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***TEMPORALITY IN SCHUBERT'S MUSIC:  
ADORNO, HEIDEGGER, AND THE  
PROBLEM OF REPETITION***

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*Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy*

## **DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP**

I, Katherine Margaret Cattell, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is my own. When I have relied on the work of others, this is clearly acknowledged.

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## ABSTRACT

Pleas to examine Schubert's music on its own terms, rather than through a Beethovenian lens, are both widespread and acknowledged to date from Robert Schumann onwards. Despite this, it is equally accepted that the comparison between Beethoven and Schubert remains remarkably prevalent in Schubert scholarship. In sympathy with these calls, this thesis takes several concepts now widely understood to be central to Schubert's musical processes (the fragment, repetition, wandering and homecoming) and explores their philosophical consequences in Schubert's music.

Much of what now constitutes the vocabulary for discussing Schubert's music can be traced back to Theodor W. Adorno, particularly the 1928 essay 'Schubert'. Adorno's approach to Schubert is doubtless fruitful, even close to a century later. As this thesis explains, the essay opens up a potential line of Adornian thought running counter to the dominant Adornian narrative about nineteenth-century music, which is entrenched in the Beethovenian-Hegelian paradigm. Instead, the thesis suggests Adorno's use of thought inherited from early German Romanticism, applied in particular to his reception of both Schubert and Mahler, offers an alternative conception of Austro-German nineteenth-century music through the fragment, can lead to a different reading of Schubert's musical time.

This alone, however, cannot overcome Adorno's problematic attitude towards repetition. With that in mind, the thesis turns to Martin Heidegger. Despite Heidegger's lack of engagement with music, he offers a potential for reading Schubert's overwhelming use of repetition as an active process. Heidegger's work places repetition, like wandering and homecoming, against a backdrop of 'being' – providing a different temporal model for interrogating Schubert's use of form: one of 'being' rather than becoming. Through using the work of both Heidegger and Adorno, a further understanding will be gained of such philosophical categories and the way they operate in Schubert's music.

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All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.

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# CHAPTER 1: SCHUBERT, BEING, AND BECOMING

## 1.1 The Problem of Schubert Scholarship

Schubert scholarship is haunted by one name in particular: Ludwig van Beethoven. As Benedict Taylor tellingly notes, the plea to consider Schubert's music on its own merits rather than through a Beethovenian lens is nearly as old as Schubert scholarship itself.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, Schubert scholarship continues to anchor itself to the monolithic other of Beethoven, each author seemingly aware that they are trapped. Not mentioning Beethoven is to ignore one of the main aspects of Schubert scholarship, but to do so necessarily perpetuates the problematic binary between the two composers, however insightful the approach to the relationship between them may be. However thoughtful recent responses in the literature to this problem are, musicology, it would seem, still needs Beethoven to talk about Schubert.<sup>2</sup>

The apparent dominance of the Beethoven Paradigm has not been diminished by the challenges mounted to its symbolic importance over the past few decades.<sup>3</sup> Janet Schmalfeldt underlines the central point thus: 'One can safely say that self-

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<sup>1</sup> Benedict Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory: The String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 ('Rosamunde')', *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, 139 (2014), 41-88 (pp. 42-43).

<sup>2</sup> For examples of particularly nuanced interpretations of the relationship between Schubert and Beethoven, see Suzannah Clark, 'Rossini and Beethoven in the reception of Schubert', in *The Invention of Beethoven and Rossini: Historiography, Analysis, Criticism*, eds. by Nicholas Mathew and Benjamin Walton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 96-120, John M. Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Benedict Taylor, *The Melody of Time: Music and Temporality in the Romantic Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) and Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory'. See Nicholas Marston, 'Schumann's heroes: Schubert, Beethoven, Bach', in *The Cambridge Companion to Schumann*, ed. by Beate Perrey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 48-62, for an account of Robert Schumann's reception of the two composers, which undoubtedly affected subsequent responses.

<sup>3</sup> It is impossible to engage with this issue fully here, due to space constraints. However, challenges to Beethoven have come from various perspectives, most notably in Tia DeNora, *Beethoven and the Construction of Genius: Musical Politics in Vienna, 1792-1803* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995) and the works of New Musicology, such as Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality* (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press), especially pp. 128-30, and Lawrence Kramer, *Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). For a more recent example, see Nicholas Mathew, *Political Beethoven* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The resultant emphasis on gender studies, politics and social context in Beethoven scholarship had clear ramifications for Schubert scholarship, as well as the reappraisal of Schubert's sexuality and its relevance for his music: see Lawrence Kramer, *Franz Schubert: Sexuality, Subjectivity, Song* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Susan McClary, 'The Impromptu Which Trod on A Loaf: or How Music Tells Stories', *Narrative*, 5 (1997), 20-35. For further dialogue on Schubert's sexuality, see Maynard Solomon, 'Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benvenuto Cellini', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, 12 (1989), 193-206, the subsequent response by Rita Steblin, 'Schubert und das Ehe-Consens Gesetz von 1815', *Schubert durch die Brille*, 9 (1992), 32-42 and Solomon's final response: Maynard Solomon, 'Schubert: Some Consequences of Nostalgia', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, 17 (1993), 34-46.

proclaimed theories of form in tonal music begin, and proceed, with efforts to account, both philosophically and analytically, for Beethoven's music.<sup>4</sup> It is not only Beethoven's music which is in need of explanation, but the very systems used to engage with similar music – such as that of Schubert – demanding interrogation too. Thus, two interconnected issues are at stake in relation to this project: the way in which musicology talks about Beethoven and the subsequent impact that this has for Schubert studies.

Carl Dahlhaus suggests 'The works of the middle period prior to Op. 74 – that is, the works from which the Beethoven myth was abstracted – dominated the nineteenth-century concert repertoire and fashioned our image of Beethoven as a classic composer.'<sup>5</sup> In many ways this is both a starting point but also, one might dare say, the sticking point for Schubert scholarship: the perception of middle-period, heroic Beethoven as an aesthetic ideal. Even late Beethoven, let alone Schubert, does not belong to that myth: Dahlhaus makes the telling observation of Beethoven's late style that 'Beethoven's formal structures, unlike those of the romantic period, are neither schematic nor disintegrated but problematic. When we understand them in their own terms rather than simply classifying them as exceptions to imaginary rules, they turn out to be solutions to problems.'<sup>6</sup> The rules to which Dahlhaus refers have been constructed around the heroic Beethoven myth and thus, a surprisingly small corpus of works. In Scott Burnham's seminal 1995 study of the influence of the paradigmatic understanding of the heroic Beethoven, Burnham makes precisely this point: Beethoven's heroic style is 'a style to which only a handful of his works can lay unequivocal claim: two symphonies, two piano sonatas, several overtures, a piano concerto.'<sup>7</sup> Twenty years later, it must read as an indictment of musicology that Burnham proclaims 'The values of Beethoven's heroic style have become the

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<sup>4</sup> Janet Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and Philosophical Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-Century Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 8. Schmalfeldt's original work on this appeared as Janet Schmalfeldt, 'Form as the Process of Becoming: The Beethoven-Hegelian Tradition and the "Tempest" Sonata', *Beethoven Forum*, 4 (1995), 37-71. For one of the responses see: William E. Caplin, 'Beethoven's "Tempest" Exposition: A Response to Janet Schmalfeldt', *Music Theory Online*, 16 (2010) <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.10.16.2/mto.10.16.2.caplin.html> [accessed 15th August 2019], and Schmalfeldt's subsequent response: Janet Schmalfeldt, 'One More Time on Beethoven's "Tempest," From Analytic and Performance Perspectives: A Response to William E. Caplin and James Hepokoski', *Music Theory Online*, 16 (2010), <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.10.16.2/mto.10.16.2.schmalfeldt.php> [accessed 15th August 2019].

<sup>5</sup> Carl Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, trans. by J. Bradford Robinson (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989), p. 80.

<sup>6</sup> Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, p. 88.

<sup>7</sup> Scott Burnham, *Beethoven Hero* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. xiii.

values of music.’<sup>8</sup> An indictment in 1995, the change in the intervening decades has been too little to distance today’s musicology from that claim entirely.

In *Beethoven Hero* Burnham not only explores the way in which Beethovenian paradigms have become so embedded in our wider aesthetic framework for discussing music, but concludes by searching for a way beyond such implicit limitations. At that point, his main concern is Beethoven’s influence over so much of the way in which music of that period and beyond is assessed: ‘The case of the reception of the *Eroica* finale shows the depth of our attachment to the end-orientation model. This way of understanding Beethoven’s musical process clearly arises from the strong instances of several of the first movements and from the four-movement design of the Fifth Symphony.’<sup>9</sup> While Burnham accepts the simultaneous prevalence of this narrative and the simultaneous quandary implicit within it, naturally the scope of his work cannot extend to the extent of these problems for other composers. Acknowledging the pervasiveness of this narrative, he suggests that musicology should work towards moving beyond it: ‘The conviction that our mainstream musical discourse has come to be fundamentally constructed by a single compelling musical style begs the question of the possibility of getting beyond this paradigm.’<sup>10</sup> Later on, he indicates using ‘presence’ could usher in a way forward: ‘I would like to return to the notion of presence and suggest that as the fundamental metaphor applied to Beethoven’s music, it can provide a point of departure for attenuating our urge to make teleological process the exclusive and defining agenda of music.’<sup>11</sup>

This reads like a call to arms for musicology: to accept that teleology can only take us so far in our understanding of music. More specifically, to place such demands on the discipline exhorts us to look at other ways a musical unfolding of both form and time can operate. In his final chapter, Burnham acknowledges the value that this has for Schubert scholarship: ‘If we can thus attenuate the valuation of process, we are less inclined to read a composer like Schubert as the negative half of a binary opposition, as “process-minus,” or Beethoven simply as “process-plus.” Instead we will ask why we value the presence of any given music and how we are present in the experience of that music.’<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, p. xiii.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. xviii.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 162-63. There is further discussion of ‘presence’ later on in this chapter.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 167.



From a Schubertian point of view, this has clear potential, even though Burnham does not develop the idea here. ‘Presence’, as he understands it, clearly offers a productive way of interpreting music that does not ‘become’ or is not fundamentally shaped towards an end-point. Presence hovers in the background of Burnham’s subsequent work<sup>13</sup> but is regrettably never explored overtly even in that on Schubert, rich though his insights into Schubert’s musical processes are.<sup>14</sup> Instead, this work shares a stance on Schubert’s exploration of mortality, which Burnham notes is particularly clear in Schubert compared to Beethoven: ‘Whereas Beethoven can seem to enlist time in a glorious ride to the future, Schubert makes us feel its irrevocable passing. We hear the sound of memory, the sound of mortality – and it is beautiful.’<sup>15</sup> In his 2014 article, which uses the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke as well as paintings by Caspar David Friedrich to explore Schubert’s music, Burnham invokes what he calls ‘thresholds’ to discuss the landscape of Schubert’s music<sup>16</sup> but in the end returns to mortality once more:

If we allow the hermeneutic resonance of death to inflect all of this (as the threshold from which anything else worthy of the name borrows its shadowy magic), the Quintet can become, like *Winterreise*, or like the two books of Rilke’s poetry invoked above, a set of variations of mortality – stylings of death and dying, passages back and forth across impossible thresholds. The frequency of these crossing, along with the heightened vividness of the worlds they join together, conveys an uncanny loss of certainty, a loss of faith in reality as something stable and impermeable: as though the Real may be but a Vision, as though a semitone could change everything.<sup>17</sup>

Burnham’s emphasis on mortality is one way in which to express the apparent emphasis of the temporality in Schubert’s music. Whilst Beethoven’s heroic style displays a forward-looking approach to time, Schubert’s deals with a backward-looking one through categories such as memory and nostalgia. Mortality, like memory and nostalgia, looks to the past, reminding us what has been lost – or the finitude of the human experience. Here, then, presence becomes valuable as a way of grasping onto notions of being as well as a concept that can stand counter

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<sup>13</sup> There is no reference to this concept in Burnham’s recent work on Mozart either: cf. Scott Burnham, *Mozart’s Grace* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> See Scott Burnham, ‘Schubert and the Sound of Memory’, *The Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 655-63, Scott Burnham, ‘Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth: Schubert and the Burden of Repetition’, *19th-Century Music*, 29 (2005), 31-41, and Scott Burnham, ‘Thresholds Between, Worlds Apart’, *Music Analysis*, 33 (2014), 156-67. Ian Bostridge also discusses Friedrich’s work in connection with that of Schubert, to which again, there is further reference in Chapter 4 (cf. Ian Bostridge, *Schubert’s Winter Journey: Anatomy of an Obsession* (London: Faber and Faber, 2015).)

<sup>15</sup> Burnham, ‘Schubert and the Sound of Memory’, p. 663.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Thresholds’ are discussed further in Chapter 4, especially 4.5, and linked to a discussion of Martin Heidegger’s writing on Georg Trakl.

<sup>17</sup> Burnham, ‘Thresholds Between, Worlds Apart’, pp. 165-66.

to becoming. The possibilities this affords Schubert scholarship are discussed more fully below.

Both the perception of Beethoven's and Schubert's markedly contrasting treatment of temporality and consternation as to how to deal with it have historical roots, dating back to the nineteenth century. John Daverio reveals the longstanding awareness of these differences when he explains how Robert Schumann saw Schubert's treatment of form as divergent to Beethoven's.<sup>18</sup> Ultimately such differing approaches to form lead to equally contrasting temporal emphases within the music. Daverio sums up Schumann's opinion thus: 'whereas Beethoven, especially in the symphonic works of his "heroic" phase, drives headlong from the present into the future, thus emulating the teleological thrust of drama, Schubert treats the present as a pretext for summoning up or mulling over the past, tending as he does toward epic breadth and lyric introspection.'<sup>19</sup> Daverio's phrasing here invokes Carl Dahlhaus (discussed below) as much as it does Schumann. Schumann too made the claim that Schubert's music was at times 'lyric'.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, in setting out the Schubertian influence for Schumann's own music, Daverio also uses the word presence (amongst others) to describe Schubert's music: 'Schumann's methods of unfolding larger designs owe quite a bit to the inimitable blend of presence and pastness, immediacy and reminiscence in his "one and only" Schubert.'<sup>21</sup>

In Schumann's time, then, there was already an acceptance that Schubert's approach to musical time was not like that of the heroic Beethoven. Indeed, Schumann himself suggests Schubert's music reflects an inward subjectivity: 'As for the general inward meaning of these creations, Schubert has tones for the

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<sup>18</sup> This is also a point echoed by Laura Tunbridge. Tunbridge suggests that Schumann suggests Schubert's instrumental works 'were too repetitive and lacking in structural cohesion.' (See Laura Tunbridge, 'Preface', in *Drama in the Music of Franz Schubert*, eds. by Joe Davies and James William Sobaskie (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2019), (pp. xi-xix), p. xxiii.) It is also worth noting that Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen notes the role of Beethoven in Schubert's own 'Jahr der Krise', suggesting that Schubert's had his own struggles with how to deal with the legacy of Beethoven (see Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen, *Franz Schubert* (München: C. H. Beck, 2011), p. 49.) Nonetheless, Schubert did refer to Beethoven's late works (cf. Walther Dürr, 'Schubert's compositional strategies', in *Rethinking Schubert*, eds. by Lorraine Byrne Bodley and Julian Horton (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), (pp. 29-40) p. 30.)

<sup>19</sup> John Daverio, "'One More Beautiful Memory of Schubert': Schumann's Critique of the Impromptus, D. 935', *Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 604-18 (p. 605).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Robert Schumann, *Music and Musicians: Essays and Criticisms*, trans. and ed. by Fanny Raymond Ritter (London: William Reeves, 1880), pp. 176-77: 'In a word, the trio in E-flat major is more active, manly, and dramatic; this, on the contrary, is more passive, feminine, lyric.'

<sup>21</sup> John Daverio, *Crossing Paths: Schubert, Schumann and Brahms* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 5.

most delicate shades of feeling, thoughts, even accidents and occurrences of life. Manifold though the passions and acts of men may be, as manifold is Schubert's music.'<sup>22</sup> Like subsequent various writers, among them Adorno and then Burnham significantly later, Schumann claims that Schubert's music speaks of the human condition. This inward-looking form of expression is an indication of Schubert's preoccupation with the musical past.<sup>23</sup>

Suzannah Clark emphasises much the same point and she too returns to much earlier writers to reveal the historical nature of the problem at stake. Drawing particular attention to the absence of Schubert in Carl Dahlhaus's *Nineteenth-Century Music*,<sup>24</sup> she then argues 'a number of scholars who have theorized Schubert's musical language have ultimately suspended and even undermined their analyses, claiming that the proper Schubertian mode of apprehension belongs to the realm of performance.'<sup>25</sup> She argues the 'status quo for music theory' means that 'only music like Beethoven's contributes to development of theoretical principles.'<sup>26</sup> These are certainly not new hurdles to be overcome, and to this end Clark references an 1856 report by the writer and impresario John Ella. Ella describes an instance of the Kapellmeister of the Vienna Court Opera, Ludwig Wilhelm Reuling, outlining Beethoven's and Schubert's compositional approaches in a Vienna café, which Clark describes as follows: 'As ever, Schubert was, by contrast, a mere vessel or medium through which music emerged: just as the Phoenix arises from ashes by magic, without undergoing any biological process, so Schubert's music appeared fully formed, magically bypassing any Beethovenian process of organic growth – a process whose audible musical symbol is dense motivic working.'<sup>27</sup> The Beethoven found in Schubert scholarship is once again shown to be a constructed image, helpful for neither Beethoven nor Schubert scholarship, but undoubtedly a contributor to the wider hierarchies found in both music analysis and musicology more broadly – and within them, opinions about Schubert.

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<sup>22</sup> Schumann, *Music and Musicians*, p. 255.

<sup>23</sup> This stands in contrast to Eric Blom's assertion, for example, that Schubert is 'needlessly circuitous in his use of form': see Eric Blom, 'The Middle-Classical Schubert', *The Musical Times*, 69 (1928), 890-91 (p. 890).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*.

<sup>25</sup> Clark, 'Rossini and Beethoven in the reception of Schubert', p. 98.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

Clark also refers to Eduard Hanslick's dualism between Beethoven and Schubert in which the former belongs to the public sphere and the latter the private sphere.<sup>28</sup> From Schumann and Hanslick onwards, the discourse surrounding Schubert has maintained there is a dialectical opposition to Beethoven, whatever form that opposition may take: and escape seems almost unattainable. Moreover, how this relationship is constituted becomes ever more clear. In some ways the difficulty Hanslick has in attempting to describe what happens in Schubert's music is much the same as commentators over a hundred years later: he lacks the necessary terms. In a review of a performance of Schubert's 'Unfinished Symphony', he writes that: 'When, after the few introductory measures, clarinet and oboe in unison began their gentle cantilena above the calm murmur of the violins, every child recognized the composer, and a muffled "Schubert" was whispered in the audience. He had hardly entered, but it seemed that one recognized him by his step, by his way of opening the door.'<sup>29</sup>

Historically, then, the perception of Schubert has been as some sort of 'not Beethoven', which, beyond stating that there are explicit differences between the two composers, achieves little else. Attempts to understand Schubert's processes are a long-standing tenet of the scholarship, but sometimes absent in the crude construction of Beethoven employed in Schubert criticism is a crucial point made by Benedict Taylor: that Beethoven too departed from the temporal and teleological model of his heroic style in his later works. He explains 'It must be noted that Beethoven's own music is already liable to collapse the all-too-ready distinctions between an "intensive" teleological experience and an "extensive" nostalgic or even purportedly timeless state, quite unaided by his younger colleague.'<sup>30</sup> It almost sounds as though the late Beethoven can be categorised as that 'non-Beethoven' too; more readily interpreted through the category of presence than process. Despite his conviction that the later Beethoven and Schubert are close, Taylor states there is still something fundamentally different about Schubert's music that sets it apart: 'Qualities of memory, reminiscence, fatalism, wandering, circularity or non-teleological lyricism, dwelling on the sensuous present, seem to constitute some of the most characteristic and endearing attributes that make Schubert sound like Schubert.'<sup>31</sup> Whilst the divide

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<sup>28</sup> Clark, 'Rossini and Beethoven in the reception of Schubert', p. 97.

<sup>29</sup> Eduard Hanslick, *Music Criticisms 1846-1899*, trans. and ed. by Henry Pleasants (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1950), p. 102.

<sup>30</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 42.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 42.

between Schubert and Beethoven is much more nuanced than it may initially appear to be, for Taylor, along with most others, the specific qualities of Schubert's music can be found in its approach to time. Such traits involve a focus on the past – borne out by memory and nostalgia, for example – but also a preoccupation with the present, breaking down any possibility of end-orientation. Into that latter category falls repetition, but also the fragment, wandering, and homecoming. The divide, though, in a sense is a needless one: the combined emphasis on present and past is what makes the music 'backwards-looking'.

Suzannah Clark suggests 1978, seventeen years prior to the publication of *Beethoven Hero* and a Schubert anniversary year, was a seminal year for Schubert studies, arguing that 'In 1978, Schubert's sonata form was thus poised to come into its own.'<sup>32</sup> Two particular publications lead her to identify it as such. The first is Dahlhaus's article on the String Quartet in G, D. 887,<sup>33</sup> in which he invokes Adorno's work on Mahler in order to call for Schubert's sonata forms to be categorised as 'lyric-epic', thus setting them apart from the 'dramatic-dialectic' sonata forms of Beethoven.<sup>34</sup> Dahlhaus, she claims 'traps Schubert [...] in a binary opposition with Beethoven.'<sup>35</sup> Clark's interpretation of Dahlhaus's essay on Schubert's sonata forms is that it is an example of a process to which Dahlhaus was prone: 'Dahlhaus was fond of redressing the balance by changing yardsticks.'<sup>36</sup> Despite Clark's criticism, it is because of the possibilities afforded by the 'lyric-epic' that Dahlhaus's essay remains widely cited and provides one of the clearest calls for Schubert's music to be understood as the manifestation of a musical process that does not necessarily map comfortably onto a dialectical schema. The second of the two publications is James Webster's first article<sup>37</sup> on Schubert's sonata forms, in which the lyricism of Schubert's work is central to his categorisation of his forms.<sup>38</sup> Clark, however, claims that 'neither Dahlhaus nor Webster fully managed to achieve a new Schubertian definition of form, despite

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<sup>32</sup> Suzannah Clark, *Analyzing Schubert* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 162.

<sup>33</sup> It is notable that Clark sees this Dahlhaus text as seminal, given her criticism of Dahlhaus's treatment of Schubert elsewhere (see above).

<sup>34</sup> See Carl Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert: The First Movement of the G-Major String Quartet, op. 161 (D. 887)', trans. by Thilo Reinhard, in *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. by Walter Frisch (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), pp. 1-12 (p. 1). For further discussion of Schubert's music in relation to Adorno's work on Mahler, see Chapter 2.

<sup>35</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 166.

<sup>36</sup> Clark, 'Rossini and Beethoven in the reception of Schubert', p. 97.

<sup>37</sup> See initially James Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Form and Brahms's First Maturity', *19th-Century Music*, 2 (1978), 18-35, (p. 19). Webster went on to publish a second article the following year: James Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Form and Brahms's First Maturity (II)', *19th-Century Music*, 3 (1979), 52-71.

<sup>38</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, pp. 161-62.

their important insights into his formal habits.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, Clark's basic point – that Schubert studies changed subsequent to 1978 – remains intact. In Clark's eyes Webster and Dahlhaus may not have fully achieved their aims, but she admits their work did nonetheless change musicology's understanding of Schubert's sonata forms, if not to the radical degree that they may have originally envisaged.

In the volume which includes the first publication of Dahlhaus's 1978 essay in English, Walter Frisch makes a very clear statement about the state of Schubert scholarship as he understood it at that time: 'Perhaps one reason Schubert's works have remained critically impoverished is that although they form part of the mainstream of the Viennese Classical/Romantic tradition, their "concrete values" are not easily elucidated by the methods developed for other composers.'<sup>40</sup> His evaluation of Dahlhaus's work is considerably more generous than Clark's, and Frisch suggests 'One special analytical challenge in Schubert studies is presented by the shorter piano pieces and the Lieder, which deviate even more sharply from the Beethoven/Classical paradigm.'<sup>41</sup> Although Frisch's work takes a similar guise to Dahlhaus's, he turns to a strophic song, reading it as an unresolved dialectic:

But for Schubert, re-creating Goethe's poem in musical terms was not as easy. Indeed, it was something of a Procrustean effort, an attempt to fit into the conventional folklike strophic structure, implied by the poem's broader design and by the musical tradition, some very unconventional music, inspired by the content of the poem. To reiterate my initial point, then: the form and content of *Nähe des Geliebten* engage in a dialectic. That the dialectic remains unresolved is not a flaw; it is, rather, the reason why *Nähe des Geliebten* stands as one of Schubert's most compelling early songs.<sup>42</sup>

Like Dahlhaus, Frisch points out that the boundary between the apparently dialectical Beethoven and non-dialectical Schubert may not always be as clear as it seems. However, that does not magically provide musicology with the requisite vocabulary and techniques needed to discuss Schubert's music where it seems inexplicable.

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<sup>39</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 162.

<sup>40</sup> Frisch, 'Introduction', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, pp. ix-xiv (p. x).

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xi.

<sup>42</sup> Frisch, 'Schubert's *Nähe des Geliebten* (D. 162): Transformation of the *Volkston*', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, (pp. 175-99) p. 197.

In a sense, Schubert's music has seemed so inexplicable, dare one say almost enigmatic, because of the reach of Beethoven's music for those who have helped develop and situate such paradigms: Burnham states, for example, that Beethoven's music was definitive for the theory of scholars such as Rudolph Réti, Adorno, and Dahlhaus.<sup>43</sup> That too is echoed in Dahlhaus, who states his case more categorically:

Analysis and hermeneutics [...] arose [...] simultaneously as opposite ways of unraveling the difficulties posed by the reception of Beethoven. It is no coincidence that virtually all analytic methods of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Adolf Bernhard Marx's to Hugo Riemann's, from Heinrich Schenker's to Rudolf Réti's, took their examples primarily from Beethoven. By the same token, the hermeneutics of music [...] have again and again, from Schumann and Wagner to Hermann Kretzschmar and Arnold Schering, taken as their starting point the interpretation of Beethoven.<sup>44</sup>

With Dahlhaus's explanation of the reaches of that influence, the extent of the problem becomes apparent. Clearly, Schubert has certainly been a historical casualty of these systems and their presumptions and this background has engendered questions about Schubert's approach to large-scale form.<sup>45</sup> Such questions have fed into a wider narrative about unity or disunity – perhaps one of the main reasons that, historically, commentators have struggled with his music.<sup>46</sup> However, it would be unfair to cast the analytical quest as one seeking unity alone: Jonathan D. Kramer, for example, suggests a rethinking of the relationship between unity and disunity:

I do not want to remove unity from musical analysis, but I do want to demote it from its privileged position as a universal or necessary condition. I want to try to use formalist analysis – as it has existed and also, where possible, in new ways – to try to understand how irrationality, disorder, chaos, disunity and so on, can make musical experience richer and more varied than is suggested in traditional analyses.<sup>47</sup>

Kramer's point is a telling one for Schubert scholarship, where quests to find unity potentially lead to readings of Schubert's forms as unsuccessful or

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<sup>43</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, p. 118. For further discussion of Rudolph Réti's work on Beethoven, see Chapter 3.

<sup>44</sup> Dahlhaus, *Nineteenth-Century Music*, p. 11.

<sup>45</sup> In a sense, harmonic expectations of Schubert's forms would seem to be skewed. In light of this, see Edward T. Cone, 'Schubert's Promissory Note: An Exercise in Musical Hermeneutics', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, pp. 13-30.

<sup>46</sup> For examples of further work on unity and disunity and the role that such concepts have to play in analysis, see the following articles: Alan Street, 'Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories: The Resistance to Musical Unity', *Music Analysis*, 8 (1989), 77-123, Robert P. Morgan, 'The Concept of Unity and Music Analysis', *Music Analysis*, 22 (2003), 7-50, Jonathan D. Kramer, 'The Concept of Disunity and Musical Analysis', *Music Analysis*, 23 (2004), 361-72, as well as Carl Dahlhaus, 'Some Models of Unity in Musical Form', trans. by Charlotte Carroll Prather, *Journal of Music Theory*, 19 (1975), 2-30.

<sup>47</sup> Kramer, 'The Concept of Disunity and Musical Analysis', p. 370.

problematic.<sup>48</sup> Varied readings of Schubert's works using different types of analysis are nonetheless plentiful.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, much of what Kramer says is readily applicable in some way to Schubert's music, despite his envisioning its use for music of the following century. Whether dealt with analytically or by other means, the fundamental assertion about the relationship between Beethoven and Schubert is often broadly the same: there is a difference between Beethoven and Schubert's music; musicology needs to move 'beyond' Beethoven in order to discuss Schubert's music in a meaningful way and Schubert and Beethoven are not quite what they seem in this binary. However this is iterated and subsequently explored, the overriding issue is that Schubert's architecture of musical time and space invites (or provokes) quite different conceptual frameworks to the organic development that leads to the Beethovenian telos.

John Gingerich expresses this problem particularly effectively. Gingerich is very clear about why he turns to analysis: he sees it as a method of interpretation, but his overriding fascination with Schubert's music (like Burnham's) comes from the way in which it treats time: 'What I find revelatory and new in Schubert's music is his manipulation of our experience of time, and of the states of consciousness and self-consciousness that are inseparable from our experience of time. Memory, reminiscence, nostalgia, regret, hedonism, dreams, daydreams, contemplation, reverie, meditation, repose, alienation, exile, banishment – all of these require various degrees of relaxation of time.'<sup>50</sup> He then argues such hallmarks of the exploration of time are not even possible in music driven by teleology and development. Moreover, he suggests the tools of analysis are, in some ways, not suited to his aims, because analysis, he argues, is governed by spatial rather than temporal concerns: 'In trying to articulate how Schubert's music expands time,

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<sup>48</sup> The pertinence of theory (a deliberately ambiguous term here!) initially conceived for much later music for Schubert's music is a recurring theme, as will be seen in the subsequent discussion of Adorno's work on Mahler (see 1.2 and especially Chapter 2). This point alone suggests that the potential of exploring the approach to temporality in Schubert's music could have ramifications for music composed long after 1828.

<sup>49</sup> A tiny sample of the diversity to be found in approaches to analysing Schubert's music can be seen in the following: V. Kofi Agawu, 'Schubert's harmony revisited: the songs "Du liebst mich nicht" and "Dass Sie hier gewesen"', *Journal of Musicological Research*, 9 (1989), 23-42, David Beach, 'Schubert's Experiments with Sonata Form: Formal-Tonal Design versus Underlying Structure', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 15 (1993), 1-18, David Beach, 'Harmony and Linear Progression in Schubert's Music', *Journal of Music Theory*, 38 (1994), 1-20, Richard Cohn, 'As Wonderful as Star Clusters: Instruments for Gazing at Tonality in Schubert', *19th-Century Music*, 22 (1999), 213-32, David Damschroder, *Harmony in Schubert* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Anne Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?: Towards an understanding of Repetition in Franz Schubert's Instrumental Chamber Music' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, King's College, 2010), and Gordon Sly, 'The Architecture of Key and Motive in a Schubert Sonata', *Intégral*, 9 (1995), 67-89.

<sup>50</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 110.



and how it evokes existential states, the shorthand technical language of theory proves hopelessly inadequate. What is left is prose, in all its imprecision and subjectivity.<sup>51</sup> For all its undoubted strengths, analysis, developed for a corpus of music functioning in ways potentially fundamentally opposed to Schubert's, has particular challenges to face in this context.

In this way, much of Schubert's music would seem to avoid the trajectory of normative organic development, creating the backward focus so prominent for the listener. In turn, this reveals the inherent flaws behind attempting to interpret Schubert's music using an aesthetic founded on essentially Beethovenian expectations. What Gingerich describes as 'relaxation' involves a different emphasis between the temporal phases of past, present, and future. The most obvious stage of that is when present and past relate to each other in a way that is not entirely orchestrated by what will come in the future. Instead, the present reflects the musical past as it pushes towards the future. Julian Johnson summarises the temporal shift, situating it in relation to a larger idea of modernity. Using *Winterreise*, D. 911<sup>52</sup> to refer to the interaction between present and past, he makes a link to Schubert's approach to tonality as well as noting the difference between that and a Beethovenian approach to resolution: 'The alternation of major and minor modes, the simplest of musical dualities, becomes an absolute in Schubert of present lack and remembered plenitude. This lack of resolution, leaving structural dissonance quietly unresolved at the end of a movement, is Schubert's modernity, the flipside of Beethoven's noisy resolutions.'<sup>53</sup>

This discussion of the problem of Schubert scholarship and the role of Beethoven has purposefully avoided engagement with the work of one particular commentator: Adorno. Instead, Adorno lurks at the edges of what has so far been said here. In some ways, the limits of musicology's standard terminology do not seem to have posed so much of a problem to Adorno. As the next section of this chapter will discuss more fully, Adorno's work on Schubert opens up an alternative set of categories that is perhaps more appropriate to Schubert's musical processes. Such terms can be traced through subsequent Schubert

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<sup>51</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 110.

<sup>52</sup> For further discussion of *Winterreise*, see Chapter 4.

<sup>53</sup> Julian Johnson, *Out of Time: Music and the Making of Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 40.

scholarship, where they are often employed to explain the unfolding of different processes. Although Adorno's work also poses problems (and these are at times not insubstantial), as will be discussed below, it still enables discussion of Schubert's manipulation of musical time. Over the course of this thesis, Schubert's music will be explored in the context of four such terms: the fragment, repetition, wandering, and homecoming. Nonetheless, a purely Adornian reading of Schubert does not suffice for various reasons: the lack of musical detail, the remaining problems around the notions of inherited Hegelian (and ultimately Beethovenian) dialectics and development, and thus, at times, the seeming aesthetic disregard for repetition, to name but a few.

Repetition, in particular, is a crucial part of Schubert's music and Adorno's dismissal of it is hugely problematic in this context. This, and the discussion in the fourth chapter of the concepts of wandering and homecoming, are the reason for the introduction of a third figure: Martin Heidegger. Heidegger offers philosophical possibilities for exploring the temporality of Schubert's music that Adorno does not, most particularly in connection to Schubert's use of repetition (see Chapter 3) and in Chapter 4 the reading of wandering and homecoming in Schubert's music uses the work of both. The reasons for this choice and the possibilities it offers are set out in the third and final section of this chapter. What began as a question in the realm of music analysis is thus explored as an inherently philosophical problem.

## **1.2 Adorno's Beethoven versus Adorno's Schubert**

### **1.2.1 Adorno's Beethoven**

Adorno's writing on Beethoven can be divided into two distinct categories: the fragments of his Beethoven study and his writing on Beethoven elsewhere. The former is intrinsically problematic: whilst all the fragments were published in one volume posthumously, Rolf Tiedemann notes that 'The book at the reader's disposal contains, on the one hand, every word Adorno wrote for his *Beethoven* study [...] All the same, it is not a book by Adorno. It lacks the closed, integrated structure of a completed work; it has remained a fragment.'<sup>54</sup> In one sense, the material is incomplete. However, the English translation of this material has contributed to the considerable momentum which Adorno's Hegel and

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<sup>54</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. viii-ix.

Beethoven pairing enjoys. Here Adorno details a theory linking Beethoven's middle-period music with Hegelian philosophy, but also takes into account the very different philosophical processes that inform the later works. Two interconnected points come out of this. The first is that link with Hegelian philosophy, which feeds into a much wider narrative of becoming adopted from philosophy and is incorporated into music theory. Max Paddison, in his exploration of Adorno's aesthetics, outlines the Hegelian dialectic as follows:

The Hegelian dialectic therefore constitutes a process of continuity and change which is *historical* in character. Human consciousness acts on 'nature', and in the process changes both itself and nature. This 'mediated nature' is historical, and is what constitutes 'reality' for us. That is to say, we make reality through the process of our interaction with 'second nature' and through our separation from and reflection upon it. Therefore for Hegel reality is this discourse, in all its diverse and concrete particularity, and it is this dynamic process of *Becoming* (*Werden*) – as opposed to static *Being* (*Sein*) – which he means when he uses that most frequently misunderstood of all his concepts, *Spirit* (*Geist*).<sup>55</sup>

This exemplifies the standard understanding of Classical, but most particularly, Beethovenian sonata form as a forward-moving, teleological, processual form. In this way, the process is understood as both dynamic and thus ever-changing. It has gained such traction that its influence on musicology means it became, at least for a while, almost hegemonic. Understood as akin to Hegelian becoming (*Werden*), this process of sonata form is only made possible through musical development. Thus, it is the all-encompassing development in Beethoven's heroic sonata forms that makes them distinct from other contemporary sonata forms. Paddison suggests that Adorno interprets the sonata form that Beethoven inherited as follows:

Beethoven's problem was how to take further the state of balance achieved within the dynamic form of the Classical sonata – a state of balance which Adorno, somewhat questionably seems to equate with a lack of thoroughgoing development and with a sense of stasis resulting from the large-scale repetition and symmetry represented by the recapitulation in Haydn and Mozart. Beethoven's contribution, he maintains, is his extension of the concept of the development to the point where it cuts across the conventional sectionalization of the sonata and pervades the form as a whole.<sup>56</sup>

For Adorno, development, as the impetus for forward motion in Beethoven, beyond that found in Haydn and Mozart's music, elevates sonata form to one saturated with dynamism throughout (rather than merely confined to the development section). In many ways, this reading of Mozart and Haydn has

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<sup>55</sup> Max Paddison, *Adorno's aesthetics of music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 113.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 234.

similarities to Adorno's criticism of Schubert: development is not the predominant formal or temporal force. Instead, form is often constructed through repetition. Both these factors prevent Schubert's form being governed by a dynamic process of becoming in Adorno's eyes.

Indeed, development provides the key to Adorno's reading of a parallel to the Hegelian dialectic, and thus the overarching importance of Beethoven's music. Development is central to the working-out of that dialectic in music; without it, indeed, there is no dialectic. As Paddison goes on to state, 'For Adorno, the "truth" of Beethoven's music concerns the way in which the thematic material, as "Subject" in both musical and philosophical senses, derives from the "whole" – i.e. tonality – but at the same time separates itself from it as a conventional system of tonal relations through re-creating the system from out of itself.'<sup>57</sup> The relationship between subject and whole sets up a possible dialectic, which when enacted leads to a Hegelian process of becoming:

This it does through a process of development and fragmentation (as 'self-reflection'), reducing given 'being' (*Sein*) to its basic elements and transforming these elements into a process of 'becoming' (*Werden*), before reconciling them once more with the 'whole' in the light of what has happened to them through the process of development in the recapitulation. In this way the Beethoven sonata form is interpreted by Adorno as an embodiment of the Hegelian dialectic.<sup>58</sup>

Here is the crux of the issue: Beethoven's highly unified sonata forms produce a musical process that Adorno interprets as a working out of Hegel's dialectic in musical form and crucially for this study, repetition would seem only to impede that process. Janet Schmalfeldt states the following of the relationship between Beethoven, Hegel, and Adorno: 'What is Hegelian about Beethoven's process itself for Adorno is its aspect of *becoming* (*Werden*).'<sup>59</sup> But, as Burnham underlines and as Adorno acknowledges, there are only a handful of such sonatas in the whole of Beethoven's output. Hegelian becoming, which is of paramount importance to Adorno's interpretation of Beethoven, like its musical counterpart, cannot so readily be applied to Schubert's music. Janet Schmalfeldt, clearly indebted to Adorno, mentions the idea of 'form coming into being' in connection with Schubert.<sup>60</sup> Schmalfeldt's focus on process, however, like Adorno, does not

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<sup>57</sup> Paddison, *Adorno's aesthetics of music*, p. 236.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>59</sup> Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, p. 4.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

entirely do justice to the moments in Schubert's music where such process seems to be absent.

Despite their shared roots, there are clear differences between Hegel's and Adorno's dialectics, although the two are closely related. Max Paddison summarises this difference as follows: 'While Adorno's dialectical approach to history is clearly Hegelian in origin, the process is not seen as leading to final reconciliation of opposites within some metaphysical concept of "the whole". The whole – in this case the social totality – is fractured, insists Adorno, and access to understanding it is only by way of the fragment, within which the "fragmented whole" is mediated.'<sup>61</sup> For Hegel, the dialectic can be a positive process: there is a discrepancy in the two sides in that the bondsman turns out to be in more privileged position than his master with regards to his own freedom,<sup>62</sup> but the dialectic leads to synthesis and the possibilities that that affords.<sup>63</sup> For Adorno, by contrast, it permits a glance at something much more negative: the 'fractured social totality' identified by Paddison.

Adorno's dialectic leads to something neither complete nor positive in nature; it is a much bleaker take on a similar concept. The inherent negativity of this interpretation means Adorno's reading of Beethoven's music cannot be entirely positive, and while this becomes more apparent as one turns to Adorno's understanding of Beethoven's late works, it is also true of Adorno's reading of Beethoven's middle-period works. Of the latter, his major concern is its affirmative character as an aesthetic whole, which leads to a propensity for it to be conscripted as ideology. Indeed, he writes that 'With regard to construction it will be decisive to identify the moment of negativity in the perfection of the middle works, a moment which took the music beyond this perfection.'<sup>64</sup> Here

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<sup>61</sup> Paddison, *Adorno's aesthetics of music*, p. 119. The fractured whole is indicative of Adorno's Romantic heritage. For further discussion of Adorno, early German Romanticism, and the fragment, see Chapter 2.

<sup>62</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), pp. 115-18.

<sup>63</sup> This is not the time or place for more detailed discussion of this particularly famous passage of Hegel's, but insightful criticism can be found in sources such as the following: Larry Krasnoff, *Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit': An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 101-106 and Terry Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For detailed discussions of the relationship between philosophy and music in Hegel, see particularly Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) and Andrew Bowie, *Music, Philosophy and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>64</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, p. 99.

one can see that there must be an aspect of negativity, even in Beethoven's middle works, for the argument (the dialectic) to function.

In the 1969 lecture 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', Adorno claims the legitimacy of the Schenkerian approach for Beethoven's music, before saying that it justifies both tonality and forms based on tonality.<sup>65</sup> He goes on:

Beethoven, as it were, tried to reconstruct tonality through his autonomous and individualised music. In a manner not unlike Kant – where, if you will allow me a philosophical digression, the objectively-given world of experience is thrown into question and has then to be recreated once more by the Subject and its forms – in Beethoven the forms (particularly the large, dynamic forms like the Sonata) could be said to re-emerge from out of the specific process of the composition. It is actually *tonality itself* which, in Beethoven's case, is both theme as well as outcome, and in this sense the Schenkerian concept of the Fundamental Line to some extent correctly applies here.<sup>66</sup>

Beethoven's musical processes are dependent on musical material that seems to generate more material from within, explained by Burnham as follows: 'analysis and criticism are motivated by a kind of ethical compulsion: one *must* show how musical works are integral and inviolate, self-generating and self-sustaining systems.'<sup>67</sup> The process, with Beethoven, is everything: the work is generated from the process itself, giving rise to the complete system – in a markedly Hegelian sense.

The second point that comes out of the links between Adorno, Beethoven, and Hegel is the possibility, using Adorno's thought, to move beyond the dominant argument about development. In the 1928 Schubert essay, Adorno refers to the 'power of active will that rises from the inmost nature of Beethoven', something that Schubert's music does not have.<sup>68</sup> Here, Adorno suggests that there are two very different styles of composition at work; essentially Beethoven has this capacity, while Schubert does not. Two very different historical ideas are at stake – the self-generating, dialectical material in Beethoven's music versus the discrete, separate elements that make up Schubert's music. Adorno's interpretation of Hegel's dialectic – and his subsequent application of it to Beethoven's music – is central to the aesthetics of the German tradition as outlined in this thesis. Indeed,

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<sup>65</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', introduced and trans. by Max Paddison, *Music Analysis*, 1 (1982), 169-87 (p. 175).

<sup>66</sup> Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', p. 175.

<sup>67</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, pp. 157-58.

<sup>68</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', trans. by Jonathan Dunsby and Beate Perrey, *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, 29 (2005), 3-14 (p. 7).

as such its ramifications extend far beyond Adorno's own work and lead to the heart of some of the main problems in Schubert scholarship. Conversely, though, Adorno's writing might also help to offer an escape from this very paradigm. Ironically, it is through his interpretation of music coming out of this system that Adorno also starts to offer a way out of this very same system. This comes through another dialectical relationship: the one that Adorno finds between Beethoven's middle-period works and his late works.

What Adorno reads as the dual aim of unity and disunity in Beethoven's music is coupled with a questioning of Hegel's dialectic. The relationship between Beethoven's music and this dialectic is revealed to be both in the music and extra-musical. Adorno's understanding of Beethoven's music is not simply that some of its forms parallel Hegelian philosophy, but that there is a dialectic within the music as a body of work. This is particularly true in the case of the middle Beethoven and the late Beethoven. For example, Adorno points out that:

Beethoven's music is Hegelian philosophy: but at the same time it is truer than that philosophy. That is to say, it is informed by the conviction that the self-reproduction of society as a self-identical identity is not enough, indeed that it is false. Logical identity as immanent to form – as an entity at the same time fabricated and aesthetic – is both constituted and criticized by Beethoven.<sup>69</sup>

In that formulation, the middle works do the constituting and the later ones the criticising meaning they thus fulfil different functions. Adorno's acknowledgement of the late Beethoven's centrality in this process opens up potential avenues for Schubert scholarship, which, if not directly applicable, enable fruitful discussion of music that does not adhere to convention.

In his discussion of the Ninth Symphony, Adorno argues that the work is not written in the late style, making the late style's 'critical intention' all too clear.<sup>70</sup> This critique works by using the same modes of engagement with form and temporality as the middle style and subsequently undoing them. In other words, it engages with the idiom which it is criticizing by deconstructing it. That this presents a way to move beyond a Hegelian reading of Beethoven's music as the only dominant paradigm is clear. However, it is necessary to be careful: one clearly cannot simply follow the same model for Schubert's music. Instead of unpicking the Hegelian nature of the forms from within as Beethoven's late style

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<sup>69</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, p. 14.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

does, Schubert uses different approaches to form (and temporality) altogether. This leads to a relationship between Schubert's music and Beethoven's music, which while it could still be construed as dialectical, is grounded in different ideas. Nonetheless, Adorno's acceptance of a temporal model which is not teleologically dominated and is simultaneously closer to Schubert's music is both telling and useful.

Adorno's respective interpretations of Beethoven's middle and late works generate a fundamental conflict between the two: 'In a sense, the dissociation found in the last works is a consequence of the moments of transcendence in the 'classical' works of the middle period. The element of humour in Beethoven's last works can probably be equated with his discovery of the inadequacy of mediation, and is their truly critical aspect.'<sup>71</sup> The late works can then function as critique of the paradigms with which they nominally engage; and by extension their middle-period predecessors. This humour is self-reflexive both within Beethoven's late works, but also in the inferences we are then led to make about the middle period works. Michael Spitzer suggests that 'Adorno's argument sets up a tension which is played out in the relationship between the middle and late periods. If middle Beethoven is Hegelian, then late Beethoven is anti-Hegelian, just as modern philosophy critiques metaphysics.'<sup>72</sup> Therefore, there is not only a dialectical relationship *in* the form of the heroic works, but in the historical relationship *between* the middle and late works – in keeping with Hegel's dialectical philosophy of history. Joseph Kerman reads Adorno's take on this relationship as follows:

Much of Theodor Adorno's musical philosophy hinges on establishing Beethoven's music as a quasi-Hegelian representative of the subject in the modern age. For Adorno, the middle period music represented a unique and unrepeatable reconciliation of subject and object, individual and world; in the late style the subject proceeds to absent itself, in a critique of that former synthesis that leaves behind a kind of desubjectivized musical materiality.<sup>73</sup>

As Kerman explains, the middle works reached such a pinnacle they were unrepeatable. The subsequent critique of those works comes in the form of Beethoven's late works and seems, at least for Adorno, a natural conclusion. The

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<sup>71</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>72</sup> Michael Spitzer, *Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven's Late Style* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), p. 45.

<sup>73</sup> Joseph Kerman et al., 'Beethoven', Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online (Oxford University Press, 2001)  
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40026pg19#S40026.19.2>  
 [accessed 3rd December 2016].



middle period works represent such a perfect reconciliation of the subject and object, that it cannot subsequently be replicated. In order to engage with that relationship dialectically, that subject-object relationship must break down.

There is no more a sense of becoming in some of Beethoven's late works than there is in the disintegration of the protagonist in Schubert's *Winterreise*. Whilst Beethoven's late works can be interpreted as having a dialectical relationship with the works that come before them, such an Adornian interpretation of works by other composers that do not hinge upon an organic teleology is more problematic; the question of how to read the fundamentally repetitive nature of a work such as Schubert's String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 is unanswered in this context.<sup>74</sup> Claiming that such musical processes are unsatisfactory frankly seems to miss the point: any age surely boasts more than one model of temporal experience. This is suggested by a nuanced interpretation of Beethoven's output alone, but emphasised more strongly by incorporating the music of Beethoven's contemporaries. While the temporality in Schubert's music is closer to that of late Beethoven, there are still significant points of divergence. Of that same String Quartet Adorno notes, for example:

However, if the triplets arranged around the triad in the transition group of the first movement of the [Beethoven's] Piano Trio op. 97 are compared to the superficially similar – and especially weak – transition in the first movement of Schubert's A minor Quartet, the difference which emerges is the following: in Beethoven there is a dynamic, which strives towards a goal and reflects the effort to reach it. Hence, the accents point beyond themselves to the whole, whereas those in Schubert merely remain where they are. [...] Beethoven's process is an incessant repudiation of all that is limited, that merely exists.<sup>75</sup>

According to Adorno in this context, Schubert's musical processes would seem to lack a capacity for development (or indeed to critique themselves), because he suggests that Schubert's music does not negate what 'merely exists'. This interpretation of Schubert's music is problematic to say the least. Not only does it further entrench Beethovenian paradigms where they are of little benefit, but it does not show what Schubert's music *does* offer as a temporal model. If there is a dialectic between the two types of temporality in middle period and late Beethoven, there is a tempting question as to whether the same possibility exists between Schubert's music and middle Beethoven – and whether that, in turn, offers a route out of the Adornian-Beethovenian-Hegelian discourse that traps

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<sup>74</sup> For a more detailed discussion of repetition in Schubert's String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, see Chapter 3.

<sup>75</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, p. 51.

Schubert. Certainly, as will be further discussed in Chapter 2, there would seem to be two Adornos (or at least two distinct arguments), somewhat contrary to his own claims in his work on Beethoven. Adorno's work on nineteenth-century music (and indeed that into the twentieth century) acknowledges that music would seem to follow two pathways: either that initially carved out by Beethoven's, or one that is much closer to Schubert. This latter route can be seen in Adorno's work on Mahler particularly – as discussed in Chapter 2.

### 1.2.2 Adorno's Schubert

In his work on Schubert, Adorno is keen to emphasise the ways in which temporality in Schubert's music is different to that of Beethoven. In that context, Adorno does not cast it as especially problematic, though, on occasion, his view would seem to differ elsewhere. The pairing between Adorno and Schubert, while acknowledged, is not as prevalent as that between Adorno and Beethoven, although Adorno's writing on Schubert has received much more scholarly attention in the last ten to fifteen years. The writing on Schubert presents different problems to those posed by the work on Beethoven: Adorno's writings on Beethoven are incomplete but fairly extensive, but his work on Schubert is much more condensed. There are only two pieces of writing that deal with Schubert's music exclusively: namely the 1928 essay and a 1933 review.<sup>76</sup> Despite the small amount of material, Adorno's undoubtedly distinct ideas on Schubert can be traced from the early essays through to *Aesthetic Theory*, even if at times there are moments of inconsistency: for example, compared to his early enthusiasm in the two essays, he sometimes downplays the capacity of Schubertian forms later. For all that, Schubert is a recurring theme for Adorno: there are references (of varying importance) to Schubert in Adorno's work on Beethoven,<sup>77</sup> Richard Wagner,<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> See Theodor W. Adorno, 'Schubert', in Theodor W. Adorno, *Musikalische Schriften IV, Gesammelte Schriften 17*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), pp. 18-33 and Theodor W. Adorno, 'Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, für Klavier zu vier Händen, op. 107', in Theodor W. Adorno, *Musikalische Schriften V, Gesammelte Schriften 18*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997), pp. 189-94.

<sup>77</sup> More specific discussion of Adorno's different lines of thought in relation to Beethoven and Schubert can be found in Chapter 2.

<sup>78</sup> Adorno's work on Wagner is interesting here: Mark Berry points out that Adorno likens Wagner to Heidegger (however briefly) – a telling resonance for this project: cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Trowbridge and Esher: NLB, 1981), pp. 118 and Mark Berry, 'Adorno's *Essay on Wagner*: Rescuing an Inverted Panegyric', *The Opera Quarterly*, 2-3 (2014), 205-27 (p. 209).

Gustav Mahler,<sup>79</sup> and in *Aesthetic Theory*,<sup>80</sup> as well as in some of the essays, but only a passing reference to Schubert in *Negative Dialectics*.<sup>81</sup>

Of Adorno's two early writings on Schubert, the 1928 essay undoubtedly plays a much more prominent role in Schubert scholarship than the 1933 review. Since it became widely available in English translation (the first published in 2003) the 1928 essay has been enthusiastically adopted by English-language Schubert scholarship, and is now regularly discussed. Indeed, aspects of the reception of the Adorno essay in Anglophone scholarship can be understood through its translation history.<sup>82</sup> Dunsby and Perrey used Adorno's 1964 version, rather than the 1928 version, but include the differences between the two in their commentary.<sup>83</sup> Emphasising just how small those changes are, Dunsby and Perrey state that 'What strikes one most here, especially in view of Adorno's later, decidedly more measured idiom, is his noninterference with his own early work.'<sup>84</sup> The changes seem remarkably slight given Adorno's comments on his own work in the foreword to the 1964 edition.<sup>85</sup> Dunsby and Perrey cite the

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<sup>79</sup> See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how Adorno's writing on Mahler and Schubert is related.

<sup>80</sup> See Chapter 4.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 262.

<sup>82</sup> There are three English translations of the essay currently available, which have come to varying degrees of prominence in English-language musicology. The three translations are very different in style, focusing on varying aspects of the text, in the context of the specific difficulties of rendering Adorno into idiomatic English, which are by no means inconsiderable (see Rose Rosengard Subotnik, 'The Unwritable in Full Pursuit of the Unreadable: Adorno's Philosophie der neuen Musik in Translation', *Music Analysis*, 30 (2011), 89-139 for an especially compelling account of these challenges). The most prominent of the three translations is an issue of *19th-Century Music* dedicated to the essay and various critical responses to it (and thus the relationship between Adorno and Schubert's music): see *19th-Century Music*, 29 (2005). Dunsby and Perrey's translation there has enjoyed the most exposure in musicology and has thus led to much of the critical reception to the essay and its perhaps belated widespread inclusion in Schubert scholarship. They make a concerted effort to retain some of Adorno's sentence structure and the atmosphere conveyed by the literary style of the original. For those writers not turning to the German version of the essay, it tends to be Dunsby and Perrey's version that is cited – and this has repercussions due to the liberal nature of their translation. The second is by Rodney Livingstone: see Theodor W. Adorno, *Can One Live after Auschwitz?: A Philosophical Reader*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). The volume previously appeared as Theodor W. Adorno, *Ob nach Auschwitz noch sich leben lasse: Ein philosophisches Lesebuch*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1997). The final one is Theodor W. Adorno, *Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Wieland Hoban (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2009), pp. 19-46. Again, this is expressly a translation of the 1964 version of the essay (itself a slightly revised version of that originally published in 1928), and the publishers refer to the version of *Moments musicaux* to be found in the 1997 Suhrkamp edition of the Adorno *Gesammelte Schriften*.

<sup>83</sup> The changes made by Adorno when he selected 'Schubert' for publication in 1964 are listed in Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 4 n. 3.

<sup>84</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 4.

<sup>85</sup> Adorno states in the foreword to the *Moments musicaux* that 'The essay on Schubert was for the hundredth anniversary of his death. As the author's first extensive work on the interpretation of music, it was included despite some awkwardness and despite the philosophical interpretation venturing forward in a way that is all too direct, because of neglect of the technical-compositional details. [...] The author can put forward no other captatio benevolentiae than his later effort was

essay's absence not only from the bibliography of Grove,<sup>86</sup> but also *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart*<sup>87</sup> alongside the lack of enthusiasm to engage with the text in depth elsewhere.<sup>88</sup> However, subsequent to 2005 this has changed substantially.

Many of the central terms of today's Schubert scholarship can be found to have their origins or parallels in Adorno's writing: terms such as landscape, memory, wandering, and repetition to name but a few. Latterly (in particular) Adorno's writings have had a profound influence on the development of Schubert criticism – both some its problems, but also in opening up routes beyond some of those issues. Through Adorno's interpretation of Schubert's music, it is possible to start to understand Adorno's wider dialectical understanding of music – and perhaps his wider narrative of nineteenth-century music (as examined in Chapter 2). While Adorno acknowledges the overlap between Schubert's and Beethoven's musical processes, he nevertheless sees them as distinct from one another, meaning that they have different implications for that narrative of nineteenth-century music. Adorno's work is clearly not only meaningful for works where there is the capacity for a successful synthesis (in the Hegelian sense), as Paddison reminded us. Adorno's writing on Schubert argues that understanding of social totality can only come through the fragment, itself central to Schubert's music. As Adorno puts it in the 1928 essay:

So when it comes to Schubert's music we speak of 'landscape.' Nothing could betray the substance of his music more – since he cannot be understood in terms of Beethoven's spontaneously integrated personality - than trying to construct him as a personality with the idea – a virtual center – of puzzling out dissociated elements. The elements of Schubert's music go against such a psychological picture, and in this they seem to want to control the fragments of that deceptive human totality that we as free spirits would like to enjoy.<sup>89</sup>

In allowing us to view totality through fragments, Schubert's music can give us a different view of that totality to the one afforded by the highly integrated

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centred on the correction of such mistakes; inasmuch as they are a factor of his thinking itself.' See: Adorno, 'Schubert', in *Musikalische Schriften IV*, p. 10.

<sup>86</sup> Maurice J. E. Brown, Eric Sams, and Robert Winter, 'Schubert, Franz (Peter)', Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online (Oxford University Press, 2001) <https://doi-org.ezproxy01.rhul.ac.uk/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.article.25109> [accessed 12th September 2019].

<sup>87</sup> Perrey must be referring to the first edition of *MGG*. In the second edition it makes an appearance: cf. Walther Dürr and Michael Kube, 'Schubert' in *Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Musik begründet von Friedrich Blume, Personenteil 15*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn, ed. by Ludwig Finscher (Kassel: Bärenreiter-Verlag, 2006), 74-205 (196).

<sup>88</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 3 n. 2.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

structures of some of Beethoven's most lauded works. One of the main charges against Adorno is that his writing lacks specific musical and especially analytical details and in many ways this passage is an example of that.<sup>90</sup> Though it may lack specific musical examples, here is a vocabulary that is not predicated on the idea of becoming. In setting this up, there is an implicit tension with the notion of becoming and its quest for an integrated whole. In seeking an alternative narrative for Schubert's music to that used for Beethoven, Adorno used categories that enable another view of Schubert's music, one not necessarily grounded in a dialectical-sonata form narrative. Here, the idea of 'landscape' permits a less teleologically-driven interpretation of Schubert's music and its approach to temporality.

It is sonata form in particular that has proven so problematic for the reception of Schubert's music, since the embedded discourse around sonata form is inherently Beethovenian. John Gingerich explains Schubert's sonata forms as follows:

More than twenty years before Beethoven's heroic style became institutionalized, Schubert found in the sonata form he inherited, with its built-in cycles and redundancies, a vehicle well suited to the expression of a new experience of time and memory. The highly discursive multi-layered field of memory, the interplay between many short sections of various degrees of reality and varying temporal modalities, the circling trajectory, the sudden transitions triggered by a vividly remembered sensory detail, a rhythmic gesture, or a texture – all of these elements of Schubert's narrative are analogous to a Proustian narrative of memory.<sup>91</sup>

It is not, as Gingerich stresses, that Schubert did not use sonata forms – or use them effectively. Instead, as Su Yin Mak comes some way to arguing, the theoretical framework that exists to look at Schubert's music is still limited<sup>92</sup> because, as Burnham has so compellingly noted, our understanding of Beethoven's heroic style has become synonymous with the value system we apply to music much more generally. Mak takes the terms 'hypotaxis' and 'parataxis' from rhetoric and argues that Schubert's so-called 'lyric' sonata forms can be considered to be examples of parataxis.<sup>93</sup> She develops this further thus: 'Schubert's cantabile themes signal the lyric because they are so often deliberately

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<sup>90</sup> For one example, cf. Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, pp. 167-68.

<sup>91</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, pp. 137-38.

<sup>92</sup> Su Yin Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric', *The Journal of Musicology*, 23 (2006), 263-306. For further discussion of rhetoric in Schubert's music, mainly but not exclusively in *Winterreise*, see Rufus Hallmark, 'The Literary and Musical Rhetoric of Apostrophe in *Winterreise*', *19th-Century Music*, 35 (2011), 3-33.

<sup>93</sup> Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric', pp. 274-75.

set apart from the hypotactic norms of the Classical sonata style.’<sup>94</sup> Adorno’s approach offers a way to consider the level of interaction between that ‘institutionalized’, Beethovenian sonata form and Schubert’s fragmentary musical processes.

Schubert’s music is internally self-questioning and thus gives us something which is re-explored from different angles – a point which Adorno makes particularly well in the 1928 essay.<sup>95</sup> Adorno’s argument, which has profound implications for the way that Schubert’s music could and should be understood, has not necessarily been fully capitalised upon. This music’s interaction with time means it asks very different questions of itself. Schubert’s music is focused on exploring something already given, rather than breaking it down and transforming it, and the conflict between the dominant paradigm of musicology and much of Schubert’s output stems from that. In this way, Burnham’s notion of ‘presence’ is more applicable to Schubert’s music than a sense of ‘process’.

In light of this complicated network of connections between Schubert, Adorno, and Beethoven, this thesis takes Adorno’s 1928 essay on Schubert as its starting-point. During the centenary year of Schubert’s death, not only the year of the first Schubert Congress in Vienna,<sup>96</sup> Adorno was not alone in publishing to commemorate the occasion, arguably making it another landmark year in Schubert studies.<sup>97</sup> The reception of these various publications is more challenging: while Donald Tovey’s and Felix Salzer’s work, for example, has been more readily integrated into the trajectory of Schubert studies, Adorno’s essay remained relatively unknown for much of its history. Backed up further by Adorno’s other piece of writing devoted to Schubert alone – the 1933 review – there is a small corpus of rich material for looking at Adorno’s thought on Schubert, especially when accompanied by his later engagement with Schubert in other work. Despite the circumstances for Adorno’s essay, it is fair to say that

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<sup>94</sup> Mak, ‘Schubert’s Sonata Forms and the Poetics of the Lyric’, p. 294.

<sup>95</sup> See Adorno, ‘Schubert (1928)’, p. 10. Thrasybulos Georgiades also makes the comparison between Schubert’s music projecting expression outwards, and Beethoven’s doing the opposite. (See Thrasybulos Georgiades, *Schubert: Musik und Lyrik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1967), p. 178.)

<sup>96</sup> Walther Dürr and Andreas Krause, ‘Vorwort’, in *Schubert-Handbuch*, eds. by Walther Dürr and Andreas Krause (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2007), pp. xi-xvii (p. xi).

<sup>97</sup> There was Adorno’s essay, but other notable publications include Felix Salzer, ‘Die Sonatenform bei Franz Schubert’, *Studien zur Musikwissenschaft*, 15 (1928), 86-125, and, in an issue of *Music & Letters* devoted entirely to Schubert, Donald Tovey made the well-known claim that ‘Schubert’s tonality is as wonderful as star-clusters’. See Donald F. Tovey, ‘Tonality’, *Music & Letters*, 9 (1928), 341-63 (p. 362).

1928 mounted a challenge for Schubert scholarship which has in many ways only been answered latterly. 1978 started that process, and its momentum continues to shape today's Schubert scholarship.

As noted above, engagement with Adorno can be found in Carl Dahlhaus's oft-cited essay on Schubert's String Quartet in G major, D. 887.<sup>98</sup> It is worth noting Dahlhaus's essay was published in English more than fifteen years prior to the Adorno essay's first appearance in English and therefore the Adornian aspects of his essay take on a particular significance for Anglophone scholars. However, Dahlhaus's engagement with Adorno is by no means as direct as much of the subsequent scholarship that has appeared as a result of the translation of Adorno's essay to English; although his terminology is undoubtedly Adornian and credited as such, he does not refer to Adorno's work on Schubert.<sup>99</sup> As Suzannah Clark notes, there are, nevertheless, obvious links between Adorno's writing in the 1928 essay and this Dahlhaus essay. Clark points out that Dahlhaus's interrogation of Schubert's variation technique could have been inspired by either Adorno or A. B. Marx, but particularly close to Adorno is Dahlhaus's understanding of Schubert's music based on ideas of wandering, landscape, and variation.<sup>100</sup> Clark herself is not particularly convinced by Dahlhaus or Adorno, arguing that, alongside McClary, they do not offer an account of Schubert's music that is sufficiently rich in analytical detail, unlike that of Richard Taruskin, which she prefers.<sup>101</sup> Given the scant focus on Adorno in Schubert studies before 2005, the allusions to Adorno on Mahler in Dahlhaus's essay take on a particular significance. As Michael P. Steinberg notes, Dahlhaus was instrumental in orchestrating Adorno's position within musicology:

The hegemony of postwar formalist musicology may be now in question and a 'new musicology,' perhaps no longer so new, is committed to cultural analysis. Adorno remains partly responsible for this turn. But in a situation rich with multiple and painful ironies, Adorno's mode of analysis claimed a foothold in American musicology in the 1980s through the prolific work of the German musicologist Carl Dahlhaus. Dahlhaus rigorously retrod the nineteenth-century musical and cultural ground that Adorno had marked out. Dahlhaus's imprimatur seemed to render Adorno respectable.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> This was first published as Carl Dahlhaus, 'Die Sonatenform bei Schubert: Der erste Satz des G-dur-Quartetts D. 887', *Musica*, 32 (1978), 125-30.

<sup>99</sup> Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', p. 1.

<sup>100</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 167.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Richard Taruskin, *The Oxford History of Western Music: The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. III (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 201.

<sup>102</sup> Michael P. Steinberg, *Listening to Reason: Culture, Subjectivity, and Nineteenth-Century Music* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 2-3.

Such reference to Adorno by Dahlhaus, limited though it may be, gives us a broader understanding of how the Schubert essay has come to hold such influence over contemporary Schubert scholarship. It is perhaps telling that no such moment of renaissance has yet come for the 1933 review of the Rondo in A Major for Four Hands, D. 951. That it has not found greater critical prominence is surprising, especially subsequent to the surge of interest in the 1928 essay, not least given that one of its central tenets is that Schubert can be Beethovenian. This provides an overt recognition of Schubert and Beethoven crossing the parameters of the temporal models Adorno constructs for them, which is invaluable in a system that seems to categorise them firmly as poles at either end of a binary. Adorno makes the claim that the Rondo ‘is a masterpiece: one of the roundest and most complete pieces to come from the mature Schubert.’<sup>103</sup> Both of these factors make it a valuable piece of writing as it deals with some of the most obvious criticism of Adorno’s position on Schubert. However, it is also intriguing in that the comparison Adorno makes between Beethoven and Schubert takes on a more flexible guise than elsewhere. He writes ‘It is not a rondo in the simple, old sense [...] instead a sonata rondo in the Beethovenian sense.’<sup>104</sup> In comparing the two, and ascribing a Beethovenian aspect to this work, Adorno would at first seem to be somehow attempting to elevate this work to a level that it can only attain by being Beethovenian. However, in this context, most interestingly, this goes both ways. Adorno goes on to compare Schubert’s Rondo with the final movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 90, describing that as ‘the most Schubertian that exists by Beethoven.’<sup>105</sup> Here then is the overriding discourse turned upside down: Beethoven can be Schubertian, as well as the other way around.

To take a brief diversion, it is not hard to see why Adorno makes this claim, one echoed almost verbatim by William Kinderman, though he does not attribute it to Adorno.<sup>106</sup> Adorno turns to the second movement of op. 90 citing in particular the final section and the return of the theme in the tenor as demonstrative of his

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<sup>103</sup> Adorno, ‘Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, für Klavier zu vier Händen, op. 107’, p. 189: ‘Es ist ein Hauptwerk: eines der rundesten und vollkommensten aus der Hand des reifen Schubert.’

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p. 189: ‘Es ist kein Rondo im schlichten alten Sinne [...] sondern ein Sonatenrondo im Beethovenschen Verstande.’

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 190: ‘dieser Sonatensatz der Schubertischeste vielleicht, der von Beethoven existiert.’

<sup>106</sup> William Kinderman, ‘The piano music: concertos, sonatas, variations, small forms’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Beethoven*, ed. by Glenn Stanley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 103-26 (p. 119).



point – that the work is fundamentally Schubertian.<sup>107</sup> However, there is plenty more to draw on that would seem to indicate a more ‘Schubertian’ approach. As a rondo, the movement is hugely dependent on its opening theme (or to put it in Kinderman’s words: ‘a luxurious rondo dominated by the many appearances of a spacious, cantabile theme’<sup>108</sup>), which in keeping with rondo form frequently returns, largely unaltered, and in the tonic.<sup>109</sup> In itself, this is unremarkable, but this is juxtaposed against a tonal vagrancy that again is more reminiscent of Schubert (such tonal vagrancy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Cumulatively, then, the movement does not have a particularly Beethovenian stance, constructed instead through means and techniques that one, following Adorno, might more easily connect with Schubert.

Later on, when discussing the Rondo, Adorno writes ‘The principle of development obtains its sense elsewhere than in Beethoven: it sets up the subjective moment of unity, the next and furthest carried through and put in relation to one another; in the relationship between simultaneity and being, not between development and becoming.’<sup>110</sup> Although he therefore sees a difference between Beethoven and Schubert in this context, he maintains there are similarities: ‘The last statement of the main theme finally appears, in that Beethovenian model. It is as though the theme was called to his name: an overwhelming moment of music, that words cannot describe.’<sup>111</sup> Adorno rejects the term analysis for his commentary on the work,<sup>112</sup> but the musical details he offers in the review are compelling, given how scarce they normally are in Adorno’s work. For example, he discusses the Rondo’s form, the tonalities that it goes through, and its motivic construction as well as its similarities to other works. Despite all this, Adorno’s quasi-Hegelian demands of Schubert can, at times, be troubling. The suggestion in the review, for example, is that Schubert is sometimes at his most successful when he gets closest to Beethoven. In the same essay, Adorno argues that the Rondo is much more successful than the

<sup>107</sup> Adorno, ‘Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, für Klavier zu vier Händen, op. 107’, p. 190.

<sup>108</sup> Kinderman, ‘The piano music: concertos, sonatas, variations, small forms’, p. 119.

<sup>109</sup> For further discussion of the role of this kind of repetition in Schubert’s music, see in particular Chapter 3.

<sup>110</sup> Adorno, ‘Franz Schubert: Großes Rondo A-Dur, für Klavier zu vier Händen, op. 107’, p. 190: ‘Das Durchführungsprinzip gewinnt seinen Sinn anderswo als bei Beethoven: es bildet das subjektive Einheitsmoment, das Nächste und Fernste durchdringt und in Beziehung setzt; doch in die Beziehung der Gleichzeitigkeit und des Seins, nicht der Entwicklung und des Werden.’

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 192: ‘Schließlich erscheint, nach jenem Beethovenschen Muster, die letzte Reprise des Hauptthemas im Tenor. Es ist, als ob das Thema bei seinem Namen gerufen würde: eine überwältigende Augenblick Musik, den Worte nicht erreichen.’

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

*Wandererfantasie*, D. 760:<sup>113</sup> the Rondo, it seems, enables an understanding of landscape in the context of Beethovenian development that particularly appeals to Adorno.

Adorno offers direct insights about Schubert's music though at times they are difficult to pin down, lacking in musical detail (outside the review), and, at times, inconsistent. For all that, Adorno's writing on Schubert reveals a captivating interpretation of Schubert's musical processes. For Adorno, on the one hand, Schubert offers us something very specific, but, on the other, even in the context of his writing on Schubert, Adorno seems to demand that Schubert's music (like Beethoven's) is shaped by a fundamental process of becoming, but Schubert's music does not always 'become'. Where Adorno does not make those demands of Schubert's music (and this will be detailed later on), he captures something crucial about it, which will be demonstrated through the different categories in the remaining chapters of this thesis. It hints at some of the musical reasons that the Beethoven-Schubert paradigm came into being in the first place and the sense that Schubert's music often does not function in the same way as Beethoven's.

Adorno implies that Schubert's music is almost episodic, that unlike the way in which the music of Beethoven's heroic style music is constructed to create forms situated within that historical dialectic, Schubert's themes have no history: 'There is no history between the appearance of one Schubert theme and a second one.'<sup>114</sup> Instead of the dynamic process of development found in Beethoven's music, Schubert's themes are simply stated – and repeated, without much change. Adorno articulates this as follows: 'Schubert's forms are forms of invocation of what has already appeared; they are not transformations of something that had been invented.'<sup>115</sup> Despite the benefits of using Adorno's work for Schubert studies, there are several stumbling blocks which cannot be overcome using his work alone. One is, in a sense, Beethoven. That Beethoven's dynamism is primary to Adorno's understanding of how music should be means that often it appears as though Schubert necessarily falls short. In this way the narrative of becoming is pervasive – and troublesome. Schubert's instrumental music uses the same idiom to construct different results, which are more readily interpreted through the way Adorno looks at Mahler than Beethoven. As will be seen in

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<sup>113</sup> For further discussion of the *Wandererfantasie*, see Chapter 4.

<sup>114</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 9.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

Chapter 2, it is easier to construct a Romantic reading of Schubert than an Idealist one.

Despite its possibilities, then, there remain limitations to an Adornian reading of Schubert. Setting aside the paradigms, discourses, and expectations of musicology, it is perhaps easier to turn to a philosophy where becoming is not the chief aim. For that reason, I now turn to Martin Heidegger and his philosophy of being. A Heideggerian reading can take advantage of the possibilities left open by Adorno, because Heidegger's interpretation of time does not denigrate repetition, but instead unpicks its fundamental role in temporality, so there is scope here to develop a reading of Schubert's non-developmental forms that is not predicated on the particular values of the dominant systems within musicology. Equally Heidegger's understanding of the concepts of wandering and homecoming provide rich points of intersection for work on Schubert in their temporal concerns.

### 1.3 Why Heidegger?

In a technical sense, Martin Heidegger's work has little to do with music and therefore might not seem an obvious choice as a key intellectual source for a musicological enquiry. However, choosing to use his work in such a context is not entirely without precedent.<sup>116</sup> Juxtaposing Heidegger and Adorno is also not entirely uncontentious but the two are not as far apart as they might seem.<sup>117</sup> Andrew Bowie links Heidegger's exploration of Being<sup>118</sup> and Adorno's exploration of music: 'philosophical concern with what is not encompassed by "apophantic" truth, which Adorno sees as central to music, is also central to Heidegger's examination of the question of "being".'<sup>119</sup> Adorno owes more to Heidegger than is immediately apparent: Martin Seel, for example, makes the

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<sup>116</sup> See J. P. E. Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar: Modernist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Martin Scherzinger, 'Heideggerian Thought in the Early Music of Paul Hindemith (With a Foreword to Benjamin Boretz)', *Perspectives of New Music*, 43/44 (2005-06), 80-125 as two examples.

<sup>117</sup> One compelling example of a study of both philosophers is Alexander García Düttmann, *The Memory of Thought: An Essay on Heidegger and Adorno*, trans. by Nicholas Walker (London: Continuum, 2002).

<sup>118</sup> There is frequent inconsistency among translators about whether to differentiate between 'being' and 'Being' in English. Julian Young's explanation of the possible gains of doing so, not only for a level of clarity otherwise obscured in English translation, but also including the theological element of Heidegger's writing is very convincing. See Julian Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 12-25.

<sup>119</sup> Andrew Bowie, 'Adorno, Heidegger, and the Meaning of Music', in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*, ed. by Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 248-78 (p. 258). For clarification, Bowie defines apophantic in the following way: "'Apophantic" is truth which is expressed in propositions.' Ibid., p. 275 n. 17.

point that *Aesthetic Theory* is not all that far from 'The Origin of the Work of Art'.<sup>120</sup> His argument hinges chiefly on Adorno's argument that the artwork can be considered an '*Artikulationsobjekt*', which is similar to Heidegger's own view.<sup>121</sup>

Moreover, Adorno is certainly not above using Heidegger as a starting-point for his own work, such as the essay on Hölderlin in *Notes to Literature*. Whilst his criticism of Heidegger's approach to Hölderlin and its conclusions are, at times, blistering, Adorno makes extensive use of it.<sup>122</sup> Adorno's preoccupation with music stands in direct contrast to Heidegger more or less ignoring the entire art-form. One of the trickier aspects of using Adorno as a basis for interpreting Schubert's music is the problematic lack of specific musical detail. By contrast, using work without music as one of its focal points perhaps permits a degree of freedom outside the very systems that Schubert scholarship is attempting to bypass – and of which Adorno is, at times, part. In other words, there is a possibility that Heidegger's system offers potential where, metaphorically speaking, Adorno comes unstuck.

For this project, there are multiple aspects of Heidegger's thought pertinent to exploring temporality in Schubert's music. Being, as understood in Heidegger's thought is paramount, but so too is his understanding of temporality and repetition. Heidegger's preoccupation with time and the temporality of human existence, as well as the import of that for art, means that there is clear potential for dialogue with Schubert. Indeed, there is a specific case to be made for Schubert here rather than music more generally. While Adorno becomes locked into the temporality of becoming, Heidegger's lack of engagement with music is in many ways an advantage here. Free of the inherent problems of some of the more established models to interrogate musical forms and temporality, adopting a Heideggerian mode of thinking means becoming is no longer the central concern. For Schubert's music, this allows a radical departure in interpretation. This is not (as is traditionally understood by the term) a 'dialectical' model, but instead offers a way of understanding a sonata form that does not really lead to a moment of synthesis in the traditional sense, or works where particular moments

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<sup>120</sup> Martin Seel, *Ästhetik des Erscheinens* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003), p. 33.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>122</sup> See Theodor W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature, Vol. II*, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Sherry Weber Nicholsen (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992), especially pp. 114-120.

are privileged in the temporal schema over others through repetition rather than development.

In this way, then, Heidegger's model is potentially equally applicable to Schubert's music, even though he himself declines to deal with music. The most commonly received notion of Adorno's reception of musical processes is that readily mapped onto Beethovenian dialectics. But there is a second strand of Adorno's thought, far closer to Schubert's musical processes (see Chapter 2), which is, in essence, arguably nearer to aspects of Heidegger's thought. In between these two intellectual models sits Schubert's music. What all of this shares – music and thought alike – is an approach to the continuum from beginning to end which is not overwhelmingly governed by teleology. Instead there would seem to be more of a focus on presence, rather than the processes to which we have become accustomed.

To take a step back, it is widely accepted that music poses a problem to the wider study of the arts. Grounded in very specific techniques and demanding a certain literacy particular to the discipline, it can be challenging for those who work outside it to approach music, especially the score, as an object of study. Conversely, many of the methodologies that would be appropriate to Schubert's music are grounded in the Beethovenian paradigms problematised above. Turning to Heidegger's understanding of being and repetition offers a freedom to use an intellectual model less inhibited by this historical situation.

It has long been clear that there is a rich dialogue to be drawn out from interaction between music and intellectual models that seemingly have little to do with the discipline.<sup>123</sup> Due to the very particular (but not new) problem that music poses for the academy, Christopher Hasty goes as far as to describe music as 'a noisy problem child, heard but not clearly seen.'<sup>124</sup> Stepping over this divide between musicology and neighbouring disciplines, as is widespread practice in musicology, means valuable critical frameworks can be applied to discussions of music. For a while, Schubert was himself, to borrow Hasty's phrase, one of

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<sup>123</sup> This dialogue sometimes struggles to go both ways, see Steinberg, *Listening to Reason*, p. 1: Steinberg explains that historians readily use 'philosophy, literature, painting, and film' in their work, but this does not extend to music, despite musicologists' increasing use of cultural history.

<sup>124</sup> Christopher Hasty, 'The Image of Thought and Ideas of Music', in *Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music*, eds. by Brian Hulse and Chris Nesbitt (London: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 1-22 (p. 1).

musicology's own 'problem children', and this project grapples with that legacy, as well as the subsequent efforts to compensate for it. Instead of loud, heroic, Beethovenian, affirmative endings, Schubert gives us something quite different: works ranging from *Winterreise*, D.911 to the String Quartets in D minor, D. 810 and A minor, D. 804 seem much less sure of their ground as they finish. Thus, the theoretical system that works so well for the former type of ending has inherent problems when applied to the latter. The vocabulary adopted to discuss Schubert's music entails a degree of circularity, making the music seem entirely self-questioning.<sup>125</sup> The relationship between musical past, present, and future is recast in Schubert's music, because teleology would seem to be substantially replaced by a focus on alternation, a process that Julian Johnson attributes to both Schubert and Mahler.<sup>126</sup>

One example of a way to look at this alternative construction of musical time comes from the notion of presence, a concept Scott Burnham introduces in the conclusion to *Beethoven Hero* – making that a useful starting point. At this point, it is not the remit of Burnham's study to examine the notion of 'presence' any further. He merely signposts it as a possible way out of musicology's 'Beethoven problem'.<sup>127</sup> However, thinking more widely about how one theorises that idea, turning to Heidegger seems more obvious. Presence is one way to bridge Burnham's idea and Heidegger's thought, and can thus offer this enquiry a set of tools for approaching Schubert's music. There is a kinship between musical presence and Heidegger's main concepts that enable a productive interrogation of various categories central to this project. Above all, presence is (at least for Burnham) a way to escape the shackles of a narrative of becoming.

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<sup>125</sup> See Charles Fisk, *Returning Cycles: Contexts for the Interpretation of Schubert's Impromptus and Last Sonatas* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001): Fisk considers this in connection to some of Schubert's later piano music, looking at it alongside potential links to *Winterreise*.

<sup>126</sup> See Julian Johnson, 'Irony', in *Aesthetics of Music: Musicological Perspectives*, ed. by Stephen Downes (Oxford and New York, NY: Routledge), pp. 239-58 (p. 247), where Johnson states 'Unlike Beethoven, who sets up oppositions in order to resolve them, Schubert often declines to resolve his musical antinomies. Instead, he allows extended movements to proceed by a process of constant alternation, a musical embodiment of a divided ironic consciousness that sees the world in double vision.' For a more extended discussion of alternation in Mahler, see Julian Johnson, 'The Status of the Subject in Mahler's Ninth Symphony', *19th-Century Music*, 18 (1994), 108-20. Drawing further on parallels between Mahler's Ninth Symphony and Schubert's music, Harald Krebs uses Christopher Lewis's ideas on tonal pairing in Mahler's Ninth for his analysis of two Schubert *Lieder*: cf. Harald Krebs, 'Some Early Examples of Tonal Pairing: Schubert's "Meeres Stille" and "Der Wanderer"', in *The Second Practice of Nineteenth-Century Tonality*, eds. by William Kinderman and Harald Krebs (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), pp. 13-33 and Christopher Lewis, *Tonal Coherence in Mahler's Ninth Symphony* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984).

<sup>127</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, pp. 162-68.

When Burnham introduces the term, he does so arguing that presence is one of the main metaphors applied to Beethoven's music: that 'one is in the presence of more than music.'<sup>128</sup> Presence, he then indicates, is part of Beethoven's music capacity to access the sublime.<sup>129</sup> However, Burnham suggests that presence can be understood in other ways too:

The presence felt in Beethoven's heroic style has always been assumed to involve the growth or destiny of a thematic subject. Presence has come to mean this type of process, an equation that is particularly compelling, for the musical theme that seems to develop is a strong attractor for one's sense of self. But presence, in the way I wish to think of it, is not equivalent to process.<sup>130</sup>

For Burnham, presence is about the temporal experience invoked by a piece of music. He is quite clear that the presence he outlines is to be found in Beethoven's music, but it is not exclusive to teleological processes. However, he argues that presence leads to music being perceived as 'a seemingly timeless place that can be revisited again and again with similar effect.'<sup>131</sup> This stands in stark contrast to 'process':

I think we have been in the business of telling ourselves that process tracking is the main reason we are engaged by music [...] There can be no doubt that process is indeed important as a means of coherence and significance, to the degree that what we call musical syntax is impossible to separate from musical meaning and arguably creates the possibility of such meaning. But I am suggesting that such process is not the exclusive attraction of music, not its ontological bottom line.<sup>132</sup>

This is a bold claim with far-reaching consequences: applying it to Schubert requires a shift in alignment, but opens up new possibilities such as those found in Heidegger's thought.

Burnham's discussion of presence – and its application to both teleological and non-teleological processes – is brief. It hinges upon the role of the listener, arguing that presence is contingent upon a certain type of listening. So too is process of course. To adapt Burnham's model subtly, this shift in emphasis offers potential for a model for Schubert studies. If Burnham's process is a working out of becoming, then presence relates much more closely to a notion of being. Burnham does not make reference to Heidegger, but a Heideggerian view of this

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<sup>128</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, p. 147.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., pp. 162-63.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., pp. 165-66.

works well. Indeed, there are even semantic parallels to be drawn here. It is no coincidence that 'presence' is a key term in Heidegger's philosophy with several distinct meanings, as explained below.

Heidegger's focus on the centrality of time to human existence makes his refusal to explore music still more baffling, especially in the context of his engagement with other art-forms. What Heidegger does have to say about music specifically is both scant and of little benefit to an enquiry such as this one. In his monograph on Heidegger and art, Julian Young sets out some of his ideas as to the possible reason for the this lack of music in Heidegger's writing, including the fact that music, as a non-representational art-form, cannot perform some of the tasks that Heidegger seems to allocate to art.<sup>133</sup> Young makes the point that 'To a degree, Heidegger's musical deafness diminishes his thinking about art. He was, however, gifted, to a consummate degree, with a sensitivity to the poetic word. It seems to be a rough kind of truth that those who are hypersensitive to one art form are typically afflicted by a compensatory blindness to another. The price we pay for Heidegger's – among philosophers, it seems to me unparalleled – insight into poetry is the comparatively low quality of his thinking about music.'<sup>134</sup> When looking at this writing from a musicological perspective, what is missing in particular is potential investigation of music as a temporal art-form, which given the wider framework of Heidegger's philosophy would only seem to be a logical step.

However, despite this remarkable omission from his writing, Heidegger nonetheless devotes significant writings to thinking about the nature of art, and ultimately how that connects with both Dasein and being. As Michael Inwood argues, 'Dasein is essentially temporal: it looks ahead to its own death, it surveys its life as whole in conscience and resoluteness, it is essentially historical. Dasein's being is intimately bound up with temporality.'<sup>135</sup> This is a different temporal vantage point; one that has resonance for music which is backward-looking – or caught up in the present. Schubert's music, as established above (and in each of the following chapters), does not seek to look forward, but instead remains caught up in the present or becomes saturated in its own past.

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<sup>133</sup> Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 169.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>135</sup> Michael Inwood, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 11.



In Heidegger's essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art', perhaps the most famous argument is that about Vincent van Gogh's painting of a pair of shoes, which Heidegger suggests reveals aspects of the shoes' function which otherwise remain obscured: 'The art work lets us know what the shoes are in truth.'<sup>136</sup> He goes on to point out that they show us the reality of the peasant woman's hard work, for example, whereas the peasant woman 'simply wears them'.<sup>137</sup> Art, he proposes, enables access to a different kind of truth, including that of being. More generally in the essay, to make this point, Heidegger relies on examples of fine art and architecture. Perhaps unsurprisingly, his point is more readily demonstrable in the context of visual art-forms.

What is striking, though, is that ultimately he is also making a point about temporality – and music, as a temporal art-form, is all but ignored. Unlike Julian Young and Andrew Bowie, Alexander García Düttmann details Heidegger's references to music in Heidegger's essay 'The Origin of the Work of Art'.<sup>138</sup> In comparison with the detailed engagement with his other chosen artworks, this tells us very little. Many of the terms used in Heidegger's essay have temporal ramifications, yet he chooses to ground them in other art-forms. Conclusions drawn about truth, being, and temporality in music from this source have to be extrapolated by the reader – however fruitful they may be. Despite this, the statement that 'art is truth, setting itself to work'<sup>139</sup>, as one example, offers ample potential. This is harder to demonstrate in music than with other art-forms, but not impossible (see Chapters 3 and 4 for discussions of temporality and being in Schubert's music).

Moreover, Adorno too makes a claim for truth in art – but specifically that one of the hallmarks of Schubert's music is the 'repeatability of unaltered truth-characters'.<sup>140</sup> While this is more readily reconcilable to the construction of Schubert's forms and his music more generally, eventually it too comes down to the music's temporality. In Chapter 2, the discussion of the fragment and

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<sup>136</sup> Martin Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (London: HarperCollins, 1971), (pp. 15-86), p. 35.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Düttmann, *The Memory of Thought*, p. 219. See also Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p. 19, where he claims when demonstrating the 'thingliness' of the artwork, for example, that 'Beethoven's quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like a sack of potatoes.'

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>140</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 11.

moments of access to the absolute might not be so far from what Heidegger is outlining.

It would not be an overstatement to claim that Heidegger devoted his life's work to the concept of 'being', to how it operates, and how philosophy might understand what it means 'to be'. As Andrew Bowie points out 'Heidegger spends much of his life asking what "being" means, and he fails to give a definitive answer.'<sup>141</sup> Julian Young gives some idea of the wide-reaching implications of that question:

Heidegger's philosophy has a great deal to say about the first and last things that confront each of us as we attempt to live our lives as best we may. His discussions of, *inter alia*, art, death, alienation, technology, community and ecology are, as the Germans say *aktuell*, of evident 'relevance' to our existential concerns [...]. For all of this manifest 'relevance', however, the centre of Heidegger's philosophy lies in none of the above topics but in, rather, his *Seinsphilosophie*, his 'philosophy of Being'. This concern with Being – *the* 'matter of thinking', for Heidegger is [...] fundamental to all of his work, both early and late.<sup>142</sup>

Being is Heidegger's main focus, although the way he looks at the concept changes substantially from the time of his early work, such as his best-known work *Being and Time* (1927), and his later work, which includes the essays on poetry. This may seem somewhat far removed from Schubert, in the same way a discussion of predominantly visual art-forms does. How either of these concepts can be applied to an exploration of Schubert's construction of temporality is perhaps far from clear. But like presence, discussed below, being can also be used as a way to interrogate music from a perspective not dependent on becoming.

There are two senses in which Heidegger uses the word B/being.<sup>143</sup> Being provides one way of looking at Schubert's music and the way he generates thematic and motivic material. In the absence of much development, Schubert's

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<sup>141</sup> Andrew Bowie, *German Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 100.

<sup>142</sup> Julian Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>143</sup> These are doubtless blurred in translation, though they have slightly different meanings. In Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, Young makes the distinction between 'being' and 'Being' in translation, arguing that the two terms can be applied to two distinct meanings of Heidegger's use of the German word *Sein*. He attributes 'being' as linked with presence (in the sense of *Anwesenheit*), suggesting that 'what presences' is just another name for beings.' (p. 10) This is a little more complex than the tautological statement it may initially appear to be. In the lower case sense, being (in this sense of presence) enables disclosure and discussion, to put it at the most basic level, of what is there, ultimately leading to Young's statement that being 'is that fundamental disclosure which is embodied in the 'linguistic' practices of a given culture in a given epoch of its historical existence. It is for this reason that Heidegger says that being exists only through human (by which he means language-using) being.' (p. 12).

musical processes tend to return to the same material in a distinctive way: framed by direct repetition, tonal vagrancy, and alternation. Instead, there is a sense that Schubert's music is dealing *only with what is there*. This is the very aspect of Schubert's music that creates the impression it is not future-orientated; its main temporal focus is instead the present and past. As such processes unfold, repeating themes again and again, there is a sense that thematic material is being explored to its full capacity or – to return to Heidegger – all of its aspects are being considered, but from slightly different angles. As these multiple aspects are acknowledged, so does the music's being become clear. This contributes to a reading of Schubert's music predicated upon repetition rather than development. In turn, this provides a direct counter to a dialectics of becoming.

One of the most extensive uses of Heidegger's work in musicology is J. P. E. Harper-Scott's study of Edward Elgar, in which he co-opts the Heideggerian notion of *Augenblick*. Inwood's definition of *Augenblick* as 'the authentic present, the moment of resolute decision in which Dasein seizes the possibilities presented by its "situation"' <sup>144</sup> is echoed by Harper-Scott who describes it as "'the moment" which changes our perception of ourselves, as the "authentic" mode of the "ecstasis" of the present'. <sup>145</sup> Harper-Scott makes a case in his Elgar study for a 'more explicitly Heideggerian formulation of music's goal-directedness, on the teleological thrust towards the end of all possibilities' <sup>146</sup>, drawing parallels between Heidegger's 'ambitious analysis of human temporality' and work such as Roman Ingarden's 'analysis of musical temporality'. <sup>147</sup> Harper-Scott goes on to use the Heideggerian notion of *Augenblick* as a way of widening the scope of Heinrich Schenker's work, making its application stretch beyond its current connection to the heroic Beethoven and thus allowing him to apply Heidegger and Schenker to a modernist analysis of Elgar's music. Harper-Scott states that the intention of using Heidegger in his work is to serve three distinct purposes: 'the useful reformulation of Schenker's phenomenology, the understanding of music's ontology, and the hermeneutics of musical works.' <sup>148</sup> Such purposes are naturally broad, and like the current study, Harper-Scott has chosen to focus on the output of one composer to make a point that is applicable elsewhere. He

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<sup>144</sup> Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) pp. 173-74.

<sup>145</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar*, p. 34.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33. Cf. Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*, trans. by Adam Czeriawski, ed. by Jean G. Harrell (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986).

<sup>148</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar*, p. 1.

claims that ‘The intention is to sever Schenker’s theory from its restrictive association with Beethoven’s heroic style, thereby making possible a richer hermeneutics.’<sup>149</sup> In making such a claim, he is dealing with a problem that is close to the heart of Schubert scholarship: Beethoven’s heroic style and the systemic problems connected with it. Whilst praising James Hepokoski’s work, he states that Hepokoski’s ‘sonata deformations and rotational structures are in important respects similar to my refined Schenkerian methodology, with its emphasis on the choice of whether to be “another heroic Beethovenian piece” (compose out an orthodox *Ursatz*), and, through a more explicitly Heideggerian formulation of music’s goal-directedness, on the teleological thrust towards the end of all possibilities – the close of the piece, whether that be monotonal or duotonal in implication or fact.’<sup>150</sup> In this sense, Harper-Scott, too, is dealing with works, which according to historical notions, present endings that are problematic, and he is using Heidegger to enrich his questions of the chronology of his case studies.<sup>151</sup>

Aspects of Harper-Scott’s study are productive for combining Schubert and Heidegger: most notably, he shows the extent to which Heidegger’s philosophy opens up the potential for escaping the heroic Beethoven narrative. His adoption of the Heideggerian *Augenblick* would seem to make the fundamental claim that Heidegger’s *Augenblick* is closely related to the Hegelian-Adornian synthesis, even if it changes the temporal slant to some extent. Harper-Scott notes:

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<sup>149</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar*, p. 4.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 8. In Scherzinger, ‘Heideggerian Thought in the early music of Paul Hindemith’, p. 84, Scherzinger suggests that Schoenberg fits an Adornian dialectical model, whereas Hindemith’s early works are more readily comprehensible through Heidegger’s dialectical position, or as he puts it ‘the dialectical dimension of Hindemith’s early *Gebrauchsmusik* is closer to the thought of Heidegger [...] than to that of Adorno.’ This is to do with Schoenberg’s and Hindemith’s respective attitudes to music history – leading once again to the fact that however one receives Heidegger’s thought, it works well for music without a teleological focus.

<sup>151</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar*, p. 4.

The *Augenblick* makes the present active, not passive: in it Dasein takes its future into its own hands. Heidegger uses the term 'repetition' for this authentic appropriation of the past, in which its crucial role as shaper of the present situation is acknowledged creatively. Authentic projection of past possibilities is thus for Heidegger an *anticipating* repetition, an active rather than a passive repetition, that holds fast to a moment of vision. Dasein focuses its past and all the possibilities it contains for personal development in an *Augenblick* that discloses how things should be if *this* Dasein is to be as *this* Dasein ought to be. If such a disclosure is worked with through the rest of Dasein's existence, with past possibilities 'repeated' in a creative way, then it will have been 'authentic'. Heidegger stresses that the *Augenblick* is not a 'now', or a single clarion call to stir a sleepy Dasein, but rather the authentic mode of the present – i.e. an ecstasis, a 'standing-out' from a preoccupation with immediate concerns.<sup>152</sup>

Harper-Scott then links this to the way that Heidegger looks at art. *Augenblick*, as used in this context, draws on a dialectical philosophical heritage, which is seemingly at odds with the task that Harper-Scott sets himself of taking up the challenge set down by Burnham, whose analysis, Harper-Scott claims, 'forces us to ask whether music is all just footnotes to Beethoven.'<sup>153</sup> Instead, other types of Heideggerian presence possibly offer musicology the chance to engage with Burnham's challenge.

Like Harper-Scott's work, this project aims to use Heidegger as a gateway to understanding musical processes in a way that is not wedded to the heroic Beethoven. Whilst, however, Harper-Scott aims to use Heidegger in tandem with and to enrich Heinrich Schenker's work, here the focus is more on the philosophical consequences of such analytical questions than those analytical questions in themselves. Heidegger's work is used as a vehicle to attempt to move beyond the expectations of middle-period Beethoven and the ultimate aim is to unpick some of the results of that for an understanding of Schubert's treatment of musical time.

Heidegger uses 'presence' in multiple senses: not just *Augenblick*. Linking being and presence can help create a way of looking at Schubert's musical processes. However, Heidegger's understanding of what would be rendered as 'presence' in English is complicated by the fact that it refers to a disparate group of terms, both German and Classical Greek. Michael Inwood details the five terms that can be translated as presence in English, noting that they are not the same as 'present-at-hand' (*vorhandensein*). Terms generally rendered as 'presence' in English are, according to Inwood, as follows: *Präsenz*, *Gegenwart*, *Augenblick*, *Anwesen* and

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<sup>152</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar*, p. 36.

<sup>153</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 28.

*parousia*.<sup>154</sup> These terms have distinct, but at times overlapping, connotations. *Präsenz* is the least interesting of these, simply having been coopted from Latin via the French ‘présence’, and is often used interchangeably with *Gegenwart* and *Anwesenheit*.<sup>155</sup> *Gegenwart* normally refers to presence in a temporal sense, but Inwood points out it can also be used in a spatial context.<sup>156</sup> However, although *Gegenwart* and *Anwesenheit* can be used interchangeably, there is a fundamental difference between them: *Anwesenheit* sometimes includes absence (*Abwesenheit*) but *Gegenwart* cannot do this and so there are connotations of Being (and its paradoxical disclosure and hiddenness) in *Anwesenheit* that are absent in *Gegenwart*.<sup>157</sup> *Parousia* literally means ‘being present’: it comes from the Greek para- and ousia (a participle of the verb ‘to be’: *einai*).<sup>158</sup> Alongside *Anwesenheit* (to which I return below), the most interesting of these terms is arguably *Augenblick*. Both *Anwesenheit* and *Augenblick* are meaningful in this context – in terms of their interaction with being – and there is a parallel here to be found with Burnham’s presence, too. Fundamentally, these types of presence lead us to being, away from teleology, and towards a way of interpreting Schubert’s music that deals with its temporal focus on the present (and thus its own past).

Further clarification can be found by returning to (one of) Heidegger’s uses of the term presence (in this sense *Anwesenheit* in German). Inwood offers a very clear explanation of the way in which Heidegger uses the family of words constructed from the root *anwesen* as well a history of their usage and development:

(*Das*) *Anwesen* is the nominalized infinitive of a now defunct verb, *anwesen*, ‘to be there, in, at or involved in something’. The participle *anwesend* still means ‘(being) present at something’. In the fifteenth century *Anwesen* acquired its current sense of ‘estate, homestead, residence, dwelling’, and by the eighteenth century lost its earlier sense of ‘presence’. [...] *Anwesen* in the sense of ‘presence’ was replaced in the seventeenth century by *Anwesenheit*, ‘presence’, usually but not invariably in a spatial sense (‘in his presence’). Heidegger also revives the old use of *Anwesen*, mainly in the verbal sense of ‘presencing, coming into presence’ [...] but also for ‘presence’.<sup>159</sup>

Alongside the rich mixture of other connotations with which Heidegger infuses the word, there is, interestingly, a spatial sense of presence<sup>160</sup> which Inwood

<sup>154</sup> Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, pp. 173-75.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>160</sup> Using spatial language to discuss music is something that many commentators have explored: unfortunately, this is not something that can be examined further here due to space constraints: see for example, Robert P. Morgan, ‘Musical Time/Musical Space’, *Critical Inquiry*, 6 (1980), 527-38.

makes very clear. Jean-Luc Nancy interprets presence both as spatial (in terms of being there) and also in temporal terms (in that presence ‘comes, and only comes.’<sup>161</sup> In his collection he seeks to explore both these aspects of presence.<sup>162</sup> When described in these terms, presence takes on a temporal guise that links it more to Heidegger’s authentic temporality (for a further discussion of this, see Chapter 3), making presence bridge various issues fundamental to this thesis, not least aspects of temporality and being. The movement and spatiality can be read as both literal and metaphorical; and only serve to give greater weight to a Heideggerian reading of Schubert’s music. However, points of particular relevance to Schubert in Heidegger’s understanding of the term would include the relationship between presence and home (for further discussion of home and homecoming, see Chapter 4), as well as the fact that within *Anwesenheit*, there is also a sense of something lacking or absent: *Abwesenheit*. The term is not, therefore, a simple one, but it describes something that, like Burnham’s ‘presence’ does not only not develop, but instead dwells on what its being means. In terms of musicology that potentially sounds very abstract, but it can readily be applied to the lack of development in Schubert’s music and the figurative sense that the music does not really go anywhere, but instead creates a sense of temporal stasis or even recollection through the use of tonality and thematic material. This can be read through the concepts of being and *Anwesenheit* which offer a vocabulary for this approach to temporality.

Julian Young also explores the idea of *anwesen* by citing a poem and explanatory note that Heidegger wrote on Cézanne:<sup>163</sup> ‘What Cézanne called “*la réalisation*” is the appearance of what is present (*des Anwesenden*) in the clearing of presence (*des Anwesens*) – in such a way, indeed, that the duality (*Zwiespalt*) of the two is overcome in the oneness (*Einfalt*) of the pure radiance of his paintings. For thinking, this is the question of overcoming the ontological difference between being and beings.’<sup>164</sup> Presence in the Heideggerian sense is similar to Burnham’s understanding of the concept: Heidegger’s understanding of Cézanne, according

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<sup>161</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Birth to Presence*, trans. by Brian Holmes and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. ix. While (regrettably) a full discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought cannot be included here, it is worth noting that his thought is an example of what Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht calls ‘extreme temporality’: see Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, *Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 77.

<sup>162</sup> See Nancy, *The Birth to Presence*.

<sup>163</sup> Young, *Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art*, p. 153.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 153 for Young’s translation of the quote cited in Günter Seubold, *Kunst als Enteignis: Heideggers Weg zu einer nicht mehr metaphysischen Kunst* (Bonn: DenkMal Verlag, 2005), p. 107.

to Young, is based on the notion that 'Cézanne "realizes" – thematizes, makes manifest – "presence" as well as "what presences". In Cézanne we take the 'step back' so as to become aware not only of the projected but also of the projecting. We become, as never happens in metaphysical art, aware of "presence" itself'.<sup>165</sup> Still more tellingly 'the duality of presence and what presences is transformed into an "identity"'.<sup>166</sup>

Presence is constructed in Schubert's music through various means. The most obvious is through repetition. As is demonstrated in more depth in Chapter 3, repetition can often be found in multiple structural layers of his music (which alone does not mark it out from that of his contemporaries). However, the unchanging and unceasing nature of that repetition, combined with tonal vagrancy – or alternation (both discussed further in Chapter 4), mean that the music loses a sense of forward motion because the dominant process is not one of development. Instead, there is a strong sense that material that has already been presented is being re-presented in slightly different guises again and again. This means that the overwhelming parts of the temporal continuum for the listener are arguably the present (in which this repeated material is unfolding) and the past (in which the memories of previous iterations of that material lie).

It is telling that despite her processual reading of Schubert's music, Janet Schmalfeldt touches on something comes close to the idea of presence, even if she does not name it as such:

As debatable as this may seem, why should we not imagine that it is possible for performers and analysts alike to experience the present and the past simultaneously within a musical work, even while thinking about its future goals? For performers, this skill is enhanced by their very corporeal involvement in making the music, like analysts who can turn the pages of a score backward and forward, singers and instrumentalists cannot help but remember where they have been musically and where they will be going, because their vocal cords, their fingers, their breathing will remind them.<sup>167</sup>

There is much here to argue: most notably the future goals, which are not necessarily the ultimate aim in Schubert. However, the fundamental point still stands; there is a temporal awareness in presence (and as Burnham suggested, presence is not unique to music like Schubert's but is just as valid for end-oriented

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<sup>165</sup> Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 157.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 157.

<sup>167</sup> Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, p. 115.



models) of past, present, and future. The question here is which is the most prominent.

Heidegger's being implies an altogether different kind of existence in time to Adorno's becoming: one that is less processual, less obviously related to the ever-dynamic, teleological Beethoven, but instead closer to a form that is predicated upon a particular type of repetition in which there is surprisingly little change. In this way, Heidegger gives us a way to explore non-teleological processes by looking at them through the lens of being, and thus relating to Burnham's notion of presence. The difference between presence and process for Burnham lies in their respective approaches to temporality: he is clear that presence is both prior and subsequent to process. Unlike process which develops (in all the musicologically-laden senses of the word), presence is. One could extrapolate that to the point where one can posit that looking at presence involves questioning what it means to be, thus bringing us back to Heidegger and his interrogation of what it means to be. Turning to presence does nothing to weaken Beethoven's position per se,<sup>168</sup> but what it does do is open up discussion of other models of musical time.

The listener's role in this is further explained by Burnham's understanding of presence. For Burnham, presence demands two crucial components: 'the effect of an actual presence and the engaging effect of being acutely alive to the present moment.'<sup>169</sup> He goes on to claim that the two are actually the same, and most importantly presence is dependent on the presence of the listener.<sup>170</sup> Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht offers the following definition of presence: 'The word "presence" does not refer (at least does not mainly refer) to a temporal but to a spatial relationship to the world and its objects. Something that is "present" is supposed to be tangible for human hands, which implies that, conversely, it can have an immediate impact on human bodies.'<sup>171</sup> The presence to which Gumbrecht refers is related to the latter part of Burnham's understanding of the concept: this is not purely a theoretical concept to be found elsewhere, but within us. Gumbrecht takes its ramifications for the human body further than Burnham, but both are arguably working towards similar ideas: that presence has an embodied,

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<sup>168</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, p. 167.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>171</sup> Gumbrecht, *The Production of Presence*, p. xiii.

corporeal component. It involves *us* being present. Presence is not found in the music alone, but also in our relationship with it. While Young links presence and being, for Gumbrecht, this has distinct implications and parallels with Heidegger's understanding of being.

Gumbrecht makes an overt link between his version of presence (see above) and Heidegger's understanding of being. The fact that space comes to play such a role for Gumbrecht may seem problematic in light of the purpose of this thesis. However, keeping in mind Burnham's conception of the idea of presence, where the subject being present is part of a concept of presence in music, this is one way in which to interpret part of the way in which presence works in Schubert's music. Gumbrecht goes further, making links between being and presence:

Both concepts, Being and presence, imply substance; both are related to space; both can be associated with movement. Heidegger may not have elaborated the dimension of 'extreme temporality' as much as some contemporary thinkers try to do; but what I have tentatively called 'the movements' of Being in Heidegger's conception make it impossible to think of Being as something stable. The most important point of convergence, however, is the tension between meaning (i.e., that which makes things culturally specific), on the one hand, and presence or Being, on the other.<sup>172</sup>

Being and presence may both have a spatial component; however, they also have a strong temporal component – and that latter, as per both Gumbrecht and most particularly Heidegger, can be applied to music – as Burnham has shown. Music provides an ideal vehicle for showing the temporal component to presence. Schubert's music, which does not focus on onward motion, but instead suggests an emphasis on the present (and the past) is particularly well-suited to this. By the time Heidegger wrote the late essay 'Zeit und Sein', he set out the relationship between being, time and presence more clearly. Indeed, he makes the claim for a dialectical relationship between being and time in which the two define each other.<sup>173</sup> However, this dialectic does not give us the key to understanding the concept of *Anwesenheit*. Although it is clear that being and time influence each other, *Anwesenheit* comes into play with both: the dialectic between Being and time does not tell us everything. Heidegger expands on *Anwesenheit*:

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<sup>172</sup> Gumbrecht, *The Production of Presence*, p. 77.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. Martin Heidegger, 'Zeit und Sein', in Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969), pp. 1-25 (pp. 3-4).

From the beginning of western European thought up until today, Being means the same as present (*Anwesen*). From the present (*Anwesen*), presence (*Anwesenheit*) speaks the present (*Gegenwart*). With the past and future this forms the common idea of the characteristic of time. Being is defined as presence through time.<sup>174</sup>

Heidegger links past and future as well as present with *Anwesenheit*, acknowledging being's temporal reach. It is a metaphor that works very well with Schubert's musical processes – not only the treatment of musical material in *Lieder* but also his approach to large-scale instrumental forms. Being and presence then offer a model to read even Schubert's sonata forms. The dialectical relationship between being and time, but also the understanding of temporality that comes from that dialectic, feed into an interpretation of Schubert's music and its temporal models. Heidegger shows us something that Young is quick to draw on: presence is fundamentally linked to being<sup>175</sup> in a way that makes it distinct from an Adornian process of becoming, which shows how Heidegger's wider philosophical system can become a vehicle for exploring Schubert's music. Schubert's music plays with the notion of 'presence' temporally: not only is it the kind of music to which Burnham is tacitly referring, its approach to temporality arguably disrupts our familiar expectations.<sup>176</sup> Whilst there are indubitably dialectics to be found within that process, they are not the same kind of dialectics at play in heroic Beethoven.

Schubert's music, with its focus on repetition, is not about breaking something apart and taking it to another place, but looking at what, metaphorically and musically, is already given. Arguably, this approach means that the same musical material returns again and again, but is made to feel different through unexpected means: a sense of the tonic being made to feel strange, for example, or motifs being carried through different movements, but accompanied by tonal stasis, so that the music feels as though it remains the same, but is looked at through from a different vantage point. Schubert's preoccupation with being takes many forms:

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<sup>174</sup> Heidegger, 'Zeit und Sein', p. 2: 'Sein besagt seit der Frühe des abendländisch-europäischen Denken bis heute dasselbe wie Anwesen. Aus Anwesen, Anwesenheit spricht Gegenwart. Diese bildet nach der geläufigen Vorstellung mit Vergangenheit und Zukunft die Charakteristik der Zeit. Sein wird als Anwesenheit durch die Zeit bestimmt.'

<sup>175</sup> Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, pp. 10-11: 'In the small "b" sense, being is, as Heidegger puts it, "presence" [...] or sometimes "presencing". [...] Presence (*Anwesenheit*) is contrasted with "what presences [*das Anwesende*]" [...] Since the essence of a being [*das Seiende*] is that it is something present, noticeable, capable of being of "concern" [...] to us, "what presences" is just another name for beings. While beings are "ontic", being, i.e. presence, as not a being but rather, in a yet-to-be-explored sense, the underlying "ground" of beings [...] is "ontological".'

<sup>176</sup> Discussions of this in connection with late style can be found in Chapter 4, but also in connection with Heidegger's authentic and inauthentic temporality in Chapter 3.

whether that be the rather more programmatic preoccupation to be found in the song cycles, or the obsessive unpicking of thematic material in the instrumental music. Interestingly those traits overlap in Schubert's output as well – the musical processes remain similar across the instrumental-vocal music divide. Much of Schubert's most celebrated output is celebrated because it does something that historically we have failed to talk about effectively. Heidegger gives us something very important in that context: a potential vocabulary and a way to explore the way in which Schubert's musical processes might be understood philosophically. In 'The Origin of the Work of Art', Heidegger makes the claim that art enables us to see the aspects of the world (such as the peasant woman's shoes) from different perspectives.<sup>177</sup> Schubert's extended focus on the very material that makes up his own musical processes does just that. It is arguable that Schubert's music can be interpreted as self-reflexively criticising itself; its continued obsession with seemingly re-examining its own material seems to question what we have sought in criticism.

For now, it is sufficient to note that Heidegger argues that repetition is implicit in any given identity<sup>178</sup> (an argument that starts to show exactly how being and repetition are fundamental to interpreting Schubert's forms). Repetition is representative of the temporal paradoxes that can be found in Schubert's music; there is a sense of history, but absence of it too (at least in a dialectical sense). Again, turning to Heidegger would seem to open up the possibility for further explanation. Gingerich offers, tellingly, the following on Schubert's approach to the self:

Schubert's ending also marks a different sense of self from the possibility offered by the organically unifying, culminating telos – the possibility of experiencing the self as a whole. A full generation after the birth of German Romanticism, having lived all of their adult years under the repressive Metternich regime, those, like Schubert and his friends, who continued to embrace many of the original ideals of Romanticism could not help but find in a redemptive, optimistic heroism a false consciousness. For Romanticism's step-children of Schubert's generation, the operative paradigm could no longer be 'heroism, but had perforce become 'loss,' and self-consciousness could no longer confidently inhabit telos, but must perforce come to terms with the memories of loss.<sup>179</sup>

The 'possibility of experience as a whole' points once more to Adorno's fractured 'social totality', and is imbued with a sense of loss. For Heidegger, however,

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<sup>177</sup> Heidegger, 'The Origin of the Work of Art', pp. 32-34.

<sup>178</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1969), especially pp. 23-42.

<sup>179</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 334.

*Dasein*'s temporal being is Being-towards-death – with a sense of loss implicit in the terminology. Schubert's music could potentially be said to expand the way in which the concept of being is interrogated. The most obvious examples would seem to be some of the most celebrated examples of Schubert's output including the two great song cycles, as John Gingerich outlines: 'Schubert has bequeathed us in the Cello Quintet and the Heine songs, instead of a heroic narrative of telos, music of tremendous courage in its refusal to shrink from the remembrance of loss or from the self-dividing consequences of introspection. That courageous honesty is Schubert's true swan song.'<sup>180</sup> In the following chapters, Adornian and Heideggerian concepts will be explored in relation to various works by Schubert, seeking to further investigate ways in which we might productively approach how Schubert's music works – and what insights might be had from bringing these philosophical concepts into dialogue with the processes of that music.

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<sup>180</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 336.

## CHAPTER 2: THE FRAGMENT AND THE 'LIBERATION OF THE PARTICULAR'

This would mean that Schubert's sadness results not just from the expression (which is itself a *function* of musical temper), but from the liberation of the particular. The liberated detail is abandoned, exposed, just as the liberated individual is also alone, sorrowful - the negative.<sup>1</sup>

The fragment is one of the hallmarks of German Romanticism.<sup>2</sup> In an everyday sense, the word fragment seems relatively self-explanatory: its emphasis is clearly on the incomplete – it implies part rather than whole, and is perhaps even broken.<sup>3</sup> The Romantics' understanding and use of the term, like Adorno's after them, is much more complex. For them, it contradicts the everyday meaning of the word: the fragment is an ostensibly closed form, but nevertheless remains forever incomplete. This has the consequence not just of elevating the fragment to a form, but situating a paradox at the heart of that form. This paradox means the fragment as a form is governed by a tension absent in the everyday sense of the word. In this way, it offers a very particular (and incomplete) perspective on a larger whole and, through that, affords certain unique modes of understanding. The incomplete nature of this perspective is inherently anti-systematic – and thus (tellingly, for this study) anti-teleological: the fragment is a reaction against the idea that when philosophy is constricted to a totalising system it can actively reflect reality. Conversely, the limitation of the knowable to the fragment relates to a longing for a greater whole. Thus, a philosophy of the fragment remains in a perpetual state of specific yearning for that unreachable whole.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>2</sup> A full discussion of the Romantic fragment cannot be undertaken here. However, for discussion of the role the fragment plays in Romantic literature and thought, see Ernst Behler, *German Romantic Literary Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Ernst Behler, *Irony and the Discourse of Modernity* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1990), Andrew Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory: the Philosophy of German Literary Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997), and Peter Szondi, *On Textual Understanding and Other Essays*, trans. by Harvey Mendelsohn (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), especially 'Friedrich Schlegel and Romantic Irony, with some Remarks on Tieck's comedies', pp. 55-74. For particular discussion of the Romantic fragment in connection to Schubert's music, see Richard Kramer, 'The Hedgehog: Of Fragments Finished and Unfinished', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, 21 (1997), 134-48.

<sup>3</sup> Andrea Lindmayr-Brandl makes the point that we can use the word fragment 'without problems in our everyday language' ('in unserer Alltagssprache problemlos'), but to define exactly what is meant by a fragment in the context of Schubert's output is an altogether different undertaking (cf. Andrea Lindmayr-Brandl, *Franz Schubert: Das fragmentarische Werk* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003), p. 25).

<sup>4</sup> Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 78-79.

One of the main proponents of the Romantic fragment was Friedrich Schlegel. Others included his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Novalis, for example<sup>5</sup> and as a form its main predecessors include the epigram and the maxim.<sup>6</sup> In particular, Friedrich Schlegel's own fragments reveal a fundamental contradiction: a sense of incompleteness which nevertheless expresses the longing for a greater whole, exemplifying the paradox at the heart of the fragment. In Fragment 14 of the *Athenäum*, Friedrich Schlegel writes 'In poetry too every whole can be a part and every part a whole.'<sup>7</sup> The one sentence that makes up Fragment 14 not only describes the relationship between whole and part, but also exemplifies the nature of that conflict between incompleteness and yearning for completion in practice. The closed sentence does not imply formal incompleteness, but the nature of the content implies that more could (or should) be said.

Andrew Bowie explains the Romantics' style of writing as two-faceted: 'A further notable aspect of their way of thinking is that they adopt forms of writing which are not straightforwardly discursive. Some of their best-known work takes the form of short fragments and aphorisms, which *enact* the sense of incompleteness they are trying to communicate.'<sup>8</sup> Their work does not merely articulate this tension between part and the yearning for a whole, but embodies the concept too. This does not mean all fragmentary writing takes the form of fragments and aphorisms: longer forms were used, but from the same ideological stance. Ernst Behler clarifies, for example, that Friedrich Schlegel's understanding of fragmentary writing is evident not simply in his formal perspective, but also in a central fragmentary outlook, meaning that longer, apparently more 'complete' texts can also be fragmentary.<sup>9</sup> One such longer, yet fragmentary, form is the essay, which is crucial to Adorno's later adoption of the idea. The essay, too, can be defined by the same ostensible contradiction at its heart. On the one hand, forms such as the fragment and essay create rounded units. On the other, they look incomplete because of their content and their anti-systematic stances. They do not present a greater whole in themselves: instead they show a longing for it,

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<sup>5</sup> Behler, *German Romantic Literary Theory*, p. 134.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>7</sup> Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. by Peter Firchow, foreword by Rodolphe Gasché (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 2.

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Bowie, *Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 99.

<sup>9</sup> Behler, *German Romantic Literary Theory*, p. 152.

though they will never fully reach it. Far removed though it might initially seem from Schubert, this inherently anti-systematic approach suggests a different way of interpreting and constructing the relationship between part and whole than the dominant, Idealist-infused formal models.

In this, the fragment could be understood as a reaction to the systematic thought of Kant, in keeping with early German Romanticism more generally (and indeed Idealism). According to Bowie, Kant's philosophy is an important impetus for both Idealist and Romantic thought: 'The immediate consequences from the 1790s onwards of the perceived failure of Kant's attempt to ground philosophy in the principle of subjectivity are apparent in two areas of philosophy which carry the broad names "German Idealism" [...] and "early Romanticism".'<sup>10</sup> It is for this very reason that early German Romanticism shuns the kind of system that Kant's work employs. Abandoning the system leads the Romantics to the different formal approach exemplified by the fragment, which is defined by an overriding tension between part and whole. Fundamentally, then, Romanticism longs for an ideal that is never achievable, but does so not from a system that can be seen as totalising, but from individual fragments exemplifying the unreachable nature of the absolute. In that there is no subsuming of the fragment into a greater whole; there is no teleology.

The Romantic approach to this unknowable whole can partly be understood through the idea of the 'absolute'. The absolute is a common concept in both Romanticism and Idealism, born of a response to the Kantian sublime,<sup>11</sup> but the two responses differed strongly. Bowie explains 'The central question in Idealism is really, then, how what the subject does relates to the nature of which it is a part.'<sup>12</sup> Bowie points out that 'In line with Kant, and in contrast to Idealism, early Romanticism acknowledges the ultimate philosophical inaccessibility of the absolute but [...] will not give up the endless attempt to grasp the infinite via the sensuous.'<sup>13</sup> This 'endless attempt' defines Romantic philosophy, which is governed by its approach to this unreachable absolute: something that remains

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<sup>10</sup> Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> For a brief but musically-based discussion of the sublime, see Michael Spitzer, *Metaphor and Musical Thought* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 326-28.

<sup>12</sup> Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.



unknowable in full, but which it still desires to reach. This contradiction lies at the heart of Romantic philosophy and the fragment.

The (incomplete) access to the absolute offered by the fragment clearly elevates its importance. Indeed, Behler notes Schlegel's metaphor of the 'not yet' was part of the way in which the whole remains unsayable (a stark contrast with the philosophical systems of Idealism). Therefore, as Behler writes, 'Completion and totality in any realizable fashion are questioned by a type of writing that, from the outset, rejects any type of closure and postpones it to an unrealizable future.'<sup>14</sup> An understanding or view of the whole in its entirety remains permanently unattainable. Behler explains further:

Schlegel illustrated his self-reflective modernism in a great variety of ways, one of which was his frequent use of formulas such as 'not yet' or 'as long as.' Thus, he justifies fragmentary writing 'as long' as we have not yet established the completed system of knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

According to the tenets of Romantic philosophy, that system of knowledge will never be reached – so the paradox is a permanent and binding one. By continuing this tradition in his own thought, Adorno creates another layer of conflict: that between Idealist system and unreachable Romantic absolute. There is a profound tension between the systems of Idealism that Adorno inherited (for further discussion of this, see Chapter 1 above) and the resistance to that implied by the fragment. This, in turn, is key to his aesthetics, as can be seen in his discussion of the fragmentary in *Aesthetic Theory*: 'The category of the fragmentary – which has its locus here – is not to be confused with the category of contingent particularity: The fragment is that part of the totality of the work that opposes totality.'<sup>16</sup> Although much of his thought seemingly sits in opposition to a Romantic interpretation of the fragment, particularly when thinking about composers such as Beethoven, this is not always the case for composers such as Mahler – and most definitely not for Schubert. Much though the paradox between apparent incompleteness and closed form would seem readily applicable to representational art-forms, its influence does not end there; as a philosophical position, it can

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<sup>14</sup> Behler, *German Romantic Literary Theory*, p. 153.

<sup>15</sup> Behler, *Irony and the Discourse of Modernity*, p. 61.

<sup>16</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, eds. by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Continuum, 1997), p. 57.

clearly be used elsewhere.<sup>17</sup> Reading Schubert's music as fragmentary offers an alternative narrative to dynamic, teleological formal models and provides a framework for exploration of the relationship between part and whole in his music. Indeed, to look at Schubert's music through the lens of the Romantic fragment is not without precedent. Richard Kramer has done precisely that, arguing that the Piano Sonata in C major, D. 840 'owes its fragmentary condition, in the actual sense, to this Romantic notion of what might be called a conceptual fragment.'<sup>18</sup> Kramer acknowledges this contradiction:

Schlegel's notion of the Romantic 'Dichtart' as a poetics that by its nature rejects the very idea of completion is here strikingly apropos. And that puts before us an aesthetic conundrum: for while we can speak of the work itself as aspiring to some Hegelian state of 'werden' – of perpetual becoming – we must at the same time recognize that we are speaking here of a metaphoric process within the boundaries of the work and a function of its style. Romantic artists do finish their works, do finish even those works whose substance means to suggest that they hadn't quite done so.<sup>19</sup>

This is a reflection on the Piano Sonata in C major, D. 840, which is incomplete in the most literal sense. While Schlegel was indeed convinced that art and philosophy were in a state of becoming, which, in turn, justified a fragmentary state of writing, that was understood to be a permanent state of affairs: the whole was (always) unattainable. This is somewhat different to Hegel's way of thinking. The musical case studies explored below are complete (in the finished sense), but draw on aspects of the fragment in other ways, suggesting that this music remains in that perpetual state of 'not yet' and offers only a glimpse of a whole in a rather different way.

Andrea Lindmayr-Brandl explores the fragmentary work in considerable detail in her 2003 monograph, drawing on both the literal sense of fragmentary as incomplete but also the sense in which it is used here. As she notes, whether Schubert was considering Schlegel's 'aesthetic of the fragment' in his work, is another question entirely.<sup>20</sup> Instead, she categorises fragments by four different types, some relating to works that are unfinished, others that were conceived to be 'fragmentary'.<sup>21</sup> However, that too is fraught, because as she notes later on, the

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<sup>17</sup> The focus here will naturally be on Schubert's music, but there would be equally valid arguments to be made about similar influences, for example, in the paintings of Caspar David Friedrich. For a discussion of Friedrich and Schubert in a slightly different context, see Chapter 4.

<sup>18</sup> Kramer, 'The Hedgehog: Of Fragments Finished and Unfinished', p. 135.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>20</sup> Lindmayr-Brandl, *Franz Schubert*, p. 18-19.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

difference between a finished work in the 'subjective' opinion of the composer and 'objective' eyes of the audience may well be far apart.<sup>22</sup>

In his use of the fragment, Adorno displays his inheritance of this central tenet of the Romantic tradition.<sup>23</sup> As Stewart Martin explains, Adorno rarely makes explicit mention of the fragment's historical context as an expressly Romantic form. He contends that Adorno's understanding and use of it is made particularly clear through his interpretation of the essay as fragmentary – and his use of it as such.<sup>24</sup> He cites 'The Essay as Form' as a particularly clear example.<sup>25</sup> By treating the essay as a fragment, Adorno is doing nothing that marks him out from his Romantic predecessors *per se*: indeed, his view of the essay as inherently fragmentary is much the same as Friedrich Schlegel's. Adorno's very use of it is, as Martin suggests, indicative of a 'critique of system' which is attributable to the fragment.<sup>26</sup> Andrew Bowie writes 'Adorno's work on aesthetics is in this respect the most radical attempt to salvage, rather than abandon, the Romantic heritage.'<sup>27</sup> In Adorno's work, though, this creates a tension between traditions which is telling for this project. On the one hand, Adorno is indebted to the Kantian and Hegelian systems, but on the other, explores the refusal of the system exemplified by artworks. The fragmentary effect is arguably little different in Romanticism for Adorno than to the claims he makes of Modernism. While his dialectical thought – borne of the system – finds its musical parallel in end-oriented models, the fragmentary approach prioritised here shows the effect of the constellation in Adorno's thought and the way in which this can be applied to Schubert's musical processes.

Adorno did not simply resurrect the fragment. Bowie is not the only one to note that Friedrich Nietzsche is influenced by the Romantic tradition in this respect.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, the legacy of the Romantic fragment permeates critical thinking well into

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<sup>22</sup> Lindmayr-Brandl, *Franz Schubert*, p. 63.

<sup>23</sup> Indeed, Karl Heinz Bohrer goes as far as to describe Adorno as a 'Spätromantiker': cf. Karl Heinz Bohrer, *Plötzlichkeit: Zum Augenblick des ästhetischen Seins* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Stewart Martin, 'Adorno's Conception of the Form of Philosophy', *Diacritics*, 36 (2006), 48-63 (p. 57).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 57 n. 16.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>27</sup> Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 238.

<sup>28</sup> Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 276. However, this is not unanimous. Judith Norman, for example posits clear differences between the Romantic and Nietzschean projects: cf. Judith Norman, 'Nietzsche and Early Romanticism', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 63 (2002), 501-19.

the twentieth century. Adorno was only one inheritor of this tradition and it exerted noticeable influence on both the form and content of his writing. In the twentieth century, the fragment found a different kind of force. One such example is the role that the fragment plays in Walter Benjamin's reading of allegory,<sup>29</sup> and Paul de Man's reading of the temporality of irony – as in Schlegel's fragments – only underlines the distance between an organic, teleological temporality and the temporality to be found in Romanticism: 'The act of irony, as we now understand it, reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and allows for no end, for no totality.'<sup>30</sup> Arguably, this is true of temporality in Schubert's music too. Moreover, as the two main premises of this chapter start to emerge, the role of the fragment starts to become clearer.

## 2.1 Adorno and the German Romantic Fragment

The two main premises of this chapter are interrelated. The first is that the fragment is central to the Adornian narrative about Schubert and the second is that the Adorno who writes about Schubert suggests a different narrative of nineteenth-century music to the Adorno who writes about Beethoven. Adorno's understanding of the fragment and its capabilities is central to both of these arguments. Indeed, Adorno's understanding of the fragment permeates his work not only in his interpretation of nineteenth-century music, but also because he writes, at times, in a fragmentary style.

While setting out the grounds for his own interpretation of Adorno, Bowie writes that the way Adorno's philosophy is explored often 'creates a specific Adorno.'<sup>31</sup> He goes on to say 'I have no idea how consistent one can make "Adorno", though I am sure he is often not wholly consistent. On the other hand the competing Adornos are one of the vital reminders in modern thought that there should be no comfortable position from which to judge the most important philosophical issues.'<sup>32</sup> For the present study, this is a vital point. Adorno inherits this very tension in European thought, present since the eighteenth century and fought out in schools of Idealism and Romanticism: and that split lies at the heart

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<sup>29</sup> See Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. by John Osborne (London: Verso, 2003).

<sup>30</sup> Paul de Man, *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2005), p. 222.

<sup>31</sup> Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, p. 238.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 238-39.

of the musicological issues explored in this project. While one thread of Adorno's thought can be used in conjunction with the Beethoven paradigm, Adorno's use of Romantic ideas and forms opens up something far more apt for Schubert.

To suggest that there are two Adornos or at least two Adornian narratives about nineteenth-century music begs certain questions: what distinguishes the two – and the rather thorny issue of how one separates them, which cannot be done as easily as one might glibly suggest. Even in the context of late Beethoven (which in its fragmentary style is closer to Schubert) Adorno reads some sort of unity absent in Schubert. In subsequent reception, the general emphasis has been on Adorno's more paradigmatic reading of Beethoven, which has obscured the parallel and distinct narrative of his interpretation of music such as Schubert's, which in the context of his writing on music reveals far more of his Romantic inheritance. With that context in mind, it is hardly surprising that Beethoven features strongly in Adorno's writing on Schubert. Moreover, Beethoven's music is, at times, clearly fragmentary. Max Paddison argues that:

The emphasis up to this point has been on *unity* in Beethoven's music – the usual emphasis, in fact, in a composer whose music has come to be seen as 'integrated' (although, as Adorno points out, this was not the distinguishing characteristic of the music as perceived by his contemporaries in the earlier part of the nineteenth century). Early on, however, Adorno also began to consider those aspects of Beethoven's music (and, indeed, of the whole tradition of art music of the bourgeois period) which work against unity and integration – or, alternatively, which create unity out of disunity, integration out of disintegration. [...] Adorno identifies features of Beethoven's late style which tend towards fragmentation, and from out of which, through the sheer force of construction, the composer creates a sense of unity.<sup>33</sup>

On the surface this makes a compelling argument for bringing the Beethovenian case closer to the Schubertian one, but the account of the two composers is still markedly divergent. The divide between Beethoven's middle and late styles sometimes runs the risk of being facile; works that are chronologically late are not always written in an idiom that would qualify as late style. Nonetheless, the point still remains that out of fragmentation, Beethoven creates a sense of unity, whereas Schubert's music remains fragmentary. Grounded, as Burnham notes, in the Germanic history of *Aufhebung*,<sup>34</sup> Beethoven's is a very different kind of becoming to the perpetual yearning in which Romantic art is suspended. Within this process of *Aufhebung*, Burnham points out the work becomes 'closed off', but

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<sup>33</sup> Paddison, *Adorno's aesthetics of music*, p. 237.

<sup>34</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, pp. 158-59.

again, this is a false parallel with Romanticism, because Romanticism does not lead to what Burnham labels as a ‘fully determined entity.’<sup>35</sup>

Without doubt, it is overly simplistic to set up a direct contrast between the concepts of fragmentation and unity, but the analytical quest to display unity has at times sidelined aspects of music that are problematic with regards to this viewpoint. Awareness that the analytical project is seeking not only unity, but is also paying more attention to *resistance* to that same unity, is an important part of the move to rethink and revalue Schubert.<sup>36</sup> Alan Street points out that ‘in its ceaseless flow towards reductionism, the music-analytical project seems to have worn smooth this distinction – in favour of unity – to the point of its becoming meaningless. What I want to suggest in this context is that, ubiquity apart, the unifying urge is by no means immune to doubt.’<sup>37</sup> In contrast to this quest, then, what Adorno offers here is a way of interpreting such fragmentary processes, which is remarkable given Adorno’s role in the narrative of middle Beethoven. Nonetheless, this lends weight to the suggestion of two parallel paths through which Adorno interprets nineteenth-century Austro-German music, with Beethoven exemplifying one and Schubert the other.

This conflict reaches beyond Beethoven’s and Schubert’s music. The impact of Beethoven’s processes, it is suggested, can be found in both Brahms and Mahler. Paddison notes for Adorno ‘*catastrophe as discontinuous, sudden change*’ is ‘a characteristic of the music of Mahler.’<sup>38</sup> According to Paddison, ‘This is seen by Adorno as a dimension of Beethoven’s music which led to no immediate development at the time but which remained as a potential in the musical material, taken up by Mahler much later.’<sup>39</sup> In Adorno’s account of the nineteenth century, it was Brahms who had to deal with the legacy of the objectivity of Beethovenian forms in the context of the subjectivity of Schumann, and also Schubert’s lyricism, according to Paddison’s reading of Adorno.<sup>40</sup> Brahms, then, was left to grapple with the legacy of both Beethoven and

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<sup>35</sup> Burnham, *Beethoven Hero*, pp. 158-59.

<sup>36</sup> This can be seen in much of the Schubert scholarship of the last thirty years. Although there are notable arguments that Schubert’s music follows a Beethovenian trajectory at times (one of the most recent examples must be Janet Schmalfeldt’s), the most compelling progress has been in carving out a narrative for Schubert’s music that moves away from that path.

<sup>37</sup> Alan Street, ‘Superior Myths, Dogmatic Allegories’, p. 80.

<sup>38</sup> Paddison, *Adorno’s aesthetics of music*, p. 238.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Schubert. Much as Paddison makes the case for reading Adorno's criticism of the fragmentary aspects of Mahler's music through Beethoven, there is also a compelling case for doing so through Schubert. Not only are the similarities between Schubert's and Mahler's music often telling,<sup>41</sup> but the terms in which Adorno describes the music are equally revealing. Robert W. Witkin argues, in his study of Adorno's writings on music, that 'Mahler's music gives the impression of being in perpetual motion, of "aimlessly circling"'.<sup>42</sup> This is language applied only too frequently to Schubert rather than Beethoven, much as Witkin argues that this heritage comes from the fragmentary late Beethoven.<sup>43</sup>

Adorno's writing on Schubert runs parallel to the trajectory running from Beethoven to Brahms and thus to Schoenberg.<sup>44</sup> Adorno's writing on Schubert, and later, Mahler, is suggestive of an altogether different heritage, and the way he writes about these two composers shows marked similarities. Indeed, Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen also notes the relationship between Adorno's writing on Schubert and Mahler, as well the role of Schubert in *Aesthetic Theory*.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, he describes the link between Schubert's late work and Beethoven in Adorno's thought as a 'constellation', a term with considerable resonance for this chapter.<sup>46</sup>

Adorno's writing on Mahler<sup>47</sup> is an important source for this project given its lateness in Adorno's output and the fact that it is longer and more fully formed than anything he wrote on Schubert. Moreover, some of the processes he describes in the Mahler book could apply directly to Schubert's music. While aspects of Adorno's Mahler are clearly derived from a Beethovenian-Idealist heritage, others are more Schubertian. These processes are not the large-scale dialectical ones he finds in Beethoven, but are more disrupted. Much as Adorno finds ruptured processes here, these are not those of Beethoven's late works,

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<sup>41</sup> See Susan Youens, 'Schubert, Mahler, and the Weight of the Past: 'Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen' and 'Winterreise'', *Music and Letters*, 67 (1986), 256-68.

<sup>42</sup> Robert W. Witkin, *Adorno on Music* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 114.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 108-20.

<sup>44</sup> See Theodor W. Adorno, *The Philosophy of New Music*, trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentnor (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen claims this lineage in Adorno's thought runs 'from Bach via Mahler to Schoenberg' ('von Bach über Mahler bis Schönberg'). Cf. Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen, 'Produktive Konstellation. Beethoven und Schubert in der Musikästhetik Theodor W. Adornos', in *Musikalische Analyse und Kritische Theorie. Zu Adornos Philosophie der Musik*, eds. by Adolf Nowak and Markus Fahlbusch (Tutzing: Hans Schneider, 2007), pp. 157-75 (p. 158).

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Hinrichsen, 'Produktive Konstellation'.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>47</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, IL, 1992).

which, for Adorno, create the dialectic between middle- and late-period works in Beethoven. In Mahler, one is dealing with something different: the way oppositions remain unreconciled, and change is handled. These two contrasting narratives open up one of the main tensions in nineteenth century music: on the one hand, its relentless drive, based on large-scale processes, and on the other, a preoccupation with smaller details explored over a larger temporal expanse. Indeed, perhaps one could go as far as to say that what Adorno finds in Mahler's music as a critique of the Beethovenian symphony turn out to be its most 'Schubertian' features.

Setting historical narratives against each other alongside the implicit paradoxes of the fragment will prove to be a fruitful way of exploring works that initially seem to resist dialectical readings. Ultimately this will show that Schubert's themes are not subsumed by ongoing teleological processes: the part remains resistant to the whole. With this in mind, this chapter turns first to one of Schubert's Impromptus: D. 899/1 and then the Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960. Adorno's use of fragmentary formal devices in line with his Romantic heritage only strengthens the suggestion that there is a second, alternative Adornian argument about the processes of nineteenth-century Austro-German music.

In the fragment, the relationship between part and whole can be considered constellational – a key term for Adorno, and one that offers insight into Schubert's preoccupation with seemingly non-developmental processes. This constellational relationship between fragment and whole affords a non-teleological interpretation of Schubert's music: it allows one to question how individual parts relate to each other, without the weight of expectation of a dynamic process of ongoing development. It also puts Schubert's music in a wider context.

In terms of this 'second' path, Adorno's continued use of this Romantic inheritance is telling. Resistance to a system does not come from artworks alone, but can also be found in Adorno's own work, something Stewart Martin attributes back to the Romantics, and in turn leads to Adorno's use of the essay. However, any constellation constructed from fragments cannot be considered comprehensive due to its inherent incompleteness, and this is partly where the



tension between Romanticism and Idealism lies. Martin indicates the nature of the relationship between fragment and absolute thus:

This incompleteness therefore requires and projects further supplementation. This takes place, not through a superconcept or the addition of that piece of the fragment, but through further fragments. The absolute is therefore presented through a combination of fragments, each relating to every other through its fundamentally incomplete presentation of its essence, the absolute. The system that this combination of fragments generates is therefore an infinite process of reflection. Each fragment reflects each other, generating a systematic interrelation of reflections as a consequence of the incompleteness that binds them together.<sup>48</sup>

Adorno cites the essay (which he understands and uses as a fragmentary form) as anti-systematic in response to the Romantic fragment: 'The essay, in contrast, takes the anti-systematic impulse into its own procedure, and introduces concepts directly, "immediately," as it receives them. They gain their precision only through their relation to one another. In this, however, the essay gets some support from the concepts themselves.'<sup>49</sup> The essay's fragmentary function is partly bound up in its 'anti-systematic impulse' and the way the form receives its content, which is not set out systematically. Instead, the concepts become meaningful in the way they relate to each other. Thus, the formal treatment of this content reveals the opposition to any kind of system:

If the essay struggles aesthetically against that narrow-minded method that will leave nothing out, it is obeying an epistemological motive. The romantic conception of the fragment as an artifact that is not complete in itself but openly striding into infinity by way of self-reflection, advocates this anti-idealist motive even in the midst of idealism. Even in its manner of delivery the essay refuses to behave as though it had deduced its object and had exhausted the topic. Self-relativization is immanent in its form; it must be constructed in such a way that it could always, and at any point, break off. It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by moving through the fissures, rather than by smoothing them over.<sup>50</sup>

The essay, as Adorno explains, lacks completion, because it 'thinks in fragments': it does not present a systematic approach to a knowable totality, instead it links glimpses of that whole through fragmented content. The relationship between fragment and whole is echoed in that between essay and whole. Adorno argues that the essay is open because of its content – and it does not seek to be all-embracing (or totalising). The rounded form, presented by a completed essay, is

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<sup>48</sup> Martin, 'Adorno's Conception of the Form of Philosophy', p. 58.

<sup>49</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'The Essay as Form', trans. by Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederic Will, *German Critique*, 32 (1984), 151-71 (p. 160).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 164.

contradicted by content that seems, in some way, incomplete – or leads it to be a ‘non-totality’:

The essay is determined by the unity of its object, together with that of theory and experience which have migrated into the object. The essay’s openness is not vaguely one of feeling and mood, but obtains its contour from its content. It resists the idea of the master-work that reflects the idea of creation and totality. Its form follows the critical thought that man is no creator, that nothing human is creation. The essay, always directed towards artifacts, does not present itself as a creation; nor does it long for something all-embracing, the totality of which would resemble creation. Its totality, the unity of a form thoroughly constructed in itself, is that of non-totality; one that even as form does not assert the thesis of the identity of thought and thing, the thesis which in its own content the essay rejects.<sup>51</sup>

This fundamental dichotomy in the essay is the paradox that makes it central for this study. In the essay, Adorno finds a form in which each independent, incomplete part has a relationship with the whole. Paradoxically, each fragment contributes to that absolute’s ‘infinite process of reflection’. Martin points out that for Adorno ‘The essay’s extended length can be seen as an extension and intensification of this process of reflection [...] And this can be understood as not only internal to one essay, but also in an essay’s relation to other essays, and so on to the composition of larger texts.’<sup>52</sup> Thus the fragment is only the starting point for Adorno. Indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy state that ‘the fragment involves an essential incompleteness.’<sup>53</sup> They go on to say that ‘every fragment is a project: the fragment-project does not operate as a program or prospectus but as the *immediate* projection of what it nonetheless incompletes.’<sup>54</sup> Here then, what Adorno understands by the fragment starts to become somewhat clearer, as do its implications. Adorno’s understanding of the essay as a constellation of fragments is also the way he understands Schubert’s musical processes: a constellation of fragments, repeated in order to create the larger whole.

Adorno’s understanding of the fragmentary Schubert is premised upon these notions, which function at the thematic and motivic levels: Schubert’s rounded phrases impede further development, leading to repetitive constructions out of necessity. Such construction is fundamentally opposed to organicism. The impromptu discussed below offers an excellent example of this; rather than the

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<sup>51</sup> Adorno, ‘The Essay as Form’, p. 165.

<sup>52</sup> Martin, ‘Adorno’s Conception of the Form of Philosophy’, p. 58.

<sup>53</sup> Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Literary Absolute* (New York, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 42.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

themes developing, they just continue to appear again and again. Therefore, the themes are isolated in the way Adorno describes, but this also draws attention to the paradox between the way they are closed in themselves and their relationship with the larger whole. Adorno states unequivocally of Schubert's piano sonatas 'It is not only the functional negation of all thematic, dialectical development that sets them apart from Beethoven's sonatas, but the repeatability of unaltered truth-characters.'<sup>55</sup> On the surface, this way of presenting musical material can simply be interpreted as repetitious, but that does little to explain the nature of the themes themselves. The themes are positioned in such a way that they make no progress as the work plays out, giving them a sense of incompleteness. They do not, as becomes clear, build up to a greater whole, but simply show how fragmented that whole is, as it cannot be presented in anything other than repeated, small parts.

These repetitive processes in Schubert's music, as well as the fragmentary aspects thereof, also contribute to how a sense of coherence is constructed. In an article that discusses another of the smaller works for piano – the *Moments musicaux*, D. 780 – René Rusch writes that 'the value of Schubert's work has largely been predicated on its inability to express a larger unity which would tie together perceived musical eccentricities [and] further highlights the marked theoretical and analytical innovations in Schubert scholarship, which seek to reveal the interconnectedness between disparate parts.'<sup>56</sup> Moreover, the way in which repetition is such a crucial part of the musical process means that Schubert's themes feel omnipresent, as though the work is saturated with repetitions of the same material. Indeed, the repetition almost seems to overwhelm the apparent system and deconstruct and dissolve it (see the discussion of the Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1 below). The inherently unmalleable nature of the themes means that they simply present what is there – and that leads Adorno to his conclusion. In this work, there is a contrast between regular phrases and non-developmental material, meaning that the sections, which seem self-contained, still create ruptures. These ruptures between the sections are precisely what prevents the parts being overwhelmed by the whole and absorbed into it.

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<sup>55</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 11.

<sup>56</sup> René Rusch, 'Rethinking Conceptions of Unity: Schubert's *Moment Musicaux* in A<sub>b</sub> Major, D.780 (Op. 94) No. 2', *Music Analysis*, 30 (2011), 58-88 (p. 58).

Repetition is thus a very powerful force within such forms, corroborating Scott Burnham's statement that 'Repetition is like a holographic presence [...]; it is there at all levels, heard from every angle. Such repetition is not the makeshift device of a composer incapable of controlling large forms; it is rather the condition of his [Schubert's] expression, the very condition of a subjectivity staking everything on the surface materiality of the musical medium.'<sup>57</sup> The repetition will be seen to sit apart from a dynamic process of development, which sets such forms apart from Beethovenian counterparts. It also sets up, especially in the case of sonata form, a tension between formal expectations and the reality of the function of the particular. The repetition means that the part is not subsumed into the whole – and indeed, that any synthesis remains absent. Ironically, fragments in Beethoven lead to the precise opposite to what happens here: an end-oriented model. In Schubert, this is eschewed, predominantly through the repetition of ostensibly rounded and complete fragments.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, the structure of the piece as a whole is far more fragmentary – in keeping with the notion of building up a work from self-contained melodic units.

These fragments, arranged side-by-side, have a constellational effect. Adorno asserts that 'Even conceding that everything in Schubert's music is natural rather than artificial, this growth, entirely fragmentary, and never sufficient, is not plantlike, but crystalline.'<sup>59</sup> This growth, then, is not consistent or smooth, but instead made up of related sections contained within themselves. Such sections are clear entities, leaving 'fissures' such as those Adorno describes in relation to the essay and fragment. In works where this occurs, the thematic material is not fully broken down and developed throughout the temporal course of the piece, but is continually reasserted closer to its original form, as will be seen with the two case studies below. Even in the context of the Piano Sonata in Bb, D. 960 (discussed below), the form does not behave in the generative way expected of a sonata form of this era, but instead presents a number of themes next to each other.

This is the paradox of the degree of unity and integration to be found in music such as this: on the one hand, the repetition of such fragments lends an apparent

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<sup>57</sup> Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', p. 37.

<sup>58</sup> For further discussion of repetition, see Chapter 3.

<sup>59</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 9.

cohesiveness to the music, but on the other, the amount of sameness impedes thematic development, and thus ensures that the fragments remain just that. The broader consequences of this are exemplified in Charles Rosen's comment that 'Each Fragment is, or should be, a finished form: it is the content that is incomplete – or, rather, that develops further with each reading.'<sup>60</sup> Adorno sees this in Schubert's phrases when he implies that there is a degree of stasis in Schubert's music, leading to a fragmented group of repeated ideas rather than a synthesised whole, thus constructing a constellation of fragments. This tension provides a glimpse of the whole, or in Peter Szondi's words: 'In the fragment it is possible to glimpse the future.'<sup>61</sup> Instead there is a sense of Adorno's fissures from theme to theme. In the repetition of the same material, seemingly from different perspectives, Schubert would seem to give a different perspective on the whole, which mirrors that between fragment and absolute.

Clearly this lack of unity and integration sets Schubert's musical process apart from Beethoven's: 'Schubert's music – immune to idealized synopsis as much as it is to the phenomenological exploration of "coherence," no more a closed system than it is, say, a flower growing to some purpose.'<sup>62</sup> Adorno's Schubert essay offers a contrast between the ways in which Adorno understands Beethoven and Schubert's music, but it does not impose a value judgement as to the quality of Schubert's music. Historically, this is an unusual view and one that Schubert scholarship has struggled to adopt: certainly until at least 1978, the idea that there was no value judgement in this comparison would have been a relatively alien one.

Only as the scholarship has gained traction, attempting to move away from the endemic Beethoven-Schubert contrasts (with varying degrees of success, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 1), have the voices, for example, claiming validity for Schubert's instrumental forms become more insistent – and, crucially, more widely accepted.<sup>63</sup> Adorno was, at least here, an early advocate for a

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<sup>60</sup> Charles Rosen, *The Romantic Generation* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 50

<sup>61</sup> Szondi, *On Textual Understanding*, p. 64.

<sup>62</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 7.

<sup>63</sup> There are multiple reasons for this and they date from Beethoven and Schubert's own lifetimes. John Gingerich, for example, addresses the issue of the different social milieux in which they worked and circulated, and thus the impact on their respective outputs (cf. Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, pp. 10-30). Notably, this impacted reception of their work too. However, it is also possible to trace a lineage of similar value judgements predicated more upon 'the music itself' from Robert Schumann onwards (as also discussed in more detail in Chapter 1). Thus Adorno, both in the 1928 essay and the 1933 review, becomes something of a lone voice for some decades.

viewpoint that has now become the prevalent one in contemporary scholarship – that Schubert's music functions on an altogether different premise to that of Beethoven.

## **2.2 Impromptu as Fragment: The Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1**

The Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1 is an example of a smaller fragmentary work in Schubert's oeuvre. The work is comprised of separate fragments, which are subjected to a considerable amount of repetition. This process of repetition, paradoxical though it might sound, binds the work together, giving it a sense of cohesion. The repetition of the fragments sets up this apparent cohesion, but it is only cohesion by similarity; there is no integration of thematic material. It is both the nature of the material and the fact that so little change occurs that makes this work a prime example to use to explore the fragment.

Charles Fisk identifies the structure of the impromptu as ABA'B'A''.<sup>64</sup> Initially, this seems unremarkable but Schubert essentially works at cross-purposes with this form. The form is ostensibly episodic in nature, but the lack of change in both A and B sections (and their subsequent repetitions) emphasises the sense of time passing. The emphasis on the present is made clearer by the absence of development or sense of progression. Although the form itself is unremarkable, the treatment of the thematic and motivic material therefore almost contradicts what the form seemingly dictates.<sup>65</sup> Such a process is evident even from the start of the piece, which is itself of central importance. This is clearly true more generally: in *Beginnings: Intention and Method*, Edward Saïd outlines the purpose of a beginning, stating 'Every writer knows that the choice of a beginning for what he will write is crucial not only because it determines much of what follows but also because a work's beginning is, practically speaking, the main entrance to what it offers.'<sup>66</sup> In an abstract sense, there is an expectation that the beginning of a work will open up a subsequent understanding of what follows. For a temporal art-form such as music this is particularly apposite. In this work, the start would seem to be indicative of what follows, indeed providing much of the material that makes up the rest of the work. While the start of an essentially dialectical work dictates the start of a dynamic process, the start of this piece presents much of the

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<sup>64</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 124.

<sup>65</sup> Such paradoxes are discussed further in Chapter 3.

<sup>66</sup> Edward Saïd, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (London: Granta Books, 1997), p. 3.

musical material in a guise in which it will return, often unaltered. Therefore, in itself, the beginning is a microcosm of something much larger. Ultimately, the repetition creates a paradoxical sense of temporal progress combined with an apparent developmental stasis. Here then, the relationship between open and closed aspects of the work makes its relationship with time equally contradictory.

The work starts boldly with a loud and prolonged unison G across a range of four octaves, followed by a much quieter, single unaccompanied line, providing the material from which the rest of the piece is generated. In Fisk's words, 'Many a Classical introduction concludes with such a portentously, if more quietly, struck dominant, prolonged like this opening one by a fermata. A main theme then always ensues, usually articulating the tonic as its first harmony. But in this impromptu no introduction precedes the G.'<sup>67</sup> The concept of such an introduction appears to have been truncated instead, and then presented as a single opening gesture, the concept of a whole introduction somehow implicit within this one note. This rounded, complete beginning does not require further development, and can therefore be followed immediately by the first full phrase. Already the paradox of the fragmentary within the piece can be seen: although at one level entirely complete, there is a sense that this start is condensed and the introduction is missing, therefore giving it a feeling of being both complete and incomplete. It is followed by a phrase which starts off unaccompanied, hovering around the tonic note of C leading to a perfect cadence in bar 8, thus affirming the C-minor tonality.

#### Ex. 2.1. Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1, bb. 1-8



The dominant function of the G is extended over the first eight bars – indeed Fisk suggests for much of the theme<sup>68</sup> – so the tonic is not understood as such until the

<sup>67</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, pp. 125-26.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

cadence. The regular phrasing therefore is not accompanied by an equally simple harmonic structure, meaning continued harmonic ambiguity dominates the start of the work. The opening of the work starts with what seems like a paradox, both in the nature of the thematic material, but also in its harmonic construction. Below is a formal model of the work, making some of these paradoxes clearer.

**Fig. 2.1. Formal outline of Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1**

A	B	A'	B'	A''
C minor  Generative structure (as seen in Fig. 2.2)	A $\flat$ major  Similarity in motivic structure to A (see Ex. 2.3)	C minor  Return to C minor is overwhelmed by G $\rightarrow$	G minor  Tonality retains overwhelming G, but now tonicised	C minor-major (ambiguous)

The structure of the first A section is shown in the following table, which reveals not only the regular nature of the phrasing in the piece, but also how the entire first section is effectively constructed from a four-bar 'antecedent' in bars 1-4:

**Fig. 2.2. Model of generative structure in Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1, bb. 1-32**

Large-scale function	A bb. 1-32							
Thematic function	A bb. 1-16				A' bb. 17-32			
Intra-thematic function 1	Period structure  a bb. 1-8		a <sup>var</sup> bb. 9-16		a bb. 17-24		a <sup>var</sup> bb. 25-32	
Intra-thematic function 2	Antecedent bb. 1-4	Consequent bb. 5-8	Ant. bb. 9-12	Cons. bb. 13-16	Ant. bb. 17-20	Cons. bb. 21-24	Ant. bb. 25-28	Cons. bb. 29-32

The structure of the work is dominated by repetition: at every level from the large-scale function, through the thematic and intra-thematic to the motivic so that this section is entirely dependent on an ever-present process of repetition. However, this repetition is not of comfortably closed material, but of this opening fragmentary motif.



The opening motif is inherently contradictory and the focus at the start of the phrase destabilises it harmonically. The antecedent is somewhat tonally ambiguous, something which is exacerbated by the lack of bass line, which in itself suggests that something more is going to happen. When, in the consequent, more lines are introduced, there is no immediate tonal clarity, reinforcing a sense of instability instead. Nonetheless, the period starts with the dominant and ends with a 6/4 chord, so at one level there is little that is unstable at all. This contradiction is uncomfortable – and it plays with a sense of what makes for comfortable closure. At one level, the period starts with the dominant and resolves neatly onto the tonic. However, the end of the period feels brief and perfunctory, too insubstantial to resolve the uncertainty that has dominated in the middle, as the temporal structure remains open until a stronger root position cadence offers closure. Suddenly, a phrase that seems whole seems to demand something more – it does not conform to our expectations of completion. Starting on the dominant with nothing to demarcate it as such means we long for an indication as to its context, but when it comes, it does not satisfy the ear. At one level finished and rounded, the period feels disconcerting, as though it is missing something: a more substantial PAC, more contextualisation of the tonic, a bass line in the antecedent.

Within the closed form of this fragment, there is a sense of possibility that comes, in part, from the work being generated from so little thematic material. This sense of possibility is captured in the oft-discussed Fragment 116 of the *Athenäum*, where Friedrich Schlegel writes:

Other kinds of poetry are finished and are now capable of being fully analyzed. The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself. The romantic kind of poetry is the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself: for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be romantic.<sup>69</sup>

Most crucial in this is the implicit sense of potential. Ostensibly this sounds distinctly Hegelian, but in reality it has some fundamental differences. Were the premise of this work Hegelian, the exploration of the thematic material would lead to two poles being brought together. This is emphatically not the case in this

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<sup>69</sup> Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, p. 32.

piece. Instead, one motif is presented and simply recurs: it does not develop. The paradox is thus that a fragmentary motif in Beethoven ultimately leads to the production of an organic and teleological whole,<sup>70</sup> but the self-contained melodic unit in Schubert's work resists organicism and with that leads to a much more fragmentary whole. Indeed, as Schubert goes on to show us, it is perfectly possible to build up entire works by putting self-contained units together; this is symptomatic of bigger differences between the idea of consciousness in German Idealism and German Romanticism. Bowie states that 'For Idealism, what philosophy can analyse in the activity of consciousness is a higher form of the intelligibility present in nature, so that the task of philosophy is to show how our thinking is the key to the inherent intelligibility of things. The essence of the Romantic response, on the other hand, is a realization that, while it must play a vital role in a modern conception of philosophy, the activity of consciousness is never fully transparent to itself.'<sup>71</sup> Therefore, for the Romantics, consciousness can 'never be finally incorporated into a philosophical system, because what we can consciously know of ourselves does not exhaust what we are.'<sup>72</sup> While Idealism is aiming at a complete system, Romanticism maintains that system's impossibility because of the limits of human knowledge.

This sense of possibility is only increased when it becomes apparent how closely related the episodes are to the main theme. Schubert uses the thematic material presented at the start of the work to create the entirety of the A sections, but its influence is seen in the contrasting B sections, discussed below. One can therefore posit that the majority of the entire piece stems originally from little more than repetitions of the material from the first 4 bars (shown below). The emphasis is on repetitions and recurrence, not on development, which makes it a fundamentally different 'process' to the dynamic one found in Beethoven.

**Ex. 2.2. Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1, bb. 1-4**



<sup>70</sup> For further discussion of Beethoven's teleological processes versus Schubert's repetition see Chapters 1 and 3.

<sup>71</sup> Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, p. 63.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Although the structures of the two succeeding A sections (A' and A'' in Fisk's denotation) do not follow the same model as the first section, they too are comprised largely of four-bar units that can be divided into antecedent and consequent phrase structures, and function in much the same way as their predecessor. The most substantial contrast is in the final section of the piece (A'') where the C minor tonality is challenged by C major, with the piece eventually finishing in the major. This alternation between tonic minor and major is endemic in Schubert's music, and will be explored in connection with repetition in Chapter 3.<sup>73</sup> Nevertheless, the repetitive nature of the material within each section becomes no less apparent, and the work is still based on the material from bb. 1-4.

The two B sections of the work are seemingly a significant contrast with the C minor-major tonality of the A sections. However, in reality, their kinship with the A sections is displayed in that they too can be seen to stem from the first four bars. Fisk argues that it is the rhythmic similarities of the motifs in the A and B sections that make the 'extreme contrasts' between the sections less apparent: the contrasts, he argues, are rhythmic, textural, and harmonic.<sup>74</sup> Despite Fisk's catalogue of contrasts, the overall impression remains one of overriding similarity, which arises from the rhythmic traits shared by both A and B sections, and dominance of conjunct, downward movement in both themes. Brian Black notes this too: despite the apparent divergences between the two, (and himself invoking Fisk) he suggests that 'The B theme thus begins as a transfiguration of the A theme.'<sup>75</sup> Although the remote tonality provides an obvious and immediate contrast, the general impression is still one of material that is recognisably related to the material that was used to create the A sections. This can be seen in the rhythmic likenesses between and predominance of conjunct motion in both bb. 1-4 (Ex. 2.1, above) and the opening of the first B section as follows:


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<sup>73</sup> The use of tonic minor and major has a very particular function in *Winterreise*, D. 911 as well; for a brief discussion of *Winterreise* see Chapter 4.

<sup>74</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 126.

<sup>75</sup> Brian Black, 'Lyricism and the Dramatic Unity of Schubert's Instrumental Music: The Impromptu in C Minor, D. 899/1', in *Drama in the Music of Franz Schubert*, eds. by Davies and Sobaskie, pp. 233-56 (p. 250). Cf. Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 126.

**Ex. 2.3. Impromptu in C Minor, D. 899/1, bb. 41-46**



In brief, most of the work's themes can be traced back to this opening material. It is not treated as malleable, but instead as a self-contained unit. This degree of unity and integration has contradictory consequences: although the work has a concision of construction, the inherent sameness in this amount of repetition ends up impeding thematic development. The contrast between regular phrasing and the predominance of repetition, as well as the lack of development, in the work shows how complete units are placed side by side to build up a larger work entirely devoid of any developmental process. Paradoxically, this fragmentary outlook arises precisely from the fact that the structure is grounded in repetition, thus making structural completion difficult to attain because there is little or no sense of genuine development. This in turn makes closure of the piece seem somewhat arbitrary. Brian Black reads drama into this process, arguing that there is 'momentum without relying on Beethovenian techniques'.<sup>76</sup> He describes instead the four-bar rhythm so endemic throughout the work as holding 'a monumental and irresistible power'.<sup>77</sup>

What makes this paradox between the regular structure and the lack of progression particularly remarkable is the characteristic of the first eight bars as such a closed form, coupled with the work's complete dependence on it for its thematic material. It is this combination that defines the fragmentary quality of the work: the relationship between complete and incomplete lies at the heart of the fragment as a Romantic aesthetic as it does in this work, reminiscent of Rosen's comment above. There are various different manifestations of the initial motif used to construct the whole piece, as seen in the analysis of the first 32 bars in Fig. 2.2. However, the motif has a further reach than that, as the material in the B sections is closely related to the A sections too.

This repetition is combined with a process of alternation at a structural level, so that there too there is no development, but instead simply a process of slightly

<sup>76</sup> Black, 'Lyricism and the Dramatic Unity of Schubert's Instrumental Music: The Impromptu in C Minor, D. 899/1', p. 255.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 255.

more elaborate repetition, only adding to the fragmentary nature of the piece. By placing A and B sections next to each other, but attempting no sense of resolution, Schubert sets up a duality which heightens the perception that the work is fragmentary.<sup>78</sup> By considering the start of the work and its role for the construction of the material that follows, it has been possible to see how Adorno's understanding of the fragmentary fits in with the form of the work. Schlegel's understanding of the fragment works similarly: his now oft-quoted statement likening the fragment to the hedgehog maintains a fragment should be complete in itself: 'A fragment, like a little work of art, must be quite separated from its surroundings and complete in itself – like a hedgehog.'<sup>79</sup> Arguably, at each level shown in the table above, there is a manifestation of the fragment as Schlegel describes it (or as Adorno adopts it). The A and B sections within the overall form, for example, are never reconciled, merely juxtaposed leading to a certain tension around the work's closure as they could simply continue to alternate.

This tension, between part and whole, and what that means for closure is captured in John A. McCarthy's comment on Novalis: 'His entire world view is marked by a tension between fragment and whole, between the desire for closure and the essential resistance to it, whether in the events of the empirical world or in the process of remembering.'<sup>80</sup> This applies equally to the Impromptu. Here there is a different temporal logic to be found: both A and B sections essentially work to expand the first period and therefore revisit the material, working in tension with straight repetitions, thus bringing to mind Friedrich Schlegel's observation that fragments have a temporal reach that can extend both forwards and backwards. The A and B sections are brought together by the use of the same material, but made distinct by their different tonal areas. The lack of development serves to make closure problematic, because there is no logical quest or indeed demand for closure at a particular moment; instead when closure happens, it is not necessarily inevitable.

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<sup>78</sup> Dualities are discussed in considerably more detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>79</sup> Friedrich Schlegel, *Kritische Ausgabe seiner Werke, Band II*, ed. by Ernst Behler (Munich: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), p. 197.

<sup>80</sup> John A. McCarthy, 'Forms and objectives of Romantic criticism', in *The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism*, ed. by Nicholas Saul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 101-18 (p. 114).

The ending is as much a factor as the beginning in a fragmentary reading of the work: thematically the start and close of the work are very similar. Notably, despite the use of the material from the start in order to construct the rest of the piece, it is only in the final phrases of the Impromptu that the opening unison G from the introductory gesture makes a return, and when it does it is presented in a different temporal context – alongside the material that, at the beginning, succeeded it. Instead of a statement by itself, it is juxtaposed against the thematic material that it once preceded. Our perception of the temporal order of what happens is thus rearranged, in that at the start the chord led to the beginning of the work, whereas now it is part of the process of closure. Other than some rhythmic alteration and the fact that the conclusion is in C major, there is little to distinguish the final phrases from the start.<sup>81</sup> The overriding impression is of difficulty in constructing a satisfactory end, meaning that one could foresee the work continuing for longer than it does, thus perpetuating the fragmentary sense of the work.

Fundamentally, it is the work's repetitive motivic construction which means it can be seen as a Schlegelian fragment. The fact that the ending brings together all the elements of the start with little change seems indicative of such 'complete' themes leading to little further development, and instead the work being dominated by reiteration. Such a process governing the music leads Beate Perrey to ask 'But how much repetition is good for us? How do we know when a lot is too much? After all, one of the points Adorno forcefully argues in his essay is how Schubertian repetition may jeopardize the work's value through the lack of a timely and truly terminal end.'<sup>82</sup> This repetition is not only part of what makes the music so fragmentary but is at the same time somewhat paradoxical: each repetition leads to the thematic material being seen in a new light, contributing to a form that has a fragmentary nature, highlighted by that potential lack of 'terminal end'.

Perrey's comment about a 'timely and truly terminal end' is especially apposite here, partly the work appears to question its own ending; even as it is happening,

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<sup>81</sup> I discuss elsewhere (in Chapters 3 and 4) the implications of Schubert's interchanging of major and minor modes. David Beach describes this as 'a hallmark of his style': David Beach, 'Modal Mixture and Schubert's Harmonic Practice', *Journal of Music Theory*, 42 (1998), 73-100 (p. 100).

<sup>82</sup> Beate Perrey, 'Exposed: Adorno and Schubert in 1928', *19th-Century Music*, 29 (2005), 15-24 (p. 23).

it continues to revisit material from the start. Indeed, the relationship between the start and finish of this work shows it to be what Adorno describes as the 'same in diversity'.<sup>83</sup> This repetition creates a paradoxical structure that is both disjunct yet highly integrated. The fact that unity and organicism are no longer central to the process which governs the way in which the music unfolds temporally challenges basic assumptions that we tend to stick to unquestioningly, especially in light of some analytical discourse.<sup>84</sup> Instead it would appear to be rather more meaningful to question what is actually going on in the process of a work such as this one, rather than attempting to describe it with ill-fitting terms. In turn, this leads to our questioning some of the fundamental tenets behind the ways in which we discuss this music and the language we use to do so. This claim of Adorno's is similar to his statement that 'In Wagner unceasing change – both an asset and a liability – ends in constant sameness. This is already embodied in his most striking musical material.'<sup>85</sup> Here, though, Adorno would seem to be making the same claim but from the opposite perspective: that too much change leads to ultimate sameness as well.

The landscape of this repetition and the resultant episodic form means Schubert works more with dualities here rather than dialectics, a trait that he shares with Mahler. As Julian Johnson comments, 'Mahler does not abandon this deeply embedded cultural tradition of dialectics, but he massively emphasises the unmediated poles of his musical dualities. By intensifying the oppositions, he strains the possibility of finding a discursive connection between them – a fact first and foremost of musical form.'<sup>86</sup> By placing weight on the two poles rather than their reconciliation, Mahler offers an alternative way to consider musical oppositions and indeed, music such as Schubert's where often those dialectics are much weakened or altogether absent. It is this same interpretation, articulated differently, that Adorno gives of Mahler's Ninth Symphony. Indeed, here Adorno likens Mahler's music to German Romanticism: 'It is only such passages

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<sup>83</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 10.

<sup>84</sup> For further discussion of this, see Chapter 1 above. Indeed, Suzannah Clark notes that Schubert's music is especially well-placed to enable us to challenge many assumptions behind tonal theory: see Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 271.

<sup>85</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'Wagner's Relevance for Today', in Theodor W. Adorno, *Essays on Music*, trans. by Susan H. Gillespie, Introduction, Commentary and Notes by Richard Leppert (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 584-602 (p. 597).

<sup>86</sup> Johnson, 'The Status of the Subject in Mahler's Ninth Symphony', p. 109.

that enact the kaleidoscopic fantasy that early German Romanticism hoped for from music.’<sup>87</sup>

The key to this argument lies in the first and fourth movements. Much of what Adorno writes could apply to Schubert: ‘The Adagio Finale is reluctant to close, as was Berg’s *Lyric Suite* after it, to the extent it remained an artistic fragment.’<sup>88</sup> Here is the ultimate presentation of Mahler’s work as fragmentary: the paradox between rounded form and yearning for something more. It is naturally not that simple. The relationship between the first and fourth movements complicates this significantly, introducing memory to Adorno’s interpretation:

Yet this tendency is limited within the form by the relation to the first movement, which, despite its constant inclination toward allegro, is likewise slow. Over and above the tempo, the two movements are structurally matched in that both, in the course of the recapitulation, divest the themes of their fixed certainty, finally presenting only fragments of them. This reinforces the character of retrospection, of a no longer restrained, fitfully intruding memory.<sup>89</sup>

Here then is a structure that is remarkably reminiscent of Schubert, one that is not only fragmentary, but making use of repetition to create a sense of memory. Moreover, the musical relationship between the two movements unseats them from a clear dialectic – meaning that ultimately they are presented only as fragments. For Adorno, this means that the temporal shift changes and rather than moving teleologically forwards, the overall sense is one of reminiscence. The listener feels that they are looking backwards. All of this could readily be written about Schubert; Adorno’s interpretation of Mahler’s music articulates some of the more problematic aspects of Schubert’s approach to these very same issues.

Adorno’s writing on Mahler opens up other ways to explore musical temporality. Adorno describes the Third Symphony in the following terms: ‘The Third, however, thumbs its nose at the thought of order and yet is so crammed with material and so rigorously composed that it never slackens.’<sup>90</sup> Here he implies something very different to the Beethovenian processes that he has outlined elsewhere. Adorno is clear that this comes from its approach to time: ‘This organization of the disorganized it owes to a singular awareness of time. If its

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<sup>87</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 164.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 164-65.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.



first movement achieves a true sonata exposition, this is not simply, as the rhythm suggests, a long march; rather the second proceeds as if the musical subject were marching with a band playing all kinds of marches one after another. The formal impulse is the idea of a spatially moving source of music.<sup>91</sup> Here Adorno not only draws on the links between temporality and spatiality, but also starts to refer to a form where themes are simply placed next to one another rather than resolved or developed in a Beethovenian fashion.

The role of such dualities in Mahler's forms leads to a paradox between encapsulated elements and larger form in Mahler. This has traits in common with fragmentary forms: 'How the individual element, emancipated in novel-like fashion from fixed schemata, takes on form and inaugurates autonomous connections within itself becomes a specific problem of Mahler's technique. It has to elaborate the Mahlerian paradoxicalness, a totality without an outline, a synthesis of the open and closed.'<sup>92</sup> For Adorno's Mahler, there is thus a tension between an 'individual element' and 'form'. The connections which the material seeks sound in theory almost Beethovenian – self-generating, at the very least – but the destination is not. The issues at stake – what Adorno terms 'the Mahlerian paradoxicalness' – are the same as those in Schubert's C-minor Impromptu: the tension between open and closed aspects of the work and how this, in turn, has profound effects for the work's approach to time.

Adorno's adoption of the fragment – and his interpretation of it in the context of nineteenth-century music – offers a way forward for works such as this one. This work appears to be saturated with fragments: the motivic material functions as a series of fragments but so too do other structural levels such as the periods, eventually leading up to the complete form. Although it is coherent and complete as a form, it is nonetheless inherently fragmentary, something which is shown not just in the nature of its material, but the temporality that it creates.

### **2.3 Some 'Particular' Moments in a Sonata**

Schubert's final piano sonata, the Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960 has not only attracted the attention of analysts because of its size and scope. Suzannah Clark lists the following striking features in the first movement alone: the bar 8 trill, the ABA' structure of the first theme (including a B section in G $\flat$  major), the shift to

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<sup>91</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 79.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

F# minor for the second theme and then C# minor at the start of the development, the return of the first theme in the development before the recapitulation proper commences and what she describes as ‘the recomposition of the first thematic material in the recapitulation.’<sup>93</sup> There are plenty more such features in the first movement, and the second movement is equally deserving of attention. In turn, this has provoked a vast secondary literature on the work.<sup>94</sup>

**Fig. 2.3. Formal outline of Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960, i, Exposition, bb. 1-116**

First group			Transition	Second group	
B $\flat$ maj	G $\flat$ maj	B $\flat$ maj $\rightarrow$	F# min $\rightarrow$	F min	F min
bb. 1-18 PAC	bb. 18-35	bb. 36-47	bb. 48-79	bb. 80-99	bb. 99-116 Ends with PAC
			Enharmonic link to G $\flat$ maj		Related to first group

While the first and second movements, in particular, make for interesting study in their own right, the aim here is not to unpick the movements from a particular analytical angle, but to do so in the context of the foregoing discussion of the

<sup>93</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, pp. 146-47.

<sup>94</sup> Space here is too limited to engage productively with all this literature. However, for analyses of the first movement see Richard L. Cohn, ‘As Wonderful as Star Clusters: Instruments for Gazing at Tonality in Schubert’, *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, 22 (1999), 213-32, David Damschroder, *Harmony in Schubert* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), especially pp. 244-63 which are conceived as a response to Cohn, David Kopp, *Chromatic Transformations in Nineteenth-Century Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 28-32, Nicholas Marston, ‘Schubert’s Homecoming’, *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, 125 (2000), 248-70 and Charles Rosen, *Sonata Forms* (New York, NY: Norton, 1988), pp. 258-59 and pp. 362-64. For discussions of the second movement, see Gingerich, *Schubert’s Beethoven Project*, especially pp. 307-15, Lauri Suurpää, ‘Virtual Protagonist and Musical Narration in the Slow Movements of Schubert’s Piano Sonatas D. 958 and D. 960’, in *Drama in the Music of Franz Schubert*, eds. by Davies and Sobaskie, pp. 283-301, and Eric Wen, ‘Schubert’s *Wiegenlied*: the Andante sostenuto from Piano Sonata in B $\flat$ , D. 960’, in *Schubert’s Late Music*, eds. by Lorraine Byrne Bodley and Julian Horton, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 134-48, and for the finale, see David Damschroder, ‘Conspicuous 6-Phase Chords in the Closing Movement of Schubert’s Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  Major (D 960)’, in *Rethinking Schubert*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 225-36 and Roy Howat, ‘Reading between the Lines of Tempo and Rhythm in the B flat Sonata, D960’, in *Schubert the Progressive: History, Performance Practice, Analysis*, ed. by Brian Newbould (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 117-37. In Charles Fisk, ‘What Schubert’s Last Sonata Might Hold’, in *Music and Meaning*, ed. by Jenefer Robinson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 179-200, Fisk focuses on a discussion of the trill in the first movement. For a more comprehensive examination of the Sonata overall see Charles Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, especially pp. 25-37 and 237-68. See also Anne M. Hyland and Walburga Litschauer, ‘Schubert’s Drafts for the Last Three Piano Sonatas Reappraised’, in *Rethinking Schubert*, eds. Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 173-206.

fragment.<sup>95</sup> In many ways, this work might seem an odd case study to display the fragmentary nature of Schubert's music: the first movement is a towering sonata form, the second a ternary form, and, as Fisk has demonstrated, there is a clear relationship between the first and final movements.<sup>96</sup> On the surface, then, these movements are hardly candidates for a fragmentary reading as in the case of the Impromptu, making use as they do of some of the tried-and-tested techniques inherited from Viennese Classicism. However, this apparent formal orthodoxy by no means tells the whole story: for example, the first movement's sonata form is, as Clark noted above, full of surprises. These surprises have a profound impact on the temporality of the work as a whole, which ends up taking unexpected harmonic and temporal turns.

It is worth drawing attention to Su Yin Mak's discussion of the opening of the work, in which she argues that often the full effects of 'lyric' are not explained fully: 'The self-contained expansiveness of the lyric thus appears to affect not only the construction of themes but also large-scale motivic design and tonal structure. Yet its rhetorical implications, the relationships it posits between technique and effect, are often left unexplored.'<sup>97</sup> Arguably the most-discussed moment in the first movement is the trill in bar 8. Clark describes it as 'menacing', and then suggests it has two harmonic functions in the exposition: it hints first at the turn to G $\flat$  major and then the enharmonic turn to F $\sharp$  minor for the second theme.<sup>98</sup> Indeed, she goes on to say that 'The trill's consistent characterization as an intruder or as isolated from the rest of the theme has led scholars to look to nineteenth-century notions of alienation and wandering to interpret the meaning of the large-scale harmonic consequences of the trill in the sonata.'<sup>99</sup> While it is undoubtedly an example of the kind of tonal vagrancy that has led to Schubert's music being seen as music that 'wanders',<sup>100</sup> it doubtless has other consequences, which I will explore below.

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<sup>95</sup> Koslovsky refers to what he calls 'timeless moments' in Schubert's String Quintet, D. 956, but these are set against a background of a forward moving tonal trajectory in his analysis of the final two movements of the work: cf. John Koslovsky, 'Timeless Reflections, Form, Cadence and Tonal Structure in the Scherzo and Finale of Schubert's String Quintet', *Music Analysis*, 33 (2014), 168-93.

<sup>96</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles* pp. 33-35 and p. 240.

<sup>97</sup> Su Yin Mak, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and Poetics of the Lyric', p. 268.

<sup>98</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 147.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 147-48.

<sup>100</sup> For further discussion of wandering in Schubert's music, see Chapter 4.

It is clear that the tripartite first theme of this Sonata is considerably more complex than the proposition of the opening material in the Impromptu. On the surface, its component parts can hardly be considered fragmentary. For example, the first nineteen bars would seem to be a completely rounded unit: an antecedent phrase that moves to V and then a consequent closing on the tonic, as seen below:

**Ex. 2.4. Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960, i, bb. 1-19**



As the Impromptu revealed, though, rounded units do not automatically exclude a fragmentary function. The first eight bars of the Sonata are far from unremarkable: they are marked by the intrusion of that trill, which completely changes not only the nature of that phrase, but (it does not seem overly audacious to suggest) the course of the entire Sonata. The HC hangs expectantly, the effect only heightened by the trill's role as a tonal interloper, before, as Clark notes, resolving back down to the F.<sup>101</sup> The silence that resonates after it emphasises the first phrase's isolation as a single entity. However, although the G $\flat$  might hint at destinations as yet unknown, the consequent phrase resolves this sense of uncertainty. The trill, as Joseph Kerman notes, returns, especially in the retransition, but 'remains essentially what it was at the beginning: a mysterious impressive, cryptic, Romantic gesture.'<sup>102</sup> Charles Fisk suggests 'The trill [...] has to a marked degree a separate identity from the surrounding music. Instead of

<sup>101</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 147.

<sup>102</sup> Joseph Kerman, 'A Romantic Detail in Schubert's "Schwanengesang"', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, pp. 48-64 (p. 59). Kerman also refers to Hans K lttsch's parallel between the opening of this sonata and the piano interlude in 'Ihr Bild' from *Schwanengesang*, D. 957: cf. Hans K lttsch, *Franz Schubert in seinen Klaviersonaten* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und H rtel, 1927).

merely reinforcing an already participatory note or gesture the way most trills do, it brings a foreign tonal region [...] into play'.<sup>103</sup> Here he articulates the trill's role as an interloper and its intrusion into the tonal area set out by Schubert.

A silence follows the end of the first phrase, seemingly breaking up some of the continuity in this A section, so coherence built up by the starting material has almost disintegrated before the movement is really underway. This means the movement quite literally starts again in the consequent phrase and the next four bars are a note-for-note copy of the first phrase – before it alters course. Harmonically these two phrases follow a perfectly normal trajectory: the first to the HC and the second to the PAC. This PAC has consequences for the B section that follows. By providing such a concrete ending to the A section and clear beginning for the B section that follows, Schubert removes much of a sense of transition between them. This creates a clear sense that the A section is both self-sufficient and self-contained: in this way an Adornian fragment. There is a reminder of the A section in the start of the B section in the trill that opens it, and indeed there is a reminder of it at the end of the first playing of the exposition too, when the trill returns, once more resolving down to an F, creating an instability in a passage that has also toyed with the notion of returning to G $\flat$  major. At the very end of the work it is still there, destabilizing a sense of comfortable ending. The trill does play a role in attempting to destabilize the work, but given the self-contained units (emulated at the level of the first theme's relation to the second) this does not overwhelm the work's structure.

This A section, functioning as a self-enclosed entity, exemplifies that Romantic paradox. The complete separation between the A section and the B section creates boundaries that have a profound temporal and harmonic consequence – in that there is no sense of completion. Instead the separation masks and impedes any capacity for growth. The harmonic path here is one Schubert took frequently: from tonic to flattened submediant. As David Kopp says of this harmonic relationship in Schubert's music:

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<sup>103</sup> Fisk, 'What Schubert's Last Sonata Might Hold', p. 179.

One of the key elements of Schubert's approach to harmony – and, more broadly speaking, of the beginning of the nineteenth-century dissolution of the norms of classical-style harmonic practice – is the redefining of constrained chords such as these as chords harmonically stable and valid in their own right. Schubert experimented constantly with the removal of constraints on the mediant chords: the direct progression I-LFM-I in his music may sound perfectly natural, meaningful, and functional.<sup>104</sup>

This is mirrored here: Schubert moves from a PAC in B $\flat$  major to a B section in G $\flat$  and the only foreshadowing of this modulation was some twelve bars previously. Once again, this is being broken down into constituent moments, rather than something that is building one single trajectory; there is, as yet, no real sense of teleological forward motion. This form would seem to break down into distinct fragments, which nevertheless offer distinct glimpses of a whole. This is a sonata form with a different premise. James Webster notes, with reference to Felix Salzer, the structure of the first subject group is not so unusual for Schubert, who made use of the ABA structure in his second subject groups too.<sup>105</sup> By making the A section so self-contained, Schubert would seem to play with ideas of what is complete and incomplete. The thematic and motivic material seems almost too complete; it permits no space for any development to take place – reminiscent of Adorno's description of Schubert's themes as simply reiterated 'truth-characters'.

This serves as just one example of the way in which this Sonata foregrounds the fragment. There are others; like the trill, they often have resonances beyond their apparent boundaries, but equally they seem entirely self-contained, showing exactly how Schlegel's and Adorno's understanding of the fragment can work in larger musical structures than an impromptu. The end of the exposition itself could be argued to be fragmentary too: the discontinuity of individual phrases is striking, and perhaps much more reminiscent of the traits that one thinks of in Beethoven's late style than Schubert's.<sup>106</sup> Indeed Beethoven's use of musical conventions contrasted with far less standard aspects is striking (as Adorno references).<sup>107</sup> One part of that is his use of trills, which contributes to its sense of

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<sup>104</sup> Kopp, *Chromatic Transformations in Nineteenth-Century Music*, p. 29.

<sup>105</sup> Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and Brahms's First Maturity', pp. 20-22.

<sup>106</sup> These are the sort of traits that Adorno outlines in the essay 'Late Style in Beethoven', in Adorno, *Essays on Music*, pp. 564-68. Such musical traits are examined in more detail in the copious musicological literature. For more on late Beethoven, see: Stephen C. Rumph, *Beethoven after Napoleon: Political Romanticism in the Late Works* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), Maynard Solomon, *Late Beethoven: Music, Thought, Imagination* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2003) and Michael Spitzer, *Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven's Late Style* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Adorno, 'Late Style in Beethoven', p. 565-66.

discontinuity, as Schubert's does here. However, the ultimate result both on a greater scale and within phrases seems to be different: in late Beethoven there is a sense that the music frequently interrupts itself and that themes are left incomplete, whereas in Schubert a sense of incompleteness is paradoxical, causing the material to be fragmentary in a different way.

Janet Schmalfeldt makes the suggestion that Schubert's Piano Sonata in A minor, D. 845 can be read as teleological in a way that is normally ascribed to Beethoven.<sup>108</sup> While there are incidences of such processes in Schubert's music (and the other way around), this is clearly not always (or even predominantly) the case for Schubert's music. The role of a work such as D. 960 would not seem so clear. Schmalfeldt advocates a kind of backwards and forwards listening;<sup>109</sup> however it would seem just as readily applicable to the Sonata in B $\flat$  – and thus not in the context of the kind of process that she outlines. Despite her dismissal of Adorno's Schubert,<sup>110</sup> there is no denying that Schubert's music is not always form-as-process, as indeed she herself acknowledges in the context of *Winterreise*.<sup>111</sup> That the instrumental music can be without such an endpoint or processual working out should not be so surprising. Instead, the process, such as it is, operates in a different way – rather than simply constructing a whole, fragments make that whole seem simultaneously incomplete. Or, to look at it another way, as M. H. Abrams describes, 'All process, Romantic thinkers believed, moves forward and also rounds back.'<sup>112</sup> The fact that the Impromptu is generated from the opening material – not by altering it – but simply by reiterating it, means that the fragment opening the Impromptu functions in one way as a microcosm of the work in its entirety. In the Sonata, it can be argued that the opening bars do the same and the type of recurrence of the material makes it particularly striking, not only through the first movement, but also, without preparation, in the second.

The development shifts to C# minor, which has certain implications. Charles Fisk explains that the key is 'the wanderer key'<sup>113</sup> and that it foreshadows the key

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<sup>108</sup> Cf. Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, p. 121.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>112</sup> M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.139.

<sup>113</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 78.

of the second movement. Although the key relations seem very distant, Fisk makes the following point:

C#/D $\flat$  is linked very closely with F $\sharp$ /G $\flat$  in this sonata. F $\sharp$  minor and C $\sharp$  minor both make their first appearances as sudden tonal deflections at points of formal articulation (the end of the first group and beginning of the development), in ways that highlight these remote keys and emphasize their remoteness.<sup>114</sup>

Taken in line with Kopp's point about flattened mediant (above), suddenly the key relations in this movement are much more readily explained. Although Fisk seeks to explain this whole network in terms of wandering, the key relations can also be interpreted as inherently fragmentary.

**Ex. 2.5. Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960, i, bb. 127-40**



**Ex. 2.6. Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960, ii, bb. 1-8**



This harmonic foreshadowing only tells part of the story; the phrase structure of the development shows something else entirely. When compared with the

<sup>114</sup> Fisk *Returning Cycles*, p. 78.



opening of the exposition, the similarities between the two become clear, but the development lacks one crucial component: the trill. Seemingly, then, it is even more rounded than the first phrase in the exposition, except harmonically it has moved further away from the tonic. This passage, just like the opening of the exposition, is a foreshadowing of something else to come. It does not drive at it; instead it sets out a temporal relationship that only becomes transparent later on, meaning that the temporal relationship becomes one about present and past (i.e. from the second movement *back* to the first), rather than one about present and future (from the first movement driving towards the second). Here lies the fundamental difference between Schubert's and Beethoven's sonata forms. In this development so far, unknown, lies the possibility of what is to come: it is still becoming. This is, however, a very different sort of becoming to the sort that one might anticipate in a sonata development.

The final moment I focus on here is another celebrated passage in the secondary literature: the return of the material from the first subject in the development, first in D minor, followed by the tonic key. This is remarkable for any number of reasons, not least because of what it does to the key relations, and how it constructs a sense of home (or lack thereof).<sup>115</sup> Given the bars that follow, Nicholas Marston, in his discussion of Fisk and Tovey, reads this tonic as follows: 'Rather than shoring up and affirming whatever force the initial dominant might possess, this music sounds more like a leaching away of the limited power to reach home possessed by that particular, attenuated harmony in the first place. Epiphany is not to be encountered here.'<sup>116</sup> This remarkable passage of music seems to work against the very principles of a sonata movement. Harmonically it does not follow expectations, but there is more to it. When this passage appears, it almost has the nature of an Adornian *Erscheinung*<sup>117</sup> in its anti-developmental stance and rather than looking forward, it feels like a memory of the tonic in the exposition. It emerges from a passage in D minor, but still, as Marston makes clear, it weakens rather than strengthens any sense of the

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<sup>115</sup> For further discussion of homecoming in this thesis, see Chapter 4.

<sup>116</sup> Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', p. 252. See further discussion of Fisk's 'epiphany' below.

<sup>117</sup> In Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', p. 32, Burnham refers to Adorno's description of Schubert's themes as *Erscheinungen*: 'For Adorno, a Schubertian theme is an apparition, an *Erscheinung*, a characteristic truth; it is not an invention in need of a formal process of destiny. Such a theme can only be invoked through repetition, not transformed through development.' See Philip Alperson, "'Musical Time" and Music as an "Art of Time"', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 38 (1980), 407-17 (p. 413) for the suggestion, in a different context, that 'The time of music is a "semblance", an appearance, a seemingness.'

tonic; a transition Xavier Hascher describes as having ‘the weight of a fatality.’<sup>118</sup> Moreover, it too is completely self-contained, seemingly resistant to moving onto the next section. The self-sufficient, self-contained cells are the precise opposite of what one might expect. Here again, a sense of completion is juxtaposed with something else altogether. Once again, the bass trills abound:

**Ex. 2.7. Schubert, Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960, i, bb. 197-208**



The first trill is ostensibly used as a vehicle to move from D minor to B $\flat$  major. The PAC in bars 190-91 is followed by the disruptive modulation in which the harmony slides to B $\flat$ , in this case, B $\flat$  being a lower flattened mediant of D minor, as well as the tonic, as per Kopp’s analysis of Schubert’s treatment of such relationships above. At the end of the B $\flat$  statement of the theme, however, there is an inversion of this trill: it is used to slide back up from B $\flat$  to D. This statement somehow, while completely isolated and fragmentary, also manages to make the tonic sound utterly alien. By uttering the theme in D minor and only modulating to B $\flat$  at the end, it ostensibly constructs D minor as the tonic, when it is anything but. Thus, B $\flat$  comes to feel like the outsider, even when the opening theme returns in B $\flat$  in bar 193. The trills play a leading role in this process. The first of the two is reminiscent of the opening trill, the second necessarily works because it is a I-iii modulation. Nonetheless, these trills play a crucial role in destabilizing this sonata form but simultaneously grounding its key relationships. Fisk casts this as a relationship between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ – and finding the very ‘epiphany’ Marston explicitly argues against.<sup>119</sup> It is particularly the casting of D

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Xavier Hascher, ‘Sur les pas du ‘Wanderer’: Pour une cartographie de l’errance schubertienne’, in *Le style instrumental de Schubert: Sources, Analyse, Évolution*, ed. by Xavier Hascher (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007), pp. 181-203 (p. 190): ‘le poids d’une fatalité.’

<sup>119</sup> Fisk, ‘What Schubert’s Last Sonata Might Hold’, p. 193 and Marston, ‘Schubert’s Homecoming’, pp. 251-52..

minor and B $\flat$  major that lead him to this conclusion; and to swap the roles of insider and outsider tonally.<sup>120</sup>

They are, in the most fragmentary sense, paradoxical. Here, then, are examples of fragments in arguably one of the most integrated structures one is likely to find in Schubert's output. It would be possible to extend this significantly further, but here is a snapshot of how the concept of the fragmentary can be applied to a work that demonstrates other Schubertian concepts such as wandering and homecoming, as well as repetition, in abundance. A reading of this work via Schlegel shows how some moments become so fundamental to an overarching understanding of its temporality. The manner in which they take on this significance is unusual, being disproportionate to their brevity. That they simply hang, unaltered and repeated is what gives them their fragmentary guise. This fits into Adorno's reading of Schubert in that he attributes crucial 'moments' in works, which are central to their fragmentary nature. Such particular moments influence the temporality of Schubert's music, and it is these that make Schubert's music distinct from Beethoven's, producing a musical form shaped by discrete moments, rather than an overarching trajectory. It is the function of these moments that is particular to Schubert; they are not tied into processual development so much as the articulation of an instant. This is repeated, often many times, but the temporal focus is not to drive forwards. If anything, they look backwards to previous iterations of the same material that have preceded them. This relationship, and its ramifications, are what leads Adorno to the phrase the 'liberation of the particular' in relation to Schubert's music.

#### **2.4 Schubert and the 'Liberation of the Particular'**

In Adorno's writing on Beethoven, there are frequent references to Schubert, many of which offer further insight into the way in which Adorno sees the music of the two composers. Some of the philosophical concepts latent in the early writings on Schubert become more obvious in this work and are examined more closely. Adorno continues to argue here that Schubert and Beethoven's music is based on processes which have differing musical and philosophical implications. However, his reading of Schubert also becomes less flexible in some ways. The musical stakes of this divide are considerable, and its interpretation has the

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<sup>120</sup> Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', p. 193. The resonances here with the later discussion of Heidegger and Trakl are considerable: see 4.5.

potential to provide an approach to overcoming some of the barriers to Schubert scholarship posed by the Beethoven paradigm; it is here that Adorno's work on Mahler, which explores some of these apparently 'Schubertian' ideas in more depth, can also be used fruitfully. This opens up a space in which Schubert's music can be examined in the context of Adorno's wider narrative of nineteenth-century music.

For Adorno, Schubert's melodic themes seem self-contained and finished, rather than still forming in the sense of a typical Beethovenian motif. Isolated themes, as constructed by Schubert, are troublingly irreconcilable with dialectical processes. Schubert's themes create music out of completed, self-sufficient fragments, placed next to one another, thus leading to a different type of temporal logic, as in the case studies above. The way in which the reader (or listener, in this case) is able to relate fragments to one another formed a crucial part of the interpretation of Romantic fragments.<sup>121</sup> The importance of Schubert's music lies therefore in the way in which it treats its details in relation to the whole.

The fragmentary aspects of Schubert's music stand in contrast to its duration.<sup>122</sup> This is most noticeable in a work such as D. 960; the first movement, especially when including the repeat of the exposition, is enormous, and incorporates a significant amount of repetition. This is mirrored elsewhere: Schubert's music has themes that seem as though they can be readily isolated from the (often vast) whole. Indeed, this repetition contributes to the sense of scale of such a work. Adorno outlines the relationship between Schubert's melodies and the length of his music as follows:

The antithesis of this was already Schubert's 'heavenly length.' Not only are the melodies, from which his instrumental movements are sometimes unwilling to tear themselves away, so complete in themselves that the thought of development applied to them is unseemly; but also the desire to fill up time with music, to resist transience by that which has the right to abide, itself becomes a musical wishful image.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Cf. Bowie, *From Romanticism to Critical Theory*, pp. 85-86.

<sup>122</sup> Adorno is hardly the first to comment on the length of Schubert's music; one of the most famous instances must be Robert Schumann's statement that Schubert's music has 'himmlische Länge': cf. Robert Schumann, *Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker* (Leipzig: Georg Wigand Verlag, 1854), p. 201. In Andrew Bowie, 'Music and the rise of aesthetics', in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Music*, ed. by Jim Samson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 29-54, Bowie reminds us that conversely both Schubert and indeed Schumann would have known some of Friedrich Schlegel's work.

<sup>123</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 73.

It is no coincidence that this discussion appears in Adorno's work on Mahler. While Schubert's melodies are contained within themselves, but 'fill up with music', Mahler's take on duration is, for Adorno, slightly different:

Almost a hundred years after Schubert mere length is, for Mahler's music, no longer divine. Patiently as it flows out into time, just as impatiently it watches to ensure that this time is filled with musical content; the critical question is the active principle of its form. [...] In their duration his *moments musicaux* weigh no less heavily than those of Schubert, to whom the expression dates back. For it is only when mediated through their intensity, and not as a crammed span, that extensive time in them becomes a plenitude.<sup>124</sup>

Mahler's music does more with its duration, Adorno seems to imply, than Schubert. For Adorno, this is bound up with the relationship between form and content in Mahler, which is, in some ways, a more dynamic (Beethovenian) process than Schubert's music – although Adorno reads Mahler's position as one that is inherently critical of its own form. Adorno likens Mahler's themes to characters in a novel rather than the musical themes of Viennese Classicism in that they not only change over time but are aware of that time.<sup>125</sup> In the Beethoven book, too, Adorno's description of the D. 899/1 Impromptu premises the relationship between whole and part as the instrumental part of Schubert's technique:

When Eduard [Steuer mann] had played the Four Impromptus, [op. 90] by Schubert (with the matchlessly great one in C minor), I raised the question why this music was so incomparably sadder than even the most sombre pieces by Beethoven. Eduard thought it was due to Beethoven's *activity*, and I defined this, with his agreement, as totality, as the indissoluble union between whole and part. This would mean that Schubert's sadness results not just from the expression (which is itself a *function* of musical temper), but from the liberation of the particular. The liberated detail is abandoned, exposed, just as the liberated individual is also alone, sorrowful – the negative. From this follows something about the twofold nature of Beethoven, which must be emphasized: that is, the totality gives a quality of the particular *holding its own* (which is lacking in Schubert and in the whole of Romanticism, especially Wagner); at the same time, it impacts to the particular an ideological, transfiguring quality which reflects Hegel's doctrine of the positivity of the whole as the summation of all individual negativities – that is, it imparts a moment of *untruth*.<sup>126</sup>

The 'liberation of the particular' which occurs in Schubert's music is a crucial idea here – in separating part from totality through the fragment, Schubert's treatment of the particular means that it remains formally dissonant because it does not simply resolve (or dissolve) into the whole. In that way, Schubert's

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<sup>124</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>126</sup> Adorno, *Beethoven*, pp. 23-24.

music is not about what it goes on to construct but what it presents. The impromptu to which Adorno refers here has been discussed above (in 2.2). For Adorno, the Impromptu is ‘matchlessly great’: it is undoubtedly a work that presents material in a finished form, but since each component is not serving the construction of a whole in the same way, each component is in a sense ‘abandoned, exposed’. By the same token, each component is liberated from being conscripted to the larger formal function and allowed to stand in its own particularity. This division between construction and presentation can most definitely be seen in the Impromptu at multiple structural levels. Although one can argue that the majority of the work’s thematic material is ‘constructed’ from the opening material, the lack of the development really epitomises what Adorno means by ‘presents’. The material is simply stated with no attempt to break it down and reconstruct it. In Beethoven, such thematic material would need to lead to an eventual *Aufhebung*, but in Schubert, this particularity simply subsists. This thematic material is merely reiterated, leading to closed, fragmentary units. At a formal level, this leads to alternating A and B sections with no sense of development or reconciliation.

Not only can this ‘liberation of the particular’ be seen in D. 899/1’s first phrase (as discussed in 2.2), but it is equally clear at the end of the development in D. 960 (as discussed in 2.3). When the opening theme of the Sonata returns at the end of the development, it does so in D minor – which feels like the wrong key. It is not the tonic, and as discussed above, the way in which this material is presented not only creates a false sense that D minor is the tonic, but also makes B $\flat$  feel entirely alien when it does return. In other words, the particularity of the theme resists being ‘resolved’ to the tonic as the logic of the whole normally dictates. In this way, the tension between the presumption of the form and what the composer does becomes clear. The treatment of the particular would seem to resist the very formal logic of the sonata. Moreover, this particularity would seem to stand in opposition to a Hegelian understanding of the form. Adorno tells us above that it is a hallmark of Beethoven’s style to have the ‘indissoluble union between whole and part’. In D. 960, the whole is present, but the part is not subsumed within it. The particular remains just that, despite the apparent presence of a harmonious whole, which coheres without the collapse of the part’s particularity.

In Adorno's essay 'Subject and Object', he writes that 'The antithesis of universal and particular, too, is both necessary and deceptive. Neither one exists without the other – the particular only as defined and thus universal; the universal only as the definition of something particular. Both of them are and are not. This is one of the strongest motives of nonidealist dialectics.'<sup>127</sup> It is neither part nor whole; in some instances, as arguably in this Piano Sonata, there can be a balancing of the two without one being subsumed by the other. Adorno states that 'Nevertheless, the concept of transcendality reminds us that thinking, by dint of its immanent moments of universality, transcends its own inalienable individuation.'<sup>128</sup> Here we see a rebalancing between part and whole; the two are not alternatives, but possible concurrently. Here, then, is a way to interpret particularity in Schubert against the work's larger, overarching, all-encompassing structure.

Although Schubert was using some of the same idioms as Beethoven (such as the sonata) the relationship between theme, form, and content is very different. It is only when Schubert's music is understood as fragmentary, then, that the nature of its content becomes clear. The 'liberation of the particular' occurs because Schubert's music functions as a series of moments rather than as a working out of a Hegelian dialectic.<sup>129</sup> With the isolation of the fragmentary themes, the temporality arguably works in a different way, as has been shown in the discussion above. The very negativity of Schubert's music thus becomes its primary strength. Indeed, it can only happen because the music is fragmentary. It is because the music remains fractured that the possibility to understand the particularity of Schubert's music even exists for Adorno.

Elsewhere in Adorno's output a series of moments is intensely problematic, as in the example of his critique of the Culture Industry. For example, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer state of the Culture Industry that 'Its element is repetition.'<sup>130</sup> However, even there, Adorno writes that 'The memorability of disconnected parts, thanks to climaxes and repetitions, has a

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<sup>127</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'Subject and Object', in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York, NY: Urizen Books, 1978), pp. 497-512 (pp. 510).

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 510.

<sup>129</sup> This links to a further discussion of Schubert's music as a succession of 'moments' or 'instants' in Chapter 4.

<sup>130</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, ed. by Gunzlin Schmid Goerr, trans. by Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 108.

precursor in great music itself, in the technique of late romantic compositions.<sup>131</sup> His description of empty repetition in popular music stands in stark contrast with that of Mahler, whose themes he describes as 'expropriated'.<sup>132</sup> This type of repetition is put to different ends meaning 'Such music really crystallizes the whole, into which it has incorporated the vulgarized fragments, into something new, yet it takes its material from regressive listening.'<sup>133</sup> This description is similar to that of Schubert's music as 'crystalline', and highlights the similarities between that and the formation of the whole in Mahler's music. There is a kinship here with Schubert; the weight is placed on the fragment as opposed to the whole, and the type of repetition is reminiscent of Schubert too (perhaps Schubert's themes could be described as 'expropriated' as well). This shows that, for Adorno at least, this repetition is not entirely empty, partly because of the relationship it has with the whole.

Adorno reads some aspects of Mahler's music as inherently Beethovenian. In his approach to musical time, however, Adorno's interpretation of Mahler can be applied to Schubert or even read almost as an extension of Adorno's Schubert criticism. Adorno certainly does not suggest Mahler is wholly loyal to Viennese Classicism – and there are occasions where this antagonism is suggestive of more Schubertian traits. He writes 'In the latter [Mahler's music] even figures that, as in the Fifth, were indeed motivically developed from what had gone before, become fresh entities removed from the machinery of the process.'<sup>134</sup> In Adorno's eyes, there is doubtless a developmental process here, but its end isolates its themes, meaning that they are somewhat alienated from the whole they initially sought to construct. As Witkin notes, in Mahler there is a 'refusal of synthesis, of reconciliation between subject and object'.<sup>135</sup>

The role of the breakthrough in this (as a continually evolving process) means that there is no glorious point of affirmation, just continual questioning, which ultimately leads to an unseating of the dominance of the potential dialecticism of the work. The disjunction between part and whole is one that Adorno continues to explore when he claims that the opening theme of Mahler's Third Symphony

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<sup>131</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, 'Fetish Character in Music and Regression of Listening', in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, eds. by Arato and Gebhardt, pp. 270-99 (p. 281).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>134</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 72.

<sup>135</sup> Witkin, *Adorno on Music*, p. 116.



is 'rather an abbreviation than material for elaboration.'<sup>136</sup> The need for development as it was put forward by Mahler's predecessors no longer stands in Mahler: instead, the themes fulfil a slightly different function which leads them to stand alone in a manner found in Schubert. Indeed, Adorno argues:

For it announces precisely the older-style symphonic claim, the model to be analyzed and dramatically developed, to which the structure of Mahler's symphonic writing has become inappropriate in that it can no longer count on the emphatic self-confirmation of the internal architecture of music, the vehemence of which imbues the classical symphony. Even in Beethoven the static symmetry of the recapitulations threatened to disown the dynamic intent.<sup>137</sup>

In Mahler, the problems are different – that is, the relationship the totality poses to the individual parts is not the same as it was for Beethoven, but there is still an inherent conflict. As Adorno observes: 'The antagonism within Mahler's technique between a repetition-shunning fullness on one hand and a densely interwoven, advancing totality on the other not only concerns the form in the narrower sense of the successive complexes, but informs every dimension of his composition.'<sup>138</sup> However, the main conflict would seem to be that Hegelian aspects of Mahler's music are not sought through Hegelian processes: 'As it was for Hegel in his critique of the principle of identity, truth for Mahler is the Other, which is not immanent yet arises from immanence; in a similar way Kant's doctrine of synthesis was reflected in Hegel. To be is to have become, as against merely becoming.'<sup>139</sup> Here, it sounds clear: Mahler's music continues in a Beethovenian vein – it seeks 'to have become' through teleological musical processes.

Yet the way in which the Other is sought here is not Beethovenian. Adorno writes that 'Mahler's atmosphere is the illusion of familiarity in which the Other is clothed. Timidly, with obsolete means, he anticipates what is to come.'<sup>140</sup> The framing of the Other is such that he dresses the Other up as familiar. This is paramount to Schubert's handling of tonality too. Schubert, indeed, does the contrary as well and makes the familiar (including the tonic) sound alien, such as the return of the tonic in D. 960. Indeed much of Schubert's handling of tonality could be interpreted in this way, including his handling of major and minor

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<sup>136</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p 78.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 107.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

modes – a technique he shares with Mahler.<sup>141</sup> Ultimately Adorno claims that Mahler ‘disrupts tonal language.’<sup>142</sup> It is as part of this disruption that Adorno interprets Mahler’s alternation of major and minor in which ‘the technical formula in which the excess of the poetic idea is encoded.’<sup>143</sup> This alternation, though, is fundamentally a Schubertian technique; and that it causes problems for dialectical processes is hardly surprising.

In brief, Adorno’s interpretation of Mahler shows Mahler’s Schubertian heritage. Although the Beethovenian lineage is acknowledged and explored by Adorno, his reading of Mahler has ramifications for a line of thought more in common with his inherited Romanticism. The problematic aspect of reconciliation between part and whole is that, for Adorno, this leads to its complication in terms of his dialectics. It stems, at least in part, from a relationship to development with inherently un-Beethovenian traits. Such development, as found in Mahler, tends towards more Schubertian traits, paradoxical though it seems to talk of development in Schubertian terms. Thus, Adorno’s work on Mahler would seem to be a later exploration of some of the same ideas he interrogates in the late 1920s and early 1930s in connection to Schubert. This fragmentary aspect of Schubert’s music is the same trait which leads to its refusal to develop. Adorno puts it thus in *Aesthetic Theory*: ‘Schubert’s resignation has its locus not in the purported mood of his music, nor in how he was feeling – as if the music could give a clue to this – but in the *It is thus* that it announces with the gesture of letting oneself fall: This is its expression. Its quintessence is art’s character of eloquence, fundamentally distinct from language as its medium.’<sup>144</sup> Schubert simply states his themes: as Adorno says, Schubert’s themes appear in the manner of ‘*It is thus*’. This is challenging for a musicological discourse that both expects and demands development, but is another way of iterating how the themes can function as fragments. The exploration of musical identity necessarily happens in a very different way in Schubert’s music: the difference between Schubert and Beethoven can perhaps be summarised by saying, as Adorno does, that Schubert’s music ‘is thus’, but one could argue in

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<sup>141</sup> Schubert’s treatment of major and minor modes is discussed further in both Chapters 3 and 4, where the implications of his use of major and minor either as equivalent or to construct particular effects (such as reminiscence in *Winterreise*) forms a significant part of his harmonic technique. By using both major and minor as harmonic equivalents, there is also scope for a constructed veneer of difference even in the setting of harmonic repetition.

<sup>142</sup> Adorno, *Mahler*, p. 21.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>144</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 147.

contrast, that Beethoven *becomes* thus. This would be in line with Janet Schmalfeldt's claim that 'Although notions of inwardness in nineteenth-century music have become commonplace, the idea that *formal processes* in music substantiate such notions has not been widely explored.'<sup>145</sup> Although it is not so much formal processes that have been examined here, arguably the thematic processes would give weight to this argument too. In many ways, Schubert's music, as exemplified by both D. 899/1 and first movement of D. 960, can be shown to construct a series of temporal moments. This contradicts much of our understanding of musical temporality, developed thanks to the processes that Beethoven made normative. The linearity, logic, and connection that one might expect to find in Schubert's works are tellingly absent in favour of these sequences of individual moments: Schubert's music does not adhere to the standard temporal structures.

In her work on Adorno and Brahms, Nicole Grimes makes the point that Adorno suggests that Schubert, along with Schumann, Chopin, and Wagner, does not confront the issue of Beethoven's legacy, but that 'on the contrary, they deflected the central question.'<sup>146</sup> It is a not dissimilar argument to Charles Rosen's at the end of *The Classical Style*, that 'For this illusion of reliving history, the style must be prevented from becoming truly alive once again. The conventions must remain conventional, the forms lose their original significance in order to take on their new responsibility of evoking the past.'<sup>147</sup> The past becomes 'irrecoverable', Rosen argues, and this leads not only to the direct confrontation of this musical language in Brahms or Mahler, but he suggests 'The true inheritors of the classical style were not those who maintained its traditions, but those, from Chopin to Debussy, who preserved its freedom as they gradually altered and finally destroyed the musical language which had made the creation of the style possible.'<sup>148</sup>

For Adorno, Brahms' importance is in relation to his way of dealing with the Beethovenian legacy in the sonata. In 'Brahms aktuell' he writes: 'After the

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<sup>145</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 136.

<sup>146</sup> Nicole Grimes, 'The sense of an ending: Adorno, Brahms, and Music's Return to the Land of Childhood' in *Irish Musical Analysis (Irish Musical Studies, Vol. 11)*, eds. by Gareth Cox and Julian Horton, (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2014), pp. 104-24 (p. 104). Grimes includes here her own translation of 'Brahms aktuell' into English as an appendix. For the original see Theodor W. Adorno, 'Brahms aktuell', in Adorno, *Musikalische Schriften V*, ed. by Tiedemann, pp. 200-203.

<sup>147</sup> Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 460.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 460.

Schumannian sacrifice, in Brahms the objective spirit of the sonata deliberates upon itself, as it were. Its whole greatness lies in how strictly such mediation commits itself to the place and the hour in which it takes place.<sup>149</sup> Adorno does not make similar claims of Schubert's treatment of form per se; it is instead his attention to motifs that are of particular interest. Adorno thus goes on to say about Brahms 'This speaks to an art of economical fragmentation of themes into the smallest motifs, which as a consequence of the sonata is developed similarly to that of Wagner from the confines of the dramatic, terse characterization, without sacrificing the formative theme as material medium between motif and large-scale form.'<sup>150</sup> This could not be further from the themes that remain as themes in Schubert's music; they are neither dismantled, nor made into a greater whole.

Adorno's understanding of Brahms is based on what his motifs eventually construct; he truly takes on the Beethovenian legacy, something made particularly apparent by Adorno's following comment: 'The regeneration and reconstruction of the sonata remains to this day an idea that is still unresolved. In the incomparable first movement of Brahms' Fourth Symphony it is formulated most precisely.'<sup>151</sup> In reality, it is not quite so clear. Brahms is considerably indebted to Schubert as well as Beethoven. James Webster has outlined some of the techniques of Schubert's that Brahms would adopt.<sup>152</sup> These include claims such as:

Many of Schubert's themes and theme-groups are lyrical, falling into close binary or A B A designs; that his transition sections hesitate to leave the tonic, and that when they finally do so they either modulate abruptly, often to a remote key, or else imply a different key than the one to be established; and that Schubert's second groups often divide into two separate sections, of which the first presents the second theme outside the dominant, while the second comprises more nearly conventional paragraphs in the dominant.<sup>153</sup>

However, Webster also notes that Brahms's sonata forms could be deemed 'essays in criticism of Schubert'.<sup>154</sup> Brahms clearly held Schubert in very high esteem, as Webster details, but nonetheless, he did not adopt his sonata techniques uncritically. As Webster shows, he was also influenced by Beethoven

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<sup>149</sup> Grimes, 'The sense of an ending', p. 122.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>152</sup> See Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and Brahms's First Maturity' and Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and Brahms's First Maturity (II)'.

<sup>153</sup> Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Forms and Brahms's First Maturity (II)', p. 52.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

– but in any case, the situation is markedly more complex than Adorno’s statement might suggest. Brahms, then, both adopts and criticizes Schubert’s processes.

Adorno notes a similarity between Wagner’s and Schubert’s processes, albeit fleetingly, in his chapter on ‘motiv’ in his Wagner study: ‘Ambiguity is no stranger to the Romantic tradition of composition: the equivocal altered chords of Schubert are of this kind, and Wagner whose work might seem to have little in common with Schubert’s uses such chords for preference.’<sup>155</sup> Later in the same chapter, in a statement reminiscent of the Schubert essay, he notes ‘The leitmotifs are miniature pictures, and their supposed psychological variations involve only a change of lighting.’<sup>156</sup> That Adorno himself does not invoke Schubert here seems surprising: instead, he suggests they are closer to Berlioz’s *idée fixe*.<sup>157</sup> Musically, *leitmotif* play a different purpose to Schubert’s motifs but, here, Adorno would seem to indicate similarities, that once again, feed into a Romantic view of Austro-German music.

Schubert’s fragmentary musical processes nonetheless have the capacity to lead us to rather different conclusions from those that Adorno reaches about both Beethoven and ultimately Brahms. In D. 960, for example, the treatment of sonata form plays havoc with tonal expectations; although Schubert is, in many ways, operating within nineteenth century norms, he manages to alienate the tonic, making it feel strange upon its return in the first movement. This combined with the nature of the thematic material leads to a disjointed sonata form, one that would seem to place the emphasis on particular moments, rather than constructing an overarching whole. This is no less true of the treatment of B $\flat$  in the C $\sharp$ -minor second movement; again, here B $\flat$  is (must be) treated as a strange key, meaning that there is a paradox of proximity and distance that sits within Schubert’s treatment of these key relations. All of this is crucially reliant on attention being drawn to individual moments; especially those when modulations occur. Thematically, however, such moments may not be obviously interesting, perhaps relying on an iteration of material heard before to highlight the distance

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<sup>155</sup> Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, p. 43.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

travelled, yet how far the music hasn't come. In *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno writes that:

Art must turn against itself, in opposition to its own concept, and thus become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber. Yet art is not to be dismissed simply by its abstract negation. By attacking what seemed to be its foundation throughout the whole of its tradition, art has been qualitatively transformed; it itself becomes qualitatively other. It can do this because though the ages by means of its form, art has turned against the status quo and what merely exists just as much as it has come to its aid by giving form to its elements. Art can no more be reduced to the general formula of consolation than to its opposite.<sup>158</sup>

Art, then, can become Other to itself in that it can become alien to itself.

Fragmentation ensures it does precisely that. By taking something and repeating it, but not developing it, cohesion is taken to extremes, almost making the repetitions seem foreign to each other: this is exactly how the retransition in D. 960 works. By making the tonic feel strange, or in Marston's terms 'unheimlich'

in the Freudian sense,<sup>159</sup> it accentuates the 'otherness' inherent in the tonic.

Under the right circumstances, then, the paradox of the Romantic fragment plays not just with a sense of completion and incompleteness, but also with how the same can become alienated in the right context. Through the 'liberation of the particular' Schubert's music can be seen to attack its own foundations. Through its existence as fragmentary statements, the music ends up questioning itself, but it never comes to a satisfactory conclusion; it instead remains a question. Whilst Beethoven's primary approach to form demands that music builds up towards a telos, a point at which all, in some sense, becomes clear, Schubert's does the very opposite. By stating a theme, and then repeating it simply as it is, Schubert makes that process seem ever less clear over time. The work does not build up towards a certain point. It does not seek to create a comprehensive totality in a Hegelian sense. What is at stake in Schubert is not the affirmation implicit in a dialectic, but the way in which a dialectic can undermine itself.

There is a problem in using such a Beethovenian paradigm here: Julian Horton refers to the analytical problem posed by an insistence on the notion that all of Beethoven's sonata forms function in this way and then states that it is 'more historically sensible to observe that narratives of dialectical overcoming are rhetorically, expressively and philosophically central to some genres in some contexts, and either present by negative implication or largely incidental in

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<sup>158</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 2.

<sup>159</sup> Marston, *Schubert's Homecoming*, p. 249.

others.’<sup>160</sup> In Schubert, however, it is the negative aspect of understanding the music dialectically that becomes ever clearer: the forms are based on small truth-characters that remain as they are, thus standing to lose everything as the work progresses. A greater body is not being constructed; instead a smaller one examines every aspect of itself and stands to lose itself in that process. As has been seen, however, in practice that is not how Schubert’s music plays out. The themes actually operate in a way that means they perpetuate a sense of being rather than becoming.

Adorno’s writings, then, offer a way to interpret the fragmentary nature of Schubert’s music. Not only can Schubert’s music be put into a wider musical context, but the stakes of Schubert’s musical processes are revealed. It has been shown that the encapsulated, yet complete form of Schubert’s themes opens up a set of Adornian questions about the fragment and the ‘liberation of the particular’. By turning to Adorno’s Romantic heritage, which aligns with Schubert so well, the nature of the temporal processes has been shown: this is about the relationship between form and content, and whole and part. Privileging the fragmentary in this Adornian reading of Schubert offers insights that are markedly different to the dominant discourse normally found in Adorno’s writing on early nineteenth-century Austro-German music.

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<sup>160</sup> Julian Horton, ‘Dialectics and music analysis’, in *Aesthetics of Music: Musicological Perspectives*, ed. by Stephen Downes (Oxford and New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), pp. 111-43 (p. 127).

## CHAPTER 3: REPETITION

Attempts at explaining the unfolding of musical time in Schubert's music have led to a series of analytical categories that is, at times, undeniably vague. Put simply, what makes Schubert's forms simultaneously compelling and troubling is that the relationship between past, present and future often feels as though it is dominated by the past and present, excluding even the possibility of a goal-directed future. Any sense of future rarely takes on the familiar guise of what one might term 'future as telos', making traditional analytical categories seem inadequate. This lack of 'future as telos' in his music marks Schubert out from both his predecessors and contemporaries. More specifically, the crux of this issue seems to lie in the way Schubert uses repetition to derail any sense of directed forward motion, both in his *Lieder* and in his instrumental music.

The lack of such forward motion in Schubert's music is discussed elsewhere in this thesis in connection to John Gingerich's work on Schubert's String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 (see below) and in relation to Adorno (see Chapter 1), as well as in the final chapter (see especially 4.1.1 and 4.4). Rather than thematic material being broken down and reconstructed to generate a sense of forward motion, Schubert's thematic material simply reappears or recurs, often with very little change, leading, at times, to the music being saturated with repetition. Adorno's Hegelian interpretation of Beethoven's middle-period works is dependent on musical material in a perpetual condition of change – even, to a certain extent, within the sonata recapitulation. By contrast, the subject groups of Schubert's sonata expositions are not even distinguished from one another by strong contrasts. It is therefore little wonder that when set against each other, Schubert's works, judged by this Beethovenian-Hegelian aesthetic, are deemed to fall short.<sup>1</sup>

Schubert's String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 (the 'Rosamunde') is a prime example of the composer's use of the sonata idiom in a distinctly un-Hegelian manner. The first movement of the work is clearly a sonata form. The basic

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<sup>1</sup> Even the fragmentation of late Beethoven operates differently to that of the fragmentary Schubert: the late styles of the two composers are also very different. For further discussion of that, see *Schubert's Late Style*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton.



elements of the form are all present and correct: exposition, development, and recapitulation are all clearly demarcated, as summarised below:

**Fig. 3.1. Formal outline of String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i**

<b>EXPOSITION</b>		
<b>1<sup>st</sup> subject group bb. 1-32</b>	<b>Transition bb. 33-58</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> subject group bb. 59-100</b>
Introduction of descending triad	Adaptation of descending triad motif; ascending triplets gradually dominate, especially from bb. 51-58	From b. 59 inverted motif, see ex. 3.10
i-I-i, ends with PAC	→	III (PAC)

<b>DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>RECAPITULATION</b>			
Use particularly of 1 <sup>st</sup> group material	<b>1<sup>st</sup> subject group bb. 168-87</b>	<b>Transition bb. 188-221</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> subject group bb. 222-63</b>	<b>Coda bb. 264-96</b>
	Return with same tonal ambivalence		Move to major mode	Return to material from first subject and transition
	i-I-i, ends with PAC	→	I (PAC)	i (PAC)

Beyond that, though, the listener's expectations are confounded: indeed, they are thwarted at motivic, thematic, and tonal levels. The apparent conflict set out between the tonic of A minor and its relative major of C is arguably not the central opposition of the movement. Hinted at in the exposition, the switch back and forth between A minor and A major becomes clearer in the development and is a central aspect of the recapitulation. Indeed, it is the main tonal focus of the movement: a microcosm, in fact, of the main tonal focus of the whole Quartet, as Nicholas Rast notes. He suggests the key schema of the first movement is mirrored in the structure of the Quartet as a whole.<sup>2</sup> This apparent conflict (hardly describable as a conflict in the traditional dialectical sense) is still more problematic because both subjects' thematic material is so closely related. Indeed, this close relationship in the thematic material is not just a hallmark of the first

<sup>2</sup> Rast, "Schöne Welt, wo bist du?", p. 83.

movement but can be found across the four movements, leading to a surfeit of repetition. Moreover, the Quartet is, as a whole, dependent on A.<sup>3</sup>

It is difficult to know where to start in order to unpick so many layers of repetition: not only is there repetition at both motivic and thematic levels, but also across movements, as well as appropriation of material from other works of Schubert's. In the first instance, then, it is necessary to sort out these different types of 'repetition'. There are several types of musical process here that can be considered repetition; broadly speaking they fall under three principal processes operating at different structural levels. Most obvious is Schubert's well-known tendency to refer to pre-existing works of his own, which might well be understood in relation to the idea of 'memory' but is nonetheless underpinned by repetition. The second type is the adoption of subtly altered motifs and themes from one movement for others, thus leading to the work's cyclic form. Thirdly, within in each movement, there is a more familiar repetition of themes and motifs arising from the kind of processes one might expect in the shared musical language of this time, though, as ever, it is problematic to consider this developmental as it might be elsewhere. Instead, this might be considered a further manifestation of 'memory', as will be seen below.

Five contrasting readings of the String Quartet, D. 804, all from the last twenty years, will be considered here: Benedict Taylor's approach to memory in the work is based upon the pre-existing works Schubert used when working on this Quartet.<sup>4</sup> Anne M. Hyland uses Edward Cone's work on strata in Stravinsky to look at teleology in this sonata form.<sup>5</sup> James Sobaskie premises his interpretation on the idea of a dialectic,<sup>6</sup> whereas Nicholas Rast argues that the work is in cyclic form.<sup>7</sup> The final version is John M. Gingerich's, which is based on cyclic loops.<sup>8</sup> These interpretations either grapple with central terms in sonata-form analysis (especially in the cases of Hyland and Sobaskie) or with terms that are central to the wider Schubert literature (Taylor, Rast and Gingerich).

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<sup>3</sup> Martin Chusid, 'Schubert's chamber music: before and after Beethoven', in *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. by Christopher H. Gibbs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 174-92 (p. 181).

<sup>4</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory'.

<sup>5</sup> Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?'.

<sup>6</sup> James William Sobaskie, 'Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert's A Minor Quartet', in *Schubert the Progressive*, ed. by Newbould, pp. 53-79.

<sup>7</sup> Nicholas Rast, "Schöne Welt, wo bist du?", pp. 81-88.

<sup>8</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*.

In response, this chapter will look at these ideas using a framework of Heidegger's philosophy to interrogate the work and offers a model for thinking about repetition in ways that extend beyond the habitual approaches of musicology. This is premised upon Heidegger's understanding of the unfolding of time and the role of repetition in the experience of temporality. Heidegger's interpretation of repetition and its interaction with both past and future makes a compelling case for understanding this very Schubertian sonata form, and why what it does is philosophically significant.

### 3.1 Pastness and Memory – Being at Home in Repetition?

Benedict Taylor's analysis of D. 804 is grounded in one of the key ideas of Schubert scholarship: memory. The relationship between musical memory and repetition is a complex one to navigate, not least because they seem in some ways co-dependent. Taylor interprets D. 804 as 'One of the most perfect and moving crystallisations of the sense of pastness, loss and nostalgia within Schubert's oeuvre'.<sup>9</sup> He sets out to question exactly what makes music feel as though it is imbued with the character of memory<sup>10</sup> and argues that the relationship between this work and some of Schubert's earlier works lead him to make such a claim. He notes that 'a substantial part of this sense of loss and longing for vanished innocence is embodied through the use of allusions to earlier pieces – in the sense of their status as musical memories of these previous works, in the sometimes fragmentary quality of their appearance in the quartet, and last but not least in their potential semantic associations'.<sup>11</sup> The more radical part of his argument is that there not only are there the more obvious links in this work to the incidental music for *Rosamunde*, D. 797 and Schubert's pre-existing setting of Schiller, but also to 'Gretchen am Spinnrade'<sup>12</sup> and, fleetingly, to the 'Unfinished' Symphony.<sup>13</sup>

This network of relationships is a central locus of Taylor's argument, because allusions to other works constitute part of the idea of memory here, whether that is as obvious and involved as the second and third movements of the Quartet, or

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<sup>9</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 45.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 44. Beyond Taylor's work, Nicholas Temperley has also suggested links between this work and the Allegretto of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony: see Nicholas Temperley, 'Schubert and Beethoven's Eight-Six Chord', *19th-Century Music*, 5 (1981), 142-54 (p. 149).

<sup>11</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 46.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

whether it comes in the form of a more fleeting reflection. In this context, there is an important distinction to make between deliberate acts of allusion and accidental echoes of earlier material. The overt references in the second and third movements naturally fall into the first category. The allusion to 'Gretchen am Spinnrade' perhaps belong to the second: Taylor takes Jack Westrup's suggestion that inspiration for the Quartet comes from 'Gretchen am Spinnrade', using a reference in a letter from Schubert to Kupelwieser as evidence.<sup>14</sup> That this link appears in a letter makes it seem more purposeful on Schubert's part than it might otherwise. Taylor takes this argument further than Westrup and Schubert's letter alone, developing it into a musical argument, suggesting that there is a similarity in the musical material in the song and the first movement of D. 804 as well. This has the additional, not inconsiderable consequence of giving unmistakable weight to the claim (which is hardly Taylor's alone) that the first movement is 'songlike' or, to phrase it using another central term of Schubert scholarship, 'lyrical'.<sup>15</sup> Taylor adopts Westrup's<sup>16</sup> approach to this seeming lyricism, stating that 'this is perhaps the most consistently songlike sonata form Schubert ever wrote.'<sup>17</sup> Indeed, despite emphasising the work's formal orthodoxy, John M. Gingerich sees the lyrical nature of the movement as its 'one massive transgression'.<sup>18</sup> Given Taylor's preoccupation with the many possible references to Schubert's own *Lieder* in this work, this interpretation fits the apparent driving force of the movement. This reading of the movement proliferates in the secondary literature: alongside Westrup and Taylor, Anne M. Hyland sees the movement in the same light, as shall be seen below. Nonetheless, it is not a view that is held unanimously.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> See Dahlhaus, 'Sonata Form in Schubert', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, pp. 1-12.

<sup>16</sup> cf. J. A. Westrup, *BBC Music Guides: Schubert Chamber Music* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1969), pp. 31-33.

<sup>17</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 55.

<sup>18</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 107.

<sup>19</sup> Discussion of lyricism in Schubert's music often comes from the perception of Schubert as a composer of *Lieder*, compellingly explained by Gingerich, as explored below. Su Yin Mak, above, explains that the lyric is often placed in a dialectical relationship with the dramatic. Whether such musical and biographical arguments together indeed lead to the conclusion that the movement is indeed 'lyrical' is perhaps debatable. Certainly the literature is not entirely unanimous – allusion to songs alone does not create a lyrical texture. Brian Black argues that the juxtaposition of lyricism and drama is uneasy and suggests that 'drama and lyricism work together effectively to create a unified and engaging whole'. (See Black, 'Lyricism and the Dramatic Unity of Schubert's Instrumental Music: The Impromptu in C Minor, D. 899/1', p. 234.) For further discussion of Black's argument, in connection with D. 899/1, see Chapter 2.

In examining why it is that Schubert's music appears to focus on the past or why the sense of future as telos is absent, Taylor discusses aspects of repetition.<sup>20</sup> In Taylor's discussion of the movement, memory, rather than repetition, is the driving force, meaning that the allusions to different works are foregrounded. Those allusions are arguably constituted by a very particular kind of repetition, different to the simple reiteration of themes or the gradual build up of related themes to create a cyclic framework.

All in all, there is a baffling web of processes dependent on repetition at a variety of levels. While this is not the focus of Taylor's discussion, the scene is set for thematic and motivic repetition across movements right at the start of the work. The falling triad of the first subject in the first movement, for example, provides a key example of the thematic repetition, appearing in a varied fashion in the transition:

**Ex. 3.1. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, bb. 3-4**



**Ex. 3.2. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, bb. 44-5**



Even the second subject would seem to be predicated on a triad, though this one rises. It is especially prominent when the bass is taken into account:

<sup>20</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', pp. 63-65.

**Ex. 3.3. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, bb. 59-60**



Move onto the second movement, and once again, this falling figure predominates. Here, however, it appears under the guise of allusion to another work (in this case the *Rosamunde* music), bringing two types of repetition together (alongside memory):

**Ex. 3.4. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, ii, bb. 1-4**



This allusion to the *Rosamunde* music is not therefore simply a reference to another work, but also part of the internal web of thematic references across the separate movements (see Ex. 3.9 below). Indeed, it is arguable that these include the opening theme of the final movement, where once again the C#-E underpins the melody. Although this seems self-explanatory, in the broader context of the work, this contributes to a sense of harmonic and melodic saturation with the same material – and thus its repetition:

**Ex. 3.5. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iv, bb. 1-2**



These few examples serve to show the extent to which repetition, even through variants, is endemic throughout the work and how much of it is derived from an extraordinarily small amount of material. The additional layer of allusions to other works means that the work feels saturated with repetition at times. These abundant references, at multiple structural levels, create a work that has a very particular relationship to temporality, where the present is infused with the past. Changing the focus of the sonata movement means the emphasis is backwards rather than forwards. Although expectations of sonata form are seemingly met with the setting out of A minor and C major, from the start, A major intrudes. Indeed, the recapitulation's turn to A major is foreshadowed in the exposition – and the recapitulation is itself a foreshadowing of the final movement. The use of A minor and major as equivalent is not remarkable in itself, especially for Schubert, but it does affect the construction of tonal teleology: or to put it another way, 'future as telos', because there are two potential tonal destinations, which while parallel, are not the same.

Such a succession of apparent false starts only reinforces the repetition, as the first subject seems continuously trapped in the same thematic material.<sup>21</sup> This repetition comes at the expense of the development of this material, although in a very Schubertian twist of fate, we do hear the material from a different perspective: that of the tonic major, which for Taylor only adds to a sense of nostalgia. As Suzannah Clark notes 'the expanded system of tonal relations in Schubert's sonata forms stems from the composer's assumption that major and

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<sup>21</sup> False starts here are slightly different to the Piano Sonata, D. 960, discussed in the previous chapter, where the interruption of the trill interrupts the course of the movement rather more obviously – and with an inflection of the flattened submediant.

minor may serve as equally valid representations of the tonic.<sup>22</sup> Clark references James Webster who describes the first subject in the following terms:

Many of Schubert's first groups are strongly grounded in closed forms and lyrical sentiments. In the String Quartet in A minor (D. 804), for example, the heart-melting turn to the tonic major at m. 23 only confirms the lyricism which has been present from the beginning – in the singing line, the clear separation of melody and accompaniment, and the consistent two- and four-bar phrases.<sup>23</sup>

By contrast, the second subject is liberated from this fate of perpetual return, meaning that temporally it does not feel the same as the first subject. It is also not reliant on regular eight-bar intervals, playing with the astute listener's expectations: 'The five-bar phrase lengths lie outside the regular hypermetric divisions of clock time, and though elements of the earlier music are not entirely absent there is a new feeling of lyrical generosity that breaks free of the previous objective fatalism.'<sup>24</sup> For Taylor then, the first subject's inability to escape its own themes proves overwhelming and therefore it is at the mercy of time, while the other defies that apparent inescapability of hypermetric regularity, making the two radically different temporal propositions. The contrast only serves to make the effect of both more apparent. It is similar to what Charles Fisk, writing about the *Moment Musicaux*, D. 780, has referenced as a 'double spiral, here first recovering a memory and then returning to re-enact it',<sup>25</sup> making that memory part of the lived present as well as the acknowledged past.

The differences between the two subjects, as well as Schubert's handling of these and the transition between them, form part of Taylor's interpretation of the way Schubert handles temporality in this work. According to Taylor, the phrase construction of the first subject group is an 'eight-bar antecedent (bars 3-10) [...] succeeded not by the expected consequent phrase by yet another antecedent (bars 11-22), this time internally expanded, closing once again on an imperfect dominant. This is followed at last by the consequent phrase, but one that now miraculously is in the major (and thus hardly conforms to that of normative period in A minor) - a vain hope sternly rebuked at the cadence.'<sup>26</sup> Taylor also suggests that the transition has to start over again<sup>27</sup> meaning that 'Such

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<sup>22</sup> Clark, *Analyzing Schubert*, p. 259.

<sup>23</sup> Webster, 'Schubert's Sonata Form and Brahms's First Maturity', p. 21.

<sup>24</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 75.

<sup>25</sup> Charles Fisk, 'Rehearing the Moment and Hearing In-the-Moment: Schubert's First Two "Moments Musicaux"', *College Music Symposium*, 30 (1990), 1-18 (p. 11).

<sup>26</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 70.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.



repetitions might also explain how, at a larger level, the return to the first subject at the start of D.804's development section [...] sounds so fate-laden in effect.'<sup>28</sup> The transition, too, as well as the first subject, contributes to this set of false starts – and thus repetitions. Following his argument to its logical conclusion, Taylor sees this kind of repetition as a major contributor to the way in which the work feels suffused by memories of its own past.

Looking at the treatment of tonic major and minor above, however, it is not always entirely clear why Taylor holds out that the two subjects are so dissimilar; they are closer than they might seem at first glance. In contrast to Taylor's analysis, Gingerich, whose interpretation is based on textural strata,<sup>29</sup> argues that the second theme displays significant continuity with the first: 'The second theme itself recombines elements from both the first theme and the bridge. Its consistent layered texture, its beginning with a gap at the top of its registral space, its songful melody, its *piano dolce* dynamic, its periodic phrase structure, and especially the flowing eighths figuration in the viola provide continuity with the first theme and contrast with the bridge.'<sup>30</sup> All these similarities indicate that the subjects are not so far apart, after all. Indeed, this set of factors feeds into the overriding repetition within the whole Quartet; instead, *qua* Adorno, there is a sense of looking at things from a different perspective. Vladimir Jankélévitch argues:

The *second time* in a Rondo, even if it does not differ from the first time except by the ordinal number, nevertheless engenders the anterior quality of the first in the midst of a context that always changes. Independent of any concrete memory, the pure fact of succession and the preterite, in other words the naked past-ness of the past, prevents the "same" from remaining exactly the same; this continuous conditioning, in the process of Becoming, assumes the form of a continuous alteration. This is why the da capo is a ravishing surprise, why a theme does not give up all that stirs us in its meaning until it is recognized once again. Do recapitulations not activate a form of memory within us?<sup>31</sup>

The link between memory and repetition, crucial to Taylor, is central to Jankélévitch's argument here, though the latter refers to a more traditional sense of becoming. However, Taylor suggests that Schubert's treatment of musical memory is connected to nostalgia.<sup>32</sup> Schubert doubtless makes play extensively

<sup>28</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, pp. 105-38.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>31</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, trans. by Carolyn Abbate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 24.

<sup>32</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', pp. 43-44.

with musical memory as outlined by Jankélévitch, especially in the sophisticated way he uses allusions to pre-existing works. The inherent lack of change means Schubert's harmonic processes sound repetitive as well as the listener hearing much of the thematic material repeatedly. Seemingly, then, the music does not change that much as it passes through time, creating a paradoxical sense of temporal stasis rather than onward motion. This is particularly apt in a movement such as this one, where large-scale harmonic change seems somewhat scant. The lack of tonal adventure does not feel monotonous due to the concurrent use of parallel major and minor. The movement (and indeed the work as a whole) instead tends to favour rocking between tonic minor and major. Taylor reads this relation in terms of an act of memory:

Yet another technique utilized by Schubert is the modified repetition of ideas in which the backdrop of emotive connotation is changed, which might suggest the subjective, mutable quality of memory. The object stays the same, but our perspective, our interpretation of it, changes. Memory here is not passive but rather constructive. Such could appear the magical shift from A minor to A major in bar 13 or the 'Rosamunde' Quartet's first movement.<sup>33</sup>

The perspective may well change, and thus too the interpretation; this concern with memory is hardly unique to this work, but this is just one guise through which Schubert's music explores repetition. To add to the sense that the music is 'fate-laden', Taylor suggests that the music, especially the first subject, is in some way 'passive', a trait that can be found elsewhere in Schubert's music: 'Rather like the reactive subject absorbing cyclic tremors in D.887, in the A minor Quartet there is a peculiar quality of passivity, even fatalistic acceptance, to the temporal unfolding of the first subject.'<sup>34</sup> The listener may well concur with Taylor's assessment but it is hard to articulate exactly what gives the music this character beyond the phrase construction of the first subject group.

The purpose of Taylor's analysis is ultimately to try to explain the construction of memory in Schubert's music. In order to do this, he cites Scott Burnham as one of the few commentators before him who has also attempted that task, mentioning Burnham's reference to Schubert's music's 'orientation towards the present moment, its sensuous immediacy.'<sup>35</sup> Overwhelmingly 'memory' in Schubert seems, for Taylor, to involve a (seemingly paradoxical) focus on the

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<sup>33</sup> Taylor, 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory', p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

present. It is a convenient label for Schubert's music because it solves two considerable problems: according to both Burnham and Taylor, memory demands two traits that have been poorly explained but are nonetheless abundant in Schubert's music: repetition and a lack of telos. These two traits seem intrinsically linked. Repetition gives an impression that the temporal focus turns away from the future, but is instead stuck in the present, or perhaps in ideas that have already appeared (i.e. the past), which, in turn, leads to memory. In other words, the temporal focus of such music is the present and the past. This then manifests itself as repetition. The relationship between present and past (presented through repetition) enables Burnham and Taylor to suggest memory is the governing concept behind this music.

As one such example, Burnham himself cites the E $\flat$  major duet for the cellos in the first movement of Schubert's C-major Quintet because it looks at something familiar (G) from an unfamiliar perspective. By centring itself around G, but appearing to be in E $\flat$ , it looks at G as the third rather than the fifth (of C major).<sup>36</sup> According to Nathan John Martin and Steven Vande Moortele, when the E $\flat$  first appears, it sounds like 'tonal never-never land'.<sup>37</sup> This is, according to Burnham, partly to do with the fact that 'a plunge into the flat side of the main key draws the attention inward rather than onward'.<sup>38</sup> In other words, it is all about the wider context, making the G sound like a third rather than the fifth it actually is. Various factors at play produce this musical effect here, including the turn flatwards and the use of varied combinations of thirds and sixths, but most of all Schubert's masking of the tonic, so that the duet seems to be in E $\flat$ , though, in reality, it is not.<sup>39</sup> This tension between hearing the passage in E $\flat$ , despite the underlying C-major tonic, creates an effect akin to that of memory: 'This is an extraordinary effect, for although the E-flat seems to have the stability of home, it is clearly perched at an odd angle; and yet there is something about that angle that lends E-flat the feeling of a sentimental home. This is not unlike the effect of memory, the sentimental home of much of our lives, and yet a place that will always be obliquely angled to our present experience.'<sup>40</sup> Through such harmonic

<sup>36</sup> Burnham, 'Schubert and the Sound of Memory', pp. 661-62.

<sup>37</sup> Nathan John Martin and Steven Vande Moortele, 'Formal Functions and Retrospective Reinterpretation in the First Movement of Schubert's String Quintet', *Music Analysis*, 33 (2014), 130-55 (p. 142).

<sup>38</sup> Burnham, 'Schubert and the Sound of Memory', p. 662.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 662. There are similarities between this and the return of the first subject in the B $\flat$ -major Piano Sonata discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 662.

distance, a different sense of musical time is created, emphasising the present moment and drawing back from the future. Moments with similar effects, although constructed differently, can also be found in the A-minor Quartet.

For Burnham, as for Taylor, it is this surface-level focus on the present and a sense of harmonic dislocation, rather than an apparent drive towards a telos, which make memory a fitting lens through which to hear this music. This is hardly a claim unique to Burnham and Taylor: John Daverio, for example, notes that Schumann was ‘sensitive to the special constellation of features that lent to Schubert’s music its inimitably melancholy, wistful character’<sup>41</sup> and this is a theme that has carried on through to Adorno and beyond. Nowhere is that clearer than in a sonata form movement such as this, where the future seems to be of no concern, the present moment is permanently heightened and references to the musical past, abound both within the work and in later movements in other works. Memory, then, gives rise to one type of repetition at the core of this work. Although memory shows us one of the ways in which Schubert plays with the musical past, it is not the only way in which that process is undertaken. For further clues as to how Schubert’s construction of musical time can be separated from contemporaneous music, the motivic and thematic processes underpinning his sonata form will prove invaluable.

### **3.2 Two Teloi: Backwards and Forwards**

Anne M. Hyland analyses D.804 in her PhD thesis, drawing attention to the ‘lied-like’ nature of the movement, as do Taylor, Westrup, and Gingerich, and noting it is ‘lyrically expanded by the use of thematic variation’.<sup>42</sup> Rather than focusing on allusions to other works, Hyland identifies two key structural levels with different functions in the first movement. She adopts this from Edward Cone’s work on Stravinsky, though with significant alterations<sup>43</sup> and she outlines the process as follows:

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<sup>41</sup> Daverio, “‘One More Beautiful Memory of Schubert’”, p. 605.

<sup>42</sup> Hyland, ‘Tautology or Teleology?’ p. 128.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp. 134-35. Cf. Edward T. Cone, ‘Stravinsky: The Progress of a Method’, *Perspectives of New Music*, 1 (1962), 18-26.

Thus, we may understand the movement as illustrating two distinct levels or strata: the first is defined by the exposition (or variation) of thematic material which is rooted in structural key-areas, the tonic (both major and minor), the relative major, and the dominant. The second stratum is characterised by passages of dynamic development or lyrical expansion, which tends towards chromatically related harmonies.<sup>44</sup>

Hyland's analysis, therefore, prioritises not only long-term harmonic goals, such as modulations of significant structural importance like those from tonic to dominant, but also, more tellingly, reveals the centrality of shifts that might otherwise be cast aside as of less structural significance, such as the ever-present chromatic shifts to the Neapolitan. Hyland notes, for example, the significance of the Neapolitan interjection in bb. 38-42 describing it as 'both dynamically and gesturally emphasised.'<sup>45</sup> Such moments, so typical of Schubert, have led to all manner of methodologies and commentary on Schubert, from Donald Tovey and Adorno, to the explanations of harmonic shifts that Richard Cohn tries to explain in his work on hexachords<sup>46</sup> all the way through to Taylor's hermeneutic reading. As John Gingerich remarks: 'Theory is good at harmony and I am grateful. But what I find revelatory and new in Schubert's music is his manipulation of our experience of time, and of the states of consciousness and self-consciousness that our inseparable from our experience of time.'<sup>47</sup> Gingerich suggests D. 804 provokes discussion of concepts familiar to the Schubert scholar: memory, reminiscence, nostalgia, and so on – and their commonality is that they are ways of experiencing time.<sup>48</sup> Hyland's reading, with its multi-layered focus, opens up these temporal spheres (and the work's complex temporality), even if it does not overtly draw such conclusions.

Hyland proposes that the work's teleology (such as it is) takes a very distinct path from beginning to end, hence her dual reading. Her delineation of the work's two strata has multiple consequences; unlike Cone, whose strata are limited to short passages, her strata extend over large portions of the work.<sup>49</sup> It is telling that Cone notes in his work that 'an initial detail controls the course of the form.'<sup>50</sup> This is not so different from Schubert's work, especially this Quartet, and

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<sup>44</sup> Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?', p. 133

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Richard Cohn, 'Maximally Smooth Cycles, Hexatonic Systems, and the Analysis of Late-Romantic Triadic Progressions', *Music Analysis*, 15 (1996), 9-40 and Cohn, 'As Wonderful as Star Clusters'.

<sup>47</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 110.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>49</sup> Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?', p. 134.

<sup>50</sup> Cone, 'Stravinsky: The Progress of a Method', p. 23.

elsewhere in his work on Stravinsky, Cone suggests that ‘Far from exploiting the sonata form as the traditional vehicle for realizing musical or dramatic potentialities of tonal conflict and progression, he [Stravinsky] adapts it to his own perennial purpose: the articulated division of uniform temporal flow.’<sup>51</sup> This does not seem to be so different from Schubert’s processes; indeed, this could function as a description of the movement discussed in the preceding chapter. First, it suggests an interpretation of the moments in the movement which cannot be accounted for by a Sonata Theory reading, or one that is dependent purely on the large-scale harmonic modulations. However, it puts those moments in a broader context where they are made meaningful in the harmonic schema of the movement.

The second consequence is that Hyland’s understanding of *telos* here is not without major deviation from the mainstream understanding of the term. The two strata have to go through three stages as Hyland (*qua* Cone) outlines: the presentation, the interlock, and finally the synthesis.<sup>52</sup> The second stage demands that the two are alternated, and of the third Hyland says the following: ‘The manner in which Schubert achieves a synthesis of the two strata in this movement is not only remarkable for its subtlety, but also because it undermines the supremacy of the tonal goal of the sonata. In short, it offers an example of a *telos* which is not a *telos*.’<sup>53</sup> The strata run on a different trajectory to the sonata form. This alternative trajectory necessarily weakens the dominance of the sonata form to some extent, despite the presence of the demands of the *telos*.

Hyland then differentiates her strata-based analysis from the needs of a Sonata Theory analysis. Here, she suggests that there are, in fact, two distinct processes at work, and they come to a head at different points in the work. She writes ‘in this movement, the attainment of the work’s *telos*, or the synthesis of the stratified process, does not hinge on a theoretical moment of realisation granted by a PAC, though that vital moment is also present.’<sup>54</sup> In other words, alongside her reading of the work in terms of two strata, Hyland notes the viability of a sonata-theoretical reading. What is particularly compelling about the contrast

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<sup>51</sup> Edward T. Cone, ‘The Uses of Convention: Stravinsky and His Models’, *The Musical Quarterly*, 48 (1962), 287-99 (p. 295).

<sup>52</sup> Hyland, ‘Tautology or Teleology?’, pp. 134-35.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

between the two readings, however, is that their culmination lies in different locations: one in the recapitulation and one in the coda:

The presence or absence of a PAC in the tonic at the end of the second group in the recapitulation thus represents the work's tonal goal, and determines its form in relation to Sonata Theory, but it does not account for the culmination of the stratified plan which informs the movement. This is provided in the coda by the synthesis of the two strata outlined above. The synthesis and telos, then, represent the respective pinnacles of two separate trajectories (a stratified process and a sonata form) and are accordingly differently defined: the former in harmonic and rhetorical terms, and the latter in tonal and thematic terms.<sup>55</sup>

Hyland uses Jonathan Kramer's work<sup>56</sup> to consider this analytical reading in terms of the work's temporality, adopting the suggestion that musical time need not be strictly unidirectional and linear.<sup>57</sup> Ultimately this leads to Hyland's interpretation of memory, because in light of the two strata she identifies, she then suggests 'that D.804/i demonstrates a double-layered tonal/thematic structure; that of the presentation and development of the themes, which is supported by two distinct, although related, tonal groupings. Our perception and understanding of this process is dependent upon our ability to follow the path of non-adjacent musical segments [...] In other words, the reader (listener) is asked to rely on his/her capacity to remember'.<sup>58</sup> For this memory is central: 'It is therefore ultimately memory that permits a teleological reading of these movements: the music proceeds forward, constantly striving towards an ultimate goal, or telos, by looking backwards and recalling earlier material. It is this return to past material which results in the reordering of the musical process and grants it its multiply-directed design.'<sup>59</sup> When considering the stratified analysis and if the work can, in this context, be considered truly teleological, this the crux. Hyland's telos is constituted in memory, rather than having a forward-reaching trajectory. This is what led Hyland to claim that its telos, paradoxically, is not a telos. However, it does, eventually, lead to a moment of synthesis, so it cannot be dismissed entirely as a telos (even if it clearly is not an example of 'future-as-telos'.) One could counter that claiming the entire stratified process is contingent upon eventual synthesis and thus does, despite its backward focus, have an implicit demand for forward motion, therefore constructing sonata form's desired teleology.

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<sup>55</sup> Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?', pp. 138-39.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Jonathan Kramer, *The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, New Listening Strategies* (New York, NY: Schirmer, 1988).

<sup>57</sup> Hyland, 'Tautology or Teleology?', p. 139.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

Hyland's reading suggests this movement has two, distinct moments of synthesis: one linked to the strata and one dictated by the premise of Sonata Theory. The first provokes more questions of the work's temporality, because although a telos it eschews a teleological function. Grounded in the movement's past and thus looking backwards, it refuses to look forwards (as it seemingly should) and embrace future as telos. The potential of this is considerable. That Schubert's music is not entirely forward-reaching has long been agreed. What is particularly helpful about Hyland's interpretation here is that it combines aspects of the teleological nature of sonata form and the backward-looking direction of Schubert's music. Even teleological processes and syntheses, such as they appear in Schubert's music, seem powerless to escape its need to confront its past.

### 3.3 Dialectics versus Cyclicism

James William Sobaskie's dialectical reading of D. 804 also focuses on a dramatic culmination. Likewise, his reading identifies this process as starting in the first movement, but the climax does not occur until the last.<sup>60</sup> Sobaskie, like Taylor, identifies the roots of the work's thematic material in its close dependency on Strophe aus 'Die Götter Griechenlands', D. 677. Indeed, it is because of this that Alfred Einstein refers to the Minuet as 'the kernel' of the Quartet.<sup>61</sup> The entirety of the thematic material, therefore, comes from a motif that can be found in the opening phrase of the *Lied*:

#### Ex. 3.6. 'Strophe aus 'Die Götter Griechenlands', D. 677, bb. 1-4



The fourth bar's falling triad (in the *Lied* above) can be found in the opening of the first movement. There is also a clear similarity between the piano accompaniment of the *Lied* and the Menuetto of the third movement. It is these points that form the basis of Sobaskie's argument. The presence of the falling

<sup>60</sup> Sobaskie, 'Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert's A Minor Quartet', pp. 66.

<sup>61</sup> Alfred Einstein, *Schubert*, trans. by David Ascoli (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 290.



triad in the opening of the first movement is only too clear (indeed it returns in the major mode in bb. 23-24) and it takes centre stage as Sobaskie's 'thesis'.

**Ex. 3.7. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, bb. 1-23, showing Sobaskie's thesis (green) and antithesis (blue)**

The image displays three systems of musical notation for the first movement of Schubert's String Quartet in A minor, D. 804. The instruments are Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Violoncello. The first system (bb. 1-4) shows the initial entry of the thesis in the first violin. The second system (bb. 5-8) shows the antithesis in the first violin, which is a more expansive version of the thesis. The third system (bb. 9-12) shows the thesis returning in the first violin, while the other instruments provide harmonic support. Green boxes highlight the thesis motif, and blue boxes highlight the antithesis motif.

Sobaskie claims the thesis (as shown in the diagram above) 'generates' its own antithesis: the first violin line from bar 4 to 10 'represents a subtle, inverted, and embellished version of the thesis itself. [...] It captures our imagination by emphasising the very same notes in a much more expansive manner.'<sup>62</sup> These two motifs form poles of a dialectic which remains unresolved until the final movement of the work, meaning one assumes its working-out would continue throughout the work. The thesis and antithesis (as shown in Example 3.7 above)

<sup>62</sup> Sobaskie, 'Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert's A Minor Quartet', p. 67.

stem from the same source. Sobaskie describes the two iterations of the thesis and the corresponding antithesis in the opening twenty-four bars in the following terms:

Each gesture is defined by its *span* (P5th) and by its *interval structure* (successive melodic 3<sup>rd</sup>). Each is distinguished by its *direction* (the thesis descends, while the antithesis ascends), *degree of elaboration* (the thesis is expressed simply, while the antithesis is embellished expansively), and *duration* (the thesis unfolds in one and a half measures or less, while the antithesis unfolds in four measures or more – often much more!). Together, these criteria serve to identify the opposing ‘agents’ or ‘personalities’ of the quartet’s musical drama.<sup>63</sup>

The thesis and antithesis are codified in the first movement. The thesis sits in the treble, the antithesis in the bass – and their motion mirrors each other.

Transformed versions of these statements govern the drama of the work throughout – not just in the first movement. The second movement opens with the start of the falling triad once again, evoking a sense of the thesis. Despite this apparent repetition, the thesis, as in the first movement, does not make a full appearance<sup>64</sup> because the fall is only a third, rather than the necessary fifth. Sobaskie suggests instead that a falling triad G-E-C in bar 7 of the second movement functions as ‘a new transformation of the thesis gesture.’<sup>65</sup> The position of the antithesis in the bassline affords it greater harmonic reach than the thesis, and Sobaskie suggests there are various statements of it within the tonal framework of the second movement, each harmonised differently.<sup>66</sup> The similarity of this material would normally suggest cyclicism, but he dismisses this, claiming instead that the dialectic is more sophisticated.<sup>67</sup>

Sobaskie argues ‘Neither the thesis gesture nor the antithesis gesture dominates the Menuetto, though their memory remains.’<sup>68</sup> The Menuetto, like the second movement, contains reminders of the thesis. Central to the movement’s drama is what Sobaskie terms a ‘crisis’. Attempts in the bassline to subvert the normal ascending motion of the antithesis, thus mirroring the thesis’s descending motion, lead to a failed attempt at synthesis in bars 8-35, where the E-C-A<sub>b</sub>-E

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<sup>63</sup> Sobaskie, ‘Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert’s A Minor Quartet’, p. 69.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 73. This last point is unsatisfactory to say the least. Cyclicism can be highly sophisticated as has been effectively demonstrated (chiefly by Benedict Taylor, see below) and others, though not Taylor, have compellingly suggested that this Quartet is cyclic. I shall deal with the suggestion that this Quartet incorporates elements of cyclicism below.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 73.

extends beyond the fifth needed.<sup>69</sup> Sobaskie explains that ‘Only with the Menuetto’s long-awaited resolution of the dominant to the tonic does the descending fifth E-A prevail. Yet without the intervening third, it does not mirror the thesis. Thus, the quartet’s dialectic continues, and, reinforced by the Menuetto’s tonal structure, seeks resolution in the finale.’<sup>70</sup> This failure at synthesis means that the dialectic is unbalanced; its crisis perpetuating the drama and delaying the synthesis until the end of the work. However, the delay to the resolution once more strengthens a potential case for cyclicism, which is often end-weighted, but strongly dismissed by Sobaskie. Towards the end of the work, according to Sobaskie, thesis and antithesis finally come together: ‘There, a synthesis – formed of essential features drawn from both gestures – appears just before the climax of the movement.’<sup>71</sup> This comes from a falling triad in the bass line and subsequent ‘tonic confirming cadences, [which provide] the dynamic tonal momentum and dramatic resolution required for the long-expected, satisfying close.’<sup>72</sup>

Sobaskie’s desire to underpin this work’s formal processes with a dialectic has several consequences. As discussed below, there is ample evidence some of this recurring material can be read in ways that are not contingent upon dialectical processes. This process of gradual change – especially as is witnessed in Sobaskie’s ‘thesis’ – would tend instead more towards cyclicism. The ever-changing, one could even say radical, nature of the difference in statements of his antithesis means that the suggestion these statements have the same function is a challenging one, for both the analyst and the listener. Indeed, this would seem more of a consequent to an antecedent than an antithesis to a thesis.

In locating the initial statements at the start of the first movement and finding their resolution only in the final movement, there is an implicit suggestion the Quartet should be considered as a whole, and that the first movement does not resolve on its own, but the first movement functions as a complete sonata form in itself. Peter H. Smith also finds a dialectic (which fully resolves) in the final

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<sup>69</sup> Cf. Sobaskie, ‘Tonal Implication and the Gestural Dialectic in Schubert’s A Minor Quartet’, p. 73.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 73-74.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 76.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

movement.<sup>73</sup> This makes an interesting alternative to Taylor's and Hyland's readings but there are clear grounds for disputing it. The related point that the harmonic schema of the Quartet is perhaps more important than that of its individual movements is a telling one, further developed by Nicholas Rast (discussed below). For Sobaskie, the impetus in this work is found in the juxtaposition of its opposing gestures. The challenge for the listener is to hear them as a clearly demarcated opposition. While the centrality, if not the function, of Sobaskie's thesis is readily apparent, there are other ways to interpret it. Moreover, the distinctly remarkable approach to temporality (arguably in part dependent on this very motif) is ignored by Sobaskie: instead he focuses exclusively on the conventional aspects of the work.

One of the reasons the thesis and antithesis cannot be foregrounded in the second movement, for example, is that the thesis is formed of the falling triad E-C-A. The key change to the relative major of C makes the recurrence of that triad in full far less probable. That the thesis demands a full statement of that descending triad has the consequence of downgrading the significance of the opening of the second movement: thus, the kinship between the *Rosamunde* music and that from 'Die Götter Griechenlands' is obscured. This problem is not confined to the second movement: in many ways, opportunities for the dialectic to play out are almost confined to the tonic, which is a problem for a sonata form, even one as static as this. Sobaskie's reading also places its weight on the third and fourth movements, which, despite his claim to the contrary, would seem more indicative of cyclic processes. Hyland, after all, has shown that there are two different points of dramatic climax and that they fall at different points in the process.

Sobaskie's dialectic is dependent on repetition, but he does not really explore that – or the nature of repetition as a multi-layered process here. The dialectic itself makes use of a thematic repetition which contributes to cyclicism, despite Sobaskie's argument. Sobaskie's focus on specific recurring material reveals the similarity in much of the thematic material across the individual movements. Within this there is a seeming dependence on repetition, especially in the different versions of the thesis statement, but by interpreting it as a dialectic,

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<sup>73</sup> Peter H. Smith, 'Tonal Pairing and Monotonicity in Instrumental Forms of Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, and Brahms', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 35 (2013), 77-102 (p. 89).

Sobaskie does not see repetition as the governing process, instead arguing that the way in which the material is used is perhaps more dynamic. However, whichever way one reads this work, the level of repetition is remarkable – and it is becoming clear that it has given rise to very varied readings. In casting his dialectic across all four movements, Sobaskie pulls the work’s repetition into play.

Nicholas Rast offers a particularly bold reading of the motivic and thematic relationships between motifs at the start of the work and the role they play for the rest of it: ‘The main theme in the first movement of the A minor String Quartet adumbrates the motivic content of the entire work. The opposition of the two melodic cells – one triadic (T), the scalar (S) – generates the substance of the composing-out process.’<sup>74</sup> In Rast’s interpretation, two main motifs are juxtaposed and give rise to this process: once again the falling triad is deemed to be one of the main motifs.<sup>75</sup> In contrast to Sobaskie, however, Rast indicates the other main motif is a scalar one: C-D-E, constructed through a voice-leading graph.

The S theme, Rast argues, appears in various alterations. Its first instantiation is at bar 59 (see below in Ex. 3.8) and then it makes a recurrence in the recapitulation.

**Ex. 3.8. String Quartet in A minor, i, bb. 59-69**

<sup>74</sup> Rast, “Schöne Welt, wo bist du?”, pp. 82-83.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

The falling third that opens the second movement is linked to the opening T theme of the first movement, Rast writes: ‘Meanwhile, the insistent prolongation of the headnote E (5̣) throughout the first two movements is achieved by the opening’s ‘obsessive’ dependence on the descending triadic motive (E-C-A) and its transformation into the *Rosamunde* theme (E-C-G) for the main subject of the Andante.’<sup>76</sup> Rast’s reading suggests that the latter two movements of the D. 804 are infused with Schubert’s allusions to ‘Die Götter Griechenlands’ and that Schubert used them ‘for their potential for thematic metamorphosis.’<sup>77</sup> Rast does not mention that the falling triad can also be found in the song. However, he does make the crucial point that ‘the imitation of the song’s alternation of A minor and A major project the second half of the Quartet towards tonal closure.’<sup>78</sup> This sets up the tacit proposition that despite the strong links between first and second movements and then third and fourth movements, the Quartet might be cyclic (which, as discussed below, is not his opinion alone).

The proposition that the work is cyclic is one way to make sense of some of the work’s internal repetition. Indeed, one can link the alleged song-like nature of the movement and the key scheme; in many ways the key scheme would be far less remarkable in a song. Again and again, the so-called lyrical nature of this first subject is cause for comment and, broadly speaking, the same thing has been said numerous ways. John Reed claims that ‘In its unity of mood, the movement is quasi-monothematic; and though the first subject is heard complete five times in the course of it, and the second subject three times, neither of these tunes outstays it [sic] welcome.’<sup>79</sup> Michael Graubart also focuses on the lyrical nature of the movement: ‘It is difficult to imagine a more coherently-structured, yet apparently free and lyrical, subject. Even the rhapsodic metric displacement of one of its particles results in a new integration – that of the accompaniment with the melody. And the whole is subsumed under the iron logic of its slowly ascending successive melodic peaks (and their subsequent descent).’<sup>80</sup> The apparently song-like nature of this sonata movement is emphasised by the use of A major in the recapitulation. The flexibility in approach to the tonic in this work – which alternates between minor and major mode – is much more reminiscent of song

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<sup>76</sup> Rast, “Schöne Welt, wo bist du?”, p. 85.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>79</sup> John Reed, *The Master Musicians: Schubert* (London: Dent, 1987), p. 107.

<sup>80</sup> Michael Graubart, Integration in Schubert: Themes and Motives I’, *The Musical Times*, 144 (2003), 37-44 (p. 41).

forms than sonata form, such as in ‘Die Götter Griechenlands’. Repetition in a song context is indicative of various forms, not least the direct repetition of strophic forms. The use of A major in the first movement is only one part of a tonal schema that sees the Quartet conclude with a movement in the same key, meaning that the work ends in a different mode to that in which it started, but this is something also seen in Schubert’s *Lieder* (for example in ‘Gute Nacht’).<sup>81</sup> In this way, the lyrical aspects of the Quartet, its cyclicism and the repetition are all linked.

The first movement is, for Rast, almost a small map of what is to come within the Quartet as a whole, making his suggestion of the possibility of cyclicism compelling. Although they form part of his cyclic reading, he argues that the quotations in the second and third movements are used in different ways respectively: Schubert ‘uses the motives from *Rosamunde* in the Quartet as prolongational harmonic cells. He exploits the quotations from “Die Götter Griechenlands”, by contrast, for ‘their potential for thematic metamorphosis.’<sup>82</sup> Therefore Rast’s interpretation of the quotations in the context of the opening motif is particularly bold given both harmonic and thematic factors come into play. According to Rast, the opening theme, broken down into opposing motivic cells, foreshadows what is to come, which is then extended both harmonically and thematically by the quotations in the inner movements. The structure of each movement is important for the overarching framework of the Quartet too. His understanding of the work is based upon the notion that the different movements hang together as one structure– and that the tonal relationship between them is as important as the modulations within each movement.

It is not only the relationship between the movements that is striking here. The notion of the dramatic climax in this work is a particularly thorny one: lack of consensus means various points in the first movement are suggested, as well as others throughout the work. This is further complicated by ostensible teleology turning out to have quite a different focus. This challenge to a teleological reading is, in no small part, levelled by the relationship between the tonic (A minor) and the tonic major (A major). A major is particularly prevalent

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<sup>81</sup> For further discussion of ‘Gute Nacht’ and *Winterreise* more generally, see Chapter 4 (especially 4.1-4.2) below.

<sup>82</sup> Rast, “Schöne Welt, wo bist du?”, p. 87.

throughout the work, and themes are repeated in both the major and minor mode, adding to the complexity of the repetition. Indeed, it is central to questions about the relationship between repetition and difference in this work. One could suggest that this relationship works harmonically rather than through a dramatic dialectic: the sonata form in the first movement would seem to work on the basis of a duality as outlined by Julian Johnson in reference to the ‘strophic alternation of sections in the tonic major and tonic minor’ in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony.<sup>83</sup> This would work in the context of the references to the first movement being song-like, and would help explain the relationship between A minor and major as well as the repetitive nature of the thematic material. Such an alternation necessarily functions as a type of repetition in its own right; indeed, some of the thematic material that appears in both major and minor contributes to this sense of being tonally stuck, despite having theoretically moved from one to the other. Alternation does not represent the same kind of harmonic movement that a modulation from tonic to dominant or relative major would provide, adding another layer of repetition in the work.<sup>84</sup>

In his monograph on Mendelssohn’s cyclic-form works, Benedict Taylor necessarily devotes significant attention to constructing a definition of the form. Taylor first sets out three types of cyclicism: works where sections of one movement reappear in another, works in which separate movements are reliant on similar thematic material, and collections of miniatures which must be considered as a whole in order to make sense.<sup>85</sup> To construct a definition of cyclic form rather than just the term cyclic, he further narrows down the terms: ‘A work in cyclic form, then, is a particular type of cycle in which the connections between the individual parts are intensified and made explicit.’<sup>86</sup> Cyclic form approaches repetition and identity in a particular way, one different to both sonata and variations forms and its reliance on recurrence is elevated to a different level.<sup>87</sup> Cyclic form is dependent on repetition having a relationship with

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<sup>83</sup> Johnson, ‘The Status of the Subject in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony’, p. 109.

<sup>84</sup> For further discussion of Schubert and Mahler, especially in relation to Adorno, see Chapter 2 above.

<sup>85</sup> Benedict Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time, and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>87</sup> It is tempting to dismiss variation form as an uninteresting (or even empty) type of repetition in this context. However, there are ample grounds for suggesting otherwise. I discuss this in more detail elsewhere with reference to Beethoven and Schubert – see Katie Cattell, ‘Identity, Subjectivity, and Temporality in Variation Form: A Musical and Philosophical Enquiry’ (unpublished MRes dissertation, London University: Royal Holloway, 2013) – but see, for



temporality that is predicated upon a balance of repetition and change. While this is also true of sonata form, the way that this works out in practice is different, not least because of its reach across a multi-movement form and the predominance of end-weighted forms. It therefore gives unity through a sense of repetition, but the way in which similar musical material is presented across movements means that instead of pushing forwards, there would appear to be more of a concentration on reminiscence and looking back, something that is true of Schubert's music more generally.

When Taylor sets out his definition of cyclic form, he cites examples from Haydn onwards. Schubert, however, does not feature particularly strongly in his list (despite his affinities for memory and a sense of pastness, as well as his propensity for repetition) and Taylor mentions only two works: the *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, and the Piano Trio in E $\flat$  major no. 2, D.929.<sup>88</sup> Although cited as an example, Taylor feels that the *Wandererfantasie* does not necessarily fulfil all the strict criteria for cyclic form as 'thematic affinity' is, on its own, not enough to permit a definition as cyclic form.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, Taylor includes the fantasy as an example of 'Multi-functional four-in-one designs (or similar), which he classes under the category of 'Combined- or single-movement cyclic forms.'<sup>90</sup> Despite all of this, Taylor himself does not propose the String Quartet, D. 804 as a cyclic work, unlike Rast.

Despite Taylor's opinion, Rast is not alone. In an article devoted to Schubert's cyclic compositions from 1824 (which includes the A minor Quartet), Martin Chusid makes a range of claims about the cyclic nature of various Schubert works: 'Schubert had apparently set a technical problem for himself: to write larger instrumental works with two or more of the individual movements

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example, Maurice J. E. Brown, *Schubert's Variations* (London: Maximilian and Co. Ltd., 1954), Roman Ivanovitch, 'Recursive/Discursive: Variation and Sonata in the Andante of Mozart's String Quartet in F, K. 590', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 32 (2010), 145-164, William Kinderman, *Beethoven's Diabelli Variations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Julian Littlewood, *The Variations of Johannes Brahms* (London: Plumbago Books, 2004), Nicholas Marston, 'Analysing Variations: The Finale of Beethoven's String Quartet, Op. 74', *Music Analysis*, 8 (1989), 303-324, Nicholas Marston, *Beethoven's Piano Sonata in E, Op. 109*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Elaine Sisman, *Haydn and the Classical Variation*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), Elaine Sisman, 'Tradition and Transformation in the Alternating Variations of Haydn and Beethoven', *Acta Musicologica*, 62 (1990), 152-82, and Peter Williams, *Bach: The Goldberg Variations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>88</sup> Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time, and Memory*, pp. 11-16

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., pp. 15-16.

deliberately related for purposes of unification.<sup>91</sup> Whether the former part of this claim is credible or not, Chusid's claim of Schubert's cyclicism is nonetheless convincing. However, this claim for D. 804 hinges on the final two movements: 'The Minuet of the A Minor Quartet, one of Schubert's most memorable movements, provides a motive which becomes the most important melodic figure for the following finale.'<sup>92</sup> Chusid puts forward an argument for the influence of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony on Schubert, which he states is Beethoven's only symphony prior to the Ninth to have 'prominent cyclic elements.'<sup>93</sup> He expands on this, saying that 'What is of particular importance is the fact that Beethoven's motive has many of the characteristics of the figures to be found in Schubert's cyclic works of that year and *only* of that year. It is short; the range is narrow; and repeated notes play an important role.'<sup>94</sup> That the motifs in the different movements of D. 804 are unusually closely related is an ever-present point, and it seems surprising that cyclicism is so rarely considered. However, it would seem to get somewhat lost in wider considerations of dialectics. Nonetheless, it would offer one way of interpreting the work's repetition.

Taylor's benchmark for considering a work 'cyclic' is doubtless both different to and arguably more systematic than Chusid's or even Rast's. Despite his own rebuttal of the work's cyclicism, it would seem reasonable to posit that it meets one of his subcategories of cyclicism: arguably, this is an example of what Taylor calls 'Non-end-orientated cyclic' form, specifically one that is 'synthetic or integrative'.<sup>95</sup> Taylor describes such forms in the following terms: 'Here, parts of earlier movements are heard returning (normally in the finale, frequently as the music nears its conclusion), either literally or in further transformation, as if binding up the course of the work and connecting the separate movements.'<sup>96</sup> D. 804 would nevertheless seem to meet some of these criteria. Moreover, the web of references in Taylor's own hermeneutic reading of the work would seem to suggest that a cyclic reading of the work is plausible. More importantly still, the repetition that abounds in the work starts to make more sense if one interprets the work as a cyclic work.

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<sup>91</sup> Martin Chusid, 'Schubert's Cyclic Compositions of 1824', *Acta Musicologica*, 36 (1964), 37-45 (p. 37).

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41. John Gingerich also draws attention to Schubert's circumstances in 1823-24 (see below).

<sup>95</sup> Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time, and Memory*, p. 13.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

### 3.4 Memory and Cyclicism

John M. Gingerich's rich reading of D. 804 takes into account its historical performance circumstances, as well as its musicological detail. Gingerich notes that although Schubert had written any number of sonata-form movements by this time, this would have only been the second heard in public.<sup>97</sup> The entire study deals with the ever-problematic Schubert-Beethoven binary in a particularly nuanced way, making it clear that the binary in the scholarship is not the only comparison which needs acknowledgment: 'By composing music in Beethoven's genres Schubert was inviting a comparison; sometimes, as with the Octet, explicitly so. But he could not have anticipated the extent to which his music would be judged by standards developed specifically to demonstrate Beethoven's greatness.'<sup>98</sup> After that calling card, Gingerich turns to this String Quartet, which, he argues, is simultaneously surprising and conventional.

Gingerich describes the first movement as one of Schubert's 'tamest when judged by conventional norms'<sup>99</sup> due to its lack of three-key exposition and the appearance of the anticipated keys in the exposition (both A minor and C major), as well as in the recapitulation and development.<sup>100</sup> This is underlined here:

The movement is not exceptionally lengthy, and its proportions are unremarkable. Its beginning is unabashedly direct and dispenses with a slow introduction or even with the overlapping of introductory, expository, and bridge functions found at the start of the A-minor Piano Sonata (op. 42, D 845), the D-minor Quartet, the G-major Quartet, or the Cello Quintet. This is of course a list of roads not taken, rather than description of what Schubert did write, much less of how it communicates. And the problem with applying conventional norms to Schubert's sonata movements is that, while they usually supply a catalogue of transgressions, even a case such as the first movement of the A-minor Quartet where transgressions are relatively scarce – and as we shall see, even this movement harbors at least one massive transgression – they tell us little about what makes the movement interesting or memorable.<sup>101</sup>

Arguing that this movement is relatively conventional sets his argument in stark opposition to some of the other points made above: the form is not where innovation is to be found. Gingerich instead finds it in the work's 'lyrical' quality.<sup>102</sup> Instead, the opposition between parallel major and minor is more noteworthy, a recurrent feature of Schubert's musical language though it is. This

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<sup>97</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 105.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>102</sup> See 3.1 above.

creates an uncertainty in the sonata form's ostensible return to the tonic, upon which the form normally relies, but which is weakened here through the tonal ambivalence.

For Gingerich, however, the key to understanding this movement lies somewhere other than in its harmony. Instead, he notes 'harmony, the usual suspect when seeking to discover what makes music peculiarly Schubertian, will not get us very far. So we will have to look elsewhere. We will have to look at the surface.'<sup>103</sup>

Like Hyland, Gingerich then discusses the movement in terms of strata.

However, his strata mean something slightly different: they are a way of marking out distinct textural layers in the opening bars (see Ex. 3.7 above). The first is made by the viola and cello together, the second by the second violin, and the third, when it enters, by the first violin.<sup>104</sup> Gingerich, too, notes the importance of the falling triad in the opening melody. He makes two fundamental points about the opening of this movement. First, he sees it as the opening of a *Lied*, not of a string quartet:

Instead, he [Schubert] began with a Lied. He began by reminding the audience of what they already knew about him, of what they already loved. He began by embracing his reputation as a Lied composer instead of fighting it. And after beginning by reminding them of what he had already done, he would have to show them what unanticipated feats he was yet capable of. He would dare his audience to follow him as he turned a Lied into a string quartet, and when it was done he would dare them to acknowledge that it was well done.<sup>105</sup>

This is one of the most convincing interpretations in claiming that the movement is *Lied*-like. The way in which Gingerich unpicks the texture, the historical circumstances, and the nature of Schubert's project makes it much more viable that this movement can indeed be interpreted as a *Lied*.

The second point to be taken from Gingerich's reading of the opening is that 'The first four measures introduce most of the material that unifies the movement. The head motive is the only melodic element; the rest of Schubert's glue in this movement is textural.'<sup>106</sup> Here, then, Gingerich's analysis can be clearly differentiated from some of the other analyses considered above. Here, textural concerns are of paramount importance. It is worth pausing to note that those four

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<sup>103</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 111.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

bars' material introduce material that extends into the subsequent movements too. Gingerich then embarks on a comparison with the *Quartettsatz*, D. 703, noting that that too, like his analysis of D. 804, relies on texture for its sense of unity.<sup>107</sup> However, for Gingerich, D. 804 goes one step further:

So, instead of relying on one unifying motive, the Quartet in A minor begins by establishing a stratified texture as a unifying resource. Unity, continuity, and cohesion are however only half the point. Each layer, each motive has its own personality, its own affect, its own agenda; we will explore in detail how Schubert gradually teases out the various implications of his opening in a complex cycle of return and departure, of simultaneous development and exposition. For the first thirty-one measures the other layers remain relatively constant while the melody unfolds in three long-breathed phrases.<sup>108</sup>

Gingerich's analysis depends on two things: texture as a major unifying force in the movement and what he sees as the relatively unremarkable (even predictable) harmony, unlike many of Schubert's other sonata form movements. The textural make-up of the movement comes about because the movement is predicated upon *Lied*-like characteristics. Therefore, these two claims are, in some sense, linked. The *Lied*-like nature of the movement, it could be claimed, serves a greater purpose than simply reminding the audience that that is the realm in which Schubert normally operated, but also offers the musical cohesion behind the form. Gingerich goes on to explain how the movement works in more detail:

For thirty-two measures the opening melody achieves continuity, one breath following upon the other in an unforced, in hindsight, almost inevitable fashion. The first perfect authentic cadence brings a degree of closure to the opening of the piece; changes in the mode, the register of the head motive, texture, dynamic, and rhythmic energy in measure 32 immediately confirm the close of the first section. While this opening section of the piece is the point of departure for the remainder of the movement, as a unit it also has its own narrative, with its own internal web of reference. The listener experiences the music as a linear progression, an unfolding in real time; this is the "what happens next" of the music. But in this music each successive phrase also seems to comment upon or reply to whole of the preceding music. All music does this to some extent, but Schubert's does so with an unusual degree of explicitness and circumspection. Within the small enclosure of the first thirty-two measures he creates a cycle of departure and return, of reiteration and comment.<sup>109</sup>

The first thirty-two bars, then, achieve something quite remarkable. Paradoxically, they set out the material that enables the movement to be unified, but equally have their own story to tell. It is here that Gingerich's strata are seen: they operate within three textural levels – and are what marks this movement out

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<sup>107</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 114.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

as particularly unusual. Clearly demarcated, they are what give this movement its *Lied*-like characteristics, but they feed into the fact that the opening is, according to Gingerich, fundamentally lyrical, which theoretically creates problems later on, at least judging by conventional norms: 'A lyrical first theme develops and devours its own material leaving nothing for the rest of the movement to feed on.'<sup>110</sup>

Gingerich subsequently outlines an analysis of the movement which suggests it is premised on cycles of varying length interwoven with development, once again dependent on texture.<sup>111</sup> Gingerich, like Taylor, sees the working of memory in the movement, because 'At some point Schubert uses each element of the initial texture in a new, defamiliarized context that reveals some of its latent qualities.'<sup>112</sup> Gingerich's analysis, therefore, would seem to resonate with aspects of Hyland's, in that it is stratified, albeit in a different way; with Taylor's, in that memory is a defining characteristic; and with Rast's and Chusid's, because aspects of cyclicism play into his interpretation of the first movement.

Gingerich suggests the first movement has 'three thematic sections, each followed by a developmental process. At some point each development has featured sequential modulation and a drastic textural contrast. Each development has been more elaborate, has included more subsections than the preceding one. The three thematic sections have strong textural ties while the developmental sections provide textural contrast.'<sup>113</sup> This contributes to what he calls a 'Proustian narrative of memory.'<sup>114</sup> He indicates one way the memory underpinning the structure is made manifest is by dislocating the familiar and putting it in an unfamiliar context. It is also indicative of Walter Frisch's comment on the opening bars of the String Quartet in G major, D. 887, that 'what we hear in the present seems to come from the past.'<sup>115</sup> That process gives rise to the cyclic potential of this movement: 'The quality of retrospective reassessment already present in the successive phrases of Schubert's opening melody is writ large in Schubert's cyclical process of continuous sectional development. Each cycle

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<sup>110</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project*, p. 121.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>115</sup> Walter Frisch, "'You Must Remember This': Memory and Structure in Schubert's String Quartet in G Major, D. 887", *The Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 582-603 (p. 587).

grows in size, and in the number of its subsections; each cycle brings back and reinterprets more of the textures and/or melodic motives from preceding cycles; and each cycle also reinterprets and develops its own theme more insistently and more thoroughly.<sup>116</sup> None of this cyclical development is suggested to have any impact on the rest of the work. While his analysis of the movement is compelling, including his comparison with Beethoven op. 59/1,<sup>117</sup> it is perhaps a lost opportunity that these loops are not linked to a work that, it has been suggested elsewhere, is cyclic across its entire form.<sup>118</sup>

The whys and wherefores of the many different types of repetition and how they convolute what initially appears to be a stable sonata structure is not necessarily fully accounted for, despite the richness and diversity of critical interpretations of D. 804 – many of which emphasise varying aspects of the work's temporality. Such readings allow the work to be understood both as part of a nineteenth-century tradition using inherited forms, but also as diverging from those very same traditions. That tension has provoked the richness of subsequent approaches to the work and continues to make the work elusive to analytical or interpretative closure. It will be shown below that the repetition is what gives rise to this tonal stasis which functions as a conflict – thus making the work seem harmonically repetitive, as well as thematically and motivically so. All of these factors would seem, at least according to traditional explanations of sonata form, to *detract* from the sonata aesthetic as they do not contribute to what Elaine Sisman has described as a 'sustained organic structure', thus 'violat[ing] one of the central tenets of German Romanticism'.<sup>119</sup> It remains, in the most Adornian sense, difficult to explain the work's compulsive return to repetition at harmonic, tonal, thematic, and motivic levels without attempting in some way to compensate for it, to excuse it, rather than just accept its presence. This brings the enquiry back to fundamental questions of temporality and repetition: and, with that, we turn again to Adorno and Heidegger.

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<sup>116</sup> Gingerich, *Schubert's Beethoven Project* p. 137.

<sup>117</sup> When Gingerich suggests that Beethoven's op. 59/1 is the most heroic of Beethoven's string quartets and then explains how Beethoven alters the sonata structure to make the form *more* linear, this is particularly compelling, because it adds another dimension to the loops of cyclic development that he finds in D. 804/i.

<sup>118</sup> My response to the notion that D. 804 is cyclic is discussed further below.

<sup>119</sup> Elaine R. Sisman, *Haydn and the Classical Variation*, p. 1.

While Adorno can be seen as an inheritor of that Romantic tradition (see especially Chapter 2 above), the way he puts it to use has a decidedly bleak outlook, something that David Roberts claims Heidegger shares: ‘Of the romantic dream there remains only its echo in the convergence of philosophy and art sought by Heidegger and Adorno in their thinking of origin and end.’<sup>120</sup> Instead of being imbued with the Romantic optimism, then, Adorno’s work has a particular pessimism. However, for all that bleakness, Adorno and Heidegger have different outlooks on repetition. Moving away from the musicological literature, which has a tendency to denigrate repetition, and instead using an interpretation which holds repetition as central to understanding time – then its role for musical temporality becomes clearer. It is for that reason that I turn to Martin Heidegger – in this chapter, the second division of *Being and Time* – where Heidegger argues that repetition serves a very particular purpose in relation to what he terms ‘authentic temporality’.

### 3.5 Adorno, Heidegger and Time

Adorno’s discussion of this work has, up until this point, been conspicuous only by its absence. Tellingly, the A-minor Quartet is one of the few works Adorno mentions by name in his 1928 essay. Here he interrogates Schubert’s repetition against a backdrop of dialectical thought. As seen, Schubert’s repetition undoubtedly poses a problem for Adorno, who describes repetition as the return of the same. Yet he is open to the idea of difference understood as a change in perspective: the ‘same in diversity.’<sup>121</sup> As far as Adorno is concerned, this goes for repetition across works, but also repetition within individual pieces:

Those themes know of no history, but only shifts in perspective: the only way they change is through a change of light, and this explains Schubert’s inclination to use the same theme two or three times in different works, and different ways; he does so most memorably by repeating the lasting melody which serves as the theme of a set of Piano Variations, as a variation theme in the A-Minor String Quartet, and in the *Rosamunde* music.[...] [T]he wanderer encounters these repeated features in new lighting - they are timeless and appear to be disconnected, isolated. This scenario concerns not only the repeated use of the same theme in different pieces, but in actual fact the very make-up of Schubertian form.<sup>122</sup>

This early in his career, Adorno would seem more permissive of repetition; or

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<sup>120</sup> David Roberts, ‘Art and Myth: Adorno and Heidegger’, *Thesis Eleven*, 58 (1999), 19-34 (pp. 33-34).

<sup>121</sup> Adorno, ‘Schubert (1928)’, pp. 10-11.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p.10.



perhaps, it is Schubert's music that leads to this attitude to repetition. Adorno indicates that both the repetition of themes across works and within a single work function in much the same way; moreover, repetition is not only motivically and thematically central to Schubert's forms, but can also generate entire works. In other words, repetition at different levels infuses works like D. 804 at every level. The interlinking of A major and A minor provides a way of examining Adorno's 'same in diversity' or, in other words, what changing mode does to motivic identity. One such example would be the treatment of A major in the first movement. Adorno explains such processes as follows:

His themes occur as truth-characters, and his artistic remit is to restate their image passionately, again and again [...] But citation can happen only once at a time, and so the atmosphere is different each time: Schubert's forms are forms of invocation of what has already appeared; they are not transformations of something that had been invented. This basic a priori completely took over the Schubertian sonata: here, harmonic shifts replace developing transitions like changes in light exposing a new part in the landscape, that itself entails as little development as any earlier part; and here too, in development sections, motivic unpicking of the themes – exploiting for the sake of dynamic sparks their every little element – is renounced, and the recurrent themes are disclosed progressively; here too he takes up themes from earlier that are encountered but not consigned to the past.<sup>123</sup>

Adorno captures the sense of seeing the same thing again and again, but from a different perspective each time, as is the case in the first movement of D. 804. In relation to Beethoven's music, repetition is considered to stand in opposition to development; hence the historical criticism of Schubert's treatment of large-scale forms, yet claiming that repetition is not form-generating is, as Adorno highlights, simply untrue for Schubert's music. In the recapitulation of the first movement of D. 804, our understanding of repetition is challenged through the simultaneous proximity and distance of the tonic major setting of the second subject. Here the paradox is audible through the change in mode from minor to major; whilst the thematic and motivic material is frequently repeated, it is done so in both tonic major and minor, thus continuing to assert the role that difference plays in Schubertian repetition:

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<sup>123</sup>Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p. 11.

It is not for nothing that the moods in Schubert, which not only revolve, but can also collapse, are bound up with harmonic shifts, with modulation, which sheds light, at whatever level of profundity on things that are always the same. Those sudden, non-developmental modulations occlude daylight like camera shutters; the introduction of the second subject in the first movement of the great B $\flat$ -Major Sonata; or say the violent chromatic progression in the E $\flat$  Trio; or indeed the opening of the beginning of the C-Major Symphony transition - these have transformed the links in the sonata model entirely into a collapse of perspective that opens up harmonic depth, and that in these three major-mode works the second subject appears to move towards the minor means, according to the modal symbolism that still held true for Schubert, a real step into the dark.<sup>124</sup>

Adorno regards the choice of key area for second subjects elsewhere as significant, but in D. 804 Schubert reverses the process and moves from minor to major. Indeed, in D. 804, A major becomes so persistent that it is presented as the key of the final movement, meaning the work finishes in a different mode to that in which it started. The way tonal identity changes throughout the work means that from a tonal perspective, difference persists but in the context of repetition.

Nowhere is this truer than in the final movement, which exemplifies the fluid approach to the tonic in this work. This is the culmination of multiple movements fluctuating between A major and A minor, and as Rast suggests, mirrors the structure of the first movement. The strange sense of change alongside stasis exemplifies the paradox of repetition in this work, especially given the motivic dependence the movement has on earlier material. The falling triad (see Ex. 3.1), for example, can be found in this final movement in yet another version, showing the way in which the same material is explored multiple times in this work, and giving further credence to a reading that emphasises cyclic form.

Undoubtedly, Adorno casts light here on the repetitive construction of Schubert's forms. Scott Burnham differentiates between Adorno's approach to Beethovenian development and Schubertian repetition: 'For Adorno, a Schubertian theme is an apparition, an *Erscheinung*, a characteristic truth; it is not an invention in need of a formal process of destiny. Such a theme can only be invoked through repetition, not transformed through development.'<sup>125</sup> For Adorno, then, Schubert's repetition stands in place of the development in Beethoven's forms. Schubert's treatment of a motivic identity is thus to examine it from different

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<sup>124</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', pp. 12-13.

<sup>125</sup> Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', p. 32.

perspectives through repetition. Adorno's understanding of repetition, while it explicates the process to a certain extent, leaves us standing still though, if not going round in circles. But if the 1928 essay does not really address the wider consequences opened up by Schubert's repetition, arguably his later work on Mahler does, picking up many of the central themes of the earlier Schubert study.<sup>126</sup>

By contrast, repetition heralds different possibilities for Heidegger. Placing repetition as a crucial component of the continuum between past, present, and future, he affords it an importance that is missing in most purely musicological interpretations of the concept. A Heideggerian approach to the Quartet can account for the repetition, equally explaining how the work's temporality is markedly different to apparently similar works of its age, and thus why it declines to construct a sense of 'future as telos'. Explaining this necessarily involves a substantial diversion into Heideggerian thought. In Division Two of *Being and Time* Heidegger moves his focus away from the question of Being, which has occupied him for the entirety of Division One. He moves onto, amongst other things, the 'Time' of the title of the work, especially in the context of its relationship to Being, which in reality means exploring the concept of temporality and how it relates to Being, especially Dasein and its Being. This is of particular interest to this study because a central part of Heidegger's interpretation of temporality involves an understanding of repetition, which in stark contrast to commonplace interpretation of repetition as empty, casts it as a central and necessary part of the human understanding of time. Not only that, but Heidegger understands repetition as an active (rather than passive) part of that process with potentially profound implications for the ways in which musical repetition in general, and a work such as Schubert's Quartet, D. 804, in particular, might be understood.

Michael Inwood suggests Heidegger outlines two types of temporality in *Being and Time*: authentic temporality and inauthentic temporality.<sup>127</sup> He elides these with two sorts of time: world time and ordinary time, as happens in practice throughout Heidegger scholarship. His corresponding entry in his *Heidegger*

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<sup>126</sup> See Chapters 2 and 4 for a discussion of Schubert and Adorno's work on Mahler.

<sup>127</sup> Inwood, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction*, pp. 87-88.

*Dictionary*, for example, is labelled ‘Time, temporality and timeliness.’<sup>128</sup> The two types of time: world-time and ordinary time are seemingly quickly dealt with: world time, explains Inwood, is ‘the public time in which we encounter beings in the world’<sup>129</sup> and ordinary time is time ‘as conceived by philosophers from Aristotle to Bergson, time as a homogeneous, unending sequence of ‘nows’ or instants.’<sup>130</sup> However, it is not necessarily that simple. We have the capacity to misunderstand time, just as we misunderstand temporality (as the way in which we perceive time), as shall be seen below. Jonathan Rée explains that we often misunderstand world-time:

We uncouple it from the web of its involvements with the world, and link it to a ‘now’ conceived of as a fleeting instant that is momentarily present to us. We forget about the temporality of anticipation and memory and reduce futurity to the ‘not yet now – but later’, and pastness to the ‘no longer now – but earlier’. We picture ourselves as leaning over the parapet of a bridge, staring down at a mighty river. Shrouded in mist, it sweeps towards us from its inscrutable sources in time future; we catch a glimpse of it for the brief instant when it passes beneath us as time present; and then it hurries out behind us into the unfathomable oceans of time past.<sup>131</sup>

Removing time from this continuum and engaging only with a sense of instants is the core issue for our engagement with time and temporality. According to Heidegger, there are two ways of understanding temporality, which he terms ‘inauthentic’ and ‘authentic’. The former centres around concrete moments, making it ontologically more problematic, because it alienates it from the continuum that stretches out between birth and death. Authentic temporality, on the other hand, operates by interpreting temporality on that plane between birth and death where past, present, and future are interlocked. This may seem very abstract, but in actuality has significant material ramifications: from Heidegger’s perspective, inauthentic temporality is a misunderstanding of temporality. This happens because inauthentic temporality insists upon isolating discrete moments in a way that is anathema to authentic temporality’s continuum. That these two types of temporality are such a central issue for Heidegger has consequences – and possibilities – for music.

Heidegger states that ‘Temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of

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<sup>128</sup> Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary*, pp. 220-21.

<sup>129</sup> Inwood, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 88.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>131</sup> Jonathan Rée, *Heidegger: History and Truth in Being and Time* (London: Orion, 1998), p. 40.

Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.<sup>132</sup> Linked to this are what Heidegger denotes as the three 'ecstases' of past, present, and future. It is possible for these to come together, as authentic temporality, which contrasts with inauthentic temporality:

Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from *itself*, its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of ecstases. What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of 'now', without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality has been levelled off. But this very levelling off, in accordance with its existential meaning, is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporalizing, in conformity with which temporality temporalizes as inauthentic the kind of 'time' we have just mentioned.<sup>133</sup>

Here, then, Heidegger starts to show the relationship between inauthentic and authentic temporality – and the ways the two differ. Identification of specific instances, which all Dasein engages in, has as a necessary consequence that Dasein ignores its Being-towards-death. In this way, Dasein can ignore its own mortality and other existential issues. Instead, each individual moment comes to be treated on its own terms and life can become a sequence of simple events – something that, in reality, human beings do all the time. Jonathan Rée (summarising Heidegger) explains that 'We may, of course, find some comfort in this conception of temporality: if our lives are strings of separate experiences then we can imagine them continuing for ever. But we must also be aware, if only obscurely, that it is inauthentic: ontologically, we know that to live our lives in terms of now-time is to be 'in flight' from finitude or 'looking away' from it.'<sup>134</sup> While this is something that humans necessarily do, this type of interaction, however temporally contingent it may be, is not what develops Dasein's understanding of temporality. Rée continues by noting that humans share an 'ontological conscience' and it is in that domain that the role of authentic temporality becomes clearer,<sup>135</sup> because it is here that inauthentic temporality is somewhat inadequate for rather more existential concerns.

Authentic temporality, therefore, is much messier than its inauthentic counterpart, because it has more complex ramifications for our perception of our mortality, and thus of the relation between ourselves and our being. Dasein,

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<sup>132</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 377.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p. 377.

<sup>134</sup> Rée, *Heidegger*, p. 41.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

argues Heidegger, requires both types of temporality; the inauthentic is necessary at an organisational and practical level. Yet authentic temporality is equally, if not more important for Dasein's own temporality, as Rée explains: 'Authentic temporality belongs to us as much as we belong to it; it is not a force of nature so much as the way our existence 'temporalizes' itself and its world. It is not an infinite sequence of uniform self-contained now-points, but a finite structure of differentiated "moments".'<sup>136</sup> In other words, authentic temporality, with its continuum between birth and death, gives temporal meaning to our existence. Our 'ontological consciences' demand engagement with authentic temporality and its existential demands, which Rée portrays as 'indefinite fields that reach out into both past and future.'<sup>137</sup> This is significantly more challenging than inauthentic temporality and its series of nows, but fundamental to Dasein and its relationship with temporality. Heidegger himself writes: 'In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That *Present* which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is *authentic* itself, we call the "moment of vision".'<sup>138</sup> Authentic temporality, through a temporal reach that stretches both backwards and forwards, ensures that time is unified.

From this, follows a further conclusion: Dasein is not temporally contingent. It is not so much dependent on its temporality as it *is* its temporality. For Heidegger, Dasein's modes of Being can only exist because of authentic and inauthentic temporality, meaning although Dasein is not contingent upon them, its Being is defined by them. The logical conclusion is expressed by Mulhall thus:

First, since temporality is the meaning of the Being of Dasein, it cannot be a medium or framework to which Dasein is merely externally or contingently related, something whose essence is entirely independent of Dasein. Heidegger's idea is not that human beings necessarily exist *in* time, but rather that they exist *as* temporality, that human existence most fundamentally *is* temporality.<sup>139</sup>

Authentic temporality dissolves the separation between past, present, and future. Instead, past, present, and future operate as what Heidegger names 'ecstases.'<sup>140</sup> This means that temporality, as experienced through Dasein, becomes self-aware

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<sup>136</sup> Rée, *Heidegger*, p. 42.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>138</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 387.

<sup>139</sup> Stephen Mulhall, *Routledge Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), p. 161.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 377.

and thus knows that time is passing. As Dasein lives its life, its use of both authentic and inauthentic temporality proves fundamental. Often it turns to inauthentic temporality for practical purposes, but its 'ontological conscience' also means that it engages with authentic temporality giving its life a sense of that greater purpose. It is within that context that the three ecstases sit. Mulhall explains the way that the ecstases are placed on the continuum of authentic temporality<sup>141</sup> which gives rise to a 'self-generating and self-transcending process' which he describes as follows: 'And, since that process underpins the Being of Dasein, it must be the condition for the possibility of its ecstatic quality – the distinctively human capacity to be at once ahead, behind and alongside oneself, to stand outside oneself, to exist (in grasping the Being of other present beings – its inherent wordliness – and in its self-projective thrownness.'<sup>142</sup>

Like authentic approaches to time, repetition is an active process for Heidegger: one over which Dasein has ownership. Heidegger states that 'Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating.'<sup>143</sup> Repetition is thus part of constituting Dasein in its temporality; the temporal approach demanded by this active repetition is such that it occurs in the context of authentic temporality, where past, present, and future are brought together, rather than in a series of moments, as to be found in inauthentic temporality.

Hubert L. Dreyfus's explanation of the relationship between repetition and authentic temporality similarly notes the importance of looking both back and forwards. He notes the temporal relationship to such events changes to encompass repetition and what he calls 'forerunning'. Repetition, alongside forerunning and resoluteness, gives form to authentic Dasein's activity: 'Thus when Dasein accepts anxiety the temporal structure of its life is transformed. While it still *expects* and *remembers* specific events, the temporal form of its relation to specific events changes from *awaiting* and *forgetting* to *forerunning* and *repetition*. Authentic Dasein in *forerunning*, *repeating*, *resoluteness*, lives out the temporality of Dasein in such a way as to give a *constant form* to its activity, no

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<sup>141</sup> Mulhall, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 161.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., p. 161.

<sup>143</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 438.

matter how its specific projects come and go.’<sup>144</sup> Authentic Dasein, therefore, deals with its authentic temporality in a very different way to the way in which it would were it inauthentic. Authentic temporalizing, as Mulhall explains below, encompasses repetition in order to permit Heidegger’s so-called ‘moment of vision’:

Both anticipation and awaiting, however, presuppose modes of temporalizing the present and the past. [...] There can be no authentic appropriation of the future without an authentic appropriation of the past as determinative of the present, and determinative in specific ways. Dasein must acknowledge the past as something not under its control but nonetheless constitutive of who it is, and so as something it must acknowledge if it is to become – to genuinely exist as – who it is. Heidegger labels this ‘repetition’; and thus defines authentic temporalizing as an anticipating repetition that holds fast to a moment of vision.<sup>145</sup>

Repetition may well retrieve past possibilities, but logically those past possibilities must also be indebted to the future because of the implication that those possibilities *will* play out at some yet-to-be-determined point. It is in this sense that the *Augenblick*, the ecstases, and authentic temporality become a vehicle to interpret Dasein’s understanding of its own temporality. As Charles E. Scott says, Dasein is simultaneously ‘present and yet to be’. However, Scott does not note the tacit role repetition must play in that process and in constructing that identity: ‘We have seen that any living present of being-in-the-world lacks completion: it is not yet finished; it is characterized by mere possibility, by futurity. Consequently, Dasein and human beings are never something merely and objecting present. *Being* mortal, they are *not* fully there. They are present and yet to be at the same time. In that sense they are indebted to the future. Dasein is thus the ground for its own lack.’<sup>146</sup> Authentic temporality must continue to move forward as everything temporally situated must. Whether simple clock time or some other perception of time, time moves forward. However, as authentic temporality moves along its continuum, repetition forms part of the architecture of that process.

This is where things start to get more interesting for music. The human capacity to be both within and outside this temporality simultaneously has profound implications for perception of music, especially from the nineteenth century

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<sup>144</sup> Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 327.

<sup>145</sup> Mulhall, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 166.

<sup>146</sup> Charles E. Scott, ‘Care and authenticity’ in *Heidegger: Key Concepts* (Durham: Acumen, 2010), ed. by Bret W. Davis, pp. 57-68 (p. 65).



onwards. From this point onwards, the way time is explored in music has a capacity for self-reflection. This focus is certainly not unique to Schubert's music, but the means that Schubert uses are unusual, as can be seen in the subsequent discussion of this in D. 804. The repetition at work in D. 804 is an active process, like that outlined by Heidegger, and its temporality reveals a highly unusual approach to past, present, and future.

The repetitive musical processes of D. 804 show one way in which this temporal continuum can operate in music: the temporal continuum just *is* as the music unfolds. However, both the links to works outside the confines of D. 804 and the motivic and thematic connections between musical events that happen both further ahead and back in the Quartet show that in some ways the barriers between past, present and future are breaking down. This would seem to be a self-conscious process, showing how close D. 804 and D. 677 are, but also the links between the movements in D. 804 are. Where in fact the locus of this thematic material lies is an open, almost unanswerable question.

Harper-Scott's (for further discussion, see 1.3 above) goes one step further on the matter of authentic temporality. Heidegger's *Augenblick*, he explains, is "the moment" which changes our perception of ourselves [...] the 'authentic' mode of 'ecstasis' of the present.'<sup>147</sup> He goes on to argue Heidegger's definition of temporality essentially means that Dasein goes on to try and shape its own future. He defines the 'ecstases' as 'active, lived time',<sup>148</sup> and suggests that they have a fundamental role in shaping the *Augenblick*, which in turn 'makes the present active, not passive: in it Dasein takes its future into its own hands.'<sup>149</sup> Although this seems a subtle differentiation, it is fundamental: active versus passive marks out aspects of Heidegger's understanding of temporality, not least repetition, and is perhaps a way out of musicology's difficulties explaining repetition. Prior explanations of repetition (especially when in the Adornian vein) have focused on its passive nature. By doing this, repetition is doomed to seem empty, as it is then without process. By contrast, Heidegger's shaping of temporality is an active one, and the repetition involved in that is equally an

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<sup>147</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar: Modernist*, p. 34.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

active process. By interpreting repetition in music in the same way, it is no longer empty, but understood as a shaping, generative force behind form.

The reasoning behind a Heideggerian explanation of authentic temporality is hopefully starting to become a little clearer. Authentic temporality as an active shaping of time has the eventual result of somewhat changing the emphasis of the way in which time would seem to unfold. Dasein's attempt to control its future, through the *Augenblick's* shift of focus, has ramifications for the past – and this is where Heidegger's understanding of repetition comes into play. Harper-Scott sets out how Heidegger explains that as follows:

Heidegger uses the term 'repetition' for this authentic appropriation of the past, in which its crucial role as shaper of the present situation is acknowledged creatively. Authentic projection of past possibilities is thus for Heidegger an *anticipating* repetition, an active rather than a passive repetition, that holds fast to a moment of vision. Dasein focuses its past and all the possibilities it contains for personal development in an *Augenblick* that discloses how things should be if *this* Dasein is to be as *this* Dasein ought to be. If such a disclosure is worked with through the rest of Dasein's existence, with possibilities 'repeated' in a creative way, then it will have been 'authentic'.<sup>150</sup>

Repetition shapes the future, shaping how Dasein *will be* and is thus a central part of how Dasein deals with its own temporality. In other words, repetition, as the unfolding of something, offers anticipation of what will and can be, and thus fulfils a very particular temporal function.<sup>151</sup> In this way, it is certainly not empty or passive for Heidegger. It may be that repetition, as understood in the Heideggerian sense, is actually no different to any other repetition, but what Heidegger does is present the possibilities that repetition affords. In being one part of that temporal continuum, repetition has a role to play in making that continuum happen. This is a way of interpreting time that is not so focused on driving towards the future in the same way as the dialectical model Adorno takes from Hegel and maps onto sonata form. In Heidegger's authentic temporality repetition actually enriches Being because no two instances of the same thing are exactly the same – a point readily acknowledged in relation to repetition in music.

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<sup>150</sup> Harper-Scott, *Edward Elgar: Modernist*, p. 36.

<sup>151</sup> This, I think, is what is so pertinent to Schubert. However, the idea of Schubert's repetition having some kind of role in 'retrieving past possibilities' is potentially a compelling one.

Mulhall explains that Heidegger's method of writing about repetition enacts the process described.<sup>152</sup> As Mulhall explains, for Heidegger retracing one's steps brings a greater comprehension of the issue at hand:

For, if all human comprehension is always already inside a hermeneutic circle, motivated by some particular structure of fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conceptions, then one can only make progress in one's philosophical understanding by retracing one's steps within the circle and deepening or modifying one's grasp of the elements of one's fore-structure. But then the second time around the circle (being temporally distinct from its predecessor) is in fact the second turn of the spiral, and hence should not be thought of as a simple retracing of one's steps. After all, such retracings are always the act of a being whose Being is Being-guilty, hence the null basis of a nullity, so no Dasein could ever completely sweep up its earlier, past steps into its own present comprehension. And it is precisely this lack of absolute coincidence between past and present that opens up the possibility of grasping new reaches of significance; absolutely exact recapitulations of past understandings would make progress in human understanding inconceivable.<sup>153</sup>

The way repetition plays out means there is always something to be gained from it. Repetition itself offers insight to the past, and what is learned from repetition helps to shape the future, as Dasein assumes control of what will happen to its own future. The way in which all parts of temporality are suffused with what has already come and what will come means that repetition is shown to be the retrieval of past possibilities; the second time around Mulhall's spiral would mean that more, different possibilities can be found in that process, and that those possibilities have potential ramifications for the future which should not be underestimated. This makes total sense in the context of the ecstases; in authentic temporality, where past, present, and future are not divided absolutely, the consequences of this become apparent. The past possibilities become visible through repetition, which arguably happens in this present, and helps, simultaneously, to shape the future.<sup>154</sup>

This sense that repetition is about retrieving past possibilities for the future is clear in the secondary literature. One such example is Richard Polt's following statement:

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<sup>152</sup> Mulhall, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 179.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p. 179.

<sup>154</sup> A process not unlike this one can be seen in some of Schubert's music perhaps.

Our everyday unawareness of primordial temporality and our tendency to reduce all time to clock time must stem from a certain inauthenticity in everyday temporality itself. The authentic future, past and present consist in anticipation (authentically facing death), repetition (retrieving past possibilities), and the moment of vision (see Chapter 4); their inauthentic, everyday counterparts are awaiting, forgetting (one's own thrownness), and making present (SZ 336-339). Because it is mired in these relatively oblivious modes of temporality, everydayness is insensitive to the genuinely unique; nothing seems to happen for the first or last time.<sup>155</sup>

Overall, repetition plays a fundamental role in the relationship between Dasein, its Being, and temporality. Whereas in the Beethovenian-Hegelian-Adornian model, there is a risk that repetition is interpreted as passive and empty, Heidegger views it as an active process– and to put it in his terms, ‘authentic’. Repetition can be found in both past and future, placing it in the realm of Heidegger’s ‘ecstases’. As part of both past and future, it is by extension part of the present as well – the retrieval of past possibilities means that it helps scope out Dasein’s control of its future, but it necessarily does so in the present. Thus, for Heidegger, repetition is a central part of the way in which Dasein understands its own temporality and thus its Being.

### **3.6 The ‘Authentic Temporality’ of Repetition in D. 804**

Various interpretations of D. 804 have been considered here; each contributes something different. The highly sophisticated mechanisms behind the repetitive processes in D. 804 can now be read through Heidegger’s ideas of authentic temporality and repetition. Heidegger’s suggestion that repetition is an active process, indeed a crucial one, for understanding temporality can thus become a means of theorising the repetition in this work. Adorno, in the context of his Schubert essay, is rather more open to the possibilities repetition offers than elsewhere in his writing, where repetition receives rather shorter shrift. Rather than being troubled by repetition as a potentially empty process, Heidegger gives us a way of understanding it as a necessary component underpinning the very particular approach to temporality found in this work. This is contingent upon the work’s form, namely its cyclicism, and Schubert’s method of constructing that, which is dependent on repetition in a way that differs from the essential linearity of contemporaneous musical processes.

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<sup>155</sup> Richard Polt, ‘Being and Time’ in *Heidegger*, ed. by Davis, pp. 69-81 (p. 73).

My own interpretation of the work is predicated upon it being cyclic. There have been two elements of cyclicism suggested in the analyses above. First, Gingerich's suggestion of the cyclic loops in the first movement, which is in line with Chusid and Rast's analyses of the entire work as cyclic. The claim that this work is cyclic is not unanimously supported (most notably, Taylor discounts the idea). Nonetheless, there are grounds to argue for this view: it is cyclic in that it makes use of similar thematic material across movements in a way that cannot be accounted for adequately in another way. However, there is no return to material from the start at the end of the work; the *Lied*-like introduction does not reappear at the end. This leaves unresolved the question as to where the climax of the work lies: arguably it is not in the sonata-form first movement, but comes later, as Sobaskie suggests.

If one compares the opening of all four movements, for example, there are important points of similarity, but these are demonstrably not mere moments of motivic kinship (see below). Of course, there is motivic kinship here, but it is different to the structural role of the motif in Beethoven as read, for example, by Rudolph Réti. In his analysis of Beethoven's Piano Sonata in F minor, op. 57, Réti argues that 'a giant motivic contour unites the whole work.'<sup>156</sup> He continues 'Indeed, the whole sonata, through its key relationships, *becomes one great expression of its basic motif*.'<sup>157</sup> The sonata is derived from the germ that is that single motif – an idea that is central to Réti's analysis of Beethoven's music.<sup>158</sup> His argument extends across multiple movements of the sonata. On the one hand, Réti's claim for a three-note motif, centred around the fifth scale degree, C, in this F-minor work would seem little different to the claim for Group A of Schubert's thematic recurrences below (see Ex. 3.10). He argues that the C is present (and dominant) at the beginning and end of the work and in the first and second themes.<sup>159</sup> However, there is an important melodic point here about this motif that fundamentally differs from Schubert's. The C implies that it needs to fall to an F in order to achieve a PAC and thus drives onwards. Indeed, according to Réti's argument, when the focus moves up a semitone in the second movement<sup>160</sup> there is then a need for it to return to the C in the third and final

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<sup>156</sup> Rudolph Réti, *The Thematic Process in Music* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p. 223.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 223.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-26 and Rudolph Réti, *Thematic Patterns in Sonatas of Beethoven*, ed. by Deryck Cooke (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), pp. 97-126.

<sup>159</sup> Réti, *The Thematic Process in Music*, p. 223.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225.

movement. It needs to be resolved and in order to reach that resolution, there is a teleological drive forwards. Overall, then, Beethoven's treatment of the motif is teleological, meaning that the temporal process has to move forward.

In the world of Schubert's Quartet, however, the motivic process is different. The absence of teleology means (metaphorically speaking) the themes have no need to travel anywhere, meaning they do something else entirely. The falling triad at the opening of the work does not indicate any need for harmonic movement, nor development. Thus, it can be repeated endlessly with remarkably little change throughout the work. Here, then, is the basis for the series of references and allusions that form the foundation of the cyclic form of this work. To put it succinctly, Beethoven's motifs imply a teleology where Schubert's do not.

The work's cyclicism is formed from a web of references and allusions across the whole piece. In a sense that is also the case in cyclic works such as Mendelssohn's early string quartets, but the mechanism is different here, hence the ambivalence in the literature as to whether this work is cyclic at all. It certainly is not end-oriented in the way Mendelssohn's early quartets are, for example. At a motivic level, contra Beethoven (and Réti's interpretation thereof), Schubert's use of variants of different motifs suffuses the work with a sense of its own past. Rather than a teleological form, the work oscillates harmonically between A minor and A major and avoids a moment of glorious dramatic climax. Instead, even when it looks forward, it looks backwards too. The endless recurrence and repetition render barriers between past, present, and future arbitrary. It is this kind of repetition that Heidegger's authentic temporality understands, requires even, and thus authentic temporality offers a meaningful way of conceiving of such musical processes in a practical sense. There are at least two groups of thematic recurrence in this Quartet (which can also be combined), as seen on the next pages:

**Ex. 3.9. Grouping of thematic recurrences from the String Quartet in A minor, D. 804**

**Group A:**

String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, Violin 1, bb. 3-6



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, Violin 1, bb. 23-26



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, ii, Violin 1, bb. 1-3



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, Violin 1, bb. 7-10



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iv, Violin 1, bb. 1-2



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, Violin 2, bb. 81-83



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iv, bb. 44-49

**Group B:**

String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, i, Violin 2, bb. 1-2




String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, ii, Violin 2, bb. 1-2



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, ii, Viola, bb. 18-20



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, Violin 2, bb. 12-14



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, Violin 1, bb. 84-85



**Group C, combining A and B:**

String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 ii, Viola, bb. 37-39



String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 i, bb. 59-61



Here a variety of references across multiple movements are visible (the list is by no means exhaustive). The import of the falling triad in the melody line at the start of the first movement has already been noted (see Ex. 3.1); its C-major relative is only too clear at the start of the second movement (Ex. 3.4). If one accepts that this falling triad has at least part of its history in D. 677 (see Ex. 3.6), there is a hint of it in the allusion that opens the third movement too. However, in addition to that hint that comes from a multi-layered presence and absence, there is the rising fourth figure in bb. 7-9, which does not seem so very far away from the original version either. Initially, this looks like a case of thematic affinity – in no way unique to Schubert – yet the construction of the work is fundamentally not organicist. At the heart of the work lies a contradictory sense of movement and stasis, which contributes to the way the movement feels suffused with repetition. These variants show instances of looking at the same thing from different perspectives, as indeed Adorno details in a rare moment of acknowledging repetition as an important musical process.

What sets this process apart from an organicist one is the lack of process connecting its musical material.<sup>161</sup> This is not material that is broken down and reconstructed; it remains as it is, recurring in multiple iterations. This material is defined by its repetition rather than development. For Heidegger, repetition is a method of looking forwards and backwards. This can be seen nowhere more clearly than the second subject in the first movement (see above in Ex. 3.10). While thematic affinity builds up through the course of the work, it is amplified through contradictory tonal vagrancy and stasis. The second subject is an example of the way in which Schubert manages to look forward and backwards. The key (C major) hints at what is to come (and where it has come from) – i.e., the second movement and its *Rosamunde* theme. As well as looking forwards though, it also looks backwards, showing – in the clearest manner – repetition as an active process. This is a process defined by the temporal nature of repetition, not development.

All of this is grounded in processes of repetition. The repetition means that forward motion is, in a sense, somewhat lost. Instead, the overriding sense is one

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<sup>161</sup> Here, I am using organicism to refer to a process where one thing grows out of the previous one – and the shape is determined, at least to some extent, by the original. The process is therefore a logical one of development.

of getting lost in the present. However, it is by no means that simple. The cyclicism means that there is an understanding of the continuum of past, present, and future as well – and the allusions to the other works only strengthen that. This rather paradoxical view is perhaps best understood from a sense of what Heidegger has to say about the relationship between repetition and the now: ‘Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives.’<sup>162</sup> Repetition, according to Heidegger, has no capacity to do anything other than be and that being has to happen in the present moment. That is exactly what is happening with Schubert in this work. Repetition, however, as an active process, is more complex than this alone would imply. Although Schubert returns to earlier works, they do not reappear fully. Heidegger, too, makes this point clear:

The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is ‘past’, nor does it bind the ‘Present’ back to that which has already been ‘outstripped’. Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is ‘past’, just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur.<sup>163</sup>

Repetition is thus simultaneously both past and present. It must bind the present to the past; there must be a sense of continuity from past to present in order to identify it *as* repetition. The present alone cannot logically constitute repetition. There must be a sense of past, of memory even, to build a sense of repetition. This is obviously an iteration of a musical identity in the present, but also reflects the past. The balance of which is more important perhaps depends on the individual circumstances. However, D. 677 and D. 797 are, in a certain sense, lost to D. 804, however much they are quoted – and however much they form the locus of the work’s cyclicism.

More importantly, the repetition exhibited within this work can be understood as operating on the temporal continuum of authentic temporality. The unadventurous tonal schema only heightens the sense of embedded recurrence as there is little sense of tonal journey to accompany the thematic and motivic repetition. A harmonic schema like this is reminiscent of song forms, but this is not a *Lied* – it is a quartet (and a relatively lengthy one!). The tonal stasis only

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<sup>162</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 438.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., pp. 437-38.

amplifies the lack of motivic and thematic process; instead the entire work is dominated by repetition. That repetition has an active role in the Quartet's temporality – and should not be misread as passive.

Here then is the central argument: in a sense, all four movements are derived from the arpeggio and the way in which that operates is distinctive to Schubert. The arpeggio is used for several purposes: as way of constituting the work's cyclicism, the root of its allusion to other, pre-existing works, and seemingly even a vehicle to prevent much in the way of harmonic journeying, leading to the rather predictable key schema. Indeed, it is not the surface conflict between A minor and C major that governs this work, but instead the tussle between A minor and A major, which cannot be described as a conflict in the true sense of the word: however, the shifts in the third mark what is happening with that argument. In the landscape of this tonal journey, even the start of the final movement does not seem to have ventured much further; it has not only returned to a version of the tonic (A major), but remains dependent upon the arpeggio as the decoration is stripped back (see above). Here are the foundations of the musical material moving and changing.

It is a more complex picture than just a matter of the opening of four movements; there are other places in which this arpeggio evolves and is a fundamental part of the musical process. In the third movement, for example, there are multiple points where this material would seem to be made manifest: the quote from the song at the start plays with the listener, as too does that fourth. However, thirds make up a substantial part of the melodic material elsewhere in the movement (for example, in bars 21-30), but it is particularly evocative of the start when the third and fourth sit around pitches that are closer to the Quartet's tonic, even if the movement at that point is not tonally stable (see bars 52-55).

**Ex. 3.10. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, bb. 21-29**



**Ex. 3.11. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, bb. 52-55**



The trio of the same movement would seem to combine an inversion of the very opening (which is also like the major version of the second subject in the recapitulation of the first movement) and the dotted rhythm of the Schiller setting, showing the way in which the material is evolving:

**Ex. 3.12. String Quartet in A minor, D. 804, iii, bb. 82-85**



There are clearly other examples, but what this does reveal is that D. 804 has a very small amount of motivic material that gives rise a multi-movement work. It may not give rise to a return to the material from the start at the end, but instead,

awareness of the linked material that is given is arguably heightened throughout the work. As has been seen in the context of various analyses of this work, the impetus in both the first movement and the work as a whole is not to drive forwards, meaning that we instead get lost looking for what Hyland termed a 'telos which is not a telos'. Repetition, especially in the way that Schubert presents it in this work, demands our attention in the here and now. The music would seem to be completely lost in the immanent moment – and the twists and turns that that produces. Thus, allusions are not only to be found in the melody but, as the examples above demonstrate, in the other voices too. The omnipresent quavers too present little change. Their (necessary) dependence on triads – or parts of triads – recall the falling triad of the melody of the Quartet, if not its dactylic construction, meaning that the work is saturated at multiple levels with the same material. By all means, this material changes, but without a developmental trajectory.

Conventional understanding of sonata form does not prioritise the now, but instead, looks to the future as telos: it is predicated on a sense of moving forwards and the way the future is constructed. Schubert's sonata form, however, really dwells in the now through and because of its repetition. Indeed, the whole work could be said to do much the same thing. The sense of future as telos is, in many ways, absent. For example, were one anticipating the grand sense of arrival that comes with the traditional sonata form, one could argue the recapitulation in the first movement might play out entirely differently. Much as Clark and Webster argue that the tonic major and minor can function as equivalents, Schubert's choice to use both weakens the sense of tonal arrival for what is normally a point of clarity in the form. It is only in the coda that Schubert conclusively picks A minor, as the key once more returns to where it started. Instead, repetitions of the falling arpeggio weaken any sense of conclusive arrival. The telos is further weakened by Gingerich's 'cyclic loops', giving the impression that the music keeps returning to where it began, rather than pushing onwards.

In conclusion it can be seen that aspects of Schubert's repetition can be further theorised by using Heidegger's understanding of temporality. Pairing Heidegger's authentic temporality and Schubert's musical processes produces a way of looking at repetition in music that suggests it might be understood as an affirmative, positive and constructive process in the context of form. Allusions to

previous works, cyclicism, and motivic cells all have their place in multiple structural levels of D. 804 and the way in which Heidegger engages with repetition would seem to provide a way of further engaging with that process and, instead of finding it challenging within the context of the expected response to sonata forms, help to explain the lack of future as telos in some of Schubert's music. The multiple loops round the spiral (to use Mulhall's metaphor) in Schubert and Heidegger open up a world of musical and philosophical possibilities that suggests we might understand temporality differently; this is a way of experiencing musical time that makes links between past, present, and future in a manner that plays with the listener's expectations.<sup>164</sup> That in itself should not be unexpected.

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<sup>164</sup> It is worth noting that this work was written at a point when it could be deemed 'late'. For an account of Schubert's late music, see *Schubert's Late Music*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton. For more on Schubert's late music, see Chapter 4, especially 4.5.

## CHAPTER 4: WANDERING AND HOMECOMING

**Fig. 4.1. Caspar David Friedrich, *Winterlandschaft mit Kirche* (1811), oil on canvas, 32.5 x 45cm, The National Gallery, London**

The scene depicted in Caspar David Friedrich's *Winterlandschaft mit Kirche*<sup>1</sup> (1811) includes, amongst other themes, archetypal Romantic wandering. Indeed, one could go as far as to suggest the work shares aspects of its exploration of this theme with the wanderer's journey in Wilhelm Müller and Schubert's *Winterreise*. Friedrich's landscape is dominated by several things: the snow, which stretches as far as the eye can see; the overt Christian symbolism of both the cross and the church, and the vestiges of the wanderer's journey. His exhaustion as he lies against the rock is plain to see, so too is the implication of physical disability, his discarded crutches creating a stark contrast with the snow – a reminder of those words in *Winterreise*'s twenty-first song 'Das Wirthaus': 'bin tödlich schwer verletzt'. This is certainly not the first time the similarities between Schubert and Friedrich have been pointed out, but the representations of winter, wandering,

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<sup>1</sup> Although this painting hangs in the National Gallery, London, there is a second version in the Museum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Dortmund, though there are questions as to its authenticity (cf. Caspar David Friedrich, *Winterlandschaft mit Kirche* (1811), oil on canvas, 33 x 45cm, Museum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte, Dortmund).

and death in these two works merit further comparison,<sup>2</sup> even if it is necessarily brief.

Much as Friedrich's work has obvious similarities to *Winterreise*, it suggests a different ultimate fate for its wanderer. It seemingly lacks, for a start, some of the ambiguity of Schubert's cycle. In an article examining Friedrich, Georg Büchner and Adalbert Stifter, Ian Cooper draws attention to both the red sky and the cold in Friedrich's painting: 'Winter evening is linked to death in a more existentially urgent way than are paradisiacal settings tinged with the thought of "et in arcadia ego", or even than are Eichendorff's subjects in landscape at summer nightfall. And it belongs directly to the framework of the Romantic wanderer motif.'<sup>3</sup> Schubert's cycle, too, begins late in the day. Cooper's analysis of Friedrich's painting suggests a far more redemptive outcome to this journey than even the most positive reading of *Winterreise*. Although Friedrich's work depicts certain death to follow, the red sky, Cooper argues, hints at the dawn to come, suggesting the wanderer's death is followed by everlasting life, as shown by the wanderer's supplication.<sup>4</sup> If (and that is not a certainty) one interprets *Winterreise* as ending with death, there is no hint of such redemption: 'Der Leiermann', for example, is not suggestive of hope so much as utter desolation.<sup>5</sup> However, Cooper suggests 'our historically embedded perspective on the material world to give access to an objective meaning associated with religion yet no longer secured by it'<sup>6</sup> is only obtainable through death, bringing *Winterreise* and Friedrich closer together. A slightly less affirmative reading is suggested by William Vaughan:

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<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in Burnham, 'Thresholds Between, Worlds Apart', Burnham looks at the slow movement of Schubert's String Quintet in C major, D. 956 and compares it to various works by Friedrich. William Kinderman also introduces Friedrich in William Kinderman, 'Wandering Archetypes in Schubert's Instrumental Music', *19th-Century Music*, 21 (1997), 208-22. Ian Bostridge includes discussion of several paintings by Friedrich in his monograph: see Bostridge, *Schubert's Winter Journey*, especially pp. 276-92.

<sup>3</sup> Ian Cooper, "Winterabende": A Romantic and Post-Romantic Motif in Friedrich, Büchner, and Stifter', *Publications of the English Goethe Society*, 86 (2017), 42-54 (pp. 42-43). It is worth noting that Cooper also points out that Heidegger explores the concept of wandering in a twentieth-century context in his interpretation of Georg Trakl's poem 'Ein Winterabend' in 'Die Sprache'. See: *ibid.*, p. 43 and cf. Martin Heidegger, 'Die Sprache', in Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 2001), pp. 11-33.

<sup>4</sup> Cooper, "Winterabende", pp. 43-44. In one sense, then, the wanderer here is one example of Bostridge's claim that 'Friedrich's wanderers do not inhabit their landscapes: they are moving through or moving on'. (See Bostridge, *Schubert's Winter Journey*, p. 280.)

<sup>5</sup> This reading is contra Susan Youens: see below. For further discussion of 'Der Leiermann', see 4.2.

<sup>6</sup> Cooper, "Winterabende", p. 44.



He has collapsed and is praying before a way-side cross, surrounded by evergreens, the symbol of faith. [...] However, the symmetry evoked is more subtle than in his large exhibition pieces, the cross and fir trees being balanced by a church that rises like a vision in the background. While showing the power of faith, it should be pointed out that there is no earthly salvation offered here. Despite the fact that the cripple has thrown his crutches away, there has been no miracle cure. The church too [...] is a vision beyond the horizon, not a graspable reality. The salvation is the realization of the life beyond this earth.<sup>7</sup>

Salvation is nowhere in sight for Schubert's wanderer, who has far bleaker reasons for wanting the comfort of death's oblivion (or as Clive McClelland, likening it to Schubert's own state of mind at the time, frames it: *Todessehnsucht*).<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, the shared goal of the two wanderers is worth noting, as is Friedrich's wanderer's disability and his desire for death, if only because they indicate the work might not be read quite as comfortingly as Cooper suggests. The symbolism of hope in the form of the red sky and the coming dawn in Friedrich's scene is absent from *Winterreise*, but the dark sky surrounding the red is much more reminiscent of its Schubertian counterpart. The light and darkness, then, is put to very different use by Friedrich than when Schubert and Müller use such motifs, such as in 'Die Nebensonnen'. There, the three suns, two of which set during the course of the *Lied*, cause the protagonist nothing but distress, as his final line betrays; he believes he would feel better in the dark, but thanks to the obstinacy of the final sun, that wish too is thwarted.

The end of the painting's journey suggests something else. For Friedrich's wanderer, with promises of redemption – the symbolism of which is littered throughout the painting – there is an aspect of homecoming, or at the very least arrival, at the end. The painting encapsulates what has come before, but what also is yet to come: there is a contraction of past, present, and future held in the image. In the wanderer's discarded crutches there is a sense of the fatigue and the demands of the prior journey. Much of what the viewer sees, however, is future-oriented: the red sky, the church, the crucifix all hint at the implied redemption after the now-inevitable death. However, inherent in that is the wanderer's arrival at a time and space where death and subsequent afterlife are possible. Although it is clear that he has not come home in the physical sense, something about the place he has reached creates a metaphorical sense of arrival denied to Schubert's wanderer.

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<sup>7</sup> William Vaughan, *Caspar David Friedrich* (London: Phaidon Press, 2004), p. 139.

<sup>8</sup> Clive McClelland, 'Durch Nacht und Wind': *Tempesta* as a Topic in Schubert's Lieder', in *Drama in the Music of Franz Schubert*, eds. by Davies and Sobaskie, (pp. 151-70), p. 159.

It would be possible to read the painting altogether less positively; the church is only a ghostly presence obscured by mist in the background. The foreground's most obvious features are the weight and bleakness of the landscape, echoing the wanderer's exhaustion, as he offers his desperate prayers to the crucifix. In this way too, the journey is perhaps closer to that of Schubert's wanderer, except one could argue that while Schubert's wanderer wants death, Friedrich's, near to it though he looks, has not yet reached a point of acceptance. Whether one finds redemption a dominant theme in the work or not, doubtless there is a sense of arrival.

Schubert's wanderer finds a journey's end in other ways: as this chapter will explore, in Schubert's work, wandering takes on various guises and the way 'home' is constructed is varied. Two case studies (the *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760 and *Winterreise*, D. 911) reveal home can mean a variety of things, not necessarily diametrically opposed to wandering. This sits against a backdrop of the complex histories of wandering and homecoming as tropes whether in poetry, music, or painting, not to mention novels of the long nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup> While Schubert's music clearly fits into that broader context, it doubtless challenges certain conventions within it.

A work such as *Winterlandschaft mit Kirche* hints at that broader context, though there are others by Friedrich where the wanderer is arguably given greater prominence<sup>10</sup> but *Winterlandschaft*'s resonances with *Winterreise* are too strong to ignore. As can be seen, not only from those resonances, but also from the multiple divergences in the way the two works approach the 'wanderer' and 'wandering', they are complex concepts with multiple nuances, not least because, as Andrew Cusack cautions in his study, the English and its German cognate have slightly different meanings and implications.<sup>11</sup> 'Homecoming' is no less

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<sup>9</sup> In his study of the wanderer in the German novel in the long nineteenth century, Andrew Cusack posits that the function of the wanderer and wandering in lyric is one for a different study, citing Eichendorff and Müller's *Die Winterreise*: see Andrew Cusack, *The Wanderer in Nineteenth-Century German Literature: Intellectual History and Cultural Criticism* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2008), p. 9, n.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. works such as Caspar David Friedrich, *Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer* (c.1818), oil on canvas, 98.4 x 74.8cm, Kunsthalle, Hamburg and Caspar David Friedrich, *Der Mönch am Meer* (1808-10), oil on canvas, 110 x 171.5cm, Alte Nationalgalerie, Berlin, both of which also feature in Bostridge, *Schubert's Winter Journey*, p. 283 and p. 277 respectively.

<sup>11</sup> Cusack, *The Wanderer in Nineteenth-Century German Literature*, pp. 1-2.

problematic.<sup>12</sup> Friedrich challenges our understandings of wandering and homecoming as they may be seen in Schubert: Friedrich also introduces religious symbolism absent from Schubert's treatment of both ideas, adding a further dimension. However, as will be seen below (in 4.5), this dimension is relevant to reading Schubert's treatment of wandering and homecoming, because these tropes can be interpreted in ways that touch on the notion of liminal spaces – and even transcendence.

## 4.1 Wandering and Homecoming

### 4.1.1 Wandering

Wandering, as found in Friedrich's painting and in German Romanticism more broadly, is outlined by Cusack:

Wandering will be used throughout to denote travel, frequently (but not exclusively) in the sense of a journey undertaken on foot, which may or may not be directed toward a particular goal, but also to nomadism, those forms of existence distinct from the settled life. The wanderers that I have in mind are therefore the itinerant players, peddlers, journeymen, gypsies, and migrants who thronged the roads throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as the artists, scientists, explorers, and students who, from the early phase of Romanticism onward, also identified themselves as wanderers.<sup>13</sup>

Such is the definition of wandering in broader artistic output. In Cusack's terms, wandering is not merely a physical state of being, but also an intellectual one, with the potential to dominate an understanding of the way one operates in the world. In order to construct that state of being, as found in the wanderer's journey in *Winterreise*, Schubert used various musical techniques which overlap with those to be found in his instrumental music. Despite, therefore, the apparent disparity between vocal and instrumental music, wandering sits at a point of intersection between Schubert's instrumental and vocal works.

Traditionally, there are two distinct ways in which the concept of wandering is understood to be manifest in Schubert's music. The romantic trope of the wanderer is central to the narrative (such as it is) in many of Schubert's *Lieder*, such as, obviously, the two Müller cycles, but also in other *Lieder*, not least the *Lied* from which the theme of the second movement of the *Wandererfantasie*, D.

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<sup>12</sup> See in particular Nicholas Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', and the final chapter of Janet Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*. The latter deals more with 'home' than homecoming in connection with Schubert, though as shall be outlined later on, there would seem to be compelling evidence for a discussion of homecoming in connection with Schubert's music.

<sup>13</sup> Cusack, *The Wanderer in Nineteenth-Century German Literature*, p. 2.

760 is derived ('Der Wanderer', D. 493). However, the musical processes in some of Schubert's large-scale instrumental music also lead to the term being applied to them. These two notions of wandering are not as unconnected as they seem, as William Kinderman argues in his suggestion that some of Schubert's instrumental music makes use of wandering processes akin to those to be found in the music of *Winterreise*.<sup>14</sup> To be more specific, some of the musical hallmarks of wandering include the use of tonal vagrancy and unresolved contrasts (both in terms of tonality, but also the construction of inner and outer worlds) which make the path of the music seem less certain, threatening to derail the apparent stability of its forward motion, thus creating an effect of an indirect journey. This chapter's two case studies show how these techniques are used to very different effect, and thus help to interrogate how wandering offers us a mode of understanding this music.

Lack of resolution and tonal vagrancy are especially pertinent for these case studies. This lack of resolution mark Schubert's music out from music that is, to put it in William Kinderman's terms, more 'deterministic'. Kinderman says, 'Schubert's music is less deterministic than Beethoven's and can seem to present no compelling, logical sequence of musical ideas. As the music unfolds, there is often a sense that it could have taken another path.'<sup>15</sup> Schubert presents uncertainty, rather than two poles moving towards synthesis<sup>16</sup> which eventually turns out to be a perfect example of wandering. In other words, often the material produces an inherent instability that leads to the precarious sense that, as Kinderman puts it, the music might have ended up elsewhere. By opening up two opposing poles, but not attempting to bring them together, instead of alternating between the two, there is a sense that the destination of the music remains open. Schubert gives his listener the sense that his music's route is not decided in advance, but rather is worked out as it unfolds.

One of the most poignant examples of the ways in which such alternation helps constitute wandering in *Winterreise*, in both poetry and music, is 'Der Lindenbaum' where the contrasting sections are set side-by-side and no attempt is

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<sup>14</sup> Kinderman, 'Wandering Archetypes in Schubert's Instrumental Music', pp. 210-11.

<sup>15</sup> William Kinderman, 'Franz Schubert's 'New Style' and the Legacy of Beethoven', in *Rethinking Schubert*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 41-60 (p. 41).

<sup>16</sup> See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how this process works in Mahler, and how it is interpreted by Adorno.

made to resolve them. There is little tonal movement in the song, which contrasts with the thematic journey; while the key areas seem merely to fluctuate between tonic major and minor, the thematic material is treated rather differently (shown in the examples below).<sup>17</sup> This contrast destabilises any sense of forward motion, because one continually returns to where one was: wandering. When one ends, it seems arbitrary, as though the process could just have continued indefinitely.

Ultimately, as Julian Rushton notes, the demands of musical form dominate over the poetry, meaning that the sixth stanza has to be repeated.<sup>18</sup> This particular song opens up two temporal realms: an immediate past, and another further back when the protagonist was happier. This is replicated elsewhere in the cycle – and as standard, the major is used for memories of happier times (see 4.2 below for further discussion of this – and indeed, the cycle more generally). Schubert, as ever, places emphasis on backward-looking, rather than forward-looking, music, and what motion there is circuitous, created by a mixture of contrasting thematic material and tonal stasis.

**Ex. 4.1. *Winterreise*, D. 911, ‘Der Lindenbaum’, bb. 8-12**



**Ex. 4.2. *Winterreise*, D. 911, ‘Der Lindenbaum’, bb. 29-32**



<sup>17</sup> Robert Hatten cites ‘Der Lindenbaum’ as an example of pastoral figures in Schubert’s work (see: Robert Hatten, ‘Schubert’s *Pastoral*: The Piano Sonata in G Major, D894’ in *Schubert the Progressive*, ed. by Newbould, pp. 151-68 (p. 154). Meanwhile, Stein and Spillman cite the change of mode as evidence of the wanderer’s changing relationship with the tree: see Deborah Stein and Robert Spillman, *Poetry into Song: Performance and Analysis of Lieder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 118-19.

<sup>18</sup> Julian Rushton, ‘Music and the poetic’, in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Music*, ed. by Jim Samson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 151-77 (p. 160).

There are plenty of contrasts like these elsewhere in Schubert's output. Kinderman turns, for example, to the contrast between a subjective inner world and the outer world in Schubert's earlier *Lieder* by referring to 'Gretchen am Spinnrade', D. 118 and 'Der Erlkönig', D. 328 briefly.<sup>19</sup> Contrasts such as those found here are not unusual in Schubert's *Lieder*, but the drama that Kinderman identifies in 'Der Erlkönig' is found beyond his vocal music: 'Little by little Schubert recognized how strongly contrasting dramatic levels could be assimilated into his instrumental music, a realization undoubtedly helped by his knowledge of Beethoven's greatness.'<sup>20</sup> That drama plays a role in Schubert's instrumental a point also recognized by Brian Black, for example, in his discussion of the Impromptu in C minor, D. 899/1.<sup>21</sup> These particular choices do not indicate wandering in and of themselves, but they show an approach to the musical material that Schubert could subsequently utilise to those ends. Arguably a more obviously dramatic choice in the realm of the *Lied*, it is within instrumental music that such duality (especially when unresolved) becomes such a trademark of Schubertian practice.

Problematic though the Beethoven-Schubert comparison can be (see Chapter 1), Kinderman's interpretation of various works of Beethoven's helps to put Schubert in context. He expands this wider context by invoking Mozart as a more meaningful basis for comparison: 'Beethoven's more directional, forward-driven aesthetic matches well to the ethically-inspired concept of the work of art promoted by the poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller, whom the young Beethoven already admired from his youth in Bonn.'<sup>22</sup> By contrast, Kinderman suggests 'Schubert is less idealistic in his symbolism. The character of his art is closer to Mozart than to Schiller. For all the beauty of its melodic invention, Schubert's tragic perspective has a bleaker effect than that of Beethoven, with a deeper sense of resignation and a more enduring impression of loss.'<sup>23</sup> These two perspectives are shown in a variety of ways; Kinderman suggests the second (and final) movement of the Piano Sonata in C minor, Op. 111 'presents a

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<sup>19</sup> Kinderman, 'Franz Schubert's 'New Style' and the Legacy of Beethoven', p. 43.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>21</sup> Black, 'Lyricism and the Dramatic Unity of Schubert's Instrumental Music: The Impromptu in C Minor, D. 899/1'. For further discussion of Black's chapter, see Chapter 2 in particular. For further discussion of drama in Schubert's music, *Drama in the Music of Franz Schubert*, eds. by Davies and Sobaskie looks at the idea from a multitude of perspectives and in relation to different parts of Schubert's output.

<sup>22</sup> Kinderman, 'Franz Schubert's 'New Style' and the Legacy of Beethoven', p. 42

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

transcendental sequence, a synthesis of Becoming and Being.<sup>24</sup> Of passages such as this, and the climax of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, he suggests: 'the music reaches its most extreme limit and points further – as a signpost points to infinity.'<sup>25</sup> However the journey goes, Beethoven, at least in Kinderman's view, pushes onwards. Schubert's music, by contrast, does not do that, by avoiding a focus on becoming. Here, then, the purpose of such alternation becomes clearer: the temporal outcome is one of a sense of stasis, leading to a preoccupation with the present and past.

Such temporal purpose helps to construct such a sense of wandering. In the preface to his monograph on *Winterreise*, Lauri Suurpää suggests 'In the poems the desire for death is often contrasted with lost love, the starting point of the wanderer's desolate winter journey.'<sup>26</sup> According to Suurpää, both of these can be brought together under another major heading within early German Romantic literature: *Sehnsucht*.<sup>27</sup> This *Sehnsucht* suggests a similar technique, which deals with the plenitude of remembered love before the moment of loss – and the ultimate negativity of death. According to Susan Youens, however, Müller's wanderer is not motivated by *Sehnsucht* 'but for other, darker reasons: *Wanderlust* ("delight in wandering," or the compulsion to travel) undergoes a sea change in the hands of the latecomer Müller.'<sup>28</sup> This is instead 'a journey undertaken in sorrow', something that Youens likens to Friedrich.<sup>29</sup> This dissonance is an interesting one: both *Sehnsucht* and *Wanderlust* lie at the heart of German Romanticism. Another reading is Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen's: that the cycle (like *Schwanengesang*, D. 957) is indicative of Schubert's '*Weltschmerz*'.<sup>30</sup> Neither lead to a resolution – and given that the cycle ends without resolution, in terms of emotion, narrative and music, there would seem to be good reason for accepting either. Which is dominant perhaps comes down to one's interpretation of the end of the cycle, for Suurpää and Youens read the wanderer's fate differently (see 4.2). Forward motion is thwarted musically, leading to a sense of wandering and

<sup>24</sup> Kinderman, 'Franz Schubert's 'New Style' and the Legacy of Beethoven', p. 42.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>26</sup> Lauri Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise: Musico-Poetic Associations in Schubert's Song Cycle* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2014), p. ix.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. ix. It is interesting that Suurpää does not make the same link as McClelland given his emphasis on death – and move from *Sehnsucht* to *Todessehnsucht* (cf. McClelland, 'Durch Nacht und Wind': *Tempesta* as a Topic in Schubert's Lieder', p. 159.)

<sup>28</sup> Susan Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey: Schubert's Winterreise* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 17.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>30</sup> Hinrichsen, *Franz Schubert*, p. 104.

heightening the sense of longing here – thus linking the two. Indeed, the longing to be back (in the now-lost) home and recover the lost love alongside the compulsion to wander form a duality of their own. Moreover, Müller’s words make that longing explicit. There are two objects of longing: the beloved and death, as Suurpää reminds us, and that brings us to the nature of homecoming in the cycle, which is arguably only found if one accepts that the ultimate outcome of the cycle is the wanderer’s death. However, what Suurpää goes on to say is the crux of the issue in the context of Kinderman’s dualities:

But to understand the overall unfolding of *Winterreise*, it is important to keep in mind that the wanderer longs for objects, not just one: the beloved in the cycle’s first part, and death in the second. That neither yearning can be satisfied makes the cycle all the more tragic. The longing for unobtainable love and death is directly related, at a more general level, to a theme that pervades the entire cycle of *Winterreise*: the juxtaposition of illusion and reality. The juxtaposition affects the course of the cycle in numerous ways, so the examination of death (and its relation to lost love) provides a chance to discuss one facet of this broader theme.<sup>31</sup>

Here dissonance is constituted temporally: the longing for the beloved is a desire to reconstruct or recover the past, whereas the longing for death is a longing to resolve the present through an event in the future. This dissonance is predicated upon the cycle’s apparent shunning of homecoming. The wanderer is potentially only at home at the start of his terrifying, traumatic, endless journey; but homecoming eludes him, at least in life. He only attains, like Friedrich’s wanderer, a sense of homecoming through his own death. This is where I part company with both Suurpää’s and Youen’s respective readings of the cycle, because of the nature of his death (see below).

Tonal vagrancy, not limited to the formation of dualities, often perpetuates a sense that this music is directionless. Rather, there are many examples where a lack of tonal motion pervades extended sections of music. This has two major consequences for the listener: first, that the music takes quite unexpected turns; and second, the return to the tonic, when it comes, can appear to construe the tonic as alien and quite distant to the ‘home’ key needed for a sense of homecoming. This is as much relevant to the two case studies here as it is to the return to the tonic in the Piano Sonata in B $\flat$ -major (see Chapter 2), as will be seen below. In the first case study here, the closing key is unconvincing, and in

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<sup>31</sup> Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, p. ix.



the second, the starting key is imposed as a 'home' key in order to close, making the journey's end a sham homecoming. While *Winterreise*'s home key does not sound like home and therefore effects no conclusive ending, the *Wandererfantasie* has the opposite problem: in order to obliterate the tonal area of the variations, the closing C major is so overwhelming it effectively alienates itself.

Kinderman summarises the pervasiveness of wanderers and wandering in Schubert's music, explaining the prominence of this trope initially in the *Lieder* and then its subsequent effect in his instrumental music. The major-minor relationships outlined in the following apply as much to the A-minor String Quartet (see Chapter 3) as the *Wandererfantasie* (see 4.3 below) and *Winterreise*:

A key to this symbolism lies in Schubert's songs, in which the protagonist or wanderer figure in the role of a lyrical subject is often confronted with an indifferent or comfortless reality. As a means of realizing this experiential dichotomy in music, Schubert employs a confrontation of contrasting themes with a concurrent change of major to minor and the resource of abrupt modulation. An inner world of imagination, memory or illusion is conveyed through lyrical thematic material in the major tonality; this idiom is set against more dramatic, restless, dissonant music in the minor tonality, which expresses a gloomier external reality. After 1820 analogous artistic devices appear in Schubert's instrumental music, which essentially contribute to a development of his style, culminating in the three profound posthumous Piano Sonatas in C minor, A major and B $\flat$  major.<sup>32</sup>

In song, the musical and semantic can coalesce, but this wandering comes across just as strongly in the purely musical constructions of the instrumental music. In the second movement of the Piano Sonata in C minor, D. 958, for example, the modulations are particularly startling. Charles Fisk discusses the resonances between 'Der Wegweiser' and 'Das Wirtshaus' and Schubert's treatment of tonality in the second movement of D. 958.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the progression that is so often repeated in the early part of the movement means that, according to Fisk, 'D $\flat$ , whether major or minor, intrudes into the music and makes it lose its way for a moment; it can continue only in an uncertain fashion.'<sup>34</sup> It is this kind of progression that imbues the music with a sense of wandering – by making the tonic seem alien, and making it feel as though it metaphorically loses its footing. Fisk interprets the form of the movement as ABA'B'A",<sup>35</sup> suggesting that the tonal schema is suggestive of the following pattern: 'home-exile-return home-

<sup>32</sup> Kinderman, 'Franz Schubert's 'New Style' and the Legacy of Beethoven', p. 41.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Charles Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, pp. 38-49.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49

<sup>35</sup> Charles Fisk, 'Schubert Recollects Himself: The Piano Sonata in C Minor, D. 958', *The Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 635-54 (p. 645).

return to exile-final transfigured homecoming.<sup>36</sup> The movement opens in A $\flat$ , but soon moves to the subdominant, before moving to D $\flat$  minor for the first B section, but this is obscured somewhat by Schubert moving initially simply to the D $\flat$  region, rather than making it clear whether it is major or minor tonality. Only later is this to become clear.<sup>37</sup> Here then, is an example of tonal vagrancy. Fisk's claim of transfigured home is, in this context, a telling one. There are multiple methods of return, but an affirmative return to the tonic to represent homecoming, this certainly is not.

In 'Täuschung', a sense of forward motion is constructed rhythmically through the relentless repetition, but tonally, the song goes nowhere; every attempt to modulate is thwarted and the music resolutely returns to A and, except for a brief turn to A minor, always A major. This combination of apparent forward motion and tonal stasis is an example of another mechanism through which wandering is constructed, because at one level the music would seem to move, but in reality it goes precisely nowhere. This paradox leaves it with a sense of movement but a lack of direction. The example below shows an example of this; although there is an attempted turn to E major, it is unsuccessful. The table shows a formal diagram marked with turns to other keys, thwarted by returns to A major or A minor.

**Ex. 4.3. *Winterreise*, D. 911, 'Täuschung', bb. 6-13**

The musical score for Schubert's 'Winterreise', D. 911, 'Täuschung', measures 6-13, is presented in A major (two sharps) and 6/8 time. The vocal line (treble clef) and piano accompaniment (grand staff) are shown. The lyrics are: 'Ein Licht tanzt freundlich vor mir her ich folg ihm nach die Kreuz und Quer'. The piano part features a 'simile' marking in measure 8, indicating a repeated rhythmic pattern. The key signature remains A major throughout the excerpt.

<sup>36</sup> Fisk, 'Schubert Recollects Himself', p. 647.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 641.

Such is the poem's fixation with its tonic (Youens describes it 'monomaniacally rooted' – and suggests that it is a 'foreshadowing of the greater harmonic fixity of "Der Leiermann"'<sup>38</sup>) that tonal analysis seems somewhat redundant. However, an outline of the structure follows, showing Müller's poem and Schubert's corresponding setting. While most of it is unremarkable, the misery, 'elend', sparks a musical break away from simply setting each line:

**Fig. 4.2. Formal outline of 'Täuschung'**

Ein Licht tanzt freundlich vor mir her;	<b>A</b>
ich folg ihm nach die Kreuz und Quer.	<b>B</b>
Ich folg ihm gern und seh's ihm an,	<b>A</b>
daß es verlockt den Wandersmann.	<b>B'</b>
Ach, wer wie ich so elend ist,	<b>C</b>
gibt gern sich hinder bunten List,	<b>D</b>
die hinter Eis und Nacht und Graus	<b>E</b> —
ihm weist ein helles, warmes Haus	—
und eine liebe Seele drin	<b>B</b>
nur Täuschung ist für mich Gewinn.	<b>B''</b>

As Walther Dürr writes, the music and poetry meet here, and it is this which leads to the heightening of effect in the seventh and eighth lines of Müller's poem. By changing the rhythm so dramatically, Schubert emphasises the torment of his wanderer:

He is also, working on parallel lines to the poet, creating new structures. These therefore do not merely repeat the poetic structures, thereby rendering them dispensable, but take their place beside them. The co-existence of musical and poetic structures – whether merely formal or detailed by the content – and their partial incongruity or congruity, lead to a new perspective, to a stratification in depth, and at the same time to an openness of form which is certainly a characteristic feature of the Romantic art-song.<sup>39</sup>

This technique is not one Schubert uses in his vocal music alone. Such tonal stasis is indicative of a type of wandering. Although it is clearly repetitive in the sense discussed in Chapter 3, it is also part of a musical process that avoids, almost at all costs, any sense of teleology, thus leading to a journey suspended in the alternation of different forms of the tonic (although in this context, mainly the major mode). Moreover, the indirect journey constructed by a work like the Piano Sonata movement discussed above, or the lack of journey in 'Täuschung',

<sup>38</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, p. 270.

<sup>39</sup> Walther Dürr, 'Schubert's songs and their poetry: reflections on poetic aspects of song composition', in *Schubert Studies: Problems of style and chronology*, eds. by Eva Badura-Skoda and Peter Branscombe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 1-24 (p. 2).

cannot lead to a triumphant return to a clear 'homecoming'. In 'Täuschung', one is harmonically suspended 'at home', but for all its familiarity, it becomes alien, in a pattern all too familiar to Schubert.

As a trope, wandering is one way of capturing the lack of certainty in the path from start to finish in Schubert's music. It is relatively simple to point to the opening bars of 'Gute Nacht' and suggest that the chords in the piano part are indicative of the wanderer's footsteps (it is, indeed, a motif echoed across the cycle), showing that Müller and Schubert's cycle is firmly situated within that trope at a multitude of levels. However, behind applications of wandering lie musical processes found in Schubert's instrumental music as well as his *Lieder* and it is these which lead to a realignment of our perception of time in this music.

#### 4.1.2 Homecoming

Nicholas Marston starts his discussion of homecoming in Schubert by noting the role the tonic plays as home.<sup>40</sup> Ostensibly, Schubert's music, as is the expectation for nineteenth-century music, culminates in a return to the home key. In some of his works, however, that very return to the tonic feels problematic, as the tonic is made to feel in some way strange. Marston's statement is in line with Janet Schmalfeldt's about music returning to its 'home key',<sup>41</sup> and Marston makes a point about the pivotal role of the privacy of home in Metternich's Vienna,<sup>42</sup> which should not be underestimated in Schubert's music. For Marston, 'home' is primarily tonal and he goes on to link 'heimlich' with its opposite: 'unheimlich', which will become a fundamental part of his interpretation of Schubert's retransition in D. 960.<sup>43</sup>

In her chapter on homecoming, Schmalfeldt concentrates predominantly on Clara and Robert Schumann.<sup>44</sup> However, she notes the role that 'home' would have played in the oppressive Metternich regime, in line with her earlier argument about Schubert's music turning 'inward'.<sup>45</sup> Schmalfeldt touches briefly

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<sup>40</sup> Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', p. 248.

<sup>41</sup> Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, p. 227.

<sup>42</sup> Marston, 'Schubert's Homecoming', p. 248.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 249. For further discussion of this Piano Sonata, see Chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, pp. 227-57.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 228-29. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of Metternich's Vienna – or even the impact that it undoubtedly had on Schubert, though as one example, Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen notes that in this context *Winterreise* would have had a political dimension. (See Hinrichsen, *Franz Schubert*, p. 104. However, for further discussion of this see *Schubert's Vienna*, ed. by Raymond

on the precarious nature of Schubert's own domestic situation and observes that he would have called none of his lodgings 'home'<sup>46</sup> but the Romantic mindset was, after all, not to feel at home anywhere. The point that Schmalfeldt does not make here is that 'Der Wanderer', D. 489 gives the variation movement of *Die Wandererfantasie* its theme. Noting, moreover, the contrast between the type of journey to be found in Ludwig Uhland's *Wanderlieder* poems and the Wilhelm Müller cycles, Schmalfeldt locates a crucial issue for Schubert and the idea of homecoming: 'through the act of coming home, Uhland's wanderer achieves resolution and attains a higher level of appreciation for the loved one he had left behind.'<sup>47</sup> In a cycle where the final poem is entitled 'Heimkehr', that kind of homecoming enables closure and synthesis in a way that seems broadly akin to the ideal of the sonata form.

In the two Müller song cycles, homecoming, such as it is, is posited poetically through the ultimate and terminal end of death. In *Die schöne Müllerin*, the definitive nature of death is, to some extent, masked by irony; the protagonist's fate is clear in the poem, but in this context the music is jarring, the final song coming from a different perspective – that of the brook as it sings a lullaby to the now-dead miller. However, *Winterreise*, is a different kind of end. If the ultimate fate of the wanderer is death, then that death is all that is offered in the form of homecoming (in as much as it is present, rather than merely postponed). However, these are poetically and musically, very different deaths. The E-major fullness of the *Wiegenlied* at the end of *Die schöne Müllerin* blurs death with sleep so that the poem and music are ironically juxtaposed.

In some ways, despite appearances to the contrary, *Winterreise* has a less ambiguous ending. The utter emptiness of Müller's 'Der Leiermann' is echoed in Schubert's music. 'Der Leiermann' is sparsely set, echoing the hurdy-gurdy of the title, and fails even to summon a full PAC at the end of the song – and thus the

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Erickson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), especially Raymond Erickson, 'Vienna in Its European Context', pp. 3-35 and Waltraud Heindl, 'People, Class Structure, and Society', pp. 36-54 and Leon Botstein, 'Realism transformed: Schubert and Vienna', in *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. by Gibbs, pp. 13-35. It is also worth noting that in his discussion of Friedrich, Ian Bostridge states that one should not 'deprive Schubert's or Friedrich's wanderers of their aesthetic autonomy'. (See Bostridge, *Schubert's Winter Journey*, pp. 287.) However, he goes on 'The desire to be alone or to retreat into oneself can have personal, psychological dimensions; pursued systematically in art or philosophy, it inevitably has roots in social and political realities.' (Ibid., p. 288.)

<sup>46</sup> Schmalfeldt, *In the Process of Becoming*, p. 229.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

cycle. In this way it denies any sense of homecoming poetically and struggles to constitute a meaningful tonal homecoming. Indeed, the music offers only empty and frozen repetition, rather than homecoming. Even if death is the ultimate fate of the wanderer, it is deferred, so that its comfort is not forthcoming, creating an inherent tension in the cycle's ending. The wanderer is far from the place he left in 'Gute Nacht', reflected by the contrasting scoring of 'Der Leiermann'. Not only is the music scored differently, but there has been a move from D minor to A minor. This is crucial, because it too underscores that there is no return in the sense that Marston talks about: the home key does not return – instead, the wanderer remains suspended in the world of this dominant indefinitely, captured in the past of D minor, but also a future that offers no resolution. As Charles Rosen notes 'It was Schubert's genius to find a way to represent both past and present with the same motif.'<sup>48</sup> This relationship between D and A is made more complicated still by (unresolved) tonal events earlier in the cycle, as discussed below.

Set against that apparent lack of possibility for closure (and with it, absence of homecoming), facets of the cycle nonetheless suggest that Schubert is working musically to construct a sense of arrival, albeit one in an alien place. This, it is suggested, at least figuratively, is the wanderer's future and thus, by the end of the cycle, the only possibility open to the protagonist. By restricting the amount of thematic and motivic material so strongly, Schubert makes any capacity for onward motion extremely limited; but equally any sense of overt arrival is equally limited. This very breakdown of motion in a form that should portray some kind of journey makes arrival (of any kind) intrinsically problematic. Instead, as Lorraine Byrne Bodley argues, in 'Der Leiermann' there is 'overpowering solitude; the music belongs to an exilic realm'.<sup>49</sup>

Homecoming, then, is made up of a variety of musical traits: most particularly, return from tonal vagrancy, and how Schubert treats poetic narrative. Despite the apparent demands of the return to the tonic, the musical processes erode the possibility of effective or convincing closure – and in doing so throws the notion of homecoming into a different kind of space, seen in the varied ways a return to

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<sup>48</sup> Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, p. 123.

<sup>49</sup> Lorraine Byrne Bodley, 'A Place at the Edge: Reflections on Schubert's Late Style', *Oxford German Studies*, 44 (2015), 18-29 (p. 28).

the 'home' is constructed in the various case studies examined in this thesis. Indeed, this is equally applicable to the sham imposition of the constructed home of the *Wandererfantasie* (see below), the empty absence of return in *Winterreise*, or the ending of the Quartet, which slides to the major mode. To a greater or lesser degree, all of these works challenge tonal return as affirmation. In doing so, Schubert's music stands in direct opposition to the expectations of the music of his era.

#### 4.2 The Archetypal Nineteenth-Century Wanderer: *Die Winterreise*

It has already been established that the wandering trope permeates *Winterreise* in several ways. The image of the wanderer in *Winterreise* journeying across the frozen landscape is one of the most iconic in Schubert's output. However, wandering is just as strong a force in the construction of the music. The cycle pairs musical cohesion with a lack of narrative closure – the wanderer's fate remains ambiguous – contributing to the sense of wandering which predominates in the cycle. The protagonist makes his non-teleological, wandering journey, accompanied by music mirroring that wandering thematically and tonally. Yet for all that, the music remains, at times, remarkably cohesive, heightening the cycle's sense of integration. By contrast, homecoming is conspicuous only by its absence, arguably not found even in death, which is endlessly deferred – unlike in the other Schubert-Müller cycle *Die schöne Müllerin*. Focusing here on *Winterreise* enables discussion of some of its particularities that both challenge and reinforce the tropes at hand.

As is well-documented elsewhere, the genesis of the cycle is complex.<sup>50</sup> Müller originally published a set of twelve poems, set by Schubert early in 1827. Subsequently, Müller published an extended set of poems, leading Schubert to increase the size of the cycle. However, whilst Müller changed the order of some of the first twelve to better meet his aims for the complete cycle of poems, Schubert's musical setting does not follow the poet's example, and instead keeps the original order of the first twelve songs broadly intact, leading to a divergence in the order of Müller's and Schubert's respective *Winterreisen*.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> See Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, pp. 3-49 for a particularly comprehensive exploration of the sources. See also Richard Kramer, *Distant Cycles: Schubert and the Conceiving of Song* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 151-53 and Lauri Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, pp. 3-6.

<sup>51</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, p. 22.

The wandering suffusing the cycle thus has its roots in both Müller's and Schubert's contributions. Though not immune to the power of the poetic collection, Schubert nevertheless played with its ordering. Although this is a small detail, it is an important one, especially in connection with 'Einsamkeit' and Schubert's subsequent decisions about key structure. The narrative use of wandering in Müller's case is abundantly clear and is fully exploited by Schubert, but other aspects of the trope emerge through the music. One obvious example is through the use of tonality, as in 'Frühlingstraum'. As the poem plots a path through various points in time of dreams and memories, the music journeys through A major and A minor alternately, rocking backwards and forwards. Despite this lack of tonal adventure, different thematic sets of material give the impression of journeying further than simply through the tonic major and minor. Indeed, Youens goes as far as to describe the song in the following terms:

The vision of earthly paradise conjured up by the imagination exists only to be destroyed by a battering ram compounded of dissonance, tonal instability, and the darkness of minor. The disjunctions are not and cannot be resolved into a unity that will fully embrace and then dissolve the contrasts. Synthesis is not possible, and therefore the ending of 'Frühlingstraum' has a particular dreary melancholy that comes from an awareness of an ideal but illusory world vanished beyond recall.<sup>52</sup>

The sense of movement, as Youens makes clear, is a temporal one, but one that is focused on a world recalled, but now lost. The present is the minor – as is the case in *Winterreise* more generally – whereas the recollections of lost happiness are portrayed in a blissful major. The lack of synthesis is telling: for the wanderer there is no possibility of marrying the two temporal experiences, and Schubert makes that clear in his musical portrayal, which in 'Frühlingstraum' he keeps very separate, not just in terms of the major and minor but also through thematic material. It is different in a song like 'Gute Nacht', where the final stanza is simply transposed into the major. This duality constructs a sense of alienation, so that when D minor returns at the end of 'Gute Nacht' it feels strange, as though it comes from distinctly further away. Part of what makes 'Frühlingstraum' so poignant, as Youens notes, is the lack of possibility for these temporal and emotional realms (as constructed musically) to be reconciled.

The nature of this wandering, though, is hard to untangle: Suurpää and Youens, for example, disagree as to whether *Sehnsucht* or *Wanderlust* motivate the

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<sup>52</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, p. 215.



wanderer's arduous (and potentially deadly) journey. Youens argues that the *Wanderlust* behind the journey (in Müller's poetry) is much darker than normal: 'In his use of a familiar subject – a journey undertaken in sorrow, Müller's accomplishment is akin to Caspar David Friedrich, who painted the moonlit graveyards and hermit-inhabited ruins popular in his day but did so to unique and haunting effect.'<sup>53</sup> Once again, one is reminded just how closely connected some of these tropes are, and how they operate across different art forms. Rather than Cooper's redemptive reading of Friedrich referenced above, Youens draws on Friedrich's work precisely because of its haunted nature. This seems ironic, especially given her relatively uplifting reading of the end of *Winterreise*.

One of the things that is particularly striking about *Winterreise* as a cycle is the simultaneous cohesion, yet lack of succession within the cycle. As Youens remarks, 'The vexed question whenever one considers the Romantic cycle is the means of unification. What justifies performing a group of songs as a centipede-like multipartite work, the parts of which belong to a larger whole and only thereby attain their fullest coherence, even given the common practice of extracting individual songs for performance?'<sup>54</sup> One of the reasons that Müller's and Schubert's cycles can have such different chronologies is precisely for that reason. Kinderman draws attention to Peter Gülke's<sup>55</sup> argument that while *Die schöne Müllerin* 'is rooted in concrete poetic images', these 'are largely withdrawn in the *Winterreise*.'<sup>56</sup> This gives *Winterreise* a sense of being a series of episodic snapshots, depicting the wanderer's interaction with concepts or things. As such, progress in the journey is denied him – indeed, as much as his journey through time continues, he disintegrates. Indeed, one could posit the cycle is episodic to the degree that these snapshots could come in any order because there is little narrative imperative for one order over another. Adorno explains this further:

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<sup>53</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, p. 17.

<sup>54</sup> Susan Youens, *Schubert, Müller, and Die schöne Müllerin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 109.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Peter Gülke, *Franz Schubert und seine Zeit* (Laaber: Laaber, 1991), pp. 236-37.

<sup>56</sup> Kinderman, 'Wandering Archetypes in Schubert's Instrumental Music', p. 209.

The ex-centric construction of that landscape, in which every point is equally close to the center, reveals itself to the wanderer walking round it with no actual progress: all development is antimatter, the first step as close to death as the last, and the scattered features of the landscape are scanned in rotation by the wanderer, who cannot let go of them. Schubert's themes wander just like the miller does, or he whose beloved abandoned him to the winter. Those themes know of no history, but only shifts in perspective: the only way they change is through a change of light...<sup>57</sup>

*Winterreise*'s lack of progress is striking; the musical material (such as the motif of the wanderer's footsteps) disintegrates in parallel with the protagonist himself, which intersects with Adorno's claim that 'development is antimatter.'<sup>58</sup> It is perhaps useful to think of this claim in light of the use of the term 'liquidation' in Adorno's later work: any attempt at development here in fact only impedes progress further. When he suggests that the 'features of the landscape are scanned in rotation by the wanderer', it sums up the futility of the wanderer's journey, but it also brings together Kinderman's and Gülke's points about the difference in imagery used between *Die schöne Müllerin* and *Winterreise*. Above all, *Winterreise* shows its protagonist disintegrate in a multitude of ways – and the lack of arrival contributes to that. For example, in 'Im Dorfe', the introduction is comprised merely of repetitions of this cell, but when the voice joins it, the paradox between the continuous vocal line only seems to make the contrast between continuity and the lack of it even stronger:

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<sup>57</sup> Adorno, 'Schubert (1928)', p.10.

<sup>58</sup> For Anne Hyland, this is evidence that 'Adorno "hears" Schubert spatially', but in this context, it is surely about the primacy of the episodic: see Anne Hyland, 'In Search of Liberated Time, or Schubert's String Quartet in G Major, D. 887: Once More Between Sonata and Variation', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 38 (2016), 85-108 (p. 86).

**Ex. 4.4. *Winterreise*, ‘Im Dorfe’, bb. 1-10**

Es bel - len die

Hun - - de, es ras - seln die Ket - - ten, es schla - fen die

Men - - schen in ih - ren Bet - - ten

The protagonist speaks of a scene where there is a contrast between outside and inside, but to which he too is an outsider. Only in the final verse does he manage to reconcile the external reality with his inner turmoil, and in the third line of that verse, he finally gives voice to his feelings to the same setting in an incredibly poignant moment: ‘Ich bin zu Ende mit allen Träumen’, which is tellingly repeated with a different setting. All of this is emotionally heightened because of the way in which the song is constructed through paradoxes of lengthier vocal lines and smaller piano motifs (see example above), articulating his disintegration, echoing his state of mind, and setting him apart from the village he describes, though, Youens suggests, it is actually the villagers’ state he desires.<sup>59</sup> Youens reads the main motif in the piano as ‘Schubert’s principal metaphor for dreams as useless figments of the imagination’, over which the wanderer’s phrases create a conflict.<sup>60</sup> Here it is the conflict which provides the poignancy, showing how his dreams and reality cannot be reconciled, reflected in the absence of synthesis in the music.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Youens, *Retracing A Winter’s Journey*, p. 258.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257.

In another conflict between the internal and external worlds, Clive McClelland emphasizes the role of the trope of the storm in the cycle and its multiple recurrences, citing as examples 'Die Wetterfahne', 'Der Lindenbaum', 'Rückblick', 'Rast', 'Frühlingstraum', 'Einsamkeit', 'Der stürmische Morgen' and 'Mut'.<sup>61</sup> With this he stresses that, as one instance of this, in 'Der stürmische Morgen' the weather certainly echoes the wanderer's state of mind, 'if not deteriorating mental stability'.<sup>62</sup>

In his discussion of *Winterreise*, Charles Rosen asserts that 'The Schubert song cycle embodies a paradox: each song is a completely independent form, well rounded and finished, which nevertheless makes imperfect sense on its own.'<sup>63</sup> He follows on: 'The reduction of narrative almost to zero brings a greater lyric intensity to *Winterreise* than to *Die Schöne* [sic] *Müllerin*.'<sup>64</sup> The poetry also invites a lack of progression compared to the cycle's counterparts. Lauri Suurpää notes that there are a number of commentators, Rosen included, who argue that there is little narrative in the cycle.<sup>65</sup> Rosen himself suggests the cycle is instead 'unsurpassed in the art of musical representation.'<sup>66</sup> Suurpää, however, stresses the cycle 'does have a kind of plot, albeit a vague one. This narrative consists only partly of actual events. The main unifying features occur in the protagonist's inner world.'<sup>67</sup>

While Rosen is right that each song is well-rounded, he also makes the point that those performed alone are less effective for it: on 'Der Leiermann' he is yet more emphatic and states 'its repetitive monotony would seem absurd, unmotivated.'<sup>68</sup> There are therefore perhaps two aspects to the apparent lack of progression in the cycle: firstly the narrative, and then there is something more particular about the music. The way Schubert sets the music to accompany the (lack of) narrative means that there is a particular sense that progress is stalled in the cycle, especially over the last few songs.

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<sup>61</sup> McClelland, 'Durch Nacht und Wind': *Tempesta* as a Topic in Schubert's Lieder', p. 162.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 163.

<sup>63</sup> Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, p. 196.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>65</sup> Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, p. 7.

<sup>66</sup> Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, p. 201.

<sup>67</sup> Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> Rosen, *The Romantic Generation*, pp. 195-96.

Although the lack of succession in *Winterreise* is a striking feature, so too, at times, is its musical cohesion. These two features create a remarkable contrast, as they did in the A-minor String Quartet which formed the basis of the previous chapter. One way this can be demonstrated are the motivic connections between songs. The relationship between 'Gute Nacht', 'Einsamkeit', and 'Der Wegweiser', for example, is very clear, where the wanderer's footsteps are manifest as an opening motif. All of these songs deal in some way with the wanderer's journey. It is telling that the motif is also present, in a slightly altered way, in 'Rast', where he is completely stationary, offering a paradoxical take on the same motif. Here the depth of this cohesion, which is presented (paradoxically) through repetition, starts to become clear. The motif is used for seemingly contradictory purposes, unifying aspects of the cycle, bringing the songs together musically, even though poetically they address both movement and the lack thereof. This dissonance in how the motif is used only strengthens its musical power. That repetition, especially in the form of disintegration rather than development, creates this cohesion is reflective of the cycle's subject matter, but also Schubert's approach to his motivic material more broadly. Other relationships can be mapped between songs across the cycle, of course, and that is, in many ways not remarkable for a song cycle, except that the depth of these relationships is particularly acute. What is remarkable is the backdrop of the disconnect against which they are set: this is not in the context of a cycle like *An die ferne Geliebte* or other similar early cycles, where the quest for coherence was paramount.<sup>69</sup>

As the wanderer disintegrates, Schubert's music simultaneously mirrors and contradicts that process. For example, if one looks at the way in which the wanderer's trudging footsteps become sparser as the cycle progresses, one can argue that that process is clearly reflected across both words and music. However, the musical cohesion of the cycle, a natural part of a song cycle, would seem in some ways to work against that progression. To look at one of the songs that most clearly deals with that motif, 'Einsamkeit' is the twelfth song in

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<sup>69</sup> Laura Tunbridge, *The Song Cycle*, p. 4. Kristina Muxfeldt makes clear the differences in historical context between *An die ferne Geliebte* and the Schubert-Müller cycles: cf. Kristina Muxfeldt, 'Schubert's songs: the transformation of a genre', in *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. by Gibbs, pp. 119-37 (pp. 121-22). Walther Dürr also writes about the progression of the nineteenth-century *Lied*: Walther Dürr, *Das deutsche Sololied im 19. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zu Sprache und Musik* (Wilhelmshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1984).

Schubert's cycle, although it is the twenty-second in Müller's expanded version.<sup>70</sup> A through-composed setting of a three-stanza poem, Schubert chooses to repeat the third verse. The song focuses on the juxtaposition between the light of the outside world and the darkness of the protagonist's existence, ending with the proposition from the wanderer that he would not be so miserable if only the weather were worse and more in keeping with his mood. Arnold Feil argues 'In this new awareness, the traveler of our songs achieves simultaneously an unparalleled musical reality and the reality of his mortality.'<sup>71</sup> Crucial to this awareness is a self-consciousness that the wanderer has previously not had: for the first time, he realises that his condition and world-view make him an outsider to society and the contrast between the universality of society and the particularity of the wanderer's existence is made particularly clear musically, showing an example of one of many dualities that this cycle highlights.<sup>72</sup> On the one hand this song reflects the wanderer's disintegration. His footsteps have become more uncertain; the texture is sparser. On the other, there is apparently teleological progress in this song, which would appear to contradict this – but it is actually removed by Schubert at the end. The song is through-composed and the end returns to the beginning – highlighting the paradox of succession and cohesion.

The poem consists of three stanzas in which the content is clearly demarcated: the first stanza rests on external imagery (although it is not yet clear to what it relates), the second grounds us in the wanderer's own experience, with a crucial moment of self-consciousness as to how far removed he is from the rest of society, before the third stanza makes his plea for the weather to join with the darkness of his mood. The music is noticeably different for each verse, but, unlike the poem, does not permit a simple journey from start to end. Having seemingly taken us on a musical journey where the open-sounding chords of the introduction are gradually built up into the remarkably pianistic accompaniment of the third verse, Schubert returns at the end to the empty and open chords of the beginning. This model of repetition is more conventional in the context of a song-form, but is nonetheless worth thinking about for its temporal

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<sup>70</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter's Journey*, p. 22.

<sup>71</sup> Arnold Feil, *Franz Schubert: Die schöne Müllerin, Winterreise*, trans. by Ann Sherwin (Portland, OR: Amadeus Press, 1988), p. 107.

<sup>72</sup> This would seem to be another conflict between the particular and the whole, as discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2. Again, here, the particular is not (or cannot) be absorbed into the overarching whole.

consequences. The return, as it were, to the start at the end undermines any sense of temporal progression, instead giving the song a sense of stasis – and contributing to a wider sense that the cycle lacks a broader narrative, but is instead made up of episodic snapshots.<sup>73</sup> The form is outlined below:

**Fig. 4.3. Formal outline of ‘Einsamkeit’**

Introduction	1 <sup>st</sup> Stanza	2 <sup>nd</sup> Stanza	3 <sup>rd</sup> Stanza		Postlude
bb. 1-6	bb. 6-14	bb. 14-21	bb. 23-34/35-46		46-48
B minor (perpetual B in bass), so cannot achieve full PAC		Hints of greater instability; B absent.	Arrives A maj, returns B min	G maj – A maj – C maj – B minor	As introduction (no PAC, just B minor chords).
		Defers PAC (HC?)	PAC 33-34	PAC 45-46	

The return at the end of the song to the chords from the beginning is especially significant given that these chords are often interpreted as a broken-down version of the richly scored chords at the start of ‘Gute Nacht.’<sup>74</sup> The repeating quavers seen in both instances can be interpreted as the rhythm of the wanderer’s footsteps as he begins his journey.<sup>75</sup> By the time he gets to ‘Einsamkeit’, his footsteps are less certain and more uneven; his lack of direction ever more apparent. During the course of ‘Einsamkeit’, Schubert builds up a sense of progress, most markedly in the piano part, only to remove it once more at the end: the wanderer’s effort (and it has been considerable) is for nothing because he ends exactly where he started, as in Adorno’s claim that ‘development is antimatter’. As Susan Youens writes, ‘Schubert simply repeats the final tonic chord in the trudging rhythms of the introduction. The outbursts of lamentation have left the wanderer even wearier and more miserable than he was at the beginning of the song.’<sup>76</sup> The wanderer has walked in a circle, taking stock of his own position, but achieving little more. Adorno’s statement that every point is equally close to the centre reveals the circular nature of the motion in this song. However much Schubert dresses it up as linear progress, its circularity is betrayed

<sup>73</sup> For Deborah Stein, the episodic nature of the cycle stems directly from the Romantic fragment and the songs are to be interpreted as such: cf. Deborah Stein, ‘The End of the Road in Schubert’s *Winterreise*: The Contradiction of Coherence and Fragmentation’, in *Rethinking Schubert*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 355-82.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Richard Kramer, *Distant Cycles*, p. 166.

<sup>75</sup> One example is Laura Tunbridge, *The Song Cycle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 34.

<sup>76</sup> Youens, *Retracing a Winter’s Journey*, p. 222.

by the end: the wanderer is trapped in his own misery, and the acknowledgement that this experience is not shared by the rest of society provides a cruel contrast between two starkly different realities. For Adorno, then, the wanderer's journey is interspersed with musical techniques (such as those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3) that emphasise his status as a wanderer. Schubert's treatment of Müller's poem accentuates the lack of teleology in the song, leaving us with a sense that despite the passing of time, and the new events that occur within the cycle, metaphorically speaking the wanderer is not getting anywhere. The stakes are not inconsiderable: here is an example of Schubert's non-teleological temporality *par excellence*, but in the song cycle it is an approach that has been lauded, not least for its dramatic consequences. However, the way in which the temporality operates here: a preoccupation with particular moments in the present and fixation on the past is a hallmark of Schubert's music more generally.<sup>77</sup>

While Schubert's approach is seemingly unremarkable (the use of the same rhythm at the end as at the beginning may not seem particularly worthy of comment), it is not so much the return of the material as the collapse which it engenders that would seem to encapsulate Adorno's idea. There is a strong disconnect between the wanderer and the society to which he no longer belongs. Richard Kramer argues this is shown through the choice of key as well, which is one of the ubiquitous musical and textual reminders of how far apart the wanderer and society have already become. The song was transposed before publication from the original D minor to B minor, a key that Kramer argues is of central importance to the cycle and 'neither a tonic nor a dissonance – nor even an antitonic – [it] continues to sound long after the cycle has run its course.'<sup>78</sup> For Kramer, B minor represents a sonority that is central to the cycle, but not part of the main key trajectory. It is almost as though B minor, too, is a neighbour to the rest of the cycle, expressing some of the tension between the wanderer and the world he inhabits. Wandering, it would seem, is expressed through this unresolved tension, one that sees the cycle start in D minor, end in A minor, and never really address or attempt to resolve the question of B minor that is left hanging. Here is a musical parallel to the lack of resolution in the narrative,

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<sup>77</sup> See Chapter 2 for a discussion of particular 'moments' in Schubert's Piano Sonata in B $\flat$  major, D. 960 and the consequences of that. Chapter 3 and its discussion of repetition is equally relevant here, because it shows that such temporal processes, even in Schubert's instrumental music, are not empty or meaningless but can be read as 'active'.

<sup>78</sup> Kramer, *Distant Cycles*, p. 187.



leaving the wanderer a perpetual outcast.

As already ascertained, Schubert has a propensity for making the tonic feel alien, but he can also do the opposite: construct a false homecoming<sup>79</sup> – and in almost every way, that is exactly what ‘Der Wegweiser’ does, creating a crucial relationship with the following song, ‘Das Wirtshaus’. Not only do the poetic topoi lend themselves to that reading – the signpost, graveyard and inn all suggestive of death as the journey’s potential end – but musically ‘Der Wegweiser’ constitutes just as much of an apparent homecoming. When the journey continues, ‘Das Wirtshaus’ is not the place of sanctuary the wanderer imagines it to be: Schubert suggests all is not quite as it seems with the cadence in the introduction. This not only foreshadows the ending, but is strongly dissonant with B minor. This F major (and F minor) could be some sort of home (though to put it in Marston’s terms, an ‘unheimlich’ one) but that is not the case. Indeed, Suurpää summarises the relationship between ‘Der Wegweiser’ and ‘Das Wirtshaus’ as follows: “‘Der Wegweiser’ signifies a turning point in *Winterreise*; the protagonist stops merely contemplating death as something positive and consciously decides to seek it out. The first two stanzas of “Das Wirtshaus” reflect the wanderer’s relief after making this difficult decision; he believes that he is about to meet death, symbolized in the poem by the cemetery. Yet the poem’s third stanza suggests that the relief might be premature.”<sup>80</sup> Kramer is in agreement with Suurpää about the significance of ‘Der Wegweiser’: ‘All measure of time and distance ends here.’<sup>81</sup> By contrast, he suggests that ‘Das Wirtshaus’ ‘evokes an otherworldly aura, no longer partaking of the journey.’<sup>82</sup>

For Suurpää, whose reading of the cycle is centred on the wanderer’s desire for death being thwarted, this makes sense. In other words, ‘Der Wegweiser’ would seem to be an apparent end to the cycle, but when the journey continues ‘Das Wirtshaus’ is as close as it gets to death-as-homecoming. However, no such ultimate arrival is achieved: the wanderer does not die. It is no coincidence that ‘Mut’, which follows, is such a display of false bravado. This is a false homecoming; constituted as such before the destitute end. If ‘Das Wirtshaus’

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<sup>79</sup> For discussion of a different (but comparable) kind of return, see Chapter 2 and discussion of the return to the tonic in the Piano Sonata, D. 960

<sup>80</sup> Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, p. 135-36.

<sup>81</sup> Kramer, *Distant Cycles*, p. 180.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.

makes for a desolate end, 'Der Leiermann', when it comes, is truly devastating. Additionally, Kinderman argues for a duality between 'Täuschung' and 'Der Wegweiser': given that the former is concerned with the internal world, and the latter with the external – and movement.<sup>83</sup>

It is the pivotal role that B minor plays here that indicates the central role that 'Einsamkeit' plays in the cycle. It was originally meant to be the closing song to Schubert's short cycle.<sup>84</sup> The decision to transpose it from the cycle's starting key of D minor to B minor has had major ramifications, even for the song that now closes the cycle: 'Der Leiermann'. Kramer argues convincingly that the manner of the closure of 'Der Leiermann' does not affirm a tonic: 'The final measures of *Der Leiermann* do not assert themselves in the manner of a tonic established and reaffirmed but rather echo as if in sympathetic vibration with some other, distant tonic.'<sup>85</sup> Certainly, looking at the score, there is no convincing PAC to end the cycle – and one ends (or fades) in A minor, as though other possibilities would still be open or possible; A minor certainly does not seem conclusive in any way. Given the open-ended nature of the wanderer's fate it is a fitting ending, but in many ways the nature of that ending is set up from 'Einsamkeit' onwards, though it becomes more and more inevitable as the rest of the cycle unfolds. The circular nature of the cycle is perhaps most obvious here; in one sense, there is no real ending at all.

The ending of *Winterreise* has been subject to many interpretations and, as mentioned above, is representative of poetic topoi of both wandering and homecoming. Tunbridge suggests of 'Der Leiermann' that 'the continuous drone of [its] music seems to encapsulate the endless journey of the wanderer – the cycle that can only end in death.'<sup>86</sup> Susan Youens argues instead that the wanderer finds his fate on the signpost of 'Der Wegweiser' and it is not death; instead it is to be a musician as the wanderer 'bears the stigmata of a Romantic artist without knowing it.'<sup>87</sup> According to Youens, 'we take for granted that the old man and the wanderer leave the cycle together.'<sup>88</sup> Meanwhile, in line with his

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<sup>83</sup> Schubert's 'Tragic Perspective', in *Schubert*, ed. by Frisch, pp. 65-83 (pp. 70-71).

<sup>84</sup> Kramer, *Distant Cycles*, p. 151.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>86</sup> Tunbridge, *The Song Cycle*, p. 34.

<sup>87</sup> Susan Youens, 'Retracing a Winter Journey: Reflections on Schubert's "Winterreise"', *19th-Century Music*, 9 (1985), 128-35 (p. 133).

<sup>88</sup> Youens, 'Retracing a Winter Journey: Reflections on Schubert's "Winterreise"', p. 132.

musical argument as to the role of B minor and lack of tonic in the cycle, Kramer suggests that 'The narrative of *Winterreise* is effectively without end. The songs following *Der Wegweiser* neither confirm nor reinforce the sense of *Der Wegweiser* as a structural close but rather dissolve from it.'<sup>89</sup> Lauri Suurpää suggests that the meaning of death might not be the simply physical:

But in *Winterreise*, death remains beyond the reach of the protagonist. Suicide, and by extension physical death, does not seem to correspond to the poetic content of the cycle unless we assume that the protagonist lacks the courage to take his own life. It therefore seems that *Winterreise* is not speaking about a concrete, physical death. In other words, death does not necessarily mean the end point of the wanderer's existence but might signify a change in the nature of this existence.<sup>90</sup>

In many ways, the open-ended way in which the cycle ends – both in terms of narrative and music, shows the extent to which it is governed by wandering processes. It is the paramount expression of the lack of conclusive narrative in the cycle. The wanderer's fate is unknown – which is why such diverse possibilities have been suggested. Closure in the cycle is therefore somewhat oblique, as the nature of that closure, at least in the poetic context is not entirely clear. The sparseness of the setting would only seem to underscore that; making it clear that there is a complete absence of homecoming. Any sense of homecoming has to be extrapolated, such as it is, and happens outside the temporal parameters of the cycle itself. If death is homecoming, then it happens after the final note has sounded. Repetition here does not lead to a return or indeed an end, but instead prevents one: it suspends the wanderer in his present moment – and offers only the next stage in the journey.

### 4.3 Does the *Wandererfantasie* go anywhere?

In Charles Fisk's words 'Schubert's music can seem to wander, but its wandering remains constantly and poignantly aware either of its distance from home or (as an aesthetically intended effect) of having lost its way, and it continually searches for paths of return.'<sup>91</sup> In other words, part of Schubert's wandering is bound up with a desire to return, even if the route to that return is far from clear. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the wandering and problematic return of the *Wandererfantasie*. Both are central not only to understanding the work's form, but

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<sup>89</sup> Kramer, *Distant Cycles*, p. 187.

<sup>90</sup> Suurpää, *Death in Winterreise*, pp. 191-92.

<sup>91</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 19.

also its treatment of themes and motifs. In the *Wandererfantasie*, wandering and homecoming work in different ways than in *Winterreise*, much though Fisk finds a link between the two works. The fantasy's lack of poetic text, its use of return (and tonal plan), and its cyclic multi-movement form all contribute to making this work a very different exploration of wandering, as well as one in which homecoming has a clear, but troubling presence.

The *Wandererfantasie* takes its name from the *Lied* of the same name, *Der Wanderer*, D. 489, from which the theme of the fantasy's variation-form second movement is derived.<sup>92</sup> A fantasia implies a degree of formal freedom denied to sonata form, as Christopher D.S. Field explains:

For the Romantics the fantasia went beyond the idea of a keyboard piece arising essentially from improvised or improvisatory material though still having a definite formal design. To them the fantasia, like the slow introduction to a sonata-allegro movement, a variation set or a fugue, provided the means for an expansion of forms, both thematically and emotionally. The sonata itself had crystallized into a more or less rigid formal scheme, and the fantasia offered far greater freedom in the use of thematic material and virtuoso writing. As a result the 19th-century fantasia grew in size and scope to become as musically substantial as large-scale, multi-movement works.<sup>93</sup>

In Field's eyes the purpose of the two genres is quite different. In this case, the contrast is particularly noticeable: Schubert combined the two by giving his fantasia a four-movement design which in some ways bears a remarkable resemblance to a sonata, though it includes formal excursions that simply could not take place in a sonata. Therefore, the combination here of the fantasia's freedom and the sonata's possibilities offered huge formal potential: Schubert was not limited by as many formal constraints by using the fantasia, yet had a structure from which to work in shaping his four-movement design. This gave him the perfect starting point for one manifestation of musical 'wandering': a duality, in this case, between two very different key areas. As mentioned above, much of Schubert's music that 'wanders' is premised around alternation or dualities. The conflict between C major and C# minor in the *Wandererfantasie* is one such duality, despite the cyclicism that seemingly governs the work. As will be explored, this duality makes the work seem even more unsettled than it would

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<sup>92</sup> In *Returning Cycles*, Fisk argues that there is a depth to the relationship between the two works that goes considerably beyond a simple quotation in the second movement and is much more all-encompassing: see p. 61.

<sup>93</sup> Christopher D.S. Field, et al., 'Fantasia', Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online. (Oxford University Press, 2001). <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40048> [accessed 29th August 2019].

otherwise, making the music's 'journey' rove further, and making its resolution more problematic than it otherwise need be. In many ways, it is the nature of the wandering that makes the homecoming such a particular problem; having gone to such remote places the return to the tonic becomes so problematised as to be almost alienated.

There are, then, two major (and connected) areas of tension at the heart of this work. The first is the obvious tonal tension between C major and C# minor. The other is between the tonal plan and the form. Whilst the tonalities battle it out, the form is perhaps more unified. While tonal conflict in the context of unified form seems to be the premise for most tonal music, it is the disparate key areas and the manner of the tonal return that marks this work out (discussed below). William Kinderman suggests that the four movements are 'closely interrelated thematically'<sup>94</sup> and that 'the basic unifying element is a dactylic rhythm linking the outer movements with the focal point of the whole work, a self-quotation from Schubert's song *Der Wanderer* in the theme of the slow variation movement.'<sup>95</sup> Kinderman is clear that the movements are closely connected, going as far as to point out that the model was crucial for the development of the later genre of the symphonic poem.<sup>96</sup> Kinderman does not, however, overtly suggest that the work is cyclic. Charles Fisk refers, meanwhile, to the work's 'unmistakable cyclic motivic organization'<sup>97</sup> but Benedict Taylor questions whether it is truly cyclical, arguing instead that the thematic affinity between movements could be better described by the term recurrence, but acknowledges that in practice works as highly integrated as the *Wandererfantasie* tend to be labelled as cyclic.<sup>98</sup> However, the implicit suggestion of return in a cyclic reading of this work indicates one way in which homecoming can be read, though the nature of homecoming in the fourth movement is hardly comfortable. In his study of cyclicism, Taylor nonetheless includes the fantasy in his list of cyclic works as an example of a 'multi-functional four-in-one design'.<sup>99</sup> Julian Johnson states of the *Wandererfantasie* that:

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<sup>94</sup> William Kinderman, 'Schubert's piano music: probing the human condition', in *The Cambridge Companion to Schubert*, ed. by Gibbs, pp.155-74 (p. 165).

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 165-66.

<sup>97</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 61.

<sup>98</sup> Taylor, *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

Cast in four movements, none of the first three has a clear ending but, instead, leads without a break into the subsequent one. The absence of closure, and the imperative to move on, is embodied in the musical form in other ways. The first movement is a sonata form that is cut off at the end of the development section by the ensuing Adagio second movement. In other words, the structural affirmation of arrival and return, so fundamental to the form, is completely undercut. This C major movement begins in an energetic and purposeful manner, full of bravura and directed motion as if it were a Beethoven sonata, but then is hijacked by the song melody in keys that are increasingly distanced from the opening. Few movements of Schubert have such a palpable sense of opposition between two different worlds.<sup>100</sup>

Johnson goes on to note that the contrast between the tonal areas of C major and C# minor is only resolved in the fourth movement.<sup>101</sup> In other words, a work that seems to start with a clear sense of direction in fact ends up going somewhere else entirely. Only at the end does it find its way home. Elsewhere Johnson has written about the role of dualities as opposed to dialectics in Mahler's Ninth Symphony.<sup>102</sup> Although there are a number of ways in which the *Wandererfantasie* is markedly different to the instances to which Johnson refers, there would still seem to be something of this kind of duality about the way in which the work unfolds.

These dualities show the relationship between wandering and homecoming is not purely linear. Homecoming does not only represent an uncomplicated resolution, to wandering or otherwise, because, as is seen here, not all manner of tonal resolution is comfortable, or indeed 'satisfying' to the ear. Instead, in the context of work like this, there are two poles, but by keeping them irreconcilable, there remains an inherent tension, in that the desire for resolution and homecoming is still present, but it is not comfortably delivered.

Kinderman's suggestion that the first movement functions as a sonata exposition with clear subject groups is one possible explanation for the way in which the first movement works; there would seem to be a clear enough consensus that the work starts out in a similar way to a sonata first movement. Susan Wollenberg suggests there are three subject groups.<sup>103</sup> The first movement starts in C major, the first of the two main key areas. Interestingly, the shift to C# minor is already

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<sup>100</sup> Johnson, *Out of Time*, p. 203.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Johnson, 'The Status of the Subject in Mahler's Ninth Symphony'. This is discussed in Chapter 2, above.

<sup>103</sup> Susan Wollenberg, *Schubert's Fingerprints: Studies in the Instrumental Works* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), p. 83.

foreshadowed in the first movement, meaning that the divide between the predominantly C major first movement and C# minor second movement is not necessarily as entirely clear-cut as might be expected. Charles Fisk describes it in the following terms: 'the C# minor of the Adagio, the wanderer's song, forcefully intrudes upon the C major of the Allegro. The transition to the Adagio denies the Allegro its gesturally and tonally prepared ending, and thus presents the experience embodied in the Adagio as not only different from but also in conflict with the experience embodied in the Allegro.'<sup>104</sup> This also has formal implications if one accepts the first movement of the work as functioning as a sonata-style exposition.

Fisk explains the conflict between the two contrasting key areas in the following terms: 'The choice of C# minor, the key of "Der Wanderer," for the slow movement of a piece in C major is, of course, extraordinary. The way Schubert introduces the song into the fantasy makes this choice a source of dramatic conflict.'<sup>105</sup> It is this 'dramatic conflict' that thus generates all of what follows for Fisk: the tonal contrast is the main event, posited in the first two movements, and finally resolved by the end of the fourth when C major returns to dominate, although the manner of that resolution feels somewhat forced. Despite the foreshadowing of the event in the first movement, the shift in tonality is still a massive contrast in the second. It is not purely the change of tonality that creates this atmosphere however, but also the change in mood: 'Although foreshadowed by the E-major sonorities in the Allegro's first pages and by the D $\flat$ -major-fanfare later on, this C# minor still seems lonely and foreign: in part because of the contradiction-of-resolution that introduces it, in part because of the extreme contrast of the Adagio with all the preceding music in both tempo and texture.'<sup>106</sup>

By introducing this rupture to the tonal schema, Schubert effects a sense of wandering: ostensibly the tonal function is purposeful, but equally, there seems to be no destination in mind. Thus, the first movement is prevented from having any sort of sense of tonal conclusion, as though it is still onward-bound. The conclusion of the first movement does, however, have a concrete tonal purpose: to set up the second movement's tonality. The subsequent movements and the

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<sup>104</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 64.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 66.

gradual process of tonal homecoming are therefore crucial for the work to be able to end at all. This foreshadowing can be seen below:

**Ex. 4.5. *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, i, bb. 165-170**



Already, then the tonal conflict is audible at the end of the first movement. Su Yin Mak explains that ‘a diminished seventh chord built on E# leads to the tonicization of F# minor, which subsequently functions as iv of C# minor. This in turn leads to a long dominant pedal on G# that prepares the arrival of the C# minor ‘Wanderer’ theme’.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, the entire passage from bar 165 onwards serves to prepare for the shift to the new tonality in the second movement. However, it does so in a way that feels repetitive, laboured, and uncertain of its destination. This is partly due to the repeated dactylic rhythm, so fundamental to the work as a whole, and is one of the unifying surface features, especially given the lack of any real melodic line, and is partly to do with the dynamics meaning the music apparently to fade into nothingness too. All of this would seem to embody precisely what is meant by wandering: tonal vagrancy, set up through duality, an uncertainty (as yet) to the destination, a path that is not clear cut, and a disintegration of many of our teleological expectations of the music. Although the passage has a clear function, to the listener it sounds quite different, summarised by Mak as ‘The presentation of this intensely personal utterance as a digression that thwarts sonata expectations is in line with the fantasy’s generic role as a strategy for the destabilization and critique of formal archetypes.’<sup>108</sup> Here, then, is an example of one of the paradoxes behind much of Schubert’s apparent wandering: there is a very clear purpose to this passage; it must move from one key area to another, but it is presented in quite a different way, as though there is there is no clear destination, when the direct opposite is in fact true. This paradox has a curious relationship with the overstatement of the conclusion – where C major is over-emphasised to a remarkable extent, when, in fact, one hasn’t really relinquished a sense of the prior key – despite its ostensible

<sup>107</sup> Su Yin Mak, ‘Formal ambiguity and generic reinterpretation in the late instrumental music’, in *Schubert’s Late Music*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 282-306 (pp. 289-90).

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 290.



(over-)resolution, it retains a feeling of being unresolved. Wandering, then, impedes any comfort that might have been found in homecoming.

Although the first movement initially appears to imply some sort of sonata style trajectory for the work, with the second movement implying a development section in a broader context, the second movement is actually a set of variations. It is here that Schubert uses the *Lied* that gives the fantasy its name, giving it the motif that allows for its cyclic unity. Arguably, therefore, it is here that the essence of a fantasia is most obvious. Variations are in some ways less teleologically-governed than a sonata. Indeed, when and how to close a variation set is not always clear.<sup>109</sup> The first movement's apparent (albeit thwarted) formal function stands in direct contrast with that of the second movement. Fisk's idea of the conflict in the movement would appear therefore not just to be at a tonal level, but at every level. This has ramifications beyond the purely musical, something to which Fisk himself briefly alludes when he writes 'But the contrast on which Schubert bases the tonal structure of the "Wanderer" Fantasy, especially as the composition dramatizes it, easily suggests a contrast, even a conflict or a contradiction, between disparate and even incompatible experiences or ways of being.'<sup>110</sup> The contradictions abound.

**Ex. 4.6. Schubert, *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, i, bb. 1-6**



**Ex. 4.7. *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, ii, bb. 189-194**



<sup>109</sup> I have previously looked at the philosophical ramifications of Schubert and Beethoven's variation forms elsewhere. See Cattell, 'Identity, Subjectivity, and Temporality in Variation Form', especially Chapter 3 'How and when to stop', pp. 47-65, which includes a discussion of this movement.

<sup>110</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 69.

**Ex. 4.8. *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, iv, bb. 598-608**



The second movement is clearly related to the material in the first movement (see above), most notably in its continued usage of the dactylic rhythm. Perhaps it would be better to say that the first movement also makes use of the *Lied*'s hallmark dactylic rhythm, which is such an integral part of the second movement's theme – which in the absence of tonal kinship provides a clear thematic link between the two movements. Simultaneously, the movement, as a set of variations, builds on the material posited in the first movement, but also operates as a development in a larger, thwarted sonata-form movement. Pleas for the work to be considered cyclic strengthen the argument of obvious thematic and motivic connections between the first two movements, despite the obvious disparity in their respective tonal areas. How to interpret the latter two movements, however, poses more of a challenge. Fisk's tonality-based understanding of the third movement is especially pertinent at this point. The third movement, Fisk argues, arbitrates between the two tonal areas, functioning as a transition to the finale.<sup>111</sup> The third movement brings the tonality gradually away from C# minor and back towards the opening key of C major. The finale does not so much make C major the victor, as install C major as the dominant force, removing meaningful reference to C# minor. It is telling that unlike the transition from first to second movements and the third to fourth movements, there is no transition between second and third movements, just a pause before shifting to the new tonality. It is as though the first two movements form a coherent outward journey, where the latter two function as an attempt to return. This would be in line with an interpretation of the latter two movements' function as a reversed recapitulation; the relationship between the final movement and the first subject in the first movement is apparent.

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<sup>111</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, pp. 67-68.

The third movement, at the start, remains closer to the variations, but when the scherzo returns after the trio, as Fisk notes, ‘the stormy interlude that it, too, has incorporated takes a new direction, becoming a transition to the finale.’<sup>112</sup> This becomes particularly clear from bar 535 onwards, when there is a change of key in preparation for the return to C major. However, the path is far from smooth. The mood created is very different to that created leading into the second movement, and again has to link two very disparate key areas. However, for Fisk, it ‘plays an essential role not only in presenting and then resolving the fantasy’s central tonal conflict but also in imparting a common harmonic color to each of the four movements.’<sup>113</sup> While this is true, that does not necessarily make it a comfortable resolution: this is not triumphant and affirmation, but, to put it in Johnson’s terms Schubert ‘imposes resolution through rhetoric and force.’<sup>114</sup> Indeed, Fisk posits that the contrast between the two key areas of the work ‘easily suggests a contrast, even a conflict or a contradiction, between disparate and even incompatible experiences or ways of being.’<sup>115</sup> This contrast is not really resolved: while, as Fisk observes, the Scherzo goes some way to bridging the tonal gap between the second and fourth movements of the fantasy,<sup>116</sup> it does not mean that the return is by any means simple. While the tonal conflict has to, at one level, end, that does not mean that the tonic sounds like a simple home key.

By moving to such a key for the second movement, the inevitable return necessarily becomes problematic and involves a significant amount of force – something that Fisk does not discuss. Rather than sounding like a comfortable return home, the finale sounds desperate to assert its authority. The first movement’s brilliant opening in C major becomes a desperate quasi-fugal return in the fourth. Neither could be further from the Adagio’s C# minor variations. There is no sense of reconciliation; although the dactylic rhythm is present in the first, second and fourth movements, it is simply recurring rather than reconciled. It is the distance wandered that has made the return so challenging. Fisk finds a unifying possibility in the passage leading into the fourth movement, and indeed, there are surface motivic ideas that help the work hang together – such as the dactylic rhythm. Nonetheless, the contrapuntal finale paradoxically feels

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<sup>112</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 67.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>114</sup> Johnson, *Out of Time*, p. 203.

<sup>115</sup> Fisk, *Returning Cycles*, p. 69.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

overwhelming: in its efforts to reestablish a tonic of C major, it feels almost as though it is structurally one gigantic PAC in C major. This, however, cannot dispel the memory of what has come before. Two tiny hints of what preceded it do lurk in the movement: in the passage between bars 667 and 672.

**Ex. 4.9. *Wandererfantasie*, D. 760, iv, bb. 667-672**



There is no way that this can be misconstrued as wandering – the music barely touches on the E major and diminished chords, with a mere hint of what came in the second movement, before it is firmly back in position. However, it is enough; because the C major is ‘over-determined’ – the exaggeration paradoxically produces a sense of doubt which undermines its authenticity. The listener is therefore saturated by a sense that this is an artificial ‘home’, because C major and C# minor have not been resolved, merely set against one another; or to put it in the terms John Gingerich uses to describe the D $\flat$ s in the String Quintet, D. 956 ‘they are not woven into the rest of the music [...] or integrated.’<sup>117</sup> There have been shifts to and from each key area, but there has not been true structural resolution, making this homecoming inherently problematic.

The paradigmatic concepts of wandering and homecoming offer frameworks for interpretation of a significant proportion of the tonal conflict that governs the work. Jeffrey Perry explains:

The tension between *Das Wandern* and *Die Reise* – between fantasia and sonata form – lies at the heart of Schubert's music. Taken together, the two modes of travel present a paradox central to Schubert's sensibility: Without distance there can be no return. Expression of this paradox becomes virtually a constructive principle of Schubert's music, particularly in those works that straddle the genres of *Lied* and instrumental music.<sup>118</sup>

This reveals the primary conflict at work in much of Schubert's music, including this piece. In the *Wandererfantasie*, wandering can be seen at both formal and

<sup>117</sup> John Gingerich, ‘Remembrance and Consciousness in Schubert's C-Major String Quintet, D. 956’, *The Musical Quarterly*, 84 (2000), 619-34 (p. 634).

<sup>118</sup> Jeffrey Perry, ‘The Wanderer's Many Returns: Schubert's Variations Reconsidered’, *The Journal of Musicology*, 19 (2002), 374-416 (p. 375).

thematic levels, making Perry's comment that 'Schubert's music is the music of a wanderer'<sup>119</sup> all the more apparent. Moreover, although a fantasia, the way in which its large-scale form is constructed bears considerable resemblance to sonata form, thus bringing the conflict between *reisen* and *wandern* still closer to the heart of this work. Finally, as a work that is based on one of Schubert's *Lieder*, it starts to break down the apparent divide between instrumental and vocal music.

#### 4.4 Adorno (again)

It was a starting point of this thesis that much of the language used to describe Schubert's music in more recent scholarship has its roots in Adorno's 1928 essay on the composer where wandering is one of the key terms. All the terms so frequently used to describe Schubert's music – 'wandering', 'homecoming', 'repetition', 'parataxis', 'memory', and 'nostalgia', for example – are, of course, claims about Schubert's approach to time and temporality. Such concerns in Schubert's music do find resonance in Adorno's writing – and not only his writing on Schubert. This comes across particularly clearly in *Aesthetic Theory*, incomplete at the time of his death in 1969.<sup>120</sup> Adorno's understanding of the relationship between art and temporality is very particular and by looking into that in more detail, light can be cast onto the processes behind Schubert's wandering and homecoming and what makes them particularly pertinent to understanding how Schubert's music operates. Robert W. H. Savage notes that:

The ideal of organic unity, which was widely applied as a metaphysical precept in the nineteenth century and then again as an analytic principle in the twentieth century as the mark of a work's value and greatness, traded on the formal integrity attributed to the way that a work's constitutive parts fit naturally or logically together. However as I have indicated, the dynamic relation between parts and whole, which was said to emulate a living organism's processes of growth and development, is itself a function of the work's temporal configuration.<sup>121</sup>

It is against this aesthetic that Schubert's music has so often been found wanting, as examined in Chapter 1. Savage goes on to write: 'Adorno, who regarded the musical work as a *force-field* (*Kraftfeld*) organized around a challenge or problem, rightly attributes the work's logic to the set of dynamic relationships that

<sup>119</sup> Jeffrey Perry, 'The Wanderer's Many Returns', p. 374.

<sup>120</sup> Tom Huhn, 'Introduction: Thoughts Beside Themselves', in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*, ed. by Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-18 (p. 2).

<sup>121</sup> Robert W. H. Savage, *Music, Time, and Its Other: Aesthetic Reflections of Finitude, Temporality, and Alterity* (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), p. 32.

contained the problem animating the work.<sup>122</sup> However, it is hard to reconcile this point of view with Adorno's following statement in *Aesthetic Theory*: 'Every artwork is an instant; every successful work is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, as which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye. If artworks are answers to their own questions, they themselves thereby truly become questions.'<sup>123</sup> Such a statement naturally throws up all kinds of questions in the context of music, as a temporal art form. However, as has become clear, it is Schubert's particular treatment of temporality that marks his music out as individual and therefore the characterization of art as 'an instant' or successful works as 'cessations' is meaningful for non-teleological formal processes – and particularly in the context of wandering and homecoming. However, perhaps this relationship is clearer if one takes into account what Adorno himself goes on to write after the point to which Savage so aptly draws our attention:

With musical compositions it is obviously the *Whole* that matters; but the Whole is not something which simply reduces the individual single moments to insignificance. The Whole – if I may be permitted to express it in Hegelian terms – is itself the relation between the Whole and its individual moments, within which these latter obtain throughout their independent value. Analysis exists only as the uncovering of the relationship between these moments, and not merely by virtue of the obtuse and aconceptual priority of the Whole over its parts.<sup>124</sup>

This is fundamental to considering Schubert's music either as an instant or as a series of instants. Even in the context of more conventional tonal (and thus temporal) processes single moments retain singular significance for Adorno. However, in Schubert's music, it is possible to posit that those single moments take on a greater import. A song like 'Frühlingstraum' constructs a temporal paradox. On the one hand there are two distinct temporal realms constructed by Müller's poem; one referring to the memory of past times, and the other of the agony of the present. These are represented by very different music in Schubert's setting. The A major section that opens the song is of particular interest here. The lilting rhythm and major tonality are in line with the memory outlined in the poetry. However, there is a lot of repetition in the words and the simple chord progressions, confined to A major, create a sense of a snapshot, a moment briefly

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<sup>122</sup> Savage, *Music, Time, and Its Other*, p. 32. Here Savage references Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis'.

<sup>123</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 7.

<sup>124</sup> Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', p. 182.

captured. The two time frames in this song are not resolved. However, they are then repeated, only exaggerating the impossibility of resolution.

This illustrates clearly what was revealed through the discussion of Heidegger in the previous chapter; Schubert opens up a temporality that stretches in both directions, both backwards and forwards. Yet, at a purely logical level, maintaining that a work such as *Winterreise* or one of the (lengthy) three final piano sonatas is ‘an instant’ demands a very particular kind of understanding. Discussion about works such as the three last piano sonatas usually hinges around their length, not any idea that they could be contracted into ‘instant[s]’. In turn, how such ‘instants’ and ‘cessations’ elucidate and are relevant to Schubert’s musical processes is yet another part of the puzzle. Part of the issue is then to work out to what extent it is possible to read Schubert’s works in this way, and what insight is gained from doing so. Indeed, what benefit is there in doing that rather than looking at the processes that are normally understood to lie behind tonal music? Perhaps the answers lie in the potential further elucidation of the manifestation of wandering in Schubert’s forms. There is a kinship between the musical processes of the song cycles and the instrumental music, as the former involve groups of smaller moments, rather than the apparent structure of the latter. Crucial to this discussion, however, is that this division between the small and large, as has been shown, is not as clear-cut in Schubert’s music: the sonatas too boast ‘instants’ like their *Lieder* counterparts.

There is a sense of this elsewhere in Adorno’s writing on Schubert. When Adorno likens Schubert’s music to a series of snapshots, once again one has the sense that time has frozen for Adorno, and the very title of the broadcast he gave in 1965 (‘Schöne Stellen’) also gives the sense that music can, for Adorno, play with time in this way. Interestingly, in ‘Schöne Stellen’, the various extracts of Schubert featured span both instrumental and vocal works.<sup>125</sup> The very title of ‘Schöne Stellen’ hints at such cessations and instants, though does nothing to further explain their workings in Schubert’s music – nor is it all about Schubert. Scott Burnham dwells on this part of Adorno’s broadcast, pointing out that Adorno draws attention to the Trio of the G-major String Quartet and the way

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<sup>125</sup> Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Schöne Stellen’, in Adorno, *Musikalische Schriften V, Gesammelte Schriften 18*, ed. by Tiedemann, pp. 695-718.

that it rocks backwards and forwards between G major and B major.<sup>126</sup> Not only is this a good example of a duality as described by Kinderman, but this lack of direction also provides some sort of sense of an instant within a form which one might expect to provide more forward motion. Instead, the Trio alternates seemingly endlessly between G major and B major making it seem as though it operates, in Burnham's words, in 'a different space'.<sup>127</sup> It is set apart because the key relations create an otherworldly sense and in turn generate a form that thwarts expectations – a stereotypical example (if a fairly brief one) of what is meant by Schubert's wandering. Burnham argues that this is constructed by modulating via the mediant rather than the dominant:

Schubert takes advantage of the formally contained, formally framed trio section to help encourage this effect of framing a space marked as exotic, ephemeral, dreamlike. The modulations by mediant are crucial to the effect of entering such a space. By foregoing the usual modulatory engineering of arriving at the dominant of the new key, modulation by mediant can give us the sense of being instantly transported to another realm. These sections seem to *appear* rather than to be result of a process of directed motion. As a listener, I haven't been moved anywhere; instead, the scene has changed around me. This is a different way of negotiating a landscape.<sup>128</sup>

In 'Schöne Stellen', Adorno notes that the key relations are exactly the same ones that Schubert uses in the song 'Der Musensohn', D. 764.<sup>129</sup> Burnham too points this out, adding that each verse oscillates between G and B major.<sup>130</sup> Here, then, is a sense that exactly the same tonal devices can be put to use in both instrumental vocal music and they have very similar effects in terms of the way that they affect how the music seems to operate. Although the wider context of these key changes is different, they both create an effect of tonal vagrancy – or ultimately, wandering.

There is, in Adorno's characterisation of art as 'instants' and 'cessations', the hint of a process. However, there are gradations in this process; while 'every artwork' fits the description of an 'instant', only 'successful' works achieve the state of 'cessation'. There is an implication of a journey from instant to cessation, but how exactly that operates is left frustratingly unclear. For Adorno to consider the music as important as he clearly does, there is almost certainly a process: were

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<sup>126</sup> Cf. Adorno, 'Schöne Stellen' and Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth'.

<sup>127</sup> Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', p. 36.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>129</sup> Adorno, 'Schöne Stellen', p. 710.

<sup>130</sup> Burnham, 'Landscape as Music, Landscape as Truth', p. 33.



there none, it would surely be in the realm of music that Adorno dismisses – pop music, film music, and so on.<sup>131</sup> Perhaps the point is that in Schubert's music the closest that we get is the description of this cessation as 'a suspended moment of the process', which logically must have clear temporal ramifications. It sounds as though Adorno implies there is something of time standing still in this moment.

Once again, it feels tantalisingly close to the nature of Schubert's musical processes, but does nothing to help unpick them. Adorno does, however, expand on the relationship of music and time specifically:

It would be senseless to contest that it [music] is a temporal art or that, however little it coincides with the temporality of real experience, it too is irreversible. If, however, one wanted to pass beyond vague generalities, such as that music has the task of articulating the relation of its 'content' [*Inhalt*], its intratemporal elements, to time, one falls immediately in pedantry or subreption. For the relation of music to formal musical time is determined exclusively in the relation between the concrete musical event and time. Certainly it was long held that music must organize the intratemporal succession of events meaningfully: Each event should ensue from the previous one in a fashion that no more permits reversal than does time itself. However, the necessity of this temporal sequence was never literal; it participated in art's semblance character. Today music rebels against conventional temporal order; in any case, the treatment of musical time allows for widely diverging solutions. As questionable as it is that music can ever wrest itself from the invariant of time, it is just as certain that once this invariant is an object of reflection it becomes an element of composition and no longer an apriori.<sup>132</sup>

This is a central point to my thesis: Schubert's music is relevant to broader conceptions of musical time. Schubert's formal processes, in other words, means that time is treated differently and that is, at least in part, what makes Schubert's music not only compelling but historically and philosophically significant. Adorno's point is in connection to a broader musical modernity and the self-reflexivity of music in respect to its form which defines its capacity for critique. In turn, his identification of a different temporality in Schubert suggests that Schubert's music lends itself to a kind of critique of the Beethovenian dialectic model.

*Winterreise* provides a perfect example of how one might consider Schubert's music as a succession of instants or, to put it another way, a series of moments. However, those instants are, by their very nature, coherent and related to one

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<sup>131</sup> Robert Adlington summarises this especially effectively, showing a path from Beethoven, via Debussy, Wagner, Stravinsky, and Schoenberg. See Robert Adlington, 'Temporality in Post-Tonal Music', unpublished PhD thesis (University of Sussex, 1997), pp. 166-67.

<sup>132</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 30.



This creates a stark contrast with the much slower-moving and more static starts to both of the songs on either side of it, which then fosters a sense of time slowing or stopping. This slowing can be considered not only dramatic, but comes across more generally. In ‘Das Wirtshaus’ and ‘Die Nebensonnen’, it is not only the tempo that is slower. Both boast more conjunct movement than the disjunct movement in ‘Mut’, and there is a similarity in the simplicity of their melodic material. They make use of a limited range in the voice part (indeed ‘Die Nebensonnen’ only covers a perfect fifth), and while ‘Das Wirtshaus’ uses a greater range, within phrases it tends to be fairly limited. This gives an impression of limiting movement, certainly in contrast with ‘Mut’ and the leaps in its voice part. The two slower-moving songs also make use of dactylic (or near-dactylic) rhythms, which as discussed in connection with the *Wandererfantasie* above, can be used to frustrate any sense of onward movement. Certainly the way that ‘Die Nebensonnen’ goes up and down from A to C# in the melody line would seem almost static and there is a similar pattern with the falling dactyl in ‘Das Wirtshaus’. This can be seen in the following examples:

**Ex. 4.11. *Winterreise*, D. 911, ‘Das Wirtshaus’, bb. 1-9**

Musical score for 'Das Wirtshaus' from *Winterreise*, D. 911, measures 1-9. The score is in B-flat major, 3/4 time. It features a vocal line and a piano accompaniment. The piano part has a steady, conjunct melody in the right hand and a more active, rhythmic line in the left hand. The vocal line enters in measure 5 with the word 'Auf'.

**Ex. 4.12. *Winterreise*, D. 911, ‘Die Nebensonnen’, bb. 1-8**

Musical score for 'Die Nebensonnen' from *Winterreise*, D. 911, measures 1-8. The score is in D major, 3/4 time. It features a vocal line and a piano accompaniment. The piano part has a steady, conjunct melody in the right hand and a more active, rhythmic line in the left hand. The vocal line enters in measure 5 with the words 'Drei Son-nen sah ich an Him-mel stehn, hab lang und fest sie an-ge-sehn.'

As these three examples (Exs. 4.10-12) show, Schubert's ability to play with musical time exemplifies Adorno's point. Moreover, if one considers these three examples in the cycle's chronological order: that is to say 'Das Wirtshaus'-'Mut'-'Die Nebensonnen', then suddenly one starts to see a very practical playing out of Adorno's description. The waxing and waning of motion gives a sense of wandering. The song cycle affords freedom to explore this idea, perhaps, that the instrumental music does not. However, that is not to say that the same process is not at work in the instrumental music, as the G-major Quartet revealed above; it is just not as readily isolated. This would seem to be exactly what Adorno is exploring. If one looks at the dualities discussed above in the context of 'wandering', it is perhaps those dualities which give it that approach to temporality that enables it to find a space in which 'cessation' is able to occur. When Adorno references Schubert himself in *Aesthetic Theory*, his comment can be linked into the narrative of 'instants' and 'cessation', even if he does not do so himself:

Schubert's resignation has its locus not in the purported mood of his music, nor in how he was feeling – as if the music could give a clue to this – but in the *It is thus* that it announces with the gesture of letting oneself fall: This is its expression. Its quintessence is art's character of eloquence, fundamentally distinct from language as its medium. It is worth speculating whether the former is incompatible with the latter; that would in part explain the effort of prose since Joyce to put discursive language out of action, or at least to subordinate it to formal categories to the point that construction becomes unrecognizable: The new art tries to bring about the transformation of communicative into mimetic language. By virtue of its double character, language is a constituent of art and its mortal enemy.[...] The true language of art is mute, and its muteness takes priority over poetry's significative element, which in music too is not altogether lacking.<sup>136</sup>

Adorno's way of describing Schubert's music is hardly concrete, but conversely seems to summarise what happens at the heart of the music and sum it up remarkably well. Despite this instinctive reaction, attempting to define the 'It is thus' in Schubert's music is hardly easy. Clearly intangible, it is arguably one manifestation of the 'instant' and this 'cessation'. As an assessment of the construction of Schubert's music, 'it announces with the gesture of letting oneself fall' implies a lack of control over the final destination. Once again, there is (implicit) a sense of lack of teleology. There is also a sense that the journey happens to Schubert's music, rather than the form constructing its journey. This would seem to make perfect sense in the context of wandering, especially. For

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<sup>136</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 147.

homecoming, too, where the destination is, in part, dictated, but how that will feel is somewhat uncertain.

One example of the 'It is thus' can be found in the introduction of 'Das Wirtshaus'. Here, the harmony takes a somewhat unexpected turn. At the start it sounds as though Schubert may be preparing for a PAC in F major, but when the moment comes, via a diminished seventh, the phrase ends in A major (III), meaning that the subsequent return to F major makes the F major sound like anything but the tonic by the time the vocal part starts (see Ex. 4.11, above). As in the foreshadowing of the two key areas of the *Wandererfantasie*, this progression can be traced further back. The slow-moving dactylic rhythm (another parallel with the transition from first to second movements in D. 760) and the harmony give an impression that one journey is being undertaken, whereas actually it is something quite different. When the reality becomes clear, there is a moment where, despite the harmonic rhythm having increased in speed, time would paradoxically seem to stop. This is heightened by the minim at the end of bar five, which slows the harmonic rhythm once more, in preparation for the opening of the first stanza.

The reason for Adorno's prioritising of the instant in music can be found in the following: 'Incidentally, art's impulse to objectivate the fleeting, not the permanent, may well run into the whole of its history. Hegel failed to recognize this and for this reason, in the midst of dialectics, failed to recognize the temporal core of art's truth content.'<sup>137</sup> For Adorno, any access to the truth content of the work must be temporary – there will be a glimpse of it that then vanishes once more. In Schubert, perhaps this happens in the 'It is thus'. The 'It is thus' takes on a very particular guise in Schubert's musical processes, the force of which should not be underestimated.

The two key areas of the *Wandererfantasie* both suggest the notion of 'It is thus' when looking at it in these terms, constituted through the duality of the other key area. However, no further meaning is reached when C major brings the work to a close: this is not the joyful synthesis of Beethoven's middle period, but closure because it has to happen. It is sonata versus fantasia, two key areas so far apart that there can be no synthesis and an ending to bring a close rather than

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<sup>137</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 286.

necessarily resolve. The ending is not precarious because there was no dialogue. The discursive and dialectic arrival in Beethoven is absent, but Schubert's music refuses this – hence the duality. The lack of transition or resolution, Adorno seems to imply with the '*It is thus*', may even be more 'true' than the discursive argument.<sup>138</sup> In turn, this means that Adorno's description of the sonata rondo below seems very alien:

The classical Viennese sonata was a dynamic yet closed form, and this closure was precarious; the rondo, with the intentional freedom in the alternation of refrain and couplets, was a decidedly open form. All the same, in the fiber of what was composed, the difference was not so substantial. From Beethoven to Mahler, the sonata rondo was much employed, which transplanted the development section of the sonata to the rondo, thus balancing off the playfulness of the open form with the bindingness of the closed form.<sup>139</sup>

Instead, the wandering journey has to come to an end, because the piece has to finish. There is a sense of homecoming in terms of returning to a 'home key', but it brings little joy. This is not a return home with nostalgia and contentment, but a return to C major that drowns out C# minor, attempting simply to deny its existence, as though it never happened. There was a profound existence of otherness, but synthesis proved an impossibility. The C major should feel affirmative, but does not, because it does not (as per Adorno below) recapitulate, except rhythmically. The otherness is too extreme to effect synthesis:

The synthesis achieved by means of the artwork is not simply forced on its elements; rather, it recapitulates that in which these elements communicate with one another; thus the synthesis itself a product of otherness. Indeed, synthesis has its foundation in the spirit-distant material dimension of works, in that in which synthesis is active. This unites the aesthetic element of form with noncoercion.<sup>140</sup>

Overall, then, Adorno's suggestion of the instant may seem far from wandering and homecoming. This instant might seem, on the surface, closer to music that Adorno rebuffs as focusing purely on the instant rather than a structural whole (as he does with popular music, for example). However, there are marked differences (and this is discussed in more detail above in Chapter 2). Adorno's discussion of the instant here gives us further insight into the way in which Schubert's music deals with time and temporality. Both wandering and homecoming show that Schubert favours circuitous routes. In the *Wandererfantasie* the wandering profoundly disrupts the way in which any arrival

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<sup>138</sup> This applies to Adorno on Mahler too.

<sup>139</sup> Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 288.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

can happen. What exploring the instant has given us is a sense of the way that temporality and wandering interact in Schubert's music – and therefore a greater understanding of how wandering works in Schubert's music, and why wandering processes sound as they do.

#### 4.5 Heidegger, Wandering, and Homecoming

In his writing on Georg Trakl,<sup>141</sup> Heidegger interprets wandering as opening up potentially transformative moments. There are two texts that consider Trakl's poetry and in both wandering plays a key role in the way that Heidegger understands the role of language in the poems he seeks to analyse. As an analysis of Trakl alone, Heidegger's reading has been acknowledged as problematic.<sup>142</sup> However, the focus of this study not being Trakl but Schubert, the philosophical argument nevertheless offers a way to further explore the temporality of wandering and homecoming in Schubert's music. The way in which Heidegger interprets wandering (and these transformative moments) can add greater depth to a reading of Schubert's music in relation to Adorno's ideas of instants and cessations as considered above. Moreover, although Heidegger does not specifically say so, the Trakl poems that he chooses to analyse involve aspects of home and homecoming, which are crucial to this chapter. The third and final reason for turning to this aspect of Heidegger's output is that wandering (and implicitly) homecoming are linked to death, though again, this is not a link that Heidegger necessarily builds as much as he might. There are resonances here with Schubert's construction of the trope in his music.

Before such ideas can be examined in the context of the music, however, it is necessary to understand the way in which homecoming and wandering relate to central ideas within Heidegger's philosophical system. For Heidegger, wandering and homecoming are closely related to spatiality, which is intrinsically linked to temporality, thus leading straight back to the central concept of his entire philosophical system: being. This is not incompatible with music; the language used to discuss temporality is often, in fact, spatial – such as the key terms of wandering and homecoming. Robert Mugerauer states: 'But space is coupled with time. Not only do we think and speak of them as interwoven – as with 'a

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<sup>141</sup> This writing encompasses two sources: 'Die Sprache' and 'Die Sprache im Gedicht', both of which can be found in Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Stuttgart: Günther Neske, 2001).

<sup>142</sup> Cf. Richard Millington, 'Georg Trakl's Ghosts: Haunted Poems at the End of History', *The German Quarterly*, 90 (2017), 267-82.

span of time' – but just as Da-sein opens around itself a region that becomes space, so it also operates in a parallel 'horizon of time' that is grounded not only in waiting for things to be done in the surrounding world but finally in a deeper unit of temporality'.<sup>143</sup> Space is thus crucial to being both in general and the very specific sort of being that is to be found in connection to the notion of Dasein. Such notions of place, time, and therefore being are all bound up together. The idea of dwelling for Heidegger has aspects of all of these concepts, summarised by Julian Young's comment that 'Place, dwelling place, is not land nor people, not space nor time, not past nor present nor future. It is, rather, all of these together.'<sup>144</sup> Spatiality and temporality are inextricable, each one demanding the other make sense and they all contribute to a notion of unity which is explained by Jeff Malpas in terms of all of these concepts coming together in the notion of place (and thus space): 'As it functions to embody and articulate the idea and image of such a gathered unity, so place embodies and articulates an idea that Heidegger takes to be central to the thinking of being as such – the idea of unity.'<sup>145</sup> Spatiality, temporality, and being are therefore all bound up together. This makes an exploration of Heidegger's understanding of wandering particularly compelling for the way that it is treated in Schubert.

In 'Die Sprache', Heidegger undertakes an analysis of Trakl's poem 'Ein Winterabend'.<sup>146</sup> This might seem quite a leap from Schubert, but like Friedrich's *Winterlandschaft mit Kirche*, it is preoccupied with the wandering trope. The surface resonances of Trakl's poem with *Winterreise* (and indeed with Friedrich's painting) are clear: the wanderer, mortality, the winter evening and the snow. Here, however, Trakl sets 'Wanderschaft' and 'das Haus' against each other, before the 'Wanderer tritt still herein', although that line, Heidegger informs the reader, is absent from an earlier version of the poem that can be found in a letter to Karl Kraus.<sup>147</sup> However, much more telling than such surface similarities is what Heidegger gleans from the poem which is not only the centrality of

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<sup>143</sup> Robert Mugerauer, *Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 39.

<sup>144</sup> Julian Young, 'What Is Dwelling? The Homelessness of Modernity and the Worlding of the World', in *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Vol. 1*, eds. by Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), pp. 187-203 (pp. 202-03).

<sup>145</sup> Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 16.

<sup>146</sup> Heidegger, 'Die Sprache', pp. 11-33.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 17. Cf. George Trakl, 'Im Winter: ein Winterabend, 1. Fassung', in *Georg Trakl, Dichtungen und Briefe, Band I*, eds. by Walther Killy and Hans Szklensar (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1969), p. 383.



wandering, but the argument that the wanderer is taken to the edge of human existence and that this process fundamentally changes him. Authentic temporality enables awareness of mortality, without a sequence of discrete moments, and this transition in the poem does that too: it happens between the second and third stanzas. The wanderer becomes aware of his own mortality. Indeed, John Wilkinson suggests that to cross the threshold is to enter ‘death’s domain’, linking wandering to death.<sup>148</sup>

**Fig. 4.4. Georg Trakl, ‘Ein Winterabend’, zweite Fassung and two English translations**

Ein Winterabend	A Winter Evening	A Winter Evening
Wenn der Schnee ans Fenster fällt, Lang die Abendglocke läutet, Vielen ist der Tisch bereitet Und das Haus ist wohlbestellt.	When snow falls on the windowpane, And the evening bell chimes long, The table is set for many guests And the house is well stocked up.	Window with falling snow is arrayed, Long tolls the vesper bell, The house is provided well, The table is for many laid.
Mancher auf der Wanderschaft Kommt ans Tor auf dunklen Pfaden. Golden blüht der Baum der Gnaden Aus der Erde kühlem Saft.	Many a journeyer on this way Arrives by dark paths at the gate. The tree of grace is blooming gold Nourished by the earth’s cool sap.	Wandering ones, more than a few, Come to the door on darksome courses. Golden blooms the tree of graces Drawing up the earth’s cool dew.
Wanderer tritt still herein; Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle. Da erglänzt in reiner Helle Auf dem Tische Brot und Wein. <sup>149</sup>	The traveler comes quietly in; Pain has petrified the threshold. Then on the table in sudden light The pure gleam of bread and wine. <sup>150</sup>	Wanderer quietly steps within; Pain has turned the threshold to stone. There lie, in limpid brightness shown, Upon the table bread and wine. <sup>151</sup>

Moreover, as Mark A. Wrathall remarks, in his chapter on Heidegger and religion, this shows us how poetic language functions. The poem, as per ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ opens up something else entirely:

<sup>148</sup> John Wilkinson, ‘Stone thresholds’, *Textual practice*, 31 (2017), 631-59 (p. 640).

<sup>149</sup> Georg Trakl, ‘Ein Winterabend, 2. Fassung’, in Trakl, *Dichtungen und Briefe, Band I*, eds. Killy and Szklenar, p. 102.

<sup>150</sup> Georg Trakl, *The Poems of Georg Trakl*, trans. by Margitt Leibert (London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2007), p. 118.

<sup>151</sup> This translation is the one found in the following: Martin Heidegger, ‘Language’ in Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 195-208 (pp. 118-19). I have included both translations here because they emphasise different aspects of the German text. Without an extended discussion of them both, it suffices to say that there are aspects of Hofstadter’s that are particularly pertinent both to this chapter and Heidegger’s reading of the poem, such as the clearly linked translations of ‘Wanderer’ and ‘Wanderschaft’ that are obscured in Leibert’s. However, Leibert’s is generally closer to the structure of the original poem, thus the inclusion of both.

In this particular case, the poem can only do this if the world to which it orients us can, for instance, actually open up in a way that allows tables to be laid out in preparation for communal meals, and in a way that allows vesper bells actually to call us together so that religious services give us order and purpose to our lives. The poetic word calls us to a world that can actually be disclosed as a space and time for living a Christian life.<sup>152</sup>

Wrathall clearly links both space and time in Heidegger's reading of Trakl's poem. However, drawing out the emphasis further, Christopher Fynsk writes of the first stanza that for Heidegger, it has 'presence dominated by absence.'<sup>153</sup> Moreover it is not just presence (ambiguously both spatial and temporal), but 'This is a nearness and thus spatial in a certain sense, but it is a nearness marked by temporality. What the stanza names, Heidegger emphasizes, is the time of the winter evening.'<sup>154</sup>

To step beyond Heidegger for a moment, this poem has further, musical resonances. Anton Webern sets this poem as the final song in his *Vier Lieder*, Op. 13. This may seem somewhat removed from this project but there is a parallel to be drawn with Schubert. Webern's lyricism has often been compared to that of Schubert, making a telling historical comparison and it is a fundamental part of his work. Christopher Wintle argues lyricism and repetition in Webern's song have, in part, a Schubertian heritage in 'the aesthetic category of *developmental lyricism*: Webern, in others, is looking for constant evolution while preserving a context that traditionally favours simple repetition. This category, moreover, leads to another pair of contradictions, the source of which again lies in Schubert's song.'<sup>155</sup>

It is apposite to look not only at wandering in the context of this song, but homecoming too: Julian Johnson notes that 'Webern's arrangement thus rounds off Op. 13 not with a broken image of a shattered *Heimat* but with the promise of a genuine one.'<sup>156</sup> According to Johnson, Webern, in his setting, makes the effort to affirm a sense of homecoming, both through performance markings and the

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<sup>152</sup> Mark A. Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, History* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 169.

<sup>153</sup> Christopher Fynsk, 'Noise at the Threshold', *Research in Phenomenology*, 19 (1989), 101-120 (p. 105).

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>155</sup> Christopher Wintle, 'Webern's lyric character', in *Webern Studies*, ed. by Kathryn Bailey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 226-63 (pp. 241-42).

<sup>156</sup> Julian Johnson, *Webern and the Transformation of Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 141.

way in which he scores the setting.<sup>157</sup> Felix Meyer and Anne C. Shreffler discuss Webern's revisions to Op. 13/4, pointing out that Webern altered his reading of the poem, moving from a stanza-by-stanza reading of it, to one that shifts halfway through the poem (i.e. halfway through the second verse). This has profound implications for the word-setting, because the first half of the poem focuses purely on images, whereas human figures only come in the second half, moving finally onto the Eucharistic bread and wine.<sup>158</sup> All of this only emphasises what Heidegger will find in the poem; the move from wandering to homecoming, which is predominantly effected with images of light, and the resultant effect on temporality. There is a historical proximity here too with Trakl's concern with this trope: once again the early twentieth century and romanticism meet.<sup>159</sup>

Andrew J. Mitchell explains that 'In his readings of Trakl, Heidegger finds a poet who emphasizes human finitude without the adherence to a thought of presence and infinitude that burdened Rilke. Finitude is inseparable from relationality, insofar as the limit of the finite is always an opening onto a beyond. The finite being is exposed to a world that affects it. Trakl traces these effects through the figure of the wanderer in his poetry.'<sup>160</sup> According to Heidegger's reading of Trakl, the wanderer becomes exposed to mortality in this way in a moment of transformation. Mitchell states of Trakl's 'Ein Winterabend' 'With the wanderer's arrival at the threshold, the things are allowed a space of appearing. We no longer impose ourselves upon them to bend them to our aims, nor are we trapped inside ourselves behind a wall they cannot reach. Standing at the limit, a transformative relation takes place.'<sup>161</sup> This transformative relationship, according to Mitchell, is a motif that Heidegger traces in both 'Die Sprache' and 'Die Sprache im Gedicht'.<sup>162</sup> In both, Heidegger suggests that mortals are 'defined by what lies beyond them.'<sup>163</sup> Indeed, 'Mortality is a matter of determination through exposure to the other, an occurrence of the limit as site of contact and relation between one's own and what lies beyond (the wild).'<sup>164</sup> There would

<sup>157</sup> Johnson, *Webern and the Transformation of Nature*, pp. 141-42.

<sup>158</sup> Felix Meyer and Anne C. Shreffler, 'Webern's Revisions: Some Analytical Implications', *Music Analysis*, 12 (1993), 355-79 (p. 374).

<sup>159</sup> Webern's *Vier Lieder* date from 1914-18, Heidegger's Trakl essays from later still – 'Die Sprache' (1950) and 'Die Sprache im Gedicht' (1952).

<sup>160</sup> Andrew J. Mitchell, 'Heidegger's poetics of relationality', in *Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays*, ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 217-32 (p. 222).

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 222.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 223.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 223-24.

seem to be any number of things to draw out here. The main point in this context would be that awareness of mortality is transformative – and ultimately leads to death; and in Heidegger's reading of the second version of 'Winterabend' at least, that happens via wandering and homecoming, and the crossing of thresholds.

Mitchell goes on to elaborate further and situate this reading in the context of Heidegger's reading of Rilke: 'The language of Trakl's poetry is not a description of this world, it is the evocation of it and participation within it. Just as the shattering of song in Rilke's poetry gained us entry into the world, so too does poetic language bring us to this world of relations for Trakl.'<sup>165</sup> It is telling that Mitchell continues by describing the wanderer as 'underway in the world'<sup>166</sup> for the journeying aspect of the wanderer is somewhat lost in his reading, but there is nonetheless something utterly transformative about wandering in Heidegger's interpretation of it. A point that Mitchell does not dwell on, however, is one that Heidegger makes in 'Die Sprache', which has to do with mortality and death. Heidegger undoubtedly sees mortality, and thus death, as connected to this moment of transformation in wandering:

These mortals are capable of dying as the wandering toward death. In death the supreme concealedness of Being crystallizes. Death has already overtaken every dying. Those 'wayfarers' must first wander their way to house and table through the darkness of their courses; they must do so not only and not even primarily for themselves, but for the many, because the many think that if they only install themselves in houses and sit at tables, they are already bethinged, conditioned, by things and have arrived at dwelling.<sup>167</sup>

Here, Heidegger starts to make the relationship between wandering and death still clearer; and perhaps homecoming too. Wandering can ultimately lead to death – as both Friedrich and Schubert have shown. How the moment of transformation works musically is much more interesting, especially given that for Heidegger, language is central to the process. Doubtless, wandering and homecoming collapse into one temporal moment for Heidegger and they have the capacity to be completely transformative; that moment is found in the poetry. By contrast, for Adorno, successful art boasts both 'instants' and 'cessation' of time. Neither of these arguments would seem incompatible; indeed, they would appear to work together to further explain the temporality of wandering and homecoming in the two case studies in this chapter. As the wanderer crosses the

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<sup>165</sup> Mitchell, 'Heidegger's poetics of relationality', p. 225.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>167</sup> Heidegger, 'Language', p. 200.

threshold in 'Ein Winterabend' there is a moment when time stops, and this is echoed in both versions.<sup>168</sup> In the second version, as the wanderer crosses the threshold from outside to inside, there is a sense that a new scene has completely opened up, and with it the rhythm of events has changed entirely. However, it would seem to be underestimating music to suggest that it is incapable of such a process.

For example, if one looks at the end of the first and start of the second movements in the *Wandererfantasie*, there is arguably something of this process to be found in the first few bars of the second movement. The end of the first movement continues to build the tension as it moves further away from the tonic, pushing the figurative wanderer further away from home, and then as the second movement starts it becomes apparent exactly where the journey so far has led. This seems as though some of the tension will dissipate somewhat, and indeed it does seem to relax a bit – even more so at the end of the theme with an almost otherworldly-sounding PAC in E major in bar 196.

**Ex. 4.13. *Wandererfantasie*, D. 797, bb. 189-96**



However, all is not as it seems. This variation movement constitutes its own version of wandering. Within the ever-building trajectory there are moments where time feels suspended. Such passages might include bars 215-226, 237-239, and 240-244. All of these share one crucial trait: the slowing of the melody. The slowing means that there is an apparent change in temporal rhythm. In all of these examples, but most particularly in bars 189-196, there is a combination of rhythmical slowing in the melody, harmonic change, and apparent relaxation of tension which creates an atmosphere that reminds one of Burnham's description

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Trakl, *Dichtungen und Briefe, Band I*, p. 102 and p. 383.

of the modulation in D. 887 as ‘ephemeral’. This is posited within the larger context of the work having an unresolved tonal duality at its heart, making the work’s tonal trajectory less definite. As the music stands on the cusp of shifting between the two parts of that duality, there is a sense that a new space has been opened up. This is of crucial importance to the journey: this new space is the ‘ephemeral’ one of an ‘instant’, but the journey has also been taken to (and will be taken over) its threshold, as the notion of wandering suggests for Heidegger. Such ‘ephemeral’ moments are reminiscent of Fisk’s description of an ‘epiphany’ in D. 960 (see Chapter 2). It is in such ways that instrumental music constructs and crosses its own thresholds.

These spaces that Heidegger identifies in Trakl’s poetry resonate very strongly with the descriptions of Schubert’s music as otherworldly – the spaces that he opens up play with the listener’s understanding of both temporality and spatiality. The wanderer and potential homecoming would appear to lie at the heart of those temporal and spatial relationships. This certainly applies not only in the *Wandererfantasie*, but also in *Winterreise*, where, if anything, it is more complicated – and the transformation more complete – because it ties into Heidegger’s arguments about mortality. In *Winterreise*, perhaps, the threshold comes in the wanderer’s changing relationship with his mortality: but ultimately the transition happens after the cycle finishes – if one reads the cycle as finishing with his ultimate death.

*Winterreise* is, of course, one of Schubert’s late works and recent scholarship has become much more aware of the issues surrounding lateness in Schubert’s music.<sup>169</sup> Lateness in general is a concept over which much ink has been spilled and this is not the place for an extended discussion of those issues, but it is clearly pertinent to Schubert nonetheless.<sup>170</sup> As Byrne Bodley states ‘Schubert’s late style is unthinkable without the existence of Beethoven’s late style, in the sense of a model he moved beyond. Yet his strategy for success – deviation from Beethoven

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<sup>169</sup> This is particularly clear in *Schubert’s Late Music*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton.

<sup>170</sup> Much of that discussion (at least in the context of musicology) with composers broadly contemporaneous with Schubert, has been premised around Beethoven. This discussion can be followed through sources such as: Adorno, ‘Late Style in Beethoven’, ‘Alienated Masterpiece: The *Missa Solemnis*’, in Adorno, *Essays on Music*, pp. 569-83, Thomas Mann, *Doktor Faustus: Das Leben des deutschen Tonsetzer Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975), and Edward W. Saïd, *On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).

– proved to be a cause of failure in the judgement of posterity.’<sup>171</sup> *Winterreise* falls squarely into Schubert’s ‘late’ music both chronologically and aesthetically and that has ramifications for this discussion. The way in which death is treated – the wanderer’s longing for and awareness of it – is, after all, one of the main aspects of its heart-wrenching poignancy.

More generally, lateness as an idea has in itself provoked literature on a variety of composers (not just Beethoven), as well as those working with other art-forms. One obvious example is Rainer Maria Rilke who is considered to have both ‘late’ and ‘very late’ periods<sup>172</sup> from which some of his most famous works date.<sup>173</sup> Rilke’s poetry, which in a sense, deals with lateness thematically, seems to sit in direct opposition to the future-oriented forms of Beethoven, so crucial for modernity. Schubert, perhaps, offers a countervailing sense of lateness – making further sense of the closer link between Beethoven’s late period and Schubert. This ostensible lateness is apparent in the temporality of Schubert’s music. What lateness does dictate is a certain understanding of time, summed up in Michael C. Wood’s introduction to Edward Saïd’s *On Late Style*: ‘Lateness doesn’t name a single relation to time, but it always brings time in its wake. It is a way of remembering time, whether it is missed or met or gone.’<sup>174</sup> Julian Horton writes of the String Quintet that ‘lateness is revealed in the self-critique of form: the music’s functional stability is problematized, but no higher-level synthesis is attempted.’<sup>175</sup> Both statements, interestingly, could in many ways refer to most of Schubert’s output, so acutely aware of its own temporality is much of his music; it comes from the same kind of observation as the need to talk about nostalgia and memory in Schubert.

Early on in his novel *Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge* (1910), Rilke writes: ‘In the old days one knew (or perhaps one guessed), that one had death *in*

<sup>171</sup> Lorraine Byrne Bodley, ‘Introduction: Schubert’s late style and current musical scholarship’, in *Schubert’s Late Music*, eds. by Byrne Bodley and Horton, pp. 1-16 (p. 16).

<sup>172</sup> See Thomas Martinec, ‘The Sonnets to Orpheus’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Rilke*, eds. by Karen Leeder and Robert Vilain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 95-110 (p. 96).

<sup>173</sup> It is worth bearing in mind the links made between Becoming, Being, Heidegger and late style in Andreas Kramer, ‘Rilke and Modernism’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Rilke*, eds. by Leeder and Vilain, pp. 116-30 (p. 129): ‘Largely on account of his late work, Rilke has long been seen as a poet of ‘Being’ (in the Heideggerian, existentialist sense).’

<sup>174</sup> Michael C. Wood, ‘Introduction’, in Edward W. Saïd, *On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), pp. xi-xix (p. xi).

<sup>175</sup> Julian Horton, ‘Stasis and Continuity in Schubert’s String Quintet: Responses to Nathan Martin, Steven Vande Moortele, Scott Burnham and John Koslovsky’, *Music Analysis*, 33 (2014), 194-213 (p. 211).

one like fruit the seed. Children had a small one and adults a large one. [...] One *had* it, and it gave you a strange worth and a quiet pride.<sup>176</sup> As a description of the human awareness of mortality, and how it changes through the chronology of life, it is an apt description. Like Adorno's oft-cited metaphor about fruit,<sup>177</sup> the kernel of Rilke's fruit has grown sufficiently over time, as Adorno's has ripened – and then over-ripened. Within both there is an inherent understanding of the passage of time and thus the natural continuum from birth to death, reminiscent too of Heidegger's authentic temporality. However, Schubert's shortened life disrupts that – and so the pertinent question, posed by Byrne Bodley is as follows: 'What happens if we become conscious of our mortality at an earlier age?'<sup>178</sup> But this is a historical question too: Schubert's music seems to look backwards whether it was written before or after 1823.

In many ways, this is not just a question for Schubert, but also a question to be asked of the wanderer in *Winterreise*. This is a man who longs for his hair to go grey so that he might be closer to death – clearly a man who is not yet old. This is a man willing himself to die, disrupting that natural chronology. This does also mean that he wishes to disturb, in a sense, his authentic temporality in the way that Heidegger would understand it. However, a way in which one could read it is that the way in which temporality is presented in the cycle as a series of instants (as per Adorno) is one representation of the disruption of that continuum; ultimately, his desire to disrupt a continuum is found in a set of discrete moments. Schubert's music's temporality undoubtedly contributes to its sense of 'lateness', purely because of the approach to musical material – many of the hallmarks of musical lateness can arguably found in Schubert's music before 1823. However, in a work such as *Winterreise* there is no doubt that there is a heightening of the burden of mortality.

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<sup>176</sup> 'Früher wußte man (oder vielleicht man ahnte es), daß man den Tod *in* sich hatte wie die Frucht den Kern. Die Kinder hatten einen kleinen in sich und die Erwachsenen einen großen. [...] Den *hatte* man, und das gab einem eine eigentümliche Würde und einen stillen Stolz.' (Rainer Maria Rilke, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), p. 12.)

<sup>177</sup> Cf. Adorno, 'Late Style in Beethoven', p. 564: 'The maturity of the late works of significant artists does not resemble the kind one finds in fruit. They, for the most part, are not round, but furrowed, even ravaged. Devoid of sweetness, bitter and spiny, they do not surrender themselves to mere delectation. They lack all the harmony that the classicist aesthetic is in the habit of demanding from works of art, and they show more traces of history than of growth.'

<sup>178</sup> Byrne Bodley, 'Introduction: Schubert's late style and current musical scholarship', p. 2.



Lateness therefore adds another dimension here to the role that mortality plays in these temporal processes because there is a self-conscious aspect to the attitude to mortality.<sup>179</sup> The inevitability of death takes on another dimension in such a context. At one level, *Winterreise* does not really end at all: as discussed above, the tonal conflict is unresolved. However, at another, the desire for death and the disintegration of the musical material suggests that perhaps the wanderer does indeed die. The lack of resolution could represent, rather than the uncertain outcome, the dissonance between the wanderer and the expectations of society. If this is indeed the case, then arguably Schubert constructs a sense of homecoming through death. This ultimate fate brings the wanderer to where he wants to be – a final resting place. In ‘Die Sprache’ ultimately the journey through language leads to death, because of this moment of transformation; the journey in *Winterreise* also leads to death. There is a complete absence of homecoming in the traditional sense in *Winterreise*, but one can interpret death as a homecoming. There is a tonal return, despite its resonance of something else; death has become home in this context. The lingering B minor hints, like Friedrich’s red sky, at what lies beyond. Schubert reveals musically that there is nowhere else for the wanderer to go and his psychological disintegration is all but complete. At the end, he is spent.

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<sup>179</sup> Laura Tunbridge points out that it is not only Schubert where the seemingly contradictory notions of late style and a tragically short life come together: this is also the case for Mozart. cf: Laura Tunbridge, ‘Saving Schubert: The Evasions of Late Style’, in *Late Style and its Discontents*, eds. by Gordon McMullan and Sam Smiles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 120-30 (pp. 120-21).

## CONCLUSION

The primary focus of the preceding chapters has been to show that Schubert's music formulates a model of temporality predicated on ideas that unpick some of the most dearly held tenets of Austro-German nineteenth-century form. In short, this is one not readily accounted for by a dialectical or teleological interpretation – and attempting to explain it within the boundaries of existing musicological paradigms leads to not inconsiderable problems. Here, then, lies the value of the vocabulary that has become mainstream in Schubert scholarship: it delineates ways to articulate temporal processes in Schubert's music. In adopting some of those terms, namely the fragment, repetition, wandering and homecoming, this project finds a foundation to explore temporality in Schubert's music.

The categories around which the latter three chapters are arranged therefore sit together as much as they do apart and are thus, in essence, aspects of the same issue. To put it succinctly, they are part of a wider question to find a way to iterate non-developmental processes outside the Beethoven Paradigm. Productive engagement with such categories can, it is clear, lead to greater understanding of the processes governing Schubert's construction of temporality. Moreover, the links to be drawn between each of these categories return to the seemingly more problematic aspect of this temporality: Schubert's use of repetition, which challenges our overriding expectation of development. His use of repetition changes not only musical processes, but their temporal focus – which leads back to the set of terms privileged in this project and elsewhere.

On the surface, repetition sounds as though it should be inconsequential. That is, however, indicative of the very problem we are attempting to overcome: teleological forms have exerted such dominance that we are almost destined to think of repetition as empty and meaningless. It is for that very reason, historically, Schubert's use of repetition has proved somewhat perplexing. But in this project, such categories, key to much contemporary Schubert scholarship, coalesce to form a constellation of ideas, all of which contribute to a different way in which to approach this music.

The aim here has been twofold, however. Compelling and useful though these categories are in and of themselves, this project has above all sought to examine their philosophical consequences. To put it another way, the project has looked to broaden the understanding of these ideas, rich though they undoubtedly are, by putting them in a philosophical context. This proves to be a fruitful area for inquiry; looking outside the discipline offers potential for a framework to interrogate these temporal processes less dependent upon the limitations of inherited paradigms ill-suited to Schubert's music. In reference to this, the thesis turned first to Adorno and then Heidegger. Adorno is hardly unknown to musicology – and his writing on Schubert makes it an obvious initial step, especially given the terms in which he frames Schubert's music. However, despite the role of the early Schubert essay in recent Schubert reception, the overriding argument adopted from Adorno's writing on music is the very argument that Schubert scholarship is attempting to escape, so this turn to Adorno is more complex than it initially seems.

This is where the thesis made one of its major propositions. Adorno's Schubert essay is not such an outlier as first impressions might suggest; and from that, as outlined in Chapter 2, one can construct a rather different interpretation of Austro-German music of this era, running counter to the Beethovenian-Hegelian tradition. This line, which extends from Schubert to Mahler, shows Adorno's indebtedness to early German Romanticism. There is a profound irony here: Adorno entrenches us in a system we are trying to overcome, but simultaneously offers us a potential escape. This approach, which at times confronts, indeed stems from, the pitfalls of the dialectical model, starts to elucidate ways in which the fragment is useful as a mechanism to explore temporality in Schubert's music. The inherently anti-teleological nature of the fragment offers one way to conceive of this conception of musical time. This Romantic heritage persists in Adorno's writing, especially on Schubert and Mahler, particularly with regards to the relationship between part and whole. The particular is no longer subsumed into its greater whole, but can stand alone as an entity, remaining remarkably unchanged – as with the seemingly fragmentary quality found in Schubert's music. The tension between whole and part is never satisfactorily resolved, as the part never gives up its identity.

Form can then be read as a constellation of fragments, with multiple implications for the way in which that will play out, not least that the temporal focus would appear to be a preoccupation with the present or the past, rather than looking forward. The removal of development as the impetus for forward motion quite simply removes the telos, and with it, the sense of becoming. Ostensibly, the music is simply an elaboration of being. Chapter 3 goes some way to elucidating what this 'being' might actually mean. This apparent temporal freedom simply 'to be' is no less complex than its teleologically-defined neighbour. Although it seems counterintuitive, preoccupation with the present moment creates music that is ultimately backward-looking. Schubert's music, which is unconcerned with its future, returns to its unchanging motifs – again and again. Repetition is one of the defining features of Schubert's music, and it is because of that repetition that Adorno only takes the thesis so far: ultimately repetition remains a stumbling block for him.

Schubert's repetition, however, as discussed in Chapter 3, is active. In itself, this affects the work's temporal continuum considerably. In order to interpret it, it proves necessary to turn outwards. This would seem to stand counter to presumptions about repetition elsewhere, where it is seen to impede process: to put it bluntly, musicology's existing structures simply do not offer a framework for interpreting the kinds of repetition in Schubert's music that do it justice, nor elucidate its philosophical consequences, motivating the turn to Heidegger. Given that repetition plays an active part in temporality, this offers a way of reading repetition that does not merely decry it as purposeless. By saying that repetition is an active process, that does not make it part of a process of teleological becoming. Instead, by liberating repetition from teleology, there is a freedom to recast interpretations of the temporal emphasis of Schubert's music, as per Scott Burnham, not as process but as presence. While Burnham, as mentioned in Chapter 1, sees presence in both teleological, but more crucially non-teleological models, by invoking a Heideggerian model, there is argument for repetition (in Heidegger's interpretation) in non-teleology. The paradigms may not be shifting, but there are subtler ways to read Schubert in relation to the paradigms, as the last few decades of scholarship have exemplified.

This is not only important in the context of Schubert studies. Repetition as an active process overturns some of the tacit assumptions underlying our

understanding of early Austro-German nineteenth-century music. However, this reading of Schubert's repetition as underpinning authentic temporality in the Heideggerian sense not only elevates repetition, but makes sense of it as a crucial part of the temporal process. Now repetition is seen to hold meaning on a temporal continuum, but one that operates in a different manner to that found elsewhere. In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 1, this is a clash of the notions of being and becoming. Here is a sense of what is at stake; Heidegger offers a way to explore this temporal continuum in a way where the temporal emphasis is different.

With the temporal focus of the music now being acknowledged not to be the future, but the present and past, this opens up another avenue of exploration. Harmonic structures, as well as thematic and motivic, contribute to a sense of teleology – or in Schubert's case, the lack thereof. Much discussed in the literature is the tonal vagrancy of Schubert's music, and how this contributes to a sense of wandering. Wandering in Schubert's music, as Chapter 4 has shown, is actually made up of a combination of factors – of which tonal vagrancy is just one. As a trope, the nineteenth-century wanderer is hugely influential for Schubert's output. However, there is kinship in those wandering processes between instrumental music and the *Lieder*. In a sense, this wandering is the ultimate archetype of a non-teleological process, especially when coupled with Schubert's approach to homecoming.

Wandering makes it possible for this music to thwart expectations and deviate from the anticipated path. However, homecoming is treated very differently in the two case studies: in the first, *Winterreise*, it is simply deferred. There is no sense of homecoming – even if the wanderer meets his ultimate homecoming in death, it does not happen within the realm (tonal or otherwise) of the cycle. The *Wandererfantasie* makes a huge show of its homecoming. The nature of the homecoming at the end is in no way subtle: it is enormous. It has one particular purpose – and that is to obliterate a tonal conflict that is never resolved, merely removed. The key of the *Wandererfantasie's* variations (like *Winterreise's* B minor) never really leaves. Arguably, this conflict is better read as a manifestation of being or of part of a Romantic thread of thought. The wandering and homecoming here are not constructed as a binary: in the first case study, wandering is present, homecoming absent; in the second, wandering is only

obliterated by the sham of a forced homecoming imposed over an unresolved tonal conflict.

Here is the flipside of this temporal model. There is no real resolution, because there is no synthesis. Sometimes there is disintegration, or an imposition of an apparent resolution, but the true affirmation of resolution is missing, because the focus is on looking back, and in the present, there remain echoes of unresolved conflicts. All in all, these different ways of looking at the problem show that there are ways to read Schubert's music which can create an architecture of the temporal processes which move outside the pre-existing model.

Ultimately, then, this thesis offers a different take on a familiar problem. Firstly, in terms of the relationship between Schubert and Beethoven, there is a shift. That shift brings about a particular way of looking at musical time and how it is constructed in Schubert's music. Ultimately the thesis has tried to liberate Schubert from the demands of teleology, but more importantly, to provide a theoretical basis on which to premise that interpretation. Any move away from teleology in the kind of formal idioms of Schubert's times sees a rupture with expected norms of musical time.

Secondly, this thesis has drawn on the shared heritage of Adorno and Heidegger, exploring the idea that they are not as far apart as they have often been taken to be. In the end, what Adorno and Heidegger contribute to this project are ways of thinking about music which do not follow the traditional dialectical model. The role of repetition in authentic temporality proves just as insightful as the notion of a constellation of fragments – and both eventually lead to the same place: the relationship between part and whole. This is a relationship that runs counter to expectations, disrupted by processes such as those examined here, even to the point of closure and resolution. The frameworks employed here help us interrogate why.

This is not simply a case of bringing a collection of writings to music in order to interpret it. Instead, three major figures are brought together into the same discursive space. By bringing these ideas and this music into dialogue the project has opened up fruitful avenues for inquiry, showing how there are ways to interrogate concepts frequently aligned with Schubert's music from rather

different perspectives. There remains ample opportunity for further research in this area, opening up these perspectives to greater ends. The limitations of this project, in terms of size and scope, are naturally many.

Neither Adorno's nor Heidegger's thought provide a perfect solution to the questions posed by Schubert's music. While Adorno's work remains perilously close to the very temporal model Schubert studies is attempting to eschew, Heidegger refuses to deal with music in any meaningful sense altogether – which for a philosopher so convinced of the philosophical import of artworks and preoccupied with the temporality of being is all the more surprising. This project has remained only too aware of the limitations of the thought to which it turns – and thus, what Schubert's music can add to this constellation. Nevertheless, there are rich possibilities here afforded by drawing together these three figures which lead to insights telling for Schubert's music.

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