**'[A]ll this our funnaminal world': An Object-Orientated Approach to Joycean Animals**

**by**

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*For Freddie*

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Introduction

I. Introduction

It is common knowledge amongst Joyce scholars that Joyce was scared of dogs; this fear, according to his brother Stanislaus, began in childhood when the young James was bitten on either the chin or the leg: ‘My brother’s fear of dogs and preference for cats dates from the time when he was badly bitten by an excited Irish terrier for which he and I were throwing stones into the sea’.[[1]](#footnote-1) Joyce’s phobia of dogs is transmuted onto his semi-autobiographical protagonist Stephen Dedalus, who is scared of ‘dogs, horses, firearms, the sea, thunderstorms, machinery, the country roads at night’.[[2]](#footnote-2) This distrust of dogs is not restricted to when Stephen is the narrator and we can see this, as well as Joyce’s fondness for cats, in how these two animals are treated and represented in *Ulysses*; the Bloom’s cat is a family member, invited by Molly into the bedroom, whilst dogs like Tatters and Garryowen are figured as aggressors.

Joyce’s representation of animals, however, is not simply confined to pets; in *Ulysses* alone there are—to name a few—symbolic and physical cattle, ungrateful seagulls, bats, a stuffed owl, horses, a figurative lapwing, rats, seals, and even a panther.[[3]](#footnote-3) Whilst a record detailing the appearances of animals in *Ulysses* can be confined to an appendix, a similar document on *Finnegans Wake* would necessitate a whole separate volume; indeed, this volume exists in the guise of Hildegard Möller’s *A Wake Bestiary*.[[4]](#footnote-4) Despite its length and its detail Möller’s bestiary is not exhaustive. For example, on page 360 of the *Wake* Möller records the presence of eighteen animals, but the *Finnegans Wake Extensible Elucidation Treasury* (hereafter known as *FWEET*) records more that Möller does not, such as dingo in the word ‘Dingoldell’ (360.33), and the clucking of hens in the phrase ‘gluck-glucky’ (360.9-10).[[5]](#footnote-5) The *Wake* is so saturated with animals, and saturated in such a subtle and delicate way that it is entirely possible to miss or overlook the majority of them that the work contains. Despite the fact that animals are prevalent in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake,* it takes a relatively long time—as shall be made clear in the two literature reviews of this thesis—for Joyce Studies to pick up on their presence. It is often quoted that with *Ulysses,* Joyce set out to reproduce Ireland’s capital city in such detail that Dublin could be remade with only his novel as a blueprint.[[6]](#footnote-6) Joyce goes further with *Finnegans Wake*, to the point where some critics claim he records the entire history of mankind: ‘Clearly, Joyce recounts the night and through his account recreates or creates the history of man and the universe’.[[7]](#footnote-7) The exhaustive and detailed nature of Joyce’s later prose demonstrates how easy it is to overlook animals; both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* reflect how animals in the real world are so interwoven with our environment, our manufacturing processes, and in our everyday encounters that it becomes easy to fail to notice them until they are out of place; ants outside are easily dismissed, whereas ants in your own kitchen demand attention. We have animals as pets (cats, dogs, snakes, shrimp, parrots) and we put out wild bird feeders. Our supermarkets are full of animal products – both obvious ones like meat and dairy, but also more subtly in plastic bags, sugar, and bread products.[[8]](#footnote-8) *Ulysses* reflects this ubiquity in its cheese sandwich, hungry gulls, lemon soap, and ivory bookmarks. Both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, however, also record—and indeed are examples themselves of—another way in which we use animals; as symbols, idioms, insults, allegory, and in art, both as an art subject, but also as the art object, such as with taxidermy, leather bound books, and paint pigments made from insect blood or cow urine.

Given this ubiquity of animals in both the physical world and Joyce’s literature, this thesis will focus on their presence, examining Joyce’s representations of animals in *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* in order to establish that Joyce is consistently using animals to consider what it means to be human, and what (if anything) separates humanity from the remainder of the animal kingdom.

Because of this ever-presence, both in Joyce’s text and in our lives, and the sheer variety of guises that animals exist in in our society, and thus in Joyce’s literature, an examination of them necessitates an equally all-encompassing philosophy. This thesis, therefore, will use Graham Harman’s ‘New Theory of Everything’: Object-Orientated Ontology.[[9]](#footnote-9) As well as having enormous scope, Harman’s philosophy has the added advantage of removing hierarchal structures, placing humans and animals (and everything else, be it prions, hydrogen, or the planet Jupiter) on an equal footing. All these things are objects, are all *equally* objects, regardless of how else they may be classified – be it as subjects, fictional characters, or even historical events. Whilst some things, such as Boris Johnson and Stonehenge, are (perhaps, unfortunately) more real than others, such as Leopold Bloom and Hogwarts, all these things are, according to Harman, equally objects: ‘My point is not that all objects are equally real, but that they are equally *objects*’.[[10]](#footnote-10) Harman’s OOO has been chosen as the theoretical framework for this thesis because it offers up an interesting and novel perspective on both objects themselves and how we conceive of the objectification of animals. Harman’s philosophy, combined with a modern, contemporary understanding of animals, generates new ideas regarding how animals are represented and perceived in Joyce’s later two works.

Since this thesis began in 2017, Harman has produced multiple works on OOO, Speculative Realism, art, and architecture. Whilst this thesis focuses primarily on his text *The Quadruple Object*, it also touches on one of these later works: *Object Orientated Ontology: A New Theory of Everything*, which was released in 2018.[[11]](#footnote-11)

It must be acknowledged, however, that OOO is not without its fair share of critics; this is made evident by Harman’s release of the text *Skirmishes with Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals* in 2020*.* This book, which cites its place of publication as ‘Earth, Milky Way’, is divided into two parts, and consists of eight chapters, each of which features Harman’s response to either a ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ of OOO. Harman’s last chapter is titled ‘Stephen Mulhall’, and is a response to the review Mulhall published, titled ‘How Complex is a Lemon’, on *A New Theory of Everything*. In his review Mulhall does raise a few pertinent points, such as Harman’s tendency to privilege ‘the case of material objects’, but his main criticisms of OOO seem to stem from a misunderstanding of the philosophy itself.[[12]](#footnote-12) Earlier Mulhall asks:

Harman has already offered Sherlock Holmes as his model of a fictional being; so if our model of a lemon really were a fiction, then surely nothing at all would correspond to it in the independently existing physical world (so it wouldn’t even be a rough translation of something in that world). For on the face of it, Sherlock Holmes is neither a vast oversimplification of a real fictional object, nor a rough translation of one, nor a distortion or falsification of one. Indeed, it’s hard to see how Harman’s supposedly universal distinction between real and sensual objects even applies in Holmes’s case. Do we have fictional representations of this fictional being, and if so what are the real properties of the real (fictional) being of which they are (fictional) representations?[[13]](#footnote-13)

Here Mulhall’s confusion appears to be the result of not understanding Holmes’ status as a ‘sensual object’ (which will be defined in Chapter Two of this thesis), which does depend upon human perception, with ‘sensual qualities’, which do not equate to an understanding of the object’s real quality, as he seems to argue:

To begin with, even if our purported model of a lemon is too simple to capture its full complexity, a simplified picture of an object can still get some things about it right, just as a rough translation can capture some aspects of a remark’s meaning perfectly well.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Harman responds to Mulhall, raising some of the same points I have made here, and further explains that he thinks ‘that even a *complete* representation of an object would absolutely misrepresent it.’[[15]](#footnote-15)

Harman, in his defence against Mulhall, also makes the following statement: ‘OOO has enjoyed extensive interdisciplinary success precisely because practitioners of various disciplines have found my writings useful.’[[16]](#footnote-16) Given its use in multiple disciplines, there may be some validity to Harman’s claim that OOO is a ‘theory of everything’. Due to Joyce’s mimetic quality and his ability to absorb and regurgitate a vast volume of material, his works are possibly best placed to test this claim, at least in the realm of literature. Additionally, the scope of both Joyce’s work and Harman’s philosophy mean that they are best analysed from multiple angles, angles which may reveal if there are any limitations to Harman’s philosophy. Whilst this thesis is first and foremost a study of animals in Joyce’s oeuvre, Joyce’s texts are ideally suited to put OOO in multiple contexts and examine whether it can be applied in each instance. Because of this range, this thesis uses multiple lenses in its discussions; each chapter uses OOO, but also incorporates another critical or theoretical field: Chapter Two features a comparison to Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, Chapter Three discusses Martin Heidegger as well as theories on taxidermy, Chapter Five turns to medieval bestiaries, and theories on metaphor, and the final chapter incorporates Aristophanes’ *The Frogs* as well as Aesop’s beast fables, before concluding with a discussion of Symbolism and Naturalism. It is also important to acknowledge here that, due to these multiple foci, OOO does, at times, disappear from the discussion, but it consistently resurfaces revealing how it can be applied to both Joyce and other philosophies.

What OOO also does, that is helpful to this thesis specifically, is provide a theoretical framework and terminology for considering object boundaries, i.e., what separates one object from another, whilst also detailing what it takes for an object to become a different object. As this thesis discusses and focuses on animals specifically as objects, this introduction must therefore define and elucidate what is meant by the terms ‘animal’ and ‘object’.

II. Defining ‘Human’, ‘Animal’ and ‘Object’

i. The Difference Between ‘Human’ and ‘Animal’

Whilst defining the terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’ may at first appear straightforward, it is more complex than simply providing the relevant dictionary definitions. Indeed, the definition in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) for ‘human’ is particularly unhelpful: ‘A human being, a person; a member of the species *Homo sapiens* or other (extinct) species of the genus *Homo’*.[[17]](#footnote-17) Their definition for ‘animal’ is only marginally more useful, and interestingly includes humans in its explanation: ‘A living organism which feeds on organic matter, typically having specialized sense organs and a nervous system and able to respond rapidly to stimuli; any living creature, including man’.[[18]](#footnote-18) Whilst this allows us to exclude things that are not animals, such as rocks, newspapers, and glass, it also demonstrates that what separates humans from other animals is not necessarily biology; instead, to understand this potential difference we can turn to philosophy.

Biologically speaking humans are just one category of animal amongst many. Animals have been organised into classifications and systems for thousands of years; for example, Aristotle’s *The History of Animals*—written over two millennia ago—segregates and examines animals through their differing physiology and behaviour. Additionally, modern science still uses a Linnaean system of taxonomy, which was published by Carl Linnaeus in the book *Systema Naturæ*, which dates from 1735. Categorising animals, however, can be problematic as it is part of a cyclical behaviour that uses the treatment of animals, by humans, to establish hierarchies, which are in turn used to justify this treatment.[[19]](#footnote-19) The categories put forward in this introduction, however, do not encounter the same difficulties, as they are formulated from literature and linguistics and not zoology; there is no hierarchy or segregation, an animal can be simultaneously physical and symbolic, and neither type is inherently more ‘important’ than another. They do, however, separate the human from the animal in this novel. These categorisations consistently situate humans as being distinctly separate from other animals, a practice that philosopher David Wood takes issue with:

My point is just this: there are no animals “as such,” rather only the extraordinary variety that in the animal alphabet would begin with ants, apes, arachnids, antelopes, aardvarks, anchovies, alligators, Americans, Australians…[[20]](#footnote-20)

Here Wood is proposing a ‘flattening’ of hierarchical systems, placing ants on the same level as Australians, implying both are of equal ‘value’. There are some problems, however, with Wood’s argument, such as his division of humans by nationality; the list does not contain this sort of differentiation for other species, as—for example—alligator is not divided into ‘American alligator’ (*Alligator mississippiensis*) and ‘Chinese alligator’ (*Alligator sinensis*), which (unlike Americans and Australians) are two distinct species. As a result, Wood’s list has the opposite effect; instead of collapsing the human-animal binary as he intends to, he creates more divisions between humans and animals, animals and other animals, and humans and other humans. His list also does not account for the differences within or between species—as Linnaean taxonomy does— as he implies that Americans are as different or similar to Australians as ants are to aardvarks.

While Linnaean taxonomy does not position humanity as being ‘above’ the rest of the animal kingdom, it does allow for (but is not necessarily complicit in) the development of a ‘speciesist’ attitude. The term ‘speciesism’ was coined by Richard D. Ryder in 1970 and gained notoriety when Peter Singer both used and defined it in his book *Animal Liberation*.[[21]](#footnote-21)

This rejection of hierarchies can also be seen in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of ‘becoming-animal’ which appears in their work *A Thousand Plateaus*. This essay is incredibly complex, and frequently informs us what ‘becoming-animal’ is *not*: ‘A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. […] To become is not to progress or regress along a series’.[[22]](#footnote-22) In order to understand Deleuze and Guattari—even if only partially—we can turn to Derek Ryan, who succinctly explains this chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*. What we learn, with Ryan’s assistance, is that ‘becoming’ is not a movement from ‘human’ to ‘animal’, but a removal of the hierarchal classifications *of* ‘human’ and ‘animal’:

Exploring territories of indeterminacy between human and animal, Deleuze and Guattari theorise a shared event of becoming different, of becoming entangled with otherness in a de- and then re-making of ontological boundaries.[[23]](#footnote-23)

This point is emphasised further when Ryan locates, and explains, the following quotation from Deleuze: ‘“generally people who like animals don’t have a human relationship with animals, they have an *animal* relationship with the animal, and that’s quite beautiful”. To have an animal relationship with an animal is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari mean by becoming-animal’.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Many of the issues regarding relationships between the human and the non-human animal are the result of a ‘vertical’ consideration of humans and animals; hierarchal methods, such as Linnaean taxonomy, allow us humans to consider ourselves ‘above’ or ‘better’ than other species. To ‘become’ an animal is to reject this hierarchy and interact with animals without the boundaries these systems generate. While it is important to mention Deleuze and Guattari’s theory in general, this particular argument of theirs must be noted: ‘Above all, becoming does not occur in the imagination, even when the imagination reaches the highest cosmic or dynamic level, as in Jung or Bachelard. Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasies’.[[25]](#footnote-25) From this we must acknowledge that across *Ulysses*—and in ‘Circe’ in particular, with Bloom’s fantasies and the hallucinogenic qualities of the night-town episode—that, even though Joyce’s characters may transform into animals (as is discussed at length in this chapter), they do not necessarily ‘become’ them as Deleuze and Guattari define ‘becoming’.

In the late 1990s, Jacques Derrida gave what has become one of the most significant sources in animal studies, namely his lecture *The Animal That Therefore I Am*. Derrida’s lecture is divided into four sections, the first of which ponders what separates the human from the animal. Using the example of his own cat, Derrida considers how the cat sees him, and whether the cat recognises his (Derrida’s) nakedness. Derrida establishes ‘nakedness’ as something that divides humans from other animals, as it requires both an awareness of being naked, and an ability to be ashamed because of it. In the course of his arguments, Derrida refers back to numerous biblical stories; for example, when discussing nakedness, Derrida mentions Adam and Eve’s ingestion of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, citing it as the instance in which humanity first learned shame, and subsequently clothed themselves. Whilst Derrida is not discussed at length in this thesis, his argument regarding shame is cited in Chapters Two, Three and Five of this thesis.

The following three sections of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* focus on the writings of three other philosophers: Descartes, Lacan, and Heidegger. Descartes is heavily criticised by Derrida for his classification of animals as machines, as well as placing animals altogether into one category; all animals are simply ‘animal’, there is no difference between a rat and a gnat, a dog or a fish. Derrida asks a series of questions in this section (such as ‘Does the animal die? Does it laugh? Does it cry? Does it grieve?’) in an attempt to understand what separates humans from the rest of the animal kingdom.[[26]](#footnote-26)

The third and fourth sections of Derrida’s lecture are significantly shorter than the preceding two, with the third focusing on Lacan, and the fourth Heidegger. Whilst the chapter on Lacan is similar in some of its points to his criticism of Descartes, Derrida’s reading of Heidegger is much different. Derrida examines how Heidegger defines the categories of ‘human’ and ‘animal’ (as well as the ‘inanimate’) which the German philosopher explains as follows: ‘the stone is without world [weltlos],” “the animal is poor in world [weltarm],” “man is world-forming [weltbilden, the term is difficult to translate]”’.[[27]](#footnote-27) Derrida dismisses Heidegger’s claim that his thesis doesn’t establish a hierarchy (namely, that the human is not above the animal because they are ‘world-forming’) arguing that Heidegger’s language necessitates or even generates this hierarchy, as the animal is defined in relation to something it is deprived of.

Derrida’s writings are not examined at length in this thesis, as there are already numerous Derridean readings of Joycean animals.[[28]](#footnote-28) Instead, this thesis will use (along with the aforementioned OOO) perhaps less conventional philosophers to discuss what divides the human from the animal; these philosophers include Martin Heidegger and Giambattista Vico. Whilst Heidegger’s writings on death, in which he argues that animals lack the capacity to die, are only examined very briefly, this thesis conducts a detailed examination of Vico’s *The New Science* in order to demonstrate that Joyce uses Vico’s ‘requirements’ for humanity in *Finnegans Wake*. One of these conditions that Vico offers up is language; interestingly, in *Ulysses* both Bloom and Gerty MacDowell consider the difference to be one of language. Bloom notes that his cat understands him more than he understands her, suggesting she has a separate language that is closed off to Bloom, and Gerty even thinks that her uncle’s dog (which is the same dog that attacked Bloom in ‘Cyclops’) ‘almost talked, it was so human’ (*Ulysses,* p.337). The issue with stating that humans are distinct from other animals because we possess language, is that it implies that animals do not have their own speech or system of communication when it is clear—even to Bloom—that they do. Indeed, this issue is explicitly addressed in the final chapter of this thesis, which examines how the death of the animal is linked to it falling silent and losing its voice.

ii. The ‘Object’

Just as classifications and interest in animals in the Western world can be traced back at least as far as Ancient Greece, so can the philosophical interest in objects. Both Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’ and Aristotle’s idea of ‘whatness’ (also known as quiddity) develop ideas of an object’s ‘essence’. In *The Republic* Plato argues that the ‘essence’ of each object exists as an ideal ‘Form’: ‘First he would find it easiest to look at shadows, next at the reflections of men and other objects in water, and later on at *the objects themselves*’.[[29]](#footnote-29) These ‘shadows’ are human perceptions of the object, and thus denote a knowledge of their surface characteristics. For example, the shadow of a flower will merely give us its outline; this understanding is—figuratively—two dimensional, and shallow. To gaze at ‘the objects themselves’ is to regard them in their totality: to observe their surface properties (shape, size, colour), but to also acknowledge a greater depth. This ideal Form, then, represents aspects that are inherent to that object – in other words, the flower’s ‘flowerness’, which exists independently of external perception; this is also what Aristotle means by ‘quiddity’. Aristotle’s ‘quiddity’, or *quidditas*, is considered by Stephen in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’, when he thinks: ‘Horseness is the whatness of allhorse’ (*Ulysses,* p.178). These principles are developed in the doctrine of ‘essentialism’, which *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* defines as follows: ‘The doctrine that it is correct to distinguish between those properties of a thing, or kind of thing, that are essential to it, and those that are merely accidental. Essential properties are ones that it cannot lose without ceasing to exist’.[[30]](#footnote-30) A flower can change colour or lose its petals, but it remains resolutely a flower.

While the principles of essentialism allow us to group objects into categories—for example, everything that has ‘horseness’ is a horse, even if they are different shapes and sizes—it does not define the term ‘object’ itself. In *The Thing,* Heidegger endeavours to define ‘object’, and comes to the conclusion that our interactions with objects are limited; for example, human perceptions of a jug can only inform us about its external properties, or properties we place onto it, such as its use and aesthetics. These properties Heidegger names ‘objectness’:

What is the jug? We say: a vessel, something of the kind that holds something else within it. […] When we take the jug as a made vessel, then surely we are apprehending it—so it seems—as a thing and never as a mere object.   
 Or do we even now still take the jug as an object? […] [F]rom the objectness of the object […] there is no way that leads to the thingness of the thing.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Each entity, then, has ‘objectness’ as well as ‘thingness’, with the latter being akin to Aristotle’s notion of ‘*quidditas’*. By focusing on the ‘objectness’ of an object, it is not possible to ‘get at’ or focus on the jug’s ‘essential’ properties, or what Heidegger calls its ‘thingness’. As an object can still exist even though it no longer functions, its ‘objectness’ cannot constitute its essential properties. Heidegger clarifies this distinction with the following statement: ‘When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear *by means of* human making’.[[32]](#footnote-32) From Heidegger, then, we get two ‘types’ of entities: ‘objects’ and ‘things’. Objects manifest when they interact with other objects and subjects, while things exist when there is no external relation. Bill Brown explains this further when he says that ‘things’ assert themselves when they refuse to function: ‘We begin to confront the thingness of objects when they stop working for us’.[[33]](#footnote-33)

This distinction between ‘object’ and ‘thing’, however, is rejected by OOO, which states that everything is an object, even what may often be considered a subject, such as in the case of humans and animals. OOO does not explicitly offer an opinion or argument regarding ‘subjectivity’, and instead focuses on object-object interactions. What OOO does acknowledge, however, is that some of these interactions are more complex than others but resists hierarchal statements by resolutely saying that this complexity ‘is not the point’.[[34]](#footnote-34) OOO completely rejects Heidegger’s definitions of ‘object’ and ‘thing’, with Harman saying: ‘I do not adopt Heidegger’s distinction between “object” (which he uses negatively) and “thing” (which he uses positively). The word “object” acquires in the Brentano School a generalizing power too valuable to be sacrificed to the cult rituals of Heideggerian terminology’.[[35]](#footnote-35) In short, the term ‘object’ can be applied to everything, as objects for OOO must meet only two conditions: autonomy and withdrawal. The first is relatively self-explanatory: an object must be able to exist independently from external objects and subjects. The second concept, ‘withdrawal’, is more complex, and will be explained in more detail below.

III. ‘Horseness is the whatness of allhorse’: The Vocabulary of Harman’s Object-Orientated Ontology.

For this thesis there are numerous terms defined by OOO that are necessary to explain. These include the following: ‘undermining’, ‘overmining’, ‘sensual’, and ‘real’. The first two of these are defined by OOO as processes by which an object is dismissed in favour of either its components or its perceived properties. The former of these, ‘undermining’, is simply the practice of reducing an object to the material out of which it is made; the focus shifts from the object as a single entity to the molecules, atoms, or quarks that are its physical basis. This physical foundation keeps getting smaller as modern physics progresses; molecules are made of atoms, which are made of protons and neutrons, which in turn are made of quarks. Through this process of undermining Harman claims that ‘[p]hilosophy becomes monism’.[[36]](#footnote-36) While all things are made up of foundational particles like quarks (and who knows what they are made of, if anything) it is naïve to assume that objects are solely the material they are made out of. For example, the components of an electronic device, such as a laptop, blended together do not create the desired computer; an object, then, is formulated through a process of building which causes it to surpass and become more than just the particles out of which it is made.

‘Undermining’ represents one extreme of object dismissal, while the other end consists of acts that Harman terms ‘overmining’. To ‘overmine’ an object one would assert that it is nothing more than a group of perceptions; the laptop, for example, would not be considered by its material basis but by its qualities: ‘light’, ‘powerful’, ‘loud’, etc. ‘Overmining’ also occurs when a theorist states that objects only exist during moments of interaction. The problems with such a viewpoint can be observed when multiple objects perceive a single object. To use Harman’s example, when an ant or giraffe encounter a house two different perceived qualities are generated: ‘huge’ in the case of the ant, ‘small’ in the case of the giraffe. Neither of these perceptions take into account the actual object and (as size is relative) these perceptions tell us almost nothing about the house itself. Before moving on, it is important here to state that it is possible to overmine and undermine an object simultaneously.

By refusing to position itself at either end of these two forms of perception, OOO states that all objects are neither solely a collection of quarks nor a group of perceived characteristics (such as ‘big’ or ‘small’). From these definitions we can come to understand objects as having an interior and exterior. Both undermining and overmining interact with the exterior of an object whilst simultaneously disregarding the possibility of an interior.

The interior of an object, according to Harman, is said to ‘withdraw’ from the external world: ‘the world in itself is made of realities withdrawing from all conscious access’.[[37]](#footnote-37) It is with this concept of withdrawal that OOO falls short; whilst Harman does not consider where the object’s ‘essence’ withdraws to, he —more importantly for this thesis—also fails to consider what happens when one object becomes another; does this essence change, or is it destroyed? We can find the answer to one of these questions by turning to another philosopher of OOO: Ian Bogost. Bogost explains withdrawal as follows: ‘When fire burns cotton, it takes part only in the cotton’s flammability, not in its other properties, or in its real essence, which withdraws interminably’. Fire, then, only interacts with one quality of cotton. This specific aspect of withdrawal can be better understood as partial interaction; some of the cotton’s qualities are inaccessible to fire (such as colour) and are subsequently irrelevant. What either theorist fails to address, however, is the question of what happens to this essence when cotton is now ash. Finally, as fire can alter or destroy these properties can the cotton really be said to withdraw? Given that OOO does not provide answers to these questions, we can only conclude that object-object interactions occur purely across the exterior surface of objects.

In addition to these terms and concepts, OOO also posits that there are two types of objects, and two types of qualities, both sets divided into either ‘real’ or ‘sensual’. Sensual and real qualities are relatively simple to define as they rely heavily on the aforementioned doctrine of essentialism. A sensual quality of an object is a characteristic which is accidental to it; the sensual properties of an orange, for example, are ‘orange’, ‘round’, ‘juicy’, etc. The removal or alteration of any of these qualities wouldn’t change the orange *itself*, whereas if one were to remove its ‘real’ or ‘essential’ properties the orange would cease to be an orange; this essential quality would be its ‘orange-ness’. What makes Harman’s OOO more complex than essentialism, however, is the presence of sensual and real objects. Harman expands on the work of previous philosophers, such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Leibniz, developing them Diagram

Description automatically generatedinto what Harman calls ‘The New Fourfold’ object, as shown below in Figure One:[[38]](#footnote-39)

**Figure One**

This chapter will not address this concept directly but will instead focus on two of its components: the sensual object and the real object, the basis for which are developed by Harman through readings of Edmund Husserl and Heidegger’s writings.

Harman declares Husserl to be ‘the first *object-orientated* idealist’, and explains that for Husserl, objects are made through conscious thought and exist purely in the mind.[[39]](#footnote-40) While this appears at first to be a clear case of overmining, Harman’s reading of Husserl is much more complicated, as he argues: ‘What makes Husserl so special among idealists is his discovery of objects *within* the phenomenal sphere’.[[40]](#footnote-41) Harman names these objects ‘sensual objects’, and claims that it is through the acknowledgement that these objects possess both real and sensual qualities that prevents Husserl from overmining them: ‘[Husserl] knows the painful and seductive labor needed to look beyond the specific traits through which an object is manifest’.[[41]](#footnote-42) If we take one of Harman’s examples from elsewhere in his book and apply it to this context, we can garner a clearer understanding of Harman’s reasoning. If we imagine a dog urinating, we will all imagine a different dog. The dog’s physical features (such as breed and fur pattern) are sensual qualities, and if they changed we would still be thinking of a dog urinating; ‘dog urinating’ is the sensual object with ‘poodle’, ‘urination’, ‘two-foot tall’ being some of its sensual qualities. Husserl, however, acknowledges that the dog, even in the mind, possesses a real quality, a ‘whatness’ that makes it a dog. Husserl argues that these ‘real’ qualities can be intuited, even though they cannot be encountered: ‘[they] can only be inferred indirectly rather than witnessed’.[[42]](#footnote-43) As a result, Husserl is not guilty of overmining, but what he *is* guilty of is excluding the ‘real’ object – in this case it would be ‘dog’.

To explain the ‘real object’, Harman turns to Heidegger’s tool-analysis, which maintains that all objects (or ‘tools’ as Heidegger refers to them) exist as part of system and not as isolated entities; because of this, all objects are created with other objects in mind. Where Harman differs from Heidegger, however, is in the claim that these relations between objects do not exhaust the object itself. If we visualise the system of tools as a pocket watch, all the internal cogs—the ‘objects’—are fashioned to work in perfect sync with one another; if we remove one of those cogs from the watch, however, it still exists as an independent object outside of the system. Harman criticises Heidegger for valuing the system above the objects within it, and for not acknowledging the autonomy of real objects: ‘Insofar as tools belong to a system, they are already nothing but caricatures of themselves, reduced to presence-at-hand’.[[43]](#footnote-44) Harman argues that real objects are different from their sensual counterparts as they do not depend on another object to envisage them: ‘though sensual objects always inhabit experience and are not hidden behind their qualities, real objects must always hide’.[[44]](#footnote-45) This is another point, however, when OOO stumbles; Harman contradicts himself in his definitions, and on the very same page in which he defines sensual objects as reliant on experience (‘If I close my eyes to sleep or die, the sensual tree is vaporized, while the real tree continues to flourish even if all sentient beings are destroyed along with me’), he also declares them to be, along with real objects, ‘autonomous units’.[[45]](#footnote-46) This contradiction of autonomy as well as dependency is not explicitly resolved, but it may be that Harman gets round it by maintaining that both forms of object possess real qualities. It is also important to note that these two definitions do not establish a hierarchy of objects – a real one is not ‘better’ than a sensual one, and in fact, OOO explicitly denies such a hierarchy: ‘My [Harman’s] point is not that all objects are equally real, but that they are equally *objects*’.[[46]](#footnote-47)

With these four definitions we approach Harman’s ‘fourfold’ structure, generated by pairing these objects and qualities together: ‘of course there are only four such pairs: real object/real quality, sensual object/sensual quality, real object/sensual quality, sensual object/real quality’.[[47]](#footnote-48) The reading of Husserl generates the second of these pairings, and the reading of Heidegger creates the third. It is the first pairing, however, which permits objects and tools to exist externally from Heidegger’s tool system: ‘the pairing of real objects with real qualities is what allows real objects to differ from one another rather than being empty unified substrata with no definite character’.[[48]](#footnote-49)

In terms of the applicability of using this vocabulary to describe Joycean animals and transformations, another example from Harman demonstrates the validity of such an approach. When discussing undermining, Harman mentions a ‘half-hearted monism of “pre-individual” things’:[[49]](#footnote-50)

Its origins lie in Anaxagoras, for whom splinters broken from the *apeiron* contain seeds of everything else: a tree must also contain the encrypted forms of birds, flowers, and fire, making it possible for one thing to transform into another.[[50]](#footnote-51)

Harman argues that these encrypted forms must be separate or not; if they are not, then we still have monism, if they are then ‘we have the same situation as in the actual world of objects, with nothing gained but the *assertion* that they are “both connected and unconnected at the same time”’.[[51]](#footnote-52) This then generates the question of whether transformation could be considered to be an act of undermining. This philosophy of ‘pre-individual’ things argues that by rearranging the ‘splinters’ or ‘seeds’ that originate from the *apeiron*—the matter from which everything is generated—one thing, such as a tree, can turn into another, such as a bird. If this could occur, what would happen to the tree’s ‘tree-ness’? Indeed, when this *does* occur, as coal can become diamond when its molecules are subjected to immense pressure, what becomes of the coal’s ‘coal-ness’? Harman does not address the ideas of object transformation, but it stands to reason that this ‘objectness’ *can* change, it just always remains inaccessible. From this, transformation can be considered as an act which undermines an object as it assumes all it takes to *be* another object is a rearrangement of particles. However, transformations can also overmine objects; if the transformation is a result of perceived and interpreted qualities, then the original object is overmined as it is these properties that are the central focus of the transformation.

When discussing literary animal transformations, the two categories of undermining and overmining can become confused; if a physical transformation occurs purely across surface, ‘sensual’ qualities then surely it would be an act of overmining and not undermining? What Harman details, however, is that if a physical thing can become another, its change happens on a molecular level; this undermines the object—as I stated previously—because it presupposes that an object can become another by manipulating its physical being, whatever that being is made of. This is not overmining, because these qualities are not necessarily generated by an observer.

Another term that is essential to define for this thesis is ‘sincerity’. Towards the end of *The Quadruple Object,* Harman sets out to define the relationships that occur across his ‘four poles’ (namely: the real object, the real quality, the sensual object, and the sensual quality). Among the multitude of terms that Harman uses in this consideration (‘withdrawal’, ‘duplicity’, and ‘emanation’, for example, are just three of the ten words he employs) is the term ‘sincerity’. ‘Sincerity’ denotes the relationship between the real object and the sensual object and can be understood as the ‘immediate contact’ or experience that happens when one object encounters or interacts with another:

If two sensual objects can never be anything better than contiguous, two real objects co-exist in the manner of *withdrawal,* having no interrelation at all. The entire metaphysics of vicarious causation is designed to shed light on this issue. That leaves only the RO-SO pair, which we have called the *sincerity* of immediate contact. Here, the experiencer as a real object is in direct contact with a sensual object.[[52]](#footnote-53)   
This concept of ‘sincerity’ is used in Chapter Three to elucidate what ‘death’ means for OOO.

What OOO offers us, then, is a theoretical framework and vocabulary with which to discuss animals in Joyce’s prose, and through utilising its terminology, this chapter will argue that neither method of transformation focuses on the animal itself, but rather on the animal’s sensual qualities. Given this superficial engagement, as well as distancing between the real qualities and essence of the human object and the animal object, the boundary that separates humans and animals is maintained.

OOO is a method of understanding objects on a level playing field; no object is given precedence or superiority over any other object: a lemon is on an ontological even-footing with an octopus, a human, a crowbar, and the Battle of Waterloo. What OOO allows us to do then, is discuss animals (including human animals) as objects without imposing an ethical or ‘value’ judgement. Animals simply are objects, they are not reduced to them.

IV. Thesis Structure

Before a chapter-by-chapter outline can be given, it is first important to address the overall structure of this thesis which is in two halves: the first on *Ulysses* and the second on *Finnegans Wake*. This division arose from a survey of the critical literature on the two texts; as animal focused criticism on *Ulysses* and the *Wake* develop differently, two separate literature reviews were required.

This thesis—after this introduction—opens with a literature review on animal-focused Joycean criticism on *Ulysses*. This survey, which is conducted chronologically, also includes a discussion of more general Joycean criticism alongside the developing field of animal studies, in order to provide a literary and theoretical context. By providing this context, this literature review will argue that Joycean animal studies has been relatively slow to develop in response to the growing philosophical and theoretical interest in the animal. The benefit of a chronological reading is that we can also observe how animals are approached at various stages in Joyce studies. As Joycean criticism begins to develop after the second World War, animals are primarily discussed as symbols. As the theoretical field develops, how animals are examined alters; they become incorporated into discussions of post-colonial, feminist, and eco-critical studies. It is not until 2017 that the animal itself frequently becomes the focus of criticism.

Following this literature review, is the first chapter in this work on *Ulysses*: ‘‘God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle goose becomes featherbed mountain’: Transforming into an Animal in James Joyce’s *Ulysses*’. This chapter is the product of conducting a re-reading of the novel through an animal-focused lens. What became apparent through this reading is that, not only are there a large number of animals in the novel which appear in numerous guises, but there are also multiple instances of human-to-animal transformation. This chapter begins by offering up six classifications of animal that the creatures of *Ulysses* can be divided into: symbolic, idiomatic, fabular, descriptive, physical, and as commodities. These categories can also be grouped together more simply as either ‘symbolic’ or physical’, which in turn are parallels to the two types of object that Harman puts forward: ‘sensual’ and ‘real’. This chapter then defines these terms—as well as others that Harman uses—to provide an introduction to and brief over-view of the relevant parts of Harman’s philosophy. This chapter goes on to discuss various moments of human-to-animal transformation, starting with Stephen’s becoming cow – which spans both *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*. Following this, Bloom’s metamorphosis into a pig is examined closely. By reading them in this order, this chapter argues that a pattern can be observed: the novel moves from symbolic, sensual transformations to physical, real ones. This chapter then concludes with a close reading of ‘Telemachus’ to show that this pattern appears on a smaller scale in the novel’s opening episode.

The next chapter, titled ‘“And what is death, he asked […] It’s a beastly thing and nothing else. It simply doesn’t matter”: The Alignment of Human and Animal Death in *Ulysses*’, examines a different form of transformation in *Ulysses*: the movement from living objects to dead ones. The main argument of this chapter is that Joyce is actively considering and even challenging the human-animal boundary by frequently aligning moments of human death with animal death. To argue this, this chapter begins with a discussion of how Harman defines death, as well as how one of his major influences, Heidegger, approaches the same topic. By examining the latter, this chapter establishes that death can be considered as something that divides humans from animals, and that this difference is another that OOO rejects. This discussion is filtered through a close reading of the ‘Proteus’ episode of *Ulysses*, comparing Joyce’s representations of a living dog (Tatters) and a dead one. A further parallel is also drawn between the dog carcass and the body of a man which is expected to surface from the water on the same day. This chapter then provides a close reading of ‘Hades’, before concluding by looking at Bloom’s taxidermized owl; the owl is an example of a unique type of object which uses the dead animal as a material to construct a new object that represents the ideal version of that animal.

This thesis then undergoes a significant shift, turning away from *Ulysses* towards *Finnegans Wake*. The literature review for this section is, once again, ordered chronologically and traces the development, and subsequent dissolution, of various key strands of *Wakean* criticism. This survey shows in great detail how the establishment of animal-focused criticism on the *Wake* mirrors the more general trends of its genre. What this literature review also demonstrates is that a lot of work has been done on animals in *Finnegans Wake*, but it has remained hidden or scattered amongst the vast volume of criticism that has been done on Joyce’s final work. This survey picks out these essays and connects them, showing the field’s development.

Following the literary survey is the chapter ‘[W]e are all animals. I also am an animal’: The Division Between Humans and Animals in *Finnegans Wake*’. This chapter examines this division by focusing on moments in which the characters appear as both human and non-human animals, particularly the hen-woman Biddy Doran. To argue that Joyce is utilizing the bird-woman pun and metaphor, this chapter opens with a discussion of three theories of metaphor: Lakoff and Johnson’s – as it appears in their work *Metaphors We Live By*, Giambattista Vico’s, and, finally, Harman’s. Much like the first chapter on *Ulysses*, this first chapter on *Finnegans Wake* offers up numerous categories for the *Wake’s* hybrid creatures: behavioural hybrids, ‘monsters’ – which are hybrids produced from interbreeding between human and animal, and metaphorical hybrids. After defining these and establishing their presence in *Finnegans Wake* this chapter then conducts a close reading of the Biddy Doran tale, figuring it as, and comparing it to, a medieval bestiary entry on hens. Ultimately, this chapter will argue and establish that, in the *Wake,* Joyce re-creates a medieval-esque landscape in which the lines between ‘human’ and ‘animal’ are blurred, allowing the two to overlap and sometimes merge.

The final chapter of this thesis is titled: ‘[S]top your harsh koaxing din’: Animal Voice in *Finnegans Wake* and Aristophanes’ *The Frogs*’. This chapter moves away from Harman’s version of OOO towards one of his followers: Timothy Morton. Morton’s writing on object birth and object death is used to offer up a way of discussing ‘voice’ as an independent entity. This is argued through a close reading of Morton’s text *Realist Magic*, Aristophanes’frog chorus that appears in *The Frogs*, and Joyce’s re-creation of the frog’s voices on page four of the *Wake*. By conducting this comparison and close reading, this chapter argues that by giving an animal a voice, or paying attention to that animal’s voice, our perception of them can be altered from dumb beasts to potential ancestors, subjects, and individuals. This chapter then uses the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable in order to discuss how voice is intrinsically linked to identity, and then concludes with a consideration of how the death of voice is connected to the death of the subject; this is done through an examination of the final pages of *Finnegans Wake* in which Anna Livia, as the river Liffey, flows out into the sea.

This thesis conducts a comprehensive study of animals in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, using a new philosophy to provide a new perspective on the field of Joycean animal studies. This thesis combines traditional readings, such as that of Biddy as a hybrid creature, simultaneously human woman and domestic fowl, with new analyses, using OOO to elucidate both the source texts and the other theoretical works that this thesis engages with, to to offer numerous original claims and readings regarding Joyce’s later two works*.*

Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is to examine how Joyce approaches this question of what separates the human from the animal and aims to establish that Joyce is consistently challenging what it means to be human or animal by rejecting, at numerous points in both works, the boundary that divides these two categories. The following chapters will consider this question through an examination of when this boundary is broken, in particular when Joyce has his characters transform into animals or exist as complex human-animal hybrids. This thesis will also examine moments when Joyce addresses or represents topics like death and language that are often said to separate the human from other animals.

Chapter One: A Literature Review on Animal-focused criticism on *Ulysses*

In 1780, Jeremy Bentham famously stated that the question about animals was not whether they could talk nor whether they could reason, but whether they could suffer.[[53]](#footnote-54) The notion of animal rights and the ethics surrounding meat-eating is not solely a modern preoccupation; almost a hundred years after Bentham’s statement, Howard Williams writes­­ *The Ethics of Diet: A Catena of Authorities Deprecatory of the Practice of Flesh-Eating*, in which he traces the history of ‘vegetarian’ (a term that w­­­as not coined until 1847 upon the foundation of the first Vegetarian Society in England) thought back to Pythagoras.[[54]](#footnote-55) Almost a decade after Williams’ book was published, the *Irish Times* records the existence of a vegetarian restaurant in Dublin.[[55]](#footnote-56) What these two points demonstrate is that animal rights, and the philosophical consideration of animals themselves, was present but remained on the margins of life in the late nineteenth century.[[56]](#footnote-57) Despite these early concerns for animal welfare, Joyce studies did not pick up an ethical approach to investigating the animal until relatively recently. This literature review consists of a chronological reading of animal-focused Joycean criticism, intertwined with theoretical texts on animals in order to provide a context to the critical works. By doing this, this literature review will establish that early animal-focused criticism on *Ulysses* treated animals in a symbolic manner and focused on how they relate to the human. This focus then shifts, as animals are mentioned briefly in discussions of other trends that occur in Joycean criticism, (such as post-colonial discourse and eco-criticism). By the later 2000s, however, we can see that animal studies in Joyce develops into a genre in and of itself. Whilst this survey of literature offers an overview, and not necessarily a critical examination, it is still useful and essential to situate this thesis in context of other theoretical and critical works in order to demonstrate what this thesis does that these earlier works do not; that is approach Joycean animals through the focus of OOO, and other lenses such as Heidegger, Vico, and Aristophanes.

When *Ulysses* was first published episodically in the *Little Review*, and indeed when the book was published as a whole in 1922, reviews on Joyce’s novel were either exceedingly positive (Arnold Bennett calls *Ulysses* ‘marvellous’, ‘prodigious’, and ‘dazzlingly original’)[[57]](#footnote-58) or called to have the book banned under obscenity laws.[[58]](#footnote-59) When focus moves away from reviewing *Ulysses* towards conducting literary criticism, we can observe numerous trends or ‘genres’ of Joycean criticism begin to develop; these include language, religion, myth,[[59]](#footnote-60) the *Odyssey*,[[60]](#footnote-61) Shakespeare, and Ibsen.[[61]](#footnote-62) Early animal-centric criticism of *Ulysses*, however, is sparse and examinations of animals are usually confined to the symbolic (such as the lapwing and panther) as opposed to the more realist or ‘physically’ present animals in the novel, like the cattle and the horses that roam Dublin’s streets.

After the end of World War Two in 1945, Joycean criticism begins to develop in earnest; work starts on cataloguing Joyce’s library, collecting all of his writings, and documenting his life.[[62]](#footnote-63) The earliest essay specifically about an animal in *Ulysses* is published five years later in 1950, and is a piece by A. M. Klein on the black panther, which he considers as a Christ figure.[[63]](#footnote-64) Around this time an influx of Joycean criticism on Shakespeare and *Ulysses* emerges, particularly in relation to *Hamlet*.[[64]](#footnote-65) Despite the con-current interest in the influence of *Hamlet* on Joyce’s novel and the publication of Klein’s essay, it takes more than twenty years for someone to connect the play to the panther.[[65]](#footnote-66)

In 1956, Maurice Beebe’s essay ‘Joyce: Barnacle Goose and Lapwing’ is published in *PMLA*; the essay itself is focused on Joyce’s ‘union with Nora’,[[66]](#footnote-67) and offers a biographical reading of Stephen Dedalus. It is only on the penultimate page, however, that Beebe finally asks: ‘why did Joyce choose, of all birds, the lapwing?’.[[67]](#footnote-68) Beebe immediately turns to the lapwing’s meaning in folklore, citing *Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology, and Legend*, before turning to Greek myth and the Qur’an. Beebe concludes that Joyce selects the lapwing because either Stephen ‘identifies himself […] as an artful deceiver feigning injury’, or because of the connotations of transformation:

The idea of transformation of shape-shifting may also be suggested by the lapwing: in one Greek myth, Graves tells us, Zeus took the form of the lapwing. At any rate, Stephen, even in this moment of self-doubt, remains proud enough to identify himself as no common bird, but with the most intelligent of the sacred birds.[[68]](#footnote-69)

Other works published in 1956 include Hugh Kenner’s important work *Dublin’s Joyce*, as well as J. Mitchell Morse’s essay ‘The Blind Stripling’, which takes a biographical approach.[[69]](#footnote-70) Morse argues that Stephen differs from his creator as he has good eyesight; the evidence for this being that the character is able to see ‘the dog and the waves on Sandymount Strand [… and] Mulligan with his bauble hat’.[[70]](#footnote-71) Morse’s argument that ‘there is nothing in *Ulysses* to indicate that Stephen’s sight is anything but the keenest’ is somewhat bizarre; it does not take exceptionally ‘keen’ eyesight to recognise a dog, and Morse even quotes Stephen’s thought ‘must get glasses’ in the course of his argument.[[71]](#footnote-72) Biography is also emphasised in Walton Litz’s essay, ‘Early Vestiges of Joyce's Ulysses’, which is primarily a genetic study of various fragments that would develop into parts of the final novel.[[72]](#footnote-73)

In 1957 Joyce studies experiences a large influx of criticism due to the release of the first *James Joyce Review*; this journal, which ran until 1959 and had only three volumes, contained a range of pieces on Joyce’s works. The majority of criticism in the 1957 issue focuses on *Finnegans Wake*, reviews of other works, as well as additions or edits to the ‘James Joyce Bibliography’. In the same year, multiple full-length works are published on Joyce which demonstrate the prominent themes or trends of Joycean criticism at this time (religion, biography, and myths or classical influence); these include William M. Schutte’s *Joyce and Shakespeare: A Study in the Meaning of Ulysses,*[[73]](#footnote-74) and Patricia Hutchins’ *James Joyce’s World,* which takes a biographical approach.[[74]](#footnote-75) Despite the growing momentum of Joyce studies in this year, little is said on animals. These themes continue in both the 1950s and the subsequent decade, with J. Mitchell Morse publishing *The Sympathetic Alien: James Joyce and Catholicism* in 1959,[[75]](#footnote-76) and S. L. Goldberg *The Classical Temper: a Study of James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’,* in 1961.[[76]](#footnote-77)

The lapwing is returned to in 1968, with George L. Geckle publishing an article on the topic in the relatively new *JJQ* (which was established five years earlier in 1963).[[77]](#footnote-78) Geckle states it is ‘time to discontinue the critical approach […] that sees Stephen Dedalus as some sort of autobiographical study of James Joyce’.[[78]](#footnote-79) Geckle reads the lapwing as a symbolic parallel for Stephen and, unlike Beebe, he refers to numerous sources in depth, tracing the bird’s representation in literature to establish that the animal is figured as ambitious but misdirected, promiscuous, and ultimately faithless. Geckle’s reading of the lapwing is used and discussed further in Chapter Two of this thesis.

In the same year that Geckle’s essay on the Lapwing is printed, Stuart Curran’s ‘“Bous Stephanoumenos”: Joyce’s Sacred Cow’ essay appears in the *JJQ*.[[79]](#footnote-80) Whilst Curran focuses mainly on *A Portrait*, he also mentions *Ulysses* as Stephen recollects the events of the former novel in the later work. The animal discussed here is, once again, completely symbolic and is only examined in relation to the human character (Stephen).

Ruth Von Phul, in 1971, examines the use of the deer and the dog as heraldic symbols in ‘Proteus’; Von Phul argues that these animals symbolise both Stephen and Buck Mulligan. Despite the physical presence of dogs in this episode, Von Phul’s analysis remains fixed on the symbolic animal, ignoring both the ‘dogsbody’ and Tatters. Indeed, Von Phul’s examination is rather brief, as they focus more on the potential source that Joyce used for his information on heraldry than on the animals present.[[80]](#footnote-81)

In 1972 the *JJQ* includes two letters to the editor which are grouped together and titled ‘Two more on “Beef to the Heel”’. These letters investigate the meaning and origin behind this animal idiom – and the first, written by George Thompson, argues that it describes Irish women’s ankles.[[81]](#footnote-82) This interest in animal idioms and using animals as insults is a trend found more commonly in criticism of *Finnegans Wake* in this time period.[[82]](#footnote-83) What this demonstrates, even if it is not explicitly stated, is that there is an awareness of using animals to ‘lower’ or dehumanise others.

In the 1970s concerns with animal welfare are brought to the forefront; indeed, the term ‘speciesism’ was coined by Richard D. Ryder in 1970, although it did not gain notoriety until Peter Singer both used and defined it in his book *Animal Liberation*, which was published in 1975:

Speciesism—the word is not an attractive one, but I can think of no better term—is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.[[83]](#footnote-84)

Human taxonomy (based on the system of Carl Linnaeus) places humans, ‘Homo’, as diverging from the same ‘tribe’ (a taxonomic rank) as chimpanzees, ‘Pan’. Society observes a degree of difference between our species and others – and Linnaean taxonomy provides a system that can be used to measure this difference.

Whilst important works on *Ulysses* and Joyce’s oeuvre are also published in this decade—such as Anthony Burgess’ *Joysprick*—the most relevant ones (to this literature review) are Michael Seidel’s 1976 ‘*Ulysses* Black Panther Vampire’ and John Gordon’s reaction two years later in 1978: ‘Notes in response to Michael Seidel’s *Ulysses* Black Panther Vampire’. Seidel figures the black panther as a ghost and a vampire, aligning it to *Hamlet*; through this Shakespearean comparison Seidel connects the animal to the theme of the absent father.[[84]](#footnote-85) Gordon responds to Seidel’s essay, expanding on the previous author’s argument, adding that Bloom is a ghost of Stephen’s future: ‘Stephen having spent a long day of not being assimilated by ruined old “literary gentlemen,” looks at Bloom, sees Mr. Deasy, and takes his walk into the night’.[[85]](#footnote-86) In these two essays, then, the panther-vampire is indicative of Leopold Bloom, interpreted by Stephen as both a predator as well as a ‘ruined old literary gentlem[a]n’, a fate which he is desperate to escape.

Two years after Gordon responds to Seidel’s article, an important source in the area of animal studies is published. In *About Looking,* John Berger opens his book with a chapter titled: ‘Why Look at Animals’.[[86]](#footnote-87) Berger traces the idea of the animal throughout human memory, stating that the animal’s first use by humanity was symbolic. The example Berger gives is of cattle: ‘the domestication of cattle did not begin as a simple prospect of milk and meat. Cattle had magical functions, sometimes oracular, sometimes sacrificial’.[[87]](#footnote-88) Berger then states he believes language had its origins in metaphor and that animal metaphors can be seen extensively throughout history (such as the signs of the zodiac, the Greek animal symbols for the times of day, and the Hindu belief that the Earth is carried on the back of an elephant). Metaphor and its influence on language, and its connection to animals, is an important part of Chapter Five, which uses Vico’s theory on metaphor—as opposed to Berger’s—and applies it to *Finnegans Wake*. Berger continues by commenting on the animal’s inability, or perhaps lack of necessity, to dominate their environment as humans have done, which then leads to a perceived inferiority of animals by humans. Finally, Berger goes on to discuss zoos, as well as pets, arguing that the latter results in animals first being trained to be useful (such as sheepdogs) before being absorbed into the personal or family sphere, becoming companions and individuals. Zoos, according to Berger, also alter how we view animals; as zoos emerge, society ‘consumes’ animals in a different way, using them not for meat or material, but for entertainment. Berger notes that zoos also represent the oppression of people as well as animals, as they gesture towards colonial power: ‘Likewise in the 19th century, public zoos were an endorsement of modern colonial power. The capturing of the animals was a symbolic representation of the conquest of all distant and exotic lands’.[[88]](#footnote-89) For Berger, then, zoos (at least zoos in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) were both prisons and theatres. In his conclusion, Berger notes: ‘Everywhere animals disappear. In zoos they constitute the living monument to their own disappearance’.[[89]](#footnote-90) It must be noted, however, that Berger offers no sources for his claims – such as that the animal’s first ‘use’ was symbolic, and his statements as a result must be regarded cautiously. Regardless of whether we agree with Berger’s arguments, his chapter demonstrates an increasing concern with *looking* at animals.

In the same year as Berger’s book is released, Hugh Kenner’s short piece, ‘Taxonomy of an Octopus’ is printed in the *JJQ*; in his essay Kenner argues that Æ is not talking of the occult, but of ‘British economic power’.[[90]](#footnote-91) A longer discussion of the octopus, however, does not surface until 2021.[[91]](#footnote-92)

Four years after Berger’s book is published, Lindsey Tucker releases a full-length study on eating in *Ulysses* titled: *Stephen and Bloom at Life’s Feast.*[[92]](#footnote-93) In her chapter on Stephen, Tucker follows the well-established practice of reading the animals of the novel symbolically, as the animals discussed in this chapter of her book are considered in terms of their symbolic purpose, and not their physical status as food. Interestingly, in her section on Bloom (in which animals as meat are mentioned only briefly) Tucker, despite her concentration on food, turns away from the animal and instead focuses more on cannibalism and human sacrifice rather than animal slaughter. By dividing her book in this manner, Tucker also shows how Stephen is often aligned with the symbolic and Bloom with the physical.

In 1987, the black panther and its symbolic meaning are once again revisited. Vincent J. Cheng notes the influence of Bram Stoker, and works to situate the animal in a literary and historical context. Cheng uses both Stoker’s depiction of vampires and medieval bestiaries to argue that the image of the black panther allows us to see Stephen as a destructive son:

A Panther, then, is a destructive son; it is Stephen the son who is the panther-vampire, whose “bat-sails” bloody the sea mother. For Stephen, birth and creation are as much associated with violence and wounding as are sex and creation: creation Itself implies violence and destruction.[[93]](#footnote-94)

The panther is returned to once again in 1990 by John Gordon. What is significant about Gordon’s essay is that it marks a turning point in animal focused Joycean criticism; Gordon no longer reads the panther in terms of Shakespearean or medieval symbolism but through the lens of post-colonial discourse, arguing that Stephen is Haines’ panther, stalking him across Dublin’s landscape.[[94]](#footnote-95) This turn away from symbolism may be due to the increasing number of theoretical texts that consider the animal in an ethical manner; these include Julia Twigg’s, Marjorie Spiegel, and Carol J. Adam’s works.[[95]](#footnote-96)

This general trend of reading *Ulysses* through the lens of post-colonial discourse continues into both the 1990s—with Cheng’s important work *Joyce, Race and Empire*, which is released in 1995—and the 2000s—with Andrew Gibson’s 2002 work *Joyce’s Revenge*. While both these books are an integral part of Joycean criticism, neither mention animals in *Ulysses* in any great detail; Gibson uses language that is reminiscent of the animal industry in the subheading of his first chapter: ‘fettered and branded’. Additionally, Gibson’s seventh chapter is named ‘An Irish Bull in an English Chinashop: ‘Oxen of the Sun’; while ‘bull’ is suggestive of the animal, it is used in this instance to refer to a blunderer or jester. Despite the prevalence of physical cattle in *Ulysses*, and the influence on the Irish cattle trade by the English colonial power, they are not discussed in Gibson’s book. Indeed, in *Joyce’s Revenge* animals are only specifically mentioned in relation to either animal produce and human poverty,[[96]](#footnote-97) or social class and fox hunting.[[97]](#footnote-98) Cheng’s book does contain a chapter on horses, adapted from an essay, but its focus is on *Finnegans Wake* and therefore the essay it is based on will be discussed in the second literature review of this thesis.[[98]](#footnote-99)

In 1997 Derrida gives his lecture *The Animal That Therefore I Am*.[[99]](#footnote-100) In 1998 Dirk Vanderbeke turns to the transformations in ‘Circe’ focusing on the inspiration or source for these transformations whilst also noting what Joyce does differently to the *Odyssey* and its potential variants.[[100]](#footnote-101) In 1999 a collection of philosophical essays on animals, named *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life*, is printed. The most interesting of these essays, ‘*Comment ne pas manger­-*Deconstruction and Humanism’, focuses on Derrida and his discussion with Jean-Luc Nancy titled ‘Eating Well’. David Wood (author of this chapter) brings in Heidegger, along with Derrida, in his discussion of Humanism. Wood discusses the dissolution of the human/animal binary, commenting on its physical, scientific dissolution (with humans using pig hearts or heart valves in surgery). Wood goes on to be heavily critical of Derrida’s views on vegetarianism, arguing against Derrida’s odd claim that he is ‘a vegetarian in [his] soul’[[101]](#footnote-102) (which is the same as not being one at all), as vegetarianism is a physical act, not a spiritual or symbolic one. Dismissing Derrida’s claim that vegetarianism is an easy way to have a good conscience, Wood claims that, instead, vegetarianism offers momentum to a movement that resists the idea and practice of using animals as dispensable commodities.

Wood’s comments on vegetarianism reveal the growing concern with animal consumption, which (as has been noted) has been championed by philosophers such as Peter Singer in the 1970s and numerous feminist critics since the 1980s. This continues into the 1990s, with Carol J. Adam’s essay ‘Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals’.[[102]](#footnote-103) Indeed, it is in the 1990s that animal studies as an individual movement appears to gain momentum; not only does Derrida give his lecture in 1997, but in 1996 David Abram publishes his monograph *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World*.[[103]](#footnote-104) A year earlier, Adams releases an edited collection with Josephine Donovan titled: *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations.[[104]](#footnote-105)*

In Joyce studies, however, the animal remains on the side-lines; indeed, as late as 2001 Rathjen Friedhelm considers animals as symbols, and uses them to reveal something about the novel’s human characters. In 2003, José Carlos Redondo Olmedilla’s excellent essay on *Ulysses* and the medieval bestiary is published. Redondo Olmedilla aligns the duality of the medieval bestiary to *Ulysses*, and convincingly argues that this ‘polymorphic character is also linked to the idea of transformation, and needless to say, it is key and omnipresent in the medieval bestiaries as it is in *Ulysses*’.[[105]](#footnote-106) Additionally, a year later Sarah Joseph publishes an essay on anthropomorphism but does not, however, mention animals.[[106]](#footnote-107)

It is not until 2004, however, that an essay on *Ulysses* and vegetarianism surfaces with Rod Rosenquist’s ‘Bloom’s Digestion of the Economic and Political Situation in James Joyce’s “Lestrygonians”’. With his essay, Rosenquist begins another trend in Joycean criticism – that of vegetarian (or vegan) studies. In his article, Rosenquist ties the topic to colonialism: ‘In the first page of “Lestrygonians” alone, Joyce has called attention to the economic and political problems caused by Ireland’s service to both the English and Italian masters­ – all through the channel of food discourse’.[[107]](#footnote-108) In the interim between this essay on vegetarianism and the next (which appears in 2009) Gary Steiner’s important work *Anthropocentrism and its Discontents* is released.[[108]](#footnote-109) In the same year (2005), Derek Ryan and Harriet Ritvo also publish works, the former his introduction to Animal Theory,[[109]](#footnote-110) and the latter an essay in *The Cultural Politics of Food and Eating: A Reader*.[[110]](#footnote-111) Ryan’s release of *Animal Theory: A Critical Introduction* emphasises the growing interest and importance of animal studies in the humanities. Ryan divides his book into four sections—‘Animals as Humans’, ‘Animal Ontology’, ‘Animal Life’, and ‘Animal Ethics’—and ends each of these with an application of the discussed theories to a literary text. Ryan’s summaries and interpretations of the seminal works of animal studies, which include Deleuze and Guatarri’s ‘Becoming Animal’,[[111]](#footnote-112) and Derrida’s *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, are both useful and succinct. What Ryan’s text excels at, however, is demonstrating how these theories can be applied to literature.

A year later in 2006 Maud Ellmann’s article ‘*Ulysses*: Changing into an Animal’ is published. Ellmann starts off by quoting Joyce, who said: ‘Circe has changed me too into an animal’.[[112]](#footnote-113) Following this, Ellmann examines numerous animals in *Ulysses* – aiming to ‘reenvisage *Ulysses* from the perspective of oxen’, discuss the role of pets, and conducts a close reading of ‘Circe’.[[113]](#footnote-114) In the course of her argument, Ellmann makes the following point: ‘A carnivore at breakfast and a vegetarian at lunch, Bloom typifies the contradictions of Western culture, especially today, when the utmost cruelty to animals in farms and laboratories coexists with the utmost tenderness towards household pets’.[[114]](#footnote-115) This demonstrates how an investigation of animals and their treatment by humans can inform us about the society in which we live.

While the area of animal studies has been growing since at least the 1990s, animal focused criticism on *Ulysses* does not start in earnest until 2009, when there is an influx of animal-related essays, most notably Ariela Freedman’s ‘“Don’t Eat Beefsteak”: Joyce and the Pythagoreans’, David Rando’s ‘The Cat’s Meow: *Ulysses,* Animals and the Veterinary Gaze’, Sam Slote’s ‘Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy Mongrel of Irish Modernity’, and Marguerite M. Regan’s ‘“Weggebobbles and Fruit”: Bloom’s Vegetarian Impulses’.

Rando associates silence and animals in his article, using what he terms ‘the veterinary gaze’ to offer a new perspective. Rando explains that through a study of feline anatomy, veterinarians observed that cats have two types of vocal cords: ‘a distinction was made between “false” and “true” vocal cords; the former are used for purring while the latter kind “causes the voice”’.[[115]](#footnote-116) Rando then takes this further, arguing that this veterinary gaze impacts how we perceive the animal, which in turn allows us to consume them both literally and symbolically. Rando concludes by saying: ‘The novel bifurcates into a double narrative: a *Ulysses* that can be seen through human eyes, and a kind of shadow-*Ulysses* that gazes at the characters and events through the eyes of the animal other’.[[116]](#footnote-117)

Not all animals, however, lack language in *Ulysses*; the Citizen’s dog Garryowen, recites (or composes) a poem in Irish. Sam Slote discusses how the translation of Garryowen’s speech from ‘Irish or canine languages’ results in a contamination or ‘mongrelisation’ of meaning. Slote unearths a Victorian text in which numerous nationalities are given an animal which is said to represent or symbolise them. Slote comments that the author, James W. Redfield, is ‘really just comparing national stereotypes with animalistic stereotypes’.[[117]](#footnote-118) As a result, many of his comparisons are unflattering, and some outright racist. Among others, Redfield ‘notes the resemblance of Germans to lions, Prussians to cats, Laplanders to reindeer, Arabs to camels, Englishmen to bulls, and, without much originality, Frenchmen to frogs’.[[118]](#footnote-119) The Irish are compared with dogs, and (apparently) each ‘type’ of Irishman is a different breed of dog. Slote notes, however, that Joyce makes Garryowen a mongrel: ‘Garryowen is thus the perfect figure for raucous, thuggish Irish nationalism, his mongrel status no accidental tribute’.[[119]](#footnote-120) This mongrelisation of language and national identity is, then, further emphasised by Garryowen’s own status as a mongrel.

Both Freedman and Regan’s essays pick up the strand of examining vegetarianism in *Ulysses*, but each offer a very different approach. Regan links vegetarianism to both feminism and the inequalities and exploitation that occurs within the class system: ‘Again Bloom slips into standard vegetarian discourse here by criticizing the meat-eating luxuries of the superrich who require the torturing of animals to make meat more delicious’.[[120]](#footnote-121) Whilst Freedman does connect the consumption of meat with social class—‘To apply this barrier to Joyce’s Ireland we might recall that the major barrier to eating meat was poverty, not ethics’—the primary focus of her essay is the Pythagorean notion of metempsychosis.[[121]](#footnote-122) Metempsychosis is—as Freedman explains—the idea that the human soul can be transported into the bodies of other animals – a theme that Bloom considers at numerous points in the novel. This idea of consuming the ‘other’ is also the central focus in Yen-Chen Chuang’s article, published in the same year. Chuang, however, does not discuss animals in any great depth, and, instead, concentrates on the physical act of eating.[[122]](#footnote-123)

John Gordon’s chapter, ‘“Mkgnao!' 'Mrkgnao!' 'Mrkgrnao!”: The Pussens Perplex’, is also released in 2009. In his chapter Gordon deftly examines moments of sound, demonstrating how their presence in *Ulysses* is dependent on the protagonist’s (be it Stephen or Bloom) attention to that sound: ‘the distinctively Joycean note is not the onomatopoeia of the last five words but rather the fact that it kicks in at the moment Stephen closes his eyes and starts to listen’.[[123]](#footnote-124) In examining these sounds Gordon argues that the cat’s meow changes because Bloom turns and listens to his cat: ‘Bloom, pricking up his ears, achieves with each successive stimulus a more refined perception’.[[124]](#footnote-125)

After 2009, however, animal-centred Joycean criticism on *Ulysses* becomes less widespread until it returns with a force in 2017. In the interim, however, another theoretical and critical movement makes its way to Joyce studies: ecocriticism. While Tim Wenzell’s 2009 book, *Emerald Green: An Ecocritical Study of Irish Literature*, makes no mention of Joyce (perhaps because he is considered as an urban or city writer), works on *Ulysses* and ecocriticism do begin to surface, albeit three years later in 2012.[[125]](#footnote-126) James Fairhall’s essay, ‘Nature, Existential Shame, and Transcendence’, concentrates on the human-nature binary, scaling it down to the individual. Instead of humanity being figured in opposition to the landscape, Fairhall discusses the human body in relation to nature. He presents an Ariel/Caliban dynamic—‘Ariel joined at the hip with Caliban’—where humanity strives towards Ariel’s pure spirituality, and rejects Caliban’s corporeal physicality and, even, animality.[[126]](#footnote-127) Fairhall uses the example of bodily cycles—menstruation, digestion, etc., —to argue that humans in pursuit of the spiritual inevitably have to confront their physical body. In the same year (2012) Fairhall releases another essay, this time on trees in the Irish landscape, stating: ‘If we admit that the ghosts of Ireland’s lost forests haunt today’s biodiversity-depleted Irish landscape, then they haunt the pages of Ulysses as well’.[[127]](#footnote-128) Fairhall argues that the flat, treeless Irish landscape is a product of the English Colonial power, which chopped down the ancient Irish forests to build ships, and converted the land for agricultural purposes. Ireland’s trees and forests, which were a large part of Irish national and cultural identity (the Ogham alphabet, for example, is based on trees), became a commodity under English rule. Fairhall does point out, however, that before colonisation the Irish themselves were cutting down their ancient forests, but it was the English who radically increased this practice, taking control from Ireland’s native inhabitants.

In between Fairhall’s two essays and the next work on Joycean ecocriticism—which is printed in 2014—Maureen O’Connor publishes her chapter, ‘“Mrkgnao!”: Signifying Animals in the Fiction of James Joyce’ in *Critical Insights: James Joyce*. O’Connor’s astute analysis in this chapter demonstrates the overlap between animal studies and feminist discourse whilst being specifically about Joyce. O’Connor examines moments of transformation, paying ‘special attention to what [these transformations mean] for representations of women in [Joyce’s] work’.[[128]](#footnote-129) O’Connor examines Biddy Doran from *Finnegans Wake* and the bird-girl from *A Portrait*, before moving on to conduct a close reading of ‘Circe’ in order to demonstrate:

Among the disabling and limiting polarities that his fiction works to undermine are those that obtain between men and women, and between the human and the animal. It is in *Ulysses*, via the multiply hybrid figure of Leopold Bloom, that these polarities are most dramatically dismantled.[[129]](#footnote-130)

In 2014 Robert Haas argues for a ‘bestiary’ of *Ulysses*, stating that each episode has an animal symbol. Haas treats the animals of *Ulysses* purely symbolically, considering only what they can tell us about the novel’s characters.[[130]](#footnote-131) This thesis offers a more extensive list of *Ulysses*’ animals, which includes both the symbolic and the physical.

In the same year as Haas’ essay is published, *Eco-Joyce: The Environmental Imagination of James Joyce*, the most recent full-length work in Joycean Ecocriticism on *Ulysses,* is released. This text consists of fourteen essays with an introduction written by the editors, Robert Brazeau and Derek Gladwin. The introduction offers a gloss on ecocriticism, which then focuses on a distinctly Irish form of ecocriticism, before speculating on the future possibilities of an ‘eco-Joyce’. Unfortunately, many of these essays refer and make use of the same few theoretical ‘source’ texts, some of which are outdated, as Alison Lacivita, author of *The Ecology of Finnegans Wake* comments: ‘ecocriticism has moved on quite significantly from many of the arguments presented in *Eco-Joyce’*.[[131]](#footnote-132) *Eco-Joyce*, then, appears to have been published a few years too late for ecocritics. *Eco-Joyce,* however, provides a good basis for *Joycean* ecocriticism, due to its extensive bibliography and wide range of essay topics. The highlight of *Eco-Joyce*, however, is Bonnie Kime Scott’s essay ‘Joyce, Ecofeminism and the River as Woman’. Kime Scott establishes the notion of the male centre, with women and domestic animals positioned in opposition to the white male, which Kime Scott terms ‘androcentrism’. Using various examples from Joyce’s texts, Kime Scott examines how Joyce blurs the lines of the species barrier, with women being metaphorically linked to animals, which in turn helps maintain the stereotypical image of nature as female: ‘Joyce fell right in with the female gendering of nature, at least as he represents the growing artistry of Stephen Dedalus’.[[132]](#footnote-133) By touching on ideas of language (specifically a human/animal language barrier) and symbolism, Kime Scott argues that women and animals are reduced to aspects of nature, or to symbols that result in their classification as ‘other’ and not human.

*Eco-Joyce* demonstrates how ecocriticism as a movement is somewhat distinct from animal studies, as the focus of the book’s chapters are predominantly interested in the inanimate environment (rocks, hills, rivers, etc.) instead of an ecosystem which includes all these things but also the animals that live in and are an essential part of that ecosystem.

In 2015 and 2016 there are two books published on animals and literature; while neither book mentions Joyce at any great length, an examination of them is still useful in order to ascertain how the field of animal studies is developing at this time.[[133]](#footnote-134) The first of these, *Animals in Irish Literature and Culture*, is part of the ‘Palgrave Studies in Animals and Literature’ series and is published in 2015. Kathryn Kirkpatrick, in her introduction to this volume writes the following:

As Steve Baker argues in his important volume on human cultural uses of animal symbols, Picturing the Beast, representations of animals have literal consequences for nonhuman animal lives; to leave any discussion of these consequences out of scholarly work in Irish animal studies risks acquiescing to the dominant cultural view that ‘the living animal exists … solely to confirm human meanings and identities.[[134]](#footnote-135)

Kirkpatrick is emphasising here the importance of remembering the real physical animal, which cannot (or should not) be figured *only* as a vessel for human applied symbolism. In her introduction, Kirkpatrick lays out a clear structure for the upcoming work, and by reading her summaries of each section we can observe a clear sequence that the book follows. Part I examines how hunting is represented in Irish literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before moving on to look at how animals are presented as industrial commodities in poetry and films of the twentieth century. This section, then, is preoccupied with the physical exploitation of animals for human entertainment and greed. Part II then transitions to investigating the symbolic commodification of animals in literature. While the first two sections are concerned with commodification, the latter two focus more on the human-animal species barrier. Section III ‘engages with posthumanism’s challenge to anthropocentrism by reading Irish texts as transforming the definition of what it means to be human’, while Part IV looks at texts that transcend this binary (such as *Dracula*) and investigate instances of humans becoming animals, as well as ideas of the animal ‘other’.[[135]](#footnote-136) It is interesting to note that Joyce is mentioned in this text only a handful of times, and no author dedicates a significant portion of their chapter to a study of his work. What this book shows is that animal studies, whilst still interested in the commodification of animals, is also focused on not only how we define ‘human’ and ‘animal’, but how one can become the other.

There are three chapters that stand out inthis volume: Katarzyna Poloczek’s ‘“Their disembodied voices cry”, Sarah O’Connor’s ‘Hares and Hags’, and Jeanne Dubino’s ‘Mad Dogs and Irishmen’.

Poloczek begins with the idea of the erasure of animals through language, specifically in relation to meat-eating. In the English language the name for the animal and the meat it becomes is often different, although it seems this is specific to mammals, as birds and fish usually retain their names (‘salmon’, ‘chicken’, ‘turkey’, ‘cod’). Instead of ‘pig’ we have ‘pork’ or ‘bacon’, instead of ‘cow’ we have ‘veal’ or ‘beef’, and so on. Poloczek quotes Carol J. Adams surmising this practice: ‘The absent referent permits us to forget about the animal as an independent entity’.[[136]](#footnote-137) Poloczek goes on to consider the dead dolphin from Morrissey’s poem, ‘Achill, 1985’, in terms of an object: ‘The stock-still mammal, takes out of its aquatic context, looks like an artefact’.[[137]](#footnote-138) While Poloczek does not delve into ideas of animals and animal products existing as relics, she does note how their displacement renders them as belonging ‘more to the world of culture’ than to its animal life. Poloczek concludes her essay with the following sentence: ‘Their poems attest to the linguistic strategies of denial humans employ to remain dead and indifferent to the suffering of other live beings when “their disembodied voices cry”’.[[138]](#footnote-139) The poets examined do not speak for the animals, Poloczek argues, but rather advocate a more attentive form of listening, and realising that the animal’s voice is present.

O’Connor and Dubino’s essays are more concerned with the blurring of the human and nonhuman animal boundary; both essays look at texts in which the human transforms into an animal, and Dubino, in her examination of *Dracula*, considers how humans (or humanoid creatures) can transform other humans into animals. Drawing on Celtic myth, O’Connor places Ní Dhuibhne’s work in an Irish literary tradition. Ní Dhuibhne rewrites the hare and the hag myth, as O’Conner points out: ‘*Dún na mBan trí Thine* employs ‘The Old Woman as Hare’ to defy standard conceptions of animal/human relations in order to perform the most anti-anthropocentric of acts – ‘becoming animal’’.[[139]](#footnote-140) This statement is somewhat problematic; is the transformation into an animal really shifting the human out of the centre, or is it placing the human in the animal centre, giving the animal a human relation and suggesting that humans can understand animal experiences?

Dubino proceeds to examine Dracula’s transformation into a dog through a colonial lens, arguing that the fear of Dracula arises not just because he is an unknown and dangerous power, but because he is a foreign one. Dubino concludes: ‘By attending to the range of canine imagery in *Dracula*, and its link to the rabid Irish dogs who Everett Millais feared were invading England, we are in a better position to understand the convoluted connections underlying late Victorian fears of degeneration’.[[140]](#footnote-141) Dracula spreads his bestiality like the foreign dog that will transmit rabies via the violent act of biting. The invasion of foreign animals and humans is seen as dangerous, and both are relegated to the status of ‘other’, degenerate, and a potential threat.

A year later in 2016 Josephine Donovan publishes her monograph *The Aesthetics of Care*, in which she raises the question of whether animals can be thought of as objects, as well as examining their persistent commodification. Donovan discusses various literary examples of animals and argues: ‘Such episodes are aesthetically satisfying (to some) because they provide an effective way to dramatize human emotions. But in their transposition of an ethical subject into an aesthetic object, they require the sacrifice of the animal as an independent being to human aesthetic interests’.[[141]](#footnote-142) The conversion of animals from subjects to objects details the process of commodification, and Donovan shows us a specifically literary version of this.

In 2017 Joycean animal studies resurfaces with an influx of criticism dedicated exclusively to Joyce and the non-human, appearing in a special issue of *humanities* on the topic, compiled and edited by Katherine Ebury. What this journal issue does is pick up on the various threads of animal focused criticism on *Ulysses* and bring them together, whilst also introducing new ways of looking at the animal.[[142]](#footnote-143) What follows is a brief examination of a few of the essays included in this issue.

The first strand of Joycean criticism that this issue addresses is concerned with the multiple ways in which the animal is consumed, which includes both eating and using the animal body as a material. Peter Adkins returns to vegetarian studies, connecting it to post-colonial discourse by looking at both foot-and-mouth disease as well as the impact of the English colonial power on the Irish beef industry. Whilst Margot Norris’ essay is not primarily concerned with consumption, she does note the sheer volume of animals in *Ulysses* that are placed in relation to food, mentioning the cows in ‘Lestrygonians’ waiting to be slaughtered for their flesh, Bloom’s cat who drinks the milk of another animal, the seagulls which are fed by Bloom, Garryowen (the Citizen’s hungry dog), and the dogs of nighttown who hungrily consume the flesh of other animals that Bloom provides them with.[[143]](#footnote-144) What Norris’ essay makes clear is that Bloom is somewhat preoccupied with feeding others – be they animal or human.

Moving away from the topic of food, the focus of Yoshimi Minamitani’s essay is the use of animals as (non-food) inanimate objects.[[144]](#footnote-145) Minamitani discusses Joyce’s short critical article ‘Force’ (or titled ‘Subjugation’ depending on the edition of the text) and examines it alongside *Ulysses*. Minamitani uses the specific example of ivory to prove that various objects in the novel, such as piano keys and bookmarks, are subtle reminders of animal exploitation. Minamitani’s essay is also referred to in Chapter Two of this thesis, and is particularly useful in demonstrating the ubiquity of animal objects in both *Ulysses* and everyday life.

Caitlin McIntyre, in her essay, argues that both *Ulysses* and *A Portrait* ‘reverberate around nonhuman land, animals, and the ecology of Dublin’.[[145]](#footnote-146) McIntyre uses ‘queer ecology’—which she defines through Timothy Morton—to demonstrate how colonialism ‘exerts its power’ through agriculture. McIntyre reads *A Portrait* and *Ulysses* as a single novel, tracing Stephen’s movement through both texts and demonstrating how Stephen uses the landscape as well as animals to interpret both those around him and himself:

Stephen’s look brings Buck back down to earth, and flattens Buck’s alpha-male performance by comically recasting Buck as a horse and a tree. As these examples show, Stephen’s animalizations are a way of humbling and shattering the culture behind Heron and Mulligan’s masculine stances.[[146]](#footnote-147)

Ruben Borg and David Ayers move away from the idea of consumption and colonialization in their essays. Borg focuses on a phenomenological reading in which he figures Bloom’s cat as ‘the site of an arbitrary, metonymic association between Molly and the earth’.[[147]](#footnote-148) Ayers’ essay, as he explains, combines ‘two areas of enquiry in recent work on modernism: animal studies and phenomenology’, in which he discusses the religious and historical tradition that relegates animals to secondary beings through the definition of a ‘soul’.[[148]](#footnote-149) Ayers traces the presence of this thought (and the influence of numerous philosophers) in *Ulysses*.

Rachel Murray examines the presence of bees in *Stephen Hero, Ulysses*, and *Finnegans Wake*. Using Maurice Maeterlinck as a source, Murray sets out to trace the presence of the bee in Joyce’s prose.

Ronan Crowley in his essay ‘Looking at Animals without Seeing Them: Havelock Ellis in the “Circe” Episode of *Ulysses*’ returns to the ‘Circe’ episode in order to provide another method of viewing Bloom’s transformation. Crowley conducts a genetic study of the episode showing how it developed and how Joyce was influenced by and incorporated Havelock Ellis’ *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* in his manuscripts. Crowley towards the end of his essay asks the important question: ‘what of the living animal?’[[149]](#footnote-150) By asking this, and subsequently turning to the real horse of ‘Circe’, Crowley argues that the animal’s brief presence before it is anthropomorphised is almost a ‘final animal cruelty [which denies] the nonhuman animal the very foundation of its alterity’.[[150]](#footnote-151)

What this issue of *humanities* begins to do is showcase how animal studies ties in with other critical and theoretical movements that focus on the ‘other’, such as feminist and post-colonial studies as well as the field of ecocriticism. This issue however, through Ayers and Borg’s essays also demonstrates how a phenomenological reading of animals can help elucidate parts of *Ulysses*.

In between the release of the 2017 *humanities* issue and the 2021 *JJQ* issue on the non-human, the growing interest in animal-focused Joycean criticism can be readily observed; in 2018 the annual workshop at the James Joyce Foundation in Zurich was devoted to animals, and in 2019 the Beastly Modernisms conference in Glasgow included two panels dedicated specifically to Joyce.

In 2020 Lauren Benjamin’s essay ‘Circe’s Feral Beasts: Women and Other Animals in Joyce’s “Ulysses”*’* is printed in the *Journal of Modern Literature.*[[151]](#footnote-152) In the course of her essay, Benjamin argues that the dehumanisation of the novel’s characters—specifically Leopold Bloom—is not just about becoming animal, but also becoming ‘other’ in terms of gender, race, and religion. Additionally, Benjamin demonstrates how the feminine is often conflated with the *domestic* animal. Indeed, this is also observed in Chapter Five of this work, as Biddy Doran is figured as both woman and hen.

In 2021 the *JJQ* releases a journal issue, edited by Ebury and Michelle Witen, dedicated to Joyce and the non-human. In this issue (which also includes an intriguing essay on bicycles, and another on the monstrous form) we can observe some already established trends of Joycean criticism re-emerge. Robert Brazeau, for example, conducts a close reading of the ‘Telemachus’ episode, both demonstrating how animals can be used to show the effect of colonialism on a society and its economy, but also—rather originally—discusses the impact of colonialism on *animals themselves*.[[152]](#footnote-153)

Richard Barlow carries on the trend of figuring animals as symbolic, but what makes his analysis different from earlier essays on animal symbolism is that Barlow situates the animal as connected to the human (and vice versa) through the chain of evolution whilst maintaining the existence of an unknowable aspect of the creature (in this case the octopus): ‘Finally, the octopus passages suggest spaces and realities that are fundamentally beyond human understanding or are ultimately unknowable, linking the ending of the world to the “cold, infrahuman” sea and incomprehensible animals’.[[153]](#footnote-154)

Stephanie Nelson, much like Barlow, returns to an older trend of Joycean criticism by concentrating on *Ulysses*’ relation to the *Odyssey*. Nelson goes one step further than the critics who were writing in the 1990s as she examines not only the symbolic aspect (and how cattle relate to colonised Ireland), but also how the animal is integral in our understanding of what it means to be human:

For Joyce, at least with regard to Stephen, it appears to mean observing the constant changes in self-actualization brought out in the process of being/becoming artist. For both [Joyce and Homer], though, it seems that an understanding of the non-human is critical before we can come to either an understanding or an actualization of what it is to be human—and in some ways that may be more about Bloom than it is about Stephen.[[154]](#footnote-155)

Finally, Annalisa Federici, in her essay on *Ulysses* and Miguel de Cervantes’ ‘The Dialogue of the Dogs’, discusses how ‘Circe’ disrupts the boundary between human and animal. Federici achieves this through a discussion of hybrid animals, as well as how these transformations manifest.[[155]](#footnote-156)

In their introduction to this *JJQ* volume, Katherine Ebury and Michelle Witen comment that:

[Animal studies and its] theoretical context […] intersects nicely with other theories—ecocriticism, Marxism, queer studies, gender studies, technology studies, postcolonialism, post humanism, the blue humanities, psychoanalysis, deconstruction—but also transcends these frameworks, in that it is specifically relevant to twenty-first century issues.[[156]](#footnote-157)

What this shows is the trajectory of Joycean animal studies – a movement or interest which began shortly after *Ulysses* itself was published. This interest first manifested through an examination of an animal’s symbolic purpose, a trend which endured (and to some extent still endures) into the twenty-first century. However, how critics view literary animals was changing throughout the latter half of the 1900s, certainly in an ethical manner connected to meat-eating, but also in viewing or using literary animals—and the real, physical context of those animals—as methods of understanding other theoretical approaches (as Ebury and Witen point out). Joycean animal studies, however, is beginning—with the publication of the special editions of *humanities* and the *JJQ*—to grow into an independent area of study that can focus *on* the animal in order to say something, not about human historical context or symbolic connotations of fictional characters, but about *the animal itself.*

Chapter Two: ‘God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle goose becomes featherbed mountain’: Transforming into an Animal in James Joyce’s *Ulysses*

I. Introduction

A chronological reading of Joyce’s prose reveals an increasing concentration of animals in his work; *Dubliners* is monument to an intense, human-centred realism while *Finnegans Wake* is a mediaevalesque creation, the pages of which are infested with animals. Between these two books lie *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses*. *A Portrait* contains significant, yet sporadic animal imagery, perhaps most notably in the presence of the bird-girl, but also contained in the surname of the novel’s protagonist, Stephen Dedalus. In contrast, *Ulysses* calls upon animals as both symbolism and an essential part of the landscape of Dublin. Robert Haas claims that there are ‘well over a thousand animal images’ in *Ulysses*, and he posits that almost every episode ‘has’ an animal, in the same way it has an ‘art’ or ‘organ’.[[157]](#footnote-158) Haas concentrates on symbolic animals, arguing that through their presence Joyce is subtly providing information about the novel’s three protagonists: Stephen, Bloom, and Molly. The range of animals extends, however, beyond the symbolic; animals are also present in the book as physical beings, as commodities, fabular animals, idioms, and in description. By reading *Ulysses,* we encounter numerous moments in which the protagonists, and indeed many other characters of the novel, become animals – in both a physical and symbolic sense. This chapter sets out to argue that these two forms of transformation are present in the novel, and that through a change in protagonist we can see a movement from symbolic transformations to physical ones. OOO will then be used in this chapter to argue that the transformations in *Ulysses* follow a pattern or movement from the symbolic to the physical, and that this movement is a result of (or results in) the presence of both different types of objects and animals. This introduction, then, will demonstrate that these types of animals—mentioned above—are present in *Ulysses.*

‘Physical animals’ denotes any non-human animal that would, or could, have been present in Dublin on the 16th of June 19­04. These animals add to the realism of the book, and their explicit mention or implicit presence is indicative of both historical and cultural attitudes towards animals. The implicit animal, most commonly the horse, is not directly mentioned in the narrative, but by necessity must be present. The horse is often combined linguistically—and perhaps actually—to the cart they are pulling; this amalgamation of horse and cart into a horse-cart object generates questions about object boundaries, such as when does one object become another, or when do two objects become one? This question of object boundaries will be discussed at length in this chapter, particularly through an examination of Clarke and Chalmer’s ‘Extended Mind Theory’.

Animal commodities as a category encompasses the physical products of absent animals which enter into a system of value and exchange. For example, behind the feather fans and feather beds are absent, plucked birds, and—as Minamitani points out—behind Father Conmee’s ivory bookmark and the keys of various pianos, lies ‘elephants killed for the purpose’ which are ‘rendered invisible’.[[158]](#footnote-159) In this category taxidermy holds a unique place; the stuffed owl, owned by Bloom, has undergone a process of literal objectification; made of itself and referring to itself, the owl-subject has become a purely aesthetic object.

While these first two categories are concerned with the bodily aspects of animals, the subsequent four are focused on intangible animals that exist only through human construction – be it linguistic or artistic. A ‘symbolic animal’ is given meaning and connotations that exceed its own qualities. An example of this type is the lapwing; George L. Geckle argues that this animal is ‘not only addicted to “concealment and pretense” but is also a proverbially precocious bird’.[[159]](#footnote-160) Geckle claims that this bird image is used to emphasise Stephen’s artistic insecurities, as well as his promiscuity – which we witnessed in *A Portrait*. Geckle traces the lapwing through numerous works in order to develop associations and symbolic connotations. While this process would be useful if he were aiming to detail the figurative qualities of the lapwing throughout literary tradition, Geckle makes the mistake of applying all the connotations he locates to *Ulysses* without establishing if they are actually present in the novel; if we place the lapwing’s appearance in context, it becomes apparent that not all of these readings are applicable. The word ‘lapwing’ appears five times in the novel, and only in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’:

Fabulous artificer, the hawklike man. You flew. Whereto? Newhaven-Dieppe, steerage passenger. Paris and back. Lapwing. Icarus. *Pater, ait*. Seabedabbled, fallen, weltering. Lapwing you are. Lapwing be. […]

Lapwing.

Where is your brother? Apothecaries’ hall. My whetstone. Him, then Cranly, Mulligan : now these. Speech, speech. But act. Act speech. They mock to try you. Act. Be acted on.

Lapwing.[[160]](#footnote-161)

While it is clear that Stephen is having a crisis of confidence, comparing his own failure to the tale of Icarus, the lapwing here does not symbolise promiscuity and filth (Geckle notes that the lapwing is said to wallow in, and even consume, ‘filth and dung’).[[161]](#footnote-162) By naming himself lapwing, we witness something akin to nominative determinism, where the name of something, and indeed the naming of something, influences its actions and being.

*Ulysses* alsocontains a number of animal idioms, such as ‘Beef to the Heel’, an idiomatic cliché that occurs at least four times in *Ulysses*.[[162]](#footnote-163) These idiomatic uses of animals, as well as animal clichés, are often reworked in *Ulysses*; Stephen, for example, turns ‘take the bull by the horns’ (*Ulysses*, p.33), which appears in Deasy’s letter on Foot and Mouth disease, into ‘took the cow by the horns’ (*Ulysses,* p.193). This type of animal is closely connected to ‘descriptive animals’, which are used to describe something – such as a character – often in an insulting of derogatory manner; this category tends to occur in the form of either metaphor or simile. The first instance of this type appears in the novel’s opening lines with Malachi Mulligan’s face described as ‘equine in its length’ (*Ulysses*, p.3).

The category of ‘fabular animals’ is more complex than those preceding it as it involves and references an entire literary tradition. Fables often use animals, as well as inanimate objects, to develop a moral narrative, which generates messages and teachings related to a distinctly human form of morality.[[163]](#footnote-164) In fables, animals and objects are anthropomorphised and granted speech, and while many animals in *Ulysses* speak, they do not fall into this category as they are not used to generate a moral message. Some fables are, however, mentioned explicitly in *Ulysses*, but it is the reference to these narratives, and not the animals they contain, that is significant.[[164]](#footnote-165) There is substantial overlap in these categorisations, particularly the last four, which all focus on an animal’s symbolic purpose.

Earlier I mentioned two different methods of metamorphosis: physical and symbolic, and in this chapter I will show that physical transformation *undermines* an object, while symbolic transformation *overmines*. Following this introduction, section two of this chapter will look at both *Ulysses* and *A Portrait* to establish that this shift is a result of a change in protagonist. Whilst establishing this, section three will also demonstrate both that symbolic transformations ‘overmine’ while physical ones ‘undermine’, and that the transformation of a ‘sensual’ object differs from that of a ‘real’ object. These readings will be accompanied by an examination of metaphor in both works, as well as through comparative readings to Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*.

II. ‘I must satisfy an animal need’: Patterns of Transformation Across *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*.

When episodes of *Ulysses* were first released in *The Little Review*, Ezra Pound complained about the novel’s persistent lack of Stephen and the continuing presence of Leopold Bloom: ‘on June 18 [Joyce] received a letter from Pound, “disapproving of the *Sirens* […] and wanting to know whether Bloom […] could not be relegated to the background and Stephen Telemachus brought forward”’.[[165]](#footnote-182) In response to this criticism, Joyce informed his friend Frank Budgen of his growing disinterest in Stephen: ‘“Stephen no longer interests me. He has a shape that can’t be changed”’.[[166]](#footnote-183) Stephen’s inability to change is a symptom of the paralysis that we observe in *Dubliners*, and the novel leaves us questioning whether Stephen will be able to overcome it, especially given the autobiographical nature of the work and the importance of the date on which it is set to Joyce. Maud Ellmann’s claim that Stephen does not even transform in ‘Circe’—‘Note that Stephen, unlike Bloom, retains his human form throughout the ‘Circe’ episode’—suggests that this resistance to change is so acute that even the episode’s hallucinogenic quality is unable to transform him.[[167]](#footnote-184) Ellmann is only partially correct, however; Stephen certainly retains his human form far more than Bloom and other characters (such as Virag), but part of him does change: ‘STEPHEN: Break my spirit, will he? *O merde alors!* (*He cries, his vulture talons sharpened.*)’ (*Ulysses*, p.532). Joyce’s statement that his interest in his characters is dependent on their malleability, reinforces the presence of a pattern that can be observed in his work; Joyce moves from the rigid, fixed characters of *Dubliners* to the symbolically changeable in *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*, the latter of which also includes physical alterations; this process culminates in *Finnegans Wake* in which the characters can exist in multiple forms simultaneously.

Stephen’s presence in *Ulysses* forms a bridge between the later work and its prequel; his presence carries over the act of symbolic transformation, which more clearly demonstrates that this shift towards physical metamorphosis in the novel is due to Joyce supplanting one protagonist for another. The differences between Stephen and Bloom are evident; Stephen is the poetic artist, entrenched in symbolism, while Bloom is the aspiring scientist and entrepreneur whose focus is on the physical world. While this movement from one form of transformation to another alters the results of human to animal metamorphosis, it does not necessarily change the method that is used, namely metaphor. This section will first discuss the relation between animals and metaphor, before examining instances of transformation when Stephen is the protagonist, in both *A Portrait* and *Ulysses*, before moving on to focus when Bloom is at the centre of *Ulysses*’ narrative; this will demonstrate the consistent method, but difference in that method’s effect.

In his essay ‘Why Look at Animals?’ John Berger states that the principal function of animals was symbolic:

Yet to suppose that animals first entered the human imagination as meat or leather or horn is to project a 19th century attitude backwards across the millenia. Animals first entered the imagination as messengers and promises.[[168]](#footnote-185)

While Berger provides no source or evidence for his claim, which as a result must be regarded sceptically, the fact remains that an animal’s use can be symbolic; Berger takes his claim further when he argues that this figurative use generated human language:

The first subject matter for painting was animal. Probably the first paint was animal blood. Prior to that, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the first metaphor was animal. Rousseau, in his *Essay on the Origins of Languages,* maintained that language itself began with metaphor […]. If the first metaphor was animal, it was because the essential relation between man and animal was metaphoric. [[169]](#footnote-186)

Berger is not the only person to claim that language has its origins in metaphor (Vico does something similar and will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Five, alongside other theories on metaphor), but he differs by asserting that these original metaphors had animals as their subject. Regardless of whether Joyce felt (or would have felt that) such a claim had any merit, animal transformations in *A Portrait* and *Ulysses* are frequently the result of Joyce’s use of metaphoric language.[[170]](#footnote-187) Ellmann argues that metaphor is used because it ‘recalls the period before’ the ‘estrangement’ of the human or child from animals ‘has occurred’.[[171]](#footnote-188) Ellmann develops her argument by stating that it is only through metaphor that humans can relate to the bestial, animal part of themselves: ‘The implication is that human supremacy over the animal is constantly sabotaged by metaphor, by the bestiary of figurative speech; hence the language of reason is obliged to banish metaphor in order to cordon off the beast’.[[172]](#footnote-189)

Before discussing the range of transformation in *Ulysses,* I would like to point out that, while Ellmann’s claim that metaphor facilitates the human literary metamorphosis into animals feels correct, her essay on becoming animal in *Ulysses* contains various tenuous arguments. Ellmann’s assertion that Bloom is transformed into his cat, as well as other animals, when he attempts to assume their viewpoint is too simplistic: ‘[Bloom] requires no Circe to transport himself into the body of an animal; [… a]s soon as he sees his cat, he wonders what it’s like to *be* a cat’.[[173]](#footnote-190) Considering the animal viewpoint does not make one an animal; it can, however, reveal some of the divisions between these two categories. In one of the seminal works in Animal Studies, Derrida’s *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Derrida records a similar feline interaction to Bloom’s, using the encounter to define what separates humanity from other animals: ‘what in the last instance distinguishes them [animals] from man, is their being naked without knowing it. Not being naked therefore, not having knowledge of their nudity’.[[174]](#footnote-191)

When Bloom considers his cat, he questions not only her external qualities but her interior motives also:

—Mkgnao!  
 —O, there you are, Mr Bloom said, turning from the fire.   
The cat mewed in answer and stalked again stiffly round a leg of the table, mewing. Just how she walks over my writingtable. Prr. Scratch my head. Prr.   
 Mr Bloom watched curiously, kindly, the lithe black form. Clean to see : the gloss of her sleek hide, the white button under the butt of her tail, the green flashing eyes. He bent down to her, his hands on his knees.  
 —Milk for the pussens, he said.   
 —Mrkgnao! the cat cried.   
 They call them stupid. They understand what we say better than we understand them. She understands all she wants to. Vindictive too. Wonder what I look like to her. Height of a tower? No, she can jump me.   
 (*Ulysses,* p.53)

Joyce uses free indirect discourse here to show the reader how Bloom views his cat; he no more transforms into her than he does the hungry seagulls on the Liffey or the cows waiting to be slaughtered, as Ellmann claims. Bloom is not considering here what it would be like to be a cat, but rather he is analysing the cat’s physical characteristics (eye colour, fur) and desires (milk, head scratches). Bloom also wonders about how he appears to his cat, acknowledging that sensual qualities like height are relative to individual perception: ‘Wonder what I look like to her. Height of a tower? No, she can jump me’. Through a catalogue of the animal’s sensual qualities and the lack of any definitive knowledge of intention or being, Joyce demonstrates that no matter how much information can be gleaned from observation, the cat-object’s real qualities remain untouched and unknown; this is made evident when later in the episode Bloom misjudges the cat’s intentions, projecting his own desires onto her:

The cat, having cleaned all her fur […] stalked to the door. She looked back at him, mewing. Wants to go out. […] The cat mewed to him.  
 —Miaow! he said in answer. Wait till I’m ready.   
[…] In the table drawer he found an old number of *Titbits*. He folded it under his armpit, went to the door and opened it. The cat went up in soft bounds. Ah, wanted to go upstairs, curl up in a ball on the bed.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.65)

Additionally, Joyce is not just an observer or recorder of this moment of animal perception; by altering the voice of the cat as the episode progresses Joyce participates in this human-animal interaction: the cat’s language is transcribed first as ‘Mkgnao’, before becoming ‘Mrkgnao’, ‘Mrkrgnao’, and ‘Gurrhr’ (*Ulysses,* p.53-54). Bloom’s, and Derrida’s, scientific and attentive curiosity does not ‘transpose’ them into the body of their pets, just as Montaigne does not become his cat when he asks: ‘When I play with my cat, who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she makes me?’.[[175]](#footnote-192)

i. ‘Bous Stephanoumenos’: Stephen’s Symbolic Animal Transformations

Transformations from human to animal in *A Portrait* are often the result of Stephen applying figurative language to human individuals. This technique often generates a caricature, where specific aspects of the individual are exaggerated; these exaggerations are frequently, but not always, aggressive or offensive. One example occurs when Stephen plays on the surname of one of his classmates, partially turning him into a bird: ‘He had often thought it strange that Vincent Heron had a bird’s face as well as a bird’s name’.[[176]](#footnote-193) Stephen uses metaphor to insult Heron’s appearance, implying, perhaps, that he has a long, beaky nose. Using metaphor to abuse or describe other characters is not a unique occurrence for Stephen, and he does the same thing to Mulligan in ‘Proteus’: ‘He has the key. I will not sleep there when this night comes. A shut door of a silent tower entombing their blind bodies, the panthersahib and his pointer’ (*Ulysses,* p.44). The ‘panther’ motif, originating from Haines’ dream, is used in *Ulysses* to gesture towards (among other things) themes of prey and predation. In this context, Stephen positions Haines as the preying colonial power that has displaced Stephen in both his place of residence and in his friendship with Mulligan who is the faithful hunting dog: the ‘pointer’. Stephen creates an image of Haines and Mulligan, in a colonial servant-master dynamic, intent on hunting him down.[[177]](#footnote-194)

As we have seen with Heron, and will see in with Mulligan, names in Joyce’s novels can enable instances of transformation. Stephen becomes victim to this himself when his school mates call out to him in ancient Greek: ‘Stephanos Dedalos! Bous Stephanoumenos! Bous Stephaneforos!’.[[178]](#footnote-195) The first of these names is merely a ‘Greek-ing’ of his, already very Greek, name: ‘Stephen Dedalus’. Stuart Curran translates the latter two phrases as: ‘Cow by the name of Stephen [… and] land-locked cow’.[[179]](#footnote-196) Curran uses the grammar of this passage to argue that: ‘At this climactic moment of the novel Stephen is to transform himself from passive sufferer into an active molder of experience through an act of self-elevation, self-coronation’.[[180]](#footnote-197) Stephen carries on the pun of his schoolmates and figures himself as a wreathed cow, a common sacrifice ‘of the Greek religion’.[[181]](#footnote-198) Interestingly, while the bird-girl epiphany—which appears just three pages after this moment and is considered to be far more climactic—is not recalled by Stephen in *Ulysses* he does recall, and repeat, his symbolic becoming of a cow/bull:

I, Bous Stephanoumenos, bullockbefriending bard, am lord and giver of their life. He encircled his gadding hair with a coronal of vineleaves, smiling at Vincent. […] Vincent said to him [… a]ll desire to see you bring forth the work you meditate{, to acclaim you Stephaneforos}.(*Ulysses,* p.394)[[182]](#footnote-199)

Through the use of metaphor Stephen imagines himself as a scared animal, applying symbolic meaning that was originally generated in *A Portrait*. Through the movement from ‘Stephanoumenos’ to ‘Stephaneforos’ Stephen expresses his artistic ambition, as Curran explains: ‘Bous Stephaneforos—the garlanded heifer, the artist crowned with laurel—is the common sacrificial offering of the Greek religion’.[[183]](#footnote-200) This method, of naming himself to establish his internal desires or emotions, occurs multiple times in *Ulysses*; the earlier quoted example of the ‘lapwing’ is another instance of this as it betrays Stephen’s feelings of failure. His transformation into this bird is also reinforced by his movement from the word ‘are’ to the imperative ‘be’: ‘Lapwing you are. Lapwing be’ (*Ulysses*, p.202).

While all these instances of transformation are the result of metaphor, the most famous instance of metamorphosis in *A Portrait*—Stephen’s bird-girl epiphany—uses similes and figurative language instead: ‘She seemed like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird’.[[184]](#footnote-201) John S. Rickard comments that this transformation turns the bird-girl into ‘a self-serving idea rather than a person’.[[185]](#footnote-202) Indeed, as she is only known to us as the ‘bird-girl’ her transformation becomes a significant part of her identity; she is overmined by being a symbol for art and undermined in part as her transformation is focused on specific aspects of her body in isolation.

As each of these transformations into animals are symbolic, no ‘real’ animal-objects are evoked. In the case of Heron, it is his name which generates a specific image, while with Mulligan and Stephen—and with the bird-girl whose name is not known—animals are chosen as symbols because Stephen perceives that they have specific symbolic and sensual qualities; Mulligan as a pointer is a hunter and a traitor, the lapwing symbolises artistic failure, and Stephen-as-cow is rendered a religious sacrifice. As these transformations reduce the significance of these animals to a group of symbolic connotations, they overmine the animal-object. When the focus shifts from Stephen to Bloom in *Ulysses* the transformations cease to be purelysymbolic; instead, humans physically turn into animals – an act which underminesthem. Before I move on to discuss moments when Bloom is the narrator in *Ulysses*, it is important to note that this pattern appears on a smaller scale in ‘Telemachus’. What follows, then, is a close reading of this episode which may be considered as laying out these patterns in miniature, before they are fleshed out and expanded upon in the novel as a whole.

ii. ‘fluttering his wing like hands’: Buck Mulligan’s Metamorphoses in ‘Telemachus’

In ‘Telemachus’ we witness Malachi Mulligan go through this pattern of becoming an animal first symbolically, then a mixture of symbolically and physically, before he ends up as a purely physical animal. In order to demonstrate this, this section will consist of a close reading of Mulligan’s three animal transformations in ‘Telemachus’.

‘Telemachus’ begins with a description of Malachi ‘Buck’ Mulligan: ‘Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed’ (*Ulysses*, p.3). In this episode the word ‘buck’ is only spoken by Mulligan himself and the context of these two occurrences reveal to us information about their speaker. As the second occurrence is significantly less relevant to this chapter than the first, I will deal with it briefly here. Towards the end of ‘Telemachus’ Mulligan claims that ‘[r]edheaded women buck like goats’ (*Ulysses,* p.22). By using his own nickname as the lewd verb in the centre of this sentence, Mulligan reveals a libidinous aspect of his personality. This is compounded by the presence of the goat at the end of this simile. The notorious lechery of goats has a long tradition; in medieval folklore the goat is deemed a ‘lascivious animal’, that is ‘always ready to mate’.[[186]](#footnote-203) This notion persists in modern language usage, with the metaphor ‘old goat’ being defined by the *OED* as a ‘lustful or lascivious man; a lecher’.[[187]](#footnote-204) The first time Mulligan uses the word ‘buck’, however, is far more important here than his quip pertaining to red-headed women.

Eighteen pages before the goat comment, Mulligan turns himself into a symbolic animal through the use of his nickname: ‘My name is absurd too : Malachi Mulligan, two dactyls. But it has a Hellenic ring, hasn’t it? Tripping and sunny like the buck himself’ (*Ulysses,* p.4). The heraldic symbolism contained in this sentence is made apparent through the verb ‘tripping’. While Michael J. O’Shea, in his book on heraldry in Joyce, only refers to Mulligan’s words in relation to Stephen’s thoughts in ‘Proteus’, he does provide us with enough information to analyse Mulligan’s sentence ourselves. O’Shea comments that the heraldic term ‘trippant’—‘tripping’ being the active verb form of the word—is ‘used to describe a walking deer or dog’.[[188]](#footnote-205) O’Shea frequently references Arthur Charles Fox-Davies’ *A Complete Guide to Heraldry* in his book, and if we turn to this source we can get a more specific idea of what ‘trippant’ means: ‘Anything in the nature of the stag must be subject to Graphical user interface

Description automatically generatedthe following terms […] if walking it is termed “trippant” (Fig.380)’.[[189]](#footnote-206) While this definition offers no more information than O’Shea’s, the attached image does; if a stag is ‘trippant’, its walking is denoted by the raising of a single foreleg, if two forelegs are raised it is ‘springing’, and if all four legs are raised—as if it were jumping—the stag is ‘courant’.[[190]](#footnote-207) Through the term ‘tripping’, we know Mulligan is referring to a heraldic animal, but the specific animal is identified by O’Shea: The ‘Arms of Leinster, with the traditional crest of Ireland: On a wreath or and azure, a tower triple-towered of the first, from the portal a hart springing argent, attired and hoofed gold’.[[191]](#footnote-208) This can be seen below in Figure **A picture containing text

Description automatically generated**Three:[[192]](#footnote-209) Both the tower on the crest, and the Martello Tower at Sandymount are made of white stone. A clear parallel is made between the stag emerging and Mulligan’s own exit from the tower. The stag in this image—springing, not trippant—can be considered an appropriate symbol for Ireland, as medieval folklore casts the stag as the natural enemy of the snake. According to Pliny the Elder’s *Natural History*, stags are ‘at war’ with snakes, killing all the serpents they come across, particularly by drowning them.[[193]](#footnote-210) This hatred of snakes links the stag to Saint Patrick, whose myth states he drove all the snakes out of Ireland *into* the sea – where they, presumably, drowned. While Mulligan uses his name to connect himself to the heraldic stag on this coat of arms, differences are established: stags and St. Patrick *drown* things, snakes specifically, but Mulligan—much to Stephen’s chagrin—*saves* men from drowning.

**Figure Two**

**Figure Three**

While the meaning of the symbolism here is unclear, what *is* clear is that Mulligan figures his name and himself as a heraldic, Irish deer. This transformation, because it is symbolic, overmines the animal. A heraldic animal is an instance where a species comes to represent a group of humans because of their perceived qualities. Stags are considered to be noble and regal, perhaps because only the aristocracy was allowed to hunt them. These qualities are, of course, sensual; the stag will remain a stag whether it is ‘regal’, ‘trippant’, ‘sunny’ or representative of Ireland. Mulligan’s interest, and thus transformation, interacts only with these sensual qualities, but the real qualities of the stag are not encountered, or even considered. As a result, this first transformation overmines the stag as it is valued for its perceived aspects and not as the animal itself.

The next instance of animal description relating to Mulligan appears sixteen pages later. This animal transformation is partial, and through the use of descriptive animals Mulligan becomes part symbolic bird and part physical human:

He [Mulligan] tugged swiftly at Stephen’s ashplant in farewell and, running forward to a brow of the cliff, fluttered his hands at his sides like fins or wings of one about to rise in the air […]. He capered before them down towards the fortyfoot hole, fluttering his winglike hands, leaping nimbly, Mercury’s hat quivering in the fresh wind that bore back to them his brief birdlike cries.  
 (*Ulysses,* p.19)

By using similes, Mulligan’s transformation is contained in the symbolic, literary sphere. Before he is depicted as part-bird, the narrative offers up another possibility in the phrase ‘like fins or wings’; although the latter description is chosen and repeated, the first indicates the presence of a sea-animal, which may be foreshadowing Mulligan’s final transformation. This second transformation, however, uses the bird aspects of Mulligan’s figure to generate both Pagan and Christian religious symbolism. As with the instance of the heraldic stag, it is Mulligan’s name that generates some of the symbolic connotations; in Hebrew Malachi translates to ‘my messenger’, [[194]](#footnote-211) and the Mercury hat that Mulligan is wearing points us firmly in the direction of the Roman messenger god, Mercury, described by Ovid as the ‘son of Jove and Maia; messenger of the gods’.[[195]](#footnote-212) As Mercury was depicted in Roman mythology wearing a winged hat and winged shoes, Joyce’s decision to settle on wings rather than fins, cements this Pagan parallel in the narrative:

Promptly he [Mercury] fastened on his ankle wings […]  
 Put on his magic cap, and thus arrayed  
 Jove’s son sprang from his father’s citadel  
 Down to the earth. [[196]](#footnote-213)

Mercury-Mulligan’s message—the final stanza (altered by Joyce) of Oliver St. John Gogarty’s ‘The Song of the Cheerful (but Slightly Sarcastic) Jesus’—floats back to Stephen on ‘birdlike cries’ (*Ulysses*, p.19).[[197]](#footnote-214) The first verse of this ballad, that Mulligan sings, is as follows:

*I’m the queerest young fellow that ever you heard.  
 My mother’s a jew, my father’s a bird.  
 With Joseph the joiner I cannot agree,  
 So here’s to disciples and Calvary.* (*Ulysses*, p.18)

The animal characteristics of the pagan deity are minor in comparison to Mulligan’s account of Jesus’ conception. In Christianity, the Holy Spirit (which came down upon Mary and impregnated her with Jesus Christ) is usually depicted as fire or a white dove. Mulligan takes this miracle and alters it into an instance of implied bestiality. While Mulligan is part symbolic bird and physical human, he implies that Christ is either the same form of hybrid, or is a product of physical woman and physical bird. In this passage, Mulligan is rendered as a comic Christ-Mercury figure, whose message is one of blasphemous bestiality.

As this transformation is hybrid in nature, the bird is both undermined and overmined. The undermining results from the bird transformation being reduced to physical parts: only the hands and the voice are altered. The overmining is due to the bird-hands and bird-voice obtaining their significance from symbolic referents—as is the case with the heraldic stag— this time from Christian and Pagan deities. In this passage, an actual ‘real’ bird is never present.

Up until this point, the animals in both transformations have had symbolic aspects, be they total or partial. As these transformations have each had a symbolic dimension, they have emphasised or revealed to us something about Mulligan’s character; namely his egotism and his satirical blasphemy. Mulligan’s final transformation, however, is devoid of a figurative part, and thus reveals nothing *about* Mulligan. At the end of ‘Telemachus’ Stephen observes Mulligan in the water: ‘A voice, sweettoned and sustained, called to him from the sea. Turning the curve he waved his hand. It called again. A sleek brown head, a seal’s, far out on the water, round’ (*Ulysses*, p.23). While this image may simply be a seal in the sea, the narrative guides us away from this assumption; the voice is described as addressing Stephen directly, and when he turns to the ocean sees neither Mulligan nor a Mulligan-seal hybrid. Instead, what Stephen observes *is* a seal; the usage of similes has ceased, and Mulligan vanishes from the narrative. As we shall see with the animals of ‘Circe’, it is the alteration of voice that reveals to us that this transformation is physical and not sensual. This aspect of physical metamorphosis is more clearly evident in Ovid than in Joyce, as we can observe with Actaeon’s transformation (inflicted on him as punishment by Diana) into a deer:

Antlers she raised upon his dripping head,  
Lengthened his neck, pointed his ears, transformed  
His hands to hooves, arms to long legs, and draped  
His body with a dappled hide; and last  
Set terror in his heart. Actaeon fled,   
Royal Actaeon, and marvelled in his flight  
At his new leaping speed, but, when he saw  
His head and antlers mirrored in a stream,   
He tried to say 'Alas!'—but no words came;   
He groaned—that was his voice; the tears rolled down  
On cheeks not his—all changed except his mind.[[198]](#footnote-215)

As with Io, what Actaeon mourns is the loss of his voice and the loss of his ability to communicate. What is retained, however, is the mind, and OOO would name this the ‘real’ quality, the essence that, as it is preserved, allows Actaeon to continue existing *as* Actaeon. The alteration of Mulligan’s voice (it has become ‘sweettoned’, whereas it was ‘birdlike’ before) clarifies that this transformation is a physical one; and as the call directed at Stephen—which is emphasised by the repeated ‘st’ sounds in the narrative which may gesture towards Stephen’s name—the presence of Mulligan’s mind or interior self is reinforced.[[199]](#footnote-216)

iii. ‘O, I have been a perfect pig’: Bloom’s Physical Metamorphosis into an Animal

In ‘Telemachus’ Stephen’s free indirect discourse interrupts the narrative at various points to apply symbolism to physical things; one example involves the milkmaid and her herd of absent cattle: ‘They lowed about her whom they knew, dewsilky cattle. Silk of the kine and poor old woman, names given her in old times’ (*Ulysses*, p.14). Stephen turns the woman and the cattle into symbols for an idealised, pastoral Ireland.**[[200]](#footnote-217)** In parallel to this contemplation, which occurs in the first episode of *Ulysses*, Joyce has Bloom consider cattle in the first episode he appears in, ‘Calypso’. In Bloom’s free indirect discourse, his interest in the animal stems from their corporeal qualities and uses, not their symbolic ones:

Of course if they ran a tramline along the North Circular from the cattle market to the quays value would go up like a shot […]. Those mornings in the cattlemarket the beasts lowing in their pens, branded sheep, flop and fall of dung.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.56-57)

While Stephen and Bloom only consider the sensual qualities of the cattle, their differing focus—Stephen’s on the symbolic and Bloom’s on the physical— clearly demonstrates the differences between the novel’s two male protagonists. As a result, it is unsurprising that the transformations which feature in Bloom’s episodes are more often bodily than symbolic.

In Bloom’s narrative animal descriptions frequently render humans as animals, either partially or totally; for example, Bloom is described as having ‘flurried stork’s legs’ (*Ulysses,* p.63) as he descends the stairs of his home. This instance produces a comic effect, but when Bloom applies metaphors of his own to other characters, the result is more often grotesque than amusing: ‘His heart astir he pushed in the door of the Burton restaurant. Stink gripped his trembling breath : pungent meatjuice, slush of greens. See the animals feed. Men, men, men’ (*Ulysses,* p.161). Bloom turns the diners into hungry animals, eating without manners or considerations of hygiene. While many arguments about Bloom’s upcoming ‘vegetarian moment’ cite his consideration of animal slaughter and metempsychosis as the motivating factor behind his meatless lunch, I believe that the reason lies in his disgust of his fellow humans, as Bloom’s response to thoughts of animal death are not ones of sympathy or revulsion, but hunger:

Wretched brutes there at the cattlemarket waiting for the poleaxe to split their skulls open. […] Hot fresh blood they prescribe for decline. Blood always needed. Insidious. Lick it up, smokinghot, thick sugary. Famished ghosts. Ah, I’m hungry.  
 (*Ulysses,* p.163)

It is through observing other diners and their bodily functions that Bloom is reminded that humans are animals; it is his disgust from this realisation, emphasised through the repetition of the word ‘men’, that results in his choice of a vegetarian lunch. Bloom’s revulsion draws an unexpected parallel between him and Stephen, who also transfigures the bestial, base aspects of humanity onto animals; Stephen’s vision of hell, for example, is infested by goat-men in various stages of digestion: ‘Goatish creatures with human faces [one] complained monotonously as his beard stuck in the tufted weeds […] their long swishing tails besmeared with stale shite’.[[201]](#footnote-218) It is this shared desire for food that blurs the human-animal boundary in ‘Lestrygonians’; the seagulls are anthropomorphised by Bloom who complains of their ingratitude after he has fed them—'Lot of thanks I get. Not even a caw’ (*Ulysses,* p.146)—and hungry humans are figured as beasts in their pursuit of food: the policemen, for example, are described as ‘[b]ound for their troughs’ (*Ulysses,* p.155). Ellmann’s argument that in ‘Circe’ ‘human supremacy over the animal is constantly sabotaged by metaphor’, can also be observed in ‘Lestrygonians’, as metaphor is used here, not to turn humans into specific animals, but to reinforce the bestial, animal nature of humanity.[[202]](#footnote-219)

In terms of animal transformations, ‘Circe’ is undoubtedly the novel’s climax; it is full of humans becoming animals, animals becoming other animals, and inanimate objects becoming animate. In this episode Bloom’s earlier claim that ‘[e]verything speaks in its own way’ (*Ulysses*, p.117) is enacted; speech dominates the episode due to its playscript structure. ‘Circe’s’ magic arises from its hallucinogenic quality, which distorts or transmutes all characters of the episode indiscriminately; it is difficult to tell who or what is real or fantasy, if we can even divide the episode into these two categories. As a result, the animals of ‘Circe’ can be divided into the two categories that OOO defines: ‘sensual’ and ‘real’. The ‘real’ animal, such as Corney Kelleher’s horse, is a physical being and not part of the fantasy. The imaginary animal—the sensual object—however, relies on the episode’s hallucinogenic fantasies to exist; it is the creation of these animals and their easily altered sensual qualities that leads to ‘Circe’ becoming overwhelmed with transformations.

When Stephen uses metaphor earlier in the text, it results in a figurative change; the transformation of the characters remains in Stephen’s description, not touching the characters he is describing. In ‘Circe’, however, the episode’s fantastical quality causes metaphors to be taken literally, as Ellmann argues: ‘This animality reasserts itself in metaphors, which are taken literally in ‘Circe’, in accordance with the Freudian principle that dreams treat words as things’.[[203]](#footnote-220) Ellmann goes on to describe the presence of a metaphoric cliché, which generates a transformation: ‘a phrase like ‘go the whole hog’ conjures up a hog; brutish men materialize as brutes’.[[204]](#footnote-221) In this instance a metaphor leads to a transformation, but the inverse also occurs; in ‘Circe’ Joyce uses a reflective sort of metaphorical transformation to connect the episode’s instances of emerging lucidity to its moments of deepest fantasy. This process can be observed in Bloom’s metamorphosis into a pig.

Roughly two thirds into the episode, Bloom bends down to tie the shoelaces of the whore-mistress Bella Cohen, and upon completing his task, he begins to change: ‘*Bloom raises his head. Her heavy face, her eyes strike him in midbrow. His eyes grow dull, darker and pouched, his nose thickens*’ (*Ulysses*, p.497). The effect of this change is revealed half a page later, with Bloom and Bella swapping genders: ‘*He* [Bella/o] *taps her* [Bloom] *on the shoulder with his fan*’ (*Ulysses*, p.498). As Bloom’s masochistic fantasy of humiliation plays out, he is turned first into a woman and then into an animal: ‘*With a piercing epileptic cry she sinks on all fours, grunting, snuffling, rooting at his feet, then lies, shamming dead with eyes shut tight*’ (*Ulysses*, p.498). In her consideration of this process Ellmann argues that ‘[i]n the psychodynamics of this episode, to be changed into an animal is equivalent to being changed into a woman, born to be bitted, bridled, and mounted’.[[205]](#footnote-222) Ellmann is correct in assuming both changes are intended to be humiliating, but Bloom’s metamorphosis is gradual; he becomes more ‘other’ than his original self with each transformation. What we witness, then, are stages of humiliation; ‘Circe’ appears to be saying: bad enough to become a woman, but to become an animal also? The change into an animal is not ‘equivalent’ to becoming a woman, it is *worse*. At this stage of degradation Bloom’s punishments can then begin.

Six pages after his initial transformation, Bloom is once again described as male: ‘(*He lifts his arms*)’ (*Ulysses*, p.504). We soon learn, however, that he is not *just* male: ‘For that lot trained by owner to fetch and carry, basket in mouth. (*He bares his arms and plunges it elbowdeep in Bloom’s vulva.*) There’s fine depth for you!’ (*Ulysses,* p.505). Then, as a hermaphrodite animal, Bloom is auctioned off to the highest bidder. The fantasy falls away seventeen pages later on page 514; on page 515 this return to a more realistic narrative is cemented by the intrusion of Kitty, Florry, and Lynch’s voices:

THE VOICE OF KITTY  
(*In the thicket.*) Show us one of them cushions.  
THE VOICE OF FLORRY  
Here.  
(*A grouse wings clumsily though the underwood.*)  
THE VOICE OF LYNCH  
(*In the thicket.*) Whew! Piping hot!  
THE VOICE OF ZOE  
(*From the thicket.*) Came from a hot place.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.515)

On the page preceding this, Bloom, gradually returning to lucidity and once again male and human, exclaims: ‘O, I have been a perfect pig’ (*Ulysses*, p.514). This metaphor, while on a realistic level refers to Bloom’s acknowledgement of his lecherous thoughts and activities, is rather comic as it is positioned after his fantasy of being bought and sold. In this fantasy, we hear of numerous characteristics that render Bloom-as-pig a bargain, such as being both a virgin and quite easy to milk. The episode justifies turning Bloom into a pig after the fact, grounding the fantasies somewhat in reality and as the result of idiomatic metaphor. In the course of his transformation Bloom retains his voice; this is due to the permeability of the boundaries of a sensual object.

There are multiple forms of object boundaries; first, there is the boundary that exists between the interior and the exterior of an object, their real and sensual qualities; second, there is the border that occurs between one object and another. The latter type is simpler to explain than the former. In their essay on ‘The Extended Mind’, Clark and Chalmers consider the segregation of objects when they ask: ‘Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?’.[[206]](#footnote-223) They recognise two existing answers for this question, and offer a third of their own:

Some accept the boundaries of skin and skull [… o]thers […] hold that […] externalism about meaning carries over to an externalism about mind. […] We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an *active externalism,* based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.[[207]](#footnote-224)

In the course of their essay, Clark and Chalmers make claims that are both dubious as well as incompatible with Harman’s OOO. Clark and Chalmers argue that objects can become incorporated and appropriated into the human mind if they become involved in the process of cognition; the example they use is of a notebook that becomes integral in the recalling of information. Their final statement is the most bizarre: ‘In any case, once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world’.[[208]](#footnote-225) Clark and Chalmers conjure up an image of a formless consciousness that engulfs all surrounding objects, denying them any real qualities in the process. It is this consumption that allows humans to become ‘creatures of the world’ (although what we are meant to be before is not addressed), although it appears that what Clark and Chalmers posit could be more accurately described as the world becoming part of the creature, or human-object. OOO argues in favour of this ‘skin/skull’ boundary that Clark and Chalmers attempt to dismiss; as has been shown through Harman’s earlier rejection of Heidegger’s system of tool-analysis, OOO considers objects to be separate and self-contained.

It is the former type of object boundary, that between the real and sensual qualities, that is significant for this examination of *Ulysses*. When discussing his work with Frank Budgen, Joyce commented of his characters, that ‘[i]f they had no body they would have no mind’.[[209]](#footnote-226) Although it is not an exact parallel, we can loosely claim that the ‘exterior’ of a human-object is the body, while the interior is the mind. This type of boundary is not as absolute as the one that occurs between one object and another. This can be demonstrated by returning to an earlier example: we know that fire can only interact with the cotton’s flammability, but this interaction, however, can *destroy* the cotton’s ‘cotton-ness’ even though this real quality cannot be directly interacted with. *Burnt* cotton is still cotton, *burned* cotton is ash. The division between real quality and sensual quality is not as clear cut as it first appears, and the two poles depend upon each other. If we apply this reading to ‘Circe’ we can argue that the exterior in this episode is the body (as either a sensual or real object), and the existence of an interior is indicated by the presence of a voice. In this episode, those who transform into sensual animal-objects are able to retain *their own* voice; this is because ‘Circe’s’ transformations occur in the ‘phenomenal sphere’—as Harman calls it—where the interior is granted a form of expression. Transformations in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and in ‘Telemachus’, both of which are examined in the course of this chapter, take place in the physical world in which withdrawal is absolute; as a result, those who undergo a transformation in these circumstances lose their original voice.

Before comparing Joyce and Ovid’s works here, it would be useful to recap and clarify the definition of a sensual object. Although this form of object has no physical presence, it can still be considered an object as it possesses both real and sensual qualities. For Harman, an object must possess autonomy to be considered an object. The presence of essential qualities, therefore, means that the sensual object retains some autonomy from the mind that contemplates it; while the mind may acknowledge that this ‘whatness’ is present, it does not follow that it can be understood. The difference between a sensual and a real object, however, is more than the obvious answer, i.e. that one is *real*; the real qualities of a sensual object can be intuited or inferred in a way that a real object’s real qualities cannot. To restate Harman: ‘though sensual objects always inhabit experience and are not hidden behind their qualities, real objects must always hide’.[[210]](#footnote-228) To explain this more clearly, Harman uses the example of a ship afloat on the sea:

The necessary qualities of a sensual object are sunk beneath its surface like the hull of a Venetian galley, invisible to the observer […]. Though the hull is submerged, it remains vital for the seaworthiness of the ship. By analogy, the real qualities of the sensual object can only be inferred indirectly rather than witnessed.[[211]](#footnote-229)

The sensual objects of ‘Circe’ have interiors that can be intuited, and as a result the episode presents these interiors as voices; the human-animals can speak with their own, internal voice in ‘Circe’ as the boundary between interior and exterior is not as concrete as it is in real objects. The creatures of Ovid’s work, because their transformation occurs in the physical world, where they are real objects, are forced to use the voice of their body and not their own.

Many of the transformations in Ovid—such as Actaeon, Io, and Callisto—are punishments; the ‘crimes’ of these mortals were either to unwittingly stumble upon Diana bathing, or being raped by Jove. Transformations in Ovid are often (but not always) the result of sexual deviancy, or an attempt to avoid it. To escape being raped by various gods, women are changed into forms in which they cannot be assaulted: Syrinx is made into a river reed, and Daphne becomes a laurel tree. As animals, or foliage, the harshest part of their punishment (or salvation) is to be denied the use of their own, original voice. In the case of Syrinx, her new voice is appropriated by her would-be rapist, Pan, who makes her into a set of pipes he uses to play music: ‘[Pan] waxed together reeds of different lengths | And made the pipes that keep his darling’s name’.[[212]](#footnote-230) In the case of Ocyrhoe, however, the transformation occurs explicitly to prevent her from using her own voice:

She cried, ‘The Fates forestall me! I’m forbidden  
 To tell you more. My power of speech is stopped.  
 […] Surely now my human shape  
 Is stolen away; the food I like is grass;  
 I feel the urge to frisk in open fields.  
 […] As she spoke, her last  
 Protests were almost meaningless, her words  
 Were all confused, sounds that seemed neither words  
 Nor whinnies, more like mimicking a mare.  
 Soon she was whinnying clearly, and her arms  
 Walked on the grass [[213]](#footnote-231)

The first aspect of Ocyrhoe to change is her voice; language is taken from her, and she begins to mimic the sounds of a mare whilst still in her human body. After the voice completes its transformation, the body follows; through Ovid’s description we can observe how this transformation reduces the mare-object to a collection of superficial attributes. The behaviours and characteristics that being a mare needs—a desire to eat grass and to run in fields—demonstrate that, for Ovid, to be an animal one only has to act like an animal, and have the desires of that animal, even though the human mind is present both during and after metamorphosis.

The incomplete manner of transformation that this example reveals, betrays—according to Mark Payne—the human interior of the object. In his reading of Ovid, Payne argues that ‘the truth will out’;[[214]](#footnote-232) the humans-as-nonhuman animals and objects will reveal themselves, as Io does by writing her name in the sand:

[H]uman consciousness is able to use a non-human body to signal its presence to another human being. Perhaps this is because it operates its new form badly and reveals itself as one form of life poorly concealed in the guise of another, like a comic actor in the costume of a bird.[[215]](#footnote-233)

While this is not always the case— Actaeon, as has been shown in the previous section, is unable to communicate that he is in the body of a deer as his friends observe him being ripped to pieces and complain of his absence—it does imply the existence of an interior, real quality that remains untouched by physical transformation. The static nature of the real quality is accompanied by the retention of various sensual qualities that are not directly concerned with the physical body; this allows for the exposure of the human interior even through the real quality remains withdrawn, as Payne elucidates:

Daphne’s beauty can still be discerned in the laurel tree she becomes […] Lycaon as wolf is the “image of ferocity” he was as a man; the river god Alpheus recognizes Arethusa, the woman he desired, in the “beloved waters” she has become.[[216]](#footnote-234)

The sensual objects of ‘Circe’ have their intuited, interior selves revealed through speech—a method that is denied the real animal-objects of the *Metamorphoses*— and not assumed through the preservation of various sensual qualities.

In order to demonstrate the difference between sensual animals and real animals in ‘Circe’, we can compare moments in which these animals speak; the first occurs when a human is in the sensual body of an animal. Using the same example as earlier, that of Bloom-as-pig, we can observe an alteration in the tone or acoustic qualities of voice, but not in the content of the speech itself: ‘(*Enthralled, bleats*.) I promise never to disobey’ (*Ulysses,* p.498). The words fit in to the context of the episode, clearly part of Bloom’s masochistic fantasy. When the hallucinogenic qualities of the episode begin to slip away, allowing for the intrusion of reality, animal speech retains a realistic quality; towards the end of the episode Corny Kelleher appears in a horse drawn cab, and both he and the horse witnesses Bloom’s clearly fabricated reasons as to why he is in the city’s red-light district. The horse is then given the following lines: ‘Hohohohohohoh! Hohohohome! […] (*Neighs*.) Hohohohohome’ (*Ulysses,* p.562-563). Bloom-as-pig’s earlier dialogue is immediately comprehensible, possessing a clear place in the narrative. In contrast, the horse interrupts human speech and—as Joyce did in ‘Calypso’—the narrative (or Bloom) attempts to record an animal sound, and then apply some discernible meaning to it. The horse’s words can be interpreted as both laughter at Bloom’s lies, or as the articulation of its desire to go home. It is unclear how much of the horse’s lines are shaped by the fantastical landscape of the episode; while this scene appears very lucid, it is only two pages later when Bloom has a vision of his deceased son as a changeling on the road ahead of him. The horse’s speech remains obscure, as while we—or Joyce—may interpret it as laughter or the stuttering word ‘home’, it does not follow that our interpretations can uncover the horse’s desire or intended meaning. As a real object, the horse’s internal qualities cannot be intuited as the sensual objects of the mind can be.

III. Conclusion

While this chapter details instances of human to animal metamorphosis, laying out a foundation for the later chapter on hybrids in *Finnegans Wake* and for an investigation into Joyce’s considerations of the division between human and animal, there is another form of transformation in *Ulysses*: the movement of humans and animals into inanimate objects, through death. There are three prominent instances of this in the novel, which will be examined by the next chapter of this thesis. The first of these occurs in ‘Proteus’ when Stephen observes two dogs, the second in ‘Hades’ as Bloom travels to Paddy Dignam’s funeral, and third with the presence of Bloom’s taxidermy owl. By considering the process of death and of objectification, Joyce also considers the difference between human and animal, and how death brings about similarities and differences.

Chapter Three: ‘And what is death, he asked […] It’s a beastly thing and nothing else. It simply doesn’t matter’: The Alignment of Human and Animal Death in *Ulysses*.

I. Introduction

When writing about film, Sarah O’Brien makes the observation that ‘the medium [of cinema] calls on animal bodies to evidence death’.[[217]](#footnote-248) O’Brien attributes this tendency to our familiarity with the animal body and our alienation with the actual dead, human one, writing:

Whereas the display of dead human bodies is largely limited to short-lived and mostly private funerary rites, we view dead animal bodies in a variety of forms and contexts: as specimens in museums and scientific laboratories, as taxidermied objects in art and craft exhibitions, and as hunting or fishing trophies on barroom and livingroom walls. (We also, of course, regularly encounter fragments of dead animal bodies in clothing and household décor, in supermarket freezers, and on dinner plates).[[218]](#footnote-249)

Given the obvious validity of this statement—the bodies of animals are ever-present in our society, in feather-stuffed coats, sausage rolls, and superglue—the question that then arises is whether Joyce not only records the presence of animal-objects, but whether he also uses the corpses of animals to signal human death. *Ulysses* itself details a day intimately concerned with death; we bear witness to Stephen’s guilt and grief over his mother’s passing, Bloom attends the funeral of a friend, and spends the day thinking of his deceased father and son. That *Ulysses* depicts not an ordinary day, but a day preoccupied with death has been stated by Joycean critics, such as Andrew Goodspeed:

Yet irremovable from this portrait of life is the centrality of death in *Ulysses*. Two of the three main characters spend their day wearing mourning. […] During his adventures, Leopold Bloom attend a funeral. This is not something that one does everyday; it already sets this day off as exceptional.[[219]](#footnote-250)

What has *not* been noted, however, is that *Ulysses* also records the plethora of animal death that can be encountered in Dublin’s environment. Perhaps the most obvious example of this occurs in the animals-as-meat that are consumed en-masse by the city’s inhabitants. As a result, various essays have already surfaced regarding Bloom’s vegetarian moment—as his cheese sandwich has been dubbed by critics.[[220]](#footnote-251) Joyce, however, does not confine his representation of animal death to meat, and he is not ‘afraid’, as it were, to present his reader with an image or description of a dead human body; Bloom, for example, thinks of his deceased father’s face in Hades: ‘Thought he was asleep first. Then saw like yellow streaks on his face’ (*Ulysses,* p.93). This presentation or suggestion—as this chapter will demonstrate—is often aligned with or filtered through the body of an animal; it is through this connection that Joyce forces his readers—and characters—to consider whether death separates humans from non-human animals, or whether it traverses the division between the two. *Ulysses* records both the possibility of this similarity in death and also the difference in perception. This chapter will argue that human death in the novel generally (but not always) possesses a specificity while animal death is characterised by a genericity or anonymity.

To support these above arguments, this chapter will consist of a series of interconnected close readings, including the dead dog in ‘Proteus’ and the taxidermied owl in ‘Eumaeus’. Before these close readings are conducted, however, there will be a short section of what equals death for Harman’s OOO, as well as a short consideration of the philosophical question regarding whether animals can die at all. Following this, is a section on burial and the ‘Hades’ episode, and a section which focuses on two dead animal objects: the taxidermy owl and the lemon scented soap.

II: An Object Orientated Approach to Death

In ‘Telemachus’, a defensive Buck Mulligan declares death to be a ‘beastly thing’ that ‘simply doesn’t matter’ (*Ulysses,* p.8); this declaration emphasises the animal physicality that is the reality of death (both human and non-human), whilst also implying the absence of a mystical or religious quality that separates human from animal. Mulligan’s authority—or his perceived authority—on the issue derives from his status as a medical student, as he claims: ‘You saw only your mother die. I see them pop off every day in the Mater and Richmond and cut up into tripes in the dissecting room. […] To me it’s all a mockery and beastly.’ (*Ulysses,* p.8). Desensitized to the human body, Mulligan no longer considers it symbolic of the person it once contained and is scathing of the related religious rituals that Stephen conforms to: ‘Etiquette is etiquette. He kills his mother but he can’t wear grey trousers […] you have the cursed jesuit strain in you’ (*Ulysses*, p.6-8). Stephen’s determination to abide by these rules—despite his refusal to pray at his mother’s deathbed—shows his acceptance of the symbolic behaviour surrounding death, and that it serves as a reminder of a specific human passing. This theme of genericity and specificity will be examined further in this chapter, but this section, however, will focus on how death is defined by Harman’s OOO, as well as the stance of one of its major influences (as mentioned in the previous chapter), Martin Heidegger – who questioned the animal’s very capacity to die. As absurd as this notion seems, it raises a group of serious ethical problems or complications; therefore, before OOO is examined in relation to the topic of death, this section will first include a short evaluation of Heidegger’s position.

Heidegger is not alone in claiming that animals cannot die­. Hegel, for example, dictates that ‘death’ requires the subject to be able to comprehend ‘death *as* death’.[[221]](#footnote-252) For Heidegger, the matter is intricately tied up in the faculty of language and the ability to name death:

Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do this. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought.[[222]](#footnote-253)

Elsewhere Heidegger defines humanity as those who possess language: ‘Man shows himself as the entity which talks’.[[223]](#footnote-254) While Heidegger is principally referring to a human-animal divide or distinction in these two quotations, his prerequisites for death imply that those who do not possess these qualities (e.g. babies, foetuses, mutes, or the mentally disabled) cannot die, and potentially may not even be human – a notion that is as absurd as the one claiming that animals lack the ability to die. These issues stem from the establishment of a hierarchal system of being and death, in which Heidegger divides the world into three categories:

As we have said, man is not merely a *part of the world* but is also master and servant of the world in the sense of ‘‘*having’’* world. Man has world. But what then about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things like the stone[…]. We can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses: [1.] the stone (material object) is *worldless*; [2.] the animal is *poor in world*; [3.] man is *world-forming*.[[224]](#footnote-255)

As a result, humans and animals have—to use Heidegger’s term—a different ‘kind’[[225]](#footnote-256) of death:

Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a kind of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. […] The ending of that which lives we have called ‘perishing’. Dasein too ‘has’ its death, of the kind appropriate to anything that lives; and it has it, not in ontical isolation, but as codetermined by its primordial kind of being. In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, *qua* Dasein, it does not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its “*demise*”. Let the term “*dying*” stand for the *way of Being* in which Dasein *is towards* its death. Accordingly we must say that Dasein never perishes. Dasein, however, can demise only as long as it is dying.[[226]](#footnote-257)

Those with Dasein—namely humans—experience a ‘proper’ death or demise, while animals are only capable of ‘perishing’. This hierarchal system is not present in Harman’s OOO, which not only outright rejects such methods of classification, but also explicitly criticises this argument of Heidegger’s:

There have been various attempts to explain the nature of animal mentality as a privation of human cognition, such as claiming that “language” or the “as-structure” problem: Heidegger’s famous 1929/1930 lectures, for instance, say nothing useful about the “world-poverty” of the animal that they proudly proclaim.   
 By contrast, object-orientated ontology holds that the human-world relation has no privilege at all.[[227]](#footnote-258)

For OOO, then, death is universal; there is no ontological difference between the death of a human or the death of an animal.. In order to apply Harman’s philosophy, this examination will be done through a close reading of ‘Proteus’, considering­—beyond the obvious—the difference between the living dog and the dead one.

As explained in the introduction of this thesis, Harman uses the term ‘sincerity’ to define object interaction and the act of perception. An example of ‘sincerity’ being generated in *Ulysses* occurs in ‘Proteus’ when Stephen observes Tatters (the living dog) and renders him as a sensual object:

Suddenly he [Tatters] made off like a bounding hare, ears flung back, chasing the shadow of a lowskimming gull. The man’s shrieked whistle struck his limp ears. He turned, bounded back, came nearer, trotted on twinkling shanks. On a field tenny a buck, trippant, proper, unattired. […] The dog yelped running to them […] reared up at them with mute bearish fawning […] a rag of a wolf’s tongue redpanting from his jaws. His speckled body ambled ahead of them and then loped off at a calf’s gallop.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.46)

Stephen’s portrayal is highly metaphorical, emphasising that this passage contains his *perception* of the dog. In the course of his description, Stephen transposes a distinctly sinister quality onto the animal by aligning it with Buck Mulligan; the heraldic imagery used here gestures back to Mulligan in ‘Telemachus’, strengthening Stephen’s conflation of his friend with dogs. In addition to this instance, Mulligan and dogs are compared twice in ‘Proteus’; Stephen labels him as Haines’ ‘pointer’ before connecting them in the following thought: ‘He saved men from drowning and you shake at a cur’s yelping’ (*Ulysses,* p.45). While the description of Tatters quoted above, which almost renders him as a chimera-like creature made up of a jumble of animal parts, deepens a symbolic theme, the dog itself feels almost irrelevant in Stephen’s thoughts.

While Stephen’s description of Tatters is an interaction with a sensual object because of the symbolic connotations, Bloom’s more scientific analysis of his cat is still a representation of a real object interacting with a sensual one. Like Stephen, Bloom divides the animal into separate pieces: ‘Mr Bloom watched curiously, kindly, the lithe black form. Clean to see: the gloss of her sleek hide, the white button under the butt of her tail, the green flashing eyes’ (*Ulysses*, p.53). Bloom has examined his pet’s physical appearance, but its real quality—and thus its status as real object—remains withdrawn and unreachable; this is why any given interaction creates a sensual object. To put it simply, the real object is the perceiver, the sensual object the perceived, and ‘sincerity’ the act of perception.

This concept of ‘sincerity’ is then intimately tied to the idea of death in OOO, as Harman describes:

The only thing that can be done to sincerity is simply to end it: replacing it with a new sincerity, or even with nothing, as in the cases of sleep or outright death. When sincerity ceases, no mediator is present to experience this event, and hence it merely vanishes from the cosmos. There is no second witness to sincerity.[[228]](#footnote-259)

An object that can no longer generate sincerity, that can no longer perceive, is classified as ‘dead’. It should be clarified here, that, ‘perception’ is not limited to a human conscious awareness of something, but also includes more ‘simplistic’ interactions; a rock can ‘perceive’ the table it is resting upon, as can the table ‘perceive’ the rock. Given this very simple requirement for an object to be, if not alive at least ‘not dead’, the question as to how we can differentiate between a dead rock and not-dead rock presents itself. For OOO, death is intricately tied up in the ‘objecthood’ of any particular object; Harman claims that the dead object is also no longer real, because it cannot sustain changes in its parts:

In short, not all objects perceive at all times; some objects are sleeping, or dormant. The metaphor is suggestive even if human sleep is never a perfect cessation of awareness or relation. Dreams enter the mind of a sleeper, as do the vague impression of distant bells or servants entering the room. But the sleep of a dormant object would instead be a state of perfect sleep, in which an entity would be real without entering into further relations at all. Note that this would be nothing like death: the dead object is no longer real, while the dormant object is real but simply without relation. An object is real when it forms an autonomous unit able to withstand certain changes in its pieces.[[229]](#footnote-260)

This inability to tolerate alterations in its pieces allows us to distinguish a living object from a dead one and this difference can be observed on numerous levels in ‘Proteus’, as well as in other parts of *Ulysses*. Stephen, for example, in ‘Proteus’ thinks: ‘My soul walks with me, form of forms’ (*Ulysses*, p.44). This phrase is then repeated in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’:

Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound.  
 Buzz. Buzz.  
 But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under ever-changing forms. […] Mother’s deathbed. Candle. The sheeted mirror. Who brought me into this world lies there, bronzelidded, under few cheap flowers. *Liliata rutilantium*. […] John Eglinton looked in the tangled glowworm of his lamp.   
 (*Ulysses,* p.182)

This philosophical digression of Stephen’s develops into a vision of his deceased mother, which is segregated into a series of short sentences or clauses, as if he is breaking the memory up into individual fragments. Whilst there are clear Platonic connotations in these two quotations, this notion that the real object possesses something—a real quality such as a soul or memory—that allows it to change whilst still remaining that *specific* object is present here. In the latter quotation, we can see that Stephen is aware that his ‘pieces’—i.e. the cells of the body—alter or are replaced over time, and his initial thought of ‘I am other I now’ is reconsidered and dismissed just two lines later through a reaffirmation of his possession of a ‘real quality’: ‘But I, entelechy, […] am I by memory because under ever-changing forms’. Stephen’s acknowledgement that he possesses memory or an ‘entelechy’—a real quality, as OOO would term it—that makes him *Stephen* is in line with Harman’s argument regarding what constitutes a dead object.

Before this section moves on to a close reading of the ‘Proteus’ episode, certain limitations or problems with Harman’s definitions of ‘death’ and ‘real object’ must be acknowledged. For example, how do we classify food; must we say that a cake is not a real object because it cannot ‘withstand’ certain processes, such as digestion or immersion in water? Additionally, as a human being *I* also cannot withstand being digested or drowned, but I am alive and able to perceive until these processes occur. Simply, Harman’s definition falls short when we consider the act of ‘killing’ the object; Harman may be aware of this limitation as he puts the caveat ‘certain’ in front of the word ‘changes’ in his definition. We may then be able to clarify Harman’s sentence to read: ‘an object is real when it forms an autonomous unit able to withstand changes in its pieces that would not otherwise cause the death of that particular object’. For example, Joyce represents a living human (Stephen) who acknowledges his capacity to endure cell death and replacement while the dead human cannot as, instead, the body rots; we are reminded of this through Stephen’s later visions of his decaying mother in ‘Circe’: ‘*Stephen’s mother, emaciated, rises stark through the floor in leper grey […]. Her hair is scant and lank. She fixes her bluecircled hollow eyesockets on Stephen and opens her toothless mouth uttering a silent word*.*’* (*Ulysses*, p.539).

Another issue with Harman’s definition, is that it is difficult to think of examples of death that can be applied to an inanimate object; what can a living rock withstand that a dead one cannot? The issue here is that it is very difficult for a rock to die, as it were; if a rock is smashed, do we now have a ‘dead’ rock with broken pieces or a collection of new rocks? Does coal ‘die’ when it becomes diamond? The problems here are similar to the issues discussed in the previous chapter on transformation, perhaps because we can consider death itself to be a form of metamorphosis. While these questions are not answered by OOO, Harman’s classification of death is still useful and apt when applied to objects that are already dead, especially those that we conventionally consider as being able to die (i.e. the animate: humans, animals, and plants), as will be demonstrated through a comparison between the dead dog and the living one in ‘Proteus’.

In this episode of *Ulysses* there are three dogs, not just two, and with the inclusion of the first dog a pattern emerges. In a similar method to the sequence that appears in ‘Telemachus’—as established in Chapter Two of this thesis—the dog-objects progress from being purely sensual to being real objects, or—in other words—from symbolic ones to physical ones. The first of these dogs is the Mulligan-as-pointer that Stephen creates. This dog is only sensual, evoked because of its symbolic connotations as being a faithful hunting dog, and is part of an extended metaphor which reveals Stephen’s feelings of betrayal and persecution. Almost directly after this metaphor, just eight lines later, Stephen notes the presence of the dead dog: ‘A bloated carcase of a dog lay lolled on bladderwrack’ (*Ulysses*, p.44). This is an animal that was, in OOO terms, real but is now, through death, a sensual object. Indeed, its very status of being a dog is almost dissevered from its physical being; by writing ‘the carcase of a dog’ the animal is linguistically distanced from the corporeal body, and this is suggestive of the absence of a real quality which has been lost through death. Additionally, we can interpret the dog as no longer being real because it cannot sustain alterations in its parts; the water has caused it to bloat and start to decompose while the living dog is able to go into the water unaffected. The sequence culminates with a living, physical animal that is able to withstand Stephen’s symbolic language; despite being rendered a ‘wolf’, ‘calf’, and ‘bear’ Tatters remains resolutely a dog. He is also described as being unscathed by his master’s abuse: ‘The cry brought him skulking back to his master and a blunt bootless kick sent him unscathed across a spit of sand, crouched in flight’ (*Ulysses*, p.46).

In addition to being unaffected by water, Stephen’s reactions to their presence reveals another distinction between these later two dog-objects. As a semi-autobiographical character, Stephen possesses Joyce’s fear of dogs, and his calm disinterest in the dead dog’s presence, therefore, is indicative of its status as no longer real; it is not perceived as a threat and is unable to act upon other objects. Stephen’s response to the living animal, however, is different, and he immediately registers his discomfort:

A point, live dog, grew into sight running across the sweep of sand. Lord, is he going to attack me? Respect his liberty. You will not be master of others or their slave. I have my stick. Sit tight. From farther away, walking shoreward across from the crested tide, figures, two. The two maries. They have tucked it safe mong the bulrushes. Peekaboo. I see you. No, the dog. He is running back to them. Who?

(*Ulysses*, p.45).

The verb ‘grew’ is suggestive of an organic development, reaffirming Stephen’s specific declaration that this animal is alive. The word ‘point’ also evokes the presence of the first, symbolic dog, drawing another parallel between Mulligan, dogs, and fear. After his initial jolt of terror Stephen thinks: ‘Respect his liberty’; he recognises the living dog’s ability to perceive and act upon him and, through this recognition of autonomy, he also resists any attempts to control or understand the animal. Interestingly, this is more than Bloom manages as he instead interprets his cat’s desires to coincide with his own current ones, and is, ultimately, proven wrong:

The cat, having cleaned all her fur, […] looked back at him mewing. Wants to go out. Wait before a door sometime it will open. Let her wait. […] He felt heavy, full: then a gentle loosening of his bowels. […] The cat mewed at him.  
 —Miaow! he said in answer. Wait till I’m ready.   
[… He] went to the door and opened it. The cat went up in soft bounds. Ah, wanted to go upstairs, curl up in a ball on the bed.   
 (*Ulysses*, p.65).

Before moving on to the next section, the moment in ‘Proteus’ when the living dog encounters the dead one should be addressed. While we—obviously—do not get Tatter’s perception of this event, we do get Stephen’s:

The carcase lay on his path. He stopped, sniffed, stalked round it, brother, nosing closer, went round it, sniffling rapidly like a dog all over the dead dog’s bedraggled fell. Dogskull, dogsniff, eyes on the ground, moves to one great goal. Ah, poor dogsbody. Here lies poor dogsbody’s body.  
 —Tatters! Out of that, you mongrel.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.46)

Tatters’ owner recognises the dead creature’s lack of ‘dog-ness’, as is implied through the use of the word ‘that’ as opposed to the use of a pronoun such as ‘he’, ‘she’, or ‘it’. Stephen’s use of the word ‘brother’, however, implies that the dead dog possesses enough of its qualities that made it a dog for a kinship to be suggested between the two animals. Strangely, when interacting with the carcase, Stephen describes Tatters as being ‘like a dog’; he uses metaphors to render the dog as *other* animals but uses a simile when comparing Tatters to his own species. The difference between Tatters and the dead dog is elucidated clearly through OOO’s definitions; the latter is no longer an autonomous unit and only the former is capable of perceiving and acting upon Stephen; as a result, only the living dog invokes fear. In this episode we can observe Stephen’s tendency to use animals to think of the human; the phrase ‘dogsbody’ connects him to the carcase, as he is named ‘dogsbody’ in ‘Telemachus’: ‘Ah, poor dogsbody, he [Mulligan] said in a kind voice’ (*Ulysses*, p.6). Given that the living dog evokes Mulligan, the image becomes subtly symbolic, with a supposed brother sniffing ‘like a dog’ over the corpse of his fellow countryman, his master yelling in the background: ‘get out of that, you mongrel’. Additionally, the thought ‘moves towards one great goal’, which is suggestive of death, demonstrates Stephen’s belief—or awareness of the belief—that death is one of the unifying qualities of man and animal.

This section has demonstrated that for OOO there is no difference between animal death and human death, or even the ‘death’ of an inanimate object – despite Heidegger’s proclamation that all of these things fall into separate categories of being. Going forward, this chapter will show that Joyce, like Harman, depicts death without enforcing a hierarchy—although he does demonstrate that this hierarchy is present—; indeed, his alignment of human and animal death actively challenges such a division.

III: ‘Only man buries. No ants too.’: Corpses and Burial

While Stephen aligns himself to the dead dog through the repetition of the word ‘dogsbody’, the carcase also stands in for an unnamed, deceased human. Both earlier in ‘Telemachus,’[[230]](#footnote-261) as well as in ‘Proteus,’[[231]](#footnote-262) the body of a man is mentioned, expected to surface from the sea; he does not, and instead what washes up is ‘the bloated carcase of a dog’ (*Ulysses*, p.44). The bloated status of the animal implies the release or build-up of ‘corpse gas’, the stage in the process of decomposition that is meant to cause the drowned *man* to surface nine days after his death. Made similar in reference to biology, the difference between the two corpses becomes instead a social or cultural one; no one is waiting or searching for the dog’s body, and no one is intending to bury it. O’Brien, quoting Jane Desmond, notes this disparity:

According to Desmond, this divide rests on Western culture’s ascription of distinct values to the bodily remains of humans and animals: whereas the human corpse “stands as a relic of a person,” the dead animal body “often takes on an overwhelming facticity—it becomes a specimen, standing for itself or for a category of animals like it, and not for the ‘being’ which ‘inhabited’ the living body.”[[232]](#footnote-263)

Bloom considers this very topic in ‘Hades’ when he thinks: ‘Only man buries. No ants too. First thing strikes anybody. Bury the dead’ (*Ulysses*, p.105).[[233]](#footnote-264) Humans and animals may be connected or aligned in death due to its impartiality, but what supposedly separates the two is the difference in response, which is the result of the human body possessing a specificity that renders it, as Desmond says, ‘a relic of a person’. Of course, this specificity of human bodies and genericity of animal ones is human-imposed, and Stephen recognises this when he names the anonymous ‘bloated carcase’ as ‘brother’ during Tatters’ interaction with it; the animal, then, can recognise specificity in the animal corpse. For humans, however, the animal body is almost always a generic stand-in for the species. Bloom’s stuffed owl is an ideal example of this; it is a scientific, aesthetic representation of that specific type of bird. The exception to this genericity is pets; Molly thinks of Bloom who ‘insisted hed go into mourning for the cat’ (*Ulysses*, p.724). Indeed, mourning is not confined to humans *for* humans in the novel, and is, instead, an inter-species occurrence. As a human can mourn the loss of a pet, so can an animal grieve the passing of its owner; Bloom recalls the grief of his father’s dog, Athos: ‘Poor old Athos! Be good to Athos, Leopold, is my last wish. Thy will be done. We obey them in the grave. A dying scrawl. He took it to heart, pined away. Quiet brute. Old men’s dogs usually are’ (*Ulysses*, p.87). This section will demonstrate through close reading, that in ‘Hades’, as well as in Dignam’s later appearance in ‘Circe’, humans and animals cannot be clearly divided as Joyce consistently aligns them through death.

‘Hades’ opens with Simon Dedalus, Martin Cunningham, Mr Power, and Leopold Bloom getting into a cab to travel to Paddy Dignam’s funeral. During the journey, Bloom makes numerous connections between human and animal death, some expressed to his fellow travellers and others remaining in his thoughts. A few pages after he thinks of Athos, Bloom observes horses pulling the funeral carriage of a dead child:

White horses with white frontlet plumes came round the Rotunda corner, galloping. A tinycoffin flashed by. In a hurry to bury. A mourning coach. Unmarried. Black for the married. Piebald for bachelors. Dun for a nun.   
 (*Ulysses,* p.91)

Here O’Brien’s claim that animal bodies are used to evidence death presents itself in a different manner; the colour of the horse’s hide is indicative of the status (social, biological, or religious) of the human corpse it pulls; human death is therefore evidenced through the animal body. Allan Hepburn reads this passage (alongside Bloom’s later imagining of the dead corpse falling out the hearse) and argues: ‘In Bloom’s fantasy, the living remain individuals, whereas the dead become featureless matter’.[[234]](#footnote-265) Hepburn applies his argument to the whole episode, saying: ‘Treated as another body being rushed to the cemetery for a quick burial, the dead acquire anonymity, which the featurelessness of coffins reinforces’.[[235]](#footnote-266) Hepburn’s analysis sits directly at odds with Desmond’s and O’Brien’s, who figure the human corpse as the relic of a specific person. Their argument, while not about *Ulysses* itself, is more apt here than Hepburn’s; while the coffins are featureless, they do not serve to provide anonymity – the mourners know who is (or is supposed to be) inside. What the coffins do instead, is protect the living from having to directly encounter the dead; such an interaction is taboo and undesirable, as demonstrated by the horror the characters display when remembering such an occurrence: ‘That was terrible, Mr Power’s shocked face said, and the corpse fell about the road. Terrible!’ (*Ulysses*, p.95). The presence of the white horses, which —according to Bloom[[236]](#footnote-267)—indicate a dead child, cause him to think of his own deceased infant son while two of the other three occupants of the coach talk of suicide:

—Sad, Martin Cunningham said. A child. […]  
—Poor little thing, Mr Dedalus said. […]  
—But the worst of all, Mr Power said, is the man who takes his own life. […]   
—The greatest disgrace to have in the family, Mr Power added. […]  
—They say a man who does it is a coward, Mr Dedalus said.   
 (*Ulysses*, p.92-93)

Through both the dialogue and Bloom’s spectrum of horses, we can interpret that, culturally, there are different kinds of death. Altered by society’s perception of their circumstances, some methods of dying are acceptable, while others are not, as Mr Power proclaims above. Bloom’s earlier assertion, for example, that a ‘sudden death’ is the best kind is met with shock by his travelling companions:

—He had a sudden death, poor fellow, he said.  
—The best death, Mr Bloom said.  
Their wide open eyes looked at him.  
—No suffering, he said. A moment and all is over. Like dying in sleep.  
No-one spoke.   
 (*Ulysses*, p.92)

His stance betrays both his Jewishness and lack of knowledge of Catholicism, in which the inability to receive the last rights causes the soul to enter purgatory instead of heaven.

Due to the coach passing a hospice, the narrative progresses to a consideration of how society and humanity prepare for death:

Ward for incurables there. Very encouraging. Our Lady’s Hospice for the dying. Deadhouse handy underneath. Where old Mrs Riordan died. They look terrible the women. Her feeding cup and rubbing her mouth with the spoon. The screen around her bed for her to die.   
 (*Ulysses*, p.94)

The hospice is perceived by Bloom as being both convenient—having a morgue on the premises—and respectful; the screen set around the bed of Mrs Riordan emphasises both the perception of death and dying as a private thing not for outsiders to witness, as well as the attitude that the dead body must be kept out of view. This almost peaceful representation of death is interrupted by a herd of cattle being driven through the city streets to the harbour:

A divided drove of branded cattle passed the windows, lowing, slouching by on padded hoofs, whisking their tails slowly on their clotted bony croups. Outside them and through them ran raddled sheep bleating their fear.  
—Emigrants, Mr Power said.  
—Huuuh! the driver’s voice cried, his switch sounding on their flanks. Huuuh! out of that!   
 (*Ulysses*, p.94)

This menagerie of animals, marching towards their end, serve as a juxtaposition with the human death above; occurring in the public sphere, the animal’s movement towards death can be observed by all the inhabitants of the city. This description is more bodily and chaotic as the street becomes inhabited by parts of animals—their ‘tails’, ‘hoofs’, and ‘croups’—which are accompanied by a cacophony of noise from ‘lowing’ cows and sheep ‘bleating their fear’. This fear is stated as an objective fact; the paragraph lacks the short sentences and semi-disjointed nature of Bloom’s thoughts, implying a more objective perception that is not filtered through one of the novel’s characters. The animals are then regarded callously when Mr Power names them as ‘emigrants’; the fact of their immanent death does not stir up pity or sympathy but anger and resentment towards England. Additionally, the driver’s shout of ‘out of that’ connects this event to ‘Proteus’ when Tatters’ master makes an identical command. After the narrator has described this scene, Joyce provides the reader with Bloom’s perception of it:

Thursday of course. Tomorrow is killing day. Springers. Cuffe sold them about twentyseven quid each. For Liverpool probably. Roast beef for old England. They buy up all the juicy ones. And then the fifth quarter is lost: all that raw stuff, hide, hair, horns. Comes to a big thing in a year. Dead meat trade. Byproducts of slaughterhouses for tanneries, soap, margarine. Wonder if that dodge works now getting dicky meat off the train at Clonsilla.   
 (*Ulysses*, p.94)

Bloom dissects the animal body down to its useful parts, considering how it is prepared after death, whilst also lamenting the loss to the Irish economy that each cow represents. What is highlighted in this passage is the commodification of animals and the purposes they can serve. Bloom’s later thoughts on how the human body is treated after death stand in contrast to this, as, while the animal body is processed into smaller parts, the human is preserved as a whole, for both dignity and decency: ‘Then the insides decompose quickly. Much better to close up all the orifices. Yes, also. With wax. The sphincter loose. Seal up all. […] It would be better to bury them in red: a dark red.’ (*Ulysses*, p.95).

The disparity between these two sets of passages, consisting of an opposition between privacy and publicity, usefulness and dignity, is repeated when Bloom presents his ‘tram idea’ to his carriage mates. The difference here, though, is that this contrast is accompanied by an alignment between the two:

—I can’t make out why the corporation doesn’t run a tramline from the parkgate to the quays, Mr Bloom said. All those animals could be taken in tracks down to the boats.  
 —Instead of blocking up the thoroughfare, Martin Cunningham said. Quite right. They ought to.  
 —Yes, Mr Bloom said, and another thing I often thought is to have municipal funeral trams like they have in Milan, you know. Run the line out to the cemetery gates and have special trams, hearse and carriage and all. Don’t you see what I mean?  
 —O that be damned for a story, Mr Dedalus said. Pullman car and saloon dining room. […]  
 —Why? Mr Bloom asked, turning to Mr Dedalus. Wouldn’t it be more decent than galloping two abreast?  
 —Well, there’s something in that, Mr Dedalus granted.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.94-95)

In almost the same breath as his suggestion of moving livestock by tram, Bloom pitches the same method as a mode of transportation for human corpses. While the first idea is readily accepted—at least by Martin Cunningham—the latter notion is, at first, scoffed at. When Bloom argues, however, that it may be more dignified, Simon Dedalus concedes that there are benefits to the notion. As a result of this debate, the group of men recall the instance in which a coffin fell out of a horse-drawn coach and caused ‘the corpse [to fall] out about the road’ (*Ulysses*, p.95). While Bloom’s imagination adds humour to the event—‘Bom! Upset. A coffin bumped out on to the road. Burst open. Paddy Dignam shot out and rolling over stiff in the dust in a brown habit too large for him’ (*Ulysses*, p.95)—the sudden appearance of the corpse, especially in the wrong context evokes feelings of unease, horror, and even repulsion. Joyce represents what O’Brien claims; the humans in the carriage are unfamiliar with a body of their own species, while the bodies of animals are so ubiquitous that they are often not registered as being bodies or remains at all.

In this short journey, which lasts only fourteen pages, mentions of human death are shadowed by or overtly connected to animal bodies and slaughter. Both bodies are broken down conceptually by Bloom, emphasising a similarity in biology but a difference in preparation and reception. The presence of the animal body is unremarkable—Bloom lists some of the many guises that animal remains reappear as commodities—while the presence of a human corpse is an event; it appears at a funeral, as a bloated carcase awaited by boatmen, and as a grim rupture from a coffin onto the streets.

The last ‘stop’ of their journey before the cemetery, is the site of a murder:

Mr Power pointed.  
—That is where Childs was murdered, he said. The last house.  
—So it is, Mr Dedalus said. A gruesome case. Seymour Bushe got him off. Murdered his brother. Or so they said. […]  
They looked. Murderer’s ground. It passed darkly. Shuttered, tenantless, unweeded garden. Whole place gone to hell.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.96)

Murder is conventionally thought of as a distinctly *human* act; animals may kill one another but this behaviour is part of the cycle of ‘everybody eating everyone else’ (*Ulysses*, p.118) that Bloom contemplates in ‘Aeolus’. If we define murder as the killing of a member of our own species, however, then animals do commit this crime; both male lions and hippos, for example, when they usurp another male, kill all the young that they did not sire. If murder is defined as killing with premeditated malice—as the *OED* defines it, although the definition is specifically limited to the human—then medieval bestiaries figure animals as capable of it.[[237]](#footnote-268) Bestiaries position animals in opposition to one another, such as in the case of the stag, which (as stated in Chapter Two) is the ‘natural enemy of the snake’ and seeks to drown them. This enmity is a human imposed quality, anthropomorphising the stag into a being capable of murder. Joyce does not allow the reader to see murder as a purely human act, however, as three pages later he has Bloom reference a tale of animal murder: ‘The whitesmocked priest came after him tidying his stole with one hand, balancing with the other a little book against his toad’s belly. Who’ll read the book? I, said the rook.’ (*Ulysses*, p.99). The ballad referenced here—‘Who killed Cock Robin’—is present in both *Finnegans Wake* and *Ulysses*, and while it is a human-constructed anthropomorphic tale, Joyce uses it to once again connect the human and animal in death. Indeed, Chris Danta argues that it is specifically through death that the human becomes animal:

[T]o reference the argument of Ecclesiastes 3:19: “Man's fate is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits both: As one dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; man has no advantage over the animal.” Humans and animals share the same bodily fate: that of becoming a corpse. To the extent that the animal traces a line of escape or a way out for the human, each becoming-animal of the human is also a becoming-corpse.[[238]](#footnote-269)

The notion of the body-soul divide appears to support this claim, as, if upon death the human soul enters the afterlife, all that would remain is the animal body; death has eradicated the ‘human’ quality, then, leaving only the animal behind.[[239]](#footnote-270) In *Ulysses*, however, this ‘becoming’ is not as present, and instead the novel uses death, among other bodily functions, to reveal the human as being animal all along. These processes include eating and defecation, shame and mourning. Additionally, in the latter half of ‘Hades’, the becoming corpse is more a becoming food than anything else.

After Paddy Dignam has been interred, Bloom ruminates on the process of decomposition:

I daresay the soil would be quite fat with corpse manure, bones, flesh, nails, charnelhouses. Dreadful. Turning green and pink, decomposing. Rot quick in damp earth lean. The lean old ones tougher. Then a kind of a tallowy kind of a cheesy. Then begin to get black, treacle oozing out of them. Then dried up. Deadmoths. Of course the cells or whatever they are go on living. Changing about. Live for ever practically. Nothing to feed on feed on themselves.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.104)

Death and rotting are linked to food, both through human and animal bodies, but also six pages later through milk: ‘A corpse is meat gone bad. Well and what’s cheese? Corpse of milk’ (*Ulysses*, p.110). Bloom’s thoughts here on the cyclical nature of eating and being eaten are more succinctly stated in ‘Aeolus’: ‘the angel of death kills the butcher and he kills the ox and the dog kills the cat. Sounds a bit silly till you come to look into it well. Justice it means but it’s everybody eating everyone else. That’s what life is after all’ (*Ulysses*, p.118). While Bloom may prefer eating one type of corpse over the other,[[240]](#footnote-271) he recognises that he, too, will one day be food for ‘flies’, ‘maggots’, and maybe even an ‘obese grey rat’:

An obese grey rat toddled along the side of the crypt, moving the pebbles. An old stager: greatgrandfather: he knows the ropes. The grey alive crushed itself in under the plinth, wriggled itself under it. Good hidingplace for treasure.  
 Who lives there? Are laid the remains of Robert Emery. Robert Emmet was buried here by torchlight, wasn’t he? Making his rounds.  
 Tail gone now.  
 One of those chaps would make short work of a fellow. Pick the bones clean no matter who it was. Ordinary meat for them.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.110)

The rat—interestingly described in human or anthropomorphic terms, such as ‘greatgrandfather’ and ‘chap’—acts as a contrast to the dead of the graveyard; he is described as being ‘grey alive’ while he is burying himself under the plinth of ‘Robert Emery[’s]’ grave. Bloom, before reading the name on the grave, asks ‘who lives here’, an ambiguous question that may refer either to the rat or the human body buried beneath. Additionally, the line ‘making his rounds’ has an ambiguous subject; it may denote Robert Emmet (or Emery) or the rat, who ‘knows the ropes’, and is figured as the animal caretaker of the graveyard. Humans and animals are both divided and aligned in the words ‘ordinary meat for them’, as Bloom recognises their similarity in the consumption of meat but difference in that they will consume human meat just as readily as any other kind. ‘[E]very*body* eating every*one* else’, as he thinks, places humans and animals together in a cyclical process of digestion in which neither species is placed above the other.[[241]](#footnote-272)

At numerous points in the novel Bloom wonders about animal consciousness and awareness, and at times even expects a human response from an animal – for example when he feeds the gulls in ‘Lestrygonians’, he grumbles: ‘Lot of thanks I get. Not even a caw’ (*Ulysses,* p.146). ‘Hades’ is no different, as Bloom looks at one of the horses, thinking:

Coffin now. Got here before us, dead as he is. Horse looking round at it with his plume skeowways. Dull eye: collar tight on his neck, pressing on a bloodvessel or something. Do they know what they cart out here every day. Must be twenty or thirty funerals every day. Then Mount Jerome for the protestants. Funerals all over the world everywhere every minute. Shovelling them under by the cartload doublequick. Thousands every hour. Too many in the world.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.97)

In addition to a passing concern for the creature’s well-being Bloom’s thoughts turn to a sense of awe at the sheer volume of the dead and dying ‘all over the word everywhere every minute’. Bloom ultimately anthropomorphises the horses, interpreting their behaviour as relieved once they have divested themselves of their cargo, when in actuality this may be due to the lack of a heavy coffin to pull about: ‘An empty hearse trotted by, coming from the cemetery: looks relieved.’ (*Ulysses*, p.95). He continues to anthropomorphise animals in the episode, stating that donkeys hide when they are dying because they are ashamed: ‘Far away a donkey brayed. Rain. No such ass. Never see a dead one, they say. Shame of death. They hide. Also poor papa went away’ (*Ulysses*, p.106). Just as each mention of human death has an animal death close behind, the inverse is also present here; the shame exhibited by the donkeys reminds Bloom of his father, who went away to a hotel to die. Shame, according to Derrida, is one of the factors that separates the human from the animal, but Bloom rejects this difference by ascribing the emotion to donkeys, and the awareness of shame to his cat, who possesses ‘shame-closing eyes’ (*Ulysses*, p.54).[[242]](#footnote-273)

With humans and animals being intimately entwined in this episode about death and burial, it would almost be remiss for Joyce not to include the burial or funeral of an animal. Two pages before the end of ‘Hades’, Bloom remembers the following incident from his daughter’s childhood:

A bird sat tamely perched on a poplar branch. Like stuffed. Like the wedding present alderman Hooper gave us. Hoo! Not a budge out of him. Knows there are no catapults to let fly at him. Dead animal even sadder. Silly-Milly burying little dead bird in the kitchen matchbox, a daisychain and bits of broken chainies on the grave.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.109)

With both this memory and Bloom’s statement ‘[d]ead animal even sadder’, mourning is once again figured as an interspecies occurrence that rejects any hierarchies of death.[[243]](#footnote-274)

Bloom and company have followed Dignam’s corpse in ‘Hades’, but we as readers can also trace Dignam to his re-emergence in ‘Circe’, in which his presence is an enactment of metempsychosis, one of the major themes of the novel. Before Bloom arrives at the whorehouse of Bella Cohen, and indeed, near the very start of the episode, a dog appears: ‘*A liver and white spaniel on the prowl slinks after him, growling. Lynch scares it with a kick*’ (*Ulysses*, p.411). Reminiscent of Tatters and his owner, Lynch kicks the dog away and he and Stephen depart. Bloom then enters the scene and in the next few pages he is followed by what is either a whole group of dogs or, more likely, one dog undergoing a continuous metamorphosis into various species.[[244]](#footnote-275) On page 447 the dog—now a beagle—transforms in the ‘stage directions’ into Paddy Dignam:

*The beagle lifts his snout, showing the grey scorbutic face of Paddy Dignam. He has gnawed all. He exhales a putrid carcasefed breath. He grows to human size and shape. His dachshund coat becomes a brown mortuary habit. His green eye flashes bloodshot. Half of one ear, all the nose and both thumbs are ghouleaten.* (*Ulysses*, p.447)

This conflation of human and animal demonstrates the genericity of the animal as the dog goes through numerous iterations that are distinguished purely by their breed, but the final transformation is both human and specific, revealing the creature to be the reincarnated form of Paddy Dignam. When asked by the ‘Second Watch’ ‘[h]ow is that possible’, Dignam replies: ‘By metempsychosis’ (*Ulysses*, p.447). In OOO terms, this is ‘possible’ because only the sensual qualities of the body have changed—from spaniel to bulldog to beagle—while the real quality that generates this specificity of identity remains intact. Dignam does not remain unaffected by his stints as numerous dogs, however, as his behaviour (along with parts of his body) remains distinctly dog-like: ‘*Paddy Dignam listens with visible effort, thinking, his tail stiffpointed, his ears cocked*’ (*Ulysses*, p.448). This hybrid creature also declares that he ‘must satisfy an animal need.’ (*Ulysses*, p.448). The presence of Dignam is concluded through the following stage direction in which he returns to where he ‘belongs’, buried underground:

*He worms down through a coalhole, his brown habit trailing its tether over rattling pebbles. After him toddles an obese grandfather rat on fungus turtle paws under a grey carapace. Dignam’s voice, muffled, is heard baying under ground: Dignam’s dead and gone below.*  
 (*Ulysses*, p.448)

Followed ominously by the overweight rodent, Dignam’s status as food is suggested through the presence of animals that will conceivably consume him: worms, rats, and even fungus (although this is neither plant nor animal).

Dignam’s hybridity in ‘Circe’ is an embodiment of one of the themes of ‘Hades’, and indeed other moments in the novel, in which despite the disparity between genericity and specificity, the animal and the human become almost inseparable in Joyce’s depiction of death. Notwithstanding this powerful alignment, Joyce also records differences in how society treats these two forms of death. The next section in this chapter will focus on this difference, which is demonstrated through the animal-objects that animal death and animal slaughter leave behind.

IV: Animal Objects and Taxidermy

*Ulysses* is littered with animal remains, which appear most conspicuously as the ‘inner organs of beasts and fowls’ (*Ulysses*, p.53) and other forms of meat. Animals appear more subtly, however, in objects such as Father Conmee’s ‘ivory bookmark’ (*Ulysses*, p.215), Bella Cohen’s ‘alpine hat with moorcock’s feather’ (*Ulysses*, p.498), and the leather-bound books that Bloom browses through in ‘Wandering Rocks’. The remnants of animals are implicit in these latter objects, either concealed or so ubiquitous in their use that their presence is unremarkable. On the other end of the scale are objects in which the animal-material is explicit and demands to be seen, such as in cases of taxidermy; these animal-objects, however, are just as processed and removed from the original animal as Bloom’s leather trimmed hat.[[245]](#footnote-276) Given these two forms of object in which the animal is either implicit or explicit, this section will examine one of each example: the taxidermy owl, and the curd soap that accompanies Bloom around Dublin. Through their production, both objects have their animal materials rendered as generic or anonymous.

As mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis, the taxidermied animal holds a unique place among objects; made up of its own skin stretched over a man-made frame, its purpose is to represent not just itself, but an *ideal* version of itself. Jane Desmond surmises this process as follows: ‘The individual animal (*the* deer) slips into the generic category (*a* deer), while the taxidermist seeks to represent an ideal (a *good* deer).[[246]](#footnote-277) The preparation of the animal body for taxidermy is an act of removal, in which the specific identity of the creature is erased in order to create the generic. The ‘best’ taxidermy, as it were, leaves behind no evidence of the method used to kill the animal while also disguising any scars, deformities, or imperfections that would make it an individual. Petra Tjitske Kalshoven lays out the aim of the taxidermist, which is to capture life through a dead body:

It is the original living shape, then, that must be recaptured in a mount’s life-affording morphology. […] Professionals frown on poorly executed work and on liberties taken by artists in creating mounts that do not look “natural,” which is seen as implying a lack of respect. Doing justice to an animal’s perfectly lifelike look, returning life to its dead body, is the ethical thing to do.[[247]](#footnote-278)

Bloom’s stuffed owl is an example of this ‘naturalistic’ taxidermy, but as the above quotation suggests, there is another form which uses the animal body to create art, or a specific identity or tale. Perhaps the best-known examples of this more ‘novel’ taxidermy are Walter Potter’s representation of the ‘Who Killed Cock Robin’ ballad, along with his ‘kitten wedding’. Animals are anthropomorphised in these displays, made to act out human narratives.

The aforementioned distinction between the generic animal body and the specific human one is also present in the practice of taxidermy; while the animal is rendered as exemplar of its species—or deformed into an identity that it has no ‘original’ relation to—the few examples of *human* taxidermy are used to preserve a particular self. The most famous example of this is Jeremy Bentham, whose remains can be seen on display at University College London. Bentham advocated for more humans to be taxidermied so bizarre debates could be staged between the corpses of various figures. Miran Božovič discusses this use of the ‘auto-icon’, explaining it as follows:

Besides their numerous other uses — moral, political, economical, genealogical, architectural, phrenological and so on — the auto-icons were also supposed to benefit the living through their “theatrical, or dramatic use”. […] The only roles the dead would play would be themselves. […] It is in this spirit that Bentham briefly sketches some dialogues that could be staged in the auto-iconic theater. The dialogues are categorized according to different disciplines, such as ethics, mathematics, politics and so on. […] Bentham also works out the choreography of the corpses on the stage, down to the smallest details: when all the representatives of a particular discipline were gathered on the stage, Bentham would enter and be greeted in the name of all the performers by one of the interlocutors who would then introduce Bentham to each of the others and briefly sketch the principal achievements of each in his respective discipline.[[248]](#footnote-279)

Strangely, when the practice is ‘inverted’, so to speak, to create a specific animal body and a generic human one, responses are also switched; the specific animal body causes discomfort while the anonymous human one evokes mixed feelings of fascination and repulsion, which are usually ascribed to animal taxidermy.[[249]](#footnote-280) Taxidermists resist working on pets because the desired effect of recapturing a particular identity never materialises:

[G]rieving owners had years ago brought their deceased pets to the museum’s taxidermist to be transformed into a lifelike image that the owner planned to take home so it could continue to be part of the household. Many of these owners, however, never took these surrogates of lost love back to their residences. One look at their stuffed pet was enough to make these owners realize that taxidermy, though it might replicate the departed’s appearance, could never reclaim what Rachel Poliquin in *The Breathless Zoo* speaks of as the little quirks and changing expressions that make a pet a uniquely loveable character.[[250]](#footnote-281)

Mulligan’s indifference to the dead human body, as mentioned above, is a result of it becoming generic; by making the corpse anonymous through a process known as plastination (as opposed to the desensitization that Mulligan experiences), Gunther Von Hagens’ ‘Body Worlds’ exhibition has ‘become the most visited touring exhibit of all time’.[[251]](#footnote-282) Plastination, which Desmond calls ‘anti-taxidermy’, involves the removal of the skin to display what lies beneath. This removal of the individual identity allowed for the bodies to be viewed without the horror the human corpse might otherwise evoke.[[252]](#footnote-283) Indeed, the main issue with the exhibit arose from the presence of skin left on some of the bodies, as it served as a reminder that each ‘exhibit’ had a particular human identity:

The single exception in the Body Worlds I exhibit is the lounging, pregnant woman. A few small areas of her skin like the aureoles around the nipples, her ears, and her lips (erogenous areas) remain. […] Seeing the nearly fully grown fetus completely exposed to our view heightens this disturbance. The fetus is the only body in the entire exhibition retaining all its skin. As such, despite its status as dead “fetus” and not dead “child,” it has the greatest sense of subjectivity of any of the specimens, and this is the source of our distress.[[253]](#footnote-284)

In terms of OOO, taxidermy takes the sensual qualities of an object—skin, hair, fur—and creates a new object out of them. Any reminder of a real quality that the human or animal possessed is subsequently met with discomfort.

Taxidermy itself serves a distinct scientific purpose, as a last resort for the preservation of dying species, a use which is particularly relevant in our current climate of mass extinction. There is considerable debate, however, on the ethical issues of taxidermy, as it can be seen as a macabre practice that appropriates the animal body for art, decoration, furniture, and even twee anthropomorphic displays. As a result, there has been a rise in so-called ‘ethical taxidermy’, which explicitly only uses the skins of animals that were killed for a separate purpose or died from either natural causes or accidents, such as in the case of roadkill. Whether this works in practice or is simply used to assuage the public’s apprehension over such works of art is debatable, but this apprehension is so widespread that many museums have removed their antique works of taxidermy from display. Art works in which animal remains are implicit and not explicit—such as paintings—remain on display without contention, as modern Western society has grown increasingly uncomfortable with the animal body and the reminder of the killing of animals.

This discomfort, and the ethical concerns around taxidermy, are relatively modern; stuffed animals used to be much more common in the domestic sphere, so Bloom’s possession of such an object—and the fact that it was a wedding gift—would not have been unusual. Indeed, the owl is not the only piece of taxidermy in the novel, as there is a stuffed fox in Bella Cohen’s whore house:

BELLA  
 You’ll know me the next time.

BLOOM  
 (*Composed, regards her.*) Passée. Mutton dressed as lamb. […] Your eyes are as vapid as the glasseyes of your stuffed fox. They have the dimensions of your other features, that’s all. I’m not a triple screw propeller.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.517)

Bloom himself has used the stuffed owl as both an aesthetic object displayed on his mantlepiece as well as an educational, scientific object to teach his daughter about avian anatomy:

In what way had he utilised gifts (1) an owl, 2) a clock, given as matrimonial auguries, to interest and to instruct her?

As object lessons to explain: 1) the nature and habits of oviparous animals, the possibility of aerial flight, certain abnormalities of vision, the secular process of imbalsamation  
 (*Ulysses*, p.647)

The first mention of the owl, however, is in ‘Hades’: ‘A bird sat tamely perched on a poplar branch. Like stuffed. Like the wedding present alderman Hooper gave us. Hoo! Not a budge out of him. Knows there are no catapults to let fly at him. Dead animal even sadder.’ (*Ulysses*, p.109). With death shadowing every thought in ‘Hades’, the presence of this living bird evokes a dead one and subsequently the two subjects become merged and confused: which bird does not ‘budge’, and which one ‘knows’ that they won’t be hit by a catapult? Bloom equates the animals’ stillness to death but his anticipation of movement or attempt to speak to it in its language—demonstrated by him saying ‘Hoo!’, as if to scare the bird into motion—suggests the possibility of, or the belief in the possibility of life, in both the bird ‘perched on a poplar branch’ and the owl on his mantlepiece.[[254]](#footnote-285) Here the owl’s status as naturalistic taxidermy is affirmed, as it looks as if it ‘just *might* twitch’ back into life.[[255]](#footnote-286) Additionally, Bloom’s ambiguous subject reveals an awareness of life that the stuffed animal once possessed.

In ‘Ithaca’ the owl is situated on the mantlepiece among other wedding gifts that the Blooms have received:

A timepiece of striated Connemara marble, stopped at the hour of 4.46 a.m. on the 21 March 1896, matrimonial gift of Matthew Dillon: a dwarf tree of glacial arborescence under a transparent bellshade, matrimonial gift of Luke and Caroline Doyle: an embalmed owl, matrimonial gift of Alderman John Hooper. (*Ulysses*, p.660)

While the owl is listed as simply another possession here, it becomes central to the following exchange:

What interchanges of looks took place between these three objects and Bloom?

In the mirror of the giltbordered pierglass the undecorated back of the dwarf tree regarded the upright back of the embalmed owl. Before the mirror the matrimonial gift of Alderman John Hooper with a clear melancholy wise bright motionless compassionate gaze regarded Bloom while Bloom with obscure tranquil profound motionless compassionated gaze regarded the matrimonial gift of Luke and Caroline Doyle.  
 (*Ulysses*, p.660)

The marble clock is excluded from this exchange of glances (despite it having a ‘face’ while the tree does not) because it neither possesses nor possessed any form of biological life. A hierarchy of objects, then could be read into this passage as the stone clock, representative of the inanimate, is excluded, and the tree, representative of plant life, is referred to only briefly, despite the fact that it is alive and the owl is not. The stuffed animal has the most detailed depiction, described with six adjectives while Bloom, representing the human, has only five applied to him. The presence of a hierarchy here, however, is undercut by the pattern of glances: the tree ‘looks’ at the owl which ‘looks’ at Bloom, and while this by itself may suggest a rank of being, Bloom looks back at the tree; instead of a linear chain of glances, Joyce depicts a cyclical exchange. Additionally, despite having more description, the adjectives applied to the owl serve to render it as a generic, vacant creature, while Bloom is depicted as a complex individual.

The descriptions of Bloom and the owl consist of two lists which contain contrasting or accompanying adjectives, with the exception of the word ‘bright’ which is used in reference to the owl and has no parallel in Bloom’s description. While ‘bright’ is a synonym of two of the other words in the owl’s list—‘wise’ and ‘clear’—it suggests more than intelligence and clarity, as it also refers to the reflection of light. As a piece of taxidermy, the owl’s eyes (like the fox’s mentioned above) would have been made of glass, a more reflective material than the natural eyes it replaces. The word ‘clear’, then, is both a reference to the eye’s material, whilst also implying a simplicity that arises from the lack of any complex consciousness contained within. Where the owl’s eyes are ‘clear’, Bloom’s are ‘obscure’; this is indicative of both an internal, sophisticated being, while also suggesting an opposing physical appearance.[[256]](#footnote-287)

While the owl’s second and third adjectives—‘wise’ and ‘melancholy’—may appear to be specific and reveal something about the individual owl, both traits are symbolic values (and therefore sensual qualities) traditionally applied to this group or ‘family’ of species. While ‘wise’ is still used in current vernacular to describe owls (despite the animal’s relative stupidity), melancholy has fallen out of use. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance period ‘melancholy’ was applied to various, solitary, nocturnal creatures like owls and cats.[[257]](#footnote-288) An example of this use in relation to owls can be seen in Thomas Nash’s *Christ’s Tears Over Jerusalem*: ‘The melancholy owl (death’s ordinary messenger) that never yieldeth his lazy leaden wings but by night’.[[258]](#footnote-289) In conjunction with ‘motionless’—which reaffirms the owl’s status as dead—these adjectives create a generic animal; the qualities so far applied to the owl either suggest a hollowness or vacancy, or are traditional symbolic values that can be applied to any owl. The owl’s transformation into taxidermy is an act which undermines it, as it implies the animal can be reconstructed only using its skin and feathers. Additionally, the owl is overmined in this passage, as it is its sensual qualities—or, rather, Bloom’s perception of them—that are made significant. The real owl remains absent from the episode, its real quality destroyed and replaced as it moved from the animate to the inanimate.

While the owl’s gaze is ‘motionless’ because it is dead, Bloom’s is identically described. It has been argued—rather unconvincingly—that Bloom dies in ‘Ithaca’, but his motionless gaze serves to indicate the possibility of death, which is almost immediately dismissed by Bloom’s attention shifting to a mirror: ‘What composite asymmetrical image in the mirror then attracted his attention?’ (*Ulysses*, p.660).[[259]](#footnote-290) This adjective, then, creates another difference between Bloom and the taxidermy owl: the animal’s gaze—as has been established through the aim of the taxidermist—suggests the possibility of life, while Bloom’s still visage reveals the potential for death.

The final pair of adjectives—‘compassionate’ and ‘compassionated’—gesture towards a complex interaction between the two objects, namely that the owl has caused Bloom’s gaze to be filled with compassion. This reading, however, is undercut by the fact that Bloom’s *motionless* eyes are focused, not on the owl, but the tree. The word ‘compassion’ is not a traditional symbolic quality applied to owls, so its presence is both anomalous and a contrast to the adjectives that have come before it; it implies the presence of an individual consciousness that is capable of emotion. Of course, this may be a result of anthropomorphisation on Bloom’s or the narrator’s part, but the choice of emotion is strange.

While the stuffed owl always evokes the animal it is made of, many animal-objects in *Ulysses* do not reveal their material origin. Bloom, for example, purchases a bar of soap in ‘Lotus Eaters’, describing it as follows: ‘Pure curd soap. Water is so fresh. Nice smell these soaps have. […] Mr Bloom raised a cake to his nostrils. Sweet lemony wax.’ (*Ulysses*, p.81-82). Both ‘curd’ and ‘wax’ portray what the object is made of, but their material basis is ambiguous; while ‘curd’ initially evokes the dairy product used for making cheese, in this context it refers to animal fat: ‘Curd soap is made from sodium hydroxide (NaOH) and purified solid animal fats’.[[260]](#footnote-291) Additionally, ‘wax’ was usually made from tallow—i.e. animal fat—or beeswax; these two nouns, then, suggest the presence of animal remains although they do not specifically state it. In ‘Hades’, however, Bloom notes that soap is—along with margarine—a ‘[b]yproduct of the slaughterhouse’ (*Ulysses,* p.94). When discussing Bloom’s objects—hat, watch, and soap—Louis Brady argues that the ‘soap is a kind of portmanteau object, carried by Bloom on his wanderings around Dublin. It takes on the qualities of the chapter it appears in’.[[261]](#footnote-292) Brady’s subsequent observation that, in ‘Hades’, the soap is a ‘lumpen dead object’ becomes more apt when we consider the soap’s ingredients; made of dead animal fat its presence serves as a parallel to the other dead object of the episode: Paddy Dignam.[[262]](#footnote-293) The soap and corpse are connected through the word ‘tallow’ in the following passage: ‘Rot quick in damp earth lean. The lean old ones tougher. Then a kind of tallowy kind of cheesy. Then begin to get black, treacle oozing out of them’ (*Ulysses,* p.104). Linked together through physical characteristics, the soap and human are divided by response; the human tallow (usually) lies in specific, marked graves, while the soap possesses a genericity in both what species of animal it is made from, as well as in the number of animals its materials originate from.

In terms of OOO, even though both objects are made of dead—and therefore no longer real—animals, they interact with and influence their environment. Somehow the owl’s gaze manages to generate compassion (even in someone who is not directly observing it), and the soap produces a lemony scent, sometimes overpowering over smells in the novel, as Brady observes happening in ‘Aeolus’: ‘the soap’s scent counteracts the smell of the printing presses’.[[263]](#footnote-294) Even though the soap will slowly dissolve through use, it remains steadfastly *lemon soap* throughout this process; it can, therefore, be said—along with the owl—to be a real object. Despite consistently revealing the animal it is made of, the owl is just as generic and anonymous as the other animal objects in the novel. Additionally, both owl and soap serve as parallels to humans, and the latter to human death.

V: Conclusion

This chapter has examined a series of animals, including: a drowned dog, a herd of cattle, a bar of lemon soap, a donkey, and a taxidermy owl. Each one of these animals or animal-objects are positioned in contrast to a human subject: a drowned man, Dante Riordan, Paddy Dignam, Rudolph Virag, and Leopold Bloom. With the exception of the final pair, as Bloom is still alive, the presence of a dead human is shadowed by an animal. This consistent alignment of human and animal in death reveals a consideration on Joyce’s part, as to the difference between human and animal; Joyce depicts a similarity in biology, representing a world in which ‘everybody is eating everyone else’ (*Ulysses*, p.118), but he also records a difference in how society reacts to the dead bodies of humans and animals. The specific human is mourned while the generic animal is dismissed or overlooked. Of course, as stated above, there are exceptions to this rule, such as when a specific animal dies or when the human body has become generic, as it has for Buck Mulligan. What we can observe then, is that this difference is more complex than a simple human-animal divide, or indeed a generic-specific one. When remembering the occasion on which he and Milly buried a bird in the garden, Bloom affectionally calls her ‘Silly-Milly’, suggesting that the mourning of a specific animal—especially one that is not a pet—is a childish action. Additionally, the generic human—or when the identity of a human is unknown—still evokes more attention and care than the generic animal; this can be observed in the difference between the drowned man and the dead dog: one is being waited and searched for, while the other lies ‘lolled on bladderwrack’ (*Ulysses*, p.44), regarded unemotionally.

The body of a dead animal is viewed in an unconcerned manner, but—as demonstrated in ‘Hades’—the presence of a dead human body is a source of intense discomfort. It is this very feeling of unease that causes Stephen to use an animal to ‘evidence’—to use O’Brien’s term—his mother’s death. Christopher DeVault establishes this in his article ‘Mourning Becomes Dedalus’:

[Stephen’s] subsequent reference to the fox riddle may parallel his earlier attempt to suppress the maternal corpse in the previous episode, but the fact that this reflection reinserts the mother as the “poor soul gone to heaven” demonstrates that his maternal mourning is perpetuated rather than suppressed as he watches Sargent (*U* 2.147).[[264]](#footnote-295)

While human death haunts the characters of the novel, animal bodies and remains are encountered often without emotion or even exclamation. It is in this representation that Joyce is able to record and explore the difference in human reception and perception that occurs between human and animal death and, through his consistent alignment of one with the other, allows him to get his readers to challenge this difference.

This half of the thesis has examined moments of human to animal transformation in *Ulysses,* as well as the transformation of living objects (both human and animal) into dead ones. Through these transformations, Joyce experiments with what separates the human from the non-human animal, considering what it takes for the human to turn into an animal. Whilst these two chapters on *Ulysses* explore how humans become animals in the novel, and how the boundary between the two is erased by death, the next half of the thesis examines what it takes for animals to become human in Joyce’s final work, *Finnegans Wake*.

Chapter Four: A Literature Review of Animals and *Finnegans Wake*

*A scholar tends to specialize. In a carefully-restricted field, a Joyce scholar may organize a manageable body of file-cards. Even so, in FW, where everything is interwoven, a writer never knows when some other body of material is suddenly going to be relevant. Willy-nilly, he will find himself, groping—like the rest of us—in an endless warehouse that is overcrowded with badly-sorted information.   
 ––––*Nathan Halper[[265]](#footnote-296)

There are very few pages of *Finnegans Wake* which do not contain at least one reference to an animal, but the core literary criticism of the *Wake* does not focus on them. What this literature review will determine, then, is that the animals of the *Wake* are frequently observed by critics but are rarely subjected to rigorous analysis. This survey will identify and trace various strands of Wakean criticism, showing how they develop in relation to the animal. The main body of this literature review offers up this chronology of works, but a critical analysis is deferred until the conclusion, which consists of a summary of the development of animal-focused criticism on *Finnegans Wake*.

In 1929, Faber and Faber released a collection of essays on *Finnegans Wake* (known then as ‘Work in Progress’) edited by Samuel Beckett: *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress*. The essays within cover a wide range of topics, such as Vico, time, and Catholicism, but the mention of animals is sparse, with the most concentrated occurrences arising from a word-by-word close reading by Stuart Gilbert. This demonstrates the prevalence of animals and their tendency to be overlooked right from the beginning of *Wakean* criticism. Elsewhere in this collection of essays, the Ondt and the Gracehoper are mentioned in passing, as either being something else—‘champions of space and time’[[266]](#footnote-297)—or taking part in human, religious ritual: ‘There is much talk of Time in it—see for instance the passage describing the saturnalian funeral of the old earwig […] piously arranged by the Gracehoper’.[[267]](#footnote-298)

During Joyce’s lifetime his work polarized opinion; reviews of ‘Work in Progress’, or occasionally released fragments—such as *Tales Told of Shem and Shaun*—were either praised as genius or ridiculed as madness. Following the release of *Tales Told* in 1929, reviewers noted its fabular form (‘The new book is full of fables’),[[268]](#footnote-299) and quality of language, the latter—according to one critic—renders the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper ‘not a description of insects but an airy, buzzing, fluttering word-insect’.[[269]](#footnote-300) In 1930 Stuart Gilbert releases a review named ‘The Growth of a Titan’, which focuses on *Tales Told* and *Haveth Childers Everywhere*. This positive review observes animals (specifically birds) as being a motif generated by Joyce’s language: ‘almost every word is nuanced so as to recall the *motifs* of the passage—music, birds, and flowers.’[[270]](#footnote-301) Reviews in 1933 and 1939 of *Tales Told* label the book as ‘nonsense’[[271]](#footnote-302) and ‘gibberish’,[[272]](#footnote-303) and they, along with other reviews[[273]](#footnote-304) do not mention animals at all, despite *Tales Told* being somewhat about animals, due to it containing two animal fables.

Both Eugene Jolas and Paul Rosenfeld, in 1933 and 1939 respectively, view Joyce’s ‘Work in Progress’ as a text specifically about the human, Jolas comments: ‘The triune evolution: theocratic, heroic and *human*, is the basis of the work’.[[274]](#footnote-305) Rosenfeld describes *Finnegans Wake* as a ‘half-tender and half-savagely blasphemous picture, much in Joyce’s spirit, of *human* life as a drunken dream’.[[275]](#footnote-306) Other reviews of the *Wake* in this decade (that do not simply dismiss it) focus on its language, saying that it is written for the ear (‘*Finnegans Wake* must be read with the ear. It may not be a coincidence that Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker […] has been given that name and that Joyce substitutes forms of ‘earwig’ for it.’)[[276]](#footnote-307) and other senses (‘The Purr of a cat can be imitated by a trilled *r*, […] Joyce, with many others, believes that words can imitate not only sounds which are essentially unlike human speech, but further, even things which appeal to other senses than hearing.’),[[277]](#footnote-308) while also reflecting the nature of the book’s characters:

The metamorphosis of the language is on an equal footing with that of the characters. The word play is made on solid roots, as the play of the characters gravitates around principles, of this sum of principles, which is closed time, immovable because of having no movement except circular, except to return.[[278]](#footnote-309)

From these reviews we can observe that not only is the focus on the human specifically, but that animal presence is explained away by reviewers as just being part of Joyce’s puns. However, animals are also noted as being subtly present through word play, the same word play which causes the *Wake*’s characters to change form.

In the 1930s, the main focus of reviews and criticism is on, perhaps, the most obvious aspect of *Finnegans Wake*:its language, as well as the puns it contains. This strand continues into the next decade. In 1940 Thomas P. Beyer publishes an essay on Joyce’s language titled ‘A Note on the Diction of “Finnegans Wake”.[[279]](#footnote-310) Another strand starts up in 1941, the year of Joyce’s death, with Edmund Wilson’s book *The Wound and the Bow*. In this book, which looks at a broad range of literature, not just Joyce, there is a chapter title ‘The Dream of H. C. Earwicker’. This chapter, perhaps foreshadowing the Skeleton Key, attempts to offer a summary of the general ‘plot’ of *Finnegans Wake*. In this summary, Wilson speculates on the origins of the donkey (‘These fathers are always associated with a gray ass and sycamore trees, and have perhaps been suggested to Earwicker by four sycamore trees on the Liffey, among which a neighbour’s donkey has been grazing.’),[[280]](#footnote-311) as well as the earwigs: ‘his tendency to imagine that his queer last name is being caricatured by his neighbours as ‘Earwigger’ –a tendency which has led to his dream being impishly haunted by earwigs’.[[281]](#footnote-312)

This trend of trying to summarise the *Wake’*splot or explaining its narrative, is continued by Campbell and Robinson in their much acclaimed *A Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake*. During the course of their summary, Campbell and Robinson attempt to define the book itself and its characters: ‘But above all, Anna is a river, always changing yet ever the same’.[[282]](#footnote-313) The earlier remark of Georges Pelorson’s concerning metamorphosis is also picked up on, and the *Skeleton Key* includes various references to humans becoming animals, and vice versa. The following are a few examples: ‘A series of questions develops the fish image. HCE becomes the Great Salmon’, [[283]](#footnote-314) ‘The janitrix herself, in a bird transformation, moves through the twilight, gathering relics’[[284]](#footnote-315), and, ‘the parable of “The Mookse and The Gripes” […] wherein the conquest of Ireland by Henry II with the encouragement of Pope Adrian IV is presented as an Alice-in-Wonderland fable translated from the Javanese’.[[285]](#footnote-316) This last quotation follows a fairly consistent strand of dismissing the animals of the *Wake*’sfables, considering them as something or someone else, be it time and space or Shem and Shaun.

The attempt to define *Finnegans Wake*, and the characters within it, goes beyond Campbell and Robinson, with Richard V. Chase labelling the *Wake* as a universe.[[286]](#footnote-317) A year later, in 1945, Ernest Bernbaum defines the donkey simply as ‘the Logos’.[[287]](#footnote-318) Bernbaum’s essay notes the inclusion of many creatures, as well as the ‘layers’ of ‘allegorical veils’, but his view of the text is predominantly negative.[[288]](#footnote-319) The earlier work on the *Wake* is certainly more likely to criticise the text, although this tendency ceases in the 1950s.

In the 50s attention starts to be made to *Finnegans Wake’*s construction. Ned Polsky, in 1950, comments on Joyce’s excessive revisions.[[289]](#footnote-320) This ‘strand’ picks up again in 1955, but in the interim critics begin to become obsessed with Joyce’s sources – be they historical, literary, or geographic. In 1951 William Peery scoured the *Wake* for as many references to Shakespeare as he could find,[[290]](#footnote-321) while John Henry Raleigh[[291]](#footnote-322) in 1953 and Joseph Prescott in 1954 focused on biographical readings.[[292]](#footnote-323) Many of these essays on source identification contain no mention (or no useful or significant mention) of animals. One that does, however, is J. S. Atherton’s 1954 essay ‘Islam and the Koran in “Finnegans Wake”.[[293]](#footnote-324) Atherton compiles a list of the suras (chapters) of the Qur’an which are referenced in the *Wake*, some of which have animals as their titles. This connection is not, however, expanded on. Atherton does make one interesting point connected to animals, however, writing: ‘At its most minute, *Finnegans Wake* tells how an earwig suffers from a tropic compulsion to insert its body into narrow dark holes and thus causes itself to be burned on a bonfire. At its vastest it is something vague and majestic happening in the starry depths of space’.[[294]](#footnote-325) While Atherton implies a hierarchy of being—with the insect squarely at the bottom—his argument here is that, ultimately, *Finnegans Wake* has a monumental scope.

In 1955 J. Mitchell Morse reads the fables as simply some of the ‘passages dealing with Shem and Shaun under whatever names’.[[295]](#footnote-326) Much more interestingly, however, Morse also offers an explanation or reason for the difference between humans and animals:

Innocence and insight come from within, and he who will have one must forgo the other. That is the native quirk of our species. The original sin was intellectual curiosity, the quality that set Adam apart from the other animals. it alienated him from nature, which asks no questions and tells itself no lies. The peculiarly human quality is inherently sinful: to be fully human is to be cast out from grace. The glory of God is manifest in the physical grace of animals.[[296]](#footnote-327)

Unfortunately, however, Morse does not apply this religious notion to Joyce’s work. Other essays of 1955 focus on the text’s revisions,[[297]](#footnote-328) and its sources.[[298]](#footnote-329) In 1956 Adaline Glasheen publishes her first census of *Finnegans Wake*. The *Census of Finnegans Wake* is an almost encyclopaedic work, which locates and explains many sources for the *Wake*’s numerous characters, whether they come from history, myth, or Joyce’s social circle.[[299]](#footnote-330) Among these hundreds of sources are a number of references to animals.

Other publications of 1956 also focus on Joyce’s sources, as well as the *Wake*’s genetic history. One essay considers gender confusion in the book, but contains no references to animals.[[300]](#footnote-331) in 1957 Bernard Benstock comments on the sound of the *Wake*, considering it is essential for it to make sense, but once again does not mention animals.[[301]](#footnote-332) Mabel P. Worthington, however, does mention animals in conjunction to a list of sources in her 1957 essay about nursery rhymes: ‘HCE is a combination of opposites, and is not what he seems to the world. “Hairy-parts” and “goat” suggest the primitive’.[[302]](#footnote-333) Animals are used again to suggest the primitive, although this time it is to emphasise the bestial in the human.

In 1958 David Hayman published two essays on the *Wake*, one focuses on the genetic development of a single sentence, while the other is concerned with the book’s cyclical structure. In the latter, ‘Dramatic Motion in “Finnegans Wake”, Hayman goes through five themes: the hero, the conflict, the crime, the fall or cycle, and ritual performance. In the first, the hero, Hayman describes a king, who is connected with a bear: ‘Butt’s comment introduces what appears to be a relatively new identify for the *Hero* (1). He is the exalted weather or rain (“to reign”) *King* as beast, as beast-man, as man and as constellation: an Ursa in his “heaven” robes’.[[303]](#footnote-334) The bear appears in three of the four themes, designated as a ‘future god’[[304]](#footnote-335) in theme one and a ‘worthy victim’ in theme four. Theme two, however, is slightly more interesting, or expansive:

Theme 2, the CONFLICT: […] The Hunt—The hunter and the bear as rivals are pictured simultaneously in a double exposure. On one hand this superposition may be due to a former sacrifice which, by giving to the human hunter the mana of the Bear, made him one with the totem animal.[[305]](#footnote-336)

The theme of the hunt is picked up again in 1968 and 1969. In Hayman’s other essay he tracks the composition of a sentence which appears in Book III. By conducting such a close reading, Hayman uncovers sources for the animals that appear—‘The Egyptian sunboat is now associated with the goose that will lay her golden egg in the east as Juan watches’,[[306]](#footnote-337) and ‘For the Egyptians, whose sun was said to have been laid by “the primeval goose,” Osiris was the son of Seb, an anthropomorphized goose’[[307]](#footnote-338)—, situating them in Egyptian mythology. The other animal sources that are identified relate to animals that are in the bible—‘Here is the holy personage who will give the signal for the separation of the sheep from the goats’[[308]](#footnote-339)—and Aristophanes’ *The Frogs*. The theme, or strand, of animals signalling the primitive occurs again in Hayman’s essay: ‘There is more than a hint of the primordial in the appearance of a frog’.[[309]](#footnote-340) Another tendency Hayman conforms with, is identifying the characters of the two main fables as the two brothers, ignoring their status as animals: ‘After that fabulous brother battle fought by the Mookse (Shaun) and the Gripes (Shem)’.[[310]](#footnote-341) Hayman also makes the claim that Joyce’s sentence is not ‘human’ enough: ‘In its stark economy the passage still lacks the sensual aspects which would make it more portentous, more human’.[[311]](#footnote-342) Hayman’s most interesting point, however, concerns the sentence’s development and the inclusion of motifs:

Joyce had heretofore neglected to incorporate the background motifs, the rich bird, fish, and animal references which had long been present in the surrounding sentences. Functionally, these references replace conventional description, contributing to the passage a rich Garden of Eden backdrop which helps situate the action on several planes while providing no positive clues for the identification of locale or epoch. Furthermore, they contribute to the evocation of certain specific attitudes and analogies.[[312]](#footnote-343)

Hayman gives a summary of what he considers the function of animals in the *Wake* to be, which is to emphasise themes or be part of the description. What Hayman’s two essays suggest, then, is that animals are read as contributing to other themes but are not a theme in themselves. The question that arises then, is whether Hayman is correct, or do animals serve another function in *Finnegans Wake*?

Other publications in 1958 and 1959 focus on various topics such as religion[[313]](#footnote-344), language, Vico, and compiling lists and locating sources.[[314]](#footnote-345) They do not, however, mention animals. In 1959 Atherton’s book *The Books at the Wake*, is published, and details many of Joyce’s sources. Mentions of animals in Atherton’s book are limited to when they are used as references to something else, such as in the following argument: ‘Each time the caterpillar is mentioned in the *Wake* it is accompanied by references to homosexualism’.[[315]](#footnote-346) Atherton also comments on the metamorphosis of characters when he observes: ‘The characters of each cycle recur under new names in all other cycles’.[[316]](#footnote-347)

This almost obsessional identification of Joyce’s sources by critics continues into the 1960s. One example is Marvin Carlson’s essay ‘Henrik Ibsen and “Finnegans Wake”’, which, obviously, examines Ibsen’s influence on Joyce.[[317]](#footnote-348) 1960 is also the publication date of Frank Budgen’s *James Joyce and the Making of “Ulysses”,* with an additional chapter on *Finnegans Wake*. Budgen’s work (minus this new chapter) appears earlier, in 1934. Budgen comments on the sound of the text, saying:

We hear voices above, below and all round—voices of big people, of children at lessons and play, obstinate mumbling of old men, stony and wooden accents of wood and stone, […] airs from operas, strange animals—Roamaloose and Rehmoose—nightbirds, thunder at intervals, the splash of fish in the river.[[318]](#footnote-349)

Animals, according to Budgen, in the *Wake* contribute to the creation of an atmosphere. This theme continues somewhat in two essays published by Benstock in 1961, both of which comment on animal motifs: ‘wooing frog motif echoes the Church’s “holy” crusade of conquest’,[[319]](#footnote-350) ‘And so the evidence amasses: a reference to the raven and the dove (the two temptresses throughout the *Wake*)’.[[320]](#footnote-351) The connection to religion and barbarity is again associated with animals. This theme is hinted at in Helmut Bonheim’s essay, when he comments on cannibalisation (which is always connected to the Catholic belief of transubstantiation, and the eating of the body of Christ): ‘Earwicker, in an account of his sins, is accused of being a pelican (a bird which murders its young, just as Ireland, according to Stephen Dedalus, is “a cow[sic] that eats its farrow”)’.[[321]](#footnote-352)

In 1962 Fritz Senn and Clive Hart published the first issue of the *Wake Newslitter*, with the journal running up until 1984. In its over 20 years of publication, the *Newslitter* tended to include essays or notes which would consist of lists of recurring phrases, themes, or sources (such as Shakespeare and Tristan and Isolde), as well as having an intense focus on translation or the identification of foreign words. As the *Newslitter* spans such a wide range of years I have included this short, general summary and will include references in the appropriate year. I will mention now, however, that two specific issues feature more animal references than the others, and these are the issues published in 1968 and 1977.

The relevant articles, or notes, of the *Newslitter* in 1962 are a list of bee references,[[322]](#footnote-353) the situation of the animal as opposite to the divine,[[323]](#footnote-354) and a question-and-answer regarding the donkey and Christ, with the answer being: ‘Mr Colin Thornton-Smith, of Newcastle University College, N.S.W., tells us that in the early days of the Church Christ was often caricatured as a figure with the head of a donkey’.[[324]](#footnote-355)

In 1962 Clive Hart’s *Structure and Motif in “Finnegans Wake*” is published by Faber and Faber, the appendix of which includes a list of leitmotifs that appear in *Finnegans Wake*. Hart includes at least twenty phrases which contain or relate to animals (such as ‘three quarks for muster Mark’) and then produces a list of all their occurrences. Hart also notes that at certain points (pages 594-5 specifically) ‘animal imagery abounds throughout’ Joyce’s book.[[325]](#footnote-356) The trend of identifying sources continues with various essays all proposing sources.[[326]](#footnote-357) In 1963 the only one to mention animals is Thornton Wilder’s essay‘Giordano Bruno’s Last Meal in “Finnegans Wake”’, but he merely connects the mythical animal to a human being: ‘Bruno was for Joyce the type of the phoenix, symbol of immortality […] the Egyptian word for the phoenix bird was *Benu*’.[[327]](#footnote-358)

The *Newslitter* in 1964 continues this trend, (for example: ‘Maeterlinck’s works may well be there, but we must remember that bees were chosen by Napoleon as the emblem of the Premier Empire. The allusion is quite fitting “after Bohnaparts” (238.26)’)[[328]](#footnote-359) but also comments on the animal identities of the male Earwickers: ‘The Goat and Compasses are the males of the family. Humphrey is the Goat. Shaun and Shem are the legs of the compasses. Humphrey – Hump – Is the Buffalo. The boys are the bi-sons’,[[329]](#footnote-360) and ‘Shem’s literary production is compared to a spider’s oozing substance out of its own body’.[[330]](#footnote-361) What this quotation demonstrates—but does not necessarily acknowledge, is that the *Wake’s* characters have multiple forms; HCE here described as both a goat and a buffalo. The most significant quotation is provided by Fritz Senn:

It now occurs to me that there could indeed be an elephant in ALP’s belly, on those occasions when she happens to be identified with the mother of Buddha, Queen Maya, or Mahamay […] In a private letter, Mr Nathan Halper once drew my attention to a combination of elephant and child in “Elenfant” (244.35). It is possible that in this passage, full of night and sleep and a peaceful nature peopled by animals, Buddha, as elephant, plays a small part. […] The parallel birth of Christ is present in an animal variant: “Panther monster” (244.34). If Buddha, or his father, is an elephant, Christ, or God the Father, can be a panther- with, of course, the story of Pantherus thrown in.[[331]](#footnote-362)

One strand that emerges more fully now is the religious and biblical references to animals, which has appeared sporadically, such as in 1961 (with the references to cannibalism). Also published in 1964 are various essays focused on language and narrative,[[332]](#footnote-363) Vico, and connecting characters to sources,[[333]](#footnote-364) linguistics,[[334]](#footnote-365) and Tristan and Isolde.[[335]](#footnote-366) None of these mention animals. The next significant full-length monograph is published in 1965 and written by Benstock: *Joyce-Again’s Wake: An Analysis of Finnegans Wake*.[[336]](#footnote-367)

*Joyce-Again’s Wake* is a detailed book with a broad scope, and refers to animals at numerous points. As well as the references that occur in passing and tell us little, if anything about the *Wake*’s animals (such as ‘The Earwicker Hen […]. This contains both the “cheep” and “cluck” of hen sounds, plus Chickenlittle, hen, and *Hahn*—German for a rooster’) Benstock mentions animals in informative contexts.[[337]](#footnote-368) On some occasions Benstock is merely restating well known facts (for example: ‘In the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper, Joyce manages to interweave types of insects of every kind in many languages into the entomological fabric of the fable’),[[338]](#footnote-369) whilst at other moments continuing the trend of focusing on the human aspect of the *Wake*’s fables: ‘since Pope Adrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear) figures prominently as the Mookse in the fable of the Mookse and the Gripes’.[[339]](#footnote-370) Benstock also focuses on biographical details, placing the Joyce brothers onto the titular characters of a fable: ‘In words reminiscent of Joyce’s brother’s concern about the author’s Paris friends and spurious efforts in writing the *Wake*, the Ondt delights in his money and in the Gracehoper’s misfortunes’.[[340]](#footnote-371)

Various other strands or critical themes also occur in Benstock’s work, such as the identification (or re-identification) of sources: ‘So that whereas Earwicker envisions his sexual experience as a dreadful, sordid sin, Anna Livia sees hers as an epic seduction, as Leda seduced by the Zeus-swan’.[[341]](#footnote-372) The next three quotations are all similar, despite their differing focus, as they locate the animal as being the ‘base’ part of humanity, as sordid and opposing the divine:

both Florence Nigtingale and her equally famous contemporary, Jenny Lind, the “Swedish nightingale.” These two sing their *twosingwoolow,* a “wooing” song of “woe” to bring men “low”[[342]](#footnote-373)

On the nearest level, the nation that represents all nations becomes the city that is all cities, since the erecting of the city comprises the evolution of the developing human animal into the rival of the God of the Creation[[343]](#footnote-374)

Here she [Florence Nightingale] is again the temptress who ruined the great man; she is Kitty O’Shea, Parnell’s mistress, as the reference to *Fox*, one of Parnell’s aliases in the affair, indicates[[344]](#footnote-375)

While this strand undoubtedly emerges and can be seen in *Wakean* criticism, it is not explicitly stated; instead, there are numerous examples provided which remained unconnected.

Along with his monograph Benstock releases three journal articles in 1965. One is a list of sources and does not mention animals at all,[[345]](#footnote-376) and another refers to animals only in context to food.[[346]](#footnote-377) The third, however, includes a comparison of the wren motif that appears in Joyce’s books, with the work of William Gaddis. *Finnegans Wake*, however, is not the focus of the essay’s brief comparison:

The wren motif is of course well known to the reader of *Finnegans Wake* […]. Both Stephens then are recognizable as the wren, the scapegoat, the sacrificial lamb, the uncrowned king, the creative *Demiurgos* that rivals the God of the Creation, the first martyr of the true religion and the surviving martyr of the true art and the false art.[[347]](#footnote-378)

In 1966 Faber and Faber publish *Twelve and a Tilly*, a collection of essays on *Finnegans Wake*. Along with the, by now, standard practice of source identification, two of the essays return to and reinforce previous ideas concerning animals. James S. Atherton picks up on animals as sacrifices or victims in his summary of the hunt on page 96 of *Finnegans Wake*:

‘[B]ut perhaps it is in the hunting that the quarry becomes most elusive. In a passage running for half a page from ‘Gundogs of all breeds were beagling’ (96.36) the beast pursued becomes a hare, an otter (from ‘holt’), a rat, a badger, a bear, a hare again, then turns into a fox and is lost. [[348]](#footnote-379)

The animals listed have notably been exploited by humans (except, perhaps the otter), culminating in the fox which is cruelly hunted for pleasure.

One may be that insects bring to mind the irresistible fecundity and the ubiquitous persistence of low animal vitality; another that, by their metamorphoses through various stages. Insects are ideally suited to stand for the important aspect of perpetual changing forms in the *Wake*.[[349]](#footnote-380)

This comment, from Fritz Senn’s essay about insects, perpetuates, or continues the theme of animals representing the primitive. However, it also provides a more original meaning by focusing on the insect’s suitability as a representation of characters which constantly move from one form to another. Other publications in 1966 deal with source identification,[[350]](#footnote-381) as well as animals in relation to food,[[351]](#footnote-382) hunting,[[352]](#footnote-383) and religion:

Joyce, in his final draft, does tie up bishops and pigs in the word, “porporates.”’ […] Perhaps we can also make out “porpoise,” with its “fish,” symbol of Christ, aligned with “pork,” Mr. Casey’s notion of “the tub of guts up in Armagh.”[[353]](#footnote-384)

The 1967 issues of the *Newslitter* contain lists of non-English words, as well as various myths which can be connected to passages of the *Wake*. Nathan Halper, for example, offers this reading on the presence of the zodiac:

In the same sentence, “scraggy”—“scraggy isthmus”—is an echo of the ram in Tristram. “Scrag” is the neck of a sheep. […] The Ram is preceded by Pisces, the Fish. There are a number of fishes in the first part of the chapter, coming to a climax on p.7.[[354]](#footnote-385)

Otheressays in 1967 and 1968 also deal with sources, such as references to Mark Twain’s *Huckleberry Finn*,[[355]](#footnote-386) Joyce’s own works,[[356]](#footnote-387) and Mormonism.[[357]](#footnote-388) William York Tindall’s *A Reader’s Guide to James Joyce* is also published in 1968. In it Tindall picks up the theme of defining animals, in particular the donkey, that emerged at least as early as the 1940s. Tindall admits his confusion regarding the donkey—‘your guess about the donkey that follows John is as good as mine’—and then glosses over the donkey’s presence by reading it as a human referent, as his ‘guess’ is that the donkey represents ‘Shaun-Joyce or Ireland’.[[358]](#footnote-389) In the same manner that others read the book’s fabular animals, Tindall regards the gulls of II.4 as a metaphor for humans: ‘The four old men observe the affairs of Tristan, Isolde, and King Mark. […] Seabirds or scavengers are their metaphor’.[[359]](#footnote-390)

In 1969 the *Newslitter* contains a high number of animal references. These references follow the standard strands for *Wake* criticism (or animals in *Wake* criticism), with many critics offering sources for Joyce’s last book.[[360]](#footnote-391) Other essays in this year comment on animal sacrifice,[[361]](#footnote-392) and Gaelic words connected to goats: ‘Irish *meigead* = a goat’s chin and beard; *meigeadach* = the bleating of a goat; *meig* = a bleat, a meg’.[[362]](#footnote-393) There is also a very good essay on the bird and bovine imagery, but it only focuses on *A Portrait*. Perhaps the most interesting and relevant article of this year’s *Newslitter* is L. A. Wiggin’s essay, ‘The Voice of the Frogs’. In his essay Wiggin’s argues:

This single incident of the constant seasonal cycle of the return, passing, and return of the frogs is a fitting parallel for the *ricorso* motif of James Joyce’s *FW*. There are, of course, other examples—many examples—of cycles in nature, but I shall, in this article, attempt to explain why the cycle of the frogs is the exact instance Joyce wanted for a multiple analogy.[[363]](#footnote-394)

Wiggin also comments on Joyce’s method of writing, specifically how he generates multiple meanings from a single word:

In *FW*, Joyce does not use the object, frog, as an analogy or a symbol. Instead, he chooses the utterance of a frog, for in this particular verbal sound Joyce was able to concentrate a variety of allusions, a method which is now widely regarded as characteristic of many of the words in *FW*.[[364]](#footnote-395)

Other essays released in 1969 note source texts (such as Shakespeare),[[365]](#footnote-396) animal symbolism,[[366]](#footnote-397) and even the influence of *Finnegans Wake* on The Beatles.[[367]](#footnote-398) In a 1969 essay Benstock notes Joyce’s use of hunting as a theme, but does not expand on it:

The process of the dream is a pursuit of the literary facts which would verify the essential innocence of the guilt-ridden dreamer, but the pursuit is a fruitless foxhunt (a basic metaphorical situation in both *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*): the wily beast changes identity with abandon, joins the pursuers at will, and skilfully eludes them until he realizes to his horror that he is his own pursuer. With each stage of the dream in the *Wake* time has passed and the characters have changed, but the state of flux is maintained and a resolution of sorts is actually achieved at the climax, before the book (like the dream) flows cyclically into itself to begin again.[[368]](#footnote-399)

Benstock, however, examines the horse race on page 342 of *Finnegans Wake* in more detail:

In the horse race described during the Butt-Taff performance, Earwicker is a horse named “*Emancipator”* (342.19), and the girls are fillies […] Here urinating is apparent as well, but the suggestion is that the girls are purposely exposing themselves to Earwicker, and their sin of sexual teasing takes the brunt of guilt from him and places it onto them instead.[[369]](#footnote-400)

Like Tindall earlier, Benstock considers animals as metaphors for human characters. Michael Bengal does the same in his reading of the fables: ‘Neither the Mookse and the Gripes nor Burrus and Caseous presents any resolution of the conflict, since in neither does one of the brothers come out ahead of the other’.[[370]](#footnote-401)

In 1972 the theme of connecting animals and religion is somewhat repeated when the *Newslitter* publishes a list of animals associated with popes. Pope Leo XII, for example, is connected to the dog and the serpent.[[371]](#footnote-402) In 1973 the *Newslitter* features an article named ‘The Birds’, which—while noting the number of birds present—argues that the passage in which they feature is actually about Aristophanes:

Page 449 of *FW* abounds in birds, including the unclean hoopoe […]. The use of the hoopoe (the chief character in *The Birds)* is really to tip off the reader to the fact that this is a page about Aristophanes[[372]](#footnote-403)

Other *Newslitter* articles of this year and 1974 only mention animals in regard to identified sources. Whilst knowing or identifying sources may be useful, it tells us little about the animal itself and their function in the text.

In 1974 Fritz Senn and Michael Begnal edit a collection of essays which appear under the title *A Conceptual Guide to “Finnegans Wake”,* which contains a few helpful comments on animals. In his essay in this collection, Atherton repeats commonly known facts about the *Wake* and animal description: ‘Words suggesting animals, wild things and sea creatures are interwoven with words suggesting food and words evoking the theatre’.[[373]](#footnote-404) Atherton’s other mention of animals is about the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable, but he merely quotes Clive Hart connecting the two brothers to the two insects:

As Hart explains, “Shaun tells his fable to denigrate Shem but, in fact, by having already characterized him as a beetle he has allotted him the majestic role of the most seminal of the gods, and he even repeats the identification with the Great Beetle at 417.04.[[374]](#footnote-405)

This is also what Epstein does in his chapter: ‘while the Gripes is also mostly Shem, his name, Niklaus Alopysius (155.31) contains the Greek for ‘fox,’ -alopēs; he is both grapes and fox’.[[375]](#footnote-406) Figuring the animals of the *Wake* solely as human is a practice also done by Edward A. Kopper, who refers to the nightingales as nurses.[[376]](#footnote-407) This thesis will avoid this practice, as while it acknowledges the presence of human parallels it does not go on to dismiss the animal part of the character. Kopper also offers an interesting idea about the donkey, using the word ‘celluloid’ to suggest that it originates from some visual media, perhaps the television in Earwicker’s pub.[[377]](#footnote-408) Hugh B. Staples also attempts to define the donkey, considering the following two options:

This brings us to the vexed problem of the donkey—a problem that is solved dogmatically by those who identify him with Christ, and somewhat less grandly, by those who see in the burro the figure of Joyce himself. The latter choice is rendered more plausible.[[378]](#footnote-409)

The two most interesting two quotations from *A Conceptual Guide*, however, are about the primitive, primal aspect of animals. These quotations are noteworthy because instead of simply remarking on the animal’s presence, they consider how they then relate to the human. The first quotation, written by Morse, considers animal sound as primal, and human sound as more civilised: ‘The croaking of frogs in the primal swamp of the chaotic age is echoed in the civil age by a well-known chorus from Aristophanes’ *The Frogs*’.[[379]](#footnote-410) The second quotation, from Benstock’s essay, shows an instance when Joyce subverts this theme: ‘His straightforward message is a pollyannic belief in perfectibility, in the example set for man by the advanced bird’.[[380]](#footnote-411) The question of what differentiates humans from animals is a somewhat developed topic in *Wakean* criticism, but it is a question that is considered somewhat obscurely and is not addressed explicitly. This thesis, however, builds on this strand and considers this question directly.

In 1975 Ian MacArthur considers how to define the donkey, which appears to be a point of contention with *Wake* critics. MacArthur, however, also considers the bear:

What is the function of the ass and bear? The ass is a familiar of the four and is an ancient sun god symbol, later associated with the dark god Set. The bear is closely linked to Sackerson and functions, along with the ass, as a symbol of the shadow.[[381]](#footnote-412)

In his essay MacArthur also includes a somewhat unclear diagram in which he connects the donkey, as well as a snake, to various human characters. In 1976 MacArthur returns to the question of the donkey, and claims that it is the ship of II.4,[[382]](#footnote-413) as well including another diagram and a potential source:

F. A. Yates provides another answer. Giordano Bruno uses the ass as a symbol for ‘The mystical Nothing beyond the Cabalist Sephiroth …’ […] He portrays ‘an ass which speaks and contemplates the works of the world and the principles of nature.’ This use is remarkably similar to Joyce’s.[[383]](#footnote-414)

Also in the *Newslitter* in 1976, is an essay titled ‘The Song of the Gulls’, which reads the gulls, not as animals, but as the customers of HCE’s pub: ‘Thus, this song of the gulls is not sung by the normally sympathetic Four but is a transfiguration of the departing customers’ raillery of HCE’.[[384]](#footnote-415)

In 1976 Margot Norris’ superb book *The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake* is published. In it, Norris observes that: ‘There is something a little inhuman about *Finnegans Wake*, compared to, say, *Ulysses*’.[[385]](#footnote-416) This stands at a contrast to the early reviews of the *Wake* which emphasised the human nature of the book; Norris’s stance, however, is more convincing. Norris also considers numerous themes connected with animals, and without referring to Joyce’s sources in great detail. The only source mentioned in conjunction with animals is ‘Leda and the Swan’: ‘The thunder’s voice is not ALP’s only brush with divinity. In her final words she thinks of HCE […] like Zeus disguised as the swan bearing down in Leda, or like the Holy Ghost as angel/bird impregnating Mary’.[[386]](#footnote-417) Norris does cross familiar territory, as it were, when she mentions animals in terms of sacrifice (‘In parody of the Lord’s prayer, “ouer Tad” is not so easily located in heaven […]. He is both patriarch […] and totem animal’)[[387]](#footnote-418) and cannibalism (‘Perhaps ALP, as hen, has found her way onto the Thanksgiving or supper table, a notion compatible with cannibal communion motifs elsewhere in the book.’).[[388]](#footnote-419) Additionally, Norris comments on the animal identities of human characters, for example: ‘Woman and hen are the same figure’,[[389]](#footnote-420) and ‘The fly pun links two important animal images of HCE, the insect (earwig) and the fish’.[[390]](#footnote-421) Norris’ more original comments, however, are far more compelling. She is, perhaps, one of the first that does more than simply state that the Mookse is just Shaun, and instead uses the simile ‘Shaun-like’ to describe the Mookse.[[391]](#footnote-422) Norris is also one of the first to note an instance of animal evolution, but the animal is, once again, used to suggest the primitive: ‘But the sentence [460.11] simultaneously conjures up the image of an apelike or simian (simself) creature, stalking about, a loutish as well as Lutheran (louther) lover, too established in his brutishness (“immutating” or unchanging) to ascend the evolutionary ladder’.[[392]](#footnote-423)

The passage in Norris’ work that is the most compelling, however, in relation to this thesis is as follows:

The most immediately striking feature of the work’s structure, however, is certainly the thematic replication – the persistence of stable relationships among characters whose protean forms remind one of the “shape-shifters” of myths and fairy tales in their ability to appear as human (Shem and Shaun), animal (Ondt and Gracehoper), inanimate (rock and stone, pieces of laundry), and even abstract (Justius and Mercius, space and time). […] In *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce explores transmutation thematically through recurring dramas and tales in which the “accidents” change but the “substances” remain the same.[[393]](#footnote-424)

Norris’s work pre-dates OOO, but through the terminology of the doctrine of essentialism (discussed in Chapter Two), Norris almost offers an object-orientated reading of the *Wake* in the above quotation. The real qualities of the characters—their ‘substance’—remains constant, whilst their sensual ones—their ‘accidents’—morph and shift innumerable times. The next chapter, Chapter Five, will examine transformations and hybrid creatures in more detail, building on the reading Norris has offered here, examining the *Wake*’s creatures through the lens and terminology of OOO.

The year after Norris’s book is published, 1977, the *Newslitter* features more mentions of animals than usual. Many of them, unfortunately, simply refer to sources. While the identification of sources can be beneficial, isolated and unapplied they tell us little about why Joyce used those sources and to what effect. Ian MacArthur, once again, returns to his attempt at defining the donkey, merely stating: ‘The interpreter of *FW* is an ass’.[[394]](#footnote-425) In the same year MacArthur also considers Joyce’s use of the sigla, relating it to animals in the book: ‘It is now clear that the horse functions as another aspect of □. Whereas the ass carries X (581.22) or more usually follows behind, the horse carries  and symbolises his backside. Ass and horse are thus closely associated’.[[395]](#footnote-426) Wilhelm Füger also mentions the sigla in the same year, in his essay about the raven/dove motif: ‘the siglum ⊣⊢stands for ‘raven and dove’ as well as for: ‘the two jinnies’, ‘the two components of Issy’s mind, [etc.]’.[[396]](#footnote-427) The rise of sigla references is likely due to Roland McHugh’s *The Sigla of “Finnegans Wake”*, which appeared a year earlier in 1976.

In his essay, Füger notes the ubiquity of birds (‘Among the countless birds that flutter and swarm through the *Wake*, ravens (crows) and doves (pigeons) are allotted a prominent role’),[[397]](#footnote-428) and also summarises their function as a motif: ‘In short, then, raven and dove in *FW* are part and representatives of a general pattern of fundamental opposites that can be summarized as follows: [What follows is a table listing the qualities of the raven as including: darkness, night, bad (omen), and decay, while the dove has the following (among others): light, day, good (omen) renewal, success’].[[398]](#footnote-429) Füger also continues the theme of connecting animals with religion in his essay: ‘Unlike the raven—according to Nashe and to the testimony of folklore and superstition a dangerous emissary of the Devil—, the dove, as a traditional symbol of the Holy Ghost, is an emissary of God’.[[399]](#footnote-430) He returns to the raven and dove motif a year later in 1978, adding another bird: ‘The raven/dove motif is indirectly elucidated by a side-glance at the role of the magpie, which, in folklore, is often thought to be a hybrid between the raven and the dove’.[[400]](#footnote-431) In the same year J. Mitchell Morse identifies a possible source for the Ondt and the Gracehoper, Plato’s cicadas.[[401]](#footnote-432) The final notes of interest that appear in the *Newslitter* occur in 1983, concerning the role of animals in the development of language: ‘A second theory saw language as a development of animal cries and was jestingly called the Bow-wow theory; *FW* turns the nickname into the ‘wowow’ of 378.33’.[[402]](#footnote-433)

Bees also appear to be a popular animal to discuss; they are mentioned twice in the *Newslitter*, in 1962 and 1964, and another article is published about them in the *JJQ* in 1987. This article primarily focuses on Greek myth, stating: ‘Joyce, too, connects bees and honey with divinity as the ancients did’.[[403]](#footnote-434)

In 1991, with the rise in criticism centred around race and post-colonial discourse, Vincent J. Cheng considers colonialism through the horses of the *Wake*: ‘Wellington and his big white horse are the *Wake*’s prime symbols for the authority and empire of white over black: white races, black races; day, night; essentialism, pluralism’.[[404]](#footnote-435) Cheng also considers Joyce’s techniques, which he uses to create this ‘pluralism’: ‘Joyce’s puns already reveal that the nature of a horse’s reality is inherently unstable (de-stabled), decentered into man and horse and arse and ass’.[[405]](#footnote-436) In his essay Cheng also raises the idea of ‘horseness’:

the “whatness of allhorse” is not a single Horseness, but an “allness” that encompasses Everybody (as in “Here Comes”): “Ear! Ear! Weaker {HC Earwicker} An allness eversides! […]’ Old Copenhagen’s foison/fetch/poison/person is a “horse elder” whose quiddity is an “allness eversides” which is multitudinous and all- inclusive.[[406]](#footnote-437)

It is interesting to note that the consideration of Aristotle’s ‘quiddity’ occurs in both *Ulysses* and the *Wake* through horses. Cheng concludes by saying:

In Joyce’s works, the nature of authority has less to do with “white horses” than with “desultory horses,” all the dark horses and rank outsiders and throwaways silenced into the dark room of the repressed Other. Joyce’s pluralistic world—of many horses […] of many races, many colors, many languages, many discourses—belies the repressive authority of a monologic, essentializing “horseness.”[[407]](#footnote-438)

What Cheng does that has not previously been done, is evaluate how Joyce uses a particular animal to provide social commentary, instead of just considering an animal’s position in myth or symbolism. This is what R. J. Schork does in his essay—published two years later—concerning the sheep and goats in the *Wake*. For example, Schork comments: ‘Between the extremes of this involuted bilingual rhetorical figure, there are Shem’s satanic goat and its fraternal rival, Shaun’s sheep, as well as Mosaic scapegoats and evangelically dextrous sheep and sinister goats’.[[408]](#footnote-439) Schork’s focus on religion, however, is understandable in this context as these animals possess obvious biblical connotations.

In 1999 Hildegard Möller’s work, *A Wake Bestiary,* is published; this text includes a useful list of (almost) all the animals that appear in the *Wake*, demonstrating an increasing awareness of the volume of animals in *Finnegans Wake*.[[409]](#footnote-440)

In 2003 the theme of hunting reappears in Lucia Boldrini’s essay: ‘HCE, both hunter and hunted, also embodies this *coincidentia oppositorum*: in chapter I.6 “hounded become haunter, hunter become fox” (*FW* 132.16-17),and in the last chapter the “huntered present human” (*FW* 618.36) combines both roles’.[[410]](#footnote-441) What is interesting here is, that, the human must turn into an animal in order to become prey. In the same collection of essays,  *James Joyce and the Difference of Language,* the strand of ‘sound’ and examining the acoustic qualities of the *Wake* in connection with animals also reappears: ‘‘To read what was never written’ is, in some ways, a description of the attitude required for engaging with *Finnegans Wake*; but it is also intrinsic to the representation of the non-linguistic, of the noise made by a cow, for example, or the experience of a hornpipe dance’.[[411]](#footnote-442)

As we progress further into the 21st century, genetic criticism picks up, and two full-length studies devoted to it are published in 2007. In his monograph, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake*, Finn Fordham conducts a close reading of specific passages and their genetic development. By doing this, Fordham mentions animals in the context of a wide range of themes, some of which have been covered before, as they are significant themes about the *Wake* as a whole. Examples include the sacrifice of animals, but Fordham adds another dimension by associating sacrifice with gender: ‘There seems to be an execution or a sacrifice occurring, a sacrifice of birds, of young women’.[[412]](#footnote-443) The ‘othering’ of women also occurs in fish-form as well as bird: ‘In the same section, the girls we met listening to Jaun now morph into a sexualized ‘school of herring’; quick-moving, fluid, vivid, and libidinous’.[[413]](#footnote-444) Fordham’s explanation for the metamorphosis of Joyce’s characters is split into two parts. The first explains the ‘why’, attributing it to Joyce’s desire to incorporate myths and other sources: ‘Joyce was simply not content with realist ‘characters’, but wanted to draw on the ancient mythic narratives about natural forces and then merge them, in an unprecedented move for modern fiction, with naturalistic characters’.[[414]](#footnote-445) Fordham comments that this metamorphosis is possible because of the book’s dream structure:

The dream serves to explain why the language and plot are strange, why it is dark and obscure with sudden displacements, where the dead can speak, where humans are animals and vice versa, and where barriers around sexualities are apparently down.[[415]](#footnote-446)

An example of this method in practice appears on page 53 of Fordham’s book:

‘Now the ‘self’ becomes a ‘squidself’, ‘hidden’ becomes ‘squirtscreened’, and the world is ‘crystalline’. Joyce has stepped from Shem to another animal whose ink courses through its body. The squid, squirting its ink defensively, hides itself from attack. So, too, Shem protects himself while writing the first and last lines of a defence against a hostile world.[[416]](#footnote-447)

It is the alteration of specific words which allows the animal qualities of Shem to be brought forwards. Animal qualities, as we have seen, are often read as revealing the primitive part of human nature in the *Wake*, and Fordham continues this theme:

Shaun, like a lawyer summing up in a trial, says his brother is the lowest imaginable human creature, as low as a snake; and in this respect resembles the man who, according to the first draft of ALP’s letter, was ‘a snake’ who spread lies about HCE.[[417]](#footnote-448)

The biblical allusions are also clear here. Two interesting comments that Fordham makes (which coincide with Norris’ claim in 1976 that ‘there is something a little inhuman about *Finnegans Wake’*), are at odds with vague claims of earlier critics, who state that the *Wake* is ‘an epic of contemporary man’,[[418]](#footnote-449) or that in the *Wake* Joyce is ‘at his most human’.[[419]](#footnote-450) Fordham’s two claims are the following:

Joyce had already visited the sex life of insects in the episode about the Ant and the Grasshopper. It is a parallel but exclusive world, the incorporation of which compromises the centrality of human roles in narrative.[[420]](#footnote-451)

A hister is a beetle that lives in decaying animal and vegetal matter, a parasite living off dying material. One level of Joyce’s work is an epic of animals, especially insects, where humans are insects and vice versa.[[421]](#footnote-452)

The second genetic-focused publication of 2007—*How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake*—features far less helpful material pertaining to animals than Fordham’s work. One reference supplies another source for the *Wake*: ‘A source text for Joyce’s Mookse and Gripes fable – Wyndham Lewis’s *The Lion and the Fox: The Rôle of the Hero in the Plays of Shakespeare*’.[[422]](#footnote-453) Another essay brings in biography: ‘Our father (*pater noster*) has been awakened from the zoo in which he sleeps. This suggests the Fluntern cemetery in Zurich (where Joyce is buried), which adjoins a zoo’.[[423]](#footnote-454) The most helpful quotation comes from Jed Deppman’s chapter:

Buzzards, asses, eagles, beagles, and bulbuls—this erratic fray of nature’s noise is dimly audible in the *Wake*’s word “bulbubly.” In the context of the *Wake* the extreme linguistic mutability of this group of letters is also noteworthy: the sounds of both the bulbul bird and the beagle baying occur in the “Circe” word “Bur*blbl*bur*blbl!*” and Joyce, later in the same chapter, also turns the sound into a verb: “*beaglebaying, burblbrbling*” (U: 15.3955).[[424]](#footnote-455)

Sound and animals are mentioned again in Edmund L. Epstein’s 2009 word, *A Guide Through “Finnegans Wake”*, which contains a large number of animal references, and is an immensely helpful work. Regarding sound, Epstein states:

They anticipate that Tristan is the young spark that would “tread” her (the term for the sexual attack of the cock on the hen)[…] In this section, Joyce brilliantly conveys the sound of the seabirds overhead screaming shrilly and gleefully (385.15-18). “The death of Cock Robin” proved the form for this last sentence.[[425]](#footnote-456)

In his reading of the opening of II.4, however, Epstein reads the seabirds as simply metaphors for the four old men:

In II.4 the enlightened children, now one man and one woman, engage in kissing and cuddling as Tristan and Isolde, while the envious Four Old Men salivate and babble, and fly about madly in the form of seagulls around the nuptial vessel of the pair.[[426]](#footnote-457)

Epstein also notes numerous other examples of human characters being animals, some examples are:

135.36: HCE as verminous, crawling with insects[[427]](#footnote-458)

127.2-3: HCE is here a lobster.[[428]](#footnote-459)

HCE rouses (559.20-29). Half asleep, he is not an attractive sight. There are both beastly and fishy aspects to him (559.23).[[429]](#footnote-460)

The themes Epstein touches upon include gender (‘Then the nightingale announces herself (although in reality only the male nightingale sings) as a bulbul, the Iranian word for “nightingale,” expanded by an Italian affix indicating large size’),[[430]](#footnote-461) evolution (‘Joyce’s Tree includes all human genders and all levels of human society. Like Darwin’s Tree of Life, Joyce’s Tree embodies the process of human and animal evolution’),[[431]](#footnote-462) and Joyce’s sources:

The specifically historical section of the chapter begins with an evocation of early history: Viking invasions of Ireland, the incursions of the ancestors of HCE, and the activities of wolves and foxes in primitive Ireland of the autochthonous Irish and the Scandinavian invaders.[[432]](#footnote-463)

Epstein goes on to comment on animals and sacrifice:

“For Ark see Zoo” (104.19-20) is a superb four-word poem of much resonance. […] The difference between an ark and a zoo is that, in an ark, the animals are enclosed for their ultimate salvation in a zoo, they are imprisoned only for the amusement of others.[[433]](#footnote-464)

Epstein also continues the strand of defining the donkey: ‘The unnamed narrator, who turns out to be the donkey of the Four Old Men’.[[434]](#footnote-465) Due to the large scope of his work, Epstein never delves into much detail concerning animals, but his work does demonstrate the ubiquity of animals in the *Wake*, as well as to reinforce various strands that have already appeared.

In 2014 Margot Norris releases the first more-modern essay explicitly on animals in the *Wake*; Norris makes claims which establish *Finnegans Wake* as a sort of mirror-image of physical life: ‘Insects, vertebrate animals, and humans are intermeshed semantically throughout the passages of this fable, as they are obliged to coexist in life’.[[435]](#footnote-466) Norris also suggests that the human characters of the *Wake* are necessary for the reader to notice the animals:

By identifying Earwicker and his sons with insects Joyce draws our attention to the vitality of living organisms that are among the smallest and ostensibly least significant on the planet and yet at the same time among the most prolific and varied.[[436]](#footnote-467)

Norris is incorrect in assuming that insects hold little importance, and her suggestion that human characters draw attention to the animals seems somewhat wrong, as the criticism of the *Wake* so far consistently equates the book’s animals with the human characters, drawing the focus away from the animal.

In 2016 another animal-centred essay is published: Cliff Mak’s ‘Joyce’s Indifferent Animals: Boredom and Subversion of Fables in “Finnegans Wake”’. This essay is used in Chapter Six of this thesis, which considers fables and silence. Mak spends part of his essay discussing the fabular form, and notes how it places humans above animals in some form of hierarchy:

The traditional fable is always composed of two aspects: an imaginary fabular aspect and a deterministic aspect. These are recognizable as the two typical stages in a fable wherein a talking animal contrives to break the natural order before being inevitably dragged back in […]. This formally inevitable triumph of determinism is also occasion for a didactic moment in the fable, which typically ends with a moral dictum delivered from on high, over the now-silenced voices of animals.[[437]](#footnote-468)

This ‘lowness’ of animals is mentioned again, when Mak argues that they are used to represent more ‘primitive’ or ‘physical’ needs of humanity: ‘Creature comforts, as it were: the provisions for biological life are what emerge as the basic ethical stakes of the *Wake’*smore bestial episodes’.[[438]](#footnote-469) Mak is also (possibly) the first to consider anthropomorphism in this context:

Boredom, of course, is a minimal affective marker of anthropomorphism – but a slightly perverse and reflexive anthropomorphism, really, that allows the animal to reject (that allows us to imagine the animal rejecting, that is) our anthropocentrism. […] Joyce’s animals seem often to be represented and named for no particular reason but their capacity and propensity to be bored or inaccessible, to tire of attending to the narcissism of human beings, and to want to be away.[[439]](#footnote-470)

Mak’s two most compelling arguments are, however, as follows:

Joyce’s nonperspectival style makes it seem ‘as if literature could quote being [‘scholastic *quidditas*, the *whatness* of a thing’] independently of any particular being’s point of view’. But this method, we might add, which so deftly unites the scholastic and the stylistic under the rubric of realism, necessarily excludes representations of real animals.[[440]](#footnote-471)

And:

There is, it seems, a certain kind of clarity in *letting* the animal subsist in literary artifice that cannot successfully be exchanged for a more didactic clarity: to let the Mookse be Mookse, and the Gripes stay Gripes, and not the allegorical skins for something else.[[441]](#footnote-472)

The latter is interesting as Mak does not read—or feel the necessity to read the fable’s characters as simply human referents. The former quotation raises questions regarding representation, as well as what we define as ‘real’.

The lack of animal-focused Joycean criticism has been noted in recent years, and steps have been taken to rectify this lack, including: a Zurich workshop on animals, a conference held in Glasgow in 2019 titled ‘Beastly Modernisms’. In 2017, a special issue of *humanities,* compiled and edited by Katherine Ebury,was published on Joyce and the Nonhuman. Many of the essays published focus on *Ulysses*, with mentions of *Finnegans Wake* being sparse. Rachel Murray comments on a bee-related source (mentioned before, in Chapter One):

Curiously, however, as Finn Fordham’s compendious catalogue of *Wake* readings attests, the text has yet to be read as a model of swarm intelligence, a concept that arose in popular science in the late nineteenth-century before becoming one of the dominant themes of Maeterlink’s *The Life of the Bee*.[[442]](#footnote-473)

Laura Lovejoy’s essay, ‘The Bestial Feminine in “Finnegans Wake”’, however, is more promising. In her essay Lovejoy combines the themes of animals, sacrifice, gender and feminism to argue:

As Josephine Donovan notes, in patriarchal societies, the feminised animal is “an abject creature, upon whom are ascribed aspects of otherness.” It is through the sacrifice of this feminised animal, Donovan notes, that access to the sacred is achieved” in traditional patrilineal societies.[[443]](#footnote-474)

It is interesting to note, that despite the volume of animals in *Finnegans Wake* the recent edition of the *JJQ* dedicated to Joyce and the nonhuman contains only one (and half of another) essay on *Finnegans Wake*. Paul Fagan opens his essay by saying: ‘Of all of Joyce’s major works, perhaps *Finnegans Wake* has the most to gain from a reconsideration through the lens of the nonhuman’.[[444]](#footnote-475) Despite this, *Ulysses* remains the focus of many Joycean animal critics.

Conclusion

*Wake* criticism has its origins in the collected essays of *Our Exagmination*, which set up the following strands, or trends of criticism, although their mention in this instance is brief: animals and religion, motif, and criticism centred on the two Aesopian fables. The first major work on *Finnegans Wake* in its entirety, marks the first shift in *Wake*-animal criticism; Campbell and Robinson’s *Skeleton Key* provides a ‘plot’ summary or simplification but, as the examples in this review demonstrate, the animals that are referenced are named as ‘image[s]’, and the authors are often concerned with the animal’s symbolic purpose and how they connect to *Finnegans Wake’*s human characters. Declaring that ‘HCE becomes the Great Salmon’ is an example of this tendency; the salmon is a passive object for the shape-shifting HCE to become, and is full of mythological and symbolic connotations. This somewhat sets the tone for subsequent criticism, which focuses on the symbolic aspects of animals. Of course, that is not to say that Joyce did not intend the symbolism and mythology to be present but, as parts of this thesis will demonstrate, this metaphorical transformation does not need to be considered from a purely symbolic angle.

The second shift occurs with the publication of Adaline Glasheen’s *Census of “Finnegans Wake”*. With her book Glasheen creates an encyclopaedic reference text, which identifies and explains Joyce’s sources as well as the potential symbolism of these sources. Glasheen sets up an entire trend of Joycean criticism, namely the identification and investigation of his sources, which is continued by other critics such as Bernard Benstock as well as numerous contributors to the *Wake Newslitter*. While other strands run through the 1960s up until the 1990s, such as animals being connected to the theme of sacrifice, the next major shift does not occur until 1991. This shift is indicated by Cheng’s essay on horses and politics. This signals a move away from conventional symbolism, to considering animals in connection to a social, political commentary. Cheng’s essay focuses on colonialism, but other essays that appear after this shift engage in other political discourses, such as feminism (Lovejoy’s 2017 essay), and Ecocriticism. There are two other (perhaps less obvious) shifts which stem from this more prominent one. The first of these two happens in 2014, with Margot Norris’ essay, in which she considers animals in conjunction to the physical, ‘real’ world. Mak continues this trend in 2016 when, in his discussion of the *Wake*’s animal fables, he comments on the exclusion of the ‘real’ animal. The final shift in this narrative is less to do with methods of criticism, and occurs in 2017 when the first journal issue specifically devoted to Joyce and the non-human is published. This entrance of animal-focused Joycean criticism continues with a Zurich workshop on animals, and with an issue of the *JJQ* devoted to the same topic being published in 2021.

This brief summary of the overarching narrative and the shifts it contains does not include a summary or evaluation of the strands that run through it. What follows, then, is an examination of these threads that appear, which are arranged into four categories: strands that appear sporadically, strands that cease, strands that start up, and strands that endure across the narrative.

A sporadic strand is one that weaves in and out of criticism, seemingly disconnected to the shifts in the narrative of Wakean-animal scholarship. One example of this type is the connection of animals to sounds in the *Wake*. This strand first emerges in 1969 and occurs again in 1974 before vanishing for almost thirty years before resurfacing in 2003, then 2007, and finally in 2009. This sporadic strand demonstrates that sound can indicate the presence of animals in the *Wake*, while sporadically appearing themes in general show the ubiquity of animals, as well as their vastness as a topic, which leads to scholarship referencing them, or touching on them without further expansion. Other strands in this category are as follows: animals in connection with insults, evolution, and animals being considered as the source of human language.

What is meant by ‘strands that cease and emerge’ is relatively self-explanatory, and by examining these threads specifically we can identify the aforementioned shifts which occur in the narrative. One strand that ceases is critics’ preoccupation of defining the donkey that accompanies the four old men. By claiming that the donkey can be defined as Joyce, Ireland, or even Jesus Christ, critics attempt to explain away, and sometimes even end up simply ignoring the animal itself. While the cessation of this specific strand may suggest a movement away from classifying the *Wake*’s animals as something other than themselves, it is merely part of a much larger thread of dismissing the animal which endures in *Wake* criticism, even though focus on the donkey stops.

Another tendency of critics which stops appearing coincides with the emergence of another; these strands form the shift which is introduced or signalled by Cheng. This shift, mentioned earlier, indicates a cessation of overly symbolic readings—such as Füger’s reading of the raven and dove motif in 1977—and the emergence of more political criticism, such as Laura Lovejoy’s essay on the bestial feminine in *Finnegans Wake*. The strands that emerge at this point, or shortly after, all move away from the more traditionally symbolic strands that appear in the criticism of earlier years. These newer strands include: animals and gender, politics, anthropomorphism, ecocriticism, and the consideration of the animal in connection to the ‘real’.

The final category concerns themes which appear consistently along the timeline of examined scholarship. There are six threads which fall into this category, and they are as follows: animals and religion, animal sacrifice, animals representing the primitive, fable criticism, the difference between human and animal, and, finally, the rendering of animals as something other than themselves – either through metaphor, transformation, or the application of symbolic connotations. One reason that these strands may endure is that themes such as sacrifice, and religion are integral to *Finnegans Wake* itself. The appearance of criticism which creates these strands demonstrates that these themes are present in the *Wake*. However, as of yet they remain unconnected, meaning the presence of the theme is not always evident.

The following chapters of this thesis will further establish that some of these themes are present, particularly the usage of animals to indicate the primitive or ‘base’ aspects of human beings in *Finnegans Wake*. These two chapters also aim to weave some of these threads together, specifically fable criticism and how Joyce considers the difference between human and animal, as well as how this boundary can be navigated. The following chapters, like Chapters Two and Three, will use OOO to achieve these aims, whilst also considering the ‘real’ animals of the *Wake*. ‘Real’ animals in this instance means to look at the animal-object and address it as an animal, not just as a symbolic or sensual quality of another, separate object. Indeed, an examination of animals as objects (as defined by OOO) is not present in current Wakean criticism, and as a result this thesis offers a new methodology to animal-focused criticism on *Finnegans Wake*.

The first of these two chapters will use OOO to demonstrate that the application of animal-specific qualities (for example, hairy goat legs) to humans (and vice versa) emphasises a difference between the human and the animal. The application of these qualities is a form of transformation, which is the result of metaphor. These metaphors result in a metamorphosis or blurring of the boundary between species, as well as—according to OOO—a new, different object. Questions that will need to be thoroughly considered, then, is whether the basic principles of OOO can be applied to the *Wake*, or whether this philosophy necessitates a realist setting. This thesis posits that OOO does not need a realist context to be useful and can be used to discuss and elucidate the bizarre objects of the *Wake.* This will then tie in with the more recent thread of considering the ‘real’ animals in the *Wake*, and whether a ‘real’ object can even exist in such a non-realist book. The second, and final, chapter of this thesis will conduct a close reading of Aristophanes’ *The Frogs* and Joyce’s fable of ‘The Ondt and the Gracehoper’ to consider how speaking animals alter our perception of them and the human-animal boundary.

Chapter Five: ‘[W]e are all animals. I also am an animal’:[[445]](#footnote-476) The Division Between Humans and Animals in *Finnegans Wake*.

I. Introduction

*Finnegans Wake* is stuffed full of animals and animal images; the book’s fringes are inhabited by all manner of creatures that are hidden in portmanteau words, puns, and both literary and historical references. It is in this manner of ever-presence yet marginalisation, as it were, that *Finnegans Wake* comes to resemble the structure of medieval manuscripts, as ‘[b]y the thirteenth century […] the margins of manuscripts began to be populated with small animals in human parody’.[[446]](#footnote-477) This representation—observed by Joyce E. Salisbury in her illuminating work *The Beast Within*—of animals in human parody in medieval texts is mirrored by the various animals of the *Wake*. Joyce’s book contains a significant number of bizarre animals; there are fabular animals that sing and dance, and animals that talk and act in so human a manner that it is difficult to call them animals at all.

Joyce’s interest in, and influence from, medieval sources is well documented. Vivian Mercier, for example, opens his essay, ‘James Joyce as Medieval Artist’, by claiming: ‘It is in his approach to art in general and to artistic symbolism in particular that Joyce shows himself to be a thoroughgoing medievalist’.[[447]](#footnote-478) Mercier also cites one of Joyce’s contemporaries, Arthur Power, as saying: ‘“It was the Medieval and the Medievalists which attracted him most”’.[[448]](#footnote-479) Given this interest, and parallels to medieval manuscripts, this chapter will use medieval sources—and criticism on these sources—to argue that Joyce uses animals to call into question the boundary between and definitions of human and animal, returning to a medieval belief in which human-animal hybrids were a literal truth and were not merely contained in the world of literary metaphor.[[449]](#footnote-480) José Carlos Redondo Olmedilla makes a similar argument about the medieval bestiary and *Ulysses*; he highlights the importance of the relation between transformation and the multiplicity of identity, and, as this chapter will argue, this can also be observed in *Finnegans Wake*.[[450]](#footnote-481)

In order to argue this effectively, this chapter will include a close reading of the ‘Belinda of the Dorans’ section of *Finnegans Wake* (110.22-112.27) which is centred around one of these bizarre animals: a hen named Biddy who unearths the infamous letter in the rubbish heap. Biddy Doran, however, may not be an animal at all; what Joyce is engaging with in this passage is an old, perhaps medieval, viewpoint or metaphor (that persists to this day) that equates women to animals, and often (as in this instance) to birds. Through an examination of this section, this chapter will argue that Joyce’s mediaevalesque consideration of human and animal is conducted through the establishment of metaphors, such as the ‘women are birds’ metaphor. To argue this, this chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will offer a brief summary of the three theories on metaphor—including OOO’s and how Harman defines it—that will be used in this chapter, while the second will consider how Joyce uses metaphor to construct a fabular, mediaevalesque world in which metaphors become literal. To facilitate this, section two will also include a discussion of human-animal hybrids. Section three will consider the idea that *Finnegans Wake* can resemble a medieval bestiary, in which animals are used to teach humans how to be human, while also seeming to provide information about a particular species.

II. Theories of Metaphor

As the second chapter of this thesis —‘Transforming into an Animal in *Ulysses*’— has observed, metaphor is an important tool of language; this earlier chapter cited John Berger’s essay, ‘Why Look at Animals’, in which he argues that language originated from metaphor and that the first metaphors had animals as their subject. While Berger’s claims are not substantiated with any credible evidence, his argument—or at least part of it—is not unique; in *The New Science* Giambattista Vico asserts something similar, although without reference to animals:

The philosophers and philologians should all have begun to treat the origins of languages and letters from the following principles. (1) That the first men of the gentile world conceived ideas of things by imaginative characters of animate and mute substances. (431)[[451]](#footnote-482)

This importance of metaphor to both language and society is established by two of the three theories discussed in this section: Vico’s *The New Science*, and Lakoff and Johnson’s *Metaphors We Live By*. The third theory, Object Orientated Ontology (OOO)—the principal philosophy underpinning this thesis—will be used to assist in the explanation of the other two sources, before Harman’s own writings on the subject are examined. Together, these theories will provide a detailed explanation concerning the use and mechanism of metaphor, which will be used to consider the boundaries between humans and animals in *Finnegans Wake*.

Vico’s claim that language began with metaphor or, more specifically, metaphorical gesture and metaphorical objects, appears in the remainder of paragraph 431, which was quoted above:

(2) That they expressed themselves by means of gestures or physical objects which had natural relations with the ideas; for example, three ears of grain, or acting as if swinging a scythe three times, to signify three years. (3) That they thus expressed themselves by a language with natural significations.[[452]](#footnote-483)

The object ‘an ear of corn’ communicates the meaning ‘one year’ as one of the properties of corn—growth rate or harvesting schedule, for example—equates to a year. Meaning is conveyed because the object or gesture possesses a quality that correlates to the desired message.

Vico provides numerous examples of metaphors in *The New Science*, a few of which contain animals, such as the following:

In yet another [story], Bellerophon slays the monster called the Chimaera, having the tail of a serpent, the body of a goat (to signify the enforested earth), and the head of a lion belching flames. […] By a fine metaphor they gave the name of serpent’s teeth to the curved pieces of hard wood they must have employed to plough the earth before the use of iron was discovered.[[453]](#footnote-484)

This metaphor, crudely put, is ‘curved wood is serpent’s teeth’. This metaphor functions because both objects share a sensual quality—as Harman would put it—namely, ‘hardness’. Another example of animals being used as metaphors appears in paragraph 435:

Idanthyrsus, king of the Scythians […] used five real words to answer Darius the Great, who had declared war on him. These five were a frog, a mouse, a bird, a ploughshare, and a bow. The frog signified that he, Idanthyrsus, was born of the earth of Scythia as frogs are born of the earth in summer rains, so that he was son of that land. The mouse signified that he, like a mouse, had made his home where he was born; that is, that he had established his nation there. The bird signified that there the auspices were his; that is, that he was subject to none but God.[[454]](#footnote-485)

These ‘real’ words—named as such because Idanthyrsus did not send ‘mouse’ written on a scrap of paper, but a physical mouse—communicate these meanings as they correspond to the essential qualities that the animal itself possesses (or is thought to possess).[[455]](#footnote-486) These qualities are communicated—as opposed to ‘furriness’, for example, which may signify that Idanthyrsus is covered in body hair—because they correlate to the animal’s perceived ‘nature’ or its real quality, and not to its sensual ones (as OOO would name them) such as ‘furriness’. This point raises two questions: first, are there any ‘real’ words in the *Wake*, and, second, given that OOO maintains that we cannot know the real quality of any object, what is the significance in the selection of specific properties to be the essence of that particular object; does their selection tell us anything about the object itself?

The answer to the first of these questions appears at first a simple ‘no’; we do not open the *Wake* only to have physical earwigs crawl out of the pages and into our laps. This interpretation of the question, however, may be too literal; if we look at previous criticism on the *Wake*, some scholars do argue something similar. Samuel Beckett’s claim that *Finnegans Wake* is ‘is not *about* something; it is *that something itself*’,[[456]](#footnote-487) has led to some of the earlier *Wake* critics, when the book was still known as *Work In Progress* and was released in fragments, to make claims such as: ‘[The fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper is] not a description of insects but an airy, buzzing, fluttering word-insect’.[[457]](#footnote-488) Do we then consider this ‘word-insect’ to be a ‘real’ word, to be the insect itself – and if we do what ‘nature’ does it communicate? While the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper does contain the names of numerous insects (almost 200 in pages 414.22-419.10) its form as a fable detracts from any semblance it may have as a ‘word-insect’; what is important in this tale is not that there is an ant or grasshopper, but, rather, that Shem and Shaun are rendered as these creatures.

The second question, regarding the significance and method of selecting particular qualities to be an object’s perceived ‘nature’, is more difficult to answer. Why is the mouse’s nature interpreted as ‘it lives where it is born’, and not ‘furriness’? While I have no answer to this specific question, medieval bestiaries can help provide an answer of a more general type. In these bestiaries, animals, such as the goat, are defined both by their appearance and their ‘nature’, which usually corresponds to a message or instruction that the bestiary’s author wished to communicate. Goats, for example, are said to be ‘lascivious’, and are often connected to the devil.[[458]](#footnote-489) This is then used to teach medieval peoples that lust is a sin which may result in eternal damnation (hence why they appear in Stephen’s vision of hell in *A Portrait*).[[459]](#footnote-490) The goat’s nature is decided because it is useful to the author for the goat to have *that* nature. While this nature is then accepted and perpetuated in culture (we still use ‘old goat’ as a way of describing a lustful man),[[460]](#footnote-491) we can see from the bestiaries that it was not fixed; the goat was also said to be ‘representative of Christ’ because it could climb to tall places, bringing it closer to God.[[461]](#footnote-492) ‘Nature’ of this sort, then, is not a real quality (as OOO would have it) but rather an arbitrary behaviour that can be rendered as a metaphor, which is in turn used to provide instruction on what was considered to be ‘proper’ behaviour. A more in-depth discussion of medieval bestiaries as instructional texts appears in section three of this chapter.

In his introduction to Vico’s work, Michael J. Fisch explains what Vico means by the term ‘nature’: ‘*For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature,* whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family’.[[462]](#footnote-493) Vico clarifies the term himself, as follows: ‘[I]t must have been the most ancient language of Atlantis, which scholars would have us believe expressed ideas by the nature [natura] of the things, that is by their natural [naturali] properties’.[[463]](#footnote-494) In terms of OOO, we can consider Vico’s use of the word ‘nature’ to correspond to the term ‘essence’ or ‘real quality’, i.e. the property it requires to exist as that specific type of object, its quiddity rather than haecceity. However, what Vico considers to be a ‘real quality’—in the example of the mouse this would be ‘making its home where it is born’—OOO would designate as ‘sensual’, alongside its other qualities, such as ‘furriness’. In this example, Vico implies that the mouse’s ability to remain a mouse is dependent on its habitat and behaviour and not its biological classification. OOO would claim that the mouse retains its essence, or ‘mouse-ness’, regardless of where it makes its home or how it behaves.

While this argument may imply that Vico does not ascribe to the Aristotelian notion of *quidditas*—i.e. that the mouse possesses a whatness that makes it a mouse—such an assumption would be incorrect. Earlier in *The New Science*, Vico makes the following claim: ‘Upon this divine authority followed human authority in the full philosophic sense of the term; that is, the property of human nature which not even God can take from man without destroying him’.[[464]](#footnote-495) One of the differences between OOO and Vico’s theory is that for OOO essence is a default property; a human possesses ‘human-ness’ simply by existing. For Vico, this essence, or ‘whatness’, is tied up in a state of becoming and is only achieved when humans meet set requirements. Fisch explains this idea succinctly in his introduction:

Vico shares with the Marxists and existentialists the negative view that there is no human essence to be found in individuals as such, and with the Marxists the positive view that the essence of humanity is the ensemble of social relations, or the developing system of institutions.[[465]](#footnote-496)

While these examples of metaphor give us an idea of how metaphor functions according to Vico, they do not explicitly explain their use, or purpose. Vico addresses this aspect in paragraph 405:

So that, as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them (*homo intelligendo fit omnia*), this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by *not* understanding them (*homo non intelligendo fit omnia*); and perhaps the latter proposition is truer than the former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them.[[466]](#footnote-497)

The main use of metaphor, then, is to understand an object or concept. Metaphor helps in this aspect as it facilitates a transformation *into* that object. A clearer explanation is provided by Vico earlier on, in paragraph 180:

When men are ignorant of the natural causes producing things, and cannot even explain them by analogy with similar things, they attribute their own nature to them. The vulgar, for example, say the magnet loves the iron.[[467]](#footnote-498)

This concept Vico names ‘Poetic Wisdom’. Metaphor, or more specifically, anthropocentric metaphor, appears to be an initial step in understanding some of the world’s objects and concepts. For OOO, however, humans can never fully understand another object. Nonetheless, Harman’s description of metaphor includes a similar process in which knowledge or understanding is gained through a human centre that is undergoing a transformation. Harman’s theory and the idea of metaphor as transformation will be examined further on in this section.

In the *Wake*, we can observe numerous instances of anthropocentric metaphor, many of which contain examples of Poetic Wisdom. For example, in Joyce’s parody of the Ant and the Grasshopper fable, in which the brothers Shem and Shaun appear in the guise of insects, part of the tale’s metaphors are only communicated if the reader is aware of a much older metaphor and moment of poetic wisdom. In this case, ‘Shaun is the Ondt’ is explained by the older understanding of ants being hardworking, at least compared to humans. The metaphor ‘ants are industrious’ is both anthropomorphic and anthropocentric as our understanding of the animal’s behaviour is mediated in human-applicable terminology and action. This metaphor is also extended and reinforced by the names given to individual ants, depending on their fertility and gender, which include: ‘soldier’, ‘drone’, ‘queen’, and ‘worker’.[[468]](#footnote-499) In order to understand the behaviour of a complex organism, such as the ant colony, it is described in similar terms to human society, to communicate its perceived nature. The metaphor ‘Shaun is an ant’, then, helps us understand Shaun, telling us that he is (or believes himself to be, as he is the teller of the story) hardworking and more deserving than his brother, the Gracehoper.

In *Metaphors We Live By*, by Lakoff and Johnson, the purpose of metaphor is explained: ‘*The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another*’.[[469]](#footnote-500) This claim corresponds to Vico’s own argument that the key function of metaphor is to provide information (or way of accessing information) which will then assist in the comprehension of the original object. This information, however, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is destined to be partial and not total, as ‘each metaphor focuses on one aspect of the concept’.[[470]](#footnote-501) Lakoff and Johnson explain the result of this as follows: ‘The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect in terms of another […] will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept’.[[471]](#footnote-502) This results in our understanding of the object to be incomplete; for example, in the ‘ant is hardworking’ metaphor discussed above we don’t learn anything about the ant’s appearance. Lakoff and Johnson expand on this limitation of metaphor by saying:

It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely understood in terms of it.[[472]](#footnote-503)

While the principal aim of metaphor is to aid in understanding, Lakoff and Johnson divide metaphor into three, main categories: structural, orientational, and ontological.[[473]](#footnote-504) Structural metaphors are defined as being ‘[w]here one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another’.[[474]](#footnote-505) The example Lakoff and Johnson give of this type is ‘argument is war’.[[475]](#footnote-506) They claim that our concept of argument is formulated through our concept of war, as the language of the latter is often used when discussing the former – just as our understanding of an ant colony is structured in terms of human society. We see arguments as being ‘won’ or ‘lost’, as fights in which the other person or opinion has to be defeated. As the language about war is so ingrained into our idea of argument, Lakoff and Johnson believe that this demonstrates the following:

[W]e don’t just *talk* about arguments in terms of war. [… m]any of the things we *do* in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. […] We talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way­—and we act according to the way we conceive of things.[[476]](#footnote-507)

A structural metaphor, then, arises when we conceive of two things in the same manner.

Orientational metaphors are explained in section four of *Metaphors We Live By* as methods of organising ‘a whole system of concepts with respect to one another. We will call them *orientational metaphors*, since most of them have to do with spatial orientation’.[[477]](#footnote-508) This type is relatively easy to understand, with one of the examples given being: ‘happy is up; sad is down’.[[478]](#footnote-509) When we talk about these two emotions we can observe how these metaphors exist in and have impacted our everyday language; we talk about feeling ‘down’ or ‘depressed’ if we are sad, ‘elated’ or in ‘high spirits’ if we are happy.[[479]](#footnote-510)

The third type of metaphor is named ‘ontological metaphor’, which is slightly more complex than the previous two categories. Lakoff and Johnson define this type as follows:

Just as the basic experiences of human spatial orientations give rise to orientational metaphors, so our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances.[[480]](#footnote-511)

While it may first appear that ontological metaphors are merely the rendering of something abstract—such as peace—as a physical object—which then enables us to say ‘we are working towards *peace*’[[481]](#footnote-512)—the actuality is slightly more intricate. Stating that the abstract concept, such as the mind, is a physical object, such as a machine, (as in Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘the mind is a machine’ metaphor), not only allows us to think about the mind in spatial terms (as in the ‘peace’ example), but also provides language which can be used to explain how ‘the mind’ functions. A few examples Lakoff and Johnson provide are: ‘We’re still trying to *grind out* the solution to this equation. […] My mind just isn’t *operating* today. […] Boy, the *wheels are turning* now!’.[[482]](#footnote-513) On the surface ontological and structural metaphors appear identical. However, ontological metaphors exclusively render an abstract concept as a *physical object*, while a structural metaphor occurs when one concept is explained in the terms of another, usually abstract, concept.

Before I move on to provide a summary of Harman’s theory of metaphor, I would like to expand on a previous point, and place it in context of OOO. In a paragraph above, I quoted the following claim of Lakoff and Johnson:

It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not total. If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely understood in terms of it.[[483]](#footnote-514)

This quotation may suggest that Lakoff and Johnson’s theories are incompatible with OOO, as it appears to imply that humans may be able to understand an object in its totality (which OOO claims to be impossible) as well as suggesting that humans can completely change one object into another through language. This latter claim is, of course, absurd; if I write ‘a lemon is a bird’, for example, the fruit is unlikely to grow wings. This discrepancy can be explained by a more fundamental disagreement between the two philosophies: Harman champions the object itself, disregarding the human perception of that object, while for Lakoff and Johnson ‘the only kind of similarities relevant to metaphors are *experiential*, not *objective* similarities’.[[484]](#footnote-515) This difference, however, alters the above quotation into a statement that is compatible with OOO, as the sentence would now read: if metaphorical structuring were total, one concept would actually be *experienced* as the other, not merely understood in terms of it’. In Section Two, I will consider the notion of partial and total metaphorical structuring further, examining how this method of metaphor can help us understand how Joyce alters our experience of an object (namely, Biddy) and perhaps the object itself – as far as literature allows.

Finally, this section will provide a brief summary of Harman’s writings on metaphor, which feature in his recently published book *Object-Orientated Ontology: A New Theory of Everything*. Harman’s account of metaphor is complex and not completely convincing, although certain aspects of his theory prove useful. Harman begins with an analysis of José Ortega y Gasset’s ‘An Essay in Esthetics By Way of a Preface’, quoting the following passage: ‘“metaphor satisfies us precisely because in it we find a coincidence between two things that is more profound and decisive than any mere resemblance”’.[[485]](#footnote-516) Harman shares with Vico, and Lakoff and Johnson, an appreciation of metaphor’s importance, although, for Harman this importance does not stem from its language creating or society forming qualities, but rather its ability to generate something new: ‘In the case of a successful metaphor, we are able to experience a new entity that somehow combines cypress and flame’.[[486]](#footnote-517) In order to demonstrate this concept—which uses one of Ortega’s metaphors as an example—Harman comes up with five rules or qualities of metaphor, some of which are more compelling than others.

The first of these rules is: ‘metaphor does not try to give us thoughts or perceptions about an object, since these would merely give us an external view of the thing in question. What metaphor gives us, instead, is something like the thing in its own right: the infamous thing-in-itself’.[[487]](#footnote-518) This contradicts Lakoff and Johnson (who emphasise the experience of the object) as it suggests the creation of a new object. For example, ‘a cypress is a flame’ does not give us a mere description of a cypress tree but, rather, a new object somehow made up of ‘cypress’ and ‘flame’ properties.

Harman’s second and third points, however, are more convincing. The second rule is summarised by Harman as: ‘metaphors are non-reciprocal, since one of the two terms is inevitably in the subject position and the other in the object position (in the grammatical sense of subject and object)’.[[488]](#footnote-519) This is relatively easy to understand; while we can say—to use Harman’s example—that ‘a cypress is a flame’, we cannot say ‘a flame is a cypress’, or if we did, the meanings of the two phrases would be completely different. This is explained further in Harman’s third point:

Third, metaphors are asymmetrical, a point related to the previous one without being identical to it. In the stripped down example of ‘the cypress is a flame’, we do not have a case of two objects on an equal footing, or even two bundles of qualities on equal footing. Instead, ‘cypress’ plays the object role and ‘flame’ the qualities role. This is crucial, since for OOO the real object always withdraws from direct access. This means that the cypress disappears.[[489]](#footnote-520)

As flame-qualities are different to cypress-qualities, and the cypress-object and the flame-object are fundamentally different, the two metaphors (‘a cypress is a flame’ and ‘a flame is a cypress’) are not interchangeable. By breaking metaphor down into object and qualities Harman provides a vocabulary that can be used to discuss metaphor effectively.

Points four and five—along with point one—are more confusing than the two preceding them. Harman explains them as follows:

Fourth, given that the cypress is absent and unavailable for metaphorical purpose (despite surface appearances to the contrary), the only object prepared for duty is the real object that each of us is him- or herself. If I do not step in and attempt the electrifying work of becoming the cypress-substance for the flame-qualities, then no metaphor occurs. […] Fifth and finally, metaphor is an act of coupling rather than uncoupling. […] All we are saying is that the real object at stake in metaphor is neither the absent cypress-object […] nor the human being who takes note of it, but rather the new amalgamated reality formed from the reader (who poses as a cypress-object) and the qualities of the flame.[[490]](#footnote-521)

The new object that the first rule sets up is revealed here in point four to be sustained by the human observer of metaphor, who gets drawn in and transformed into a new object. This in turn, as described by rule five, creates a new reality. Together, these rules tell us that for Harman metaphor does not give us an alternate view of an object or its inaccessible real quality but rather a new object, that bears some relation to or has its origins in the initial object of the metaphor. This is where OOO falls short, as it does not expand on why metaphor functions in this way (if it does), or the purpose of this new metaphorical-human object. Indeed, the whole concept of metaphor creating a ‘new’ object feels at odds with Harman’s philosophy.

By comparing Harman to Vico, however, we can see some similarities between Harman’s theory and Vico’s Poetic Wisdom. Even with all these detailed rules, Harman’s most clarifying explanation of metaphor appears as a footnote to a diagram on page 84:

By assigning improbable but not impossible new sensual qualities to the sensual object – such as the metaphorical ‘wine-dark sea’ rather than the literal ‘dark-blue sea’ – the sensual object ‘sea’ is cancelled […], being unable to uphold such unusual qualities. A mysterious real object is needed to do the job. But since sea as *real* object withdraws inaccessibly from the scene […], the sensual qualities of the metaphor are supported instead by the only RO that is not withdrawn from the situation: I myself, a real experiencer of metaphor.[[491]](#footnote-522)

What Harman means here, is that the human becomes a human-sea object with wine-dark properties. Vico’s earlier example can be explained in these terms: the human becomes a human-magnet with ‘loves iron’ as its quality. As the magnet itself cannot sustain the metaphor it withdraws from the situation, supplanted by the human. Vico’s claim that when man does not understand something, ‘he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them’, is then repeated by OOO, which then takes it further; the human not only transforms themselves into the object through metaphor but in doing so creates a *new* object.[[492]](#footnote-523)

The metaphor that Joyce uses in the characterisation of Biddy Doran, ‘woman is a hen’ can be classified in Lakoff and Johnson’s terms as a structural metaphor. This extremely old metaphor, which dates back at least as far as the medieval period, is employed by Joyce in a unique manner; he pushes at the perceived limitations of metaphor, and in *Finnegans Wake* creates a new reality in which Biddy Doran is experienced simultaneously as a woman and as a hen. This is a result of Joyce achieving a total metaphorical structuring.

II: ‘not at all, man. No such parson. No such fender. No such lumber. No such race’: The Construction of Human-Animal Hybrids in *Finnegans Wake*.

When Plato gave, perhaps in jest, his definition of man as a ‘featherless biped’, Diogenes brought forth a plucked chicken and declared it to be a man; Plato’s definition was subsequently amended to include the clause ‘with broad flat nails’.[[493]](#footnote-524) As humorous as this anecdote is, it demonstrates one of the problems with early distinctions between humans and animals; the ambiguous classifications make it possible for one to be named the other if certain conditions are met or not met as the case may be.

In her study of being human in the medieval period, Dorothy Yamamoto notes the issue with establishing categories and boundaries:

‘However, any ordered system means that there must be boundaries between different categories […]. Where there are boundaries […] there is always a danger of frontiers being crossed and categories becoming mixed, with formlessness or hybridization the result’.[[494]](#footnote-525)

It is this very permeability of boundaries that this chapter engages with as it allows humans and animals to become one another, either partially or totally. This ‘crossing of frontiers’ is also acknowledged and demonstrated here, as the categories of hybrids put forward can overlap with one creature having the potential to be more than one form of hybrid. One type, however, that is ubiquitous among medieval writings will not be addressed by this essay; liminal species such as centaurs and manticores do not demonstrate this process of change or alteration as they are hybrids by default.

In the introduction I claimed that, in *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce returns to a medieval belief where fantastical beasts, such as hybrids and monsters, were a physical reality. While medieval literature, such as the bestiaries, does contain bizarre ‘imaginary’ animals, this does not necessarily prove that they were thought to have existed. In her essay ‘Did Imaginary Animals Exist?’, Pamela Gravestock covers this point of contention, providing arguments for and against such a belief. The evidence provided in favour of a belief in these creatures is compelling; Gravestock cites their inclusion in certain remedies[[495]](#footnote-526) as well as more ‘factual’ works, such as treatises on natural history.[[496]](#footnote-527) Additionally, her case against this belief is weak; the main argument being that these creatures were merely misrepresented and misidentified forms of existing animals. This argument, however, does not address the question of belief at all, and could even be used to argue that belief in strange and hybrid beasts was present; if they are merely real animals misconstrued then it can be assumed that they were thought to exist, just as much as any creatures that medieval scribes had access to. Additionally, as Gravestock points out, the bestiaries treat both real and ‘imaginary’ animals identically, suggesting they were conceived of in the same manner.

This section is devoted to an examination of criticism on medieval hybrid creatures, which inform us about contemporary perspectives regarding humanity, animality, and what lies in-between. This discussion is interspersed with various explanations of Vico’s definition of the human, used to assist in the identification and establishment of categories of medieval hybrid creatures. The categories that will be addressed are as follows: behavioural hybrids, hybrids that are the result of bestiality (named by Vico as ‘monsters’), and metaphorical hybrids.

i: Behavioural Hybrids

In her widely acclaimed work, *The Beast Within*, Salisbury notes that in the Middle Ages ‘animals were also defined by their behaviour’.[[497]](#footnote-528) Indeed, Gravestock argues that in bestiaries animals were grouped together based on behaviour: ‘these [imaginary] creatures were placed in various bestiary locations based on the defining characteristic(s) for each group’.[[498]](#footnote-529) A behavioural classification of animals, instead of a biological one as we have today, has serious implications on what we consider to be an animal. In Vico’s *The New Science* we can observe that his definition of humanity is also dependent on behaviour. While Vico only mentions animals a few times in his work, and never at great length, Vico’s definition of humanity informs us of his views regarding non-human animals and assists in our understanding of behavioural hybrid creatures. What we learn, as shall be shown below, is that Vico equates sexual sin, uncleanliness, and a nomadic way of life with the bestial or subhuman.

When Vico discusses the development, or evolution of human society he consistently equates movement with animality. The first mention of this appears near the beginning of Vico’s work, in paragraph thirteen:

For it will be found that the races, first of Ham, then of Japheth, and finally of Shem, without the religion of their father Noah, which they had repudiated […], were lost from one another by roving wild in the great forest of the earth, pursuing shy and indocile women […] and as the result of it all were reduced, at the end of a long period, to the condition of beasts.[[499]](#footnote-530)

This argument is repeated at various points in *The New Science,* for example in paragraph 504: ‘For the giants [who would later become human], enchained under the mountains by the frightful religion of the thunderbolts, learned to check their bestial habit of wandering wild through the great forest of the earth’.[[500]](#footnote-531) The former quotation details the conditions that must be met for human degeneration, namely: wandering and sexual sins (which seem to range from promiscuity to rape). Vico goes on to observe other characteristics specific to bestial humans, and other beasts: ‘For out of the passions of men each bent on his private advantage, for the sake of which they would live like beasts in the wilderness’,[[501]](#footnote-532) ‘We thereby establish the fact that man in the bestial state desires only his own welfare’.[[502]](#footnote-533) Beasts, unlike humans (supposedly), are considered selfish, as well as being driven purely by instinct and thus lacking the capability to reason or form a complex language:

Now, since the minds of the first men of the gentile world took things one at a time, being in this respect little better than the minds of beasts, for which each new sensation cancels the last one (which is the cause of their being unable to compare and reason discursively), therefore their sentences must all have been formed in the singular by those who felt them.[[503]](#footnote-534)

Vico details that language was lost as a result of the nomadic lifestyle of Noah’s descendants, which facilitated the ‘forgetting’ of their father’s Jewish faith. As humans had lost these things (language and religion) and gained other qualities (promiscuity and selfishness) they ceased to be human, as Vico explains:

[F]or a long period of time the impious races of the three children of Noah, having lapsed into a state of bestiality, went wandering like wild beasts until they were scattered and dispersed through the great forest of the earth, and that with their bestial education giants had sprung up and existed among them at the time when the heavens thundered for the first time after the flood.[[504]](#footnote-535)

What Vico puts forward is that a change of behaviour and morality produces a physical change to the human body. Vico also considers cleanliness to be a requirement to maintain the human form, and uses Jewish cleaning rituals as evidence for his argument:

The Hebrews, on account of their cleanly upbringing and their fear of God and of their fathers, continued to be of the proper stature in which God had created Adam […]; and it was perhaps in abomination of giantism that the Hebrews had so many ceremonial laws pertaining to bodily cleanliness.[[505]](#footnote-536)

What this then implies, is that beasts (albeit specific beasts)[[506]](#footnote-537) have the potential to become human through a change in behaviour, and, as will be shown, the formulation of a society.

The idea that man is the result of the creation or construction of a society predates Vico stretching at least as far back as Aristotle, as M. H. Fisch explains in his introduction to Vico’s *New Science*:

When Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal, he means that he is an animal that becomes a man only in the *polis*. […] Now Vico here agrees with Aristotle. […] What Vico wanted to assert was that the first steps in the building of “the world of nations” were taken by creatures who were still (or who had degenerated into) beasts, and that humanity itself was created by the very same process by which the intuitions were created. Humanity is not a presupposition, but a consequence, an effect, a product of institution building.[[507]](#footnote-538)

As Vico considers humanity to be a result of environment, and not a biological state, he complicates what it means to be an animal. Vico proceeds to argue that even being contained in a society and subject to their laws was enough to facilitate the ‘forgetting’ of bestial practices:

This *form* consists entirely […], in guarding the confines and the institutions, so that peoples newly come to humanity might, by the very *form* of their governments, continue for a long time to remain enclosed within these confines and institutions and so forget the infamous and nefarious promiscuity of the bestial and feral state.[[508]](#footnote-539)

If beasts can become human through exposure to human society and participation in their rules and customs, the question then arises as to whether the animals in *Finnegans Wake* become human through their participation, or performance of human behaviours, or vice versa. Vico goes on to summarise his requirements for humanity as follows:

We have set forth above in the Poetic Economy how the founders of gentile humanity in a certain sense generated and produced in themselves the proper human form in its two aspects: that is, how by means of frightful religions and terrible paternal powers and sacred ablutions they brought forth from their giant bodies the form of our just corporature, and how by discipline of their household economy they brought forth from their bestial minds the form of our human mind.[[509]](#footnote-540)

The human mind is created by the adherence to human-constructed institutions, just as the physical body is altered by human ritual. The words Vico uses to describe the rules, or regulations of human society—frightful, terrible, sacred, and discipline—emphasise both the fear of God (and thunder) necessary to frighten men from their bestial state, as well as the required surrendering of individual power and desire. This also becomes apparent from the language Vico uses (albeit translated) to describe the beasts: ‘wandering’, ‘desire’, ‘vagrancy’, ‘passions’, and he even uses the phrase ‘bestial liberty’.

In *Finnegans Wake* instances of such degeneration or dual nature abound; one example is expertly detailed by Margot Norris, who writes:

But the sentence [460.11] simultaneously conjures up the image of an apelike or simian (simself) creature, stalking about, a loutish as well as Lutheran (louther) lover, too established in his brutishness (“immutating” or unchanging) to ascend the evolutionary ladder.[[510]](#footnote-541)

However, the inverse is also present; there are animals in the *Wake* which possess ‘human’ behaviour, which are then sometimes used to teach humans how to be human. This concept will be covered extensively in the third part of this chapter.

ii: Bestiality Hybrids or ‘Monsters’

In addition to behavioural hybrids, Vico talks about ‘monsters’ with dual natures, produced from interbreeding between human and not-yet-human animals. Vico explains that these monsters are: ‘men in aspect but beasts in their habits’.[[511]](#footnote-542) Vico uses an example from Greek myth to emphasis his point further:

In other versions Penelope prostitutes herself to the suitors (signifying the extension of *connubium* to the plebs) and gives birth to Pan, a monster of two discordant natures, human and bestial. This is precisely the creature *secum ipse discors* of Livy, for the Roman patricians told the plebeians that, if they were to share with them the *connubium* of the nobles, the resulting offspring would be like Pan, a monster of two discordant natures brought forth by Penelope who had prostituted herself to the plebeians.[[512]](#footnote-543)

Here hybridity is used as a warning against marriage between the upper and lower classes, while simultaneously dehumanising the ‘plebeians’, positioning them as beasts. This viewpoint is made explicit further on: ‘All of which accords well with the times when the heroes were asserting that the plebeians were monsters of two natures, half man, half goat’.[[513]](#footnote-544) For Vico these products of bestiality reveal themselves through behaviour and not anatomy, but what separates this type of hybrid from the former, is that behavioural hybrids are not a result of interspecies breeding.

While Vico maintains that the offspring of bestiality can be identified principally by their behaviour, medieval hybrids of this type can be recognised from their corporature. Salisbury details medieval opinion on the subject alongside a contemporary source that reflects the anxieties of the period:

After the twelfth century, as people showed increasing preoccupation with the blurring of lines between species, including humans and animals, an observer could see in a deformed child evidence of the blending of species. […] Gerald of Wales in the twelfth century […] reports on several births of human-cow hybrids. […] Increasingly in the Middle Ages, people seem to have understood “monstrous” births as revealing a hybridization. This interpretation of such births is another example of the growth of the idea (and fear) of the blurring of the lines between humans and animals.[[514]](#footnote-545)

The possibility of such hybrids, according to Salisbury, ‘led to an increased fear of and repression of bestial intercourse, in an attempt to preserve a separation that had already been lost’.[[515]](#footnote-546) It is interesting to note that bestiality was condemned because the human and animal were deemed too *similar* rather than too *different*.

Bestiality can be observed at numerous points in the *Wake*, but one instance that produces hybrid offspring occurs on pages nine and ten, in the ‘museyroom’ section, in which Wellington is positioned on a battlefield atop his ‘white harse’ (8.17), Copenhagen. Wellington and Copenhagen are some form of hybrid, perhaps even a product of bestiality themselves, somehow combined yet separate. Wellington is described as a ‘bornstable ghentleman’ (10.17-18), and while this phrase is shrouded in well-known historical (and even religious) context, it also serves to establish a common point of origin between man and horse.[[516]](#footnote-547) Alongside Wellington-Copenhagen on the battlefield are a group of ‘jinnies’. ‘Jinny’ is an obscure term for a female donkey, likely a variant form of the far more common ‘Jenny’. On page nine the jinnies spend most of the time teasing and taunting Wellington-Copenhagen, succeeding in making ‘Willingdone git the band up’ (9.9). By the next page, however, the jinnies have vanished, leaving in their wake a ‘hinnessy’ (10.7). A ‘hinny’ is the name for the offspring of a female donkey and male horse, but Joyce has distorted the word into ‘hinnessy’ gesturing towards the presence of HCE’s daughter, Issy. This hybrid creature consists of a realistic fusion of horse and donkey, which is then undermined by the addition of a human element.

iii: Metaphorical Hybrids

As has been outlined in both this chapter and Chapter Two of this thesis, metaphors have a considerable power to transform one thing into the other, albeit at a conceptual (or ‘sensual’ as OOO would name it) level and not on the level of the object (and its real qualities) itself. This thesis has already discussed metaphorical instances of transformation, such as Bloom’s metamorphosis into a pig in ‘Circe’. Metaphorical hybrids differ, however, as they are not the alteration of one thing into something else but are a single entity that contains two natures simultaneously. While hybrids produced from bestiality have mixed physical anatomy and behavioural ones can alter their physical being rendering humans as beasts, metaphorical hybrids indicate a duality of essence and not of body. In terms of OOO, we could call these hybrids ‘real’ and the former ones ‘sensual’. Salisbury states that fear of (and thus belief in) such fusions was very real in the Middle Ages:

However, the texts show that people were concerned with not only surface characteristics that seemed to blend species; their preoccupation showed concern for a mixing of the actual essence of human and animal.[[517]](#footnote-548)

One of the most common forms of this hybrid are revealed through, or a result of, insults. Animals are often used to degrade other people, as Vico demonstrates when discussing religion.

Vico establishes the importance of religion to human society in the claims that Jews maintained their physical form through religious ritual, and that society was constructed because of a fear of God who appeared in the form of thunder. Perhaps due to the integral nature of religion to human society, those who lack religious beliefs, or the ‘correct’ religion’s beliefs, are labelled as animals: ‘[F]or, since they had come thither without gods, the heroes regarded them as beasts’.[[518]](#footnote-549) Religion was also used to dehumanise other societies, as Vico observes:

For because of the practice of duels in those times, the conquerors believed that the conquered had no god, and hence held them no better than beasts. This national feeling is still preserved between Christians and Turks. To a Christian the name Turk means a dog […]; the Turks, on the other hand, call the Christians swine.[[519]](#footnote-550)

It is the failure—or inability—to adhere to a specific religion, and the other rules of a civilisation, which results in the dehumanisation of a group of people. For example, those who do not practice what would be considered a ‘proper’ or ‘legal’ form of marriage are condemned: ‘just as the Roman patricians made out to their plebeians that the latter were all monsters because they practised marriages like those of wild animals’.[[520]](#footnote-551) A similar technique of dehumanisation is used in connection to slavery: ‘The Latins applied to these laborers the term “herd” […] because both they and the later slaves were regarded as beasts, which are said to feed in herds’.[[521]](#footnote-552)

The power of metaphor in relation to an individual rather than a group of people can be observed in an account of Saint Francis of Assisi, whose interactions with animals have been misconstrued as love or tenderness. David Salter details an account that shows St. Francis conceived of himself through a metaphor which subsequently altered his behaviour:

That Francis actually conceived of himself in these warring terms was reiterated by Bonaventure, who observed that the saint: “used to call his body Brother Ass, for he felt it should be subjected to heavy labour, beaten frequently with whips and fed with the poorest food”.[[522]](#footnote-553)

St. Francis’ metaphor, ‘my body is an ass’, reflects a common belief in the opposing natures of the animal body and divine, human soul. The ass of *Finnegans Wake* may potentially be an instance of a similar metaphor.

The donkey of the *Wake* behaves and communicates in so human a manner it is somewhat problematic to consider him in animal terms at all. Indeed, as I have noted earlier in the literature review on *Wake* criticism in this thesis, many *Wake* scholars dismiss the donkey’s ‘animal-ness’ altogether. The ass, then, may be one of the book’s metaphorical hybrids, in which the insult of ‘being an ass’ is acted out. On page twenty of the *Wake* there is the following line: ‘You can ask your ass if he believes it’ (20.26). Ass has three meanings in this instance; arse, fool, and donkey. The transformative power of this insulting metaphorical pun is demonstrated in the book through the production of a human-donkey hybrid. This dual essence is revealed through instances of speech; the donkey acts as a translator at various points but also lets out the occasional ‘hee haw’ of laughter.[[523]](#footnote-554) As the label ‘ass’ or ‘donkey’ is used to consistently refer to this character, denoting a dilution and combination of essence, the insult ‘your ass’ becomes a metaphor that the character lives by.

Before I move on to discuss Biddy Doran, I would like to note that in Joyce’s oeuvre hybridity of species is often (but not always) accompanied by a hybridity or alteration of gender. In the Biddy Doran passage, for example, there is a ‘manewanting human lioness with her dishorned discipular manram’ (112.21-22). Additionally, HCE is described as a hermaphroditic goat: ‘*Hircus Civis Eblanensis!* He had buckgoat paps on him’ (215.27-28). This theme appears in other phrases of the *Wake*, such as ‘*Hatches Cocks’ Eggs’* (71.27), and is also present in *Ulysses*, as when Bloom turns into a pig he also turns into a woman.

iv: Biddy Doran:

Having laid out the variations of metaphors and medieval hybrids that this chapter will engage with, this section will now detail which of these classifications are applicable to ‘that original hen’, Biddy Doran (110.22). In conjunction with this, this subsection will demonstrate that metaphor is used to create a fabular world, in which Biddy Doran’s two natures are expressed simultaneously.

Before this section discusses these forms of metaphor and medieval hybrids, it is important to situate Biddy in the context of the *Wake*. As Laura Lovejoy notes, ‘the link between women and animals is manifest in *Finnegans Wake* on a grand scale’.[[524]](#footnote-555) Biddy is a prime example of this, as she is both the hen that uncovers the infamous letter, written by ALP in defence of her husband, and the maidservant (known as Mistress Kate) of the household. Lovejoy, strangely, reads the hen as ALP herself, and this demonstrates the *Wake’s* ability to ascribe multiple identities to its characters; William York Tindall recognises this when he says that ALP is a ‘triple goddess, young, old, and middling at once. Isabel and Kate are two of her aspects’.[[525]](#footnote-556) Biddy, then is a domestic fowl, perhaps even a pet, but also the maidservant and­­­—if we agree with Lovejoy­—the mistress of the household; she is simultaneously a bird and the women of the *Wake.* Additionally, her uncovering of the letter pokes fun at the concept of archaeology; this supposedly important artifact is unearthed by a hen, or a poor maidservant, and not an educated scholar. The animal, and the woman, are given the agency of the human, and usually male, archaeologist.

Section one noted that the phrase ‘a woman is a hen’ is—in Lakoff and Johnson’s terminology—a structural metaphor; the character Biddy Doran is conceived and discussed in terms that are applicable to both ‘woman’ and ‘hen’. In OOO’s terminology the metaphor ‘a woman is a hen’ consists of a woman-object with hen-qualities. As Harman explains, metaphors reveal a correlation between two things but do not consist of two equally balanced terms. By placing ‘woman’ in the object position and not the quality position, we render the character human by default; the metaphor for Biddy Doran character, however, could just as easily read ‘a hen is a woman’. The anthropocentric nature of metaphors, particularly animal metaphors, is so firmly entrenched that the animal itself disappears, as Salisbury notes: ‘Metaphoric animals live in the borders of human imagination, where any particular animal is almost irrelevant compared to its symbolic meaning’.[[526]](#footnote-557) Not only do we assume the centrality of the human in metaphor, but the included animal is almost redundant, supplanted by the qualities we have decided that it possesses. Joyce avoids this type of anthropocentrism here through a total metaphorical structuring.

While Harman argues that the two metaphors ‘the cypress is a flame’ and ‘the flame is a cypress’ do not convey the same meaning, Joyce’s metaphor—as seen in the phrase ‘[t]he bird in the case was Belinda of the Dorans’ (111.5)—does not conform to this rigidity that Harman, as well as Lakoff and Johnson, profess.[[527]](#footnote-558) As Dirk Van Hulle observes in his essay ‘Out of Metaphor: Mauthner, Richards and the Development of Wakese’, part of the magic of the *Wake* is contained in the ‘idea of inverse identity’, which is ‘crucial to the most typical and conspicuous of *Wakean* features. In his *portmanteaux* Joyce has broadened the traditional employment of metaphors by making tenors and vehicles interchangeable’.[[528]](#footnote-559) This duality of metaphor differs from the type Salisbury records in medieval bestiaries, which she elucidates as follows: ‘When people can see an animal acting as human, the metaphor can work both ways, revealing the animal within each human’.[[529]](#footnote-560) This difference between what Salisbury notes in the bestiaries and what Van Hulle observes in the *Wake*, is that the former invokes partial metaphors which reveal a similarity between human and animal, while Van Hulle details a total metaphoric transformation as its two objects are interchangeable and thus experienced in an identical, non-hierarchical manner. Joyce, then, avoids anthropocentrism in this way by making the metaphors ‘a woman is a hen’ and ‘a hen is a woman’ possess the same meaning. In OOO terms, this is because these metaphors do not consist of an object part and a qualities part (as ‘a cypress is a flame’) does, but of two equally balanced objects.

We can observe this totality of metaphor—in which one thing is experienced as the other and vice versa—at various points in the Belinda of the Dorans passage, even in its opening phrase: ‘About that original hen’ (110.22). The adjective of this sentence, ‘original’, can denote various things about its subject – such as that the hen is the first of something biologically or (in a more social context) the first of its type to be employed or owned by a particular household. It may also mean that Biddy was originally a ‘hen’ (whether we take that to mean woman or animal) but is now something else, or even that she is an Eve figure – an original model (which only managed to win third place in the hen exhibition) on which all others of its kind are based. While ‘hen’ can obviously denote the animal, it is also used in various ways to mean ‘woman’, some of which are insulting and some of which are terms of endearment.[[530]](#footnote-561) As Biddy Doran’s character consists of a total, structural metaphor the two subjects are interchangeable, and thus the meanings of ‘original hen’ are applicable to both animal and human.

The metaphor can also be observed in the character’s name, which is given in both the phrase ‘[t]he bird in the case was Belinda of the Dorans’ (111.5), and ‘Biddy Doran’ (112.27). Apart from the obvious pun on the word ‘bird’, the character’s dual identity is revealed in her names; ‘Biddy’ is a colloquial term for both a chicken and an ‘Irish maid servant’, the latter of which is often used in a derogatory manner.[[531]](#footnote-562) The part of the phrase which reads ‘of the Dorans’ (111.5), could then be read as ‘belonging to that family’ either through relation or employment. Belinda, then, is a chicken or maid of the Doran family, and due to Joyce’s carefully chosen puns—‘bird’ and ‘Biddy’—the two options are indistinguishable and transposable.

Having established what form of metaphor Joyce is employing, it is now necessary to consider what category—or categories—of hybrid Biddy Doran falls into. Given that we have little to no information on her parentage, we have to disregard the form of hybrid that is created by bestiality. A case can be made, however, for Biddy being both of the two remaining types of hybrid: metaphorical and behavioural.

As Biddy the hen’s dual nature is revealed at moments through puns and metaphor, as well as her behaviour—rather than being *the result* of behaviour—she is partly a metaphorical hybrid. This can be identified by examining two phrases: ‘behaviourising strangely’ (110.25) and ‘lookmelittle likemelong hen’ (111.33).[[532]](#footnote-563) The first of these quotations suggests a change in behaviour, or behaviour that is unusual for its subject to perform. While this may indicate either a duality of essence (as in a metaphorical hybrid) or conduct that may generate a change in essence and body (as in a behavioural hybrid) the second quotation suggests that Biddy is the metaphorical kind. A behavioural hybrid, according to Vico, produces an alteration in appearance, but the phrase ‘lookmelittle’ (111.33) gestures away from this type of combination; the words establish a difference in appearance but a similarity in nature to the hen, whether that means woman or animal.

If we apply Vico’s requirements for humanity, however, to Biddy Doran we can also consider her to be a behavioural hybrid, perhaps slowly becoming more human and less animal as the passage progresses. Four of Vico’s five characteristics of humanity appear in this section: cleanliness, conformity to the rules of society, marriage or monogamy, and language, with all but the third being easily applied to Biddy Doran.[[533]](#footnote-564)

Upon being introduced to Biddy Doran, we are told that she is pecking about in a pile of rubbish: ‘a cold fowl behaviourising strangely on that fatal midden or chip factory or comicalbottomed copsjute (dump for short)’ (110.25-26). While this clearly goes against Vico’s obligation of cleanliness, to say that merely being in a rubbish dump means that she is a beast rather than a human would be problematic; simply by being or working in unclean conditions does not render someone less than human. Despite this, the narrator of this passage may be implying exactly that (that Biddy is subhuman because she is unclean), as the label of ‘fowl’ denotes the animal and not the woman, as well as implying uncleanliness through the pun on ‘foul’. However, it is also implied in this section of the *Wake*, that to be a woman is also to be less than human, as Caroline Whitley argues[[534]](#footnote-565): ‘Joyce depicts a woman who is an animal, and who thus might be considered less than human, yet she nurtures her young and promotes international peace—as a character she is at the same time an exemplary human’.[[535]](#footnote-566) Part of Whitley’s reasons for making such a claim stem from the fact that Biddy takes care of her children, as shown in the line: ‘hoosh her fluffballs safe through din and danger’ (112.14-15). This, however, does not necessarily denote a human quality as animals do take care of their young. This quotation also promotes an idealistic view of nature in which chickens will protect their children. The word ‘din’, suggesting ‘dinner’, is notably sinister when considered alongside both the human consumption of chickens, as well as the hen’s potential consumption of her own offspring. While it is uncommon, a hen will cannibalise chicks, be it their own or another bird’s. Additionally, the idea that ‘international peace’ is a positive quality of humanity is somewhat strange; granted that nature and animals do not campaign for peace, they also do not start wars. This depiction of woman being inherently more animal than man is another characteristic which demonstrates Joyce’s application of medieval practices and beliefs to the *Wake*, as for medieval peoples, women were considered less than human than their male counterparts. Salisbury explains this as follows: ‘However, even from the earliest years of the Middle Ages, church thinkers defined women as more earthy, more sensual than men. With this view, it did not take much for women to slip to the bestial level’.[[536]](#footnote-567)

Roughly a page after we are introduced to Biddy, we get a list of her credentials:

The bird in the case was Belinda of the Dorans, a more than quinquegintarian (Terziis prize with Serni medal, Cheepalizzy’s Hane Exposition) and what she was scratching at the hour of klokking twelve looked for all this zogzag word like a goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper (111.5-9).

Given Biddy’s success in the local hen exhibition, we can see that she complies with and meets society’s standards, which Vico asserts as necessary for her to be human. Of course, her ‘animality’ is reinforced through the awards being from a *hen* competition, although, as noted earlier, ‘hen’ can be used to refer to both a woman and an animal. In this quotation we can also observe Biddy’s hybrid nature; her age (which is given as more than 50) points to her being human as hens have a lifespan of roughly ten years. The inclusion of animal sounds or an animal voice, however, gestures towards a non-human element. The alteration of words, such as ‘clocking’ to ‘klokking’, indicate the presence of a bird whose voice is emerging though the book’s distortion of language.

Biddy Doran’s capacity or ability to meet Vico’s requirement of language is challenged by the patronising tone of the narrator when she uncovers the infamous letter; Biddy is not described as engaging with or reading the letter she plucks out of the rubbish heap, and is instead portrayed as if she simply observes it. For Biddy the paper ‘looked’ (111.8) like a letter, she ‘saw’ (112.2) what was written, and ‘looked [at] literature’ (112.27); none of these verbs suggest an engagement with or comprehension of language. Talia Schaffer, however, argues differently, stating that Biddy Doran, after absorbing the epistle, goes on to construct her own language:

Biddy begins the first hen language by creating her own brand-new letters. […] “Yeigh, yeigh, neigh, neigh” are the first words from Biddy Doran […]. This is a new female language, capable of negating its own affirmation, or affirming its own negation.[[537]](#footnote-568)

Instead of simple animal sounds, as we find in the Belinda of the Dorans passage, Biddy speaks the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’; her language, then, (if it is present) appears to be merely an echo of a human language. This may denote that through the discovery of, and interaction with, writing Biddy starts to move away from being an animal and becomes more human. This idea will be examined in more detail in the last subsection of this chapter. For OOO this would be an alteration in sensual qualities; Biddy ‘gains’ language but the real quality—‘Biddy’—remains.

The metaphor, ‘a woman is a hen’ or ‘a hen is a woman’ is dramatized and performed through a character that is both a metaphorical and behavioural hybrid. This world, created by Joyce’s total metaphorical structuring, is even named in this section as this ‘zogzag world’ (111.8), which is more significant once we learn that ‘zog’ means ‘bird’ in Albanian.[[538]](#footnote-569) Additionally, the name of the specific location of this passage, ‘Cheepalizzy’ (111.6), mirrors the duality of its most prominent inhabitant, combining a human location and a human name (Lizzy, which in turn echoes the name of HCE’s daughter, Issy) with an animal sound.

III: The Biddy Doran Tale as a Bestiary Entry

*But ask now the beasts, and they shall teach thee; and the fowls of the air, and they shall tell thee: or speak to the earth, and it shall teach thee: and the fishes of the sea shall declare unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this? In whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all mankind.* (Job 12. 7-10)[[539]](#footnote-570)

From an examination of Salisbury’s book in the previous section, we can understand the bestiary as an informative, scientific text which provides its readers with detailed, yet often erroneous facts pertaining to various animals, both real and fictitious, occasionally accompanied by a fable or myth. In this section I argue that the Belinda of the Dorans passage can be read as a bestiary entry in which the tale of a hen reveals to us the (perceived) nature of an animal, whilst also containing instructions on how to be human. To do this, it is first important to elucidate the bestiary’s role as both a scientific, informative text and a moral, instructive one.

The editor of *Animals in the Middle Ages*, Nona C. Flores, lays out in the volume’s introduction the historical development of the bestiary:

The bestiary included the *Physiologus*,[[540]](#footnote-571) but was greatly expanded by the incorporation of many additional sources, the original 40 chapters increasing to as many as 150 in some versions. These chapters were often organized into zoological categories: beasts, birds, serpents, and fish. There was less emphasis on allegory, and many animals that had not appeared in the *Physiologus* were given no moral interpretation at all.[[541]](#footnote-572)

The bestiary, then, is an amalgamation of fables and ‘scientific’ observations, both of which are concerned with the nature of various animals. While the latter of these provides us with information such as ‘goats are lustful creatures’—which then generates the still used metaphor ‘you old goat’—the former turns this information into a moral lesson, used to teach humans how to behave, e.g. that lustfulness is a sin. This use of the bestiaries was so significant and effective, that some priests began to use them in their sermons.[[542]](#footnote-573) Salisbury demonstrates the prevalence of this approach, as well as the importance of animals to understanding humanity through an account of Ambrose of Milan:

Ambrose urged people to learn hard work from the example of the ant, to learn loving care for the young from the bear, and dogs. […] Ambrose argued, “We cannot fully know ourselves without first knowing the nature of all living creatures”.[[543]](#footnote-574)

Ambrose’s claim has clear parallels to Vico’s notion of poetic wisdom, in which our understanding of the world is achieved through a metaphorical transformation into the world’s objects. Ambrose makes this perhaps more anthropocentric and egotistical by claiming that the nature of other objects assists in the understanding of the human object, as if they were somehow connected. The bestiary, then, by providing information on the nature of animals facilitates a symbolic metamorphosis into something other than our human selves. Can we consider *Finnegans Wake*, then, to resemble a bestiary, containing fables and myths in which a metaphorical transformation is enacted as literal, albeit confined in a textual world? This section, then, will demonstrate that *Finnegans Wake* mimics bestiaries in both an informative way while also engaging with their other use as an instructional text.[[544]](#footnote-575)

What follows is an examination of this question, conducted through a close reading of the Belinda of the Dorans passage, in particular page 112.9-27. I will first consider this abstract as an informative text, paying particular attention to what it tells us about the (perceived) nature of hens (and women). These are, of course, sensual qualities and to reduce the animal to them would be a case of ‘overmining’. Following this, the excerpt will be read as an instructional text in which animals are used to portray exemplary human behaviour; this will include Vico’s theory on the development of language, as described in *The New Science*. These two parts will include comparative readings to two bestiary entries on hens; this will demonstrate that Joyce utilises medieval techniques and animal symbolism in this passage of the *Wake*.

In Dirk van Hulle’s essay, ‘Out of Metaphor: Mauthner, Richards and the Development of Wakese’, cited above, he includes a transcription of the notes Joyce made when reading Mauthner’s *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*. Among these notes is the following: ‘each metaphor = a mythos’.[[545]](#footnote-576) If every metaphor contains a mythical story, what, then, is the mythos of Joyce’s ‘a woman is a hen’ metaphor? This chapter comprises of an examination of Biddy’s tale, used to demonstrate that Joyce’s work resembles the bestiary’s purpose as an informative text. This function is closely connected to its other use as an instructional work, as instructions for human behaviour often rise out of the particulars of any given creature. To demonstrate both these uses, *Finnegans Wake* will be examined alongside two bestiary entries on hens, while detailing how each one informs the reader of their subject. Through this comparison I will show that Joyce utilises medieval techniques and animal symbolism in this passage of the *Wake.*

Given the number of medieval bestiaries and manuscripts that contain information on animals (such as *The Travels of Sir John Mandeville*), there are surprisingly few entries on hens, and even fewer that have been transcribed or remain legible. There are far more accounts, however, of roosters, mainly because of the mythical importance of its cry as well as its power over lions. Given this scarcity, I will examine only two passages that have hens as their subject. The first of these appears in *MS Bodley 764*, while the second can be found in *Royal MS 12 F XIII*, also known as the *Rochester Bestiary*.

The entry in *MS Bodley 764* on hens—which appears directly after a much longer examination of the male half of this species—makes three claims about the bird: they represent divine wisdom, their name is not an insult as they are exemplary mothers, and their chicks make them weak. The first claim appears in the entry’s opening lines:

Hens are symbols of divine wisdom, as Christ Himself said in the Gospels: “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings” [Matthew 23:37].[[546]](#footnote-577)

This passage, with minor alterations, is repeated in the *Rochester Bestiary*, and demonstrates a common technique of the bestiarist: to support a claim with religious scripture. With this form of evidence, the author shows that the wisdom of Christ stems from a maternal instinct to protect the weak, much like a mother hen. This maternal quality is parodied in the *Wake* when Biddy is described as ‘hoosh[ing] her fluffballs safe through din and danger’ (112.14-15). Given that this description occurs in the last paragraph of the passage, when Biddy is portrayed as more human (or at least less bestial), this may imply that the connection of a hen to motherhood is a very human and idealised interpretation of a hen’s behaviour. This change, however, may not solely be a movement from realism to idealisation, animal to human, but of childlessness to motherhood; the author of *MS Bodley 764* comments that the presence of chicks induces in the mother an alteration in behaviour, in which the hen makes herself weak:

The name of hen is not an insult: compare it with other birds. Many birds hatch and rear chicks, but no other bird is so enfeebled by its chicks as the hen. If we see swallows, geese or storks off their nests, we would not know that they had chicks, but if we see a hen off the nest we can tell by the weakness of her voice and her ruffled feathers that her changed appearance means that she is broody. […] Because the chicks are weak, she makes herself weak. Because we grew weak, so the wisdom of God made itself weak and became flesh and dwelt among us. [[547]](#footnote-578)

The hen is elevated and lauded above other birds due to its exemplary nature as a mother; this nature is so potent that it induces a change in both body and voice. Biddy is celebrated in the same manner, and a change in her body is also implied:

For her socioscientific sense is sound as a bell, sir, her volucrine automutativeness right on normalcy: she knows, she just feels she was kind of born to lay and love eggs (trust her to propagate the species and hoosh her fluffballs safe through din and danger!); lastly but mostly, in her genesic field it is all game and no gammon, she is ladylike in everything she does and plays the gentleman’s part every time. (112.11-17)

The phrase ‘her volucrine automutativeness right on normalcy’ has echoes of the bestiary’s claim of physical alteration; ‘volucrine’, meaning pertaining to birds, in conjunction with the word ‘automutativeness’ clearly denotes an automatic mutation, with ‘right on normalcy’ implying that it is a standard or common change. This change is then strongly linked to Biddy’s status as a mother through the inclusion of a colon between the two clauses. The remainder of lines 11-17 almost read like a resume, highlighting Biddy’s good points with the word ‘sir’ implying an audience to which the speaker is making their case.

While this is all *Bodley MS 764* has to say about hens, the *Rochester Bestiary* entry is significantly longer. While similar claims are made, such as the hen making herself weak, this text also includes different details – although the majority of the text comprises of parallels between the hen and Christ. The new information that this bestiary provides appears in the following passage:

Gallina clamando rauca e(s)･ Sic et dicit (Christcum)･   
Laboravi clamans rauce facte sunt fauces mee･ et   
laboravi sustinens･ Gallina pro amore pullorum(m)  
hysp\re/idatur et turpis fit･ sic et (Christcum) abiectus ab om(n)i-  
bus putabatur･ et leprosus dicebatur･ Gallina؛  
precedit pullos･ Et (Christcum) dicit･ Qu vult me(is) e(ss)e･ dis-  
cipulus؛ tollat crucem suam et sequatur me･ Gal-  
lina unguib(us) ped[[\*\*\*]] terram scarpendo strami-  
na deicit؛ ut grana inveniat pullis･ […]   
 Gallina granu(m)  
 ex ore p(ro)prio retrahit･ et pullis proiecte･ Sic et Christcum   
dicit･ Aperi os tuum et implebo illud･  
 [My transcription]

[The shouting of the hen is hoarse. And as Christ says:  
I am weary of crying: my throat is dried, and  
I am weary of suffering.[[548]](#footnote-579) The hen, for the love of her children  
becomes hairy and ugly, as Jesus is said by everyone  
to have washed the feet of lepers. Hens  
go before chicks. And as Christ says: let he who wishes to be one of my  
followers take up his cross and follow me. The hen  
with its claws kicks up the litter of the earth, so that her chicks  
can find grain/food. […]  
 The hen takes grain   
out of its own mouth and throws it into the chicks’ mouths. And as Christ  
says: open your mouth and I will fill it.]  
 [My translation][[549]](#footnote-580)

The claims that this passage includes appear rather haphazard, with seemingly random claims made in conjunction with extracts from the bible. While the majority of the material is used to reinforce the idea that hens are exemplary mothers, taking care of their chicks much like Christ takes care of his followers, we are also provided with some new details.

Here we have further evidence, as it were, that motherhood brings about in the hen a change in physical body. What is more significant to this chapter, however, is the structure that the *Rochester Bestiary* demonstrates: a claim is made about the animal, subsequently a corresponding piece of biblical scripture is then quoted which cements a parallel and connection between the animal and the biblical subject (in this case Christ); this in turn elucidates the animal’s perceived nature. While this pattern is immediately evident in the bestiaries, Joyce’s work is far more subtle; the hen in the *Wake* performs an action or we are given more information about her before we are then presented with accompanying references to Vico’s *The New Science* and his theory on the development of language. Before I discuss this, I would like to highlight various other instances in which Joyce alludes to Vico’s philosophy.

Paragraph 112.9-27 starts with a list of achievements, made by birds, which correspond to three of Vico’s requirements for humanity: ‘Lead, kindly fowl! They always did: ask the ages. What bird has done yesterday man may do next year, be it fly, be it moult, be it agreement in the nest.’ (112.9-11). The latter two qualities clearly correspond to Vico’s conditions of cleanliness and marriage, or the establishment of a family unit. The first, ‘flight’, may refer to religion, as birds are often associated with divinity because of their closeness to the heavens. The presence of the word ‘nest’ also suggests a fixed abode, implying that birds meet Vico’s fourth prerequisite to be human: a cessation of wandering. Before I discuss the remaining condition of humanity (language) I would like to briefly comment on the gender implications of this quotation and the paragraph it introduces.

The ‘bird’ in ‘What bird has done yesterday man may do next year’ is clearly an extension of Joyce’s woman-bird pun, which is in turn further emphasised by the word ‘man’ being used to denote both humanity in general and the male gender specifically. This contrast gestures towards the medieval viewpoint which equated women to—or claimed that women were closer to the level of—beasts. It would also be useful at this juncture to note that this linking of women with animals is a continuation of a trend that began in *Ulysses*, as Bonnie Kime Scott argues in her essay on ecofeminism. In her work, Kime Scott details how Joyce blurs the species barrier by connecting women and animals, contributing to the representation of nature as feminine: ‘Joyce fell right in with the female gendering of nature, at least as he represents the growing artistry of Stephen Dedalus’.[[550]](#footnote-581) Biddy is an extension of this trend, and while the use of the word ‘fowl’ emphasises the subject’s status as an animal and suggests an animal-human divide as opposed to a human man-animal woman one, the characteristics given to Biddy Doran are all stereotypically associated with women. This evokes another medieval belief which stated that men could come to understand women by understanding ‘other’ beasts:

[B]y structuring the entire work as a bestiary, Richard increased the metaphorical blurring: this bestiary was about women; animals were used simply to illustrate a woman’s character. Richard quoted Aristotle in the opening lines, “one may learn the nature of one animal from the nature of the other”. By using this quotation, Richard meant that once could learn about the female by understanding other animals. Women had been reduced to the bestial.[[551]](#footnote-582)

We can see in the ‘Lead, kindly fowl!’ paragraph this technique being employed: women are mentioned only in reference to other animals. The whole passage can also be read as a critique, or a parody of a critique, of feminism; the feminist discourse in this passage is undercut by the continued association of women with beasts, while men are often allowed to remain wholly human. It must be noted, however, that in this paragraph men are also at times depicted as animals, though certainly not as often.[[552]](#footnote-583) A good example of this can be seen in the following quotation:

Man will become dirigible, Ague will be rejuvenated, woman with her ridiculous white burden will reach by one step sublime incubation, the manewanting human lioness with her dishorned discipular manram will lie down together publicly flank upon fleece. (112.19-23)

In this quotation the woman desires the very thing that may make her appear more animal (a mane), while the man has his (horns) taken away. As horns are also used to indicate the gender of a sheep, this action gestures towards the notion that feminism seeks to ‘de-horn’, or demasculinise men. The hybridity of species and gender in this passage is another example of the observation made above, that these two forms of hybridity often accompany one another. Through the phrase ‘manewanting human lioness’­­­—another example of these double hybrids—Joyce is also implying that the lioness desires to be male, as only male lions have manes. This anti-feminist discourse (or Joyce’s parody of it) is further emphasised with passage’s final lines:

No, assuredly, they are not justified those gloompourers who grouse that letters have never been quire their old selves again since that weird weekday […] when to the shock of both, Biddy Doran looked ad literature. (112.23-27)

This phrase is obviously referring to traditional views that maintain ‘letters’ to be a masculine field which is then corrupted by the intrusion of not just a woman, but a bestial woman-animal hybrid. Through this hybridity women are once again placed on the same level as beasts, echoing Bloom’s transformation in ‘Circe’, where his humiliation is emphasised by him turning into *both* woman and animal.

Vico’s remaining requirement to be human, that of language, plays a significant role in the hen’s tale; indeed, the story is primarily about the hen’s unearthing of a letter which represents the abstract idea of language. Before this discovery, however, we can observe the presence of Vico’s earlier forms of language. In *The New Science* Vico dictates that there are three stages of history (and a ricorso) and that each stage has a corresponding phase of language; in the age of Gods it consisted of metaphorical gesture, in the Heroic age it includes symbolism such as fables and heraldry, and in the age of Man language is made up of letters and is named by Vico as ‘vulgar’ or ‘epistolary’ language. In the Belinda of the Dorans tale, all three of Vico’s phases of language are present and occur sequentially; this pattern is accompanied by the protagonist’s development from being more bestial to more human.

When we first see Biddy Doran she is ‘behaviourising strangely’ on a mound of rubbish; while this phrase has clear connotations of behaviourism, it may also suggest an attempt at communication through physical gesture that the observer cannot comprehend. While this reading may be a bit of a stretch, the hen’s subsequent kicking up of orange peel is more obviously a metaphorical gesture with historical connotations: ‘when in the course of deeper demolition unexpectedly one bushman’s holiday its limon threw up a few spontaneous fragments of orangepeel’ (110.27-29). In earlier drafts of the episode, the presence of the pronoun ‘its’ makes it more evident that it is the hen doing the throwing: ‘a cold fowl behaving strangely on the fatal dump at the spot called the orangery when in the course of its deeper demolition it unexpectedly threw up fragments of orange peel’ (Proto draft, 1st draft § 1). At this juncture we know very little about the hen and her behaviour appears wholly animal as she is scratching about in a pile of detritus. Much like scripture is used in the bestiaries, the presence of Vico’s philosophy here reveals to us the nature of the hen; Biddy is, at this juncture, distinctly not-human.

After this description of Biddy, Joyce mentions the discovery of the Ardagh chalice; an Irish ecclesiastical relic from the 8th century: ‘the finding of the Ardagh chalice by another heily innocent’ (110.34-35). The chalice, an exemplary piece of Irish art, is also an example of Vico’s second stage of language which is made up of symbolic images, myths and fables. The Ardagh chalice is intricately decorated with Celtic patterns and various images, including animals. By referring to this chalice, comparing its discovery to the imminent uncovering of the letter, Joyce is suggesting that the notepaper, before it is even read, is a symbolic object; indeed, the hen’s unearthing of it symbolises the discovery of language by an animal. Now that this second stage of language has passed, we learn more about Biddy as she is given a name and accolades; before the letter is even studied, she appears less earthily bestial.

Once the letter has been read and transcribed, two things happen: first, Joyce inserts a passage about transformation and nature, and second, he presents Biddy Doran in a more ‘human’ or ‘civilised’ manner. The first piece reads as follows:

Well, almost any photoist worth his chemicots will tip anyone asking him the teaser that if a negative of a horse happens to melt enough while drying, well, what you do get is, well, a positively grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values and masses of melthwhile horse. Tip. Well, this freely is what must have occurred to our missive […] unfilthed from the boucher by the sagacity of a lookmelittle likemelong hen. (111.26-33).[[553]](#footnote-584)

This clearly evokes Stephen’s thoughts on Aristotle in *Ulysses* and this quotation from *Finnegans Wake* demonstrates the earlier statement that ‘horseness is the whatness of all horse’ (*Ulysses,* p.178). In terms of OOO, what is described in this passage is a representation of a horse object, whose surface, sensual ‘horsehappy values’ have been transformed and distorted; its real quality, however, remains untouched. This then allows it to still be identified as a ‘meltwhile horse’. The infamous letter has undergone the same process, changed by the heat of the midden heap. The hen, however, endures the same process, but is altered by language and not heat; in the final paragraph of this abstract (112.9-27), Biddy Doran now meets all of Vico’s requirements to be human, and Joyce provides us with a glimpse of a society in which animals possess language.[[554]](#footnote-585)

In the paragraph preceding the abstract that this chapter has examined, Joyce introduced this fabular ‘zogzag world’ (111.8) to us as being a place in which ‘the possible was the improbable and the improbable was the inevitable’ (110.11-12). The Biddy Doran passage is then described as follows: ‘for utterly impossible as all these events they are probably as like those which may have taken place as any others which never took person at all are ever likely to be. Ahahn!’ (110.19-21). The distortion of the word ‘amen’ to ‘Ahahn’ (hahn is aurally similar to hen and is also the German word for cockerel) foreshadows the displacement of men by animals. This is also suggested by the phrase ‘which never took person at all’, which implies that there will be a lack of humans in the following passage. Additionally, ‘amen’s’ meaning of ‘so be it’ gives a finality and strange certainty to the following events, as if they were somehow possible.

In the final paragraph, the Biddy Doran we see is vastly different from ‘that original hen’ at the start of the tale (110.22). This transformation, or Biddy’s status as a hybrid creature has already been discussed at length above, so in this section I will demonstrate how Vico’s theory on language development fits in with this character’s process of metamorphosis.

As Biddy is a hybrid creature, the changes in language affect each part of the hybrid differently; the bestial side becomes misrepresented, while the human side becomes more prominent or civilised. In *The New Science*, Vico claims that the language of Gods, made up of gesture and metaphor, was the language used in the ancient city of Atlantis, ‘which scholars would have us believe expressed ideas by the nature of things’.[[555]](#footnote-586) What is relevant here, is the connection of language with nature as well as the implication that the expression of an object’s nature gets progressively distorted as humanity moves through the ages of Gods and Heroes to the age of Man. If we apply this logic to *Finnegans Wake*, we can see that Biddy’s hen-nature gets more obscure, or at least less realistic, as the abstract develops; this would account for the change between the ‘cold fowl behaviourising strangely’ (110.25) and the Biddy Doran that ‘looked ad literature’ (112.27). The hen’s depiction at the beginning is both realistic and bestial; Joyce conjures up the image of a bird scavenging in a mound of human waste, presumably looking for food and not incriminating missives (this is the age of Gods, and appears in lines 110.22-111.5). Biddy, in the final paragraph which represents the age of man, is now depicted in a sentimental and idealistic manner: ‘she knows, she just feels she was kind of born to lay and love eggs […] and hoosh her fluffballs through din and danger!’ (112.13-15). While Biddy’s hen side is becoming more idealised, her human side is becoming more prominent and civilised; in the second age (lines 111.5-10) she is given a name, and in the third age (lines 111.10-112.27, although lines 112.9-112.27 deal with Biddy specifically) she is made literate.

With the development of language, then, we can see Biddy’s nature move from being more bestial than human in the first age, to balanced in the second, and more human than animal in the third age. With these references to Vico, we can see how the instructional properties of this tale consist of two parts: the first demonstrates the necessity and power of language—and in this case literature specifically—to make someone human and rise out of the bestial state. The second point is, that, if *mere* animals can do these things—such as agreement in the nest—then surely man can do them also. This is the lesson that was given by Ambrose of Milan when he ‘urged people to learn hard work from the example of the ant, to learn loving care for the young from the bear, and gratitude from dogs’.[[556]](#footnote-587)Additionally, Biddy’s changing nature is clearly elucidated through the parallels to Vico’s theory on language; it is in this way that the structure of the Belinda of the Dorans tale reflects that of a medieval bestiary.

V: Conclusion

At the start of this chapter, I made two claims: first, that Joyce uses animals to investigate the definitions of and subsequent division between humans and animals: second, that, due to this first consideration, *Finnegans Wake* contains a medieval-esque world in which these two categories of human and animal cannot be so rigidly defined. Joyce establishes these things through creation of hybrid creatures, total metaphorical structuring, and references to Giambattista Vico. While this argument has been constrained to a specific passage of the *Wake*, these themes spill over into other parts of the book. On page 113, for example, words that denote a human audience are distorted to include animals: ‘Mesdaims, Marmouselles, Mescerfs!’ (113.11).[[557]](#footnote-588) Additionally, the phrase ‘with a graith uncouthrement of postmantuam glasseries from the lapins and the grigs’ (113.1-2) contains similar alterations, this time of the names of languages: ‘Latin’ and ‘Greek’ are changed to ‘lapins’— which contains the French word *lapin*, meaning rabbit—and ‘grigs’, which is a short-legged hen.[[558]](#footnote-589) The word ‘postmantuam’ also has implications of something beyond humanity, such as animals learning how to write letters; Joyce’s animal-woman pun resurfaces here as this word can also be read as meaning something beyond man, such as women creating their own language.[[559]](#footnote-590) The gender implications of this reading are diminished, however, by the distortion of both the female and male terms of address to include animals. While these examples are, in the text itself, close to the Belinda of the Dorans section I have examined, this material was not added until 1938 – fifteen years after Joyce first wrote about the hen, and thirteen to fourteen years after Joyce wrote the line ‘What bird has done yesterday man may do next year’.[[560]](#footnote-591)

This chapter posits questions concerning the communication of the perceived nature of objects; in an earlier chapter on *Ulysses,* Joyce’s work was compared to Ovid’s *Metamorphoses,* establishing a connection between voice and a type of transformation; this was because of the voice’s ability to communicate the inner nature. The next chapter of this thesis applies this idea to *Finnegans Wake*, looking at instances in which animals speak and eventually fall silent.

Chapter Six: ‘[S]top your harsh koaxing din’: Animal Voice in *Finnegans Wake* and Aristophanes’ *The Frogs*.

I. Introduction

*"It is a source of considerable astonishment to me," said the scientist, sitting down beside the lemming, "that you are capable of speech."*

*"You human beings are always astonished," said the lemming, "when any other animal can do anything you can. Yet there are many things animals can do that you cannot, such as stridulate, or chirr, to name just one.”*

*—James Thurber,* ‘Interview with a Lemming’*.[[561]](#footnote-592)*

In *Being and Time* Martin Heidegger defines humans, in part, as ‘the entity which talks’;[[562]](#footnote-593) much like Vico, Heidegger positions language and speech as something exclusive and fundamental to the human. The issue with such a definition, however, is that it presumes or claims that non-human animals neither speak nor have their own system of communication when it is obvious that they do: birds sing, dogs bark and leave scent markers, and crickets chirr. Given the evident fact that animals do communicate with one another, including through voice, Vico’s (and Heidegger’s) claims can be read as placing human language as superior and more developed than that of the animal. This depiction of animal to human speech as an evolutionary act of ascendence will be explored further, in the first section of this chapter, which includes an examination of Aristophanes *The Frogs*. What happens, however, when animals like Aristophanes’ frogs move away from their own words to speak in a human language? The previous chapter of this thesis has demonstrated through a close reading of Biddy Doran’s unearthing of the infamous letter, that the discovery of the written word is accompanied by the humanisation of the animal; in that instance, however, the hen never speaks – although numerous words in the surrounding text are distorted to suggest clucking sounds. When animals do speak in a human tongue, their words signal the establishment or presence of a fabular narrative. Whilst *Finnegans Wake* contains numerous instances of speaking and singing animals which contribute to the non-realist parts of the book, the *Wake* also includes multiple tales that are definitively fables. The most notable of these are the two that appeared (alongside the tale ‘The Muddest Thick That Was Ever Heard Dump’) in their own volume (*Tales Told of Shem and Shaun*): ‘The Mookse and the Gripes’ and ‘The Ondt and the Gracehoper’. The aim of this chapter is to use the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper to argue that Joyce uses both animal voice and the fabular form to challenge how we perceive animals as fundamentally different from our human selves; this is not to say that fables are arguing that animals are human-esque, but rather that they, in the course of their narrative, challenge our perceptions of what we believe to be purely bestial or purely human behaviour. Whilst this at first appears a rather broad claim, the perceptions that are challenged are individual to each fable; this chapter will focus only on those that are addressed by Joyce’s version of the ant and the grasshopper tale.

In order to demonstrate that the animal voices of *Finnegans Wake* are used in this manner, this chapter will consider moments in which the animal speaks. The first section will examine an onomatopoeic translation of an animal’s voice and consider whether OOO, via Timothy Morton (a follower of Harman’s ‘brand’ of Object-Orientated Ontology), can be used as a framework to discuss both animal voice and ‘voice’ as an object. This examination will be accompanied by a close reading of the first animal voice of the *Wake*—the ‘brekekekex’ of the frogs—as well as its literary source: Aristophanes’ *The Frogs.*

The subsequent sections will focus on the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable, specifically pages 414.16-415.25. The second part of this chapter will examine this instance of animals speaking in a human tongue and argue that, by making animals use human language, our attention is drawn to the differences not necessarily in behaviour between the human and the animal, but rather the differences in how those behaviours are perceived and depicted. The third section will examine how Morton defines death and will use the end of the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable to demonstrate how the loss of voice is connected to the death of the animal.

The conclusion, following this theme of death and silence, will consist of a discussion of Naturalism and Symbolism and how their presence can be discerned in the *Wake* through the range of animal vocalisations. This chapter will end by focusing on moments of bird song, particularly the gulls who signal the death of Anna Livia on the last page of the *Wake*. By looking at this spectrum of animal speech in the *Wake*, this chapter will conclude by showing how the animal voice is used to challenge or consider the difference between the human and the animal.

II: Perception, OOO, and Frogs

When, in Aristophanes’ *The Frogs,* Charon begins to ferry Dionysus across Lake Acheron to the land of the dead, he tells the demi-god that he will hear ‘the loveliest timing songs’.[[563]](#footnote-594) These songs turn out to be the croaking of the frogs: ‘Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax!’ (*The Frogs*, 35.11). Joyce begins the second page of *Finnegans Wake—*which, among other things, examines humanity’s development and evolution (which in turn is suggestive of Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution)[[564]](#footnote-595)—with an altered version of Aristophanes’ ‘brekekekex’: ‘Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!’ (004.02-03). The same reference is made by Timothy Morton, a follower of Harman’s OOO, to open his chapter on object birth, or creation. What is it, then, about this particular reference that implies an origin or beginning? This section, whilst examining this question, will also consider whether OOO can be used to provide a structure for discussing animal voice, especially when that voice appears in an, at times, fabular, non-realist narrative such as *Finnegans Wake*. To achieve this, however, ‘voice’ as an object, especially in context of OOO, must first be examined. While Harman does not discuss voice himself, Morton does in *Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality*. Morton’s principle argument in his text is that ‘causality is wholly an *aesthetic* phenomenon’: because of this, action at a distance (which will be explained further on) allows objects to interact and—to use Morton’s terminology—to be ‘born’ and to ‘die’.[[565]](#footnote-596) This section, then, will first examine Morton’s theory and discuss how it relates to voice in an attempt to answer whether we can use OOO as an outline before applying it to the second page of *Finnegans Wake,* and Joyce and Morton’s mutual source: Aristophanes’ frog chorus. By doing this, this section will demonstrate that OOO can be used as a framework for an examination of animal voice in literature.

As something basically intangible, it is at first somewhat difficult to conceive of voice as an independent object. This difficulty is compounded by voice’s relatively ‘short-lived’ existence compared to more ‘concrete’ objects, such as a lamppost. Additionally, defining ‘voice’ is more complicated than defining ‘a lamppost’; is ‘voice’ the words or noises that are spoken (e.g., the croak that irritated Dionysus), or is it a sound originating from a particular source (such as ‘my voice’ or ‘a frog’s voice’)? The two options here, however, are fundamentally different because ‘voice’ is not the same as ‘a voice’; the first is an object and the second a quality. The frog croaks with his voice, but the croak travels away from him as an independent object; this is what Morton demonstrates when he lays out the manner in which the noise from a frog touches the surrounding landscape:

As the wave front advanced, the shape of the wave remained fairly constant as molecule after molecule translated it into its own vibration. The expanding wave front brushed against the outermost rim of a spider’s web, causing the spider to detect in her feet the possible presence of the next meal.[[566]](#footnote-597)

For Morton the way in which objects brush against one another is a form of perception: the web perceives the frog’s croak as it vibrates; the spider then perceives this vibration as the possibility of food, as if an insect had been caught in her trap. Morton relates this idea of perception to the concept of ‘as-structure’, or (in this case) hearing-as:

Hearing is hearing-as. It’s an example of what Harman, via Heidegger, calls the *as- structure*. My human ears hear the frog as human ears. The digital recorder hears the frog as a digital recorder. The spider web hears the frog in a web-morphizing manner.[[567]](#footnote-598)

Sticking with arachnids, the spider would be unable to hear the frog’s croak (as we understand hearing) because they do not possess ears; instead, they have tiny hairs on their bodies that alert them to the presence of sound. How the spider translates this information, however, is known only to the animal itself. What Morton and OOO allow us to do here is challenge our idea of what perception means; it is not simply ‘I can see a spider’ or ‘I can hear a frog’, but rather the croak perceives me as it vibrates across the molecules in the air. Perception is not exclusively a human ability, and inanimate objects are capable of perceiving one another:

That is, an effect is a kind of perceptual event for some entity, no matter whether that entity has skin or nerves or brain. How can I even begin to suggest anything so outlandish?   
 One way to start thinking about why it might be compelling and even reasonable to think this way is to examine whether there is anything all  
 that different about my perception and the perception of a frog, or for that matter, the perception of a spider, or indeed of a spider’s web. […] We can take comfort here from the hardest of hardcore evolutionary theory. If we think perception is some kind of special bonus prize for being highly evolved, then we aren’t being good Darwinians.[[568]](#footnote-599)

One snooker or billiard ball perceives another when they collide and go veering off in different directions.[[569]](#footnote-600) This is possible, according to Morton, because causality is purely an aesthetic phenomenon:

*Realist Magic* is an exploration of causality from the point of view of object-oriented ontology. I argue that causality is wholly an *aesthetic* phenomenon. Aesthetic events are not limited to interactions between humans or between humans and painted canvases or between humans and sentences in dramas. They happen when a saw bites into a fresh piece of plywood. They happen when a worm oozes out of some wet soil. They happen when a massive object emits gravity waves. When you make or study art you are not exploring some kind of candy on the surface of a machine. You are making or studying causality. *The aesthetic dimension is the causal dimension*.[[570]](#footnote-601)

In Harman’s terms, what Morton is asserting is that object interactions occur solely across surfaces, and he calls these interactions ‘perception’. The sensual properties of the voice—such as its tone (which is a measure of a sound wave’s quality)—cause the web to move in a specific manner; when the voice moves on, both it and the web are unchanged. Additionally, when sound does cause an object to change—Morton uses the example of an opera singer and a wine glass[[571]](#footnote-602)—the real object and its real quality are untouched; the glass breaks into shards and merely ceases to be, leaving behind new objects, each with their own real qualities: ‘[t]he birth of an object is the deforming of the objects around it.’[[572]](#footnote-603)

Voice, then, is an object just as much as an egg or—to use Morton’s favourite example—a cinderblock.[[573]](#footnote-604) Voice is simply more short-lived than these concrete objects, but it still meets Harman’s criteria for a real object as it is an autonomous unit and does not depend upon other things to perceive it in order to exist. The material quality of voice can be observed in the ‘Aeolus’ episode of *Ulysses*; various machines at Bloom’s workplace create sounds that have their own presence in the narrative, which Bloom identifies: ‘Everything speaks in its own way. Sllt’ (*Ulysses,* p.117). The voice of the printing press is isolated from the surrounding text, emphasising its independence as an object.

If, as Morton says, the birth of an object comes from the deforming of objects around it, it is relatively easy to observe how voice and sounds can generate new objects. Morton demonstrates this process when he discusses the frog’s croak:

Humans hear the croak and translate it: into the word *croak*, for instance. Aristophanes translated it into the rhythmically fancy *brekekekex, ko-ax ko-ax*. *Croak* or *ko-ax*, it’s not too bad a translation, or to use the strict term for the figure of speech, onomatopoeia. Frogs don’t go *boing* or *clunk*. They croak. Somehow these nonhuman sounds made it into human language, altered but reasonably unscathed. A new translation has appeared. […] *An object is born*.[[574]](#footnote-605)

This quotation, taken from the opening of Morton’s chapter on object origins—named Magic Birth—reiterates the established viewpoint that ‘*brekekekex, ko-ax ko-ax*’ is an onomatopoeic transcription of an animal sound: it is—as Morton declares—a ‘new translation’. For Morton, this new written word is a new object, born from human mimicry and of the sound-object that originated from the animal. In this manner we could say that *Finnegans Wake* contains thousands upon thousands of new objects that Joyce has created through puns, portmanteau words, and onomatopoeic translations (such as ‘quark’). The chain or sequence of translation, of putting sound into words or text, is useful for an examination of *Finnegans Wake* as it reveals, or allows for, a connection to be established between the animal and the written word.[[575]](#footnote-606) Morton names this occurrence, in which the thought of a thing can bring us closer, or connect us, to the thing itself, ‘action at a distance’:

Action at a distance happens all the time if causation is aesthetic. What is called consciousness is action at a distance. Indeed, we could go so far as to say that consciousness-of anything is action at a distance.[[576]](#footnote-607)

Of this point, however, I am sceptical; while Morton argues that action at a distance connects objects together, what it actually reveals is a chain of perception which originates with, or leads back to, the perception of that original object. Morton, for example, states that ‘[t]hinking of a black hole is far safer than being in the vicinity of one, yet somehow thinking links us to it.’[[577]](#footnote-608) But does it? Our thinking of an astronomical entity really only reveals or connects us to our own perception of that object. To use Aristophanes’ ‘*brekekekex, ko-ax ko-ax’* as an example, the final object—the written ‘brekekekekex’—is a transcription or translation of an animal sound; we can follow this sound back to the animal that generated it, but rather than this connecting us to the animal itself what we are met with is our *human* perception of the frog, which ultimately forces us to confront the limits of our own perception. This chain of causality, or action at a distance would read as follows: brekekekekex-croak-frog (transcription-voice-animal). While Morton may argue that this connects us to the object itself, each of these steps are perceptions; this is because, in Morton’s own words, causality is an *aesthetic* occurrence:

Actual, real things are happening at multiple levels and involving multiple agents, as the wave front of the single sound wave from the frog’s mouth traverses the pond to my ears. The wave becomes imprinted on the air, on the spider’s web, in the human ear. Each packet of air molecules translates the wave from itself to the next packet: trans-late means “carry across,” which is also what meta-phor means. I hope you are beginning to see how causality and aesthetic “information” are deeply bound up with one another.[[578]](#footnote-609)

Causality becomes similar to the doppler-effect, making ripples on the surface but leaving the water itself—and the stone thrown in—unchanged. What OOO offers us, then, is an alternate way of thinking about perception, which in turn allows us to re-evaluate how we view speaking animals in literature. The remainder of this section will demonstrate how Joyce does exactly this through his incorporation of the frog’s croak on page four of the *Wake*. An examination of animal voice in the *Wake*—via a framework of OOO—then, allows us to consider how animals are perceived and how Joyce represents that perception both when animals speak in a naturalistic, realist manner as well as a fabular one.

Why, then, does the sound of the frogs gesture towards an origin, and how does giving frogs a voice effect our perception of them? To consider this we should return to Aristophanes, to begin at the beginning, as it were, of the ‘brekekex koax koax’ object. Aristophanes uses the frog chorus to irritate and taunt Dionysus as he travels across a lake in the underworld. This dialogue between animal and demi-god reveals a lot about the human attitude to animal language, and begins as follows:

Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax,  
 Brekekekex ko-ax, koax!  
 We children of the fountain and the lake  
 Let us wake  
 Our full choir-shout, as the flutes are ringing out,   
 Our symphony of clear-voiced song.  
 The song we used to love in the Marshland up above,  
 In praise of Dionysus to produce,   
 Of Nysaean Dionysus, son of Zeus,  
 When the revel-tipsy throng, all crapulous and gay,   
 To our precinct reeled along on the holy Pitcher day.  
 Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 (*The Frogs*: 35.10-37.10)

It is interesting to note that the frogs describe themselves as singing, as it raises the issue of what we define as song and what we define as noise; indeed, as humans we make this distinction, deciding that mosquitos and dogs are noisy, while birds and whales sing. This question is intrinsically linked to how we define voice outside of OOO particularly in regard to the potential difference between language and noise, voice and sound.[[579]](#footnote-610) This opening verse is framed by the more ‘realistic’ transcription of the frog’s voice; it is this sound that Dionysus responds to, for now either ignoring the more fabular lines in which the animal speaks in a human language, or is simply unable to understand them:

Dio. O, dear! O, dear! now I declare  
 I’ve got a bump upon my rump,   
 Fr. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 Dio. But you, perchance don’t care.  
 Fr. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.

(*The Frogs*: 37.11-39.1)

What Dionysus realises or observes here is that animals are indifferent and unsympathetic to the opinion or emotion of humans (and humanoid deities). This sits somewhat as a contrast to various moments in *Finnegans Wake* (and, indeed, *Ulysses*) which interact with the idea of human anxiety about the animal gaze and potential judgement. Indeed, the frog’s indifference to Dionysus’ annoyance is somewhat humorously emphasised when the frogs respond to his complaint with their standard ‘Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax’. The god’s answer is as follows:

Dio. Hang you, and your ko-axing too!  
 There’s nothing but ko-ax with you.  
 Fr. That is right, Mr. Busybody, right!

Dionysus is still deaf to the frog’s human speech and is becoming more irritated by their repetitive croaking. Whilst in this version the frogs simply agree with Dionysus, other translations more explicitly dismiss this perceived limitation of the animal’s language, having the frogs maintain that, for them, this croaking sound is sufficient.[[580]](#footnote-611)

Halfway through his journey across this lake Dionysus begins to speak in the frogs’ language:

Dio. My hands are blistered very sore;  
 My stern below is sweltering so,  
 ‘Twill soon, I know, upturn and roar  
 Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 O tuneful race, O pray give o’er,   
 O sing no more.  
 (*The Frogs*: 39.11-41.4)

With his outburst of ‘Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax’, Dionysus and the frogs are situated on the same level, as it were, both now bilingual, speaking in a human tongue and a frog one. [[581]](#footnote-612) This connection is subsequently demonstrated in the following passage:

Fr. & Dio. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 Dio. This timing song I take from you.  
 Fr. That’s a dreadful thing to do.  
 Dio. Much more dreadful, if I row  
 Till I burst myself, I trow.  
 Fr. & Dio. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.

(*The Frogs*: 41.15-20)

This passage, through the frog’s assertion that taking their voice from them would be ‘dreadful’, and Dionysus’ presumption that he is able to do so, raises questions regarding ownership of voice. Additionally, this then establishes the song as an object independent of its producer, and thus is able to be taken from one being by another. The frogs also demonstrate their indifference to Dionysus’ plight by continuing to croak. Now nearing the end of his journey, Dionysus declares, in a somewhat childish manner: ‘Go, hang yourselves; for what care I?’ (*The Frogs*: 41.21). The frogs respond making their disinterest in his emotions explicit, saying:

Fr. All the same we’ll shout and cry,  
 Stretching all our throats with song,  
 Shouting, crying, all day long,  
 Fr. & Dio. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.

(*The Frogs*: 41.22-25)

The demi-god then shows the falsehood of his previous claim ‘what care I?’ by arguing:

Dio. In this you’ll never, never win.  
 Fr. This you shall not beat us in.  
 Dio. No, nor ye prevail o’er me.  
 Never! never! I’ll my song  
 Shout, if need be, all day long,  
 Until I’ve learned to master your ko-ax.  
 Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 I thought I’d put a stop to your ko-ax.

(*The Frogs*: 41.26-43.7)

Dionysus amusingly claims here that he can ‘out-croak’ a frog; what is interesting about this, however, is that, despite the frogs’ reassurance that Dionysus ‘shall not beat [them]’, the god appears to be correct, as he utters the last ‘Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax’ of the play. Dionysus also now claims this croaking as his own, calling it ‘my song’. More significant, however, is the frogs’ silence. Chris Mak notes that a trope of animal fables is a return to order at their end; this is often signified by the ‘return’ to silence on the part of the animal.[[582]](#footnote-613) This fabular aspect of *The Frogs* is over, and as the boat no longer travels across their lake or ‘sanctuary’, the frogs go quiet, not rising to Dionysus’ challenge, and are indifferent to human opinion.

The combination of realistic and fabular voice, both rendered in human language (and in this case translated from Greek into English) allows us to consider both that animals speak—frogs do croak—and that they may indeed be saying something, but without the fabular narrative a meaning (however accurate) cannot be discerned.[[583]](#footnote-614) The voice-object, the ‘brekekekex koax koax’ which acts as a refrain in this passage, persists even after the frogs have fallen silent. Not only does Dionysus repeat and recreate the object by saying it, it also generates a written-object, and each time ‘brekekekex koax koax’ is written it leads us back to its literary source. The question remains, however, why does Joyce use it in *Finnegans Wake*?

Joyce’s variation of Aristophanes’ croak—'Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!’—appears at the top of page four (the second page of the *Wake*) in a passage concerning war,[[584]](#footnote-615) but also evolution. While Darwinian evolution is undoubtedly present in this passage, another ‘form’ of evolution is also present, namely Viconian evolution.[[585]](#footnote-616) While Darwin’s scientific Theory accounts for the physical emergence of humanity from the frog’s primordial bog, this passage of *Finnegans Wake* is also concerned with the evolution or development of language and speech. This development, much like Biddy Doran’s, follows Vico’s three stages of history and language: the age of gods, the age of heroes, and the age of men. Vico describes their corresponding forms of language as follows:

Now these are the same three languages that the Egyptians claimed had been spoken before in their world, corresponding exactly both in number and in sequence to the three ages that had run their course before them. (1) The hieroglyphic or sacred or secret language, by means of mute acts. This is suited to the uses of religion, for which observance is more important than discussion. (2) The symbolic, by means of similitudes, such as we have just seen the heroic language to have been. (3) The epistolary or vulgar, which served the common uses of life.[[586]](#footnote-617)

Put simply, Vico’s stages of language begin with gesture, then move to symbolic images or tales before finally culminating in the written form of language that we use today. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the voice of God—in the form of thunder—is instrumental to the development of humanity, as it was thunder which drove man into caves and forced them to develop a society and language.[[587]](#footnote-618) It is significant, then, that the first instance of speech in the *Wake* (excluding that of the narrator’s) is one of Joyce’s infamous thunder words: ‘bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonner-ronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthur-nuk!’ (003.15-17). This word—made up of other words that mean thunder, distorted to mimic the acoustic quality of the voice of Vico’s God—signals the start of humanity’s development (from beast to human) and acquisition of speech. Less than half a page after this thunder-word, Joyce includes the, by now familiar, croak of the frogs. What is interesting here is that, for Vico, humanity developed from ‘the frightful religion of the thunderbolts’, and for Darwin humanity emerged (in some form) from these koax-ing animals. While the ‘Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax!’ (which acoustically may also suggest thunder) as an object of speech inevitably gestures back to its literary source in Aristophanes, Joyce has also altered its form and added the following words: ‘Ualu Ualu Ualu! Quaouauh!’ (004.3). While *FWEET* suggests that the added ‘k’s refer to the Ku Klux Klan (as well as mimicking the sound of machine gun fire, emphasising the passage’s theme of war and conflict), these repeated consonants also indicate the presence of a stutter, linking the voice to the book’s protagonist HCE (introduced as ‘Bygmester Finnegan, of the Stuttering Hand’ (004.18) in the subsequent paragraph).[[588]](#footnote-619) *FWEET* also notes that one of the words that follows the ‘koaxing din’ gestures towards the Irish word ‘uileliúgh’, which means ‘wailing cry’.[[589]](#footnote-620) No explanation is offered for the final word, ‘Quaouauh’, but these three different sounds in succession can be seen as a development of voice in which the speaker moves from a consonant heavy croaking to the vowel-dominant words that acoustically mimic the cry of an infant. What these words have in common, however, is their gestural quality; their meaning is dependent on sound and pronunciation as opposed to any specific definition.

While Aristophanes’ frogs claim that ‘koax’ is sufficient for their vocabulary, it is not enough for a human language, which continues to develop in this passage alongside the continued moments of war. For Darwin evolution is born from conflict in a desperate bid for survival, but for Vico evolution—specifically the evolution of language—results from the construction of a society. This society, however, is generated out of fear and the same desire to survive. It is appropriate, then, that this evolution of language is intimately tied up in examples and accounts of conflict, be they violent war or more academic disputes, such as the one between arts and science, between ‘the Baddelaries partisans’ and the ‘mathmaster Malachus Micgranes’ (004.03-04).

If we follow instances of speech in this passage, separating them from the voice of the narrator, one of the next examples reads as follows: ‘He addle liddle phifie Annie ugged the little craythur. Wither hayre in honds tuck up your part inher.’ (004.28-30). This part stands out from the surrounding text by virtue of its cadence, which forces the reader to recognise its nursery rhyme-esque pattern. Nursery Rhymes, like fables (but perhaps to a lesser extent) have potentially coded meanings and symbolism; therefore, we can place them in Vico’s age of heroes alongside allegory and poetry spread through oral tradition. So far these instances of voice have occurred before ‘Helviticus committed deuteronomy’ (004.21), or in other words, before tales were written down.[[590]](#footnote-621) The passage then moves on, describing a man (‘Haroun Childeric Eggeberth’ (004.32)) who originated from ‘next to nothing’ (referring perhaps to the idea of creation ex nihilo) ‘and celescalating the himals and all’ (005.01). The final stage of language, which Vico calls vulgar language, is signalled, appropriately, not by speech but through reference to the written word: a ‘himal’ or ‘hymnal’. The word ‘himal’ suggests the presence of man (‘him’), everything (‘al[l]’ – which may refer to HCE’s status of ‘Everybody’), as well as the alteration of animal (anim-al) to human (him-als). After this development the *Wake* introduces us to him as ‘the first […] to bare arms and a name’, (005.05) signalling that the evolution of language, and therefore the evolution from animal to human is complete.[[591]](#footnote-622)

Joyce’s use of both Darwin and Vico forces us to rethink where we position humanity in relation to the animal, and our perception of the frogs shifts them from being ‘dumb’ animals to potential ancestors. In terms of OOO, we could say that not only has the written-object ‘brekekekex koax koax’ redefined our consideration of animal speech, but these theories of evolution also cause us to connect the frogs to ourselves in an evolutionary instance of action at a distance. Aristophanes, Joyce, and Morton have each forced their reader to stop and consider how we perceive the voice of an animal, as well as that animal itself and how it connects and exists in our landscape. *Finnegans Wake*, through its portmanteau words, puns and references, demonstrates how even the briefest noise (like a frog’s croak) is capable of communicating meaning. Much like Thurber (who is quoted at the beginning of this chapter) Joyce—albeit in a subtler manner—demonstrates the animal’s capacity for meaningful noise and for speech, ultimately repositioning our perception of voice and speech as something that is not exclusive to the human. What OOO allows us to do, however, is consider voice as an independent object, which in turn allows us to consider the fabular narrative as more than something solely allegorical.

III: Animal Voice in ‘The Ondt and the Gracehoper’ Fable

By linking the frogs through their voice to the development of language, Joyce repositions the animal—as Darwin does—from a ‘dumb’ beast to an evolutionary ancestor. In *Finnegans Wake* the frogs’ speech remains contained to the human representation of their (the animal’s) language.[[592]](#footnote-623) What happens, then, when animals speak in a human tongue? This trait, or trope, of putting (human) words into the mouth of the animal is intrinsically linked to the fabular form or narrative in which animals are used (as has been examined in the previous chapter) to teach humans how to behave and how to *be* human. While the very nature of fables bypasses the animal, using them as ‘absent referents’ which are selected because of some symbolic quality that may or may not be related to their behaviour, they still force us to reconsider how we perceive the animal, making us ask both ‘what if animals *could* talk?’, and whether fables depict a realist image of animal behaviour.[[593]](#footnote-624) The answer to the latter question is, of course, dependent on the specific fable; mice, for example, do not chew through the traps of hunters to set lions free, but a dog may bark at its reflection in the water.[[594]](#footnote-625)

Various critics, such as Naama Harel, have sought to ‘reclaim’ the animal in the fable, arguing that these narratives are not solely about the human. Harel, in the course of her article, asks whether ‘animal fables actually represent nonhuman animals?’ and if ‘they have any relevance to nonhuman animal experience?’.[[595]](#footnote-626) These questions are answered in the affirmative, as Harel puts forth the claim that ‘animal fables do not necessarily exclude the nonhuman animals and at least some of them describe some authentic nonhuman animal behaviour’.[[596]](#footnote-627) Harel states that we should not ‘ignore’ the literal level of the fable, and uses the fable of ‘The Country Mouse and the City Mouse’ as an example, arguing, that:

Unlike many other nonhuman animals [sic] protagonists in fables the mice in this fable behave quite authentically; they seek food and cooperate with members of their species and fear humans, as real mice do. […] It describes the interaction between the humans and the mice from the mice’s perspective. […] Readers can definitely sympathize with the mice, and even learn a thing or two about their real lives and experiences.[[597]](#footnote-628)

But do we learn anything about the ‘real’ lives or experiences of mice? I would argue that we do not, and instead what we observe are specific behaviours: mice eat, mice may share food with other mice, and mice run away from humans. We learn nothing about the mice, and we certainly do not learn anything about their experiences; what we do gain from this fable, as Harel points out, however, is ‘sympathy’. What the fable has done here is allow us to challenge how we perceive the animal, positioning them as creatures struggling for survival rather than merely as vermin. Therefore, despite Harel’s arguments to the contrary, the answer to both of the questions that are put forward is ‘no’, as the fable is intrinsically for and about its human audience. Gillian Beer’s criticism, that Harel cites, regarding the inability of fables to be ‘true to animal experience’ when the ‘medium of description is written human language’ is also easily dismissed, as it were, because neither traditional fables nor Joyce’s, are attempting to present animal experience. Rather, they are used to challenge the perception we, as humans, have regarding the animal and the environment we share. Chris Danta, when writing about Kafka’s fables, makes the following observation:

If fables traditionally teach responsibility—the type of responsibility that constitutes us as human selves—then Kafka’s fables are remarkable for the way they diverge from tradition by teaching self-forgetfulness […]. They do not aim to correct wayward human behaviour or to provide moral instruction; they work instead to erase the very distinctiveness of human behaviour. The metamorphosis of human into animal they present is essentially non-reversible. The human subject transforms into the animal in order to die *as* *an animal*.[[598]](#footnote-629)

Can the same be said of Joyce’s fables, however? Do they erase the ‘distinctiveness of human behaviour’ by presenting an animal that speaks like a human? Whilst the previous section has examined an onomatopoeic translation of animal speech, this section will focus on the fabular representations in which animals speak in a human tongue. In order to consider how speaking animals alter our perception of them, and argue that Joyce uses the fable and the animal voice to get his reader to reconsider the boundary or difference between the human and the non-human animal, this section will conduct a close reading of the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable (414.12-419.10).

When asked to sing a song, Shaun apologises and states he would rather tell a fable instead. This fable, described as the ‘case’ (or calamity) of the Ondt and the Gracehoper is introduced amidst one of Joyce’s thunder words:

— I apologuise, Shaun began, but I would rather spinooze you one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Esaup, fable one, feeble too. Let us here consider the casus, my dear little cousis (husstenhasstencaffincoffintussemtossemdamandamnacosaghcusa- ghhobixhatouxpeswchbechoscashlcarcarcaract) of the Ondt and the Gracehoper. (414.16-21)

The thunder word, made up of the word ‘cough’ from numerous languages, represents Shaun either having a coughing fit or pompously clearing his throat to announce the title of his tale. This thunder word, however, does more here than simply indicate a cough; it introduces two themes that are at the centre of this fable, one of which is most certainly essential to the book as a whole. In this specific instance, the presence of thunder before a tale, especially a fable, gestures towards Vico’s theory on the development of language, and subsequently humanity. On a broader scale, however, the cough is a prime example of Joyce pushing at the limits of language, demonstrating both its restriction and inability to represent non-linguistic sound, while simultaneously trying to circumvent this limitation in an attempt to record the noise of an environment.

After this thunder and the voice of Vico’s God, the fable begins with the voice of the narrator:[[599]](#footnote-630)

The Gracehoper was always jigging ajog, hoppy on akkant of his joyicity, (he had a partner pair of findlestilts to supplant him), or, if not, he was always making ungraceful overtures to Floh and Luse and Bienie and Vespatilla to play pupa-pupa and pulicy-pulicy and langtennas and pushpygyddyum and to commence insects with him, there mouthparts to his orefice and his gambills to there airy processes,  
 even if only in chaste, ameng the everlistings, behold a waspering pot.   
 (414.22-29)

Right at the start of the tale Joyce aligns the Gracehoper to himself through the word ‘joyicity’, we are therefore reminded, or informed, from the very beginning that this is not solely a story about animals.[[600]](#footnote-631) The subsequent information provided in parentheses serves to establish this fable’s concern with animal voice and how the animal speaks or generates noise; the partner pair of ‘findlestilts’ refers both to fiddlesticks (a fiddlestick being the bow used to play a fiddle) and the legs of the insect, which it rubs together to produce sound. Additionally, given that the grasshopper is aligned with Joyce and that ‘fiddlesticks’ is also a colloquialism for ‘nonsense’, Joyce may be poking fun at himself by suggesting that what he writes makes no sense. This meaning of nonsense may also suggest the inability for animal language, or speech (or noise, or music) to make sense to a human listener.

The fable then moves on to provide an account of the Gracehoper’s proclivities, which stretch beyond the sentence quoted above and into the next:

He would of curse melissciously, by his fore feelhers, flexors, contractors, depressors and extensors, lamely, harry me, marry me, bury me, bind me, till she was puce for shame and allso fourmish her in Spinner's housery at the earthsbest schoppinhour so summery as his cottage, which was cald fourmillierly Tingsomingenting, groped up.  
 (414.29-35)

These two opening sentences of the fable demonstrate the grasshopper’s promiscuity and sexual deviance as he convinces others to ‘commence insects with him’ (or commit incest with him). What this sentence or section reveals however, is not the ‘experience’ or ‘real life’ of an animal, as Harel might state, but rather what the human may observe regarding the animal’s behaviour. Of course, the observation here is not realistic in the suggestion that grasshoppers may breed with lice, fleas, or wasps, but it is realistic in its indication that non-human animals are rarely monogamous and often incestuous (or will ‘commit’ incest if there is no other ‘option’ available).[[601]](#footnote-632) For humans these acts are considered sinful or taboo, while for animals they possess no moral implication, even though they do have an evolutionary one.[[602]](#footnote-633) The Gracehoper, however, is not an animal (or at least not completely); this can be observed through various words used to describe his behaviour, such as ‘commence’ which is suggestive of the word ‘commit’. ‘Commit’, meaning to carry out a ‘reprehensible act’ or perpetrate ‘a crime, sin, offence, etc.’, re-enforces the notion that his actions are sinful, as does the description ‘[h]e would of curse melissciously, by his fore feelhers’.[[603]](#footnote-634) While we might describe the actions of an insect as malicious, even while breeding (female spiders often eat their mate after copulation), we would not describe them as ‘cursing’ (which applies a moral dimension to voice).[[604]](#footnote-635) Additionally, one of the female insects is depicted as going ‘puce for shame’; Derrida, in *The Animal That Therefore I am*, states that shame—which he links to nudity—is one of the key differences between the human and the animal, implying that the animal cannot feel shame because it lacks the ability to be naked.[[605]](#footnote-636) This application of human standards to the animal both serves to remind us that this tale is not primarily about a grasshopper and an ant but about typical human behaviour, whilst also reinforcing the moral message of the fable by saying: ‘if you commit these acts you are no better than this insect’. What the fable reveals here is not necessarily a difference between human and animal behaviour, as both can be promiscuous and while it is (hopefully) rare humans can commit incest and bestiality; instead, the fable is used here as a mechanism or device to reveal a difference in our perception of what we consider to be human or animal behaviour.

This difference in perception is precisely what Danta means when he says that fables erase the distinctiveness of human behaviour. In a different essay, Danta discusses the importance of the mouth in the fable, arguing that:

The open mouth signifies speech – for the game of the fable is to raise the animal to the level of the human by enabling it to talk. But the open mouth also signifies the grotesque. […] The point of the fabulous animal, for Marin, is not simply that it speaks like a human, but rather that, in speaking like a human, it remains an animal, “a body that both eats and is eaten.” Insofar as we think of speech as an exclusively human trait, then the fable debases the human by animalizing or physicalizing speech, by linking the higher order of the word to the lower order of instinct. In speaking, the fabulous animal draws attention to the mouth as the site not just of sovereign speech but also of bestial devourment.[[606]](#footnote-637)

There are numerous issues with Danta’s argument here that must be addressed before we consider the mouth of the insect in Joyce’s fable. Danta’s claim that the animal remains an animal because it is ‘a body that both eats and is eaten’ appears to exclude the human, when humans both obviously eat, and will be eaten by worms or insects upon death – or even by other animals, such as sharks or tigers. Additionally, the notion that ‘we think of speech as an exclusively human trait’ is flawed; as stated in this chapter’s introduction, it is evident that animals speak: they bark, meow, roar, and some even imitate human language (such as in the case of parrots). Furthermore, how does the fable physicalise speech any more than any other tale that includes animals speaking, or indeed humans that both eat and talk?

Joyce brings attention to the mouth of the animal (as well as the mouth of the narrator through his coughing fit) at this opening stage of his fable, but he does not do so through speech or eating—the two features Danta focuses on; instead, Joyce uses a cluster of words which begins with the names of various insects, before moving on to name various parts of those insects. In order of their appearance in the text (quoted in full above), this cluster reads as follows: ‘Floh’ (flea) ‘Luse’ (louse), ‘Bienie’ (bee), ‘Vespatilla’ (wasp), ‘pupa-pupa’ (pupae), ‘pulicy-pulicy’, (‘pulicine’, which means ‘pertaining to fleas’), ‘langtennas’ (antennas), ‘pushpygyddyum’ (pygidium, which is a segment of an insect’s body), ‘mouthparts’, ‘orefice’, ‘gambills’ (‘gambilles’ is a French colloquialism for legs, while ‘bil’ is a Dutch word meaning ‘buttock’).[[607]](#footnote-638) With the least altered words being ‘mouthparts’ and ‘orefice’, and the presence of malicious cursing in the next sentence, the mouth is figured as having, at least, a dual purpose – that of speech and the application of ‘mouthparts to his orefice’.

By calling attention to the ‘mouthparts’ of insects, Joyce records the various behaviours, such as kissing and speaking, that can be ‘committed’ by the mouth; these actions, however, are performed by animals and humans alike. The fable does not debase the human by animalising voice as Danta argues, but rather forces us to re-evaluate what we define as ‘speech’, and in doing so demonstrates that animals have been speaking all along; the Gracehoper had ‘findlestilts’ long before humanity had the fiddle.

As the previous section has begun to demonstrate, the presence of Vico’s theory on language emphasises that the boundary or division between human and animal is principally (albeit not completely) one of perception.[[608]](#footnote-639) While the thunder-word at the beginning of Shaun’s tale indicates the presence of Vico’s God, as has been stated above, the cough is also an example of Vico’s first stage in the development of language, which is named ‘The Age of Gods’. In this age language primarily consisted of gesture. While the cough could be a bodily function with no linguistic subtext, it is also a gestural form of language. Coughing in general can communicate derision, irritation, or even supressed laughter. Shaun’s cough, however, is made more complex by being aligned with thunder and, subsequently, the divine. By connecting the spiritual to a bodily function, Joyce pokes fun at Shaun’s self-perceived superiority. Whilst gestural language is initially performed by the human narrator, once the tale begins it includes a reference to animal gesture; the grasshopper, using his ‘partner pair of findlestilts’ literally produces sound through the physical movement of his hind legs.[[609]](#footnote-640)

The language of the second age, named the ‘Age of Heroes’, is characterised by the symbolic nature of its content; this age is represented in this section by the form of the fable itself, which as a literary genre is an allegorical tale in which animals are used as similitudes (to use Vico’s—albeit translated—word) for human beings. Given the alignment of the Gracehoper with the first of these forms of language he is depicted as less developed than the sophisticated Ondt, which may then justify or explain his lewd or sinful behaviour, especially as monogamy is one of Vico’s conditions of humanity. The Ondt, however, is connected to the final form of language, the written word, which Vico names ‘epistolary’ or ‘vulgar’. This is done through the alignment of the Ondt with Thoth, the Egyptian god of writing:

Grouscious me and scarab my sahul! What a bagateller it is! Libelulous! Inzanzarity! Pou! Pschla! Ptuh! What a zeit for the goths! vented the Ondt, who, not being a sommerfool, was thothfolly making chilly spaces at hisphex affront of the icinglass of his windhame, which was cold antitopically Nixnixundnix. We shall not come to party at that lopp's, he decided possibly, for he is not on our social list.  
 (415.25-31)

Before the Ondt is associated with the Egyptian god credited with the invention of the written word, he says the following: ‘Pou! Pschla! Ptuh!’. Each of these words is aurally similar to various noises made in derision or when scoffing at something. The first of these two exclamations are the names of insects (louse and flea respectively), while the last one is a reference to the Egyptian god Ptah. This is especially significant as Ptah, according to *FWEET* is the god of speech.[[610]](#footnote-641) With the ant aligning the god of speech with a sound of derision it places him in contrast to the Gracehoper, valuing the written word above the music that the latter creates. While the Ondt’s association with Vico’s third age of language may suggest a more sophisticated or ‘human’ character he ‘commits’ the same acts as the grasshopper, and while he is still an animal he is figured as an upper-class animal. This connects to the theme of perception and how we judge and categorise behaviour. The line ‘We shall not come to party at that lopp’s, he decided possibly, for he is not on our social list’ alters our earlier understanding regarding the Ondt’s shock; it is not necessarily what the grasshopper is doing that the Ondt objects to, but rather that he is not of a suitable social class.

The presence of Vico’s theory of language in this passage indicates that the division between the human and the animal is not as concrete as it was thought to have been, instead showing how the animal could become human through the acquisition of language.

How these characters speak—and the Viconian age they are subsequently aligned with—is significant because of the intrinsic link between voice and identity. This in turn connects to perception, since an expression of the inner self voice can alter or impact how we perceive the object that generated it. Steven Connor elucidates this connection to voice and the self*,* writing: ‘Unlike my hair colour, gait, or fingerprints, my voice is not incidental to me; not merely something about me. It is me, it is my way of being me in my going out from myself’.[[611]](#footnote-642) Whilst Connor may not agree with OOO—saying voice ‘is not a condition nor yet an attribute, but an event. It is less something that exists than something which occurs’[[612]](#footnote-643)—he does assert its connection to identity by pointing out the anxiety we experience when we encounter a voice without a source: ‘Sound, and especially the sound of the human voice, is experienced as enigmatic or anxiously incomplete until its source can be identified’.[[613]](#footnote-644) While Connor is, in this context discussing cinema and an audio-visual medium, the same questions or anxieties arise in literature, albeit rarely. Whilst nearly all authors combat this difficulty through the use of speech or quotation marks, Joyce is infamously against their use, naming them ‘perverted commas’ (as opposed to inverted commas).[[614]](#footnote-645) Speech marks also give authority to the words spoken, implying that it was these exact words that were said, when that authority may not be justified.

As Connor has stated, voice is used to present the self to the world. As a result, speaking animals help us challenge our perception of them by allowing us to imagine their internal voice or identity. Whilst we cannot actually or accurately access this experience it can alter our perceptions of it, which in turn may alter how we perceive the animal outside the fable. Before the theme of voice and identity in this fable can be discussed, it must be noted that the voices of the fable are all filtered through its narrator, Shaun, who in turn is a literary character created by Joyce; these are literary representations and perceptions of voices, and it is through action at a distance and Morton’s assertion that causality is an aesthetic phenomenon that we can connect a literary perception of an object to ‘real’ versions of that object.

From the first draft of the fable in 1928 right up to *Finnegans Wake*’s publication (as an entire book) in 1939, the basic outline of the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable remains unchanged. What does change and develop, however, is the manner and method in which both the eponymous characters, as well as the narrator, speak. In the first draft, interestingly named ‘*The* Ondt and *a* Gracehoper’ (emphasis mine), the Ondt does not speak at all, although Joyce does include an instance of the animal’s internal monologue: ‘Grouscious me~~,~~! |aPou!a| what a bagateller it was, to be sorry~~,~~! |aAnd what a zeit for the goths!a| thought the Ondt who was making |achillya| spaces at himself affront of the icinglass’.[[615]](#footnote-646) This, coupled with the fact that the Gracehoper’s song is included from the first draft, demonstrates that from very early on it is the Gracehoper who is aligned with the more aural/oral aspects of language. The Ondt is connected to the written word in the 3rd draft level, with the inclusion of the reference to Thoth. It is in the same draft level that the theme of silence is introduced; this will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.

One other significant change that the drafts record, is the alteration of: ‘1Weº shall not |~~a~~~~visit them~~ |~~b~~~~visit him~~ come to |c~~his~~ that lopp'sc| partyºb|a|, he decided, for he is not on our social list.1|’ (which appears in draft level 1),[[616]](#footnote-647) to: ‘We shall not come to that lopp's party, he decided |5possibly5|, for he is not on our social list.’[[617]](#footnote-648) The addition of the word ‘possibly’ removes any sense of authority from the Ondt’s speech (i.e. that these are the Ondt’s words): ‘who’, then, is speaking, and on what authority are these words reported?

What this development demonstrates is that, very early on in the creation of this section, Joyce is interested in how voice relates to identity and the inner self. This theme is introduced from almost the beginning of the fable’s development, and indeed also right before the fable begins, through a reference to the biblical tale of Jacob and Esau: ‘—I apologuise, Shaun began, but I would rather spinooze you one from the grimm gests of Jacko and Esaup, fable one, feeble too.’(414.16-18).[[618]](#footnote-649) In the tale of Jacob and Esau, Jacob tricks his father into naming him his heir by wearing goat furs to imitate his brother’s hirsute body. In the process of this deception, Isaac (the father) remarks: ‘The voice *is* Jacob’s voice, but the hands *are* the hands of Esau.’ (Genesis 27. 22). Despite this observation, Isaac blesses Jacob before he dies, determining his son’s identity not from his voice but from a less integral attribute. Isaac may make this decision because he perceives voice to be a more intangible object, disconnected on some level from the physical body that has produced it. Both Morton (through his concept of action at a distance) and Connor (through his argument that voice is the projection of the internal self to the external world) demonstrate the inaccuracy of such an assumption (if, indeed, such an assumption was made) by linking voice irrefutably to the object that generated it. Rebekah, Isaac’s wife and the mastermind behind Jacob’s deception, recognises the importance and connection between voice and identity as she tells her son to ‘obey only [her] *voice*’ (Genesis 27. 13). Ultimately, Jacob betrays his true identity through his voice, just as (as this section will argue) the distinctive manner of the Ondt and the Gracehoper’s speech betrays or affirms their presence in the fable.

It is relatively easy in this fable to distinguish between the voices of the eponymous characters and the voice of the narrator; the speech of the Ondt and the Gracehoper (not including the latter’s song at the end) is broken up by a series of exclamation marks. This is demonstrated in the following two quotations, the first being an example of the Gracehoper’s speech and the second the Ondt’s:

Bruko dry! fuko spint! Sultamont osa bare! And volomundo osi videvide! Nichtsnichtsundnichts! Not one pickopeck of muscowmoney to bag a tittlebits of beebread! Iomio! Iomio! Crick’s corbicule, which a plight! O moy Bog, he contrited with melanctholy. Meblizzered, him sluggered! I am heartily hungry!  
 (416.15-20)

We shall not come to party at that lopp’s, he decided possibly, for he is not on our social list. Nor to Ba’s berial nether, thon sloghard, this oldeborre’s yaar ablong as there’s a khul on a khat. Nefersenless, when he had safely looked up his ovipository, he loftet hails and prayed: May he me no voida water! Seekit Hatup! May no he me tile pig shed on! Suckit Hotup! As broad as Beppy’s realm shall flourish my reign shall flourish! As high as Heppy’s hevn shall flurrish my haine shall hurrish! Shall grow, shall flourish! Shall hurrish! Hummum.

(415.30-416.02)

In the latter example, the exclamation marks in conjunction with the word ‘possibly’—discussed above—allow the reader to identify when the Ondt speaks and when the narrator is speaking, or ‘putting words into’ the mouth of the animal. While this demonstrates the connection between voice and identity, the issue that remains, however, is whether there are multiple voices in this fable or just one; the differences in speech patterns may be attributed to Shaun ‘putting on a voice’, as it were, as he is telling the story to children. If this were the case, however, why does he fail to consistently speak like the Ondt? On the other hand, the inclusion of the narrator’s voice in the Gracehoper’s song (which will be discussed in the next section) at the end serves to remind us that this tale is filtered through a narrator.

Regardless of whether we consider the tale to include three voices or just Shaun’s (I would argue that it is the former), Joyce’s fable includes one of the key features—according to Mak—of the genre; the return to silence on behalf of the animal. This is made most apparent with the fable’s final word: ‘allmen’. ‘[A]llmen’, of course indicative of ‘amen’, provides a religious ending to the tale (which combined with its ‘moral’ narrative gives it the feel of a sermon or homily), but it also suggests both that the characters of the fable are all men, and therefore dispelling or removing the allusion that animals can speak or have been doing so, as well as suggesting that from this point forwards only humans talk; ‘[A]llmen therefore indicates the moment in which animals are silenced. The erasure of distinctive behaviour—to use Danta’s term—is also indicated here through ‘allmen’; the fable itself has demonstrated how some behaviours (such as promiscuity and selfishness) are not limited to the human or the animal, but ‘allmen’ generalises this further by implying a universality to behaviour, particularly human (perhaps human *male*) behaviour.

IV. Death of Voice

The second chapter of this thesis examined how Joyce represents both human and non-human animal death in *Ulysses*. The chapter concluded that, by aligning moments of animal death with human death (and vice versa), Joyce demonstrates that the difference between these two ‘forms’ of death is primarily one of perception. This section will argue that Joyce does something similar in the tale of the Ondt and the Gracehoper. Joyce causes us to re-evaluate our perception regarding the difference between human and animal death by showing that death forces a return to silence on behalf of both the human and the animal. To argue this, this section will first discuss how Morton defines death.

In *The Quadruple Object,* Graham Harman (as has been explained in Chapter Three) claims that the most significant difference between a living object and a dead one is that the latter is unable to endure alterations to its pieces:

[T]he dead object is no longer real, while the dormant object is real but simply without relation. An object is real when it forms an autonomous unit able to withstand certain changes in its pieces.[[619]](#footnote-650)

Morton, although he is a follower of Harman and his branch of OOO, defines death slightly differently. Death, for Morton, is—just like causality—an aesthetic occurrence: ‘The aesthetic dimension, in other words, is where death happens’.[[620]](#footnote-651) Death is a part of the life cycle of objects along with object birth, both of which occur continuously: ‘It turns out that objects are dying around us all the time, even as they give birth to other objects’.[[621]](#footnote-652) Whilst Harman argues that an object is dead when it cannot tolerate changes in its parts, Morton claims that an object dies when it *becomes* (or is reborn as) its pieces. He calls this process ‘translation’[[622]](#footnote-653):

The more complete the translation, the more complete the death of the object. […] An object affects another object by translating it, as best as it can, into its own terms. A plane gouges a plane-shaped hole in a skyscraper. A perfect translation of one object by another object would entail the destruction of that object. […] Yet there can be no perfect translation of an object, because the translator is also an (inconsistent) object. There would be no trace of a perfect translation. Thus there appear cinders, fragments, debris. New objects are uncanny reminders of broken objects. A culture of mourning might arise around them.[[623]](#footnote-654)

Whilst at first, Morton appears to be claiming that death is not an absolute, with one object potentially having a more ‘complete’ death than another, he is actually asserting that each act of translation inevitably causes both the death and the birth of an object. In the following example Morton demonstrates how the glass may die but shards are born:

Watch a slow-motion video of the opera singer’s effect on the glass. Watch how the glass in the video shudders just before it ceases to exist. […] These quakes cancel the difference between a thing and its resonance, its appearance. […] Sound waves match the resonant frequency of the glass. When they reach a critical amplitude, the glass ceases to exist. It becomes its environment.[[624]](#footnote-655)

A perfect translation would leave behind no trace of the object; however, as has been demonstrated in the quotation above, this is deemed to be impossible by Morton. Each translation leaves behind remnants of the original object; Morton calls these remains ‘matter’:

The formal properties of the glass are transmitted into different objects that bear an uncanny resemblance to the original. “Matter” is just the term for previous life of an object: these are shards *of* glass; this is a picture frame *of* wood; that is a mountainside *of* granite; this is the sound *of* the wind in the treetops. An object becomes matter-for.[[625]](#footnote-656)

This idea of matter, in conjunction with an earlier claim that upon death an object ‘becomes its environment’, is useful when considering the death of voice. In Morton’s description of the frog’s croak, we can observe this translation by, and into, the environment:

As the wave front advanced [of the frog’s croak], the shape of the wave remained fairly constant as molecule after molecule translated it into its own vibration. The expanding wave front brushed against the outermost rim of a spider’s web, causing the spider to detect in her feet the possible presence of the next meal.[[626]](#footnote-657)

As the voice *of* the frog travels as sound waves, the environment absorbs it, translating it into terms that can be understood; the croak becomes, as it dies, the quiver of the spider’s web, the vibration of an ear drum, and the written word recorded by an American philosopher.

Despite these subtle differences, both Harman and Morton demonstrate that there is no philosophical difference between the death of a human, animal, or an inanimate object. What this shows, as has been argued in Chapter Three, is that what separates human and animal death is not the moment itself, but It is perceived and represented. In *Ulysses*, Joyce challenges the perception that animal death is generic and human death specific by aligning one with the other. This theme is also present in the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper, as while this tale consists of bizarre human-animal hybrids, and whilst the human parts have specific referents (such as Joyce himself and Wyndham Lewis), the animal parts are known only by their species (although they are referred to as *the* Ondt and *the* Gracehoper and not ‘a’). This non-specificity is due, in part, to the genre of the fable itself which tells a moralistic story through character *types*.

In the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper, death is intimately connected to the loss of voice, as the death of one of its eponymous characters is signalled by the return to silence on behalf of the animal. As has been stated elsewhere in this chapter (and indeed in this thesis as a whole), a common trope of the fable genre is the return to silence at the end of the fable by the animal, as noted by Cliff Mak:

The traditional fable is always composed of two aspects: an imaginary fabular aspect and a deterministic aspect. These are recognizable as the two typical stages in a fable wherein a talking animal contrives to break the natural order before being inevitably dragged back in […]. This formally inevitable triumph of determinism is also occasion for a didactic moment in the fable, which typically ends with a moral dictum delivered from on high, over the now- silenced voices of animals.[[627]](#footnote-658)

In Joyce’s fable the Gracehoper’s silence at the end of his song implies his death. It must be noted, however, that this return to silence in other fables may be due to a multitude of reasons. For example, the lion in ‘The Lion and the Mouse’ fable survives his encounter with hunters because of the mouse; his silence, then, may be a result of his humility. In other fables this silence occurs when the animals are reinstated as beasts, such as in ‘The Wolf and the Lamb’, in which the wolf eats the lamb despite its arguments and logic to the contrary. In Joyce’s fable, however, this theme of silence is introduced before the fable’s conclusion, in the following passage:

For if sciencium (what's what) can mute uns nought, ‘a thought, abought the Great Sommboddy within the Omniboss, perhops an artsaccord (hoot's hoot) might sing ums tumtim abutt the Little Newbuddies that ring his panch. A high old tide for the bar-heated publics and the whole day as gratiis! Fudder and lighting for ally looty, any filly in a fog, for O’Cronione lags acrumbling in his sands but his sunsunsuns still tumble on. Erething above ground, as his Book of Breathings bed him, so as everwhy, sham or shunner, zeemliangly to kick time.

(415.15-24)

Multiple readings and meanings can be found in this passage, such as science’s inability to explain the ‘Great Sommboddy’ and the hope that art may offer a glimpse at divinity: ‘perhops an artsaccord (hoot's hoot) might sing ums tumtim abutt the Little Newbuddies that ring his panch’. What this section will focus on, however, is Joyce’s alignment of science with silence and art with voice. While science can tell us ‘what’s what’ through the classification and ordering of the natural world, it is, however—according to this passage—unable to silence the object—‘mute uns nought’—regardless of that object’s classification. This is because, as Morton demonstrates, extensive description and readings of any particular object are fundamentally *not* that object:

[A] cross section of a cinder block is not a cinder block. A finger’s impression of a cinder block is not a cinder block. A butterfly’s touch on a cinder block is not a cinder block. [[628]](#footnote-659)

In summary: *‘All the things by which we specify the object are not the object*.’[[629]](#footnote-660) Science is (apparently) unable to affect voice, which conveys the internal identity to the external world. This limitation, however, is not shared by art which communicates ‘hoot’s hoot’. This phrase can be read as ‘who’s who’ but also ‘who’s hoot’; these two phrases combined and presented as bird song, firmly link voice (hoot) to identity (who), and the two to art. For OOO, however, art is just as incapable of ‘explaining’ the object as science:

You could plot the position and momentum of every single particle in the block (assuming you could get around Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle) and you wouldn’t discover the withdrawn essence of the block. Ten of the world’s greatest playwrights and film directors (let’s say Sophocles, Shakespeare, Garcia Lorca, Samuel Beckett, Akira Kurosawa and David Lynch just for starters) could write horrifying, profound tragedies and comedies and action movies about the block and still no one would be closer to knowing the essence of the block.[[630]](#footnote-661)

Further on page 415 of *Finnegans Wake,* Joyce aligns voice with literature in the phrase ‘Book of Breathings’. This not only gestures towards literature’s ability to record instances of voice, but it also describes what Joyce is attempting to do in *Finnegans Wake*; record the non-linguistic sounds of the environment and its inhabitants, its ‘breathings’. According to this passage, science, then, can tell us what something is while art explores both voice and the ‘who’ behind that voice.

This above quotation demonstrates that, in art and literature, humans have the power to both grant and take away (human) language from the animal; additionally, this ability does not carry over into the physical, ‘real’ world (as is conveyed by the claim that science can ‘mute uns nought’). It is, however, present in Joyce’s fable and can be observed through the inclusion—or intrusion—of the narrator’s voice in the Gracehoper’s song:

*He larved ond he larved ond he merd such a nauses*

*The Gracehoper feared he would mixplace his fauces.*

*I forgive you, grondt Ondt, said the Gracehoper, weeping,*

*For their sukes of the sakes you are safe in whose keeping.*

(418.10-13)

In these four lines there is potentially three voices, if we count the laughter of the Ondt as separate from Shaun’s narration. The presence of Shaun’s voice here serves to remind us that Shaun is in control over what is said; because of this, we are confronted with the fact that this is a tale of humanoid animals (or animalised humans) told to a human audience by a human narrator (which is, in turn, part of a larger tale written by Joyce). The Gracehoper, filtered through Shaun, ends his song with the following question, addressed to the Ondt: ‘*But, Holy Saltmartin, why can't you beat time?’* (419.08). The Gracehoper’s reminder (to both the Ondt and the audience) that all things will die is accompanied by his relapse into silence and the fable’s end. The human narrator takes over once more to end the tale, having the last word: ‘Allmen’.

Whilst Shaun has no difficulty controlling the voices of his animalesque characters, literature, of course, can record the difficulty of silencing animals that can be faced in the ‘real’ world. We can observe this difficulty in *The Frogs*; Dionysus attempts to silence the eponymous animals but fails. Indeed, what we can observe in this play is, that, as the demi-god traverses the lake, and moves from the land of the living to the land of the dead, he begins to understand what the frogs are saying; at the start of his journey he responds only to the frog’s croaking, but by its conclusion he shares lines with the animals, and (for example) responds to their objections:

Fr. and Dio. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.  
 Dio. This timing song I take from you.  
 Fr. That’s a dreadful thing to do.  
 Dio. Much more dreadful, if I row  
 Till I burst myself, I trow.  
 Fr. and Dio. Brekekekex, ko-ax, ko-ax.

(*The Frogs*: 41.15-20)

As Dionysus and the frogs traverse the lake, they also traverse two languages seamlessly. This is suggestive of a removal or absence of a hierarchy between them. Charon, however, appears to be above the interaction as he can make both Dionysus and the frogs cease to speak: ‘Stop! Easy! […] Now pay your fare and go.’ (*The Frogs*: 43.8-9). Death, which is represented in *The Frogs* by moving across the lake from the land of the living to the land of the dead, therefore, erases the distinction between the human and the animal in this play, and allows for a mutual understanding of language.

This connection, by Joyce, between death and the loss of voice is not isolated to this moment in the *Wake* or indeed to *Finnegans Wake* itself. Earlier on in *Ulysses*, Bloom aligns the two through his business idea of attaching a gramophone to a grave in order to hear the dead speak: ‘Besides how could you remember everybody? Eyes, walk, voice. Well, the voice, yes: gramophone. Have a gramophone in every grave or keep it in the house.’.[[631]](#footnote-662) Given that the separation of voice from the body, or the presence of voice without an obvious source (such as with Echo from Ovidian myth) is perceived as unnerving, (as Connor points out, and I have referenced previously in this chapter)[[632]](#footnote-663), Bloom’s business idea is unlikely to have been successful. It does, however, fit into Morton’s idea of ‘translation’; as the original voice object dies, its environment translates it into various new objects, such as a digital (or gramophone) recording, which can outlast both the voice and its speaker. This connection between silence and death—as the following conclusion will demonstrate—can also be observed (appropriately) at the *Wake*’s end.

V: Conclusion

Whilst the Gracehoper’s silence at the end of the fable renders his death implicit (which is also suggested by both the fable’s source text—Aesop’s original—and the Gracehoper’s declaration that ‘you can’t beat time’) this act of falling silent is also present in the more explicit death of one of the novel’s principal characters: Anna Livia Plurabelle. The movement of the river into the sea signals the death of Anna Livia, as (like the book as a whole) it represents a cyclical process of death and rebirth through the water cycle. The Liffey starts in Kippure, formed from many smaller streams which have their origins in rainwater; the river then flows into the sea at Dublin Bay where evaporation and condensation cause clouds to form. These clouds then go on to rain over Ireland, feeding the streams that turn into the Liffey.

In the closing scene of *Finnegans Wake*, before the book rolls round and starts again, Anna Livia finally speaks and gives her account of the infamous letter before she, as the river Liffey, flows out into the sea and to her death. In this final scene on the last page of the *Wake*, Joyce includes the voice of an animal: ‘A gull. Gulls. Far calls.’ (628.13). This depiction of both an animal and its voice, is in stark contrast to the fabular singing of the Gracehoper; we can conceive of these two ‘types’ of voice as the two extreme ends on a scale of representation which has ‘naturalist’ depictions at one end and ‘symbolist’ ones at the other. By including, not only these two extremes, but multiple methods of representation that can be placed at numerous points along this ‘scale’, Joyce shows that each of these forms of depiction allow for and demonstrate different methods of perceiving and relating to the animal. For example, through the Ondt and the Gracehoper tale Joyce establishes how animals can be used as human referents in order to impart a moral lesson. Of course, this method of representation is not original, as it is precisely what Aesop does in his fables. Neither is Joyce’s inversion of the moral message original, as Aesop’s fables include a counter-fable, which (while it does not include the grasshopper) criticizes the ant.[[633]](#footnote-664) What Joyce does that Aesop does not, however, is display multiple methods of animal representation. This conclusion will establish, then, that this spectrum is present and that it is used to consider the variety of ways that humans perceive and relate to the animal. To do this, this conclusion will first briefly define ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Symbolism’—and how they may be seen through the lens of OOO—before using moments of birdsong that appear in the *Wake* to prove the presence of this spectrum.

Naturalism itself did not begin as a literary movement and has no definitive ‘dates’ regarding when it was established. Lilian Furst, however, does note that:

Eighteenth-century Naturalism, as elaborated by the thinker Holbach, was a philosophical system that saw man living solely in a world of perceived phenomena, a kind of cosmic machine which determined his life as it did nature, in short, a universe devoid of transcendental, metaphysical or divine forces. That this was the chief meaning of ‘Naturalism’ well into the nineteenth century is shown by a large number of statements as well as by the dictionary definitions of the time.[[634]](#footnote-665)

Literary Naturalism, however, was rather late to the party and was championed by French novelist Emile Zola, who was heavily influenced by the scientific advancements and theories of his era. Indeed, Roland Stromberg in his work *Realism, Naturalism and Symbolism*, attests that at the heart of Zola’s form (or ‘school’) of naturalism was the ‘philosophical belief that man is a creature determined by physical laws and is subject to scientific investigation exactly as material objects and animals are’.[[635]](#footnote-666) This viewpoint is also shared by Edmund Wilson, who cites the impact of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution on literary philosophy and practice:

It was the effect of the theory of Evolution to reduce man from the heroic stature to which the Romantics had tried to exalt him, to the semblance of a helpless animal, again very small in the universe at the mercy of the forces about him. Humanity was the accidental product of heredity and environment, and capable of being explained in terms of these. This doctrine in literature was called Naturalism, and it was put into practice by novelists like Zola[[636]](#footnote-667)

It is interesting to note that numerous critics describe naturalism as a method of re-visiting the animal or bestial part of the human.[[637]](#footnote-668) Indeed, the claim that humanity is subject to the same scientific examination as objects and animals is akin to OOO’s own levelling of hierarchies and decentring of the human through its establishment of humanity as one object among many.

While Naturalism attempts to record or represent events in an almost scientific manner and insists on looking at all aspects of life and behaviour regardless of how pleasant they may be, the countering literary movement (Symbolism) had a different agenda. Stromberg declares that ‘[r]ather than being a cult of the natural, symbolism was a cult of the artificial’, and quotes Oscar Wilde: ‘“The first duty of life is to be as artificial as possible”’.[[638]](#footnote-669) Stromberg also goes on to describe symbolism as follows:

Symbolists suggested rather than stated; indeed symbolist works often create a blurred, shadowy effect. They strove to fuse all the senses, to mingle colors, scents, music in a single intangible, bewitching effect. They were purposely ambivalent or suggestive of more than one level of meaning, like a postimpressionist painting.[[639]](#footnote-670)

Wilson, however, puts this more succinctly: ‘To intimate things rather than state them plainly was thus one of the primary aims of the Symbolists’.[[640]](#footnote-671) For OOO, these multiple levels of meaning become part of the object’s sensual qualities, human applied and subject spedific; just as an ant may see an orange as huge and a tiger would see it as small, multiple observers may see different symbolic qualities in a single object. From these quotations and definitions, we can conclude that Naturalism as a method of depiction aims to be scientific and detached whilst Symbolism strives to communicate meaning through a multitude of senses, to suggest rather than to state things explicitly. We can see this difference played out in the first chapter of *Ulysses*: Mulligan, the scientist and doctor, sees the cracked mirror as a piece of metal and glass useful for shaving. Stephen, the poet, declares it to be (perhaps half-jokingly) representative of Irish art. Wilson concludes his examination of these two literary movements by stating that the ‘literary history of our time is to a great extent that of the development of Symbolism and of its fusion or conflict with Naturalism’.[[641]](#footnote-672)

From this brief overview three questions arise: where does Joyce fit in, can Naturalism and Symbolism be combined, and how do they relate to OOO? The second question can be answered by the first as Joyce’s works showcase a fusion between the two movements. While the extent to which Joyce used naturalism in his works is debateable (and too large a topic to get into here)[[642]](#footnote-673) it is well established that he combined the two movements in both *Dubliners* (Richard Robinson in an examination of *The Untilled Field* and *Dubliners* notes: ‘However, unlike *The Untilled Field*, *Dubliners* does not advertise its symbolic outlines in its title but smuggles them in under cover of naturalism’)[[643]](#footnote-674) and in *Ulysses,* as Wilson argues:

Joyce takes us thus directly into the consciousness of his characters, and in order to do so, he has availed himself of methods of Symbolism. He has, in “Ulysses,” exploited together, as no writer had thought to do before, the resources both of Symbolism and of Naturalism.[[644]](#footnote-675)

Wilson notes that the tension between naturalism and symbolism in Joyce’s writing reaches new heights in *Finnegans Wake*, as ‘the balloon of this new kind of poetry pulls harder at its naturalistic anchor’.[[645]](#footnote-676)

In terms of OOO, this fusion of the two movements can be explained quite simply; both the naturalistic (cracked glass) and symbolic qualities (Irish art) of an object are sensual ones: they are applied by or are relative to an external observer and thus do not affect the object’s internal, real quality. In his philosophical discussion of naturalism and symbolism, Daniel Whistler argues that these two types of characteristic (naturalist and symbolic) are intimately linked, and that the symbolic may be a method in which the real quality of an object can be expressed. Whistler quotes Schelling who argues:

If the human spirit is of an organic nature, nothing will enter into it mechanically from the outside; whatever is in it, [the spirit] has configured to itself from the inside out in accordance with an inner principle [...] Whatever is absolutely purposive is in itself complete and perfected. It contains within itself the origin and the final purpose of its existence [...] In purposiveness, form and matter, concept and intuition interpenetrate. Precisely this is the character of the spirit wherein the Ideal and the Real are absolutely united. Hence there is something symbolic in every organism, and every plant is, so to speak, an arabesque delineation of the soul. (“Treatise” 92).[[646]](#footnote-677)

The symbol for Schelling—according to Whistler— is ‘a potentiated presentation in which being and meaning, real and ideal, are intimately united’, and that ‘[s]uch an account thus satisfies the two features of Schellingian naturalism set out above: to explain the emergence of meanings from nature, while simultaneously maintaining their fundamental autonomy’.[[647]](#footnote-678) Whilst this shares some similarities with OOO, such as the requirement for autonomy, the idea that these ‘meanings’ emerge from nature and are ‘independent of human meanings’ is not compatible with Harman and Morton’s philosophy.[[648]](#footnote-679) Symbols are human-applied sensual qualities that communicate neither a real quality nor something inherent in the object itself. This is incompatible with OOO as it suggests an access to (or expression of) the object’s ‘real quality’, its essence, that both Morton and Harman assert is inaccessible to all other objects.[[649]](#footnote-680) What OOO offers us, that Symbolism and Naturalism do not, is a method of looking at the object and being able to observe both its naturalistic qualities as well as symbolic ones; OOO allows us to combine parts of these two philosophies without assigning or falling into the trap of giving one form of quality (naturalistic and symbolic) more importance than the other.

As we have seen with the cracked mirror, Joyce manages to create objects that have ‘equally weighted symbolic and material functions’, but he also depicts objects that are principally one or the other.[[650]](#footnote-681) This can be seen through various depictions of birds in *Finnegans Wake*.

In summary, naturalism in literature is the presentation of the natural world, supposedly devoid of any human projection or adornment. At the other end of the spectrum, there are highly symbolic animals for which their physical or ‘natural’ status as animals is almost irrelevant; what is significant in these instances is the implied meaning or reference which is not explicit in the text itself. To understand some of the symbolism of the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable, the reader must be familiar with Aesop’s version. In *Finnegans Wake*, these two animals are firmly on the symbolic end of this scale, while the gulls are presented in a more naturalist way, placed in the text as bare objects without any human projection or adjectives: ‘A gull. Gulls. Far calls’ (628.13). Despite this ‘bare-bones’ depiction, it is difficult not to read the gulls as symbolic objects, heralding both the death of Anna Livia and the end of the Wake itself.

This section of the *Wake* (pages 619.20 to 628) was—according to the JJDA—written almost entirely in November 1938, with a few alterations being made in January 1939 before publication. During this chapter’s development birds are present from the very first draft level, the most significant of which are the blackbirds, the phoenix, and the gulls. Blackbirds are introduced during the first draft when ALP, speaking to HCE, says: ‘Look! Your blackbirds! That’s for your good luck.’.[[651]](#footnote-682) In medieval bestiaries blackbirds represented, not good luck, but ‘those who are tempted by carnal pleasures’.[[652]](#footnote-683) The blackbirds remain in this form up until the third draft level when Joyce removes them; they are subsequently reintroduced in the sixth draft level (albeit in a different place), which also includes the first reference to the gulls. The presence of the blackbirds now appears in the following way, hidden in the Irish word for blackbird – ‘londubh’: ‘Laud,º ~~man~~ men of Londub’.[[653]](#footnote-684) In this draft (which remains almost the same upon publication: ‘laud men of Londub’ (625.36)), the blackbirds’ presence is made more obscure (unless you speak the Irish language); like many of the *Wake*’s animals they become hidden in wordplay and non-English language. The final word of this above quotation, then, is both a portmanteau of London and Dublin as well as a reference to the name of the animal. These two depictions of blackbirds are situated at different points on this spectrum of representation, demonstrating that in this section’s development, Joyce is experimenting with how to depict the animal in literature. The first variation appears to fall in the middle of this scale, as it were, as while they are presented in a naturalistic manner, simply named as blackbirds, their function is immediately rendered symbolic and explicitly *for* the human observer. Additionally, the first possessive pronoun in ‘Look! Your blackbirds! That’s for your good luck.’ implies an ownership by the human over the animal. This is subsequently made more sinister with the knowledge that ‘blackbird’ was a colloquialism for slaves, especially those from the South Pacific.[[654]](#footnote-685) By aligning the human with the animal like this, in a much more subtle manner than he does with the ant and the grasshopper, Joyce is portraying more than one way in which the human relates to the animal; the first version expresses an almost biblical sense of dominion over the animal through the use of ‘your’, whilst the second demonstrates how the evocation of animals was used to metaphorically dehumanise people, to figure them as less-than-human in an attempt to enable violence and abuse.[[655]](#footnote-686) Both of these presentations, however, are similar in that they ascribe to a hierarchy in which humanity places itself above the animal kingdom. The second, and published, version depicts the blackbird in a more complex manner; the animal is not permitted to exist in the book as itself as it is also two cities. Once again, the bird is also aligned to the human as it is figured as a point of origin for ‘laud men’. This falls on the more symbolic end of the spectrum, as the blackbird cannot be separated from its figurative meaning.

While Joyce’s representation of blackbirds changes from draft level to publication, the gulls (once placed in the 6th draft level) remain the same. In contrast to both versions of the blackbirds, however, the gulls’ presence is both explicit and singular; they are not confused or compacted with references to other objects, and they are also not immediately rendered as symbolic. Additionally, they are devoid of a human referent and are allowed to exist in the book solely as animals. Their naturalistic depiction through short, staccato-like sentences places the animal, and its voice, into this final passage as distinct, independent objects. Indeed, it is only when the gulls are situated in a wider context that their presence can be read as symbolic. In a letter written in 1937, Samuel Beckett laments the fact that critics lack the ability to let things be silent; interestingly, he phrases his complaint as follows: ‘For in the forest of symbols that are no symbols, the birds of interpretation, that is no interpretation, are never silent’.[[656]](#footnote-687) As we can see in Joyce’s works (through the lapwing in *Ulysses*, the bird-girl, and the eagle in *A Portrait*), there is an almost automatic symbolic quality to birds that humans apply to them, perhaps because of their ability to fly. This persistent symbolism is also present here in the *Wake*; Biddy Doran is a ‘mother hen’, and the gulls beckon or announce the movement of the river into the sea.

Their naturalistic depiction sets the gull’s calls apart from other moments of birdsong in *Finnegans Wake*, most notably the song of the seaswans (383.1-14) and the song of the nightingales (360.23-361.34). The latter, also known as the song of the naughty girls, is a clear play on the bird as animal/woman pun, and despite various references to birds, the nightingales are distinctly more human than animal, with their animal ‘part’ serving mostly to introduce various symbolic connotations.[[657]](#footnote-688) Additionally, the symbolic nature of the birds is made more explicit here through the emphasis of them being ‘naughty *girls*’, as in nature it is only the male nightingale that sings. The song of the seaswans, however, features animals that—whilst fabular because they sing in a human language—are distinctly *animals* and not symbolic references to humans. We are reminded of their animal identity through their voice, as Joyce gives the song an ‘—ark’ rhyme scheme; this, like the brekekekex of the frogs, is another instance of an onomatopoeic translation of animal voice. Through the subject matter of the song, in which the seaswans are mocking the cuckolded King Mark, Joyce represents an almost Derridean instance of the animal gaze and judgement. Much like when he describes the cat’s ‘shame-closing eyes’ in *Ulysses*, Joyce is representing, and giving voice here, to the human paranoia of the animal watching and judging the human.[[658]](#footnote-689) By ending the *Wake* with a naturalistic moment of animal voice, that is placed into the text in a manner that almost separates it from its context, Joyce is representing the animal’s more natural indifference to human projection. The gulls call regardless of the presence of a dying river-woman, just as the cockerel crows on page 584 without regard to whether it interrupts plot or speech.[[659]](#footnote-690)

As Anna Livia and the Gracehoper die, they both fall silent; this disappearance of voice gestures towards a return to objecthood through the loss of subjectivity or ability to communicate an internal human identity. However, it must be noted that in terms of OOO ALP and the Gracehoper are both always objects, regardless of whether they are also subjects. By losing *human* language the Gracehoper and the river also lose their human referent, allowing both to return to their ‘original’ form, and die in silence.

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to consider and answer if­—­and how­—Joyce uses animals as a method of challenging how we define and understand what it means to be human. This thesis has explored and answered this question by examining moments when Joyce represents behaviours and characteristics that are conventionally or exclusively ascribed to the human. In this thesis I have demonstrated that Joyce takes features that are meant to differentiate humans from the remainder of the animal kingdom (such as death and language) and applies them to animals: dogs recite poetry, chickens read literature, and insects commit blasphemy. By doing this, this thesis has shown that Joyce reveals how our perceptions of animals may be unimaginative or rigid; as a result, he causes his readers to re-consider not only how we define the animal, but­—as a consequence—what it means to be human.

In addition to this primary aim I have also considered a secondary question, not about Joyce, but about philosophy, namely OOO and whether this philosophy, as Harman claims, is universally applicable and is able to elucidate ‘everything’. As the introduction to this thesis has explained, each chapter of this work employs multiple theoretical or textual foci; this is due to the fact that Joyce’s works—with their almost obsessional need to record either an entire city or include references to innumerable philosophies, events, people, books, myths, songs, and so on—lends itself to multiple contexts. This makes Joyce’s later two novels ideally suited to examine OOO’s claim of universality. The aim of this conclusion, then, is to reflect on the four critical chapters of this thesis (chapters two, three, five and six) and analyse how they have considered these two research aims, and why they are significant.

Chapter Two examines moments of human-to-animal transformation in *Ulysses* to establish that the novel contains two forms of metamorphosis: symbolic and physical. That these two forms of transformation, and their pattern of moving from symbolic to physical, are present is significant because it demonstrates that Joyce is engaging with animals and situating them into the patterns of the novel; the symbolic to physical change is accompanied by a shift in protagonist. Going forward, then, it may be interesting to examine animals in ‘Penelope’ to see how their representation changes when Molly is the narrator.

In conjunction with this, Chapter Two challenges OOO to explain the process of one object becoming another, and it is here where OOO stumbles. Harman does not address what happens to the real quality of an object when it turns into something else, but his explanation of objects is clear enough that we can infer or establish this process independently. Ultimately, as long as the real quality remains inaccessible, its transformation into something else does not necessarily threaten its status as an object.

Chapter Three of this thesis then takes one of the characteristics that supposedly separates humanity from other animals—death—and argues that Joyce dismisses or challenges such a distinction. In this chapter I argue that, by shadowing instances of human death with an animal parallel, Joyce clearly demonstrates that the difference in human and animal death is not due to philosophical arguments that claim animals lack the capacity to die, but rather how these two events are perceived. In this chapter I also analyse and make clear OOO’s strengths and limitations; while Harman convincingly defines the dead object and the living one, he fails to adequately explain the process of dying. This failure, however, is not shared by Morton (who is used in Chapter Six), who names this process ‘translation’. Chapter Three also showcases OOO’s ability to explain a plethora of objects – from the animate to the inanimate, from Paddy Dignam’s ‘dogsbody’ in ‘Circe’ to Bloom’s taxidermy owl in ‘Eumaeus’.

After this chapter, this thesis shifts from discussing *Ulysses* to *Finnegans Wake*. Chapter Five examines the hen Biddy Doran in order to argue that *Finnegans Wake* moves away from the rigid definitions of ‘human’ and ‘animal’, presenting us with hybrid creatures, whilst also showing that Joyce is experimenting with what it means to be human by creating a scenario in which an animal discovers, not just language, but literature. In order to argue these things effectively, I use three theories of metaphor: Vico’s, Harman’s, and Lakoff and Johnson’s. Whilst OOO’s own theory may be overly complex in places, I demonstrate OOO’s ability to elucidate and adapt other theoretical texts. Not only can OOO help us understand Vico’s idea of ‘poetic wisdom’, but this chapter also shows how it can be applied to medieval bestiaries and non-realist narratives like the *Wake*. Through doing this I reveal one of OOO’s uses, as well as its ability to be applied to a plethora of theoretical and literary texts. What is becoming apparent, then, is that OOO really does have a remarkable scope.

This range is once again established in Chapter Six, in which OOO—this time via Morton, and not Harman—is used in a discussion of both Aristophanes’ *The Frogs* and a more intangible or short-lived object, like voice – especially when that voice appears in a non-realist narrative. By tracing the croak of the frogs from Aristophanes to both Joyce and Morton, I examine how objects travel through both literature and their physical environment to argue how this can impact our perceptions. What this chapter establishes, with Morton’s help, is that OOO can also be used, not only as a method of challenging our perceptions of objects, but also in challenging how we define perception itself. This is then used in a discussion of the Ondt and the Gracehoper fable to lay out how Joyce challenges the notion that language is a human-specific quality. The Ondt and the Gracehoper, along with Biddy Doran (and other examples from the *Wake*) show how Joyce not only moves away from the rigid categories of ‘human’ and ‘animal’, but also how he merges them; his characters become, at times, hybrids that are both human and animal, enmeshed so completely that the two parts are impossible to separate.

Ultimately, this thesis only scratches the surface of Joyce’s representations of animals, and a more thorough or extensive examination of *Finnegans Wake* especially would prove fruitful, as so many of the book’s characters are more than human – they are animals, rivers, rocks, trees, and a whole host of objects piled together as if Joyce is laying them out and saying: ‘Here. This is everything’.

Appendix One: A List of Animals in *Ulysses* arranged by episode

1. Telemachus:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 3 | ‘Buck’, ‘equine’ |
| 4 | ‘buck’ ‘black panther’ |
| 6 | ‘dogsbody’ (twice)  ‘vermin’ |
| 7 | ‘swine’  ‘sacred calf’  ‘whale’ |
| 8 | ‘beastly dead’  ‘beastly’ used two more times |
| 9 | ‘rashers’ |
| 10 | ‘feather fan’  ‘birdcage’ |
| 12 | ‘butter’ ‘honey’ ‘milk’ ‘eggs’ |
| 13 | ‘fishgods of Dundrum’ |
| 14 | ‘cattle’  ‘horsedung’  ‘serpent’s prey’ |
| 16 | ‘hoof’ |
| 19 | ‘his hands at his sides like fins or wings’  ‘winglike hands’  ‘birdlike cries’ |
| 21 | ‘frogwise his green legs’ |
| 22 | ‘redheaded women buck like goats’ |
| 23 | ‘Horn of a Bull, hoof of a horse, smile of a saxon’  ‘A sleek brown head, a seal’s’ |

2. Nestor:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 26 | ‘sloth of the underworld, reluctant, shy of brightness, shifting her dragon scaly folds’ |
| 27 | ‘cock crew’ ‘fox’  ‘snail’s bed’ |
| 28 | ‘snail’s bed’  ‘boneless snail’  ‘fox’ |
| 29 | ‘honey’  ‘leather’ |
| 32 | ‘squire on horseback’  ‘images of vanished horses’  ‘meatfaced woman, a butcher’s dame’ |
| 33 | ‘salted horses’  ‘bull by the horns’ |
| 34 | ‘gabble of geese’ |
| 35 | ‘toothless lions couchant’ |
| 36 | ‘bullockbefriendingbard’ |

3. Proteus:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 37 | *Madeline the mare?*  *Deline the mare* |
| 38 | ‘seahorses […] the steeds of Mananaan’ |
| 40 | ‘equine faces’  ‘Foxy Campbell’  ‘basiliskeyed’  ‘horns’  ‘gelded’  ‘kidneys’ |
| 41 | ‘Ay, very like a whale’  Pigeonhouse (not a pigeon house)  ‘Son of wild goose, […] My father’s a bird, he lapped the sweet *lait chaud* […] plump bunny’s face. Lap, *lapin.* |
| 42 | ‘Hired Dog’  ‘mammoth skulls’  ‘froggreen’ ‘wormwood’ |
| 44 | ‘panthersahib’ ‘pointer (type of dog)’  ‘a bloated carcase of a dog lay lolled’  ‘weasel rats’ |
| 45 | ‘live dog’ ‘Respect his liberty’  Malachi wore the collar of gold’  ‘whales’  ‘The dog’s bark ran towards him’ ‘Dog of my enemy’ |
| 46 | ‘like a […] hare’  ‘a buck, trippant’  ‘serpented’  ‘bearish fawning’  ‘rag of a wolf’s tongue’  ‘calf’s gallop’  ‘dog all over the dead dog’s bedraggled fell. Dogskull, dogsniff’  ‘poor dogsbody’s body’  ‘panther’ |
| 47 | ‘vampire’  ‘bat’ |
| 48 | ‘Pan’s hour, the faunal noon’ |
| 49 | ‘seasnakes’  ‘rearing horses’  ‘fishes’  ‘porpoise’  ‘minnows’  ‘God becomes man becomes fish becomes barnacle becomes goose becomes featherbed mountain |

4. Calypso:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 53 | ‘inner organs of beasts and fowls’  ‘-Mkgnao’  ‘The cat mewed in answer’  ‘Wonder what I look like to her (and the rest of this paragraph) |
| 54 | ‘She blinked up out of her avid shameclosing eyes’  ‘Nothing she can eat?’ |
| 56 | ‘if they ran a tramline along the North Circular from the cattle market’ |
| 57 | ‘forcemeat’  ‘spicy pig’s blood’  ‘the model farm’  ‘cattlemarket the beasts lowing in their pens, branded sheep, flop and fall of dung’  ‘slapping a palm on a ripemeated hindquarter’  ‘behind her moving hams’ |
| 58 | ‘foxeyes’  ‘cattle (picture of)’ |
| 59 | ‘no fish’ |
| 61 | ‘shegoats udder’ |
| 62 | ‘Metempsychosis’  ‘Cruelty behind it all. Doped animals’ |
| 63 | ‘flung it to the cat’  ‘beef to the heels’ |
| 65 | ‘Wanted a dog to pass the time’  ‘The cat mewed to him.  -Miaow! He said in answer. Wait till I’m ready.’  ‘Hope no ape comes knocking’  ‘manure’ |
| 66 | ‘hens in the next garden’  ‘cattle’ |

5. Lotus Eaters:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 69 | ‘tripe’ ‘cowheel’  ‘snaky lianas’ |
| 70 | ‘bearskin’ |
| 73 | ‘leather’  ‘nags’ ‘nosebag time’ |
| 74 | ‘Their full buck eyes regarded him as he went by’  ‘Too full for words’  ‘Gelded too’  ‘Neigh can be very irritating’  ‘wise tabby’ ‘watched from her warm sill’ ‘Mohammed’ |

6. Hades:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 84 | ‘horses’ hoofs’ |
| 86 | ‘watching those two dogs at it by the wall’ |
| 87 | ‘Dog’s home over there’  ‘Poor old Athos […] pined away’ |
| 90 | ‘A thrush. A throstle’ |
| 92 | ‘White horses’ |
| 94 | ‘drove of branded cattle’ ‘Emigrants, Mr Power said’  ‘Tomorrow is killing day’  ‘Dead meat trade’  ‘tramline’ |
| 95 | ‘horse’ |
| 96 | ‘carrion dogs’ |
| 97 | ‘dogbiscuits’  ‘team of horses’  ‘horse looking round at it’  ‘Do they know what they cart out here every day’  ‘harpy’  ‘Fish’s face’ |
| 98 | ‘frogmore’ |
| 99 | ‘rook’ |
| 100 | ‘poisoned pup’  ‘eyes of a toad’ |
| 105 | ‘maggots’  ‘Only man buries’ |
| 106 | ‘Far away a donkey brayed. Rain. No such ass. Never see a dead one, they say. Shame of death. They hide.’ |
| 109 | ‘A bird sat’ ‘like stuffed’ ‘Dead animal even sadder’  ‘birds coms and peck like the boy with the basket of fruit’  ‘some animal’ |
| 110 | ‘obese grey rat’  ‘Flies’  ‘A corpse is meat gone bad’  ‘eaten by birds’ |
| 111 | ‘Oyster eyes’ |

7. Aeolus:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 114 | ‘old grey rat’ |
| 115 | ‘mules and jennies’ ‘Pat and Bull story’ |
| 116 | ‘meat’ |
| 117 | Not really animal but:  ‘everything speaks in its own way’  ‘horseshow month’ |
| 118 | ‘And then the lamb and the cat and the dog and the stick and the water and the butcher and then the angel of death kills the butcher and he kills the ox and the dog kills the cat’ |
| 127 | ‘Foot and mouth’  ‘Bullockbefriendingbard’  ‘she had the foot and mouth disease by no mistake |
| 131 | ‘Skin-the-goat’ |
| 133 | ‘*The Skibereen Eagle*’ |
| 134 | ‘beast with two backs?’  ‘*that stony effigy in frozen music, horned and terrible, of the human form divine…*’ |

8. Lestrygonians:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 144 | ‘Blood of the lamb’ (twice)  ‘codfish’ |
| 145 | ‘marge’  ‘Rats get in too’  ‘collie floating’  ‘Rats : vats’  ‘gulls’  ‘Not such damned fools’  *‘The Hungry famished gull.*  *Flaps o’er the waters dull’.* |
| 146 | ‘those poor birds’  ‘aware of their greed’  ‘live on fishy flesh’  ‘swanmeat’  ‘Lot of thanks I get. Not even a caw.’  ‘why is it is that saltwater fish are not salty?’  ‘Eat pig like pig’ |
| 147 | ‘Met him pikehoses’  ‘Appetite like an albatross’  ‘a baron of beef’  ‘Barrel of Bass’ |
| 148 | ‘elephantgrey’ ‘braided frogs’  ‘Flies’ picnic too’  ‘Rabbit pie’ |
| 149 | ‘mutton’ |
| 150 | ‘he’s a caution to rattlesnakes’  ‘mockturtle’ |
| 151 | ‘mockturtail oxtail mulligatawny’ |
| 152 | ‘oyster eyes’ |
| 153 | ‘uneatable fox’  ‘pork shop’  ‘Sit her horse like a man’  ‘Strong as a brood mare’  ‘Want to be a bull for her’  ‘Dog in the manger’ |
| 154 | ‘pigeons flew. Their little frolic after meals’  ‘Goose green playing the monkeys’  ‘Mackerel they called me’ |
| 155 | ‘Let out to graze […] Bound for their troughs’ (Policemen not animals)  ‘That horse policeman’  ‘His horse’s hoofs’ |
| 156 | ‘Gammon and Spinach’  ‘Fed the birds’ |
| 157 | ‘octopus’ |
| 158 | ‘vegetarian’  ‘beefsteak’  ‘eyes of that cow will pursue you’ |
| 159 | ‘glowworm’ |
| 160 | ‘hoofthuds’  ‘chewbacon’  ‘beef to the heels’ |
| 161 | ‘hoofthuds’  ‘see the animals feed’  ‘men, men, men’  ‘smells of men’ |
| 162 | ‘Kill! Kill!’ |
| 163 | ‘After all there’s a lot in that vegetarian fine flavour of things’  ‘Pain to the animal too’  ‘Flayed glasseyed sheep’  ‘Ah, I’m hungry’  ‘Slaughter of innocents’ |
| 165 | ‘Flea having a good square meal’  ‘I never put anything on a horse’  ‘Mr Bloom ate […] with relish of disgust’ |
| 166 | ‘rare bit of horseflesh’  ‘Dog’s cold noses’ ‘Molly fondling hum in her lap. O the big doggybowwowsywowsy’  ‘shelves of tins, sardines, gaudy lobster’s claws’  ‘Silly fish learn nothing in a thousand years’  ‘oysters’ (twice) |
| 167 | ‘venisons’  ‘half of a cow’  ‘geese stuffed silly for them. Lobsters boiled alive’  ‘two flies buzzed, stuck’  ‘earwigs in the heather’ |
| 168 | ‘nannygoat’  ‘the flies buzzed’ |
| 171 | ‘ravenous terrier’ |
| 174 | ‘Bear with a saw paw’ |

9. Scylla and Charybdis:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 177 | ‘Good hunting’ |
| 178 | ‘I am the sacrificial butter’  ‘Horseness is the whatness of allhorse’ |
| 180 | ‘not for nothing was he a butcher’s son’  ‘behoof’  ‘flesh creep’  ‘the bear Sackerson growls’  ‘Shakespeare has left the Huguenot’s house in Silver street and walks by the swanmews along the riverbank. But he does not say to feed the pen chivvying her game of signets towards the rushes. The swan of Avon has other thoughts’. |
| 181 | ‘made up in the cast off mail of a court buck’ |
| 182 | ‘Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound.’  ‘Buzz Buzz’ |
| 183 | ‘the cry of hounds’  ‘Katherine the shrew’ |
| 184 | ‘Hesouls, shesouls, shoals of souls’ |
| 185 | ‘The pigs’ paper. Bullockbefriendingbard’  ‘Christfox’ ‘Knowing no vixen’ |
| 186 | ‘birdgod’  ‘basilisk’ |
| 188 | ‘tusk of the boar’  ‘shrew […] woman’s invisible weapon’  ‘flesh’ |
| 189 | ‘the beast with two backs’  ‘old dog’  His beaver is up’  ‘gaseous vertebrate’ |
| 191 | ‘turtledove her’  ‘Eve. Naked wheatbellied sin. A shake (snake?) coils her, fang in’s kiss’  ‘papal bull’ |
| 193 | ‘mare of Troy’  ‘herringpies’  ‘pigeons’  ‘took the cow by the horns’  ‘birdsnies’  ‘canary for every cockcanary’  ‘harebell’ |
| 194 | ‘sudden lizards flash’  ‘shrew to a wife’  ‘swansong’ |
| 195 | ‘Stagyrite’ |
| 197 | ‘covet his ox or his wife or his manservant or his maidservant of his jackass’ |
| 199 | ‘incests and bestialities’  ‘jailbirds’  ‘queens with prize bulls’  ‘Sabellius, the African, subteist heresiarch of all the beasts in the field’  ‘bulldog’ |
| 201 | ‘firedrake’  ‘bear’ |
| 202 | ‘*Bous Stephanoumenos*’  ‘hawklike man’  ‘Lapwing. Icarus. […] Lapwing you are. Lapwing be. |
| 203 | Lapwing.’ (x2) |
| 204 | ‘Cuckoo! Cuckoo!’ |
| 206 | ‘Come wandering AEngus of the birds’ |
| 207 | ‘crows’ |
| 208 | ‘two birds with one stone’ |
| 209 | ‘Here I watched the birds for augury. AEngus of the birds’  ‘No birds’ |

10. Wandering Rocks:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 210 | ‘Brother Swan’ |
| 211 | ‘canary gloves’ |
| 212 | ‘porkbutchers’  ‘towhorse’ |
| 213 | ‘kid gloves’ |
| 214 | ‘otter plunged’  ‘beeswaxed’ |
| 215 | ‘muttoning clouds’  ‘ivory’ |
| 219 | ‘pigeons roocoocooed’  ‘*una bestia’* |
| 222 | ‘horses he passed started nervously […] he slapped a piebald haunch’ |
| 223 | ‘ambulance car to gallop’ |
| 224 | ‘whose riding her’  ‘game filly’  ‘back a bloody horse’  ‘porksteaks’ |
| 225 | ‘cold joints galore’  ‘the great bear’  ‘and the dragon’ |
| 226 | ‘cuddled in a ball in bloodred wombs like livers of slaughtered cows. Lots of them like that at this moment all over the world’  ‘flesh. Flesh’ |
| 231 | ‘Dogs licking the blood’  ‘Runaway horse’  ‘Stables’  ‘A cavalcade in easy trot along’ |
| 232 | ‘swinesnouts’  ‘sowish’  ‘ape gloating’  ‘Beingless beings’  ‘butcher’  ‘*Irish Beekeeper’* |
| 236 | ‘reins’ |
| 238 | ‘Clatter of horsehoofs’  ‘he saw the horses’ |
| 240 | ‘ratsteeth bared he muttered’  ‘porksteak’  ‘pelts’ |
| 241 | ‘Dublin’s pet lamb’  ‘porksteaks’  ‘was a fly walking over it’ |
| 243 | Oyster eyes  Horse  Hoofs |
| 244 | Horses  Cockles |

11. Sirens:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 245 | ‘hoofirons’ |
| 246 | ‘Pearls’  ‘Cow’  ‘Where hoofs’ |
| 247 | ‘viceregal hoofs’ |
| 248 | ‘hoofs ring […] steelhoofs ringhoof ringsteel’ |
| 250 | ‘hawked’ |
| 251 | ‘by tore a solfa fable for her’  ‘Ah fox met ah stork. Said thee fox too thee strork: will you put your bill down inn my troath and pull upp ah bone’ |
| 253 | Birdnotes |
| 254 | ‘hecat walked’ |
| 258 | ‘Leopold cut liveslices. As said before he ate with relish’ |
| 259 | ‘steelhoofs ringhoof ring’ |
| 261 | ‘Steak, kidney, liver, mashed at meat’  ‘birdsweet’  ‘Blackbird I heard’ |
| 264 | ‘It soared, a bird, it held its flight, a swift pure cry, […] |
| 265 | ‘like a garden thrush’ |
| 266 | ‘slender catgut thong’  ‘rat’s tail wriggling’ |
| 267 | ‘cute as a rat’ |
| 268 | ‘porkshop’  ‘gallantbuttocked mare’ |
| 269 | Deaf beetle |
| 270 | ‘cows lowing’ ‘cocks, hens don’t crow, snakes hissss. There’s music everywhere. Ruttledge’s door : ee creaking. No that’s noise’ |
| 272 | ‘die, dog. Little dog, die’  ‘Bird sitting’  ‘birdlime’  ‘Wonder where that rat is by now’  ‘What do they think when they hear music. Way to catch rattlesnakes’ |
| 273 | ‘mooing cows’ ‘crocodile music’  ‘Spinoza’ ? |
| 274 | ‘she knew he meant the monkey was sick’  ‘understand animals too that way’ … ‘gift of nature’ |
| 277 | ‘sardine’ (x2)  ‘Pig’s cheek’  ‘asses’ skins’  ‘mermaid’ |

12. Cyclops:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 280 | ‘foxy thief’  ‘chicken lane’ |
| 281 | ‘Cattle traders’ ‘foot and mouth disease’  ‘foxy Geraghty’ |
| 282 | There is a list of fish  ‘with all kinds of lovely objects as for example golden ingots, silvery fishes, crans of herrings (here follows a list of living animals, mostly fish and insect)  There is a list of livestock |
| 283 | Continuation of list of livestock  ‘mangy mongrel Garryowen’  ‘that bloody dog. I’m told for a fact he ate a good part of the breeches …’  ‘claps his paw on his knee’ |
| 284 | ‘What Garry?’  ‘field lark’  Description that follows of an Irish hero who is wearing various animal pelts. |
| 285 | ‘a savage animal of the canine tribe’  ‘hoarse growls and spasmodic movements which his master repressed from time to time’  ‘guts of the fish’ |
| 286 | ‘like a poodle’ |
| 287 | ‘bloody mongrel’ |
| 288 | ‘rhino’ |
| 289 | ‘flesh’  ‘ram’ |
| 290 | ‘Old Garryowen started growling’  ‘cod’s eye on the dog’ |
| 292 | ‘old dog smelling’  ‘new dog’ |
| 293 | ‘give us the paw’  ‘hungry bloody mongrel’  ‘thoroughbred dog’ |
| 295 | ‘pig iron’ |
| 296 | ‘decapitated a flock of sheep’  ‘cats’ and dogs’ home’ |
| 298 | ‘old cow died of’  ‘the old dog seeing the tin was empty’  ‘talking to him in Irish’  ‘hydrophobia’  -style change:  ‘lower animals and their name is legion’  ‘cynanthropy’  ‘wild horses shall not drag it from us’ |
| 299 | Garryowen’s ‘poem’  ‘Giltrap’s dog’  ‘Entertainment for man and beast’ |
| 301 | Cattle traders |
| 302 | ‘sheepdip’ ‘coughing calfs’  ‘Teach your grandmother to milk ducks’  ‘Ga ga gara. Klook klook klook (and so on) |
| 303 | ‘human animals’ |
| 305 | ‘kipper’  ‘Dublin’s pet lamb’ |
| 306 | ‘hair on the animal’s chest’  ‘sold the same horses twice’  ‘ravenharied’ |
| 307 | ‘neither fish nor flesh’  ‘nor good red herring’ |
| 308 | ‘Cruelty to animals it is’ |
| 309 | ‘oxeyed’ |
| 310 | ‘filling country with bugs’  Old dog at his feet’ |
| 311 | ‘corned beef’ |
| 312 | ‘other dog’ |
| 313 | ‘horses’  ‘fish in our waters’ |
| 314 | ‘heron feathers’  ‘tanyard cat. Cows in Connacht have long horns’ |
| 315 | ‘bull at a gate’  ‘*Black Beast Burned in Omaha’* |
| 316 | ‘geese’ |
| 317 | ‘horses’  ‘oyster’ |
| 318 | ‘North American Puma (a far nobler king of beasts than the British article)  ‘Kerry calf and a golden eagle’  ‘like slaves or cattle’ |
| 319 | ‘Jumbo, the elephant loves Alice, the elephant’ |
| 321 | Lots of mentions of horses- gambling and then ‘dark horse’  ‘Mac Hale’s goat’ |
| 322 | Short list of animals as food |
| 323 | ‘I’m the alligator’ |
| 324 | ‘A wolf in sheep’s clothing’ |
| 325 | Another list. Includes ‘dragon’ ‘beehive’ ‘stags’ horns’ |
| 326 | ‘cute as a shithouse rat’  ‘bloody dog woke up’  ‘white dolphin’ |
| 327 | ‘high horse’ (mention also of Spinoza) |
| 328 | ‘Ox’ – one of a mountain  ‘Pig’ – shouting like a stuck pig  ‘Nag’  ‘Mongrel’  (pigeonhouse, that’s not a Pigeon house) |
| 330 | Shouting at the bloody dog  ‘sheeps face’  ‘bloody mongrel’ |

13. Nausicaa:

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| 333 | ‘kid gloves’ ‘milk’ |
| 337 | Garryowen, that almost talked it was so human |
| 341 | ‘saint Bernard’  ‘crowed’ |
| 343 | ‘canary bird’ |
| 344 | Irritable little gnat she was’ |
| 346 | ‘confounded little cat she was’  ‘cooing of the ringdove |
| 347 | ‘just too ducky’  ‘tortoiseshell comb’ |
| 348 | ‘crosscat Edy’ |
| 350 | ‘That was their secret, only theirs, alone in the hiding twilight and there was none to know or to tell save the little bat that flew so softly thought the evening to and fro and little bats don’t tell’ |
| 353 | ‘beargreese’  ‘Beauty and the Beast’  ‘Shark liver oil’ [this ends Gerty’s ‘narrative’]  ‘Parrots.’ |
| 354 | ‘the bird will squeak’  ‘featherbed mountain’  ‘Of course they understand birds, animals, babies’  ‘Like a cat sitting beyond a dog’s jump’ |
| 355 | ‘Clever little minx!’  Beef to the heel’  ‘Monkey puzzle’ |
| 356 | ‘crooked as a ram’s horn’  ‘like a polecat’  ‘chickens come home to roost’  ‘Cat’s away the mice will play’ |
| 357 | ‘horse show’  ‘cat likes to sniff’ |
| 358 | ‘Muskrat’  ‘Dogs at each other behind’  Animals go by that’  ‘Women buzz round it like flies round treacle’ |
| 359 | ‘glowworms’ |
| 360 | Circus horse  What is that flying about? Swallow? Bat probably. Thinks I’m a tree, so blind’  ‘Have birds no smell?’  ‘Metempsychosis’  ‘like mice’  ‘Birds are like hopping mice’  ‘like the eagle’  ‘cat this morning’ |
| 361 | ‘who knows what they’re always flying for?’  ‘Insects. That bee’  ‘Birds too never find out what they say’  ‘sharks catch hold of him’  ‘do fish ever get sea sick’  ‘the bat flew’ |
| 362 | Bears in the zoo  Puking overboard to feed the herrings  Seabirds screaming  Old barbary ape that gobbled all his family |
| 362 | ‘hawked about’  ‘fangs in her mouth’  ‘kissed the cow’  ‘poisoned by mussels’  ‘porkpie hat’  ‘curse seems to dog it’ |
| 364 | ‘Bat again’  ‘*Cuckoo’* |
| 365 | ‘*Cuckoo*’  ‘canary bird’ |

14. Oxen of the sun:

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| 368 | ‘bellycrab’ |
| 369 | ‘meat’  ‘dreadful dragon’  ‘horns of buffalos and stags’ |
| 370 | ‘lay strange fishes without heads’  ‘serpents’  ‘up his beaver’  ‘laid husbandly hand under hen’ |
| 371 | ‘leeches’ |
| 372 | ‘vampires’  ‘fisherman’s seal’ |
| 373 | ‘lamb’s wool’  ‘flesh’ x2 |
| 374 | ‘creature’ x2  ‘God ape’ |
| 375 | ‘Oxtail’  ‘milk and money’ |
| 376 | ‘retrogressive metamorphosis’  ‘hillcat’ |
| 377 | ‘bird-in-the-Hand’ x2 |
| 378 | ‘oxengut’ |
| 379 | ‘skittish heifer’  ‘beef to the heel’  ‘bullyboy’  ‘ninth chick to live’ |
| 380 | ‘cows to be butchered’  ‘bully beef’  ‘as good fish’  ‘colt’  ‘bearpit’  ‘cocking main’  ‘choking chickens’  ‘brood beasts’  ‘live stock’ |
| 381 | ‘cowcatcher’  ‘bull by the horns’  ‘horns’ ‘bulls’  ‘An Irish bull in an English chinashop’  ‘cattle’  ‘Bullseye’ ‘bull’  ‘bulliness’  ‘cowhouse’  ‘bulls language’ |
| 382 | ‘cattleraider’  ‘horns’  ‘I’ll make that animal smell hell’  ‘bull’ (multiple times)  ‘cows drinking’  ‘grammar of the bulls’ language’ |
| 384 | ‘fish’  ‘flesh’  His point by analogies of the animal kingdom more suitable to their stomach, the buck and the doe of the forest glade, the farmyard drake and duck’  ‘loaves and fishes’  ‘wolf’ |
| 385 | ‘creatures’ |
| 386 | ‘cowflesh’ ‘dog’ |
| 388 | ‘strong animal spirits spoke in their behalf’ |
| 389 | ‘metempsychosis’  ‘birds of a feather’ |
| 391 | ‘Aristotle has classified’  ‘creature’  ‘swineheaded’  ‘doghaired’  ‘fables such as that of the Minotaur’ |
| 392 | ‘flesh’  ‘The black panther!’ (repeated)  ‘spider’  ‘chameleon’ |
| 394 | ‘mare leading her fillyfoal’  ‘Elk and yak, the bulls’ ‘mammoth’ ‘mastodon’  ‘metempsychosis’  ‘flesh’  ‘Taurus’  ‘Bous Stephanamous. Bullockbefriendingbard’ |
| 395 | ‘mare’ ‘buffalo’ ‘filly’ ‘ananomes’ |
| 396 | ‘mare’ |
| 398 | ‘dead animals’ |
| 399 | ‘municipal abattoir’  ‘flesh of a calf’  ‘let the cat into the bag’ |
| 402 | ‘cockerel’ ‘jackanapes’  ‘butcher’s bills’  ‘mule’  ‘beefsteaks’ |
| 403 | ‘bison’  ‘cow’s dung’  ‘calf’ ‘beef’  ‘bulldogs’ ‘beerbeef’ |
| 404 | ‘boomblebee’ |
| 405 | ‘goosegog’  ‘dog’ |
| 406 | ‘mutton’ ‘hawks’  ‘Blood of the Lamb’ ‘dog-gone’ |

15. Circe:

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| 408 | ‘swancomb of the gondala’ |
| 409 | ‘leg of the duck’ |
| 410 | Ibid |
| 411 | ‘Stag that one is. Stubborn as a mule!’  ‘Oliphant’  ‘spaniel on the prowl’  ‘shrewridden Shakespeare and henpecked Socrates’  ‘stagyrite’ |
| 412 | ‘snakes of river fog’ |
| 413 | ‘bonham eyes’ (Bonham – pig)  ‘Fish and taters’  ‘pork butchers’  ‘pig’s crubeen’  ‘cold sheep’s trotter’ |
| 414 | ‘pugnosed’ |
| 415 | ‘horsey woman’  ‘lost cattle’  ‘Mark of the beast’  ‘hunted by Tommy’ |
| 416 | ‘the retriever approaches’  ‘hides the crubeen and trotter’  ‘Rudolph: ‘with feeble vulture talons’  ‘drunk as a dog’ |
| 417 | ‘Agnus Dei’ |
| 418 | ‘raven hair’  ‘a camel […] Fiercely she slaps his haunch –(Molly)’  ‘The camel, lifting a foreleg, plucks from a tree a large mango fruit, offers it to his mistress […] fumbles to kneel’ |
| 419 | ‘followed by a sniffing terrier’ |
| 420 | ‘she flaps her bat shawl and runs’  ‘wolfeyes shining’ |
| 421 | ‘white duck suits’ |
| 422 | ‘valentine of the dear gazelle’ |
| 423 | ‘meaty palm’  ‘said it was beauty and the beast’ |
| 424 | ‘dogs him to left and right’  ‘pigeon kiss’  ‘pig’s feet’  ‘kippered herrings’ |
| 425 | ‘doggedly’  ‘terrier follows’ |
| 426 | She did, of course, the cat!’  ‘as the other ducky little tammy toque with the bird of paradise wing […] a pity to kill it you cruel creature’  ‘spiced beef’ |
| 427 | ‘mimicking a cock’  ‘followed by a whining dog’ |
| 429 | ‘the dog approaches’  ‘wildgoose chase’ |
| 430 | ‘pigsticky’  ‘The retriver’  ‘the wolfdog’  ‘dogged by the setter’  ‘The mastiff’  ‘A covey of gulls’  ‘munching spaniel’ |
| 431 | ‘give the paw’  ‘Prevention of cruelty to animals’  ‘illusing the poor horse with his harness scab’  ‘tales of circus life are highly demoralising’  ‘in liontaming costume’  ‘my educated greyhound’  ‘bring your lion to heal’  ‘the thinking hyena’ |
| 432 | ‘shake of a lamb’s tail’ |
| 433 | ‘scapegoat’ |
| 434 | ‘cock’s wattles wagging’ |
| 435 | ‘hangdog meekness’  You funny ass’  ‘You’re too beastly awfully weird for words’  ‘hallmark of the beast’ |
| 436 | ‘you ought to be ducked in the horsepond’ |
| 437 | ‘oylsters’  ‘black sheep’  ‘purely domestic animal’ |
| 438 | ‘cat calls’ |
| 439 | ‘mole’s eyes’  ‘pigfoot evly night’  ‘howled down’  ‘a pack of curs and laughing hyenas. The Mosaic code has superseded the law of the jungle’ |
| 440 | ‘cattle cropping’  ‘ferreteyed’  ‘pork kidney’  ‘avine head, foxy moustache’ |
| 441 | ‘seal coney’  ‘tortoishell’ |
| 442 | ‘sheepskins’  ‘buck’s head’  ‘cob *centaur’*  ‘horsewhipping’ |
| 443 | ‘pigeonlivered’  ‘You have lashed the dormant tigress in my nature into fury’  ‘Thrash the mongrel’  ‘cat-o-nine tails’  ‘hangdog mein’ |
| 444 | ‘pig dog’  ‘cuckoo’ |
| 445 | ‘ramshorns’ |
| 446 | ‘Gulls. Good heart’  ‘monkeyhouse. Zoo. Lewd chimpanzees’ |
| 447 | ‘Pig’s feet’  ‘beagle lifts his snout, showing the face of Dignam’  ‘His dachshund coat’ |
| 448 | ‘I must satisfy an animal need’-Dignam  ‘Father Coffey, toadbellied’  ‘tail stiff pointed, his ear’s cocked’  ‘grandfather rat on fungus turtle paws’  ‘Tom Rochford, robinredbreasted’ |
| 449 | ‘salmon leap’ |
| 450 | ‘little mousy any tickles’ |
| 451 | ‘dear gazelle’  ‘gazelles are leaping’  ‘bronze flight of eagles’ |
| 452 | ‘tramline cattle market’ |
| 453 | ‘cow parlour’ ‘bugbears’  ‘chimera’ ‘royal mountain stags’ ‘shooting peasants and phartridges’  ‘imperial eagles’ |
| 454 | ‘primate of all Ireland’  ‘coopers, bird fanciers’  ‘horse repository hands’  ‘glovers’  ‘the master of the horse’  ‘milkwhite horse’ ‘sceptre with the dove’ ‘mantle trimmed with ermine’ |
| 457 | ‘camel swivel guns’ ‘our light horse’ |
| 458 | ‘pork kidney’ ‘Dog of a christian’  ‘toad in the hole’ ‘pork sausages’ |
| 459 | ‘leaps on his horse’ |
| 460 | ‘ram’s horns sound for silence’ |
| 462 | ‘and a cow for all the children of nature’  ‘free fox in a free henroost’ |
| 463 | ‘you beast’ |
| 464 | ‘fishing cap’  ‘stinking goat of mendes’ ‘white bull mentioned in the apocalypse’  ‘Parnell was, Mr. Fox’  ‘Dorset street throw objects of little or no commercial value, hambones … sheep’s tails, odd pieces of fat’ |
| 465 | ‘viper’  ‘elephantitis’ |
| 467 | ‘eats 12 oysters’ |
| 468 | ‘Bloom is a cod’  ‘cattlecreep’  ‘Bloom with asses’ ears’  ‘You hig you hog, you dirty dog’ |
| 469 | ‘nighthag’  -desc. Of scapegoat-  ‘goose under his arm’ |
| 470 | ‘pheonix’  ‘leading a black pig’  ‘by all the goats in Connemara |
| 471 | ‘Hog’s Norton where the pigs play the organs’  Tittlemouse  ‘velvet paws’  ‘greeneyed monster’ |
| 472 | ‘pared talons she captures his hand’  Lurks the lion reek of all the male brutes’ |
| 473 | ‘goatee’ ‘fox’ ‘spaniel’  ‘moth flies’  ‘peacock feathers’ ‘doeskin gloves’ |
| 474 | ‘goosefat’ ‘spreadeagle’ ‘catterpillar’ ‘she snakes’ |
| 475 | ‘whinny of laughter’ |
| 476 | ‘rocking horse races’ ‘Sea serpent’ |
| 477 | ‘two headed octopus’ |
| 478 | ‘doggone clod’ ‘buck joyride’ |
| 479 | ‘goosestepping’  ‘beef battledog buybull’  ‘lizard lettered’  ‘pigtail toupee’ |
| 480 | ‘eels and elvers’ ‘crayfish by its two talons’  ‘stormbirds’  ‘crayfish’ |
| 481 | ‘sheep’s eyes’  ‘Hippogriff’ |
| 482 | ‘gull’  ‘weasel teeth’ ‘barks hoarsely’  ‘chameleon’ ‘ugly duckling’ ‘mammal in weight of bosom’ |
| 483 | ‘coopfatteded their livers reach an elephantine size’ |
| 484 | ‘horse hair’ ‘crows derisively’ ‘everflyingmoth’  ‘pig’s whisper’ ‘parrotbeak’ ‘Bear’s buzz brothers bees’ ‘night insects follow the light’  ‘Nightbird’ ‘Buzz’ ‘Bee or bluebottle’ |
| 485 | ‘spanish fly’ ‘oysters’ ‘vermin’  ‘Eve and the serpent contradict’ ‘Serpents too are gluttons for woman’s milk’  ‘peers at the moth, points at a horning claw and cries’ |
| 486 | The Moth: (makes a song)  ‘sparrow feet’  ‘husks of swine’ |
| 487 | The bird that can sing |
| 488 | ‘junglemeat’ ‘featherskins’ ‘walrus smoke’ |
| 489 | ‘mooncalf’ ‘Pig God!’  ‘tortured forepaws’  ‘Jimmy Pidgeon’  ‘It was the sacred pigeon’  ‘inoculated anthropoid apes’ |
| 490 | ‘scorpion tongue’ ‘baboon’s cries’  ‘padded paws’  ‘Rats!’ |
| 491 | ‘cow’s lick’  Virag’s head: ‘Quack!’  ‘the dog sage’ |
| 492 | ‘duckloving drake’  ‘multitude of midges’ |
| 493 | ‘rabbits’ |
| 494 | ‘fur overcoat’  ‘eagle glance’ |
| 495 | ‘sheepish grin’ |
| 496 | ‘believed in animal heat’ ‘a skin of tabby’  ‘Athos faithful after death’ ‘A dog’s spittle’ |
| 497 | ‘hoof’  ‘Smell my hot goathide’  ‘basilisk stare’ ‘Hound of dishonour! |
| 498 | ‘bleats’ |
| 499 | ‘come ducky dear’ ‘so gently pet’  Suckling pig’  ‘turning turtle’ |
| 501 | ‘horsemans knees’ ‘he horserides cockhorse’ |
| 502 | ‘hegoat’s udders’ |
| 503 | ‘siamese cat laugh’ ‘By the ass of the’ |
| 504 | ‘the gross boar’ ‘go the whole hog’ ‘you skunk’ |
| 505 | Bloom is sold in the same language of the cattle market |
| 506 | His sire’s milk’  ‘Manx cat!  ‘Sing, birdy sing’ |
| 507 | ‘you owl!’ |
| 508 | ‘sauce for the goose, my gander’ ‘horseplay’ ‘buck flea’ |
| 509 | ‘crocodile tears’ |
| 510 | ‘turtle head’ |
| 512 | ‘pigeonbrested’ ‘Mackrel!’ |
| 513 | Staggering Bob a while calf: ‘Me. Me see’  ‘nannygoat’-neggegeageg |
| 514 | ‘alpaca’ ‘perfect pig’ |
| 515 | ‘serpenting’ ‘a grouse wings’  ‘birdchief’ ‘Sitting Bull’ |
| 516 | ‘The fox and the grapes is it?’  ‘Cat of nine lives’ |
| 517 | ‘mutton dressed as lamb’ ‘stuffed fox’ ‘sowcunt barks’ ‘Dear Cod!’ |
| 518 | ‘The cats ramble through the slag’ |
| 519 | ‘sow’s ear of the public’ |
| 520 | Stephen’s riddle again |
| 521 | ‘thirsty fox’ |
| 522 | ‘Lamb of London, who takes away the sins of our world’  ‘cursed dog’ |
| 524 | ‘thumbprint on the haddock’  ‘henpecked husband’  ‘Black Liz, a huge rooster’ |
| 525 | The Rooster speaks/makes noise- and lays an egg’  ‘mare’ |
| 526 | ‘turkey’ |
| 527 | ‘pelt’ |
| 528 | ‘cock horse’ |
| 529 | ‘pen chivvying her brood of signets’  ‘crying cods’ mouth’  ‘beeftea’ |
| 530 | ‘Queens lay with prize bulls’  ‘vampire man debauch’ |
| 531 | ‘bestial butcher’s boy pollutes in warm veal liver’ |
| 532 | ‘vulture talons’  ‘fox’ ‘staghounds’ ‘beaglebaying’ ‘badgerearth’ ‘salmon gaffs’ |
| 533 | ‘monkey’  ‘dark horse’ ‘bucking mounts’ ‘skeleton horses’ ‘nag’ (several times)  ‘mutton broth’ ‘leopard buckets’ |
| 537 | Escargots! |
| 538 | ‘frogsplits’ ‘hobbyhorse’ ‘snakes dangled’  ‘horse, nag, steer, piglings’ ‘nags, hogs, bellhorses, Gadarene swine’ |
| 539 | ‘beastly dead’  ‘Lemur who are you?  ‘dogsbody’ |
| 541 | ‘a green crab with malignant red eyes’ |
| 543 | ‘bulldog on the premises’ |
| 544 | ‘hackney car’  ‘bloodhounds’ ‘dogwhip’ |
| 545 | ‘dead codfish’ ‘Beaver street’ |
| 548 | ‘Elephant of Denmark’ ‘Probyn’s Horse’ |
| 550 | ‘Green rag to a Bull’  ‘his rabbit face’  ‘two wild geese’  ‘porcos’ |
| 551 | ‘English Dogs’ |
| 552 | ‘The old sow that eats her farrow’ |
| 553 | ‘Carrion Crow’  ‘Bearskin’ |
| 554 | ‘butchershop’ ‘Garryowen’ |
| 555 | ‘gallop of hoofs’  ‘Birds of prey’  A list of types of birds  ‘sheepskin overcoats and black goatfell cloaks’  ‘It rains dragon’s teeth’ |
| 558 | ‘The Retriever: ute ute ute’ |
| 559 | The retriever barks |
| 562 | ‘The horse neighs’ (transcribed) |
| 563 | The horse neighs: hohohohohome  ‘horse back slowly’ |
| 564 | ‘tinkling hoofs’  ‘Black Panther Vampire’  ‘dog barks in disctance’ |
| 565 | ‘lambskin’ |

16. Eumaeus:

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| 571 | ‘beeline’ |
| 574 | ‘bleeding horse’  *Rara avis* ‘rare bird’ |
| 575 | Parasite |
| 576 | ‘the cat’ |
| 577 | ‘Skin-the-Goat’ |
| 578 | ‘ear of a cow elephant’ |
| 581 | ‘maneaters in Peru that eats corpses and the livers of horses’  ‘a dead horses liver raw’ |
| 584 | ‘Cooks rats’ |
| 585 | ‘North Bull’ |
| 586 | ‘lice’ |
| 587 | ‘Ate by sharks’  ‘gallowsbird humour’ |
| 589 | ‘horse of quite another colour’ |
| 591 | ‘friers in the fish way’  ‘animal of the feline persuasion’ |
| 593 | ‘woke a horse of the cabrank’  ‘A hoof scooped’ |
| 594 | ‘ducks and drakes’ |
| 595 | ‘the best meat in the market’  ‘Irish bacon’ |
| 596 | ‘how the cat jumped’  ‘goby’ |
| 599 | ‘crabs’ |
| 601 | ‘dark horse’ |
| 602 | ‘foot and mouth’  ‘colts and fillies’ |
| 603 | ‘French horse’ |
| 604 | ‘lucky dog if they didn’t set the terrier at you’ |
| 606 | ‘fables ass’s kick’ |
| 607 | ‘met him pike hoses’ |
| 611 | ‘brought home a dog’  ‘mermaids |
| 612 | ‘People could put up with being bitten by a wolf but what properly riled them was a bite from a sheep’ |
| 615 | ‘a horse dragging a sweeper’  Description of the horses movements  ‘Bloom looked at the head of a horse not worth anything like sixtyfive guineas’ |
| 616 | ‘was sorry he hadn’t a lump of sugar’  ‘nervous noodly kind of a horse’  ‘But it was no animal’s fault in particular if he was built that way like the camel, ship of the desert, distilling grapes into potheen in his hump. None tenths of them all could be caged or trained, nothing beyond the art of man barring bees: whale with a harpoon and so on’ |
| 618 | ‘horse was just then…’  ‘The horse […] added his quota’ (shit on the street)  ‘And humanely his driver waited till he had ended’ |

17. Ithaca:

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| 624 | ‘Capricorn’ |
| 625 | ‘tanneries’ ‘submarine fauna’ |
| 626 | ‘bacon’ |
| 628 | ‘meat’ ‘milk’ ‘ribsteak’ |
| 631 | ‘fish’ |
| 633 | ‘dogcarts’ ‘ponytraps’  ‘pedestrians, quadrupeds’  ‘Skye terrier’ |
| 636 | ‘Aries to Pisces’  ‘zoological biscuits’  ‘Meat’ |
| 637 | ‘beast of burden’  ‘Wheels and hoofs’ |
| 638 | ‘cool dairy shop’ |
| 639 | ‘met him pike hoses’ |
| 640 | ‘Aristotle’ ‘Spinoza’ |
| 646 | ‘A temporary departure of his cat’ |
| 647 | ‘cat’ ‘fish’ ‘cat’ ‘cat’ ‘horse whose name had been Joseph’ ‘cat’ ‘owl’ ‘oviparous animals’ |
| 650 | ‘monotonous menstruation, of simian and … human females’  ‘metamorphosis’  ‘He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal’ |
| 651 | ‘cat’  ‘Sirius alpha in Canis Maior’  ‘organic existences concealed in the cavities of the earth’ |
| 654 | ‘heaventree, not a heavengrot, not a heavenbeast, not a heavenman |
| 656 | Leo |
| 660 | ‘an embalmed owl’ |
| 661 | ‘Spinoza’ ‘leather’ |
| 663 | ‘bee’ |
| 664 | List of what Bloom bought/budget for the day which includes pork kidney, pig foot and sheep trotter |
| 666 | ‘beehive arranged on humane principles’  ‘eeltraps, lobsterpots, fishingrods’ |
| 667 | ‘dovecote’  ‘donkey’ ‘cob’ ‘roan gelding’  ‘equestrian circumprocession’ |
| 668 | ‘Livestock’ ‘cows’  ‘breeder’ |
| 670 | ‘equine handicap’ ‘sewer rodents’ |
| 671 | ‘mixed animal and vegetable diet’  ‘dogvans’ ‘goatvans’ ‘tramline cattle marked’ ‘cattle park’ |
| 676 | ‘fleshmeat’ ‘milk’ |
| 678 | ‘dogs’ |
| 683 | ‘adders’ ‘Horse show’ |
| 686 | ‘mute immutable mature animality’ |

18. Penelope:

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| 690 | ‘her dog’ |
| 691 | ‘oysters’ |
| 693 | ‘bullneck’ ‘horsecollar’  ‘I didn’t like his slapping me behind’ ‘Im not a horse or an ass’ |
| 694 | ‘whole sheep’ |
| 696 | ‘maggot’ |
| 697 | ‘horses dung’ |
| 700 | ‘selling the horses’ |
| 701 | ‘made her like the dogs do it’  ‘featherbed mountain’  ‘chicken out of my fingers’  ‘fishslices’ |
| 702 | ‘chickensoup’ ‘beeftea’ |
| 703 | ‘oyster knife’ x2 |
| 704 | Pigheaded  Meat  eggs |
| 705 | Thicker than cows |
| 706 | ‘mosquito nets’  ‘Doggerina’  ‘clean dog’  ‘Bulls’ ‘Bull fights’ |
| 707 | ‘Old Bull’  ‘poor horses’  ‘dog barking’  ‘bugs’  ‘mosquitos’ |
| 709 | ‘bulls and cows’ ‘pair of paws’ |
| 711 | ‘said she was a regular old rock scorpion’ ‘chickens’ ‘monkeys’ ‘dog’ ‘bird flying’ |
| 712 | ‘woodcocks and pigeons screaming’  ‘butcher’ |
| 713 | ‘sparrowfarts’ |
| 714 | ‘pork chop’  ‘pork butchers’  ‘cat she rubs up against you for her own sake’  ‘she has fleas’ |
| 715 | ‘cod’ ‘eels cod’  ‘butchers’  ‘loin chops’ ‘leg beef’ ‘rib steak’ ‘scrag of mutton’ ‘calfs pluck’ ‘horses toenails’ ‘cold veal and ham’  ‘bee bit’  ‘sardines’  ‘fishermen’ |
| 716 | ‘leather’ |
| 718 | ‘dog’ |
| 719 | ‘hawking’  ‘cat itself is better off than us’  ‘Spinoza’ |
| 721 | ‘gelatine’ |
| 722 | ‘frogs march’ |
| 724 | ‘swallowtail to sing’  ‘he insisted hed go into mourning for the cat’  ‘but hes no chicken’ |
| 726 | ‘butcher’  ‘you might as well be in bed with a lion’  ‘im sure hed have something better to say for himself an old lion would’ |
| 727 | Fish |
| 728 | ‘slaughtering’ – about humans but term does make you think of animals  ‘losing it on horses’  ‘when I was watching the two dogs’ |
| 731 | ‘fine cattle’  ‘birds fly’ |
| 732 | ‘fowl marker’ ‘poor donkeys slipping half asleep’ ‘the bulls’ |

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Word Count (excluding bibliography, title, contents, acknowledgements, and appendix): 89,867

1. Stanislaus Joyce, *My Brother’s Keeper: James Joyce’s Early Years* (New York: The Viking Press, 1958), p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* ed. by John Paul Riquelme (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007), p.215. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For a more detailed list of animals in *Ulysses*, see appendix one of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hildegard Möller, *A Wake Bestiary: mit Untersuchungen zurTiersymbolik in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake* (Herne: Tibor Schäfer Verlag, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Raphael Slepon, (ed.), *The Finnegans Wake Extensible Elucidation Treasury (FWEET),* Online Resource, <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?i=1&o=1&r=1&b=1&s=%5E360> [Date Accessed: 18/06/2021]. All further references will be cited simply as *FWEET* followed by the website address. It must be noted, however, that *FWEET* often ‘misses’ a large number of animals that Möller records. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. ‘"I want," said Joyce, as we were walking down the Universitätstrasse, "to give a picture of Dublin so complete that if the city one day suddenly disappeared from the earth it could be reconstructed out of my book."’ (Frank Budgen, *James Joyce and the Making of "Ulysses*" intro. by Hugh Kenner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960) p.68). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. David Hayman, ‘The Manystorytold of the *Wake*: How Narrative was Made to Inform the Non-Narrativity of the Night’, *James Joyce Studies Annual* 8 (Summer 1997), 81-114 (81). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Some bread products contain a specific E-Number (E920) that is made from either pig or human hair. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Hereafter shortened to OOO. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Graham Harman, *The Quadruple Object* (Winchester: Zer0 Books, 2011), p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Graham Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology: A New Theory of Everything* (London: Pelican Books, 2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Stephen Mulhall, ‘How Complex is a Lemon’, *London Review of Books* 40.18 (27 September 2018), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Mulhall, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Mulhall, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Graham Harman, ‘Stephen Mulhall’ in *Skirmishes with Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals* (Earth, Milky Way: Punctum Books, 2020), pp.333-351 (p.349). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Harman, *Skirmishes*, p.336. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. ‘human’, n. 1, *OED Online*, *online resource* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, June 2021) [Date Accessed: 14/06/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. ‘animal’, n. 1 a, *OED Online*. [Date Accessed: 14/06/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. For example, pigs are a good food source and are therefore farmed for their meat; as a result, they are lower down this ‘hierarchy’ than dogs, which are companions; this means they can be eaten without guilt or controversy. This hierarchy if often cultural, as dogs are farmed for meat in some cultures. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Wood, ‘*Comment ne pas manger—* Deconstruction and Humanism’, p.29. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. For a more detailed discussion of this development, see the first literature review of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible…’, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. and forward by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), pp.256-341 (p.262). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Ryan, *Animal Theory*, p.61. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ryan, p.63-64. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Deleuze and Guattari, p.262. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am,* trans. by David Wills, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) [Lecture given in 1997], p.63. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Derrida, p.145. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. For example, see Peter Adkins, ‘The Eyes of That Cow: Eating Animals and Theorizing Vegetarianism in James Joyce’s *Ulysses’, humanities,*6.3(2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Plato, *The Republic,* trans. Desmond Lee, 2nd edn(London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2007),p.242. Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Simon Blackburn, ‘essentialism’, in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,* 3rd edn <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198735304.001.0001/acref-9780198735304-e-1139?rskey=Brppvt&result=5> [Date Accessed: 18/08/2017]. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Martin Heidegger, ‘The Thing’, in *Poetry, Language, Thought,* trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1975)*,* pp.165-186 (p.166-167). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Ibid., p.181. Original emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, in *Things,* ed. by Bill Brown (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp.1-22(p.4). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *The Quadruple Object,* p.45. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Ibid.,p.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *The Quadruple Object*, p.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *The Quadruple Object*, p.38. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Figure One: Graham Harman, ‘Figure 3: The Fourfold Structure Emerges’ in *The Quadruple Object*,p.50. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. *The Quadruple Object*, p.31. Original emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Ibid., p.30. Original emphasis. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. *The Quadruple Object*, p.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Ibid., p.29. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. *The Quadruple Object*, p.43. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Ibid., p.48. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Ibid., p.48. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. Ibid., p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Ibid., p.49. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Ibid., p.50. See Figure One. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. *The Quadruple Object*, p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Ibid., p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Ibid., p.9 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. *The Quadruple Object*, p.128. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. ‘The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ (Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), p.311, n. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. Howard Williams, *The Ethics of Diet: A Catena of Authorities Deprecatory of the Practice of Flesh-Eating* (London: Pitman, 1883). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. Quoted in Peter Adkins’ essay: ‘The Eyes of That Cow: Eating Animals and Theorizing Vegetarianism in James Joyce’s *Ulysses’, humanities,* 6.3(2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. This, of course, sits in contrast to the physical environment, in which horses were in the streets and livestock was sometimes kept in gardens. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. Arnold Bennett, ‘Concerning James Joyce's *Ulysses*’, *Bookman*, 55.6 (August 1922), 567-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. For a full-length study on the ‘trial’ of *Ulysses* see: Joseph Hassett, *The Ulysses Trials: Beauty and Truth Meet the Law* (Dublin: The Lilliput Press Ltd, 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. For example: T. S. Eliot, ‘*Ulysses,* Order and Myth’, *The Dial,* LXXV (November 1923), 480-83 and Howard Emerson Rogers, ‘Irish Myth and the Plot of *Ulysses*’, *ELH,* 15.4 (1948), 306-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. One example of which is Joseph Prescott’s ‘Homer's *Odyssey* and Joyce's *Ulysses*’, *Modern Language Quarterly*, 3.3 (September 1942), 427-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. For example: Hugh Kenner, ‘Joyce and Ibsen's Naturalism’, *The Sewanee Review* 59.1 (1951), 75-96, Calvin R. Edwards, ‘The Hamlet Motif in Joyce's *Ulysses*’, *Western Review*, 15.1 (Autumn 1950), 5-13, and Arthur Heine, ‘Shakespeare in James Joyce’, *Shakespeare Association Bulletin*, 24.1 (January 1949), 56-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. Herbert Gorman, *James Joyce: A Definitive Biography* (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, 1941). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. This is recorded in numerous texts such as Vincent J. Cheng’s essay ‘Stephen Dedalus and the Black Panther Vampire’, *JJQ,* 24 (1987), 161-176. Cheng writes: ‘As Klein points out, in medieval bestiaries the black panther was a symbol of Christ’ (Cheng, p.175). The original reference is as follows: Klein, A. M., ‘The Black Panther: A Study in Technique’, *Accent,* 10 (Spring 1950), 139-155. I have, however, been unable to locate the original text. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. For example: William Peery, ‘Shakespeare and Joyce’, *Shakespeare Newsletter*, 1.6 (November 1951), 23,

    Hugh Kenner, ‘Joyce's *Ulysses*: Homer and Hamlet’, *Essays in Criticism*, 2.1 (January 1952), 85-104, and William Peery, ‘The Hamlet of Stephen Dedalus’, *University of Texas Studies in English*, 31 (1952), 109-19. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. Michael Seidel’s 1976 essay ‘*Ulysses* Black Panther Vampire’ will be discussed later on in this literature review. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. Maurice Beebe, ‘Joyce: Barnacle Goose and Lapwing’, 71.3 *PMLA* (June 1956) 302-320 (320). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Beebe, p.319. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. Beebe, p.319. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. J. Mitchell Morse, ‘Joyce and the Blind Stripling’, *Modern Language Notes*, 71.7 (November 1956), 497-501. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. Ibid., p.497. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. Ibid., p.498 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. Walton Litz, ‘Early Vestiges of Joyce's Ulysses’, *PMLA*, 71.1 (March 1956), 51-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. William M. Schutte, *Joyce and Shakespeare: A Study in the Meaning of Ulysses* (New Haven: Yale University Pres, 1957) [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. Patricia Hutchins, *James Joyce's World* (London: Methuen and Company, 1957). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. J. Mitchell Morse, *The Sympathetic Alien: James Joyce and Catholicism* (London: Peter Owen, Vision Press, 1959). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. S. L. Goldberg, *The Classical Temper: a Study of James Joyce's 'Ulysses'* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. George L. Geckle, ‘Stephen Dedalus as Lapwing: A Symbolic Center of *Ulysses’*, *JJQ,* 6 (1968), 104-114. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Ibid., p.112. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. Stuart Curran, ‘“Bous Stephanoumenos”: Joyce’s Sacred Cow’, *JJQ,* 6 (Winter 1968), 163-170. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Ruth Von Phul, ‘The Boast of Heraldry in the 'Proteus' Episode of *Ulysses*’, *Journal of Modern Literature*, 1.3 (March 1971), 399-405. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. George Thomas and Al Solomon, ‘Two More on “Beef to the Heel”’ in ‘Letters to the Editor’, *JJQ*, 9.4 (Summer 1972), 490-496. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. For a discussion of this, see the second literature review of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals* (New York: Random House, 1975), p.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Michael Seidel, ‘*Ulysses* Black Panther Vampire’, *JJQ,* 13 (1976), 415-427. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. John Gordon, ‘Notes in response to Michael Seidel’s *Ulysses* Black Panther Vampire’, *JJQ,* 15 (1978), 229-235 (234). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. John Berger, ‘Why Look at Animals?’ in *About Looking* (London: Writers and Readers, 1980), pp.3-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. Ibid., p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Berger, p.21. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Berger, p.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. Hugh Kenner, ‘Taxonomy of an Octopus’, *JJQ,* 18.2 (Winter 1981), 204-205 (205). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. Richard Barlow, ‘End(s) of the world/world without end: Coming Events and the Twoheaded Octopus of *Ulysses’*, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 115-130 (125). [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. Lindsey Tucker, *Stephen and Bloom at Life’s Feast: Alimentary Symbolism and the Creative Process in James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’* (Columbus: Ohio UP, 1984). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. Cheng, ‘Stephen Dedalus and the Black Panther Vampire’, p.169. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. John Gordon, ‘Haines and the Black Panther’, *JJQ,* 27 (1990), 587-594. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. These are as follows: Carol J. Adams, ‘Feminism, the Great War, and Modern Vegetarianism’, in *Arms and the Woman: War, Gender, and Literary Representation,* ed. by Helen M. Cooper, et al (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp.244-267, Julia Twigg, ‘Vegetarianism and the Meanings of Meat’, in *The Sociology of Food and Eating: Essays on the Sociological Significance of Food,* ed. by Anne Murcott (England: Gower, 1983), and Marjorie Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery* (London: Heretic Books, 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. Andrew Gibson, *Joyce’s Revenge: History, Politics, and Aesthetics in Ulysses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.90. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. Ibid., p.197. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. Vincent J. Cheng, *Joyce, Race, and Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. For a brief discussion of this text, please see the introduction of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. Dirk Vanderbeke, ‘Man into Woman into Swine: Transformation in Joyce's *Ulysses*and the *Odyssey*’, *Papers on Joyce*, 4 (1998), 61-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. David Wood, ‘*Comment ne pas manger­-*Deconstruction and Humanism’ in *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life,* ed. by H. Peter Steeves (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp.15-36 (p.32). [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. Carol J. Adams, ‘Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals’, in *Ecological Feminist Philosophies,* ed. by K. J. Warren (Bloomington Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1996) [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. Abram, David, *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World* (New York: Pantheon, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. Carol J. Adams and J. Donovan (eds.), *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. José Carlos Redondo Olmedilla, ‘The Modern Middle Ages in James Joyce: From Medieval Bestiaries to the United Field in *Ulysses*’, *Papers on Joyce,* 9 (2003), 69-79 (74). [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. Joseph, Sarah, ‘Anthropomorphism and Other Figures of Speech in James Joyce’s *Ulysses*’, *Modern Language Review,* 99.3 (July 2004), 584-94. It is also important to note that in the same year (2004) an interesting sounding essay on Joyce and animals is published, but is in Chinese: Sun-chieh Liang, "'Wonder what I look like to her': Joyce's Views on Animals in *Ulysses*." *Chung-Wai Literary Monthly*, 32.9 (February 2004): 7-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. Rod Rosenquist, ‘Bloom’s Digestion of the Economic and Political Situation in James Joyce’s ‘Lestrygonians’’, *flashpointmag,* (2004), <http://www.flashpointmag.com/lestrgon.htm> [Date Accessed: 13/05/21]. No pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. Gary Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the History of Western Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005) [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. Derek Ryan, *Animal Theory: A Critical Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. Harriet Ritvo, ‘Mad Cow Mysteries’ in *The Cultural Politics of Food and Eating: A Reader,* ed. by James L. Watson and Melissa L. Caldwell (Oxford: Blackwell Publish, 2005), pp.299-306. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. For a discussion of this essay, please see the next chapter of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. Maud Ellmann, ‘*Ulysses*: Changing into an Animal’, *Field Day Review,* 2 (2006), 74-93 (75). [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. Ibid., p.76. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. Ibid., p.82 [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. David Rando, ‘The Cat’s Meow: *Ulysses,* Animals and the Veterinary Gaze’, *JJQ,* 46 (2009), 529-543 (530). [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. Rando, p.536. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. Sam Slote, ‘Garryowen and the Bloody Mangy Mongrel of Irish Modernity’, *JJQ,* 46.2-3 (Spring-Summer 2009), 545-557 (545). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. Slote, p.545. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. Slote, p.548. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. Marguerite M. Regan, ‘“Weggebobbles and Fruit”: Bloom’s Vegetarian Impulses’, *Texas Studies in Literature and Language,* 51 (2009), 463-475 (470). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. Ariela Freedman, ‘“Don’t Eat Beefsteak”: Joyce and the Pythagoreans’, *Texas Studies in Literature and Language,* 51 (2009), 447-462 (451). [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. Yen-Chen Chuang, ‘Derrida avec Joyce: The Principle of Eating the Other in Ulysses’, *Hypermedia Joyce Studies*, 10 (2009), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. John Gordon, ‘“Mkgnao!” “Mrkgnao!” “Mrkgrnao!”: The Pussens Perplex’ in *Bloomsday 100: Essays on Ulysses*, ed. by Morris Beja and Anne Fogarty, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), pp. 31-40 (p.31). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. Ibid., p,34. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. Tim Wenzell, *Emerald Green: An Ecocritical Study of Irish Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). There is, however, an essay by Michelle McSwiggan Kelley on Joyce and ecocriticism which is published in 2009, but I have been unable to locate a copy. (Michelle McSwiggan Kelley, ‘Oceanic Longings: An Ecocritical Approach to Joyce’ in *Joyce in Progress: Proceedings of the 2008 James Joyce Graduate Conference in Rome*. ed. by Ruggieri, Franca, and John McCourt, and Enrico Terrinoni, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 135-47). [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. James Fairhall, ‘Nature, Existential Shame, and Transcendence: An Ecocritical Approach to *Ulysses’, Joyce Studies Annual,* (2012), 66-95 (67). [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. James Fairhall, ‘Ecocriticism, Joyce, and the Politics of Trees in the ‘Cyclops’ Episode of *Ulysses’*, *Irish Studies Review,* 20.4, (2012) 367-387 (381). [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. Maureen O’Connor, ‘“Mrkgnao!”: Signifying Animals in the Fiction of James Joyce’ in *Critical Insights: James Joyce,* ed. by Albery Wachtel (Ipswich: Salem Press, 2013), pp.101-119 (p.102). [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. Ibid., p.110. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. Robert Haas, ‘A James Joyce Bestiary: Animal Symbolism in *Ulysses’*, *ANQ,* 27.1 (2014) 31-39. For a slightly longer discussion of Haas’ essay, see the subsequent chapter of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. Alison Lacivita, ‘Review of: ‘Eco-Joyce: The environmental imagination of James Joyce’’, *Green Letters,* 19.2 (2015), 210-212 (211). [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. Bonnie Kime Scott, ‘Joyce, Ecofeminism and the River as Woman’ in *Eco-Joyce: The Environmental Imagination of James Joyce*, ed. by Robert Brazeau and Derek Gladwin(Cork: Cork UP, 2014)*,* pp.59-69 (p.61). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. It is, once more, important to note here that in-between 2014 and 2015 three essays on Joyce and animals are published, but are in Japanese: Kazuhiro Doki, "Symposium: Joyce and Animal." *Joycean Japan*, 25 (2014), 43-48, Sachiyo Yamada, "Alterity, Thy Name Is Animal: Reading Ulysses through Derrida's Work on Animal." *Joycean Japan*, 25 (2014), 4-15, Yoshimi Minamitani, ‘Fear of Rabies and a Failed Rescue in Proteus: Dogs as Modern Animals in Ulysses’ *Joycean Japan*, 26 (2015), 4-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. Kathryn Kirkpatrick, ‘Introduction’ in *Animals in Irish Literature and Culture,* ed. by Kathryn Kirkpatrick and Borbála Faragó (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp.1-10 (p.3). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. Kirkpatrick, ‘Introduction’, p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. Katarzyna Poloczek’s ‘“Their disembodied voices cry”: Marine Animals and their Songs of Absence in the Poetry of Sinéad Morrissey, Caitríona O’Reilly, and Mary O’Donoghue’ in *Animals in Irish Literature and Culture*, pp.75-91 (p.76). [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. Poloczek, p.77. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. Poloczek, p.89. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. Sarah O’Connor, ‘Hares and Hags: Becoming Animal in Éllis Ní Dhuibhne’s *Dún na mBan trí Thine’,* in *Animals in Irish Literature and Culture*, pp.92-104 (p.97). [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. Jeanne Dubino, ‘Mad Dogs and Irishmen: Dogs, Dracula, and the Colonial Irish Other’ in *Animals in Irish Literature and Culture,* pp.199-213 (p.209). [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. Josephine Donovan, *The Aesthetics of Care: On the Literary Treatment of Animals* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), p.48. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. This literature review will not examine the following essays of this issue, as they are centred around other aspects of the non-human or other works in Joyce’s ouvre: Christin Mulligan, ‘Flower Power: Desire, Gender, and Folk Belief in the Joycean Mary Garden’, Rasheed Tazudeen, ‘Sounding the Nonhuman in Joyce’s “Sirens”’, and John S. Rickard, ‘A Portrait of the Animal as a Young Artist: Animality, Instinct, and Cognition in Joyce’s Early Prose’. Additionally, Laura Lovejoy’s essay ‘The Bestial Feminine in *Finnegans Wake*’ is looked at in the second literature review of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. Margot Norris, Tatters, Bloom’s Cat, and Other animals in *Ulysses’*, *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. Yoshimi Minamitani, ‘Joyce’s “Force” and His Tuskers as Modern Animals’, *humanities,* 6.3(2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. Caitlin McIntyre, ‘“We are All Animals”: James Joyce, Stephen Dedalus, and the Problem of Agriculture’, *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. Ibid., no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. Ruben Borg, ‘Figures of the Earth: Non-Human Phenomenology in Joyce’, *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. David Ayers, ‘De Anima: Or, *Ulysses* and the Theological Turn in Modernist Studies’, *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. Ronan Crowley, ‘Looking at Animals without Seeing Them: Havelock Ellis in the “Circe” Episode of *Ulysses’,* *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
150. Crowley, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
151. Lauren Benjamin, ‘Circe’s Feral Beasts: Women and Other Animals in Joyce’s “Ulysses”*’, Journal of Modern Literature,* 43.2 (Winter 2020), 41-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
152. Robert Brazeau, ‘“The Sassenach wants his morning rashers”: The Colonial Market and the Commodified Animal in “Telemachus”’, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 19-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
153. Barlow, p.125. Yoshimi Minamitani, in a close reading of Stephen Hero, also discusses this theme of Darwinian Evolution, arguing that Stephen’s status of becoming artist is linked to Darwin through the image of the Plesiosaur. (Yoshimi Minamitani, ‘The Metamorphosis of Stephen Da(e)dalus: The Plesiosaurus and the Slimy Sea’, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 101-114). [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
154. Stephanie Nelson, Bullockbefriending Bards: The Ambivalent Role of Cattle in the *Odyssey* and *Ulysses*’, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 37-60 (52). [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
155. Annalisa Federici, ‘From Animal Anthropomorphism to Human Animality in *Ulysses*: Joyce After Cervantes’, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 81-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
156. Katherine Ebury and Michelle Witen, ‘Introduction’, *JJQ*, 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 11-17 (11). [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
157. Haas, p.31. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
158. Minamitani, ‘Joyce’s “Force” and His Tuskers as Modern Animals’, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
159. Geckle, ‘Stephen Dedalus as Lapwing: A Symbolic Center of “Ulysses”’, p.105. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
160. James Joyce, *Ulysses*,ed. Jeri Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.202-203. All further references will be followed by parenthesis in the text. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
161. Geckle, p.111. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
162. The meaning of this phrase, as identified by George Thompson and Al Solomon, is to have thick ankles. (George Thompson and Al Solomon, ‘Two More on “Beef to the Heel”’, in ‘Letters to the Editor’, *JJQ*, 9.4 (1972), 495-496). [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
163. For a more detailed discussion of fables as instructional tools for human behaviour, see Chapter Five of this thesis. For a discussion of speech and the fabular narrative, see Chapter Six. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
164. These three occurrences are as follows: In ‘Sirens’ Lenehan confuses two fables, generating a composite one: ‘Ah fox met ah stork. Said thee fox too thee stork : Will you put your bill down inn my troath and pull upp ah bone’ (*Ulysses*, p.251. Jeri Johnson identifies the two fables that Lenehan is confusing in this passage: ‘two of Aesops’ fables combined: ‘The Wolf and the Crane’ […] and ‘The Fox and the Stork’’. (Jeri Johnson, notes on *Ulysses*, p.876). In ‘Oxen of the Sun’ Ovid’s fable of the minotaur is mentioned: ‘in support of fables such as that of the Minotaur which the genius of the elegant Latin poet has handed down to us in the pages of his Metamorphoses’ (*Ulysses* p.391). Later on, in ‘Circe’ Bloom mentions Aesop’s fable of the ‘fox and the grapes’ (*Ulysses* p.516). [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
165. This extract from Joyce’s letter to Frank Budgen is quoted in Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce,* 2nd edn(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.459. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
166. Ibid., p.459. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
167. Maud Ellmann, ‘*Ulysses*: Changing into an Animal’, p.92. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
168. Berger, ‘Why Look at Animals?’, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
169. Ibid., p.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
170. In *Finnegans Wake* he refers to Marcel Jousse who asserted that language had its origins in gesture, not metaphor: ‘In the beginning was the gest he jousstly says’ (James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake,* intro. by Seamus Deane (London: Penguin Books, 2000), p.468.5). All further references will be followed by parentheses in the text. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
171. Maud Ellmann, p.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
172. Ibid., p.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
173. Ibid., p.84. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
174. Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, p.4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
175. Michel de Montaigne, *The Works of Michel de Montaigne: Comprising his Essays, Letters, Journey through Germany and Italy, with Notes from All the Commentators, Biographical and Bibliographical Notices, &c. &c,* ed. by William Hazlitt, 2nd edn (London: C. Templeman, 1845), p.206. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
176. *A Portrait,* p.67. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
177. This is also O’Shea’s reading of the passage, and he uses heraldic symbolism to tie Stephen and Parnell together as the hunted deer: ‘Stephen becomes a deer once more in “Proteus”, [… and the] heraldic significance of Stephen (and Parnell) as hunted stags is two-fold’. (Michael J. O’Shea, *James Joyce and Heraldry* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), p.69). Interestingly, when asked what animal he would consider himself to be, Joyce connected himself with Stephen and Parnell when he answered, ‘a deer’. (R. Ellmann, p.438). [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
178. *Portrait,* p.147. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
179. Stuart Curran, ‘“Bous Stephanoumenos”: Joyce’s Sacred Cow’, *JJQ,* 6.2 (1969), 163-170 (163-164). [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
180. Ibid., p.164. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
181. Ibid., p.167. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
182. The curly brackets (or braces) indicate a section of the quotation that is not included in Johnson’s edition of *Ulysses*, which is the 1922 text, but appears in later versions, such as Hans Walter Gabler’s edition (James Joyce, *Ulysses*, ed. by Hans Walter Gabler (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), p.339). [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
183. Curran, p.167. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
184. *Portrait,* p.150. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
185. John S. Rickard, ‘A Portrait of the Animal as a Young Artist: Animality, Instinct, and Cognition in Joyce’s Early Prose’, *humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
186. ‘Goat’, *The Medieval Bestiary,* Online resource <http://bestiary.ca/beasts/beast163.htm> [Date Accessed: 19/03/2018]. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
187. ‘goat, n. and adj. 4.a.’, *OED Online*, [Date Accessed: 19/03/2018]. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
188. O’Shea, p.172. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
189. Arthur Charles Fox-Davies, *A Complete Guide to Heraldry – Illustrated by Nine Plates and Nearly 800 Other Designs* (Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. JACK, 1909), p.208. See Figure Two (Fox Davies,‘Figure 380.—Stag trippant’ in *A Complete Guide to Heraldry,* p.208). [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
190. Ibid., p.208. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
191. O’Shea, p.70. O’Shea takes this quotation from A. C. Fox-Davies, *The Book of Public Arms* (Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1894). For an example of this crest from O’Shea’s book, see Figure Three. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
192. O’Shea, ‘Illustration 4-C Arms of Leinster, with the traditional crest of Ireland: On a wreath or and azure, a tower triple-towered of the first, from the portal a hart springing argent, attired and hoofed gold’ in *James Joyce and Heraldry*, p.70. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
193. ‘Stags are at war with snakes, drawing them out of their holes with the breath of their nostrils’. (‘Stag’, *The Medieval Bestiary,* Online resource, <http://bestiary.ca/beasts/beast162.htm> [Date Accessed: 19/03/2018]. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
194. Translation from Gifford and Seidman, p.22. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
195. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, trans. A. D. Melville intro and notes by E. J. Kenney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)*,* p.475. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
196. Ovid, p.21 (I.673-677). [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
197. Joyce renamed Gogarty’s song in *Ulysses* to ‘The ballad of Joking Jesus’. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
198. Ovid, p.56-57 (III.194-204). [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
199. Thanks to Finn Fordham for this reading of the ‘st’ sounds. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
200. For more detail on this passage see: Don Gifford with Robert J. Seidman, *Ulysses Annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s Ulysses,* 2nd edn (Berkley: University of California Press, 1974), p.21. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
201. *Portrait,* p.120. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
202. Maud Ellmann, p.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
203. Maud Ellmann, p.90. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
204. Maud Ellmann, p.90-91. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
205. Maud Ellmann, p.90. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
206. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind’, *Analysis*, 58.1 (1998), 7-19 (7). [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
207. Clark and Chalmers, p.7. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
208. Clark and Chalmers, p.18. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
209. Cited in Rickard, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
210. *The Quadruple Object*, p.48. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
211. *The Quadruple Object*, p.29. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
212. Ovid,p.22 (I.713-714). [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
213. Ovid, p.44 (II.659-673). [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
214. Mark Payne, *The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic Imagination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p.118. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
215. Payne, p.124. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
216. Payne, p.123-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
217. Sarah O’Brien, ‘Why Look at Dead Animals?’, *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media*, 57.1 (Spring 2016) 32-57 (33). [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
218. Ibid., p.47. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
219. Andrew Goodspeeed, ‘“Damn death. Long live life!”’ Death in *Ulysses*’ in *Death in Literature*, ed. by Outi Hakola and Sari Kivistö (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014) 121-137 (122-123). [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
220. For example, see: Peter Adkins, ‘The Eyes of That Cow: Eating Animals and Theorizing Vegetarianism in James Joyce’s *Ulysses’* and Ariela Freedman, ‘“Don’t eat a beefsteak”: Joyce and the Pythagoreans’. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
221. This reading of Hegel, made by Stuart J. Murray, is as follows: ‘This presumes a death that amounts to more than mere animal or organismic “perishing”—a human self-consciousness of death *as* death’. Stuart J. Murray, ‘Hegel's Pathology of Recognition: A Biopolitical Fable’, *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 48.4, Special Issue: The Rhetorical Contours of Recognition (2015), 443-472 (446). [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
222. Quoted in: Kari Weil, ‘Killing Them Softly: Animal Death, Linguistic Disability, and the Struggle for Ethics’, *Configurations*, 14.1-2, (2006), 87-96 (90). For a deft criticism of Heidegger, via Derrida, see Matthew Calarco, ‘On the Borders of Language and Death: Derrida and the Question of the Animal’, *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities*, 7.2, (2002), 17-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
223. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962), p.208 (H 165). [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
224. Quoted in: Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, p.153. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
225. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* p.291 (H 246). [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
226. Ibid., p.291 (H 247). [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
227. *The Quadruple Object*,p.119. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
228. *The Quadruple Object*, p.134. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
229. *The Quadruple Object*, p.122-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
230. ‘The man that was drowned. A sail veering about the blank bay waiting for a swollen bundle to bob up, roll over to the sun a puffy face, salt white. Here I am.’ (*Ulysses*, p.21). [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
231. ‘The man that was drowned nine days ago off Maiden’s rock. They are waiting for him now.’ (*Ulysses*, p.45). [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
232. O’Brien, p.47. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
233. Joyce expands this category to include earwigs in *Finnegans Wake*: ‘Ladies did not disdain those pagan ironed times of the first city (called after the ugliest Danadune) when a frond was a friend inneed to carry, as earwigs do their dead, their soil to the earth- ball where indeeth we shall calm decline, our legacy unknown.’ (*Finnegans Wake,* 079.14-17). [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
234. Allan Hepburn, “The Irish Way of Dying: ‘Ulysses’ and Funeral Processions.” *The Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, 38.1-2, (2014), 184–207 (192). [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
235. Ibid., p.194. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
236. Bloom’s ascription of colour of horse to status of the deceased appears to have no basis in reality; Don Gifford notes that they ‘have not found a source for these funeral traditions.’ (Don Gifford with Robert J. Seidman, *“Ulysses” Annotated: Notes for James Joyce’s “Ulysses”*, p.111). [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
237. The *OED* defines murder as follows: ‘The deliberate and unlawful killing of a human being, esp. in a premeditated manner’. (murder, n.1 and int., *OED Online*, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/123858> [Date Accessed: 30/01/2020]. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
238. Danta makes this argument specifically in relation to J. M. Coetzee’s *Elizabeth Costello*. Chris Danta, ‘"Like a Dog... like a Lamb": Becoming Sacrificial Animal in Kafka and Coetzee’, *New Literary History*, 38.4 (2007), 721-737 (731). [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
239. This theme is undoubtedly present in *A Portrait*, and, for example, can be observed in the following quotation: ‘At the last moment of consciousness the whole earthly life passed before the vision of the soul and, ere it had time to reflect, the body had died and the soul stood terrified before the judgement seat.’ (*A Portrait,* p.98). [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
240. Bloom eats the ‘inner organs of beasts and fowls’ ‘with relish’ (*Ulysses,* p.53), while he eats his cheese sandwich ‘with relish of disgust’. (*Ulysses*, p.165). [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
241. Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
242. This difference is discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
243. Despite the fact that Bloom labels Milly ‘silly’ for burying the animal, Molly recalls that Bloom said he would go into mourning for his cat. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
244. For example, the dog appears as a ‘sniffing terrier’ (*Ulysses*, p.419), a ‘retriever […] wagging his tail’ (*Ulysses,* p.430), and a ‘bulldog’ (*Ulysses,* p.431). [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
245. One of the exceptions to this is unprocessed meat, such as the kidney that Bloom has for breakfast. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
246. Jane Desmond, ‘Postmortem Exhibitions: Taxidermied Animals and Plastinated Corpses in the Theaters of the Dead’, *Configurations*, 16.3, (2008) 347-378 (365). [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
247. Petra Tjitske Kalshoven, ‘Gestures of taxidermy: Morphological Approximation as Interspecies Affinity’, *American Ethnologist*, 45.1 (2018), 34-47 (38-41). [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
248. Miran Božovič, ‘The Body and *Psycho*; or, of “Farther uses of the Dead to the Living”’, *Umbr(a)* (2000)*,* 81-98 (87-88). [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
249. Rachel Youdelman writes: ‘All works of taxidermy, but especially anthropomorphic figures, evoke dual emotions of discomfort and fascination, an aesthetic experience akin to what Edmund Burke and others described as the aesthetic sublime, a sensation we recognize as emotional ambivalence—a struggle between delight and terror.’ (Rachel Youdelman, ‘Iconic Eccentricity: ‘The Meaning of Victorian Novelty Taxidermy’, *PsyArt*, 21 (2017), 38-68 (55). [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
250. Ann C. Colley, ‘The Morbid and the Trendy’, *Victorian Literature and Culture*, 46 (2018), 259-266 (261). [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
251. Desmond, Postmortem Exhibitions’, p.348. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
252. Desmond notes: ‘With no age, no fat, no race, no social class, no nationality attributed, there is a simultaneous idealization through universalization that invokes both the work of art (a sort of fictionalized “portrait” that stands for more than itself) and of anatomy (an individual becomes a specimen of its kind) of “all people,” to the extent that we all share a basic anatomical makeup. When the balance tips too far toward the individual specimen, as in the case of the pregnant woman with her belly split open, the exhibit fails and invites censure. […] To succeed both in terms of audience satisfaction […] and to escape debilitating censure, the anti-taxidermy approach is absolutely necessary. For humans, unlike animals, a taxidermic retention of the skin would turn a universalized specimen not only into a unique body, but also into a specific human’. (Desmond, Postmortem Exhibitions’, p.375). [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
253. Desmond, ‘Postmortem Exhibitions’, p.373-374. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
254. ‘hoo’ may also be a humorous gesture towards the name of the man who gave the Bloom’s the owl: ‘Hooper’. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
255. Kalshoven, p.40. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
256. ‘Obscure’ may be a reference to cloudy eyes (a result of cataracts or glaucoma, perhaps), but there is no evidence in the rest of the novel to support this reading. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
257. This is noted in the *OED*: ‘In extended use, esp. of an animal. Frequently in proverbial phrases, as ***as melancholy as a cat***, etc. Now chiefly in historical context. Certain animals, esp. the hare and the cat, seem to have been associated with melancholy in the Middle Ages, perhaps from their solitary or nocturnal habits.’ (melancholy, adj. and n.2, *OED Online*, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/116008> [Date Accessed: 30/01/2020]. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
258. Thomas Nash, *Christ’s Tears Over Jerusalem* (London: Thomas Thorop., 1613) p.52, appearing in: *Archaica: Containing a Reprint of Scarce Old English Prose Tracts,* vol. 1 of 2, ed., by Sir Egerton Brydges (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown., 1815), ‘Part the Seventh’. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
259. The article on Bloom’s death is: C. David Bertolini, ‘Bloom's Death in ‘Ithaca, or the End of *Ulysse*s’, *Journal of Modern Literature*, 31.2, (2007), 39–52. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
260. Partha Pratim Mandal and Biman Mandal, *A Textbook of Homeopathic Pharmacy,* Revised and enlarged 2nd edn. (London: New Central Book Agency (P) Ltd., 2009), p.137. Soap made from vegetable fat is named either ‘hard’ soap or ‘soft’ soap; this distinction is made in numerous scientific texts, another example is: Stanley Alstead, *Poulsson’s Text-Book of Pharmacology and Therapeutics*, 2nd revised edn (London: William Heinemann (Medical Books) Lits., 1938). [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
261. Louis Brady, ‘What is the Semantic Significance of the Objects Bloom Carries in James Joyce’s *Ulysses*?*’* (unpublished Master’s thesis, Open University, 2020), p.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
262. Brady, p.11. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
263. Brady, p.12. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
264. Christopher DeVault, ‘Mourning Becomes Dedalus: Ethics, Prosopopoeia, and Impossible Mourning in *Ulysses*’, *JJQ*, 54.1-2, (2016-2017), 87-103 (94). [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
265. Nathan Halper, ‘Being a Sommerfool’, *A Wake Newslitter*, New Series 8.1 (February 1971), p.4. (Hereafter *A Wake Newslitter* will be referred to simply as *Newslitter*). [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
266. *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress,* ed. by Samuel Beckett (London: Faber and Faber, 1929), p.126 [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
267. Ibid., p.127. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
268. Cyril Connolly, ‘review in *Life and Letters* 1929’ in *James Joyce Volume 2, 1928-41: The Critical Heritage*, ed. by Robert H. Deming (London: Routledge, 1977), pp.401-403 (p.402). [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
269. Michael Stuart, ‘on *Work in Progress*, 1929’ in *The Critical Heritage*, pp.500-502 (p.501). [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
270. Stuart Gilbert, ‘The Growth of a Titan’, *The Saturday Review of Literature,* 7.2 ed. by Henry Seidel Canby, (2 August 1930), 17-19, (18). [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
271. Anonymous, ‘Poposterous!’, *The Saturday Review*, (10 December 1932), 629 [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
272. Eleanor Carroll Chilton, ‘’Twas Brilig’, *The English Review*, (1933), 106-108 [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
273. For example: Anonymous, ‘A New Work by James Joyce: The Author of “Ulysses” Turns to Punning’, *Spectator,* (1929), 111-113. The reviews of *Tales Told* in *The Critical Heritage* also do not mention animals. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
274. Eugene Jolas, ‘explication, 1933’ in *The Critical Heritage*, pp.603-604 (p.604). Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
275. Paul Rosenfeld, ‘review, 1939’ in *The Critical Heritage*, pp.663-664 (p.664). Emphasis mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
276. Leon Edel, ‘on *Finnegans Wake* 1939’, *The Critical Heritage,* pp.719-720 (p.719-720). [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
277. Archibald A. Hill, ‘A Philologist Looks at “Finnegans Wake”, *The Virginia Quarterly Review,* 15.4 (Autumn 1939), 650-656, (652). [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
278. Georges Pelorson, ‘review, in *Aux Ecoutes*, 1939’ in *The Critical Heritage*, pp.680-683 (p.683). [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
279. Thomas P. Beyer, ‘A Note on the Diction of “Finnegans Wake”, *College English*, 2.3 (December 1940) 257-277 [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
280. Edmund Wilson, ‘The Dream of H.C. Earwicker’ in *The Wound and the Bow: Seven Studies in Literature* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941), pp.243-271 **(**p.249). [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
281. Ibid., p.260. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
282. Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson, *A Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake: Unlocking James Joyce’s Masterwork* (Novato: New World Library, 2005), p.9. [First published in 1944]. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
283. Campbell and Robinson, p.313. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
284. Campbell and Robinson, p.41. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
285. Campbell and Robinson, p.18. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
286. Richard V. Chase, ‘“Finnegans Wake”: An Anthropological Study’, *The American Scholar,* 13.4 (Autumn 1944), 418-426. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
287. Ernest Bernbaum, ‘The Crucial Question Regarding “Finnegans Wake”, *College English,* 7.3 (December 1945), 151-154 (152). [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
288. Ibid., p.152. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
289. Ned Polsky, ‘Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”, *The Explicator,* 9.3 (1950), 41. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
290. William Peery, ‘Shakhisbeard at Finnegans Wake”, *The University of Texas Studies in English,* 30 (1951), 243-257. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
291. John Henry Raleigh, ‘“My Brother’s Keeper”—Stanislaus Joyce and “Finnegans Wake”, *Modern Language Notes*, 68.2 (February 1953) 107-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
292. Joseph Prescott, ‘Concerning the Genesis of “Finnegans Wake”, *PMLA*, 69.5 (December 1954), 1300-1302. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
293. J.S. Atherton, ‘Islam and the Koran in “Finnegans Wake”, *Comparative Literature,* 6.3 (Summer 1954), 240-255. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
294. Ibid., p.247. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
295. J. Mitchell Morse, ‘Cain, Abel, and Joyce’, *ELH,* 22.1 (March 1955), 48-60 (51). [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
296. Ibid., p.54. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
297. Theodore B. Dolmatch, ‘Notes and Queries Concerning the Revisions in “Finnegans Wake”, *Modern Language Quarterly,* (1955), 142-148. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
298. Walter A. Sedelow Jr., ‘Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”, *The Explicator,* 13.4 (1955), 61-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
299. Adaline Glasheen, *Third Census of Finnegans Wake: An Index of the Characters and Their Roles* (n.p.: The Regents of the University of California, 1977) [The First census was published in1956]. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
300. Robert Bierman, ‘“Streameress Mastress to the Sea”: A Note on “Finnegans Wake”’, *Modern Fiction Studies,* 2.2 (May 1956), 79-80**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
301. Bernard Benstock, ‘Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Explicator,* 15.9 (1957), 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
302. Mabel P. Worthington, ‘Nursery Rhymes in “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Journal of American Folklore,* 70.275 (January–March 1957), 37-48 (42). [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
303. David Hayman, ‘Dramatic Motion in “Finnegans Wake”’, *Texas Studies in English,* 37 (1958), 155-176, (165). [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
304. Hayman, ‘Dramatic Motion in “Finnegans Wake”, p.167-168. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
305. Hayman, ‘Dramatic Motion in “Finnegans Wake”, p.168. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
306. David Hayman, ‘From “Finnegans Wake”: A Sentence in Progress’, *PMLA,* 73.1 (March 1958), 136-154 (139). [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
307. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.140. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
308. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.150. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
309. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.147. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
310. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.149. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
311. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.143. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
312. Hayman, ‘A Sentence in Progress’, p.145. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
313. Helmut Bonheim, ‘The Father in “Finnegans Wake”’, *Studia Neophilologica,* 31.2 (1959), 182-190 [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
314. Karl Kiralis, ‘Joyce and Blake: A Basic Source for “Finnegans Wake”’, *Modern Fiction Studies,* 4.4 (Winter 1958-1959), 329-334. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
315. James S. Atherton, *The Books at the Wake: A Study of Literary Allusions in James Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959) p.95. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
316. Ibid., p.53. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
317. Marvin Carlson, ‘Henrik Ibsen and “Finnegans Wake”,’ *Comparative Literature,* 12.2 (Spring 1960), 133-141. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
318. Budgen, *James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses*, p.286. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
319. Bernard Benstock, ‘The Final Apostacy: James Joyce and “Finnegans Wake”’, *ELH,* 28.4 (December 1961), 417-437 (436). [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
320. Bernard Benstock, ‘Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”, Book II, Chapter II, Footnotes’, *The Explicator,* 20.4 (1961), 65-68 (66). [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
321. Helmut Bonheim, ‘“Tory” in “Finnegans Wake”, *Notes and Queries*, (September 1961), 349-350 (350). [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
322. Philip L. Graham, ‘Bees at the Wake’, *Newslitter,* Old Series, 5 (1962), 2-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
323. ‘“[B]oos” suggests Latin bos—the ox as a sacrificial animal and also St. Luke’s symbolic ox. The presence of sheep (“baas”) and the ass, together with the sounds of alpha and omega (implied in the spectator’s ahs and ohs) bring in Christ. German der Böse is the devil’ (Fritz Senn, *Newslitter,* Old Series, 2 (April 1962), p.7). [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
324. ‘Answers’, Old Series, 5 (September 1962), 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
325. Clive Hart, *Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962) p.53. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
326. For example: Edward A. Kopper Jr., ‘Joyce’s “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Explicator,* 22.5 (1964), 69-71, and Denis Johnston, ‘Clarify Begins at: The Non-Information of “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Massachusetts Review,* 5.2 (Winter 1964), 357-364. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
327. Thornton Wilder, ‘Giordano Bruno’s Last Meal in “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Hudson Review,* 16.1 (Spring 1963), 74-79 (79). [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
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334. F. G. Asenjo, ‘The General Problem of Sentence Structure: An Analysis Prompted By the Loss of Subject in “Finnegans Wake”’, *The Centennial Review,* 8.4 (Fall 1964), 398-408. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
335. David Hayman, ‘Tristan and Isolde in “Finnegans Wake”: A Study of Sources and Evolution of a Theme’, *Comparative Literature Studies,* 1.2 (1964), 93-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
336. Bernard Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake: An Analysis of Finnegans Wake* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1965). [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
337. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake*, p.153 [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
338. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake*, p.133 [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
339. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.69. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
340. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.146. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
341. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.211. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
342. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.171-172. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
343. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.43. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
344. Benstock, *Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.172 [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
345. Bernard Benstock, ‘A “Finnegans Wake” Address Book’, *JJQ*, 2.3 (Spring 1965), 195-203. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
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347. Bernard Benstock, ‘On William Gaddis: In Recognition of James Joyce’, *Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature,* 6.2 (Summer 1965), 177-189 (181-182). [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
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351. Peter Spielberg, ‘Addenda: More Food for ‘The Gastronome’s “Finnegans Wake”’, *JJQ*, 3.4 (Summer 1966), 297-298. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
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357. L. L. Lee, ‘The Mormons at the Wake’, *JJQ,* 6.1 (Fall 1968), 87-88. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
358. William York Tindall, *A Reader’s Guide to James Joyce* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), p.245-245 n.7 [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
359. Tindall, *A Reader’s Guide to James Joyce*, p.287. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
360. For example, in issue 6.3, Edward A. Kopper has two essays about the *Wake*’s sources which reference animals in some manner: Edward A. Kopper, ‘More Legends in “Finnegans Wake”’, *Newslitter,* New Series, 6.3 (1969), 39-43, and ‘Saint Olaf in “Finnegans Wake”’, *Newslitter,* New Series, 6.3 (1969), 35-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
361. Phillip L. Graham, ‘The Middlewhite Fair’, *Newslitter,* 6.5 New Series (October 1969), 67-69 (67). [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
362. H. D. Rankin, ‘Megageg (169.14)’, *Newslitter,* New Series, 6.6 (December 1969), 92 (92). [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
363. L. A. Wiggin, ‘The Voice of the Frogs: An Analysis of Brekkek kekkek koak from Finnegans Wake”’, *Newslitter*, New Series, 6.4 (August 1969), 60-63 (60). [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
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367. Ruth Von Phul, ‘“Not a Leetle Beetle” (FW 417.3-4)’, *JJQ*, 6.3 (Spring 1969), 265-266. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
368. Bernard Benstock, ‘Every Telling Has a Talking: A Reading of the Narrative of “Finnegans Wake”’, *Modern Fiction Studies,* 15.1 James Joyce Special Number (Spring 1969), 3-25 (4). [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
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376. Edward A. Kopper, ‘“but where he is eaten”: Earwicker’s Tavern Feast / Book II, chapter iii’ in *A Conceptual Guide*, pp.116-138 (p.131). [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
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379. J. Mitchell Morse, ‘Where Terms Begin / Book I, chapter i’ in *A Conceptual Guide,* pp.1-17 (p.11). [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
380. Bernard Benstock, ‘Concerning Lost Historeve / Book I, chapter v’ in *A Conceptual Guide,* pp.33-55 (p.49). [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
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382. Ian MacArthur, ‘The Complex Ass’, *Newslitter,* New Series, 13.5 (October 1976), 92-94 (91). [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
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387. Norris, *The Decentered Universe,* p.62. [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
388. Norris, *The Decentered Universe*, p.35. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
389. Norris, *The Decentered Universe,* p.65. [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
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391. Norris, *The Decentered Universe,* p.50. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
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397. Füger, ‘Ravens and Doves’, p.91. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
398. Füger, ‘Ravens and Doves’, p.94. [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
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409. Whilst the majority of Möller’s work consists of this list of animals (ordered first by page number and then again by species) there is an introduction which may provide a useful analysis of the animals of the *Wake*; it is, however, in German and I have therefore been unable to read it. (Möller, *A Wake Bestiary*). [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
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412. Fordham, Finn, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake: Unravelling Universals,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.167. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
413. Fordham, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake,*, p.231. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
414. Fordham, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake,* p.66. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
415. Fordham, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake,* p.8. [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
416. Fordham, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake,* p.53. [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
417. Fordham, *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake,* p.40 [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
418. Bernard Benstock*, Joyce-Again’s Wake,* p.264. [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
419. Hart*, Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake,* p.160. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
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425. Edmund Lloyd Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), p.158. [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
426. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, p.103. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
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430. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, p.149. [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
431. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, p.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
432. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
433. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, p.51. It is interesting to note that zoos now claim to be concerned with the salvation of animals. [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
434. Epstein, *A Guide Through Finnegans Wake*, p.167. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
435. Margot Norris, ‘The Animals of James Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*’*, Modern Fiction Studies,* 60 (2014), 527-543 (537). [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
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439. Mak, ‘Joyce’s Indifferent Animals’, p.201. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
440. Mak, ‘Joyce’s Indifferent Animals’, p.181. [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
441. Mak, ‘Joyce’s Indifferent Animals’, p.190. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
442. Rachel Murray, ‘Beelines: Joyce’s Apian Aesthetics’, *Humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
443. Laura Lovejoy, ‘The Bestial Feminine in *Finnegans Wake’*, *Humanities,* 6.3 (2017), no pagination [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
444. Paul Fagan, ‘The Nonhuman Skin of *Finnegans Wake’*, *JJQ,* 58.1-2 (Fall 2020-Winter 2021), 157-180 (157). [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
445. *A Portrait*, p.181. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
446. Joyce E. Salisbury, *The Beast Within: Animals in the Middle Ages,* 2nd edn (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), p.90. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
447. Vivian Mercier, ‘James Joyce as Medieval Artist’, *The Crane Bag*, 2.1/2, ‘The Other Ireland’ (1988), 11-17 (11). [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
448. Mercier, p.11. [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
449. Whether animal hybrids were believed to be real by medieval peoples is a point of contention in medieval studies, and this point will be discussed briefly in section two. [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
450. Redondo Olmedilla, ‘The Modern Middle Ages in James Joyce: From Medieval Bestiaries to the United Field in *Ulysses*’. [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
451. Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, Revised trans. of 3rd edn. (1744). Trans and ed. by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), Paragraph 431, p.139. Like the Vico scholar, David Phillip Verene, all further citations will provide the paragraph and page number in an accompanying footnote. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
452. Vico, par. 431, p.139-140. [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
453. Vico, par. 541. p.189 -190. Various other examples of animal metaphors can be found in paragraphs: 512, 540, 605, 679, and 1108. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
454. Vico, par. 435, p.142-143. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
455. The bird is subject to none but God because of its quality of ‘flight’, and it is therefore seen as being out of the reach of humanity. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
456. Beckett, ‘Dante... Bruno. VicVicooyce’ in *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress,* pp.5-13 (p.10). [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
457. Michael Stuart, ‘on *Work in Progress*, 1929’, *The Critical Heritage*, pp.500-502 (p.501). [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
458. Goat’, *The Medieval Bestiary,* Online resource <http://bestiary.ca/beasts/beast163.htm> [Date accessed: 10/04/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
459. *A Portrait*, p.120. [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
460. ‘goat, n. and adj. 4.a.’, *OED Online*, [Date accessed: 10/04/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
461. Goat’, *The Medieval Bestiary*. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
462. Max Harold Fisch, ‘Introduction’ in Vico, *The New Science,* par. C3, p.xxiii. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
463. Vico, par. 431, p.139-140. The original Italian reads: ‘che *Platone*, e *Giamblico* dicevano, essesi una volta parlata nel Mondo, che deve essere slata l’antichissima *Lingua Atlantica*, la quale Eruditi vogliono, che spiegasse l’idee per la natural delle cose, o fia per le loro naturali propietà’. (Giambattista Vico, *Principi di Scienza Nuova*, (Napoli: 1774), p.170). [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
464. Vico, par. 388, p.122. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
465. Fisch ‘Introduction’ in Vico, *The New Science,* par. J4, p.xxxix. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
466. Vico, par. 405, p.129-130. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
467. Vico, par. 180, p.70. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
468. ‘Ant’, *Wikipedia,* Online resource <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ant> [Date accessed: 10/04/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
469. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
470. Lakoff and Johnson, p.95. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
471. Lakoff and Johnson, p.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
472. Lakoff and Johnson, p.12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
473. *Metaphors We Live By* also mentions ‘container metaphors’, which this chapter will not address. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
474. Lakoff and Johnson, p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
475. Lakoff and Johnson, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
476. Lakoff and Johnson, p.4-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
477. Lakoff and Johnson, p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
478. Lakoff and Johnson, p.15. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
479. Lakoff and Johnson, p.15. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
480. Lakoff and Johnson, p.25. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
481. Lakoff and Johnson, p.26. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
482. Lakoff and Johnson, p.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
483. Lakoff and Johnson, p.12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
484. Lakoff and Johnson, p.154. [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
485. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.73. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
486. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.73. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
487. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.86. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
488. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.86. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
489. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.86-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
490. Harman, *Object-Orientated Ontology*, p.97-88 [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
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494. Dorothy Yamamoto, *The Boundaries of the Human in Medieval English Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p.29. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
495. Pamela Gravestock, ‘Did Imaginary Animals Exist’ in *The Mark of the Beast: The Medieval Bestiary in Art, Life, and Literature,* ed. By Debra Hassig (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999), pp.119-135 (p.130). [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
496. Gravestock, ‘Did Imaginary Animals Exist’, p.124. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
497. Salisbury, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
498. Gravestock, p.124. [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
499. Vico, par. 13, p.9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
500. Vico, par. 504, p.171. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
501. Vico, par. 133, p.62. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
502. Vico, par. 341, p.101-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
503. Vico, par. 703, p.265-266. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
504. Vico, par. 195, p.72. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
505. Vico, par. 371, p.114-115. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
506. As Max Harold Fisch explains in his introduction: ‘It is not any and every sort of bestiality out of which humanity can be generated, and in order to obtain as his raw material beasts that have it in them to become men, Vico, as a good Catholic, starts from the universal flood and allows two centuries for the descendants of Ham and Japheth and the non-Hebraic descendants of Shem to lapse into a bestiality suitable for his purpose’. [par. J3, p.xxxviii-xxxix). [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
507. Fisch, ‘Introduction’VicoVico, *The New Science,* par. C4, C6, p.xxiv. and par. M7, p.xliv. [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
508. Vico, par. 629, p.234-235. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
509. Vico, par. 692, p.262. [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
510. Norris, *The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake,* p.102. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
511. Vico, par. 561, p.200-201. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
512. Vico, par. 654, p.246. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
513. Vico, par. 910, p.330-331. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
514. Salisbury, p.126-127. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
515. Salisbury, p.82 [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
516. The further melting of both subjects into one is described and elucidated expertly in Cheng’s essay: ‘White Horse, Dark Horse: Joyce’s Allhorse of Another Color’. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
517. Of course, it should be noted that the range of sources Salisbury is using, contain both literary as well as what appear to be ‘factual’ or serious accounts. What Salisbury fails to address (and has been pointed out by scholars, such as David Salter in *Holy and Noble Beasts: Encounters with Animals in Medieval Literature* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2001) p.5), is that the presence of hybrids in fiction does not necessitate a real belief in them. For example, we could not use *Twilight* to argue that there is a contemporary belief in vampires; Salisbury’s claims are more credible than this, because of the inclusion of non-fictional source material. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
518. Vico, par. 917, p.336. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
519. Vico, par. 1055, p.399. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
520. Vico, par. 649, p.244-245. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
521. Vico, par. 1058, p.401. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
522. Salter, p.34. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
523. Such as on page 57.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
524. Lovejoy, ‘The Bestial Feminine’, no pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
525. Tindall, p.99. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
526. Salisbury, p.81. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
527. Vico, *Object-Orientated Ontology,* p.87. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
528. Dirk Van Hulle, ‘Out of Metaphor: Mauthner, Richards and the Development of Wakese’ in *Vico Joyce: The Study of Languages,* ed. by Dirk Van Hulle (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2002) pp.91-118 (p.91). [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
529. Salisbury, p.82. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
530. ‘hen n. 5’, *OED Online*, [Date accessed: 10/05/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
531. ‘biddy n. 1 and n.2, *OED Online,* [Date accessed: 10/05/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
532. Of course, ‘behaviourising strangely’ contains connotations of Pavlov’s Science of Behaviourism in which he demonstrates that animal (and human) behaviour can be conditioned into an ‘unnatural’ response; by associating food with the ring of a bell, Pavlov managed to condition his dogs to salivate upon hearing that specific noise regardless of the presence or absence of food. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
533. The fifth requirement, ‘cessation of wandering’, is not touched upon in this section. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
534. We can observe this viewpoint in phrases such as: ‘woman with her ridiculous white burden’ (112.20-21), and ‘to the shock of both, Biddy Doran looked ad literature’ (112.27). The latter phrase is an example of this sexist opinion as it treats a woman reading literature as surprising as an animal doing so. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
535. Caroline Whitley, ‘Nations and the Night: Excremental HistorVicoJames Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* and Djuna Barnes’ *Nightwood*’, *Journal of Modern Literature*, 24.1 (Fall, 2000), 81-98 (86). [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
536. Salisbury, p.136. [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
537. Talia Schaffer, ‘Letters to Biddy: About that Original Hen’, *JJQ*, 29.3 (Spring, 1992), 623-642 (640-641). [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
538. ‘This information comes from *FWEET*: <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?srch=zogzag&cake=&icase=1&acighlightbeauty=1&hilight=1&showtxt=1&escope=1&tscope=1&rscope=1&dist=4&ndist=4&fontsz=100&shorth=0> [Date accessed: 10/05/2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
539. *The Bible: Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha*, intro. and notes by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Job 12. 7-10. All further references will be followed by parenthesis in the text. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
540. ‘The *Physiologus*, or *The Naturalist*, was a Greek text originating in Alexandria, possibly as early as the second century A.D. It is a compilation of the supposed natural characteristics of some forty animals, birds, reptiles, fish, and mystic stones, which are then allegorized in terms of Christian dogma’. (Nona C. Flores, ‘Introduction’*, in Animals in the Middles Ages*, ed. by Nona C. Flores (London: Routledge, 2000) pp.ix-xvi (p.ix). [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
541. Flores, p.x. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
542. ‘However, by the thirteenth century, chruchmen increasingly used examples drawn from fables, bestiaries, and beast epics to illustrate their sermons’. (Salisbury, p.98). [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
543. Salisbury, p.88-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
544. It is important here, to clarify that when I say *Finnegans Wake* mimics a bestiary, I do not mean in a universal sense; it is not structured into chapters dealing first with fish, then birds, then mammals, but rather, I mean that the animals of the *Wake* are used in the same manner as a bestiarist uses the animals of their text; to symbolise something, to gesture towards specific myth and legend, to consider both the animal’s place in the world and their ability to teach humans how to be human. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
545. Van Hulle, ‘Out of Metaphor’, p.109. Below this note is anVico, in which Joyce writes: ‘/var/folders/24/qmfbmh810932lxt5mm8wqbv40000gn/T/com.microsoft.Word/WebArchiveCopyPasteTempFiles/HCE.PNG becomes all / by not knowing’. This has Vicor connections to Vico’s theory of metaphor. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
546. Richard Barber, *Bestiary: MS Bodley 764* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2016), p.174. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
547. Barber*,* p.174. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
548. The first part of this line ‘I am weary of crying: my throat is dried’ comes from Psalm 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
549. It must be noted here that this translation is not exact; as the *Rochester Bestiary* has been neither transcribed nor translated, I have provided both a transcription and a translation to the best of my ability. For images of the original text from which this was transcribed see: *Royal MS 12 f XIII,* The British Library Manuscript Viewer, p.82v-83v. <http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=royal\_ms\_12\_f\_xiii\_f082v>, <http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=royal\_ms\_12\_f\_xiii\_f083r>, and <http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Viewer.aspx?ref=royal\_ms\_12\_f\_xiii\_f083v> [Date Accessed: 29/07/19]. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
550. Bonnie Kime Scott, ‘Joyce, Ecofeminism and thVicoer as Woman’ in *Eco-Joyce: The Environmental Imagination of James Joyce*, ed. by Robert Brazeau and Derek Gladwin(Cork: Cork UP, 2014)*,* pp.59-69 (p.61). [↑](#footnote-ref-581)
551. Salisbury, p.138. [↑](#footnote-ref-582)
552. Men are explicitly mentioned three times (and implicitly a fourth in the word ‘gloompourers’, which, while it is ambiguous in terms of gender, this context implies the subject masculine) and are rendered as animals once; women are mentioned explicitly four times and are depicted as animals on each occasion. [↑](#footnote-ref-583)
553. For a thorough, expert reading of this passage seeVicong, ‘White Horse, Dark Horse: Joyce’s Allhorse of Another Color’. [↑](#footnote-ref-584)
554. This transformation is also confirmed in the line ‘woman with her ridiculous white burden’ (112.20-21); she is described explicitly as a woman but remains a hybrid as the ‘white burden’ refers to eggs. [↑](#footnote-ref-585)
555. Vico, par. 431, p.139-140. [↑](#footnote-ref-586)
556. Salisbury, p.88. [↑](#footnote-ref-587)
557. The first and third word contain French words for ‘deer’ while the second obviously has ‘mouse’ in its centre. [↑](#footnote-ref-588)
558. *FWEET*, <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?i=1&o=1&r=1&b=1&s=%5E113.02> [Date Accessed: 05/08/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-589)
559. Of course, this word also evokes ‘post-humanism’, a philosophy which Vico predates. (Although the word ‘post-human’ was used as early as 1916, it was used to denote a species which could evolve from humanity and was principally used in Science Fict“on. "post-human, adj. a”d n." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/263433> [Date Accessed: 5 August 2019]). [↑](#footnote-ref-590)
560. The first mention of ‘hen’ appears in the 1st draft §1 of the Proto Drafts, while the section including ‘lapins’, ‘grigs’, ‘postmantuam’, ‘Mesdaims, Marmouselles, Mescerfs!’ was not included until the 2nd set of Galleys. The first occurrence of ‘What bird has done yesterday man may do next year’ appears in the 1st typescript for *Criterion*. (Information taken from the *JVicoJoyce Digital Archive*, <http://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/e/ed11.htm> [Date Accessed: 5 August 2019]. [↑](#footnote-ref-591)
561. James Thurber, ‘Interview with a Lemming’ in *The Year’s Best Science Fiction No 1*, ed. by Harry Harrison & Brian Aldiss (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1968) pp.90-91 (p.90). [↑](#footnote-ref-592)
562. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* p.208 H 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-593)
563. Benjamin Bickley Rogers, *The Frogs of Aristophanes*, 2nd edn. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1919), p.35 line 7. All further references will be followed by the page and line number in parentheses in the text. In this edition the original Greek is placed on even numbered pages, and the English translation on the odd numbered ones. [↑](#footnote-ref-594)
564. For a detailed examination of Evolution and Darwinian Vicoy in Joyce see: Paul Bowers, ‘“Variability ”n Vico Tongue": Joyce and the Darwinian Narrative’, *JJQ*, 36.4 (Summer, 1999), 869- 888. [↑](#footnote-ref-595)
565. Timothy Morton, *Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality,* (London: Open Humanities Press, 2013), p.19. [↑](#footnote-ref-596)
566. Morton, p.111. [↑](#footnote-ref-597)
567. Morton, p.120. [↑](#footnote-ref-598)
568. Morton, p.121. [↑](#footnote-ref-599)
569. Morton uses this example on page 74: ‘There is no “causation” as such—that’s a superficial illusion, a Vicoce-at-hand as Harman would say. Like Al-Ghazali, for whom God provides the causal links between unlinkable objects, a kind of magic happens (without God) and we see flames emerging out of candlewicks and billiard balls smacking one another. There is nothing underneath this display. And the display happens whether “we” observe it or not. What does this mean? It means that causality is aesthetic.’ (Morton, p.74). [↑](#footnote-ref-600)
570. Morton, p.19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-601)
571. ‘When an opera singer sings a certain note very loudly, the sound stirs up the resonant frequencies of a wine glass. In slow motion, you can see the wine glass rippling. Then the glass explodes. […] The sound was able to reduce the glass to a pure appearance.’ (Morton, p.199). [↑](#footnote-ref-602)
572. Morton, p.124. [↑](#footnote-ref-603)
573. As Morton writes: ‘it’s not that voice really gives access to the hidden depth of meaning—it’s that voice is an object in its own right, vibrating with uncanny overtones.’ (Morton, p.84-85). [↑](#footnote-ref-604)
574. Morton, p.110. [↑](#footnote-ref-605)
575. Of course, the animal remains unchanged by and indifferent to this connection. [↑](#footnote-ref-606)
576. Morton, p.21. [↑](#footnote-ref-607)
577. Morton, p.21 [↑](#footnote-ref-608)
578. Morton, p.112. [↑](#footnote-ref-609)
579. While this chapter does not examine this difference, an excellent account of it can be found in Mladen Dolar’s ‘Introduction’ in *A Voice and Nothing More*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006), pp.3-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-610)
580. For example, in another edition, in response to Dionysus saying: ‘Nothing but koax koax’, the frogs answer: ‘Yes, and for us that’s fine’. (Aristophanes, *Frogs*, trans. by Ian Johnston, (Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008), p.27). [↑](#footnote-ref-611)
581. In Johnston’s version, Dionysus declares the following:

     Brekekekex koax koax

     from you I’m catching your disease! (p.28).

     The description of voice or language as a disease, specifically an infectious one, is interesting in the context of OOO as it implies a sense of multiplication or reproduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-612)
582. This is discussed in more detail in section three of this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-613)
583. SomethinVicoilar happens in the ‘Circe’ episode of *Ulysses*, as a horse’s neigh—written as: ‘Hohohohohome’—is distorted to suggest both laughter and a desire to return home. (*Ulysses,* p.563). [↑](#footnote-ref-614)
584. *FWEET*’s synopsis for this section describes it as including the ‘storms of warfare’. (*FWEET*, <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?i=1&o=1&r=1&b=1&s=%5E004> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2020]). [↑](#footnote-ref-615)
585. This is discussed in detail in the previous chapter (Chapter Five). [↑](#footnote-ref-616)
586. Vico, par. 32, p.20-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-617)
587. ‘For the giants [who would later become human], enchained under the mountains by the frightful religion of the thunderbolts, learned to check their bestial habit of wandering wild through tVicoreat forest of the earth’ (Vico, par. 504, p.171). [↑](#footnote-ref-618)
588. *FWEET* <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?i=1&o=1&r=1&b=1&s=%5E004> [Date Accessed: 18/09/2020]. [↑](#footnote-ref-619)
589. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-620)
590. This reading in which ‘Helviticus committed deuteronomy’ ‘refers to the act of ‘commit[ing] [something] to writing’ comes from *FWEET*: <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?i=1&o=1&r=1&b=1&s=%5E004> [Date Accessed: 09/04/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-621)
591. Amusingly, this pun refers to both the development of weapons as well as the loss of fur. [↑](#footnote-ref-622)
592. Of course, it is slightly more complicated than that because the animal’s speech is recorded by a human, in a human alphabet, referring to another transcription made by a different human (in a different alphabet). [↑](#footnote-ref-623)
593. The term ‘absent referent’ is used by Carol J. Adams in *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory*, (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Ltd., 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-624)
594. These two fables are ‘The Lion and the Mouse’ and ‘The Dog and its Reflection’ respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-625)
595. Naama Harel, ‘The Animal Voice Behind the Animal Fable’, *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, 7.2 (2009), 9-21 (9). [↑](#footnote-ref-626)
596. Harel, p.10. [↑](#footnote-ref-627)
597. Harel, p.11-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-628)
598. Chris Danta, ‘Kafka’s Mousetrap: The Fable of the Dying Voice’, *SubStance,* Issue 117, 37.3 (2008), 152-168 (156). [↑](#footnote-ref-629)
599. Interestingly, as Shaun is the one who is coughing, he is aligned to Vico’s God. [↑](#footnote-ref-630)
600. Dennis Brown, for example, reads the fable as an account of the rivalry between Joyce and Wyndham Lewis. (Dennis Brown, ‘James Joyce’s Fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper: “Othering”, Critical Leader-Worship and Scapegoating’, *Wyndham Lewis Annual,* VII (2000), 32-42). [↑](#footnote-ref-631)
601. It must be noted that the Gracehoper’s escapades include members of a different species; his ‘sin’, then, is not so much incest as it is bestiality. [↑](#footnote-ref-632)
602. This is because animals cannot sin, even though in medieval times they could be excommunicated. [↑](#footnote-ref-633)
603. ‘commit’, v. 9.a: ‘To carry out (a reprehensible act); to perpetrate (a crime, sin, offence, etc.), *OED Online,* [Date accessed: 18/09/20]. [↑](#footnote-ref-634)
604. The *OED* defines curse as: ‘To speak impiously against, to rail profanely at (the deity, fate, destiny, etc.); to blaspheme.’ (‘curse’, v. 3, *OED Online*, [Date accessed: 18/09/20]. [↑](#footnote-ref-635)
605. Derrida writes: ‘It is as if I were ashamed, therefore, naked in front of this cat, but also ashamed for being ashamed. […] Ashamed of what and before whom? Ashamed of being as naked as a beast. It is generally thought […] that the property unique to animals, what in the last instance distinguishes them from man, is their being naked without knowing it. Not being naked therefore, not having knowledge of their nudity, in short, without consciousness of good and evil.’ (Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, p.4-5). [↑](#footnote-ref-636)
606. Chris Danta, ‘The Grotesque Mouth’ in *Animal Fables After Darwin: Literature, Speciesism, and Metaphor*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) pp.37-60 (p.38). [↑](#footnote-ref-637)
607. These ‘translations’ can be found on *FWEET,* <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?r=1&f=100&b=1&i=1&o=1&s=%5E414> [Date Accessed: 18/09/20]. [↑](#footnote-ref-638)
608. For an in-depth discussion of Vico’s requirements for humanity see the previous chapter of this thesis. In addition to Vico’s theory of language here, his cycle of history is also present, revealed in the line: ‘lamely, harry me, marry me, bury me, bind me’ (414.31-32). [↑](#footnote-ref-639)
609. Given the parallels this has to the violin (indeed the grasshopper in some versions of the fable is depicted as playing the fiddle) raises the question as to whether we can consider music (generated by instruments as opposed to the voice) to be a gestural form of communication. [↑](#footnote-ref-640)
610. *FWEET,* <http://www.fweet.org/cgi-bin/fw\_grep.cgi?r=1&f=100&b=1&i=1&o=1&s=%5E415> [Date Accessed: 18/09/20]. I have been unable, however, to find a corroborating source for this. Other sources say that Ptah is the god of language and not speech specifically. [↑](#footnote-ref-641)
611. Steven Connor, ‘What I Say Goes’ in *Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.3-43 (p.4). [↑](#footnote-ref-642)
612. Of course, OOO would state that an event is just as much an object as something more concrete (like a table). Additionally, by saying that voice is not simply a quality, or an attribute, Connor asserts that it is an independent entity, just as OOO does. [↑](#footnote-ref-643)
613. Connor, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-644)
614. Richard Ellman ed., ‘To Harriet Shaw Weaver’ in *Letters of James Joyce Volumes II and III,* Vol. III (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), pp.99-100 (p.99). [↑](#footnote-ref-645)
615. This text is taken from: ‘Protodrafts: 1st draft, February-March 1928, §1C draft level 0’, *James Joyce Digital Archive (JJDA)*, eds. by Danis Rose and John O’Hanlon, <https://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/p/pC0d.htm> [Date Accessed: 07/08/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-646)
616. ‘Manuscript Fair copy, March 1928, §1C draft level 1’, *JJDA,* <https://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/pc/pcd1.htm> [Date Accessed: 07/08/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-647)
617. This change is made in draft level 5: *‘Tales Told* 1st proofs, April-May 1929, §1C draft level 5’, <https://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/pc/pcd5.htm> [Date Accessed: 07/08/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-648)
618. The first reference to this biblical tale is made in draft level 0+: ‘— I apologuise, Shaun began, but I would rather |+spin spinooze+| you one from the grimmgests of Jacko and Esaup, fable one, feeble too’. (‘Protodrafts: Re-draft, March 1928, §1BC draft level 0+’, <https://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/p/pC0yd.htm> [Date Accessed: 07/08/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-649)
619. *The Quadruple Object*, p.122-3. For a more detailed discussion of Harman and death see Chapter Three of this thesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-650)
620. Morton, p.188. [↑](#footnote-ref-651)
621. Morton, p.188. [↑](#footnote-ref-652)
622. It must be noted here that this translation does not need to be performed by another object: ‘No other objects, let alone relations, are required for an object to “die.” This means that theoretically at least an object can die alone, unknown and unloved. All an object needs to cease existing is to coincide with itself.’ (Morton, p.201). [↑](#footnote-ref-653)
623. Morton, p.196-200. [↑](#footnote-ref-654)
624. Morton, p.193. [↑](#footnote-ref-655)
625. Morton, p.218. [↑](#footnote-ref-656)
626. Morton, p.111. [↑](#footnote-ref-657)
627. Mak, ‘Joyce’s Indifferent Animals’, p.185. [↑](#footnote-ref-658)
628. Morton, p.50. [↑](#footnote-ref-659)
629. Morton p.27. [↑](#footnote-ref-660)
630. Morton, p.55. [↑](#footnote-ref-661)
631. *Ulysses*, p.109. [↑](#footnote-ref-662)
632. ‘Sound, and especially the sound of the human voice, is experienced as enigmatic or anxiously incomplete until its source can be identified’. (Connor, p.20). [↑](#footnote-ref-663)
633. Whilst the more well-known tale criticises the grasshopper for being unprepared for winter, the ‘counter-fable’ condemns the ant for his selfishness. This alternative version is listed as number 166 in the Perry Index (which lists Aesop’s fables), and can be found here: Aesop, ‘Zeus and the Ant’, <http://mythfolklore.net/aesopica/perry/166.htm> [Date Accessed: 29/01/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-664)
634. Lilian Furst, ‘The Term ‘Naturalism’’ in *Naturalism*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971), pp.1-9, (p.2-3). [↑](#footnote-ref-665)
635. Roland N. Stromberg, ‘Introduction’ in *Realism, Naturalism and Symbolism: Modes of Thought and Expression in Europe 1848-1914*, (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), pp.ix-xxxvi (p.xx). [↑](#footnote-ref-666)
636. Edmund Wilson, ‘Symbolism’ in *Axel’s Castle: A Study in the Imaginative Literature of 1870-1930,* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931) pp.1-25(p.6). [↑](#footnote-ref-667)
637. For example, Stephen C. Brennan states that: ‘Opposing the mistaken notion that naturalism, with its emphasis on the bestial and irrational in humans, was a unique expression of the age’s scientific materialism, Pizer considers naturalism as but another version of the relatively “bleak” view of humankind held in the past by such figures as St. Augustine, John Calvin, and Thomas Hobbes’. (Stephen C. Brennan, ‘Literary Naturalism as a Humanism: Donald Pizer on Definitions of Naturalism’, *Studies in American Naturalism*, 5.1, 2010, 8-20, (13)). Additionally, Stromberg goes on to note: ‘critic Stuart Sherman declared the difference between realism and naturalism to be that the former is based upon a theory of human conduct and the latter upon a theory of animal behaviour’. (Stromberg, p.xx). [↑](#footnote-ref-668)
638. Stromberg, p.xxiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-669)
639. Stromberg, p.xxiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-670)
640. Wilson, ‘Symbolism’, p.21. [↑](#footnote-ref-671)
641. Wilson, p.25. [↑](#footnote-ref-672)
642. Phillip Raisor sums up the argument as follows: ‘At its widest, the range extends from those who feel that naturalism primarily determines meaning to those who feel it has no function (it is no more than “superficial and accidental,” says Magalaner). The majority of critics are in the middle, disagreeing basically on three interpretations. One, argued first by Stuart Gilbert, is that naturalism is a foundation or vehicle for the unfolding of symbolic meaning. […] Other critics contend that naturalism works equally and integrally with symbolism to determine meaning […] On the other hand, some critics feel that naturalism determines a separate layer of meaning within multiple layers of meaning […] Consequently, the extent of naturalism in Joyce will probably remain a matter of choice and argument.’ (Phillip Raisor, ‘Grist for the Mill: James Joyce and the Naturalists’, *Contemporary Literature*, 15.4 (1974) 457-473 (462)). [↑](#footnote-ref-673)
643. Richard Robinson, ‘“That Dubious Enterprise, the Irish Short Story”: The Untilled Field and Dubliners’ in *James Joyce in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. by John Nash (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp.46-60, (p.51). [↑](#footnote-ref-674)
644. Wilson, ‘James Joyce’ in *Axel’s Castle*, pp.191-236 (p.204). [↑](#footnote-ref-675)
645. Wilson, ‘The Dream of H.C. Earwicker’ in *The Wound and the Bow,* pp.243-271,(p.258). [↑](#footnote-ref-676)
646. Daniel Whistler, ‘Naturalism and Symbolism’, *Angelaki*, 21.4 (2016), 91-109 (96-97). [↑](#footnote-ref-677)
647. Whistler, p97, p.95. [↑](#footnote-ref-678)
648. Whistler writes: ‘As Hamm puts it more generally (807), through this deployment of the category of the symbolic, “Goethe attempted to secure for ‘nature’ [...] a ‘sense’ independent of human meanings.”’ (Whistler, p.93). [↑](#footnote-ref-679)
649. This inaccessibility is shown through Morton’s cinder block argument, which is discussed earlier in this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-680)
650. Paul K. Saint-Amour, ‘Symbols and Things’, in *The Cambridge Companion to “Ulysses”*, ed. by Sean Latham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 200-215 (204). [↑](#footnote-ref-681)
651. ‘*Finnegans Wake* Manuscript, 1st draft, Nov. 1938, IV§5 draft level 0’, *JJDA*, <http://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/te/ted0.htm> [Date Accessed: 29/01/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-682)
652. ‘blackbird’, *The Medieval Bestiary*, online resource, <http://bestiary.ca/beasts/beast531.htm> [Date Accessed: 29/01/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-683)
653. ‘*Finnegans Wake* Typescript, 6th typescript, Nov. 1938, IV§5 draft level 6’, *JJDA* <http://www.jjda.ie/main/JJDA/F/flex/te/ted6.htm> [Date Accessed: 29/01/2021]. [↑](#footnote-ref-684)
654. The *OED* offers the following two definitions: ‘A black person who has been taken captive as a slave’ and ‘An indentured labourer recruited in the south Pacific to work on a sugar plantation’. (blackbird n., 3.a and 3.b, *OED Online*, [Date accessed: 29/01/2021]). [↑](#footnote-ref-685)
655. This connects to Vico who, as explained in the previous chapter, argued that animal names were often used to dehumanise or objectify the human. [↑](#footnote-ref-686)
656. Samuel Beckett, quoted in: Thirthankar Chakraborty, ‘The Metempsychotic Birds: An Exploration of Samuel Beckett’s Allusions to the Upanishads’, *Rupkatha Journal: On Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities,* 7.2 (2015) 83-88 (83). [↑](#footnote-ref-687)
657. ‘buzzard’ (361.16), for example is used to refer to the figurative meaning of ‘worthless or stupid person’, as opposed to the bird. (buzzard n., 2a, *OED Online*, (Oxford University Press) [Date Accessed: 29/01/2021]). [↑](#footnote-ref-688)
658. *Ulysses,* p.54. [↑](#footnote-ref-689)
659. This crowing appears in the lines ‘the hen in the doran's shantyqueer began in a kikkery key to laugh it off, yeigh, yeigh, neigh, neigh, the way she was wuck to doodle- doo by her gallows bird (how's that? Noball, he carries his bat!)’ (584.20-23), but also on its own separate line, distinct from the surrounding text: ‘Cocorico!’ (584.27). The crowing continues, appearing at numerous stages on this page, as well as onto the subsequent page, 585. [↑](#footnote-ref-690)