So far, we have mentioned that the ghost has *the same* selfhood as the embodied person in *Il*. 23.69-70 and in *Od*. 11.424-426. But consider also *Il*. 23.77-79:

> οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων
>
> βουλὰς ἑζόμενοι βουλεύσομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὲ μὲν κὴρ
>
> ἀμφέχανε στυγερή, ἥ περ λάχε γιγνόμενόν περ

In this counterfactual construction, the ghost of Patroclus *imagines* that it will not sit with Achilles as it did when the embodied living Patroclus did when alive (ζωοί). The first person plural βουλεύσομεν and participle ἑζόμενοι emphasise that the ghost of Patroclus sees itself as having the same kind of selfhood as the embodied Achilles. The referent of the object ἐμέ

[447] Clarke 1999: 212.
[448] Clarke 1999: 207 and 211.
[449] PPF §244.

and participle γιγνόμενον indicates that the ghost's selfhood is the same as that not only of the embodied living person, but also of the dead person, whom κήρ engulfs. This means that the ghost's selfhood is apparently similar to that of the embodied person in the same way that the duck and the rabbit have similar shapes in Jastrow's picture. In this way, there is an internal relation between the corpse and the wraith: both represent the embodied person.

But while Patroclus is aware that his "I" is the same as the embodied living person, the ψυχή is a different being from the corpse (much like the duck is from the rabbit). Patroclus for instance knows, in verses 72-74, that the residents in Hades are ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων (τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων) and identifies with them as a shade, but one that cannot be allowed to cross the river or the gates (until he is buried):

τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων,

οὐδέ μέ πω μίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐῶσιν,

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτως ἀλάλημαι ἀν᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ.

The ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων, as Patroclus characterises them, have cognitive abilities: they can ostracise the ghost of Patroclus and recognise that he is lacking a burial. This means that the wraith in Hades is quite different from the mindless corpse that decays in the mortal world. Between 23.71 and 75-76, then there is an evident change of aspect, an identity shift: the ghost of Patroclus goes from identifying itself as a wraith that has cognitive abilities (one that can pass the gates of Hades, and that recognises rejection) to speaking about itself as the inanimate corpse.[450]

What we have so far suggested is that these contradictory modes of self-description are exercises of aspect perception. However, we have also seen that the ghost of unburied

[450] See next chapter for Elpenor's selfhood in 11.71-76.

Elpenor speaks about the ψυχή, and, in *Odyssey* 24.186, the ghost of unburied Amphimedon does the opposite and attaches his "I" to the wraith and not to the corpse. These descriptions are not indicative of aspect dawning since the ghost does not shift from one identity to the other. Nevertheless, I will argue that *Odyssey* 24.186–7 does signify that Amphimedon is exercising his capacity for aspect perception.[451]

ὣς ἡμεῖς, Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀπωλόμεθ᾽, ὧν ἔτι καὶ νῦν

σώματ᾽ ἀκηδέα κεῖται ἐνὶ μεγάροις Ὀδυσῆος…

Clarke has suggested that "Amphimedon's words come exceptionally close to articulating a body-soul dichotomy, and might therefore reflect a post-Homeric development in death-lore."[452] Clarke, however, does not believe this passage to be "un-Homeric" because the difference between this use of the word σώμα here and in *Od*. 11.51-54 is small. However, we cannot ignore the crucial difference between the σώμα in *Od*. 11.51-54 and 24.187. The former passage is spoken by a living person who can, retrospectively, see that there is a difference between the inhabitant of Hades and the corpse in Aeaea. It is, however, unusual for the wraith to make this distinction between the "I" and the body.

Clarke is trying to argue for the "authenticity" of the *Deuteronekyia*. We are not here concerned with the same problems as Clarke. We are not necessarily arguing for a non-dualist reading of Homeric epic, nor are we trying to read the descriptions as unified through the filter of "authenticity."

Instead, I would argue that this speech suggests that Amphimedon is not only exercising his capacity for aspect perception, but is also indicating that he is in a pitiful

[451] On a discussion of *Od*. 11.65-66, see next chapter.
[452] Clarke 1999: 226.

condition. It first needs stressing here that this passage does not in fact differ from other Homeric descriptions, and that Amphimedon is not, in fact, presenting a unique image of the inhabitant. On the contrary, the body–self dichotomy is a common image in Homeric epic when the person is either a) purposefully neglected by another, or b) no longer a working bodily whole. Indeed, we might say that this conceptual division between the self and body also appears when a character envisions that he will no longer be a living-working whole. Notice that the last two lines, 341-342, are formulaic and appear in *Iliad* 7.77ff.:

εἰ μέν κεν ἐμὲ κεῖνος ἕλῃ ταναήκεϊ χαλκῷ,

τεύχεα συλήσας φερέτω κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας,

σῶμα δὲ οἴκαδ᾽ ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν, ὄφρα πυρός με

Τρῶες καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι λελάχωσι θανόντα.

Hector imagines that Zeus will take him (ἐμὲ κεῖνος ἕλῃ). Notice that in the protasis, Hector's selfhood is coterminous with his living condition. But in the apodosis, where he is imagined as losing his life, he talks about his body as a possession, not as something that is coterminous with his selfhood (σῶμα δὲ οἴκαδ᾽ ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν). The body-self dichotomy is particularly evident when a person is neglected or in a pitiful condition. Notice that we see a somewhat similar image to *Od*. 24.187 appear in *Iliad* 24.107-108:

ἐννῆμαρ δὴ νεῖκος ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ὄρωρεν

Ἕκτορος ἀμφὶ νέκυι καὶ Ἀχιλλῆϊ πτολιπόρθῳ

The genitive Ἕκτορος informs us that the body is no longer coterminous with Hector. However, notice that, in this particular context, Hector's corpse has been neglected by Achilles. The son of Peleus leaves the corpse to rot. The modifier ἐννῆμαρ emphasises the amount of time that Hector's body has been neglected. Consider also that the same body–self

dichotomy comes to the fore when Hector prays to Achilles that he will not let him be marred by the dogs in 22.338ff.:

‘λίσσομ᾽ ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς καὶ γούνων σῶν τε τοκήων

μη με ἔα παρὰ νηυσὶ κύνας καταδάψαι Ἀχαιῶν,

ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν χαλκόν τε ἅλις χρυσόν τε δέδεξο

δῶρα τά τοι δώσουσι πατὴρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ,

σῶμα δὲ οἶκαδ᾽ ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν, ὄφρα πυρός με

Τρῶες καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι λελάχωσι θανόντα.

Here we see that the body–self dichotomy appears when a character’s death is seen as neglectful. All of this is to say that it is common in Homeric epic for a character to talk about the body as something separate from the his “I” when the speaker brings to the fore a pitiful image of the dead man. Amphimedon’s description is similar. The ghost uses the genitive ὧν and the σώμα to paint a pitiful image of the dead suitors in the mortal world: their relatives have not been able to give their rites of burial or lament them:[453]

οὐ γάρ πω ἴσασι φίλοι κατὰ δώμαθ᾽ ἑκάστου,

οἵ κ᾽ ἀπονίψαντες μέλανα βρότον ἐξ ὠτειλέων

κατθέμενοι γοάοιεν· ὃ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων.

This discussion so far gives the impression that Amphimedon is not presenting a unique image of the wraith’s state of being. Rather, the wraith is simply drawing attention to the lamentable nature of his death. Indeed, the tone of Amphimedon’s speech is tragic. The

[453] *Od*. 24.188-190.

ghost informs Agamemnon that the suitors' death was bitter (ἡμετέρου θανάτοιο κακὸν).[454] Likewise, he claims that Penelope set them up (ἡμῖν φραζομένη θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν). This tells us that Amphimedon's self-description in 24.186 is a Homeric motif in which the speaker is emotional.

The emotional tone of Amphimedon's speech seems to imply that the ghost is also exercising his capacity for aspect perception in 189. We may begin by suggesting that this passage is one of three instances in Homeric epic in which a character utilises aspect perception when he is in an emotional state. Achilles, as we have seen, sees the ghost of Patroclus as a corporeal being that can be embraced. Achilles' exercise of aspect perception occurs at the moment that he is also emotional: μίνυνθά περ ἀμφιβαλόντε / ἀλλήλους ὀλοοῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο.[455] Similarly, in *Odyssey* 11.206, after the ghost of Anticleia speaks, Odysseus *sees* his mother *as* a bodily being, and is emotionally driven to hug her (ἐλέειν τέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγε). This gives us reason to think that Amphimedon's emotional speech is also an exercise of aspect perception. Notice that Amphimedon attaches his "I" to the wraith that can recall all of the things that happened (μέμνημαι τάδε πάντα, διοτρεφές, ὡς ἀγορεύεις).[456] In the characters' schema, the dead person's "I" continues as the wraith in Hades.[457] However, within the character's mental schema is also the conception that the wraith is a separate entity from the corpse.[458] By attaching his "I" to the wraith, Amphimedon can make an internal relation, and he realises that he is the same entity as the disembodied ψυχή that journeys to Hades. By making this internal relation, Amphimedon can *see* himself *as* one of the disembodied shades. It is for this reason that the shade does not see its identity as coterminous with the corpse. All of this indicates that aspect perception is part of this

[454] *Od*. 24.124.
[455] *Il*. 23.97-98.
[456] *Od*. 24.122.
[457] Cf. *Il*. 5.646, 6.422, 6.487 ; *Od*. 6.11. See chapter two for this folk model.
[458] Cf. *Il*. 5.654, 7.328-330, 11.445, 16.625.

conceptual mapping that leads Amphimedon to this description of his selfhood. In this regard, aspect perception is at the heart of the ambiguous ways in which the shade presents itself.

Conclusion

Let us review the argument of this chapter.

In the first section, we examined the extent to which Achilles dream-state affected the presentation of the dead. We concluded that the scene between Patroclus and Achilles shared similar motifs with other dream sequences. However, we concluded that the dream did not affect Achilles' cognitive competence during the dream, or his memory of it. We established that Homeric characters are not only expected to remember the information in the dream, but are also expected to remember the instructions given to them. This meant that the dreamer Achilles is expected to have the same cognitive abilities as his awake self. What this discussion helped us to establish was that Achilles' confusion over the wraith's state of being was not a result of the dream state. This helped us to pave the way to argue that the shade is highly ambiguous.

In the second section, we have seen that there are evident epistemological differences between primary and secondary focalisers' descriptions of the inhabitant of Hades. The former, we have seen, present the ghost as a wraith who appears fundamentally life-like but also physically insubstantial and inhuman at the point of movement. The latter, by contrast, present the inhabitant as a witless being. We have also observed that, in character descriptions, characters are also uncertain whether or not the inhabitants of Hades have cognitive abilities. We have arrived at the conclusion that the life-like and non-human characteristics of the ghost in *Iliad* 23 lead focalisers to see an internal relation between the cognitive abilities of animals and humans. This internal relation means that Achilles then

uses the φρένες as a metonym to describe the non-human aspect of the wraith. This has led us to conclude that Achilles utilises aspect perception when he describes the ψυχή's condition and state of being.

For the second part of this chapter, we acknowledged the alternative view that the dead are witless and life-like because their burial statuses provide them with different abilities. We have removed any doubt about the symbolic importance of burial rites. We have argued that this rite of incorporation does not affect the status of the wraith. We have seen that both the buried and unburied are imagined as being both witless and cognitively active. This has allowed us to see that the contradictory descriptions of the wraith cannot be explained through particular rites of passage. In other words, this has paved the way for us to suggest that the properties of the wraith are at the centre of this ambivalence.

The final part of this discussion has focused on the seemingly contradictory ways the dead talk about themselves. We have noticed that there are several instances in which the inhabitant attaches its "I" to the wraith or to the corpse. We have come to the conclusion that these contradictory descriptions of the dead occur because characters notice and change aspects of a mental image in which the incorporeal wraith has the same "I" as the embodied person. This continuity of identity reveals an internal relation, by having the same "I" as the corporeal embodied person, the shade is capable of seeing itself as the corpse and change between seeing itself as a wraith that has the cognitive abilities of the living person, and the mindless cadaver. This has meant that the wraith must shift between the image of the corpse and the image of the wraith in order for the dead to describe their state of being. In other words, the contradictory ways of speaking about the wraith, we have argued, are an exercise of aspect perception.

This chapter has primarily enabled us to see the differences between the way the ghosts, living characters, and primary narrator present the wraith. The first, as we just stated

above, presents the inhabitant as either a corpse or a wraith. The second also fluctuates between thinking that the ghost is a corpse or a wraith and is unsure whether the ghost has cognitive abilities. The third group presents the inhabitant as a wraith with life-like characteristics and a non-human appearance when it moves. In the next and final chapter, we shall examine how these properties of the wraith encourage Odysseus, like Achilles, to fluctuate between seeing the inhabitant as life-like and witless as well as substantial and insubstantial. This will then help us to establish that Odysseus himself uses aspect perception to make sense of the dead.

PART TWO

THE INHABITANTS OF HADES

Chapter Four

The *Nekyia*

Introduction

So far in this thesis, I have examined how the living see and interpret the dead diversely. In Chapter Two, we looked at how the folk model of the dead (THE DEFICIENT GHOSTS HAVE THE SAME LIFE-LIKE ABILITIES AND SELFHOOD AS THE EMBODIED LIVING PERSON) leads characters to use aspect perception to interpret the dead. They see the shades as beings who take on the appearance of the dead man himself deprived of life-faculties, as εἴδωλα, and, in one instance, as the life-faculty θυμός. In Chapter Three, we have suggested that this folk model is also the reason for these diverse presentations. The ghosts in Hades have the same selfhood and appearance as the embodied living person. This life-like appearance encourages the primary narrator to present the shade as the dead man himself, and encourages Achilles to see the shade as his friend. These heterogenous and metaphoric presentations of the wraith have all, we have argued, been constructed from the focalisers' capacity to exercise aspect perception. That is to say, the internal relation in aspect perception has allowed for these metaphoric constructions to appear and for the dead to change aspect and thus see themselves as corpses and wraiths.

In this chapter, I aim to show that this folk-model also operates in the *Nekyia* and that the shades and Odysseus himself, both as a narrator and as a focaliser, use aspect perception to comprehend the ghosts in Hades. Specifically, I suggest that the narrator and characters use both *conceptual* and *optical* aspect perception.[459]

I start by examining the epistemological value of the *Nekyia*'s presentation of the dead. I argue that the *Nekyia* must, first and foremost, be treated as a living character's subjective account of Hades. In so doing, I propose that we should not make any assertions as to whether or not the dead are actually capable of physically engaging or communicating with the living. Instead, my aim is to suggest that the contradictory presentations of the dead's abilities must be seen as interpretations of Odysseus' sensory perceptions of them when he is in Hades.

Once I have done this, I shall argue that Odysseus uses aspect perception when he engages with the dead. I first argue that Odysseus *qua* narrator notices conceptual aspects. That is to say, he reports how he saw the shades as the dead men themselves who have bodily faculties. I suggest that the narrator arrives at this interpretation when he notices their life-like movements. From there, I argue that Odysseus *qua* narrator presents the perceptions that Odysseus had as a focaliser during the encounters themselves. This kind of embedded focalisation, I will argue, emphasises that Odysseus, as a focaliser, uses aspect perception to make sense of the dead. I suggest that Odysseus' *qua* focaliser capacity to see the dead as life-like explains why he indicates *qua* narrator that some of the ghosts appear capable of speaking without consuming from a pool of blood. I also suggest that Odysseus uses aspect perception when he engages with the ghost of his late mother: the focaliser sees the shade as the dead woman herself and as an εἴδωλον. My aim is to show that the conflictingly life-like

[459] See page 15 for an explanation of this term. On optical aspects, see RPP I 970. On conceptual, see RPP II 509.

and insubstantial nature of the shade's movements explains why the dead appear at times substantial and, at other times, insubstantial. I suggest the reason for this is that Odysseus is foregrounding the life-like properties of the shade over the deficient characteristics.

In the second part of this chapter, I examine the role of internal relations when the dead describe themselves and when Odysseus as a narrator presents the shades. I first suggest that the ghosts in Hades have the same sense of selfhood as the embodied living person. This I argue means that there is an internal relation between the selfhood of the shade and the corpse. I go on to argue that this internal relation forces the ghosts to alternate between talking about themselves as wraiths that have cognitive abilities and as mindless corpses. This shift, I argue, is the same change of aspect that we see when an observer examines Jastrow's duck-rabbit. Once I have explored this topic, I go on to look at the names the narrator assigns for the dead. Specifically, I examine Clarke's and Cairns' opposing interpretations of the names for the dead. The former, we shall see, argues that these names represent a change in conceptions whilst the latter suggests these names are all efforts to articulate a single conception: that the resident in Hades is a ψυχή. I argue that there is a compromise between these two interpretations. Like Cairns, I suggest that Odysseus notices at first that the ghost in Hades is a ψυχή, which has both deficient and life-like characteristics. However, I suggest that eventually these names for the dead present different conceptions of the ghosts. I argue that aspect perception allows us to go from seeing the ghosts as wraiths to then changing aspect and seeing them as phantoms and "corpses," as Clarke calls them.[460] In short, I suggest that Wittgenstein's model resolves an issue of interpretation when it comes to the presentation of the wraith.

What I am essentially aiming to show in this chapter is that the ghosts in Hades encourage us to notice two types of aspects, optical and conceptual. To begin this discussion,

[460] Cf. Clarke 1999: 191.

let us first draw a comparison between examples of these two types of aspect perception and the presentations of the ghosts in the *Nekyia*.

With regards to optical aspect perception, Wittgenstein draws our attention to two objects that we can see in different ways. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* Wittgenstein mentions that we may have different interpretations of which side of a cube is meant to be the front of the shape:[461]

> To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way. This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure
>
> 
>
>
> as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (If I look in the first place at the corners marked *a* and only glance at the *b*'s, then the *a*'s appear to be in front, and vice versa).

The other example that he draws our attention to is the double cross in the *Philosophy of Psychology Fragment*:[462]

[461] TLP §5.5423.
[462] See pages 15-16.



When we look at this image, we may either see it as "a white cross on a black background" or "as a black cross on a white background". The ghosts in Hades are similar to the double cross: both comprise conflicting properties. Indeed, the dead in Hades have both life-like and deficient characteristics. Take, for example, Odysseus' narration of his first interaction with the dead in 11.37-43:

αἱ δ᾽ ἀγέροντο

ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.

νύμφαι τ᾽ ἠίθεοί τε πολύτλητοί τε γέροντες

παρθενικαί τ᾽ ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι,

πολλοὶ δ᾽ οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,

ἄνδρες ἀρηίφατοι βεβροτωμένα τεύχε᾽ ἔχοντες:

οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος

θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ

The ghosts gather near Odysseus (ἀγέροντο) and as they do so, they look remarkably life-like. They appear like old men, maidens, and unmarried youths; they can show emotions, and the soldiers even wear bloodied armour. Yet, whilst they approach and appear human, they also seem, opposingly, inhuman, moving around the blood making an awful screeching sound

(οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος / θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ). Similarly, the ghost also appears life-like and deficient when it moves insubstantially:[463]

> τρὶς μὲν ἐφωρμήθην, ἐλέειν τέ με θυμὸς ἀνώγει,
>
> τρὶς δέ μοι ἐκ χειρῶν σκιῇ εἴκελον ἢ καὶ ὀνείρῳ
>
> ἔπτατ᾽.

Anticleia is deficient: she moves from Odysseus' hands like a shadow or a dream. And yet, her movements are so life-like that Odysseus makes three attempts to embrace her. Likewise, Odysseus seems to suggest that the dead in Hades have a life-like appearance, but, conflictingly, have deficient mental abilities. Consider his description to Teiresias of his late mother's ghost:[464]

> μητρὸς τήνδ᾽ ὁρόω ψυχὴν κατατεθνηυίης·
>
> ἡ δ᾽ ἀκέουσ᾽ ἧσται σχεδὸν αἵματος, οὐδ᾽ ἐὸν υἱὸν
>
> ἔτλη ἐσάντα ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ προτιμυθήσασθαι.
>
> εἰπέ, ἄναξ, πῶς κέν με ἀναγνοίη τὸν ἐόντα;

Odysseus recognises that the shade looks just like his mother and is capable of doing the same life-like activities, such as sitting down (ἧσται). And yet despite this appearance, the ghost is conflictingly not like her living self: the shade does not recognise her son (ἀναγνοίη) and does not seem to speak (προτιμυθήσασθα). Teiresias explains that whomever Odysseus allows near the blood will speak meaningfully to him, but whomever he rejects will go away:[465]

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[463] *Od*. 11.206-208.
[464] *Od*. 11.141-144.
[465] *Od*. 11.147-149.

ὅν τινα μέν κεν ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων

αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, ὁ δέ τοι νημερτὲς ἐνίψει·

ᾧ δέ κ᾽ ἐπιφθονέῃς, ὁ δέ τοι πάλιν εἶσιν ὀπίσσω.

Teiresias recognises Odysseus' problem, that the shade lacks the capacity to recognise him, and explains that the blood will allow the dead to speak with him. The cognitive characteristics of the dead are conflicting here. On the one hand, Teiresias acknowledges the dead's inability to remember and to speak with the living, which makes them seem witless. And yet, at the same time, the ghosts have the basic cognitive ability to recognise that the blood offering is in front of them, that Odysseus is allowing them to come forward, and that he is denying them access to the blood. The dead maybe witless and lack the capacity for memory, but they are still expected to have the same basic cognitive abilities as the living.[466] The same presupposition is made when Circe instructs Odysseus on how to prevent the dead from the blood in 10.536-37: μηδὲ ἐᾶν νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα / αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, πρὶν Τειρεσίαο πυθέσθαι. These dead that Circe describes are still believed to have the cognitive ability to obey his non-verbal commands. Indeed, we see from Odysseus's own encounter with his mother that the dead have the cognitive ability to follow non-verbal basic instructions (84–9):

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ μητρὸς κατατεθνηυίης,

Αὐτολύκου θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος Ἀντίκλεια,

τὴν ζωὴν κατέλειπον ἰὼν εἰς Ἴλιον ἱρήν.

τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ·

ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς εἴων προτέρην, πυκινόν περ ἀχεύων,

[466] On the restorative abilities of the blood offering, see Hentze 1908: 146 *ad Od*. 11.148; Rohde 1925: 1.36-37; Büchner 1937: 111-112; Vermeule 1979: 63; Garland 1985: 2; Bouvier 1999: 61 and n. 3; Johnson 1999: 8; Heath 2005: 389-401. On blood and sacrifice in wider cultural contexts, see McCarthy 1969: 166-278.

αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, πρὶν Τειρεσίαο πυθέσθαι.

Odysseus learns later that his mother is incapable of remembering or speaking to him without the blood. Nevertheless, the narrator acknowledges that she, in some sense, is still cognitively active since she does as Odysseus commands, by waving his sword, not to come near the blood. The very fact that the dead can recognise the sword stands for the instruction "do not come closer" presupposes a basic form of cognition. The overture to the catalogue of women also shows us that the dead have some of the properties of a cognitive living being (225–34):

νῶι μὲν ὣς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβόμεθ', αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες
ἤλυθον, ὥτρυνεν γὰρ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια,
ὅσσαι ἀριστήων ἄλοχοι ἔσαν ἠδὲ θύγατρες.
αἱ δ' ἀμφ' αἷμα κελαινὸν ἀολλέες ἠγερέθοντο,
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἑκάστην.
ἥδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή·
σπασσάμενος τανύηκες ἄορ παχέος παρὰ μηροῦ
οὐκ εἴων πίνειν ἅμα πάσας αἷμα κελαινόν.
αἱ δὲ προμνηστῖναι ἐπήισαν, ἠδὲ ἑκάστη
ὃν γόνον ἐξαγόρευεν: ἐγὼ δ' ἐρέεινον ἁπάσας.

We see that the dead are indeed cognitively able to follow non-verbal instructions. By drawing his sword, Odysseus orders them to drink the blood one at a time. And indeed, the dead women follow these instructions and each (ἑκάστη) of them approaches.

This suggests that there is a similarity between the ghosts in the *Nekyia* and the double cross whose opposing tones allow us to notice aspects: both entities comprise incompatible characteristics. This gives us the ground to say that Odysseus, like the observer

of the images, notices selective aspects of the shade. We will put this theory into practice in this chapter.

The epistemological value of the *Nekyia*: subjective narration and aspect perception

In the *Nekyia*, we see a number of seemingly contradictory presentations of the dead. On the one hand, the dead are capable of performing life-like activities. The ghosts of Achilles, Elpenor, and Agamemnon (ἔγνω δ' αἶψ' ἐμὲ κεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἴδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσι) [467] are said to communicate with Odysseus by themselves, Sisyphus can push a rock up a hill, Tityus can have his organs plucked by birds, and Achilles can run like his living self.[468] On the other hand, the dead are deficient: they cannot remember the living unless they drink from the blood offering, they screech, and they lack the substance to engage with the living. Teiresias, as we have seen above, explains that all the dead need the blood to regain the power of speech, the ghost of Anticleia cannot recognise her son without drinking from this blood, and her and Agamemnon's ghosts are also physically insubstantial, unable to make physical contact with Odysseus.

In Chapter Three, we looked at one school of thought that argues the burial, or lack thereof, determines whether the dead are life-like or deficient. We argued that the dead person's burial does not affect the shade's status or abilities in the other world. However, my argument so far only dismisses the suggestion that burial affects the cognitive abilities of the dead. But those who follow this anthropological approach also argue that the shade may be

[467] See Heubeck 1990: 100-101 *ad Od*. 11.390 on the reading "ἔγνω δ᾽ αἶψ᾽ ἔμ᾽ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πίεν αἶμα κελαινόν" as an ancient conjecture. Cf. Schwartz 1924: 147.1; Focke 1943: 220. 2; van der Valk 1949: 177; Erbse 1972: 28. 64. For the defence of ἔγνω δ᾽ αἶψ᾽ ἔμ᾽ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πίεν αἶμα κελαινόν see Merkelbach 1969: 190.2.
[468] Cf. *Od*. 11.59, 390, 471-472, 569-600.

substantial if its corpse does not received a cremation. Consider the ghost of Anticleia's explanation as to why she lacks physical substance in 218-222:[469]

> ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν·
> οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
> ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο
> δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός,
> ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

Robb, González Merino, Finn, and Gazis have interpreted Anticleia's speech as an indication that the ghost becomes immaterial only after the cremation.[470] But this interpretation will not work. First, the temporal construction αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν makes it clear that the shade's lack of substance is a condition of death, not of burial. Second, the co-ordinating particles μέν… δέ indicate that the shade is already floating in a physically insubstantial state in, or at least en-route to Hades *when* the dead man is cremated. In his examination of 11.82-83, Tsagarakis claims that the reason the ghost is corporeal is due to his lack of burial: [471]

> Elpenor may be an *eidolon*, but he still occupies space, thus claiming corporeality. As long as his body remains unburied (vv. 52ff.), i.e. uncremated, the dead man is imagined to be "real."

Tsagarakis seems to be alluding to an earlier argument where he says that the ghost of Elpenor appears to be corporeal since he can sit and, thus, occupy space.[472] But this does not

[469] For further reading of this passage see Stanford 1947: 381, 389; Warden 1971: 96; Sullivan 1979: 32; Heubeck 1990: 90; Albinus 2000: 32 n. 20; Tsagarakis 2000: 112; Meyer 2008: 13.
[470] See: Robb 1986: 345 n 10; Finn 1997: 59; Merino 2013: 73; Gazis 2018: 123. Cf. Sideri 1976 *ad Od.*11.219-222; Kazantzakis and Kakrids 2015 *ad loc*. See also: Stob.*Anth.*1.49.50.45-55 Apollod. (*FHG*) Frg.10.54; Eust. *ad Od.*11.218-222*;* Plut. *De Facie.* 30.
[471] Tsagarakis 2000: 117-118.
[472] Tsagarakis 2000: 105-106.

indicate that Odysseus sees a distinction between the buried and unburied dead in terms of substantiality. Indeed, the ghost of Anticleia, who hints that she is one of the dead to receive a cremation,[473] can also sit near the blood silently (ἡ δ᾽ ἀκέουσ᾽ ἧσται σχεδὸν αἵματος).[474] The role of burial, then, cannot explain the strange contradictory presentations of the dead's movements in Hades.

In the introduction, we have also looked at other schools of thought that have attempted to explain these diverse presentations of the dead. We have briefly noted how these presentations have been explained as products of compositional strata and metaphoric models. What many of these explanations have in common is the presumption that Odysseus is an authoritative narrator. Sourvinou-Inwood and Tsagarakis do not sufficiently consider, in their analyses of *Odyssey* 11, that these inconsistencies could be explained as Odysseus' attempts to present the shade. Clarke's unitarian reading also dismisses the notion that Odysseus is presenting a subjectivist view of the shade.[475] Likewise, Cairns' metaphoric model makes the presumption that there is an "official conception" in the *Nekyia*, that the dead are insubstantial. All other life-like descriptions are simply metaphorical. But this again, as we have stressed, presupposes that Odysseus, as a narrator, is aware of this "official" conception of the dead.

Narratological examinations of the *Nekyia* have also failed to consider the epistemological difficulties that the secondary narrator might face presenting the shade. De Jong, in her *Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey*, makes no mention of how Odysseus tries present the shades that appear, as we see, both life-like and deficient through the best of his cognitive abilities.

[473] Cf. *Od*. 11.218-220.
[474] *Od.* 11.142.
[475] Clarke 1999: 190 n 69.

Gazis, in his monograph *Homer and the Poetics of Hades*, highlights that many of Odysseus' descriptions of Hades are based on his sensory perceptions of the world of the dead. Gazis has shown how Odysseus has the special ability to see into Hades, a world which is invisible and shrouded in darkness. As a result, the Homeric narrator is able "to access issues and air stories that were otherwise inaccessible to the epic narrator."[476]

Although this analysis is important in understanding the way in which Odysseus serves as a narrator, Gazis focuses on how the hero's ability to see into Hades helps us to hear stories from the epic past. But much of his argument suggests that Odysseus acts as a substitute for the Muses or Helios who are all-knowing.[477] Yet Odysseus is very different from the two divine beings. Unlike the omniscient Muses and Helios, who know the world below them,[478] the secondary narrator confronts a world which he does not know. He tells Circe that he does not know how to reach Hades[479] and he is uncertain why the ghost of his mother cannot recognise him[480] or embrace him.[481] In other words, Gazis does not concentrate on how Odysseus, as a narrator, tries to understand and describe a fundamentally unknowable state of being and what image emerges of the dead as a result of this narration.

In this section, my aim is to provide a conservative reading of the dead in the *Nekyia*. That is to say, I do not wish to make assertions about what the "official" conception of the shade is in Odysseus' *Nekyia*. Rather, my aim is to simply concentrate on what Odysseus reports himself as having seen when he encountered the shades in Hades. In so doing, I suggest that Odysseus, both as a focaliser and as a narrator, uses aspect perception to make sense of the dead. This model, I argue, explains why we see the dead so inconsistently as life-like and witless, substantial and insubstantial.

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[476] Gazis 2018: 83.
[477] Gazis 2018: 13-14, 88, 91-92.
[478] Cf. *Il.* 2.485, *Od.* 11.109.
[479] *Od.* 10.501-502.
[480] *Od.* 11.140-144.
[481] *Od.* 11.210-214.

Let me begin by first explaining why we should read the *Nekyia* as a living person's subjective presentation of the dead. From there, I will argue that the focaliser notices conceptual aspects of the shade and that the narrator presents these aspects through embedded focalisation. Consider Alcinous' praise to Odysseus in the Intermezzo:[482]

ὦ Ὀδυσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὔ τί σ᾽ εἰσκομεν εἰσορόωντες,
ἠπεροπῆά τ᾽ ἔμεν καὶ ἐπίκλοπον, οἷά τε πολλοὺς
βόσκει γαῖα μέλαινα πολυσπερέας ἀνθρώπους,
ψεύδεά τ᾽ ἀρτύνοντας ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο·
σοὶ δ᾽ ἔπι μὲν μορφὴ ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί.
μῦθον δ᾽ ὡς ὅτ᾽ ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας,
πάντων τ᾽ Ἀργείων σέο τ᾽ αὐτοῦ κήδεα λυγρά.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον,
εἴ τινας ἀντιθέων ἑτάρων ἴδες, οἵ τοι ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ
Ἴλιον εἰς ἅμ᾽ ἕποντο καὶ αὐτοῦ πότμον ἐπέσπον.

Alcinous contrasts Odysseus with the many men (πολλοὺς… ἀνθρώπους) who lie: he is not considered a cheat or a deceiver (ἠπεροπῆά τ᾽ ἔμεν καὶ ἐπίκλοπον).[483] Alcinous' words hint at the idea that Odysseus' narration is a report of his own interpretations. Alcinous compliments the hero by claiming that they do not think he is dishonest, based on what they have seen (εἰσκομεν εἰσορόωντες). The expression (εἰσκομεν εἰσορόωντες) here emphasises that sight is indeed the basis for interpretation, and Alcinous asks Odysseus to describe the people he sees (εἴ τινας ἀντιθέων ἑτάρων ἴδες). What this means is that Odysseus' narration is his own interpretation of events in Hades that is based on his capacity for sight.

This, I will argue, means that Odysseus narrates through embedded focalisation.

[482] *Od*. 11.363-372.
[483] Cf. Heubeck 1990: 99 *ad Od*. 11.364-366.

Let us look at other examples from the *Apologoi* where this type of narration occurs. We might compare the blood drinking to Odysseus' realisation that his comrades are swine. Notice that Odysseus *qua* focaliser is informed by two authoritative characters, Circe and Teiresias, about the uncanny phenomena. The latter explicitly tells Odysseus that the dead need the blood in order to speak to and recognise the living. The former is shocked to learn in 10.325-329 that the potion, which turned his friends into swine, did not affect Odysseus' mind:

τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες;
θαῦμά μ᾽ ἔχει ὡς οὔ τι πιὼν τάδε φάρμακ᾽ ἐθέλχθης·
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος ἀνὴρ τάδε φάρμακ᾽ ἀνέτλη,
ὅς κε πίῃ καὶ πρῶτον ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.
σοὶ δέ τις ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀκήλητος νόος ἐστίν.

Circe marvels at how his νόος cannot be charmed. This seems to imply that the drug changed not just the state of his comrades' bodies but their mental state when they transformed into pigs. Indeed, after Odysseus learns as focaliser about his comrades' warped mental state, he describes as narrator how the comrades turned back to their former selves and were then able to recognise Odysseus: ἔγνωσαν δέ με κεῖνοι ἔφυν τ' ἐν χερσὶν ἕκαστος. This is not so different from what we see in the *Nekyia* 145-158. Odysseus asks Teiresias how the ghost of his late mother can recognise him. The authoritative figure Teiresias informs Odysseus *qua* focaliser that the dead need to drink the blood. It is after the focaliser learns this that the narrator stresses that the ghost of Anticleia could recognise Odysseus after she drank the blood. Odysseus, the narrator, presents information which he has learned as a focaliser from the authoritative figures. These passages underline that the narrator introduces certain descriptions after the focaliser has made a newly found discovery about the

supernatural world. This suggests that Odysseus narrates through the cognitive filters he had at the time he encountered the mystical elements in the *Apologoi*.

This means that Odysseus, as a narrator, will emphasise the character's interpretation of the dead. Here we will argue that Odysseus, as a focaliser, exercises his capacity for aspect perception when he encounters the shades and interprets their state of being. Indeed, the reason for applying Wittgenstein's seeing-as to Odysseus' narration becomes clear when we consider that our hero narrates by describing what it is that he sees.[484] Whatever presentation of the dead we get in Odysseus' narration, it is acquired from Odysseus' ability *qua* focaliser to interpret his perceptions of the dead.

The best example of seeing-as, which we have discussed in the introduction, is when Odysseus meets with the ghost of Ajax. The narrator presents the shade as though it has the cognitive ability to recognise Odysseus and to remember the contest for Achilles' armour (543–6):

οἵη δ᾽ Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο
νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης,
τήν μιν ἐγὼ νίκησα δικαζόμενος παρὰ νηυσὶ
τεύχεσιν ἀμφ᾽ Ἀχιλῆος: ἔθηκε δὲ πότνια μήτηρ.

The narrator's presentation of the shade reflects the way in which Odysseus *qua* focaliser *sees* the shade *as* someone who has the same cognitive abilities as the living person. Indeed, it is the life-like characteristics of the ψυχή which encourages Odysseus *qua* focaliser to *perceive* and address the ghost *as* Ajax himself who has the cognitive abilities to understand the living (553–5):

Αἶαν, παῖ Τελαμῶνος ἀμύμονος, οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἔμελλες

[484] Cf. *Od*. 11. 235, 260, 266, 271, 281, 298, 305-306, 321, 326, 329, 371, 566-567,568, 572, 576, 582, 593, 601.

οὐδὲ θανὼν λήσεσθαι ἐμοὶ χόλου εἵνεκα τευχέων

οὐλομένων;

Indeed, Ajax's life-like emotions convince Odysseus that the ghost has the capacity for memory (οὐδὲ θανὼν λήσεσθαι) as well as the mental faculties to restrain his anger: δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν. Here we see a type of embedded focalisation in which the narrator presents the dead as cognitive as a result of Odysseus' capacity to exercise aspect perception. The focaliser has the ability to look at the life-like characteristics of the shade and see it as the dead man himself.

This is also a conceptual aspect that the narrator notices when he describes the sinners.[485] Consider Odysseus' description of Orion (572-5):

τὸν δὲ μετ᾽ Ὠρίωνα πελώριον εἰσενόησα

θῆρας ὁμοῦ εἰλεῦντα κατ᾽ ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,

τοὺς αὐτὸς κατέπεφνεν ἐν οἰοπόλοισιν ὄρεσσι

χερσὶν ἔχων ῥόπαλον παγχάλκεον, αἰὲν ἀαγές.

Orion manages to do life-like activities: he can run and hunt his prey. The narrator says that he perceived (εἰσενόησα) these qualities. This perception leads him to present Orion as the man himself, αὐτός. As the scene proceeds, Odysseus claims to have noticed the life-like qualities of the shade and, from this perception, presents them as corporeal beings instead of incorporeal shades. Look at Tityus' torture scene (576-581):

καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν,

κείμενον ἐν δαπέδῳ: ὁ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐννέα κεῖτο πέλεθρα,

γῦπε δέ μιν ἑκάτερθε παρημένω ἦπαρ ἔκειρον,

[485] On a very detailed discussion of the mythological background of this scene, see Sourvinou-Inwood 1986.

δέρτρον ἔσω δύνοντες, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀπαμύνετο χερσί

Odysseus saw (εἶδον) two vultures come towards the sinner and Tityus cannot ward off the creatures with his hands. The movements from both the birds are so life-like that Odysseus views both the birds and the sinner as substantial and corporeal. Indeed, the animals' actions encourage Odysseus to think that Tityus has the same bodily faculties as his living self, a δέρτρον and ἦπαρ. These actions encourage Odysseus to *perceive* the ghost not *as* the shade, but *as* the embodied dead man himself.

The same conception of the dead emerges when we see Sisyphus walking up a hill carrying up a boulder (593-600):

καὶ μὴν Σίσυφον εἰσεῖδον κρατέρ᾽ ἄλγε᾽ ἔχοντα

λᾶαν βαστάζοντα πελώριον ἀμφοτέρῃσιν.

ἦ τοι ὁ μὲν σκηριπτόμενος χερσίν τε ποσίν τε

λᾶαν ἄνω ὤθεσκε ποτὶ λόφον: ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε μέλλοι

ἄκρον ὑπερβαλέειν, τότ᾽ ἀποστρέψασκε κραταιίς·

αὖτις ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής.

αὐτὰρ ὅ γ᾽ ἂψ ὤσασκε τιταινόμενος, κατὰ δ᾽ ἱδρὼς

ἔρρεεν ἐκ μελέων, κονίη δ᾽ ἐκ κρατὸς ὀρώρει.

Sisyphus' actions are so life-like that Odysseus says that he perceived (εἰσεῖδον) the inhabitant as the corporeal being that has the stuff of limbs (κατὰ δ᾽ ἱδρὼς / ἔρρεεν ἐκ μελέων). All this indicates is that Odysseus as the secondary narrator presents the aspects that the focaliser noticed at that time.

A good example of this embedded focalisation occurs when Odysseus meets the ghost of Elpenor. The ghost approaches Odysseus first among the shades (51–8):

πρώτη δὲ ψυχὴ Ἐλπήνορος ἦλθεν ἑταίρου·

οὐ γάρ πω ἐτέθαπτο ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης·

σῶμα γὰρ ἐν Κίρκης μεγάρῳ κατελείπομεν ἡμεῖς

ἄκλαυτον καὶ ἄθαπτον, ἐπεὶ πόνος ἄλλος ἔπειγε.

τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ,

καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδων·

Ἐλπῆνορ, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα;

ἔφθης πεζὸς ἰὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ.

Notice that the focaliser first perceives the ghost as deceased since he weeps when he sees Elpenor (τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ δάκρυσα ἰδὼν ἐλέησά τε θυμῷ,). And yet, in a space of a few lines, the character addresses Elpenor as though he is a being who has the cognitive abilities of the living person. We see that Odysseus' narratorial descriptions of the wraith's approach mirror his shifting perception as focaliser. Indeed, Odysseus *qua* narrator presents Elpenor as dead by calling him a ψυχή; but the ψυχή quickly shifts and the narrator *sees* the wraith *as* the dead man himself, τόν. The demonstrative pronoun marks a form of embedded focalisation, since Odysseus *qua* focaliser addresses the ghost not as a wraith, but as Elpenor himself (Ἐλπῆνορ).

This narrator's ability to shift from the feminine to the masculine also marks the focaliser's ability to *see* the shade *as* the dead man himself. Consider Clarke's observation on Teiresias' movements. The ghost approaches Odysseus holding a sceptre (90-91):

ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχων, ἐμὲ δ' ἔγνω καὶ προσέειπεν·

Clarke notices the gender shift between the feminine ψυχή and the masculine participle ἔχων: "this shift between verbal patterns is part of a deeper ambiguity as to whether the inhabitant of Hades is the man himself or something we could call a wraith."[486] But if we accept this

[486] Clarke 1999: 192. I do not however want to push the gender distinction too far since many of these examples can be explained away as economical efforts to keep to the meter.

interpretation of the gender shift, then Odysseus' narration of Teiresias involves aspect perception. Notice that Odysseus uses this gender of the dead person proper when the ghost looks to be holding the sceptre. Here we see how the life-like qualities of the shade induce the narrator to *see* this ghost *as* the man himself.

All of this suggests that the narrator presents the kind of conceptual aspects that Odysseus *qua* focaliser notices when he engages with the dead. This gives us the grounds to argue that the *Nekyia* is not meant to be an authoritative account of what lurks in Hades, but a subjective one. Odysseus narrates his encounters with the dead through the cognitive filters he had at the time he was in Hades.

In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that the dead are similar to Wittgenstein's double cross because both the image and the shade have conflicting intrinsic properties. What we have, up until now, shown, however, is that Odysseus notices conceptual aspects from the dead. It would, at this point, be helpful to find an image that utilises optical and conceptual aspect perception. Here, we will draw our attention back to Chapter Two, where we compared the dead to Rubin's Vase.[487] The latter requires us to see both optical and conceptual aspects. We first notice either the black tone or white tone as the foreground or background, as we do with optical aspect perception. Once we have done this, we then notice conceptual aspects from the image. Indeed, by foregrounding the black tone, we see the image as two faces or, by foregrounding the white shade, we see the picture as a vase.

We can see that the dead are fundamentally similar to Rubin's image, when we examine Odysseus' reaction to the ghost of Anticleia's flight. The shade tells Odysseus about the nature of her death and, after considering her speech, makes three attempts to embrace her in 204-205:

ὣς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γ' ἔθελον φρεσὶ μερμηρίξας

[487] See page 101.

μητρὸς ἐμῆς ψυχὴν ἐλέειν κατατεθνηυίης.

Odysseus is driven to embrace his mother after she has explained how she died. The drive to contact her is emotional, but, even then, this drive to see the ghost as the same bodily being as her living self is an exercise of aspect perception. The participle μερμηρίξας is retrospective and suggests Odysseus wanted to embrace her after he considered her words. This means that the ghost's ability to speak like Anticleia herself induces Odysseus to see her as the bodily being. From there we see that the shade has conflicting characteristics. It exhibits, as we established in the introduction to this chapter, insubstantial flight, but the insubstantial movements are so life-like that Odysseus persists in trying to embrace her. This, as we have said, makes Anticleia's movements comparable to the double cross, but it also makes the shade comparable to Rubin's vase since both have conflicting properties. Indeed, like the observer of Rubin's vase, Odysseus goes on to make two conceptions of the ghost because of its conflicting life-like and deficient characteristics:

μῆτερ ἐμή, τί νύ μ᾽ οὐ μίμνεις ἐλέειν μεμαῶτα,
ὄφρα καὶ εἰν Ἀίδαο φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε
ἀμφοτέρω κρυεροῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο;
ἦ τί μοι εἴδωλον τόδ᾽ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια
ὤτρυν᾽, ὄφρ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω;

When the shades' insubstantial movements appear life-like, Odysseus appears to notice not only optical aspects but conceptual ones as well. Consider the question he asks after the ghost flies away: τί νύ μ᾽ οὐ μίμνεις ἐλέειν μεμαῶτα, / ὄφρα καὶ εἰν Ἀίδαο φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε / ἀμφοτέρω κρυεροῖο τεταρπώμεσθα γόοιο. On the one hand, the question suggests that Odysseus notices optical aspects of the shade. That is to say, Odysseus foregrounds one characteristic, the life-like movement, of the shade, over the shade's insubstantiality. Indeed, Odysseus does not seem to acknowledge that the shade, at first, is

insubstantial. On the contrary, the life-like movements are so convincing that Odysseus thinks the ghost is not staying still for him (οὐ μίμνεις ἑλέειν). This optical aspect – that is, the ability to foreground the life-like property of the shade– leads Odysseus to notice a conceptual aspect: namely, he sees the ghost not as a wraith, but as the dead person herself. The use of the dual participle βαλόντε and the first person plural τεταρπώμεσθα suggests that his mother is the same as him, a bodily being who has the capability to embrace the other person and to show emotions.

However, Odysseus then proceeds to ask whether or not what he has witnessed is an εἴδωλον sent by Persephone. Here again the question seems to imply that Odysseus notices optical and conceptual aspects. On the one hand, the εἴδωλον is a conceptual aspect. The εἴδωλον is characterised as an insubstantial but life-like replica of the living person.[488] By noticing this conceptual aspect, Odysseus seems also to notice an optical aspect – that is, he foregrounds the insubstantial nature of Anticleia's movements, and sees the life-like nature of the movements as peripheral. Odysseus still recognises that the shade's movements are life-like, but he sees these as the characteristics of an insubstantial εἴδωλον. The εἴδωλον seems to be life-like in movements but ultimately is immaterial. This is an aspect that Odysseus *qua* narrator presents when Odysseus as a focaliser sits across from the ghost of Elpenor in 11.81-83:

νῶι μὲν ὣς ἐπέεσσιν ἀμειβομένω στυγεροῖσιν
ἥμεθ', ἐγὼ μὲν ἄνευθεν ἐφ' αἵματι φάσγανον ἴσχων,
εἴδωλον δ' ἑτέρωθεν ἑταίρου πόλλ' ἀγόρευεν

Here Odysseus *qua* narrator presents the shade as an εἴδωλον, but the first person plural ἥμεθα and dual participle ἀμειβομένω suggest that the εἴδωλον has the same life-like abilities as Odysseus. Similarly, Odysseus *qua* narrator presents the εἴδωλον aspect that the

[488] Cf. *Il*. 5.449, 451, 23.104-107; *Od*. 4.796-839, 824, 835,11.83, 602-607, 20.355.

focaliser notices in 214-215. Odysseus wonders whether or not the shade that he sees is sent by Persephone: εἴδωλον τόδ᾽ ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια / ὤτρυν᾽, ὄφρ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω. This aspect of the shade, that it is an illusion created by Persephone, is brought to the fore in Odysseus' narration shortly after the Intermezzo:[489]

> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ψυχὰς μὲν ἀπεσκέδασ᾽ ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ
>
> ἁγνὴ Περσεφόνεια γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων

All of this adds to the suggestion that Odysseus *qua* narrator presents his ability to exercise aspect perception when he was in Hades.

Embedded focalisation then emphasises the living focaliser's capacity for conceptual aspect perception. But this only so far suggests that Odysseus notices conceptual and optical aspects from the dead's movements and flight. I will now argue that the inconsonant presentations of the shade's cognitive abilities represent Odysseus' capacity to use optical aspect perception. That is to say, Odysseus foregrounds some properties of the shade over others. I will start to show this by first examining the contradictory presentations of the wraith's ability to recognise and speak to the living after consuming the blood. The ghosts of Elpenor, Agamemnon, and Achilles can speak to and recognise Odysseus without needing to consume the offering, whilst Anticleia and most of the other dead, according to Teiresias (ὅν τινα μέν κεν ἐᾷς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων / αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν, ὁ δέ τοι νημερτὲς ἐνίψει), need to rely on the blood to engage meaningfully with the living.

Scholars have sought to explain why these inconsistencies appear in the epic. Macchioro attempted to explain these inconsistencies as an indication that there are two types of narrative in the *Nekyia*. He labels these A and B, the former referring to the so-called *original Nekyia* (specifically verses 51-234, 385-537, 627-635) and the latter referring to a

[489] *Od*. 11.385-386.

supposed Orphic interpolation (verses 235-327, 538-626).[490] According to Macchiaro, the reason the dead do not need to drink the blood in the Orphic version is that the shades are now images of the dead: "le anime appaiono come persone vive e non bevono il sangue."[491] But the problem with this interpretation is that Achilles and Elpenor are not said to drink the blood and yet they are characters in narrative A (the narrative where the dead do need to consume the offering). The narrative distinction which Macchiaro proposes is then hard to reconcile with the text.

Büchner suggested that the reason why some of the dead drink the blood while others do not is that one group approaches the offering while the other shades appear life-like because they are only seen when Odysseus peers further into the underworld.[492] This distinction, however, is not easy to make either since the topographical details of Odysseus' position are unclear. Likewise, the problem remains that Elpenor, who approaches Odysseus, is imagined to be outside Hades and yet can just as easily recognise and speak to Odysseus as those who supposedly lurk deeper in the underworld.

Clarke dismisses the contradictory presentations of the blood drinking as a minor inconsistency:[493]

> Elpenor is not the only wraith for whom the poet ignores the requirement of drinking the blood; and given the shifting character of the death lore of the whole Nekuia, there is no good reason to invent doctrinal subtleties to explain such minor inconsistencies as this.

By the term "shifting death-lore" Clarke appears to be alluding to his later argument in which he argues that conflicting folk-lore is responsible for the inconsistencies:[494]

[490] Macchioro 1928: 239-249, esp. 241-242.
[491] Macchioro 1928: 241.
[492] Büchner 1937: 111-112.
[493] Clarke 1999: 189 n 67.
[494] Clarke 1999: 226-227.

> It makes sense that the dead called up in necromancy should be seen as wispy and insubstantial images, while the dead during a journey into Hades itself are more substantial and more in control of their shadowy existence. This might also explain why the drinking of the sacrificial blood is remembered in some of Odysseus' meetings and forgotten in others, since that offering belongs in the story-pattern of a necromantic ritual rather than a journey inside the land of the dead.

But this again is problematic because there is no evidence in the *Nekyia* that suggests Odysseus moves from outside the gates of Hades to inside the underworld. There is also no indication that the ghost of Elpenor is any less "substantial" than the dead who are living in Hades, especially since he is imagined to sit opposite Odysseus and chat with him in 11.81-83.

Vermeule, Tsagarakis, and Heath have, as we discussed, suggested that Achilles' imbibing is omitted to avoid careless repetition.[495] This explanation seems the most tempting, since it immediately takes into account Odysseus' necessity to move the narrative along and to report to Alcinous the people whom Odysseus meets.[496] I agree that the narrative requirements are indeed an important factor to consider, but as I have said the narrative requirement is for Odysseus *qua* narrator to present what he interpreted when he was a focaliser in Hades. We shall see now that the lack of imbibing is Odysseus' interpretation of the shade's striking resemblance to the living person.

[495] Vermeule 1979: 29; Tsagarakis 2000: 108-109 n. 456; Heath 2005: 391-393. See also West (1997: 162) who says that the dead "have lost the power of human speech (except when poetic convenience requires them to make conversation)."
[496] Cf. *Od*. 11.370-372.

Teiresias, for instance, implies that the dead need the blood to recognise and speak to the living. Yet, we see that the ghost of Achilles is in fact capable of recognising and speaking to Odysseus by himself without consuming the blood:[497]

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
καὶ Πατροκλῆος καὶ ἀμύμονος Ἀντιλόχοιο
Αἴαντός θ᾽, ὃς ἄριστος ἔην εἶδός τε δέμας τε
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ᾽ ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.
ἔγνω δὲ ψυχή με ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
καί ῥ᾽ ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα…

This strange presentation of the shade seems to represent the focaliser's capacity for aspect perception. Odysseus claims to see the shade as being just as capable as his living self (482–6):[498]

σεῖο δ᾽, Ἀχιλλεῦ,
οὔ τις ἀνὴρ προπάροιθε μακάρτατος οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὀπίσσω.
πρὶν μὲν γάρ σε ζωὸν ἐτίομεν ἶσα θεοῖσιν
Ἀργεῖοι, νῦν αὖτε μέγα κρατέεις νεκύεσσιν
ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐών: τῷ μή τι θανὼν ἀκαχίζευ, Ἀχιλλεῦ.

According to Odysseus' speech, the ghost of Achilles appears to still have the same life-like characteristics: he wields power over the dead, just as he did in life. This likeness between the living Achilles and the ψυχή leads Odysseus *qua* narrator to *present* the shade *as* capable of recognising the living without the blood.

This embedded focalisation also explains why the ghost of Elpenor is said to recognise Odysseus by itself. The ghost appears before Odysseus and looks just like Elpenor

[497] *Od*. 11.467-472.
[498] On Achilles' honorific death and burial, see *Od*. 24.35-93. See also Edwards (1985). See also Schmiel (1987) for the opposing view of Achilles' honoured death.

(πρώτη δὲ ψυχὴ Ἐλπήνορος ἦλθεν ἑταίρου). Odysseus sees a likeness between the ghost and Elpenor himself. It is by noticing this aspect and the ghost's life-like characteristics that Odysseus proceeds to see the shade as having the same cognitive abilities as the living person. Indeed, he asks as though the ghost is able to understand and respond to his question:[499]

Ἐλπῆνορ, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα;

ἔφθης πεζὸς ἰὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ.'

It is after Odysseus notices the life-like aspect of the wraith that the narrator then says the ghost is able to recognise Odysseus and respond to his question without needing to consume the blood: [500]

ὣς ἐφάμην, ὁ δέ μ᾽ οἰμώξας ἠμείβετο μύθῳ

This so far provides us with an explanation as to why the dead appear seemingly cognitive at times and at others incapable. The narrator mentions that the ghosts can recognise the living without consuming the blood *when* Odysseus *qua* focaliser exercises his capacity for aspect perception and so sees a likeness between the shade and the living person.

Let us now explain how and why optical aspect perception can explain the seemingly inconsistent descriptions of the dead's movement in Hades. Achilles, Orion, Tityus, and Sisyphus can, as we have noted, do the same life-like movements in Hades as they could in the real world; whilst Agamemnon and Anticleia appear insubstantial and unable to engage with the living. Aristarchus and many subsequent scholars saw the life-like actions of the dead, the sinners' ability to suffer pain, as conflicting with the view that we see earlier in the

[499] *Od*. 11.57-58.

[500] *Od*. 11.59. In verse 82, Odysseus does actually say that he was guarding the blood with his sword while they were talking. It is tempting to suggest that this implies Elpenor did not drink from the blood, but the scene between Elpenor and Odysseus is the same as the ones we see between the hero and the ghosts of Achilles and Ajax: Odysseus *qua* narrator says that the ghosts do not need to drink the blood when the focaliser believes they are strikingly like the living person. The inconsonant presentations represent Odysseus' use of aspect perception.

book in which the shades are imagined to be immaterial.[501] Denys Page agreed with Aristarchus that these presentations of the shade signified compositional strata (my italics):[502]

> It seems indeed very improbable that one person should declare two *contrary* opinions about so important a matter as his own destiny after death; and that he who took so much trouble to keep within the law at the beginning should break it so openly at the end.

Page noted that these presentations are "foreign to Homeric tradition," and uses the example of the sinners having "substantial bodies" as evidence of this.[503]

Tsagarakis, however, takes the view that the two views of the dead - the fact they seem substantial and insubstantial - are not so mutually exclusive as Page suggests; rather they are superimposed onto one another:[504]

> The two views are, as we will see, not mutually exclusive. It does not help to find ingenious explanations for the presence of the "non-Homeric" view, suggesting among other things that the activities and the sufferings of the dead are merely "copies" of living conditions in the upper world. It is doubtful whether there is an "Eidolon-Vorstellung" in this view or whether there are hints at a "continuity of personality" which some see in the reaction of Aias, Achilles or Agamemnon. It is even more doubtful whether the "urge" of the ghosts to drink blood presupposes "drives" and "capabilities" of bodily beings that contradict the view of a shadowy existence. For the ghosts simply react to the blood (vv. 36f.) and it is only after they taste blood that they can display emotions. There is no contradiction. There is a new

[501] See Wilamowitz 1884: 199-226; Schwartz 1924: 319; Merkelbach 1969: 177, 189-190; Kirk 1985: 236-237. For a summary of this issue, see Heubeck 1990: 111 *ad Od*. 11.569-627.
[502] Page 1955: 25.
[503] Page 1955: 48 n. 6 (2).
[504] Tsagarakis 2000: 106-107.

view, best expounded by Anticleia's words, super imposed upon an older one, with some traces of its nature still showing through.

Clarke meanwhile tries to explain the difference between the substantial and insubstantial dead as a sign Odysseus' journey further into Hades: "It makes sense that the dead called up in necromancy should be seen as wispy and insubstantial images, while the dead during a journey into Hades itself are more substantial and more in control of their shadowy existence."[505]

When we apply aspect perception to this analysis, we begin to see that Odysseus' *qua* narrator presentations are what Wittgenstein calls optical aspects and are not in fact contradictory. That is to say, Odysseus, as a narrator, foregrounds the life-like movements of the shade and hides the deficient characteristics similar to the way in which Odysseus *qua* focaliser foregrounds the life-like movements of the shade when he wonders why she did not stay still for him. A good example of the narrator's capacity for optical aspect perception is when the ghost of Achilles runs away in 11.538-540:

> ὣς ἐφάμην, ψυχὴ δὲ ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
> φοίτα μακρὰ βιβᾶσα κατ᾽ ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
> γηθοσύνη ὅ οἱ υἱὸν ἔφην ἀριδείκετον εἶναι.

The shade runs away from Odysseus, joyful at the news of his son's achievements. This presentation foregrounds the life-like behaviour of the shade over deficient characteristics. Indeed, in the introduction to this chapter, we noted that in 36-43 the shade can look like, move, and display emotions, much like the living person, but also deficiently screech in an animal-like manner. Here however, the deficient properties are not brought into focus. Indeed, the narrator, by noticing optical aspects, foregrounds the life-like characteristics of

[505] Clarke 1999: 216-217.

the shade, and, in so doing puts out of focus the deficient characteristics. Furthermore, Achilles' speech and his ghost's life-like behaviour, its ability to display joyful emotions, lead Odysseus to *perceive* the shade *as* one that has the capacity for memory.

In contrast to some of the scholarly views we cited above, the presentations of the dead's movements are not actually conflicting: one of the intrinsic properties of the shade is that it has the same life-like characteristics as the living person. The dead who approach Odysseus in 41 do so wearing armour and carrying weapons; the εἴδωλον of Elpenor and the ψυχή of Anticleia appear to sit. In addition, the dead who appear to have the substantial ability to drink the blood, to run, hunt, and push objects up a hill, are not different from the shades who lack the ability to engage physically with Odysseus. After all, none of the shades make any attempt to engage with Odysseus. Odysseus simply reports what he sees. Indeed, he *sees* Anticleia sat down (μητρὸς τήνδ' ὁρόω ψυχὴν κατατεθνηυίης· ἡ δ' ἀκέουσ' ἧσται σχεδὸν αἵματος), he *perceives* Orion penning his prey (εἰσενόησα / θῆρας ὁμοῦ εἰλεῦντα), and Tityus having his organs plucked (καὶ Τιτυὸν εἶδον, Γαίης ἐρικυδέος υἱόν… γῦπε δέ μιν ἑκάτερθε παρημένω ἦπαρ ἔκειρον, / δέρτρον ἔσω δύνοντες). It is only when Odysseus engages with the dead first-hand that he learns of their lack of physical substance.[506] This again draws our attention back to the importance of aspect perception. Odysseus *sees* the dead's actions *as* substantial in movement, but it is when he engages with them that the illusion breaks.

Consider also the dead's capacity for speech without the blood. The dead gather around Minos and ask him questions:[507]

> ἔνθ' ἦ τοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
>
> χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν,

[506] Cf. *Od*. 11.207-222, 391-393.
[507] *Od*. 11.568-571.

ἥμενον, οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα,

ἥμενοι ἑσταότες τε κατ᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ.

Odysseus begins this narration by emphasising what it is that he *saw* (ἴδον). This suggests that the dead's capacity to sit, and to ask Minos questions is an interpretation that is based on sight. Furthermore, there is no indication that Odysseus hears the conversation between Minos and the dead. Indeed, the dead positioning themselves around him (μιν ἀμφί) leads Odysseus to the interpretation that "they asked him for δίκαι" (δίκας εἴροντο).[508] In other words, by noticing the optical aspect of the dead– the ability to sit around Minos – Odysseus credits the dead with cognitive abilities, such as the ability to speak. In so doing, he also hides the deficient characteristics of the shade, such as the fact they screech unintelligibly.

The self-description, continuity of identity, and aspect perception

So far, in this chapter, we have examined how aspect perception can explain away the inconsistencies surrounding the dead's activities: namely their ability and inability to speak and recognise the living, as well as to physically engage with their environment.
The purpose of this section is to look at conceptual aspect perception and how the ghosts and Odysseus go from viewing the dead in Hades as bodily beings to then seeing them as wraiths. In so doing, I look at Wittgenstein's role of internal relations in aspect perception.

I first examine the speeches of the dead and I explore how they present a continuity of identity. I argue that the shade's continuity of identity means that there is an internal relation between the ψυχή and the embodied person. This apparent similarity, I propose, leads the ghost of Elpenor to change aspect and describe itself as a cognitive wraith, at one moment,

[508] See Heubeck 1990: 111 *ad Od*. 11.570.

and then the mindless corpse at others. I then go on to look at how the continuity of identity leads the ghost of Anticleia to describe her lack of physical substance by drawing on images of a corpse's cremation and a shade's insubstantial flight.

I then explore Odysseus' decision *qua* narrator to name the ghosts in Hades as ψυχαί and εἴδωλα. I explore Clarke's and Cairns' interpretations as to what these names signify about the ghost in Hades, and propose a compromise between these scholars' interpretations. I argue, similarly to Clarke, that the ability to shift from one name to another signifies a shift in conceptions. However, I suggest that these shift in conceptions occur because the shade in Hades, as Cairns suggests, has some of the characteristics of the embodied person. I argue that aspect perception is the model that can settle these two scholars' conflicting suggestions.

When the ghost of Agamemnon speaks to Odysseus, he explains the nature of his death and journey to Hades (424-426):

ἡ δὲ κυνῶπις

νοσφίσατ᾽, οὐδέ μοι ἔτλη ἰόντι περ εἰς Ἀίδαο

χερσὶ κατ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐλέειν σύν τε στόμ᾽ ἐρεῖσαι.

In the previous chapter, we used this as one of many examples where the "I" of the dead person continues to exist in Hades. After all, the dative pronoun μοι attaches to the incorporeal wraith that travels to Hades (μοι ἔτλη ἰόντι περ εἰς Ἀίδαο) as well as to the bodily being that has eyes and a mouth (μοι… ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐλέειν σύν τε στόμ᾽ ἐρεῖσαι). Odysseus as well seems to suggest that the person's selfhood continues to exist in Hades when he speaks to the ghost of Epicaste in 277-280:

ἡ δ᾽ ἔβη εἰς Ἀίδαο πυλάρταο κρατεροῖο,

ἀψαμένη βρόχον αἰπὺν ἀφ᾽ ὑψηλοῖο μελάθρου,

ᾧ ἄχεϊ σχομένη· τῷ δ᾽ ἄλγεα κάλλιπ᾽ ὀπίσσω

πολλὰ μάλ᾽, ὅσσα τε μητρὸς Ἐρινύες ἐκτελέουσιν.

The subject of the ἔβη is the wraith that descends to Hades, but in the succeeding lines, the subject of the participles ἀψαμένη and σχομένη is the dead woman when she was alive. The continuity of identity is also made clear through the first-person narrations of the memory of the dead. Consider Achilles' mournful speech to Odysseus (498–503).

οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπαρωγὸς ὑπ᾽ αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο,
τοῖος ἐών, οἷός ποτ᾽ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ
πέφνον λαὸν ἄριστον, ἀμύνων Ἀργείοισιν·
εἰ τοιόσδ᾽ ἔλθοιμι μίνυνθά περ ἐς πατέρος δῶ·
τῷ κέ τεῳ στύξαιμι μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους,
οἳ κεῖνον βιόωνται ἐέργουσίν τ᾽ ἀπὸ τιμῆς.

Achilles confesses to Odysseus that he is not able to defend his father from certain threats. According to Stocking, Achilles admits that he is fundamentally deficient and ineffective.[509] There are aspects of Stocking's arguments which I contest. For example, at the start of the speech, Achilles is not so much admitting that he is a deficient version of himself when he starts to express concern about his father's welfare. Rather, he is confessing that he is in Hades and so cannot hope to bring help to his father (οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπαρωγὸς ὑπ᾽ αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο). Nevertheless, Stocking is, for the most part, right in saying that Achilles' speech reveals how he is a deficient semblance of his former self. Achilles wishes that he could approach the people who commit hubris against Peleus in the same manner (τοιόσδ᾽) as he did when he slaughtered the soldiers at Troy. This particular future less-vivid conditional sentence performs like a contrafactual construction: Achilles wishes to do harm to his father's attackers, but he realises this wish is impossible and the outcome unreachable. The phrase τοῖος ἐών, οἷός tells us that this ghost is still Achilles but without the effectiveness of being the helper that he was when he was alive. Indeed, Achilles confesses that he is not the person

[509] Stocking 2007: 67.

that he once was in the mortal world: τοῖος ἐών, οἷός ποτ᾽ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ / πέφνον λαὸν ἄριστον. Yet the subjects of the aorist πέφνον and στύξαιμι is the counterfactually revenant once-living corporeal being who could physically engage with the environment and interact with others In other words, despite admitting he is fundamentally deficient and lacking any ability to destroy his father's enemies, he still ties his "I" to the corporeal being who used to be able to fight.

The same identity relationship between the shade and the embodied person appears in Anticleia's description of her death to Odysseus (197–203):

> οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼν ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον·
> οὔτ᾽ ἐμέ γ᾽ ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐύσκοπος ἰοχέαιρα
> οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν,
> οὔτε τις οὖν μοι νοῦσος ἐπήλυθεν, ἥ τε μάλιστα
> τηκεδόνι στυγερῇ μελέων ἐξείλετο θυμόν·
> ἀλλά με σός τε πόθος σά τε μήδεα, φαίδιμ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
> σή τ᾽ ἀγανοφροσύνη μελιηδέα θυμὸν ἀπηύρα.

Anticleia here suggests that her selfhood is tied to the bodily being (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼν ὀλόμην καὶ πότμον ἐπέσπον). However, Anticleia attaches her "I" to her former corporeal self. The referent of ἐγὼν, ἐμέ and μοι is the living bodily being who did not die from disease or from painless arrows. This again establishes that the named individual in Hades is tied closely to the embodied being who is able to feel the effects of death. She proceeds to explain that it was longing for Odysseus which finally killed *her*. The passage resembles Achilles' mournful words to Odysseus. The με is both the living Anticleia who was once able to feel suffering (πόθος) and the deficient incorporeal shade who is deprived of the life faculty (θυμὸν ἀπηύρα). Here the "I" of the deceased is tied both to the corporeal being that has life-

like characteristics and to the incorporeal wraith. This continuity of identity is also evident from Elpenor's demand for a burial:[510]

σῆμά τέ μοι χεῦαι πολιῆς ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης,
ἀνδρὸς δυστήνοιο καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι.
ταῦτά τέ μοι τελέσαι πῆξαί τ᾽ ἐπὶ τύμβῳ ἐρετμόν,
τῷ καὶ ζωὸς ἔρεσσον ἐὼν μετ᾽ ἐμοῖς ἑτάροισιν

Here the dative of interest μοι suggests that Elpenor's "I" is both the wraith and the corpse. On the one hand, dative "for me" refers to the current speaking ghost Elpenor who makes the request. On the other hand, the dative of advantage seems to imply that the burial will also benefit the corpse. Let us remember that Elpenor's "I" is also attached to the living being which Elpenor once was (59–65):

ὣς ἐφάμην, ὁ δέ μ᾽ οἰμώξας ἠμείβετο μύθῳ:
'διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
ἦσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος.
Κίρκης δ᾽ ἐν μεγάρῳ καταλέγμενος οὐκ ἐνόησα
ἄψορρον καταβῆναι ἰὼν ἐς κλίμακα μακρήν,
ἀλλὰ καταντικρὺ τέγεος πέσον: ἐκ δέ μοι αὐχὴν
ἀστραγάλων ἐάγη, ψυχὴ δ᾽ Ἄϊδόσδε κατῆλθε.

The referent of με is Elpenor, the living breathing being who was intoxicated by wine. Elpenor describes his past self as the person who did not consider (ἐνόησα) the ladder as he went down from Circe's roof. He also is able to narrate how he fell from the roof as well (πέσον) and narrate the moments leading up to his neck-breaking death. Already we see that the "I" of the person is attached to the cognitive and substantial corporeal being moments

[510] *Od*. 11.75-78.

before his death. However, Elpenor's memory of the event suggests that his "I" is tied primarily to the embodied person.

What this so far suggests is that the ψυχή's selfhood is the same as the bodily being. Rohde and Cairns take similar passages as evidence that the person's selfhood continues in Hades as the ψυχή.[511] Clarke is of the stance that post-mortem existence is tied to the bodily being.[512] However, I suggest that the ghosts are simply aware the ψυχή has the same identity relationship as the bodily person, and that they are aware the ψυχή is not the same as their bodily self. This, I argue, is the same kind of acknowledgement that the observer has of Jastrow's duck-rabbit: he knows that the animals in the picture have the same shape, but the rabbit is different from the duck. This internal relation, their similarity in shapes, is responsible for the observer alternating between the duck aspect and the rabbit aspect.[513] Likewise, I suggest that the similarity in identity between the ψυχή and the embodied person leaves the ghost to alternate between talking about itself as the ψυχή and as the corpse. I argue then that when the shade speaks about its existence in Hades as a wraith, and then its existence as a corpse, they are changing aspect. Consider the last few words of Elpenor's narration in 11.64-65:

ἐκ δέ μοι αὐχὴν / ἀστραγάλων ἐάγη, ψυχὴ δ' Ἄϊδόσδε κατῆλθε.

The decision to present the ψυχή in the third person suggests that Elpenor knows that there is a distinction between his corporeal self and the wraith that lives in Hades, in the same way that we know that rabbits are distinct from ducks when we look at Jastrow's picture. Indeed, the ψυχή, being syntactically tied to αὐχήν, then suggests that Elpenor sees the wraith as a part of him that goes to Hades, but it is not himself that goes to the otherworld. By seeing the wraith as something separate from his sense of selfhood, Elpenor emphasises that his "I"

[511] Cf. Rohde 1925: 6, 44 n. 3; Cairns 2003: 60-61, 2014: §23.
[512] See Clarke 1999: 137, 180, 190, 198.
[513] Cf. PPF §§130-131, 137, 216, 247.

belongs to the bodily stuff that has a neck and vertebrae which he can feel are broken. This means that in verse 75, Elpenor realises that his "I" as a wraith is the same as his bodily self, but he appreciates that the ψυχή and corporeal person are distinct. By making this distinction, Elpenor is the same as the observer who knows that the duck and the rabbit have the same shape in Jastrow's picture, but are distinct beings.

Elpenor's distinction between the body and the ψυχή, then, invites us to see a change of aspect when the ghost speaks about itself. Consider then the way the ghost of Elpenor begs Odysseus to remember him and not to let his corpse be unburied:[514]

> ἔνθα σ᾽ ἔπειτα, ἄναξ, κέλομαι μνήσασθαι ἐμεῖο.
> μή μ᾽ ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν
> νοσφισθείς.

The subject of κέλομαι is the ψυχή, the being who does the imploring. The ghost's "I" suddenly shifts and the referent of με is the corpse awaiting burial (μή μ᾽ ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον). This suggests that there is an evident change of aspect when Elpenor attaches his "I" to the ghost and to the corpse. Clarke examines Elpenor's role at narrating his own death and takes verses 64-65 and 71-72 as signs that the shade's "I" is attached to the undivided bodily man (my italics):[515]

> Here the 'I' in the wraith's mouth attaches to his bodily substance; so that by following this thread, when he narrates *the actual death he speaks of the wraith in the third person*…Again, when he demands a funeral the 'I' of the speech is the corpse, who must here be completely distinct from the wraith which is speaking:

[514] *Od*. 11.71-73.
[515] Clarke 1999:198.

Clarke is right to acknowledge the importance of the third person use of ψυχή in Elpenor's narration. But the problem is that it does not suggest that the "I" of the dead person is attached wholly to the bodily being. Rather there is alternation between the "I" of the shade that is a ψυχή and the "I" of the corpse. By referring to the ψυχή in the third person, Elpenor is showing an awareness that the wraith descends to Hades. But the ghost then quickly proceeds to talk about itself as the wraith:[516]

> νῦν δέ σε τῶν ὄπιθεν γουνάζομαι, οὐ παρεόντων,
>
> πρός τ᾽ ἀλόχου καὶ πατρός, ὅ σ᾽ ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα,
>
> Τηλεμάχου θ᾽, ὃν μοῦνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔλειπες·
>
> οἶδα γὰρ ὡς ἐνθένδε κιὼν δόμου ἐξ Ἀίδαο
>
> νῆσον ἐς Αἰαίην σχήσεις ἐυεργέα νῆα

Indeed, in verse 69, the subject of οἶδα is the resident in Hades, the place which Odysseus will eventually leave (κιὼν δόμου ἐξ Ἀίδαο). Here the specific subject of this verb is the ψυχή, not necessarily the bodily being, since the Elpenor shows an awareness that it is indeed the ψυχή that leaves the body to reside in Hades in verse 65. This means that there is an evident shift in aspect between Elpenor identifying himself as the wraith to then as the corpse.

By having the same sense of selfhood as the embodied person, we can see that the ghosts can alternate between speaking about themselves as wraiths and corpses. This internal relation, we shall argue, explains why the ghost of Anticleia uses the corpse's cremation and the wraith's flight to describe the ghost's lack of substance:[517]

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[516] *Od*. 11.66-70.
[517] *Od*. 11.217-222.

οὔ τί σε Περσεφόνεια Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἀπαφίσκει,

ἀλλ᾽ αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν·

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,

ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο

δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ᾽ ὀστέα θυμός,

ψυχὴ δ᾽ ἠύτ᾽ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

Clarke takes issue with this passage, arguing that it places an unusual emphasis on the role of cremation as the cause for the dead person's lack of physical substance. Clarke, as a result, argues that the γάρ is digressive, and that verse 222 offers a direct answer to the statement in 218.[518] For Clarke, the αὕτη is retrospective and refers to the physically insubstantial disappearance that Odysseus has witnessed moments before his speech.[519] This alternative interpretation, however, presents more problems than it does solutions. As Cairns mentions, 11.222 cannot be resumptive of 218 because 222 is syntactically linked to verse 220 through the co-ordinating particles μέν… δέ:[520]

> This will not work. It is true that αὕτη is not wholly prospective — it is indeed the δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν that one cannot embrace a dweller in Hades, but the reason why is that shades are incorporeal: the γάρ-clause supplies this reason; and the clause beginning ψυχὴ δ᾽ in 222 cannot be resumptive, for this leaves τὰ μέν in 220 entirely out of account. We need the traditional interpretation, in which the γάρ-clause, explaining why one cannot embrace a shade, draws a contrast between the cremation of the body and the flight of the ψυχή to Hades.

[518] See Chapter One, pages 89-91.
[519] Clarke 1999: 203-205.
[520] Cairns 2003: 55-56.

Cairns is right that what he calls the "traditional interpretation" of this passage makes best sense of the Greek. Indeed, this particular passage does emphasise that the wraith is physically insubstantial because it is incorporeal. This is emphasised through the co-ordinating particles μέν… δέ. On the one hand (μέν), nothing of the corporeal being exists: the cremation destroys the body.[521] On the other hand (δ'), the wraith is incorporeal because the ψυχὴ has left the body and now is in a state of floating in Hades. Incorporeality and the lack of a working unity of bodily elements are at the heart of this passage. However, the internal relation between the selfhood of the bodily being and the shade resolves Clarke's concern without changing our reading of the Greek. By having the same identity as the bodily being, the shade is able, as we have seen with Elpenor, to see itself, at one moment, as a corpse, and then at another as the ψυχή. This means that, when the ghost needs to describe its own state of being, it also relies on the corpse aspect and the ψυχή aspect to explain why the shade is incorporeal. In short, the shade uses the image of the cremated corpse as a conceptual aspect to explain the shade's lack of substance.

It is the shade's capacity to exercise aspect perception that also leads Odysseus *qua* narrator to present the ghost as the dead man himself. Indeed, note that the ghost of Anticleia explains her lack of substance by drawing on imagery from the source domain, the state of the bones, flesh, and sinews (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν).[522] This leads Odysseus to notice the ghost of Agamemnon as the dead man himself when the shade attempts to embrace him (392–4):

> πιτνὰς εἰς ἐμὲ χεῖρας, ὀρέξασθαι μενεαίνων·
> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ οἱ ἔτ᾽ ἦν ἴς ἔμπεδος οὐδέ τι κῖκυς,
> οἵη περ πάρος ἔσκεν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσι.

[521] On Homeric cremation, see *Il*. 23.238-240; *Od*.2 4.71-72. See also *Il*. 7.334, 9.456; Mylonas 1948: 63. Burkert 1985: 51; Vernant 1991: 69. Cf. *FGrHist* 10 F 10. On archaeological evidence for cremation and funerals, see Kurtz and Boardman 1971: 99 and Alexandridou 2016. See also Laser 1983: S3.
[522] On the sinews, see Bolens 2000: 24-25.

As Clarke mentions,[523] the word πάρος suggests that Odysseus *qua* narrator presents the ghost as the person who once had the sinewy stuff of strength, but it is now devoid of all form of physical substance. Here we see that the ghost's selfhood is attached to the being who had the corporeal properties, but it is simultaneously incorporeal since it lacks the stuff of physical substance.

What we have argued so far is that the continuity of identity leads shades to make a number of internal relations and, consequently, alternate between aspects in their self-description. The shade of Elpenor, for instance, changes from attaching its "I" to the cognitive ψυχή who has the capacity to speak and remember Odysseus, to the mindless corpse that remains on Aeaea. This continuity of identity as well is the reason that Anticleia presents the shade as a corpse that needs a cremation but subsequently as a shade that leads an insubstantial existence in Hades.

Let us now move onto the way in which Odysseus *qua* narrator presents the shade in Hades when he refers to them as ψυχαί, εἴδωλα, and νεκύες. Clarke sees these the names for the dead as an indication that there are shifting conceptions in Homer about what exists in Hades,[524] whereas Cairns contests the view that we should see these names as an indication that the conceptions shift. All of these phrases to describe the dead are compatible, he says, with the conception that the post mortem resident in Hades is a ψυχή.[525]

I argue that there is a compromise between Clarke's and Cairn's interpretations. Like Cairns, I suggest that Odysseus and the dead are aware that the post-mortem survivor is a ψυχή that has the characteristics of the εἴδωλον and νέκυς. But I suggest, similarly to Clarke, that εἴδωλον and νέκυς become alternative and conflicting conceptions that attempt to make sense of the wraith. What I aim to show is that aspect perception is the model that allows

[523] Clarke 1999: 195.
[524] Clarke 1999: 191 - 195.
[525] Cairns 2003: 63 = 2014 §28.

Odysseus and the dead to go from seeing the ghosts in Hades as ψυχαί to then as εἴδωλα and νεκύες. Let us start by looking at the alternative readings that Clarke and Cairns provide of 11.36-43:

> …αἱ δ᾽ ἀγέροντο
>
> ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων.
>
> νύμφαι τ᾽ ἠίθεοί τε πολύτλητοί τε γέροντες
>
> παρθενικαί τ᾽ ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι,
>
> πολλοὶ δ᾽ οὐτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,
>
> ἄνδρες ἀρηίφατοι βεβροτωμένα τεύχε᾽ ἔχοντες:
>
> οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
>
> θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ: ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ἥρει.

Clarke points out that, in verses 36-37, the ghosts "are literally 'wraiths of dead corpses'" but from 38-41 "immediately the image shifts… Now they are the people themselves—girls, youths, old men, children, and warriors."[526] Cairns takes on the opposing reading of this passage:[527]

> The inextricable closeness of the two supposed conceptions (inhabitants of Hades as ψυχαί and νεκύες) is illustrated by the very phrase ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων. These ψυχαὶ are then immediately identified with the individuals whose existence they continue, young men and women, old men, girls, and warriors both wearing their blood-stained armour and bearing the wounds of which they died… These are ψυχαί, but they have the appearance of the corpses that were cremated and, somehow, sufficient corporeality to wear armour.

[526] Clarke 1999: 191.
[527] Cairns 2003: 62 = 2014 §§24-25.

This along with other evidence (see below) leads Cairns to arrive at his conclusion: [528]

> If a ψυχή *qua* ψυχή can wear clothes and armour, exhibit wounds and scars, perceive, converse, and show emotion, then there is no reason to assume that, when the dead in Hades are described as νέκυες/νεκροί, given corporeal existence, and depicted perceiving, conversing, and showing emotion, they are anything other than ψυχαί. They are, after all, εἴδωλα: very convincing εἴδωλα indeed.

I agree with Cairns in so far as verses 38-41 are appositional to verses 36-37 and that the characteristics of the bodily dead are characteristics of the ψυχαί. That being said, however, the construction ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων does not determine that the names νέκυες/νεκροί and ψυχαί are always appositional. We might compare this to Wittgenstein's explanation of aspect perception (my italics) in *PPF* §128:

> I'm shown a picture-rabbit and asked what it is; I say "It's a rabbit". Not "Now it's a rabbit". I'm reporting my perception. - *I'm shown the duck–rabbit and asked what it is; I may say "It's a duck-rabbit".* But I may also react to the question quite differently. - The answer that it is a duck–rabbit is again the report of a perception; the answer "Now it's a rabbit" is not. Had I replied "It's a rabbit", the ambiguity would have escaped me, and I would have been reporting my perception.

Wittgenstein points out that if we were to see Jastrow's picture as "duck-rabbit" we would still be reporting a perception. Odysseus is similar to the observer in this scenario. By using the construction ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων, Odysseus is aware that the ghost and the corpse have the same characteristics, in just the same way that the observer realises the image has the same shape as the duck and the rabbit and hence calls it ambiguously a duck-rabbit.

[528] Cairns 2003: 63 = 2014 §28.

But this does not necessarily mean that the νεκύες/ νεκροί and ψυχαί present the same conception; both can present different aspects. Consider Wittgenstein's further comment in *PPF* §§130-131:

> The expression of a change of aspect is an expression of a *new* perception and, at the same time, an expression of an unchanged perception. I suddenly see the solution of a puzzle-picture. Where there were previously branches, now there is a human figure. My visual impression has changed, and now I recognize that it has not only shape and colour, but also a quite particular 'organization'. —— My visual impression has changed a what was it like before; what is it like now? —— If I represent it by means of an exact copy – and isn't that a good representation of it? – no change shows up.

By this understanding, someone who first notices the duck-rabbit aspect as a perception is likely to change aspect and see Jastrow's picture as a rabbit or as a duck. The image may not have changed, but still the observer sees it differently. This change of aspect, or conception, is evident in Odysseus' narration. Indeed, Odysseus goes from attributing the life-like and witless characteristics to the shade to then seeing ψυχαί as lively and the νεκύες as deficient.

Odysseus *qua* narrator proceeds to present the shade similarly to the primary narrator: the ψυχή is a being that can perform the same cognitive activities as the living person.[529]. When the shade appears life-like, Odysseus describes it as a wraith, much as the primary narrator does. Notice that the primary narrator attributes life-like characteristics to the wraith in *Odyssey* 24. The shade of Agamemnon can, for instance, recognise the ghost of

[529] Interesting to note is Alcinous' praise to Odysseus. The king says that Odysseus is like that of a bard. the simile ὡς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς creates a conceptual divide between Odysseus' narration and the descriptions from the primary narrator: Odysseus has told his story skilfully *like* the narrator, but it is not the same as what we might expect from the primary narrator's descriptions. On Odysseus' likeness to the primary narrator, see *Od*. 17.518-521, 21.406-409. See also Thalmann 1984: 170-173. On Homeric Narration, see Peradotto 1990; Richardson 1990. On other useful discussions of bardic narration in the *Odyssey*, see Austin 1975 and Biles 2003.

Amphimedon: ἔγνω δὲ ψυχὴ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο / παῖδα φίλον Μελανῆος (102–3). He can also speak to it: τὸν προτέρη ψυχὴ προσεφώνεεν Ἀτρεΐδαο (105). The ψυχή of Patroclus also has all of the life-like characteristics of the living Patroclus (*Il*. 23.65–7):

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ᾽ ἐϊκυῖα
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵματα ἕστο.

Here we see that Odysseus' focalisation *qua* narrator involves imagery similar to the primary narrator's descriptions. The ghost of Agamemnon, for instance, approaches Odysseus in a state of grief (11.387–8): ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο / ἀχνυμένη. The ψυχή of Achilles expresses emotions and can recognise and speak to Odysseus:[530]

ἔγνω δὲ ψυχή με ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
καί ῥ᾽ ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·

And his departure, his running, and his joyful reactions are all attributed to the ψυχή:[531]

ὣς ἐφάμην, ψυχὴ δὲ ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
φοίτα μακρὰ βιβᾶσα κατ᾽ ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
γηθοσύνη ὅ οἱ υἱὸν ἔφην ἀριδείκετον εἶναι.

Likewise, those who approach Odysseus and can ask him questions without the mention of imbibing are ψυχαί: ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων ἔστασαν ἀχνύμεναι εἴροντο δὲ κήδε᾽ ἑκάστη.[532] Ajax who is angry, the narrator says, is a ψυχή: οἵη δ᾽ Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο / νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης.[533]

By contrast, the νεκύες and νεκροί are terms that the secondary narrator uses to present the dead when they appear inhuman or incompetent.

[530] *Od*. 11.471-472.
[531] *Od*. 11.538-540.
[532] *Od*. 11.541-542.
[533] *Od*. 11.543-544.

Indeed, the dead who are devoid of μένος (οὐδ᾽ εἴων νεκύων ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα /αἵματος ἆσσον ἴμεν,) and who sound like birds (ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κλαγγὴ νεκύων ἦν οἰωνῶν ὥς) are νεκύες.[534] Similarly, the dead who screech around Odysseus at the end of the *Nekyia* are νεκροί (ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπὶ ἔθνε᾽ ἀγείρετο μυρία νεκρῶν / ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ).[535] So too, Achilles tells us, the νεκροί are mindless (ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ / ἀφραδέες ναίουσι).[536] Odysseus also calls the dead who are overpowered νεκύες when he says that Achilles rules over the shades: νῦν αὖτε μέγα κρατέεις νεκύεσσιν.[537] Likewise, Achilles uses νεκύες derogatorily to refer to the dead who are supplicants:[538]

> ‘μὴ δή μοι θάνατόν γε παραύδα, φαίδιμ᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ.
> βουλοίμην κ᾽ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ,
> ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
> <u>ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν</u>.

Minos also is said to show his power over the νεκύες in 568-571:

> ἔνθ᾽ ἦ τοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
> χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα <u>νέκυσσιν,</u>
> ἥμενον, οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα,
> ἥμενοι ἑσταότες τε κατ᾽ εὐρυπυλὲς Ἄϊδος δῶ.

Aspect perception explains why these names should represent conflicting conceptions of the shade. Wittgenstein says that when we notice an aspect, the stimulus remains the same but we see it differently.[539] Here the νεκύες and νεκροί are the same as the ψυχαί: the former in 11.569-570 ask questions (<u>νέκυσσιν,</u> / ἥμενον, οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα) in just the same way as the ψυχαί ask about the fate of their loved ones to Odysseus (ψυχαὶ νεκύων

[534] Cf. *Od*. 11.49-50 and 605. On ἀμενηνὰ being α-privative of μένος, see: Risch 1974: 100.
[535] *Od*. 11.632-633.
[536] *Od*. 11.475-476.
[537] *Od*. 11.485.
[538] *Od*. 11.488-491.
[539] PPF §113.

κατατεθνηώτων ἔστασαν ἀχνύμεναι εἴροντο δὲ κήδε᾽ ἑκάστη). Likewise, the dead who screech at Odysseus in 632-633 (ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπὶ ἔθνε᾽ ἀγείρετο μυρία νεκρῶν / ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ) are the same as the ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων who come out of Erebus and screech around the blood (οἳ πολλοὶ περὶ βόθρον ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ). But despite these similarities, Odysseus and the characters see the shades not as life-like replica of the living person, but as νεκύες who are characterised as deficient beings. Consider, for instance, Achilles' speech in 11.475-476:

> πῶς ἔτλης Ἄϊδόσδε κατελθέμεν, ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ
>
> ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων;

The ghosts in Hades are, in one way, mindless (νεκροὶ / ἀφραδέες ναίουσι), but in another way they are images of the dead (βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων). Cairns argues for a metaphorical reading of this passage in which the νεκροὶ and εἴδωλα are interchangeable ways of describing the ψυχή:[540]

> This ψυχή has (at least some of) the properties of the living man, and is able to talk about itself as a member of the class that can be called indifferently νεκροὶ and εἴδωλα.

This reading, however, is problematic. It is true that the ψυχή has the properties of the living Achilles, as Cairns observes from the overture to Achilles' speech: ἔγνω δὲ ψυχή με ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο / καί ῥ᾽ ὀλοφυρομένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα. But the ψυχή of Achilles is not talking "about itself as a member of the class that can be called indifferently νεκροὶ and εἴδωλα." On the contrary, at no point does Achilles suggest *he* is one of the mindless dead.

Clarke and Cairns have fundamentally opposing readings of this passage. The former argues that Achilles' speech is just one of many instances in which the conceptions of the

[540] Cairns 2003: 63 = 2014: §27.

survivor of Hades change within a single line: "A single sentence can slip from one articulation to the other."[541] By looking at this passage through the lens of aspect perception, the passage begins to make more sense and we begin to see that there is a compromise between Cairns' and Clarke's readings. Cairns is fundamentally right when he says that the "ψυχή has (at least some of) the properties of the living man." Indeed, the ψυχή in Hades is *both* life-like and mentally deficient. The shades in verses 36-43 are life-like in that they show emotions and wear armour, but they are deficient of human speech since they screech. Likewise, the ghost of Anticleia is, by all accounts, like the living person except that she lacks the capacity to speak and is unable to recognise her son. It is not unreasonable for Cairns to suggest that these names for the dead, νεκροί and εἴδωλα, attempt to describe the wraith that has incompatible characteristics. But this does not preclude us from thinking that the two names represent a shift from "one articulation to the other."

We might compare this description from Achilles to Odysseus' encounter with the shade of Anticleia when she appears both insubstantial and witless. As we have said earlier, when the ghost appears insubstantial, she appears both deficient and life-like, she lacks materiality but her life-like appearance and movements convince Odysseus that what he has seen is the dead woman herself. When he has this encounter, he changes aspects and sees her as possibly the bodily being, or as an εἴδωλον. These two conceptions rival each other, but they are an effort to articulate the insubstantial ψυχή that flies away from Odysseus. We might say that Achilles is doing the same in this passage. Indeed, as we just said above, the shades appear life-like, but at the same time mentally deficient, screeching and unable to communicate or recognise the living. Achilles seems to be like Odysseus in that he is attempting to describe the wraith that has incompatible characteristics. This indicates that Achilles, like Odysseus in 213-215, shifts between calling the wraith νεκροί and εἴδωλα, in

[541] Clarke 1999: 192.

the same way that Odysseus wonders if his deficient mother is the dead woman herself or an εἴδωλον. Odysseus as we have argued uses aspect perception when he reaches for this interpretation, and changes aspects when he refers to the ghost as his mother and then as an εἴδωλον. The similarities between Odysseus and Achilles' efforts to articulate the shade indicate that Achilles is also changing aspects when he describes the ghosts as νεκροὶ and εἴδωλα.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to show how aspect perception is at the heart of Odysseus' narration of the dead in the *Nekyia*. We have established this in a number of ways.

In the first section, we explored how Odysseus narrates the *Nekyia* through his limited capacity of sight. We argued that all of the presentations of the dead are interpretations that are based on what Odysseus sees as a focaliser. We were able to show that, as a focaliser, Odysseus exercises his capacity for aspect perception to make sense of the dead. By reporting what the focaliser sees, the narrator's conflicting presentations of the shade as witless and cognitive, and as substantial and insubstantial are all representations of the focaliser's change of aspect.

In the second section, we examined the ghosts' selfhood in the *Nekyia*. We argued that the ψυχή has the same selfhood as the embodied person. I suggested that this made the shade's selfhood comparable to Jastrow's duck-rabbit which have the same shapes, but are entirely different animals. I argued that the ghosts were aware that the ψυχή is, likewise, different from the embodied person. I suggested that the similarity between the shape of the duck and the rabbit encourages the observer of Jastrow's image to change aspects and see the picture as that of a duck, at one moment, and then that of a rabbit at others. I argued that, by

the ψυχή having the same "I" as the embodied person, the ghost can alternate between talking about itself as a wraith and as a corpse. In this section, I also examined the role of aspect perception for the names of the dead. I argued that Odysseus' ability to go from describing the ghosts as ψυχαὶ νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων to then as ψυχαί and νέκυες/νεκροί is the same as the observer of Jastrow's duck-rabbit, who first sees the picture as a duck-rabbit but then alternates between thinking of it as a duck and then as a rabbit. By applying aspect perception to the examination of the dead, I have attempted to resolve an interpretative issue between Clarke and Cairns as to how to make sense of the many diverse names of the dead. Moreover, by applying this model, I have attempted to resolve the interpretative difficulties of Homer's presentation of the ghosts in the *Nekyia*.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out to address two research questions. First, what is it within Homeric epic that makes the dead so fundamentally ambiguous? Second, if the characters and primary narrator view the dead differently, what causes these different metaphorical descriptions to come to the fore?

My original contribution in this thesis has been to answer these questions. I have, throughout this thesis, maintained that there is a model which can disambiguate the diverse presentations of the dead and that can also utilise metaphor theory. Many of the distinct presentations of the dead are, I have proposed, formed from the primary narrator's and characters' capacity to exercise aspect perception. We have come to realise that the heterogenous presentations of the dead are not the result of compositional strata, poetic license, or even simply metaphorical models. Rather, the many images of the dead are all products of a perceptual and cognitive phenomenon which both the primary and secondary focalisers use to present and make sense of the dead in Hades.

In the introduction, I outlined my basic argument and my original contribution to the study of the dead in Homeric epic. I argued that a new model of perception, aspect perception, can disambiguate the seeming inconsistencies of the dead's actions and names. I established my original contribution by setting my argument against Douglas Cairns' metaphorical approach. His application of metaphor theory, I suggested, failed to consider the epistemological differences between the primary narrator's and secondary focalisers' conceptions of the dead. I argued that aspect perception is a model that makes use of the metaphorical and epistemologically distinct presentations of the wraith. I began this methodological part of my discussion by first summarising Wittgenstein's model. I then explained how aspect perception could be applied to the study of metaphor theory and mapping. I then gave several examples where the dead in Homer were similar to objects that

Wittgenstein said could be seen as one thing and then as another. I then went on also to explain why the analyst explanation for the conflicting presentations of the dead could not work. Indeed, I argued that there was a folk-model, throughout the Homeric tradition, in which the dead are presented diversely by the primary narrator and characters. This discussion meant we were open to explore the extent to which aspect perception could explain away these contradictory presentations.

Before I examined the role of aspect perception in my thesis, I needed to establish that the premise of my argument was sound: that the diverse presentations of the ghost are efforts to articulate the folk-theory THE SHADES ARE DEFICIENT REPLICAS OF THE LIVING PERSON. The purpose of Chapter One was to provide further support for this basic premise. I argued that many of the diverse presentations of death all articulated a coherent folk-theory: DEATH IS A JOURNEY TO HADES. I began by demonstrating that there was a coherent sequence of events surrounding death. This comprised three stages: dying, death, and post-mortem existence. Two metaphoric presentations in particular – DEATH AS SEIZING and DEATH AS A FATED MOMENT - represented the stage at which someone dies. Both of these presentations, I argued, were not conflicting products of compositional strata, because the line-by-line articulation of this salient event meant that the two presentations are indistinguishable. I suggested that death *qua* fate and death *qua* seizing are various articulations of a metaphoric principle: SALIENT EVENTS ARE ENCOUNTERS. Similarly, I suggested that the ψυχή as an entity that can be destroyed adhered to the conception that DEATH IS A JOURNEY TO HADES. To show this, I argued that the presentations of the ψυχή's dissolution were brittle object metaphors that highlighted one aspect of the wraith's departure to Hades: the moment that the ψυχή ceases to function in the Homeric man when it departs. I did this by suggesting that the MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT metaphor was present when we understood ψυχή *qua* breath as a metonym for life

lost and ψυχή *qua* life as an ontological metaphor. This discussion was particularly useful for my argument in the following chapter. After all, the basic premise of the second chapter's argument is that various presentations that the wraith, in Homer, are efforts to articulate the same conception: that the ghost in Hades has the same selfhood as the living person and is a deficient replica of the living person.

Chapter Two concentrated on how the primary narrator and secondary characters use aspect perception as a mapping device when describing the entity that travels to Hades. I suggested that the internal relation between the dead man's and the ψυχή's characteristics and selfhood induced the characters to use conceptual metaphors to describe the wraith's state of being. I began by looking at the folk-theory THE DEFICIENT SHADE HAS THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AND SELFHOOD AS THE LIVING PERSON. In the following section, I argued that the internal relation between the living and the shade's selfhood invites characters to conceptualise the wraith as the dead man deprived of life-faculties. This aspect of the discussion proved most useful for the analysis I provided in Chapter Three and Four in which I explored how the dead in Hades have the same selfhood as the living person. In the third section, I examined how the ghost's insubstantial departure led Peleus to imagine the post-mortem survivor as a θυμός. In the section after that, I posited that the flight of the shade encourages Theoclymenus to see a likeness between the ψυχή as an εἴδωλον. In the final section, I examined the way in which the primary narrator uses the simile to compare the dead's screeching to that of bats. I suggested that this simile underlies that the primary narrator uses aspect perception to present that shade. I did this by suggesting that the primary narrator simply notices an internal relation between the screeching of the shade and the screeching of the bats. I argued against Vermeule and Cairns that this particular simile does not suggest Homer was influenced by an artistic tradition in which the ψυχή is imagined to be winged. Rather, I argued that the simile simply makes explicit a similar characteristic

between these animals and the wraiths. The overall discussion in chapter two provided us with a premise for one of the arguments in chapters three and four: namely that both the primary and secondary narrators utilise aspect perception when attempting to make sense of the dead.

In the third chapter of this thesis, I analysed the presentation of the shade when it inhabits Hades. Specifically, I examined *Iliad* 23's presentation of the ghost of Patroclus and Achilles' reactions to the shade. My aim in this chapter was to show how the shade's life-like and deficient induce the primary narrator and secondary focalisers to notice aspects and thereby form conceptualisations of the inhabitant of Hades. I argued that, overall, Homer was not concerned with the dreamer's cognitive state and that Achilles is imagined as having fundamentally the same cognitive abilities as a person that is awake. This discussion helped us to maintain the overall thesis argument that the shade's characteristics are responsible for these ambiguities. In the second section, I suggested that characters, unlike the primary narrator, preconceive the shade in Hades to be witless. I then suggested that the inhuman characteristics of the ghost of Patroclus highlights an internal relation between the shade and animals that seem mentally deficient. This internal relation, I argued, meant that Achilles relies on the preconception of mindlessness to make sense of these inhuman traits of the ghost. In the third section, I argued against the school of thought that suggests the inconsistencies of the dead can be explained by the symbolic importance of burial rites. I argued that characters and the primary narrator do not see a difference between the buried and unburied dead in terms of ability. This helped establish that aspect perception is the preferred model to explain away these conflicting presentations.

In the final section of this chapter, I explored the ways in which the inhabitant describes itself contradictorily as a shade and as a corpse. I argued that the ghost ability to fluctuate between talking about itself as a corpse and as a wraith is an exercise of aspect

perception. I maintained that the shade has the same selfhood as the embodied person. This internal relation, meant that the shade and can indeterminately talk about itself, at one moment as the wraith and, at the other moment, as the corpse. This part of the discussion also provided a useful premise for my discussion in Chapter Four: that the ghosts of Elpenor, Achilles, and Anticleia use various contradictory images of the corpse and the wraith to describe the inhabitant of Hades' state of being.

The fourth and final chapter examined exclusively the *Nekyia*'s presentation of the dead. I began by first drawing a comparison between the way in which Odysseus sees the dead and the way in which the observer looks at Wittgenstein's double cross. I argued that both are able to acknowledge that the shade has conflicting characteristics. In the following section, I examined how these conflicting characteristics led Odysseus, as a focaliser, to foreground the life-like and deficient characteristics of the dead. I then went on to argue that Odysseus, as a narrator, uses embedded focalisation to present his views of the dead. As such, he presents the shade inconsistently as life-like and deficient because the focaliser changes aspect and foregrounds, at times, the life-like characteristics of the shade and, at other times, the deficient characteristics.

In the second section, I examined the wraith's selfhood and the names that the secondary narrator assigns to the dead. I examined examples from Elpenor's speech in which the shade attaches its "I", at one moment, to the corpse and, at another moment, to the immaterial wraith. This fluctuation is, I argued, a characteristic of aspect perception. I suggested that there is a similarity between Jastrow's picture and the shade's selfhood. For the former, the duck and the rabbit have the same shapes and concaves and, for the latter, the wraith and the embodied person share the same sense of selfhood. It is this similarity of shapes, this internal relation, that leads the observer to see the image, at one moment, as a duck and, at another moment, as a rabbit. The similarities between Jastrow's picture and the

selfhood of the shade led me then to argue and conclude that the ghost changes aspect when it describes itself as a wraith and as a corpse.

I also proposed that aspect perception provides a compromise to Clarke's and Cairn's interpretations of the dead. Like Cairns, I argued that Odysseus does see the characteristics of the bodily being as characteristics of the ψυχή. I compared this perception to Wittgenstein's observer of Jastrow's duck rabbit, who sees the images as a duck-rabbit. Both Odysseus and the observer, I argued, see that the two have the same characteristics. However, I suggested, like Clarke, that the names for the dead, νεκύες and νεκροί, indicate that the characters, Odysseus and the ghosts, shift their conceptions of the dead. I argued that the change of name signifies what Wittgenstein calls a change of aspect. Odysseus and the dead still see that νεκύες and νεκροί and similar to the ψυχαί, but they see them differently. Indeed, the νεκύες and νεκροί are the names assigned to the dead who are more incapable and witless.

We have placed a considerable amount of importance on the role of aspect perception to the study of the dead. But Wittgenstein's model also has wider implications for how we make sense of Homeric epic.

First, our argument indicates that this analytic and cognitive theory can provide analysts with the tools to look for coherency in Homeric epic. After all, aspect perception invites us to examine how later poets attempted to form coherent presentations. For example, we have noted that the internal relation in aspect perception is responsible for the primary narrator presenting the dead diversely. Our analysis of this perceptual phenomenon, then, suggests that the poets were acting out of cognitive necessity when they presented the dead in diverse ways. This implies that later poets were prone to describing the dead contradictorily because they noticed different constituent parts of Homer's description of the ψυχαί. The implication of this study is that cognitive and phenomenological approaches can explain how later poets arrived at different interpretations of the Homeric text. This means that further

research needs to be done on how cognitive theories can disambiguate conflicting descriptions that were the product of compositional strata. Homeric compositionality has not been the focus of this thesis and we have been unable to explore this issue in further detail. Nevertheless, the application of aspect perception invites us to see how cognitive theory can explain how later poets create diverse images in an effort to be coherent.

Second, aspect perception can be a model that can help us make sense of Homeric similes. In Chapter Two, for instance, I looked at the baroque simile in *Odyssey* 24.5-9 where the dead that go to Hades are compared to bats. This simile, I argued, was a "basic" example of aspect perception. However, this discussion raises other research questions which are worth exploring: namely, to what extent can all similes be products of aspect perception? After all, noticing an aspect, Wittgenstein tells us, involves seeing a likeness between something and something else and indeed we see a likeness between two entities in a simile. Aspect perception, then, potentially has a deeper role in Homer's presentations and one that is worth examining in greater detail.

My overall argument is that the contradictory presentations of the dead are images which emerge from the narrator's and characters' ability to utilise aspect perception. This wider argument is however limited by the fact that there are other descriptions in Homeric epic which are seemingly contradictory. In the introduction, I suggested that the descriptions of the dead belong to a special group that is different from some of the other contradictory descriptions we have seen in Homeric epic. On the one hand, I mentioned that the contradictions are so intricately merged together that we cannot isolate the witless dead from the lively dead in the way we could with nuptial practices. On the other hand, I have suggested that the brief descriptions of the dead all conform to a guiding principle whereby the ghost must appear contradictorily through the poets' ability to merge together different formulaic phrases.

This line of argument has been useful for avoiding analyst objections. Nevertheless, there are, for instance, other ambiguous presentations of the dead which aspect perception cannot explain. Analysts who observe these passages may find reason to doubt the application of aspect perception as a model. We note the confusing description of Teiresias drinking the blood in the *Nekyia*:[542]

ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο
χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχων, ἐμὲ δ᾽ ἔγνω καὶ προσέειπεν·
‘διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
τίπτ᾽ αὖτ᾽, ὦ δύστηνε, λιπὼν φάος ἠελίοιο
ἤλυθες, ὄφρα ἴδῃ νέκυας καὶ ἀτερπέα χῶρον;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀποχάζεο βόθρου, ἄπισχε δὲ φάσγανον ὀξύ,
αἵματος ὄφρα πίω καί τοι νημερτέα εἴπω.

It is noted in 147-153 that the dead need to drink the blood to recognise and speak to Odysseus. But contradictorily Teiresias, who, according to Circe, retains his wits, drinks the blood to speak meaningfully to Odysseus. This is a strange presentation of the prophet which our aspect perception model cannot explain. There is, after all, no feature of Teiresias' character that leads Odysseus *qua* narrator to this view. Likewise, Heracles' appearance at the end of the *Nekyia* (601-630) cannot be explained as an exercise of aspect perception.[543] So too, there are notable differences between *Iliad* 23 and the *Nekyia* that our model cannot explain. We have for instance said that the dead, in the *Nekyia*, speak to Odysseus by themselves when he *qua* focaliser *sees* the dead *as* embodied life-like beings. This is not the case in *Iliad* 23: there is no indication that the ghost of Patroclus speaks independently because Achilles saw the dead as lively. As we mentioned, it is not the case in Homer that

[542] *Od*. 11.90-96.
[543] On this part of the Nekyia, see Karanika 2011: 1-27.

characters are said to be lucid dreamers and it is assumed that the primary narrator sees the shade as a replica of the living person in almost every way bar bodily substance.

These are the limitations of the model, and it is not the case that seeing-as can resolve all of the interpretative difficulties surrounding the dead. Nevertheless, the model does go a long way to explaining why the dead are presented so diversely in Homeric epic. Achilles *sees* the ghost of Patroclus *as* the embodied person because there is a likeness between the ghost and the living Patroclus. Odysseus *sees* the ghosts inconsistently *as* lively and *as* witless because the shade, like Wittgenstein's double cross, has conflicting intrinsic properties. The dead can see themselves, at one moment, as wraiths, and, at another moment, as corpses, because the dead have the same selfhood as the living person. This means that the dead are similar to Jastrow's duck-rabbit since both animals have the same shape, in just the same way that the ghost and the corporeal person have the same identity relationship. What we have come to conclude from this thesis is that aspect perception can help us to understand how the Homeric characters and the primary narrator make sense of the uncanny Homeric underworld.

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