

'Blue blood, blue shirt'

**The role of the Conde de Mayalde during the Franco dictatorship in Spain,
1939-1975**

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy in History

2020

Declaration of Authorship

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Date:

Abstract

The thesis explores the political career of José Finat y Escrivá de Romaní, the Conde de [Count of] Mayalde in the years before and during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 followed by the subsequent Franco dictatorship which lasted until 1975. An aristocrat and member of the fascist Falange party which supported Franco, Mayalde occupied important political posts at pivotal moments. During the period of World War II he helped cultivate links with the Axis powers. A political survivor, Mayalde continued to have a significant political career in Spain during the Cold War years, when between 1952 and 1965 he was the longest-serving Mayor of Madrid. During this time he promoted Spain before the United States and Europe.

Mayalde's career could be considered microcosmic of the Franco regime itself. Studying Mayalde provides the opportunity to examine important subjects concerning the role of fascism in Franco's Spain and its international relations including the controversial relationship with Nazi Germany. Looking at Mayalde as an aristocrat who took up fascism in the Falange, the aim of this study is to understand what Mayalde meant for Franco's Spain in its different phases throughout its existence, although the main focus is the WWII period. The thesis assesses Mayalde as an administrator, bureaucrat and diplomat as it attempts to analyse core Francoist objectives and Falangist ambitions. This was significant for Franco's repression of political opponents and other "undesirables" which also overlapped with Axis relations. The thesis also considers the extent of any adaptability under postwar developmentalist and ostensibly "defascistised" Francoism. Ultimately we see where Mayalde stood between his fervent Falangist politics, the constantly changing geopolitical climate and his value and loyalty to Franco himself with the promises of power and prestige.

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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to the tuition, involvement, perspective and advice of the late Professor David Cesarani whose Holocaust Studies programme inspired this research, as of course he was an inspiration to so many people in academia and outside. Of course I am very grateful to my supervisor Professor Helen Graham who introduced me to 20th Century Spanish research during my undergraduate studies, gave me insight into the complexities of history and encouraged my interest in researching the subject of this thesis. Throughout these years I have received an immense level of support. I also thank Rudolf Muhs for his extensive support as my advisor and Becky Jinks for the copyediting. Others I wish to acknowledge and thank include Dan Stone, Daniel Beer, Emmett Sullivan, Markus Daeschel, Jonathan Harris, Sarah Ansari, Andrea Mammone, Robert Eaglestone, Graham Smith, the late Professor Justin Champion, James Kent, Sarah Wright, Judith Meddick, Miriam Haddu, Tyler Fisher, Alba Chaparro, Robert Priest, Nicole Young and other lecturers, students and faculty members at Royal Holloway; Paul Preston, Ángel Viñas, Paco Romero Salvado, Bernd Rother, María Ocón Fernández, Ismael Saz Campos, Jimmy Burns and other lecturers, investigators and writers. Pedro Correa, Joe Mulhall, David Brydan, Seb Browne, Carl-Henrik Bjerström, Richard Ryan, Álvaro Cepero, Susana Grau, Stephanie Wright, Nick Sharman and other contemporaries including those from the Cañada Blanch Centre discussion group. Fond thanks to departmental and administrative personnel at Royal Holloway for their pivotal parts throughout my time there.

Archivists and others also aided me greatly with my investigative endeavours. Thanks to Esperanza Adrados Villar and the staff at the *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, Madrid. The *Archivo de la Villa* and *Hemeroteca*, Madrid. The *Archivos del Congreso de los Diputados*, Madrid. Daniel Gozalbo Gimeno, Julio Martín-Varés and the staff at the *Archivo General de la Administración*, Alcalá de Henares. The *Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica*, Salamanca. Subteniente Francisco Quintero Martínez, Víctor Moraleda Torres and the staff at the *Archivo General Militar*, Ávila. José Ramón Barroso Rosendo, Santiago Saborido Piñero and the staff at the *Archivo Histórico Provincial*, Cadiz. Ángel Arias Lozano and María Jesús del Castillo Cortés at the *Archivo Histórico Provincial*, Guadalajara. Susana Penelo Werner and the staff at the *Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya*, Barcelona. Álvaro Castresana López and staff at the *Archivo Histórico Provincial*, Burgos. Magdalena Canellas Anoz and the teams at the provincial and municipal archives in Seville. The provincial and municipal archives in Salamanca, Zaragoza, Valencia, Bilbao. Emilio de Miguel and the staff at the *Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco*, Madrid. Rafael Finat y Rivá, Conde de Mayalde. Annegret Wilke and staff at the *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts*, Berlin. Heinz Fehlauer, Michael Conen and staff at the *Bundesarchiv*, Berlin. The National Archives of Britain, Kew. National Archives of Ireland, Dublin.

National Agency Release Panel at the CIA, Maryland. *Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior*, Madrid. The British Library, London. The Cadbury Research Library, Birmingham. *Centro Sefarad-Israel*, Madrid. Senate House, London. The Wiener Holocaust Library, London. London School of Economics. Other archives, libraries, institutions and names that I was unsuccessful obtaining or that I have inadvertently omitted.

I am particularly sorry to anyone I may have failed to include especially where any great length, interest, alacrity and goodwill was involved in undertaking to assist me. With regards to my support when studying in Spain, I must thank my friends Marco and Elena in Valencia. We had many good conversations and memorable meals over summers and winters in Spain. I also thank Nieves and Fernando as well as my other friends, family, colleagues and others, alive and deceased across Surrey, London and the rest of the UK, Valencia and the rest of Spain as well as the rest of Europe and beyond. I received much help, support, key assistance, patience and goodwill when it came to my studies of History, Spain and the Spanish language, the German language, organisation, training, resources and equipment along with hospitality and fond occasions.

Rudolf B.G. Savundra

List of abbreviations and glossary terms

AA – German Foreign Ministry (*Auswärtiges Amt*)

ABC – Spanish newspaper

Acción Española (AE) – right-wing anti-Republican association

Acción Popular (AP) – right-wing elite party falling under CEDA from 1933, had its youth section *Juventudes de Acción Popular* (JAP)

ACdD – *Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados*, Parliamentary Archives

Africanistas – Spanish career officers commanding the colonial troops of Spain’s Army of Africa, based in Spain’s Moroccan enclave. The Army of Africa came to be under Franco’s command

AGA – *Archivo General de la Administración*, Spanish state administrative archives

- AR – *Archivo Renovado*, foreign affairs section opened in 2016, previously part of AMAE
- TOP – Decrees/notices concerning appointments

AGM - *Archivo General Militar*, Military Archive (Ávila)

- DEV – Blue Division section

AHN – *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, National Historical Archives

- H – Police files
- FC – Contemporary Institutions

AJ – *Archivo Judaico*, Franco’s “Jewish Archive”

Alcalde – Mayor (of a city)

AMAE – *Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores*, Foreign Ministry Archive

ANC – *Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya*, National Archives of Catalonia

Antipatria and *Gemeinschaftsfremde* – “community aliens”, those sectors of the (Spanish and German) populations considered “undesirable” by the Francoist and Nazi regimes

Arriba – main Falangist newspaper

Artilleros – Artillery officers

“Accidentalism” and “catastrophism” – used to describe the two contrasting right-wing responses to the Republic before 1936. “Accidentalism” meant opposing reform through legal and parliamentary means while “catastrophism” meant seeking to destroy the Republic through force

“Alternate diplomacy” – my encapsulating description of how Mayalde and his factional allies in the Falange on the Spanish side, with Heinrich Himmler and his SS, police etc. on the German side, worked around official diplomatic channels, often undermining them

BArch – *Bundesarchiv*, German Federal Archives

BD – Blue Division. Known in Spanish as the *División Azul*, this was a volunteer unit of division size dispatched by Franco to fight within the Wehrmacht against the USSR in 1941

Berliner Volkszeitung – popular Berlin daily newspaper

BNE – *Biblioteca Nacional de España*, Spanish National Library

C11 – the founding order for the “Jewish Archive”

Caudillo – medieval word meaning “warlord”, title used by Franco as Spain’s dictator akin to Mussolini’s *Duce* and Hitler’s *Führer*

CDMH – *Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica*, Civil War Archives (Salamanca)

- DNSD - Delegación Nacional de Servicios Documentales, National Document Service Delegation

CEDA – *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*, Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups. Right-wing coalition-party, 1933-36

CG – Civil Governor, answerable to the Interior Ministry (MdG)

Comisarias and *Brigadas de Investigación* – police units which cropped up during and after the Spanish Civil War for the purposes of Francoist repression, either as appendages of the state or Falange

Consejo de Hispanidad and *Ibero-Amerikanische Institut* – German-backed Spanish espionage relating to Latin America

contubernio – the “anti-Spanish conspiracy masterminded by Jews, Masons, Bolsheviks”

conversos – medieval-era term referring to descendants of converts to Christianity from Judaism

CPAT - *Cuerpo de Policía Armada y de Tráfico*, Armed and Traffic Police Corps created by Mayalde's DGS in 1941

Cuerpo de seguridad y asalto – Spanish armed-police during the Republic

Cuerpo General de Policía (CGP) – General Police Corps representing the “reformed” police by Mayalde's DGS in March 1941

cuñadísimo – (literally “supreme brother-in-law”) used, somewhat humorously, to describe Ramón Serrano Suñer, who was Franco's brother-in-law, and also the second most powerful man in Spain between 1939 and 1942

DERD – *Delegación del Estado para la Recuperación de Documentos*, Francoist Document Recovery Delegation in Salamanca

Deutsche Arbeitsfront – Nazi German Labour Union

DG – *Director General de Seguridad*, Commissioner of Police

DGFP – Documents on German Foreign Policy

DGS – Spain's police organisation, answerable to the Interior Ministry (MdG)

divisionarios – members of the Blue Division (BD)

“dual effect” – used to refer to the benefits that Hispano-German cooperation conferred on each party

“dual goals” – used to refer to the Franco regime's intertwined aims of domestic consolidation and imperial expansion after the Spanish Civil War. This formed the basis for WWII Axis cooperation

Einsatzgruppen – SS extermination units on the Eastern Front

El Alcazar – Spanish right-wing newspaper

El ausente – “the absent one”, used in reference to Falange founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera after his death in 1936

Endlösung – “Final Solution to the Jewish Question”, Nazi term for the Holocaust

Falange – ideologically fascist party that supported Franco, subsumed from 1937 into FET y de las JONS

fascio – Italian Fascist paramilitary group

FET y de las JONS – the official mass party-organisation of the Francoist state, later referred to more as the *movimiento* or movement

FNFF – *Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco*, a private foundation holding Franco’s papers

Guardia Civil – Civil Guard, a militarised police force, operating mainly in the countryside

HIA – Hoover Institution Archives

Informaciones – Falangist newspaper

Kew – National Archives

- FO – Foreign Office
- HS – Special Operations Executive
- KV – Intelligence Service
- GFM – German Foreign Ministry

MAE – *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores*, Spain’s Foreign Ministry

May Crisis 1941 – political fallout in Franco’s regime in May of 1941 which resulted in the loss of the Interior Ministry (MdG) by Serrano

MdG – *Ministerio de la Gobernación*, Interior Ministry

Medalla Militar – Spanish military decoration

NAI – National Archives of Ireland

- DFA – Department of Foreign Affairs

NARA – National Archives and Records Administration (USA)

NWCDA - Nazi Warcrimes Disclosure Act 2007 collection of CIA Freedom of Information service

“National Syndicalism” – term used to refer to the Falange’s specific fascist-inspired ideology

OCCPAC – US Office for Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, featured in both American and British archival collections

OSS – American Office of Strategic Services, WWII forerunner of the CIA

PAAA – *Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts*, German Foreign Ministry Archives

Reconquista – the centuries-long wars of expansion of Christian/Catholic kingdoms across Iberia, ending with the fall of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada in 1492. The idea of “reconquista” became an ideological vehicle for Franco and the Spanish Right

RSHA – *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, Reich Main Security Office, supreme Nazi police and intelligence agency, headed by Himmler

“red gene” – pseudoscientific concept devised by a Francoist Professor of Psychiatry which ascribed “anti-Spain” politics to a supposed biological defect

SA – *Sturmabteilung*, Nazi party paramilitary organisation, sidelined after 1934

SD – *Sicherheitsdienst*, intelligence branch of the SS and from 1939 part of the RSHA

Servicio de Extranjeros – Spanish police agency which dealt with foreigners and passports

Servicios de Vigilancia y Seguridad del Estado – blanket term for all Spanish security services meant to include the DGS, the *Guardia Civil*, the Falange auxiliaries and other state and party agencies

SIS – British Secret Intelligence Service

SS – *Schutzstaffel*, Nazi paramilitary force which also became part of the German security service

Vernichtungskrieg – “war of extermination” as pursued by Nazi Germany in the East

Völkischer Beobachter – Nazi daily newspaper

Volksgemeinschaft – “national community”, Nazi ideal of a homogeneous people

Waffen-SS – military formations of the SS, during WWII part of the German Armed Forces

Wannsee Conference – 1942 meeting of high-ranking party and state functionaries on the outskirts of Berlin to discuss and coordinate practicalities of the Holocaust

Wehrmacht – German Armed Forces

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The role of the Conde de Mayalde during the Franco dictatorship in Spain, 1939-1975

Introduction

This MPhil thesis comprises a political assessment of the Spanish diplomat and politician, José Finat y Escrivá de Romaní, 17th Conde de [Count of] Mayalde (1904-1995). He was a close collaborator of General Francisco Franco who ruled Spain between 1939 and 1975 following the Spanish Civil War of 1936 – 1939. Mayalde served as Franco's police commissioner or *Director General de Seguridad* (DG) between 1939 and 1941, Spain's Ambassador to Berlin between 1941 and 1942 and Mayor of Madrid between 1952 and 1965. These were important posts under Franco, who had come to power with the support of World War II (WWII) Axis powers Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and before his death became the "good friend and ally" of the United States.¹ As such, this thesis considers the whole of Mayalde's career under Franco. However, the focus of this MPhil thesis and its most substantive chapters are on Mayalde's role in the 1940s.

Mayalde, an aristocrat and member of the Falange fascist party that supported Franco, occupied sensitive government posts at pivotal moments. At the peak of Franco's Axis cooperation we see he was the most important subordinate of leading Falangist Ramón Serrano Suñer, Franco's brother-in-law and then right-hand adviser, the "cuñadísimo". Mayalde was important in developing Franco's police force and establishing a working relationship with the police leadership of Nazi Germany including Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich. It was Mayalde who in 1940 invited Himmler to Madrid to establish closer operational links. Himmler would advise Franco on apparatus and techniques for his repression of defeated Spanish Republicans following the Civil War. Simultaneously Mayalde was key in a machinery whereby Himmler could represent an extended German influence in territories that Germany did not formally occupy. Mayalde continued working with the Axis cause as Ambassador to Berlin. He took up this post when Franco provided manpower, in the form of the "Blue Division", to the Axis' Eastern Front against the Soviet Union. By the time the Division was officially withdrawn in 1943, Mayalde had ceased to be Ambassador. Ultimately Mayalde resurfaced as Mayor of Madrid during the Cold War-era of friendly relations with the Western democracies. Madrid's prestige was promoted on a par with London and Paris and Mayalde was presented as a regarded statesman and diplomat on the European and world stage.²

¹ "Nixon Asserts Franco Won Respect for Spain", *The New York Times*, 21 Nov. 1975, p. 16

² "Proceedings of the 63rd Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference held in Madrid", *Interparliamentary Bureau* 63, 2 (1976), 10: "the Count of Mayalde, is not unknown to us. He has a great parliamentary record behind him and has been associated with the Inter-Parliamentary Union for many years, and he has much to his credit in the contributions he has made"

My thesis research helps enhance our knowledge and understanding of Francoism and the influence of fascism by looking at Mayalde and his main contributions to Spanish and European politics. My MPhil focuses on using this knowledge and understanding to consider new perspectives on Francoism and the relationship with Nazi Germany across the Spanish Civil War and WWII. Mayalde's view to redefining the social and political order in Spain and Europe guides the theme of this thesis. Through Mayalde, not only do we have new perspectives on ideological interfaces in the international fascist relationship, but also how any compatibility suited both WWII-Nazi priorities and post-Spanish Civil War Francoist priorities even though ideological identicalness was another matter.

Under Franco and his right-hand Serrano Suñer, with the view to upholding a new order built on fascist values, during WWII Mayalde was instrumental in facilitating the deployment in Spain of Nazi-inspired forms of political and police organisation along with techniques of monitoring and controlling sectors of the population that Franco deemed to be "undesirable". Of note is Mayalde's particular role where the Jewish population was concerned along with the extent of any potential cooperation with any controlling intent by the Nazis. Mayalde in due course was elevated to Franco's representative in Berlin where he energetically promoted himself as the "Ambassador of the Blue Division". However this wartime politics ended with the political downfall of Serrano Suñer in 1942 which was also followed by a change in the tide of WWII in the Allies' favour.

Despite Mayalde's endeavours leading up to the Nazi military defeat in 1945, his political survival was a singular success story. Mayalde appeared to reinvent himself in the later "developmentalist" phase of Franco's dictatorship, serving as Mayor of Madrid for thirteen years. Yet in spite of this he remained a committed Falangist and continued communicating with international fascist networks, including with wanted war criminals. In line with the thematic scope of this entire thesis, Mayalde's political survival might even be seen as a success story for Falangism and perhaps indeed fascism after 1945. Both Francoists and international fascists shared a perspective that in the face of ascendant Soviet Communism they possessed the necessary disposition to defend and safeguard "traditional Europe".³ The thesis thus ends with a brief consideration of any changes, the limits of such changes and the extent of the continuities in Mayalde's political credo while he operated in a regime endorsed as the "Sentinel of the West". This in turn allows us to make some broader

³ NWCD: Vol. 02/0028, Information Report distributed 2 Oct. 1951; Vol. 02/0026, Report printed 29 Sept. 1951; Graham Macklin, *Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the Postwar Reconstruction of British Fascism* (London, 2007), p. 100; Kew: KV3/45-6, for evidence of post-war contact between British Fascists and Fascist individuals and organisations in Spain, 1946-1954

inferences on how much of the early Francoist value system endured right through the dictatorship, behind ostensible technocratic modernisation.

In the light of Mayalde's singular wartime career and long postwar career, it is surprising that we still have relatively little material which can shed light on Mayalde's intent. A precise analysis of his personal importance under Franco in the wartime proceedings remains hard to achieve. The reasons for beginning this thesis had initially hinged on finding out, through Mayalde, more about the close political relationship between Francoist Spain and Nazi Germany during WWII. It has been possible to add to our empirical knowledge of that relationship and even of Mayalde's role therein. Yet with the material currently available to researchers in the relevant Spanish state archives for both the Spanish Civil War and WWII periods, as well as the absence of any accessible personal archives, Mayalde himself remains a somewhat opaque figure. The difficulties in "approaching" Mayalde have doubtless been doubled by the fact that in the end he was not actually "condemned" to the "political wilderness" after 1945. For Mayalde under Franco, as for others, the choice was clear: loyalty to Franco and access to the privileges of power, or opposition to Franco meaning "unemployment" and perhaps worse.⁴

In terms of the relationship between this present thesis and the existing historiography on Francoism, the thematic coverage I offer therein gives some further consideration to the role of the Falange and its nature within the dictatorship. My work also, if indirectly, allows us to reflect further on the existing wide range of definitions of the Franco regime. The thesis builds on the work of Sheelagh Ellwood,⁵ Paul Preston,⁶ Joan María Thomas,⁷ Herbert Southworth,⁸ Ismael Saz Campos⁹ and Ferrán Gallego.¹⁰ The thesis does not propose a radically new understanding of the structural importance of the Falange to Francoism as a bureaucracy that provided both key state personnel and an enduring nationwide political support base. However, the thesis does cast some light on the way in which, in spite of the dizzying international political changes that Francoism witnessed throughout its entire rule and especially the technocratic modernisation in Spain during the 1960s and early 1970s, Francoist core values were never really challenged. In this context, what the Falange would come to find was that its real *raison d'être* was not actually its envisioned "National Syndicalist revolution". Rather it struggled to identify its own relevance as manpower to safeguard,

⁴ Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London, 1993), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 6136

⁵ Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987)

⁶ Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge* (London, 1991)

⁷ Joan Maria Thomàs, *Franquistas contra franquistas: Luchas por el poder en la cúpula del régimen de Franco* (Barcelona, 2016); Thomàs, *Lo que fue la Falange* (Barcelona, 1999)

⁸ Herbert Southworth, *Antifalange* (Paris, 1968)

⁹ Ismael Saz Campos, *Fascismo y franquismo* (Valencia, 2004)

¹⁰ Ferrán Gallego Margalef, *El evangelio fascista* (Barcelona, 2014)

maintain and reproduce the interests of the broader Francoist political class and its social support base and above all to ensure this through the perpetuation of a closed system of politics.¹¹

Of course, my thesis also seeks to contribute to the broader histories of the Spanish Civil War, international fascism, World War II, the Holocaust and (fleeting) the Cold War. The thesis cites a broad array of secondary sources dealing with these subjects. The major works for the period of relations between Spain and the Axis powers and Spanish fascism include Paul Preston's *The Politics of Revenge* (1991), *Franco: A Biography* (London, 1993) and his seminal "Franco and Hitler: The Myth of Hendaye 1940"¹² (1994), Ángel Viñas' *La Alemania nazi y el 18 de julio* (Madrid, 1974) and *La otra cara del Caudillo: Mitos y realidades en la biografía de Franco* (Barcelona, 2015), Javier Tusell's *Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona, 1995), Wayne Bowen's *Spain During World War II* (Missouri, 2006), and Stanley Payne's *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977* (Wisconsin, 1999) and *Franco and Hitler* (Yale, 2008). On police cooperation, references are made to Paul Preston's "No reconciliations" chapter in *The Spanish Holocaust* (London, 2012), Manuel Ros Agudo's *La Guerra secreta de Franco* (Barcelona, 2002), Jose Luiz Rodríguez Jiménez's *Franco, Historia de un Conspirador* (Madrid, 2005) and several technical histories published in cooperation with Spain's Interior Ministry.¹³ With regard to the Jews and the Holocaust, Isabelle Rohr's pivotal studies *The Spanish Right and the Jews* (Eastbourne, 2007) and "Productive Hatreds"¹⁴ (2016) as well as Bernd Rother's *Franco y el Holocausto* (Barcelona, 2005) and Danielle Rozenberg's *La España contemporánea y la cuestión judía* (Barcelona, 2010) set Franco regime conduct and antisemitism into perspective. Inevitably, the analysis will have to grasp the contentious history and historiography of the Holocaust and for this works including Mark Roseman's *The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting* (London, 2001), Peter Longerich's *Heinrich Himmler* (Oxford, 2008) and David Cesarani's *Eichmann* (London, 2005) and *Final Solution* (London, 2016) are cited. For the Blue Division, Gerald Kleinfeld and Lewis Tambs' *Hitler's Spanish Soldiers* (Pennsylvania 1979), Xavier Moreno Julià's *Blue Division* (Eastbourne, 2004) and Rodríguez Jiménez's "Ni División Azul, ni División Española de Voluntarios" (2009)¹⁵ frame my understanding of the history of the Blue Division and the primary

¹¹ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 58

¹² Paul Preston, "Franco and Hitler: The Myth of Hendaye 1940", *Contemporary European History* 1, 1 (1992), 1-16

¹³ Julio de Antón, *Historia de la policía español* (Madrid, 2000); Diego López Garrido, *El aparato policial en España* (Madrid, 1987); Martín Turrado Vidal, *Estudios sobre historia de la policía* (Madrid, 1991); Turrado Vidal, *La policía en la historia contemporánea de España (1766-1986)* (Madrid, 2000); Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército español durante el franquismo* (Madrid, 1999); José Caamaño Bournacell, *La policía a través del tiempo (1908 – 1958)* (Madrid, 1999)

¹⁴ Isabelle Rohr, "Productive Hatreds" in Helen Graham (ed.), *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London, 2016), pp. 99-113

¹⁵ José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, "Ni División Azul, ni División Española de Voluntarios", *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 31 (2009), 265-296

sources I have consulted in Spain and Germany. Ultimately, by looking at Mayalde the thesis attempts to both embellish and bridge a wide range of contentious aspects across these distinct publications.

Sources and thesis structure

My archival research encompasses sources from London's National Archives (Kew), Madrid's *Archivo Histórico Nacional* (AHN) and *Congreso* (Parliamentary) Archives, the *Archivo General de la Administración* (AGA) in Alcalá de Henares, Salamanca's *Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica* (CDMH), Ávila's *Archivo General Militar* (AGM), Berlin's *Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts* (PAAA, Foreign Archives) and *Bundesarchiv* (BArch, Federal Archives) and Dublin's National Archives (NAI). Other archival collections include newspaper sources such as Spain's *ABC Hemeroteca*,¹⁶ declassified intelligence documents of the British SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) as of 2003 in Kew and those of the American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) under the Nazi Warcrimes Disclosure Act 2007 (NWCDA).¹⁷ I have also had the chance to access the collections of the *Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco* (FNFF) in Madrid and make contact with the Finat family. Although the family were unable to point to any documents they highlighted his military accolades and diplomatic credentials. Furthermore, I make use of memoirs such as those of Ramón Serrano Suñer and his press personnel Ramón Garriga Alemany and Dionisio Ridruejo along with occasional interviews of Mayalde himself by historians or journalists. Whereas significant Spanish material eventually became lost by the end of Franco's regime if not deliberately withheld, concealed and/or destroyed, a good deal of German material was secured and preserved by the Allied Occupation Authorities in Germany from 1945 as well as by succeeding German governments. My chapters make extensive use of Spanish and German newspapers and memoirs in order to give an enhanced perspective on Mayalde's public machinations and private intrigues to some extent as well. The primary sources collected by authors such as Hugh Thomas and Ian Gibson which include interviews with Mayalde have also been very useful. After Spanish and German sources, British and American intelligence and diplomatic documents help supplement my assessment by providing less restrictive insights.

As stated earlier, this thesis pivots around its long, core, second, third and fourth chapters with its focus on Mayalde and the WWII-period. These long chapters are framed by the relatively shorter first and fifth chapters in addition to this summary thematic and historiographical introduction. This

¹⁶ ABC Hemeroteca, <http://hemeroteca.abc.es/>. Digitised editions of the Spanish newspaper ABC

¹⁷ Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room for the NWCDA collections, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/home>

structure is mainly determined by the thesis' thematic focus on fascist-period activity. It is also true that for the shorter framing chapters, especially chapter 5, the unevenness of the sources does play a part. As stated earlier, accessible personal documentation on Mayalde remains to date relatively sparse. Furthermore, the focus of international relations across Chapters 2-4 almost exclusively concerns Nazi Germany. Mayalde's additional post of Civil Governor of Madrid between 1939 and 1940 is also only brought up fleetingly.

Chapter 1 addresses Mayalde's development as a young aristocrat, soldier and politician up to becoming a member of the Falange, a collaborator in the Francoist cause and a participant in the Spanish Civil War in which the Falange considers itself the victor although it was the Army under Franco that secured the victory. This opening chapter spans Mayalde's education and upbringing, the relatively brief dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera between 1923 and 1930, the establishment of the democratic Second Republic in 1931 and of course the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Chapter 2 picks up at the end of the battlefield war, following the Falange's victory and with Mayalde as a Francoist administrator and bureaucrat. Mayalde here, as Serrano Suñer's subordinate, now looked to consolidate a victorious Falangist ideology inside Spain. Mayalde and his allies recognised that the consolidation of victory not only centred on post-Civil War priorities in domestic politics but also on foreign policy, with the outbreak of WWII. Mayalde and Serrano had to compete with rival factions under Franco as they forged relations with Himmler. By indulging Himmler, at the same time as working towards a refined and Falangised police, Serrano and Mayalde also managed to take over Foreign Affairs. This leads into Chapter 3 when Mayalde finally occupied the coveted Ambassadorial post in Berlin. This is a pivotal moment because Spain was now effectively participating in World War II as a combatant on the Eastern Front. What is also significant was that by this point Mayalde's Falange agenda had shifted from consolidation to survival. This was because the dispatch of the Blue Division came just after the Falange lost the Interior Ministry to political rivals from the Army who also stymied Falange attempts to capitalise on the Blue Division. The chapter follows Mayalde's energetic attempts to salvage his Falangist project through his association with the Blue Division. It is Chapter 4 though that attempts an in-depth analysis into the ideological development of Mayalde as a Falangist to consider his motives and actions in Chapters 2 and 3, not least the controversial question of the Francoist "Jewish Archive" which had originally impelled this study of Mayalde. Finally, Chapter 5 briefly explores the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 5 indicates that Mayalde did in fact survive politically and perhaps even with his 'optimistic' outlook intact. Although his Falangism had faced setbacks in the 1940s, Franco's dictatorship itself, to which Mayalde remained fully committed, received endorsement as the "Sentinel of the West". Moreover, Franco allowed wanted fascists and Nazis to flourish in Spain. Mayalde may well have imagined a future for

at least some redefined form of Falangism if not fascism. He also enjoyed prestige as an interface to Cold War era-Europe and above all Franco's confidence. Following Franco's death in 1975, democracy was restored albeit through an amnesty preventing any investigation into Franco-era conduct. Mayalde comfortably retired before he died in 1995. The amnesty remains in force.

Chapter 1

The Making of Mayalde: The Falange and the Spanish Civil War 1933-9

Introduction

This chapter starts with Mayalde's development before Spain's Second Republic was established in 1931. Initially Mayalde's mentor and chief influence in politics and diplomacy was Spain's WWI-era Prime Minister, Don Álvaro de Figueroa, First Conde de Romanones. Arguably it was Romanones who guided Mayalde's choice of CEDA (Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups) in 1933 as the option of using the Republic as a stable way of defending the old order. Mayalde would retain both political and personal connections to the Romanones family throughout his life.¹ By 1936, this "stable" form of politics seemed to be an idea of failure. He joined his friend José Antonio Primo de Rivera ("José Antonio") in the Falange. The Falange aimed to overthrow the Republican state and replace it with a "totalitarian state".² It would seek to harness Spain's Spanish Civil War mass political mobilisation through its party "blue shirts" and achieve harmony with the interests of the "blue blood" of aristocracy. Both Mayalde and José Antonio subscribed to "the old order", associated with Spanish prestige and glory, with the privileges it conferred upon patriarchal hierarchy, the landowners, the aristocracy, the nobility, the Catholic church and the pre-eminence of Spain's Army officer corps. Eventually, it was General Franco who became Spain's Head of State and gave Mayalde some power to pursue a Falangist vision for Spain.

Education and service (1904 – 1931)

José María Finat y Escrivá de Romaní, Third Conde de Finat, Fifteenth Conde de Villafor and of course Seventeenth Conde de Mayalde, was born in Madrid on 11 February 1904, six years after Spain had lost its prized Imperial possessions, most importantly Cuba, through defeat in the 1898 Spanish-American War. On 19 September 1919, José Finat aged fifteen assumed his title "Conde de Mayalde". This title was first created in 1533 but became extinct in 1763. King Alfonso XIII himself resurrected the title the same year Finat was born and bestowed it upon his father.³

¹ Juan Miguel Soler Salcedo, *Nobleza española. Grandeza Inmemorial 1520* (Madrid, 2012), p. 161; ABC, 28 Jun. 1929, p. 33; "La caza del monumento franquista - Foro por la Memoria", https://www.foroporlamemoria.info/simbolos_franquistas/colegiosf_clm.htm; Geneall, <https://geneall.net/es/name/72602/casilda-de-bustos-y-figueroa-19-marquesa-de-campotejar-15-duquesa-de-pastrana/>

² José Antonio Primo de Rivera, "The Totalitarian State" in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings* (London, 1972), p. 68

³ Soler Salcedo, *Nobleza española*, p. 161

Mayalde's education and development, in these years of waning Spanish monarchy and diminished Spanish imperial prestige in Europe, were consistent with the expectations and the privileges of aristocracy. He had his schooling in Toledo and qualified to practise Law from the University of Madrid.⁴ His contemporaries who also trained as lawyers included José Antonio, Ramón Serrano Suñer (Serrano) and José María Gil Robles, who were all politically conscious and would go onto be leading right-wing politicians in 1930s Spain.⁵ Mayalde also rendered service in Spain's mainland-based Light Artillery attaining the rank of Captain aged twenty-two in 1926 and competing in the Polo Regimental Cup.⁶ Mayalde socialised with high society including the King himself.⁷ José Antonio was also a peer as heir to the title Marquis de [Marquess of] Estella while in contrast Serrano and Gil Robles were middle class.

This transpired while José Antonio's father General Miguel Primo de Rivera ("Primo") was Spain's "iron surgeon" dictator. The dictatorship was a turning point in Spain's history which marked the final years of the monarchy between 1923 and 1931. It had initially been welcomed by the King and Spain's elites in response to civil unrest in Spain attributed to agitation from left-wing political activists especially communists and anarchists. Along with other "counter-revolutionary" regimes in Europe, most notably Benito Mussolini's Fascist Italy, Primo was considered a response to foreign contraband ideas which had culminated in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. It seemed Spain had a strong government that could fix Spain's problems since 1898 through to the more recent 1921 defeat in its miniscule Moroccan possession by indigenous combatants. However, the dictator would go on to alienate his key support from the elites, the King and the Army. Primo's agenda of "regenerating" the *patria* (fatherland) involved taxing the rich and attempting to change the Army structure with the unpopular dissolution of the Artillery Corps in which Mayalde had served. Primo was eventually forced to resign in 1930 though Spain remained a dictatorship until April 1931. However it was still too late for Spain's Monarchy.⁸

Entering Politics: From Romanones parliamentarianism to José Antonio's Falange 1931-36

Mayalde first entered active politics when nationwide municipal elections were convened in April 1931. These elections were essentially a plebiscite on the Monarchy. Mayalde ran representing the Monarchist Liberal-Conservative Party. Mayalde and the Monarchist cause lost to the Republicans

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ José María Zavala, *La Pasión de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 2011), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 2447

⁶ *ABC*, 8 Jun. 1926, p. 38; 4 Sept. 1927, p. 68

⁷ *ABC*, 27 Feb. 1927, p. 34

⁸ Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923-30* (London, 2007), pp. 81, 183-188

and the King left Spain. On 14 April the democratic Second Republic was promulgated and parliamentary elections followed on 28 June. The Republicans and the Socialists formed a coalition government after winning a majority. The Monarchists suffered heavy defeats in the urban centres but retained votes in the rural parts of Spain including Mayalde's Toledo constituency.⁹ Spain was now a Republic furnished with a government pursuing various forms of structural and constitutional change considered undesirable by proponents of the "old order".¹⁰

Broadly speaking, the Spanish Right felt the new Republican-Socialist government was "unmaking" Spain and aligning it more closely with "Soviet-Bolshevism". Anti-Republican output even went as far as to portray Republicanism and associated currents as *antipatria* or "anti-Spain" masterminded by a "Judeo-Islamo-Masonic-Bolshevik" conspiracy or *contubernio*.¹¹ Agrarian reform favoured workers' living conditions and challenged the hegemony of the landed oligarchy. Women were soon allowed the vote. Education was secularised. Perhaps most opprobriously, the Basque Country and Catalonia were awarded autonomy to appease regional separatist movements.¹² Secularisation and autonomy threatened and certainly, in the view of the Right, undermined the unity of Spain brought together by the medieval *reconquista* which had seen the expulsion of the Jews and Moors and the rise of Spain's Golden Age Catholic Empire. Soviet Communism had an international appeal, including in Spain – although owing to Spain's limited industrial development anarchism remained a competing left-wing current and especially predominant in the southern regions. In fact, this was the same reason fascism did not attain real traction in Spain until the heat of the Civil War in 1936.¹³ Nevertheless, conspiratorial notions including *antipatria* and *contubernio* had scarcely any basis in reality.

Those receptive to anti-Republican sentiment included Mayalde, José Antonio, Gil Robles, Serrano and Franco who was then serving with Spain's Army of Africa ("Africanistas") on the Moroccan Rif. Franco increasingly resented the Republic with a government considered hostile to the officer corps and its Spanish imperial duties. In his consumption of anti-Republican literature Franco became more politically engaged although he was not an active politician. Mayalde himself certainly saw no

⁹ Mary Vincent, *Spain, 1833-2002: People and State* (Oxford, 2007), p. 117

¹⁰ Helen Graham, *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2005), p. 84

¹¹ Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, p. 40; Graham, *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 84; Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews: Antisemitism and Opportunism* (Eastbourne, 2007), p. 68

¹² Isabelle Rohr, "Productive Hatreds" in Graham (ed.), *Interrogating Francoism*, pp. 99-113

¹³ Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987), pp. 27, 29; Ángel Viñas, "Natural Alliances" in Graham (ed.), *Interrogating Francoism*, pp. 139-158

benefit from the ambitious Republican agenda when it involved taxing aristocratic titles such as that of Finat, then held by his father, along with other challenges to his family's status.¹⁴

Mayalde traversed different ideas of governing Spain for the "old order" up to 1936. Romanones' cause was stable constitutional monarchy and the preservation of politics for the elite. This view had its differences with the authoritarian politics of Primo and later José Antonio's fascist politics. Romanones' opposition to Primo had found him implicated in a 1926 coup attempt and fined as a result. The "Primo de Rivera" approaches to saving the old order seemed more appropriate for Europe after WWI and Russia's revolution.¹⁵ This would unravel once the old order fell from Spanish government in 1931. Although a dictatorship, Primo's was not as repressive as others, certainly not when compared to contemporary European dictatorships or of course the later Franco regime. Furthermore, unlike Mussolini, Primo did not seriously attempt to promote the necessary mass political participation for an all-encompassing "patriotic" movement considered necessary for a fascist regime. Nevertheless some of the dictatorship's ideas effectively served as the basis for future Spanish fascism with José Antonio as an aspiring leader.¹⁶

Right-wing responses to the Republic were classed under two distinct approaches known as "catastrophism" and "accidentalism". "Catastrophism" was unsurprisingly as old as the Republic itself, with its main proponents the mainstream-Alfonsine and alternative-Carlist monarchists wanting to dismantle the Republican state entirely. José Antonio was a monarchist before founding the Falange. Franco was also inclined to monarchism before eventually becoming the anti-Republicans' Generalissimo in autumn 1936. Anti-Republican activism saw an abortive August 1932 military coup which had insufficient support and was divided in its aims.¹⁷ After this, "accidentalism" was the mainstream right-wing course before 1936. Officially, "accidentalism" did not seek to change the structure of the Republic but control government to defend the church, the landowners and the aristocracy and indeed reverse the reform agenda. "Accidentalism" was endorsed by the Vatican. Arguably it also continued the tradition of Mayalde's mentor Romanones in as far as political stability through legal mechanisms appeared to be the aim. The Liberal-Conservatives of April 1931 had attempted to prevent the Republic's inception but even then this was a strategy adhering to the legal process at that time. In 1933, conservative groups of varying persuasions converged under Gil Robles' pro-"accidentalism" CEDA. CEDA maintained an electoral approach,

¹⁴ AHN: FC-DEL_HDA_MADRID_EXENTO,792,Exp.168, Special tax on the title of "Conde de Finat", 1932

¹⁵ Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, pp. 183-188; Martin Blinkhorn, *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (London, 1998), p. 123

¹⁶ Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, pp. 183-188; Blinkhorn, *Fascists and Conservatives*, p. 123

¹⁷ Julian Casanova, *The Spanish Republic and Civil War* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 74

although the period leading to July 1936 would betray the allure of the new European right as represented by Fascist Italy and the emergent Nazi regime in Germany. Gil Robles himself attended Hitler's Nuremberg Rally in 1933.¹⁸

In 1933, Mayalde, along with his contemporary Serrano, continued with the Romanones current rather than that of Primo. With the change in political landscape after two years of Republican-Socialist government, Mayalde and Serrano enlisted in *Acción Popular* (AP) which was part of CEDA. José Antonio on the other hand participated in active politics but being of a more radical persuasion rejected the traditional right wing approach. Increasingly influenced by the Italian Fascist example, he sought a Spanish regime that would improve on his father's. José Antonio launched the Falange on 29 October 1933 with the aim of forcibly replacing Republican democracy with his Spanish brand of fascism.¹⁹

Mayalde, Serrano and José Antonio all successfully campaigned for seats in November 1933's parliamentary elections, with Mayalde winning Mazarambroz in Toledo.²⁰ CEDA, representing the Spanish Right, won a parliamentary majority thanks to a collapse of consensus among the pro-Republican parties and abstention by key voter bases. However, President Alcalá-Zamora refused to allow CEDA to form a government. The opportunistic Radicals as the next most-successful party were to form a government while CEDA still influenced the agenda. This marked the "black two-years" or *bienio negro* of counter-reform up to the next elections in February 1936. The "old order" factions found cause for celebration and landowners cut their workers' wages. José Antonio was the only elected representative out of his small Falange party. Even then however he was not elected as a Falangist but, rather curiously, as a monarchist permitted to run under the CEDA umbrella.²¹

Mayalde's choice of natural political continuity in 1933 allowed him to further a certain discipline for civil service and diplomacy surely instilled by Romanones. As an elected parliamentarian, Mayalde frequently attended session and acquired worthwhile experience. He was among a parliamentary delegation receiving an official representation from Toledo, Ohio on a cultural visit to Toledo in 1934, an early diplomatic engagement preceding his later Francoist career.²² Furthermore, a tactical advantage of being a *diputado* was parliamentary immunity from arrest or prosecution by

¹⁸ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 12; Sid Lowe, *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism* (Eastbourne, 2010), pp. 35, 58-60

¹⁹ Lowe, *Catholicism*, p. 7; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Memorias: Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue* (Barcelona, 1977), p. 31; Joan Maria Thomàs, *José Antonio: Realidad y mito* (Barcelona, 2017), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 1758

²⁰ José María Ruiz Alonso, *La Guerra Civil En La Provincia de Toledo: Utopía, Conflicto y Poder En El Sur del Tajo, 1936-39* (Toledo, 2004), pp. 63, 80, 569

²¹ Thomàs, *José Antonio*, Line 2671

²² *ABC*, 18 May 1934, p. 32

the State. Parliamentary immunity helped protect Mayalde from further recrimination should he have found himself in a domestic or political entanglement, such as a driving incident in 1934 which saw him taken to court and fined.²³

Within less than a year however Mayalde might have shared some disenchantment among CEDA's supporters. Along with Serrano he contacted the "catastrophist" think-tank *Acción Española* (AE). AE felt that two prominent CEDA representatives attending its conferences meant that it had influence growing beyond ardent monarchist parties.²⁴ At age thirty, Mayalde and his other contemporaries born in the 1900s seemed particularly receptive to the changing dynamic of the political scene in Spain and Europe. CEDA was gradually exerting its counter-reform agenda at a considerable yet still unsatisfactory pace. Frustration contributed to increase militant propensities. *Acción Popular* in particular was standing out for its increasingly militant tendencies. As time went on the youth section would wear green-shirt uniforms and give fascist-style salutes, warranting inevitable comparison with Italy and Germany. Although not yet as "catastrophist" as the Falange, both factions' militias engaged in street violence against political opponents. When considering these common attributes, it is clear that their youth meant that Mayalde, José Antonio and Serrano sought a dynamic and energetic solution against the *antipatria* during the tumultuous era of the Republic.²⁵ This seemed proportionate to the sentiment of anti-Republican literature produced at the time and also might explain the significance of attending the AE conference. But at least for the time being, electorally successful "accidentalism" pragmatism could be reconciled with militant tendencies.

One of the turning points happened in October 1934 after CEDA finally gained cabinet posts. It was not just the politicians of the Spanish Right becoming more determined. The left and its supporters among the working classes were growing fearful of encroaching right-wing authoritarianism and fascism. Hitler had consolidated power in Germany and the Austrian dictator Engelbert Dollfuss had suppressed dissenters in Vienna. Reacting to developments in Madrid, on 6 October Catalan President Lluís Companys proclaimed a Catalan state within a Spanish Federal Republic. This failed after ten hours but this episode would not be forgotten by Franco and the Falange whom Mayalde would serve. Two days earlier the Asturian miners' strike began, lasting two weeks until its suppression by none other than Franco. Franco brought to Spain and exacted on the miners a taste of the colonial violence that he had honed against indigenous opponents in North Africa and that

²³ AHN: FC-TRIBUNAL_SUPREMO_RECursos,131,Exp.322, Court case nº 322/1934 over injuries, 1934

²⁴ Gonzalo Redondo, *Historia de la Iglesia en España 1931-1939* (Madrid, 1993), p. 265; Eugenio Vegas Latapie, *Memorias políticas* (Barcelona, 1983), p. 240

²⁵ Whereas the likes of Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini were born in the 1880s and early 1890s, Mayalde, Serrano, José Antonio, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich were born in the 1900s; Lowe, *Catholicism*, p. 7; Rohr, "Productive Hatreds", p. 100

was to ravage Spain during the Civil War. This precipitated the convergence of Spain's Centre and Left under the Popular Front (*FP*) banner. It also precipitated the gravitation of the Spanish Right from CEDA to the Falange after *FP* electoral victory in February 1936. The next eighteen months would see increasing dissatisfaction with the electoral process and on the Right a preference for radical solutions against the *antipatria*.

The 16 February 1936 elections definitively marked the "catastrophist" turn. Despite CEDA's efforts, the *FP* won a majority. CEDA had failed in using the system of the Republic to satisfactorily secure the privileges of the old order. Following CEDA's defeat, Mayalde and Serrano finally unified with José Antonio and his Falange and there were many such defections to the militant anti-Republican group led by the Marquis de Estella. Mayalde and Serrano in fact helped facilitate mass defections from *AP*'s green-shirts to the Falange's blue-shirts.²⁶ The sense of service to the *patria*, verging on militancy, now found its home in the Falange. By joining the Falange, Mayalde was adopting the methods of the time in which he developed politically. The "Romanones-era" was now over and had no foreseeable future in the turmoil of 1930s Europe. The Falange used mass politics, but unlike CEDA intended to both "transform" mass politics and "reinvent" the old order with its "National Syndicalist" ideology in order to function in the new "totalitarian state".²⁷

Although the *FP* had won a majority, they did not fare so well in the rural heartlands of the Right – indicating sustained support for a right-wing cause. Mayalde held his seat in Toledo by 125,513 votes coming eighth out of the eight "antirevolutionary candidates" comprising CEDA and other parties. This was better than the only two successful local *FP* candidates who each had no more than 81,000 votes.²⁸ With respect to the cause, Mayalde renounced "accidentalism" but not parliamentary privileges nor uses. José Antonio had lost his seat on his platform. It was now up to the likes of Mayalde to effectively represent their new *Jefe* in parliament and serve the anti-Republican cause of the Falange. Firstly, in April Serrano and Mayalde considered forming a Falange parliamentary minority. These plans came to nothing.²⁹ The importance shifted to parliamentary immunity. The post-election fallout saw the *FP* outlaw the Falange and incarcerate José Antonio. This was after Falangists had attempted to assassinate the jurist Luis Jiménez de Asua in February although no direct link to José Antonio had been identified. While he had not wasted his brief parliamentary period having impressed fellow right-wing politicians with his contributions, José Antonio was no longer protected by parliamentary immunity. Mayalde's sense of "service" to the *patria* soon shifted

²⁶ Lowe, *Catholicism*, p. 148

²⁷ Thomàs, *José Antonio*, Line 3311; Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio*, p. 68

²⁸ Ruiz Alonso, *La Guerra Civil*, pp. 63, 80, 569

²⁹ Lowe, *Catholicism*, p. 131

to direct action.³⁰ Although the Falange had effectively superseded CEDA, as the historian Sheelagh Ellwood points out, any prospect of the party's continued existence – let alone any actual real appeal of fascism in Spain – hinged on the Civil War to come and thus the intervention and influence of the Army.³¹

Conspiracy

Amid continued political tensions in the months building up to the 17 July 1936 coup, José Antonio kept contact with military conspirators including Generals Mola and Franco themselves. José Antonio proposed that the Falange militias would receive weapons from the Army, follow Army command if necessary then relinquish their weapons once they had fulfilled their role.³² Being detained in Alicante, José Antonio had to rely on colleagues, including Mayalde, for his contact with the outside world. Mayalde was entrusted with a pivotal though insufficiently successful role. He was to ensure that the coup was ignited in line with José Antonio's wishes and included the Falange.³³ Mayalde's final act as a Republic parliamentarian was as a Falangist conspirator against the Republic a mere four days before the 17 July coup occurred. This would be the last time Mayalde saw José Antonio.

On 13 July, a right-wing politician José Calvo Sotelo was killed while in police custody following arrest. The previous day Falangists had killed Lieutenant José Castillo of the Republic's *Cuerpo de seguridad y asalto* (Spanish armed police at the time) which answered to the DGS (police authorities). Calvo Sotelo's death provided a convenient albeit questionable pretext for the conspirators. That day Mayalde arranged for José Antonio's brother Fernando, also incarcerated albeit in Madrid, to be transferred to Alicante. Mayalde used his parliamentary credentials to persuade the DGS to process the transfer. Ironically Mayalde would later direct the DGS and its agencies with a Falangist reorganisation agenda.

Mayalde then personally visited José Antonio to review the coup and José Antonio's escape plans. Mayalde arrived at Alicante early the following morning, again using his credentials with the warden. Meeting José Antonio for the last time, Mayalde presented a letter and two pistols from Fernando. They were determined that the uprising would go ahead and that José Antonio would escape. José Antonio cited Calvo Sotelo's assassination when instructing Mayalde to take a letter to Mola with advice that he himself would initiate unrest from his location in Alicante if the military did not bring

³⁰ Mayalde's testimony in Ian Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 1981), pp. 194-6

³¹ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 30

³² Ibid; Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio*, pp. 68, 125

³³ Gibson, *En busca*, pp. 194-6

the coup forward.³⁴ While in Alicante, Mayalde used the cooperation by guards who, in his own words, were unconditionally supportive of his cause even going as far as to provide prison keys for José Antonio's escape. Fervent Falangist support was also to be found among Navy officers working at a nearby Murcia base and Mayalde went to consult them. In Mayalde's own words, the escape plan was set. However José Antonio would never escape. Mayalde's role would simply serve as an example of commitment to the Falange by someone who was not initially a Falangist but an elected CEDA representative.

Mayalde returned to Madrid the following day carrying instructions for Fernando and he also collected documents from Serrano to take to Mola.³⁵ Finally, Mayalde reached Mola in Pamplona on 15 July with the letter and documents:

I had never seen the general before. He was big and ugly, mean-looking and tough. And he was unconfident and nervous. I gave him the letter from José Antonio. He opened it and once he had read it, he said: "I am in complete agreement with José Antonio. We will start as soon as possible".³⁶

Serving the Caudillo

Three days later, mainland-based Army rebels joined the coup. The Republican government suppressed this initial revolt in most mainland areas. The conspirators needed reinforcements from Franco. Mussolini and Hitler granted Franco's request for assistance starting with the airlifting of Franco's troops onto the mainland from Morocco, which ironically consisted of indigenous combatants who Franco had earlier been subjugating. The arrival of Franco's *Africanista* forces *ipso facto* marked the start of the escalation to full-scale Civil War. However, Franco had also solicited the help of foreign governments and their armed forces in the subjugation of Spain. In fact the Francoists viewed the "Civil War" as a crusade or a new, modern *reconquista*. This was to be comprehensive and methodical in expunging the *antipatria* and the *contubernio* from the *patria*. As José Antonio intended, the Falange played a role and supported the military conspirators, as did many clergy and Alfonsine and Carlist Monarchists. Mayalde and others who were not professional soldiers enlisted in the ranks of the *alfereces provisionales* (provisional, wartime non-commissioned officers).

³⁴ Paul Preston, *Las tres Españas del 36* (Barcelona, 1998), p. 143

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Gibson, *En busca*, pp. 194-6

While José Antonio remained incarcerated and Serrano was trapped in Republican Madrid, Mayalde was safely in conspirator-controlled territory. Mayalde again served in the artillery, this time as an *alferez provisional* on the battlefield in the war against the Spanish Republican state. In August 1936 he participated in the advance front at Badajoz. In November 1936 Mayalde was stationed at Cerro de Garabitas, in Toledo's Casa del Campo, as part of the Third Light Regiment's 9th Battalion in the attempted siege of Madrid. He was the only survivor of a Republican bombardment that killed nineteen fellow *artilleros*. This was attributed to divine intervention and the "Sagrado Corazon" statue was later erected in the Casa del Campo. Later in 1958, as Mayor of Madrid he would attend the founding ceremony for the *alfereces provisionales* association at this location. By the time Mayalde ended his military service, he had been wounded twice and awarded the *Medalla Militar*. Preceding his rise in the Falange leadership and in Franco's government, conspiracy and battlefield service were among his accolades.³⁷ In November 1936 Mayalde also made his last move as a conspirator to help free José Antonio who was tried for treason then sentenced to death following the coup. Mayalde proposed to Franco that Romanones would use his excellent contacts with the French government to persuade it to intercede with Madrid on José Antonio's behalf. However Franco was loathe to suffer José Antonio as a rival for power and delayed permission for Romanones to journey to France until after the death sentence was announced. Although it was actually in the political and diplomatic interests of the Republican government to keep José Antonio alive, José Antonio was executed by firing squad.³⁸

Mayalde reunited with Serrano after the latter's February 1937 escape from Madrid and arrival in Salamanca. In October the conspirators had declared Franco as Head of State or *Caudillo* operating a wartime junta. Between February and April 1937, Serrano being Franco's brother-in-law became known as the "cuñadísimo" and organised Franco's first government. By this time Franco acknowledged that the Falange could play a useful role on the civilian front after it had cooperated with the Army.³⁹ In April Serrano played an influential role in Franco's merger of the Falange and Carlists into a single movement known as the "FET y de las JONS".⁴⁰ Although Serrano was never actually officially in charge of the Falange he nevertheless achieved authority as "cuñadísimo". After his conspiracy role and battlefield service, Mayalde became Serrano's political secretary and began his rise under Franco as a bureaucrat. He also performed diplomatic service by corresponding and

³⁷ Javier Fernández Delgado, *La memoria impuesta* (Madrid, 1979), p. 130; ABC, 7 Jun. 1958, p. 16; Letter from Rafael Finat, Conde de Mayalde to author, 26 Apr. 2017; Kew: HS6/966, "Falangist Personalities", 5 May 1941, p. 5

³⁸ Ramón Garriga Alemany, *La España de Franco: las relaciones con Hitler* 2 edición (Puebla, 1970), pp. 18-19; Paul Preston, *Comrades: Portraits from the Spanish Civil War* (London, 1999), pp. 105-6

³⁹ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 59

⁴⁰ Ramón Garriga Alemany, *Las relaciones secretas entre Franco y Hitler* (Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 353-4, 374-7

meeting with international fascists and Nazis, hence helping with the early phases of cooperation as addressed in the following chapters.⁴¹

Mayalde was thus becoming Serrano's most important subordinate. Attesting to Mayalde's significance, it was even "prophesised" that the fair historian would not forget Mayalde's name when writing about this period of "national reconstruction".⁴² Mayalde was described as sensible, wise, experienced, very patriotic and had been celebrated as "alert in the face of danger while working in the most discreet and efficient manner for the salvation of a free and greater Spain".⁴³ His role as José Antonio's intermediary during the conspiracy was acknowledged. Mayalde had a "straight and clear" expression about the "honour" of the Falange blue-shirts. With respect to his service to Franco, Mayalde had facilitated projects and solved problems. Franco had Mayalde inducted in the *Orden de Isabella la Católica* for his "services of the highest order" to the regime.⁴⁴

By 1 April 1939, the military conflict had ended. Franco was Spain's undisputed ruler adhering to the *Führerprinzip* or leadership principle as Spain's *Caudillo*. Mayalde rapidly ascended from being Serrano's secretary to becoming police commissioner (*Director General de Seguridad*). Upon assuming this position, Mayalde was described as a "true fighter" taking up a "truly enviable position" and that with his "great abilities and merits" would "open up broad opportunities to develop projects and initiatives".⁴⁵ Interestingly this quote was attributed to his outgoing predecessor, an Army Colonel José Ungria Jiménez. As Mayalde rose, the Army was the Falange's most significant competitor in Franco's coalition for control over the new regime's agenda as will be seen in Chapter 2.⁴⁶ Francoist rivals of a more traditional conservative authoritarian rather than ideologically fascist persuasion contested Serrano and Mayalde's Falangist interpretation of the "demands of Civil War victory."⁴⁷ Nevertheless all these factions shared a basic common agenda. Franco's *reconquista* demanded the consolidation of a homogeneous, socially conservative domestic order as well as imperial expansion concurrent with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini in Europe. Because both goals were tied to one another, they could be described as the "dual goals" of Francoism.

⁴¹ CDMH: DNSD-CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.38, Mayalde to Marcelino Ulibarri, 14 Jul. 1938

⁴² Alonso de Palencia, "FALANGE SIGUE... Un duelo de batallas, victorias y esperanzas", *Heraldo de Zamora*, 23 Nov. 1938, p. 3. This newspaper column appeared after Mayalde's radio broadcast commemorating José Antonio.

⁴³ Alonso de Palencia, "FALANGE SIGUE... Un duelo de batallas, victorias y esperanzas", *Heraldo de Zamora*, 23 Nov. 1938, p. 3

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ *Arriba*, 27 Sept. 1939, p. 5

⁴⁶ Viñas, "Natural Alliances", pp. 139-158

⁴⁷ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 April 1941

The experience of political activism, service to the Francoist cause and comradeship during the years of political conflict and Civil War have to be taken into account.⁴⁸ Mayalde and the Falange harboured great expectations especially after losing comrades including José Antonio. Although it was the Army which did the fighting and conquest, the Falange believed they had “proven” themselves with “their” victory for the Francoist cause and their delivery of José Antonio’s promise to enforce order. As the historian Michael Richards explains, both Falangists and *alféreces* came to believe that under Franco's command they, virtually alone, had been instrumental in winning the war and they received many rewards.⁴⁹ The Falange as a mobilised force with its “National Syndicalist” ideology, which promoted active mass political participation and unyielding obedience to the new Spanish state, underpinned the Francoist management of post-Civil War Spain.⁵⁰ Rather than relinquish its arms as originally proposed by José Antonio, after the Civil War “trauma” the Falange militias were to remain armed with permanent militarisation as the aim.

Throughout his Francoist career, Mayalde frequently invoked the memory of his fallen *Jefe*, José Antonio, “el ausente” (“the absent one”), to the point of esteeming him alongside preeminent Spaniards such as the 16th century King Philip II.⁵¹ In a 4 December 1938 radio broadcast, Mayalde praised José Antonio as a “formidable man of action who conceived and carried out violence with his surprisingly cold head and knew how to win not just minds but also hearts because of his strength and audacity”.⁵² Significantly, the subsequent printed version censored Mayalde’s reference to violence.⁵³ Nevertheless, for Mayalde, political violence helped comprise the necessary spirit to be injected into the totalitarian Spain “required” at this point in history. This came after the failure of “old ideas” and “liberal democratic” ideas – not just values associated with the Republic but also Romanones-style politics. José Antonio had believed that the necessary “totalitarian state” for Spain required a “genius” as its ruler and Mayalde must have come to consider José Antonio as that “genius” if José Antonio himself had not.⁵⁴ Evidently, as Chapter 4 will elaborate, the war radicalised Mayalde and facilitated his embrace of fascism. “Political spirit” would determine Mayalde’s conduct.

⁴⁸ Viñas, “Natural Alliances”, p. 144

⁴⁹ Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making memory and re-making Spain since 1936* (Cambridge, 2013), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 4030

⁵⁰ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, pp. 57-74

⁵¹ BNE: VC/4805/25, “Felipe II, fundador de la capitalidad de Madrid” printed speech, 1961

⁵² Preston, p. 114; Gibson, *En busca*, p. 194; *Radio Nacional* broadcast, 4 Dec. 1938

⁵³ Gibson, *En busca*, p. 196; Anon, *Dolor y memoria de España en el II aniversario de la muerte de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 1939), p. 43

⁵⁴ Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio*, p. 68; AHN: H24132, “8 March 1941 Law” for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

In the next chapter we will see how, in the Nazi-led European fascist framework of World War II, Mayalde would develop as a respected Falangist, diplomat and administrator. With Hitler's domination of Europe only a year after Franco's conquest of Spain, Mayalde under Serrano would have a "clearer" picture of Franco's aforementioned "dual goals" and José Antonio's "totalitarian state" based on the "evidence" of fascist military victory. Mayalde would look to consolidate the Falange's agenda through control of Franco's police and the "alternate diplomacy" with Germany it entailed.

Chapter 2

Director General of Security – 1939-41

Introduction

With Franco's Spanish Civil War victory, Mayalde achieved prominence as a Falangist under the wing of Franco's "cuñadísimo" Ramón Serrano Suñer. This chapter outlines the events and developments relating to Mayalde's governmental role in domestic Francoism between 1938 and 1941. This chapter considers how as a Falangist and DG (*Director General de Seguridad*, police commissioner) between 1939 and 1941, Mayalde established himself as an administrator and bureaucrat in Franco's regime and, pivotally, as a diplomat to a Europe witnessing a convergence of a "fascist consensus" with the predominance of WWII Axis Powers Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Mayalde was Serrano's key subordinate in a phase of consolidating a Falange programme. They were competing against others in Franco's regime as described in Chapter 1.

Serrano and Mayalde had their vision of the Francoist "dual goals" of a politically homogeneous *reconquista* Spain and a restored Empire in this era of continued European imperial struggle following the Civil War, in which their long-time comrade José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *el ausente* of the Falange, had perished. While in charge of Franco's *Dirección General de Seguridad* (DGS) or state police, Mayalde represented Francoist and Falangist priorities through an "alternate diplomacy" with Nazi Germany's SS-police "micro-reich" under Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. Himmler himself was concerned with his major role in the making of the "Nazi New Order" in Europe during WWII.¹ Mayalde's priorities were also reorganising Spain's police and pursuing the perceived enemies of the new Spain or *antipatria*. Looking to realise and consolidate José Antonio's "totalitarian state", Mayalde's tenure in domestic Francoism heralded a "blue ideologue" agenda of empowering both the police and the militias of the Falange in making Franco's new Spain.²

Set against the backdrop of the Civil War and WWII, the chapter spans Mayalde's conduct of Serrano's "alternate diplomacy" which goes back to his initial appointment as Serrano's political secretary and gradual promotion towards DG between 1937 and 1939, then through to his visit to Berlin in August 1940, the reciprocal visit to Spain by Himmler in October 1940 and Mayalde's

¹ Peter Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 504-7

² AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941; Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, "Guidelines of the Falange: 26 Points", Nov. 1934 and "Spain and Barbarism" speech, 3 Mar. 1935 in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings* (London, 1972), pp. 132-7, 141-8; Ramón Garriga Alemany, *Berlín, años cuarenta* (Barcelona, 1983), p. 192: Garriga refers to the next stage concerning foreign policy when Mayalde was "Ambassador of the Blue Division" as a "blue ideologue" period and contrasts "blue ideologues" with "professional diplomats".

departure as DG in May 1941. The focus then shifts to how Spain's police developed in this "blue ideology" period between 1939 and 1941 under Mayalde as the state's DG and head of the Falange's intelligence service (DSII). The constant reorganisation of the police in the early Franco regime was defined by a distinct Falange agenda of improving the Spanish police through politicisation and militarisation with German influence and on-the-ground involvement. Mayalde's reform agenda over eighteen months was framed in the struggle against liberal democracy by totalitarian states and culminated in the Law of 8 March 1941 for police reform.³

The chapter goes on afterwards to consider certain specific events relating to the *antipatria* that took place between Spain and Germany during the period. Broadly speaking this includes consideration of antisemitism, anti-Freemasonry and cross-border activity such as extradition considered contrary to international law.⁴ This also includes the construction of police records and data sharing based on politics, religion and race, leading to the arrests and extraditions. They relate to the essentials of what Mayalde and his Falangist agenda meant for this period of Francoism. The section is not a compendium of Francoist persecution *per se* nor DGS activities of little significant relevance to Mayalde, because the DGS covered a lot of routine work including urban policing and traffic. Also, looking at Francoist persecution, the DGS was concerned with smaller prison facilities and border control. Franco's more infamous concentration camps were Army-run and so did not involve Mayalde directly. Furthermore, the *Guardia Civil* (Civil Guard), which operated outside the towns, was independent of the DGS while the DGS's armed police operated more in the towns. The ideological and political significance of Francoist *antipatria* activity will be examined in Chapter 4.

This chapter's focus remains Mayalde's role and his own mission, its essential features and the circumstances which draw our attention to him during this period and beyond his tenure as DG. The conclusion will find that Serrano and Mayalde's "dual goals" agenda was strengthened but was not unassailable over this period of time. Arguably, their most important accomplishments lay in foreign policy as opposed to specifically the domestic aspect of policing, with a view to consolidation edging towards a struggle for survival in the top echelons of Spanish government.

"Alternate diplomacy"

In 1939 Serrano used his position as Interior Minister to control the domestic agenda. Serrano first retained Mayalde not only as his own political secretary but also appointed him as secretary to his

³ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

⁴ Kew: KV3/269, Report from Tomas Harris in Spain to Kim Philby, 19 Nov. 1941: Harris claimed despite the understanding that an extradition by the Gestapo was against International Law, the DGS were "unable" to prevent it.

Interior Ministry (MdG) with Franco's approval. Mayalde was named to the second iteration of the Falange's National Council and head of the party "intelligence service" or DSII. In August Mayalde acquired the post of Civil Governor of Madrid which he held until December 1940. The Civil Governors (CGs) were appointed by and answerable to Serrano's MdG. On 24 September Mayalde became *Director General de Seguridad*.⁵ With both Franco's official FET y de las JONS⁶ party and the state supposed to be at Mayalde's disposal for his sphere of domestic governance, the Falange directly controlled the Spanish police under Serrano's direction.⁷ Evidently the aim was to fuse the police with the Falange's militias. As Chapter 1 explained towards the end, these militias were not demobilised after the military conflict had formally ended in April 1939. Other Francoists were uneasy about the Falange but Franco had recognised they had an important role to play.

Returning to the broader "dual goals" agenda, recalling Chapter 1, the first aspect of Franco's "dual goals" was completing his *reconquista* and consolidating domestic government through repressing *antipatria* associated with an international Judeo-Masonic conspiracy or *contubernio*. This was to achieve a *Volksgemeinschaft* ("homogeneous community") based on the virtues of *conquistador* Spain (the *patria*, fatherland). Secondly, Franco wanted a restored Spanish Empire. For the purposes of the "dual goals" which required an association with a European power bloc, Franco looked to Germany and Italy who had enabled his victory. Although Franco's Spain was not a WWII belligerent, nor was it identical to Nazi Germany, there was enough ideological compatibility for a positive pro-Axis relationship which will be examined further in Chapter 4. Not long after the Spanish war's formal conclusion, WWII broke out. With rapid German military victories, it seemed fascism would prevail in Europe.

Again recalling Chapter 1 regarding internal competition over the "dual goals", the Army and the Falange were the main competitors in both broader pro-Axis cooperation and policing. The Army was actually responsible for the wartime victory and for most of Franco's repression. Pro-Axis sentiment was not confined to the Falange - the Army maintained a pro-German tradition despite rejecting the "novelties" of fascist ideologies including Falangist "National-Syndicalism".⁸ Army

⁵ AGA: TOP13/165, Confirmation of Mayalde's Appointment as DG, 24 Sept. 1939

⁶ Main reference is Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987), pp. 57-74. The official Francoist umbrella organisation was the *Falange Española Tradicional y de las JONS*. As time went on this grouping was better known as the *movimiento* (movement) with the actual Falange aspect treated separately.

⁷ *The Fortnightly* 154, 1940: The posts of National Delegate for Information and Investigation, and of Director-General of Police in the Home Office, are also held by the same man, the Count of Mayalde, who thus has at his disposal the organization of both State and Party; Wayne Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Missouri, 2006), pp. 232-4

⁸ Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge* (London, 1991), p. 5

officers held civilian politicians including and especially Serrano in contempt.⁹ Although Serrano and Mayalde would speak of Falangist "victory", as will be seen, the reality of course was that the Falange had needed the Army for its propulsion to power.¹⁰ This was something José Antonio had expected and accepted while also hoping the Falange would achieve both glory and independence. In due course the eventual Falange Secretary General José Luis de Arrese would emerge as a rival to Serrano, although Serrano and Mayalde claimed they had helped ingratiate him with Franco. Mayalde recalled this happened in an episode, to be noted in later chapters, where he impressed Franco by dispersing a few Falangists who suggested discontent against Franco in Malaga in early 1940.¹¹ The three distinct competitors in Franco's regime were the traditional Army officer corps, the Falangists loyal to Serrano Suñer which included Mayalde, and those loyal to Arrese.

Controlling the police did not only augment Serrano and Mayalde's domestic influence. Serrano used "alternate diplomacy" to exert himself in the ever-important Foreign Affairs. Police cooperation in particular with its own "dual-effect" of benefiting both the Spanish and German agendas gave Serrano and Mayalde a viable means of enhancing their standing before the Axis powers short of control of official diplomacy. This was before Serrano took official control in October 1940 and eventually became confined to that Ministry in May 1941. As a result police cooperation was an opportunity for aggrandisement for a regime faction in Spain and Europe. As well as a suitable DG, Civil Governors and other MdG functionaries, Serrano wanted suitable diplomats but according to him they were not available in 1939. When eventually visiting Berlin in September 1940, Serrano expressed his lack of satisfaction with Spanish diplomats in Germany to Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. He said that the Falange had been unable to produce any suitable diplomats for the post of Ambassador in Berlin. The Ambassador at the time was the pro-German but anti-Falangist General Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros who would become a bitter enemy of Serrano's. This was during the time Mayalde was cultivating links with Himmler.¹²

Serrano and Mayalde's "alternate diplomacy" also resonated with the Third Reich where Himmler competed for influence against Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry (AA) and the Wehrmacht whose *Abwehr* (military intelligence) chief Admiral Canaris had ties with Spain's Army since before the Civil War.¹³ Himmler wanted his "SS-police micro-Reich", which was Germany's authority on policing and

⁹ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 40; PAAA: 29744, Muñoz Grandes memo, 31 Aug. 1942

¹⁰ Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making memory and re-making Spain since 1936* (2013), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 4030

¹¹ Ramón Garriga Alemany, *Las relaciones secretas entre Franco y Hitler* (Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 374-7; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Memorias: Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue* (Barcelona, 1977), pp. 192-3

¹² Kew: FO371/60332, Serrano-Hitler meeting, 17 Sept. 1940

¹³ Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 504-7

racial matters, to be the apex of the expanded Third Reich in the upcoming new world order, meaning beyond Germany. The *Schutzstaffel* (SS) controlled the Gestapo (state secret political police) and the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD, Nazi party intelligence) which from 1940 were known as *Amt IV* and *Amt VI* (Foreign SD while *Amt III* was internal) of the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) run by *SS-Obergruppenführer* Reinhard Heydrich. With German territorial expansion, inevitably Himmler and Heydrich played a pivotal role with their police and intelligence services acquiring a broader international dimension. On assuming control of the Vienna-based International Criminal Police Cooperation (ICPC) in 1938, Himmler and Heydrich raised their profiles by networking with other countries' police forces and representatives. This included inviting the Metropolitan Police Chief Sir Norman Kendal and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on a guided tour of Dachau in 1939 which was only cancelled by the invasion of Poland.¹⁴ With WWII, Himmler and Heydrich directed the repression in German-occupied territories.

In the more sympathetic countries such as Spain, Himmler not only wanted to empower his apparatus but also sought even higher personal status as a preeminent "statesman" of the Third Reich. Ribbentrop resented Himmler's encroachment and resultant "unnecessary" disrepute for German diplomacy.¹⁵ Although Himmler had been able to cooperate with both traditional conservatives and fascists it would seem he preferred fascists who shared a similar zeal owing to the question of generation as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4.¹⁶ The SS was particularly assertive on German antisemitic policy and often disregarded foreign ministry stipulations that had been in place to maintain veneers of legality. This dynamic was significant for the Holocaust.¹⁷ Himmler was also subverting longstanding Canaris links with the Spanish Army.¹⁸ Assisted by some ideological compatibility along with some plain convenience in the practice of "alternate diplomacy", Mayalde and Himmler complemented each other's aims. Mayalde considered German victory important as a requirement for and conditional on achieving Falange-favourable "dual goals".¹⁹

Before Berlin (1938-1940)

Mayalde and Serrano's "alternate diplomacy" and the overarching political competition began during the Civil War. Between 1938 and 1939, Mayalde with Serrano had received prominent international politicians such as *Action Francaise's* Charles Maurras, Mussolini's son-in-law and

¹⁴ Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London, 1998), p. 100

¹⁵ Manuel Ros Agudo, *La guerra secreta de Franco* (Barcelona, 2002), p. 200

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Longerich, *Himmler*, p. 618; David Cesarani, *Eichmann* (London, 2005), p. 183

¹⁸ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 200

¹⁹ ABC, 17 Aug. 1941, p. 7; Garriga, *Las relaciones secretas*, pp. 374-7

Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano and the eventual correspondent in Spain for the Nazi-daily *Völkischer Beobachter*, René Bayer.²⁰ However, they did not actually initiate police relations with Himmler. That was the accomplishment of the veteran authoritarian and pro-German but anti-Falangist Interior Minister General Severiano Martínez Anido who reached an agreement with Himmler on 31 July 1938.²¹ Both policing regimes agreed that they would keep the other up to date on the best methods to use against their enemies. German operatives in Spain were allowed to apprehend and question wanted Communists, Socialists and German Jews fighting for the Republicans, including those captured by Franco. Spain received the same deal, but as political opponents were escaping to countries like France rather than Nazi Germany, the deal had little practical significance for Spain until Germany occupied France and even then there was a difference between occupied France and Vichy France. Furthermore it did not confer either party an increased *attaché* presence nor diplomatic immunity in each other's countries. Above all, both parties had to observe the jurisdictions of their respective countries' Foreign Ministers. This meant as soon as Serrano and Mayalde took over, there was much potential for furthering police cooperation for their agenda.²²

It was after Martínez Anido's death in December 1938 that Serrano finally took over the Interior Ministry (MdG). Serrano and Mayalde were able to continue the links established with the German police including the representatives Paul Winzer and Heinz Jost.²³ Mayalde did not become DG until 24 September 1939, replacing the pro-German Army Colonel José Ungría Jiménez who had been Franco's first DG. Immediately upon becoming DG, Mayalde asserted his politics. Following his outgoing predecessor's tribute as mentioned in Chapter 1, Mayalde stated straightaway that he wanted the police of the New Spain to *not* be "apolitical". He expected "political feeling" and cooperation with the demands of Falangist "National-Syndicalist" ideology as "required" by Civil War victory.²⁴ Mayalde further warned that anyone who tried to hinder him would be "torn apart," arguably echoing appeals to violence as mentioned in Chapter 1.²⁵ The timing of Mayalde's appointment was important when the DGS issued a bulletin ten days earlier announcing the agenda of police reform with the Falange playing a role which marked the start of Mayalde's 18-month long "overhaul".²⁶ The recent outbreak of WWII and the apparent consolidation of the "Nazi New Order"

²⁰ *ABC Sevilla*, 5 May 1938, p. 10; *ABC*, 2 Jun. 1939, p.10; 13 Jul. 1939, p. 11; CDMH: DNSD-CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.38, Letter from Mayalde to Marcelino Ulibarri, 14 Jul. 1938

²¹ Roberto Muñoz Bolanos, "Severiano Martínez Anido (1862-1937): Militar y Represor", *Anatomía de la Historia* (2013), 3-13

²² Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, pp. 178-183

²³ Kew: KV2/104, 12 May-5 Dec. 1945, Appendices II, VI

²⁴ *Arriba*, 24 Sept. 1939, p. 5

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *ABC*, 24 Sept. 1939, p. 8; 27 Sept. 1939, p. 19

in Europe just eight months later, which took Hispano-German cooperation to a new level, also provided further convenience for the timing.

The sudden defeat of France and disarray which afflicted its Empire in North Africa in June 1940 surprised all governments including Franco's. Spain switched its original wartime position of neutrality to non-belligerence. By this time Franco's cooperation for the "dual goals" agenda had developed through the publication of pro-Axis press and propaganda in Spain, material support including the export of wolfram, and police cooperation. With Axis victory looking inevitable, Franco wanted to share in the spoils, up to the point that he made an offer of belligerence with strings to Hitler that was declined.²⁷ At the same time, many Spanish Republican escapees once again found themselves in territory under fascist or sympathetic control with Germany's occupation of northern France and the establishment of the puppet Vichy France regime in the south. Franco, Serrano and Mayalde wanted to test the 1938 Himmler-Martinez Anido agreement and exact Francoist "justice" on these Republicans. This was an opportunity for Serrano and Mayalde.²⁸

Pre-1940 cooperation had Serrano and Mayalde taking advantage of earlier MdG achievements. Their "alternate diplomacy" with German police went as far as to exceed the stipulations of the July 1938 agreement and encroach on the territory of the Foreign Ministry (MAE) still headed by Colonel Juan Beigbeder. This included extraditions. In June 1940 the DGS facilitated the "escape" of Frank Ryan, an Irish International Brigade Commander during the Civil War who had been captured by Franco. German agents took Ryan, a neutral third-party national, to Germany for a certain use in the war against Britain. On Serrano's advice, Franco turned to the Germans and snubbed Irish Ambassador Leopold Kerney and Taoiseach Eamon de Valera himself while Mayalde spoke in place of Beigbeder to Kerney's lawyer.²⁹ By August, a number of prominent Republicans in France had been arrested by the Germans and transferred to the DGS' operative on the ground, Pedro Urraca. The most prominent arrest was that of Lluís Companys, former President of Catalonia's autonomous government whose 6 October 1934 declaration of independence surviving ten hours was not forgotten by the Francoists. Companys was returned to Spain on Mayalde's orders, later being summarily tried and executed in October a few days before Himmler's visit to Spain.³⁰ These near-reciprocal extraditions that transpired in the wake of the European upheaval of June 1940 can be seen as moving towards officially furthering the provisions of July 1938. Serrano and Mayalde were pursuing an agreement while Germany was arresting Spaniards on the regime's behalf through the

²⁷ Paul Preston, *Franco* (London, 1993), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 8158

²⁸ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 183; Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (London, 2012), p. 491

²⁹ Barry Whelan, *Ireland and Spain, 1939-55* (Maynooth: 2012), pp. 85-96

³⁰ Ibid; ANC: ANC2-4, Reproduction of AHN: H338 on Lluís Companys, 1940

Ryan extradition. Serrano encroached on broader Foreign Policy before eventually becoming Foreign Minister. Still, as Manuel Ros Agudo writes, there was no clear arrangement about whether Republicans would be brought back to Spain or left in German and Vichy French hands. Franco decided that "the swathes" comprising many thousands of other, less prominent Republicans would not be extradited but be used as slave labour by the Nazis. The effect of the unwritten Himmler-Mayalde agreement can now be seen.³¹

The Himmler-Mayalde agreement

Himmler invited Mayalde to Berlin for late August 1940 to discuss police cooperation. This would be followed by a visit by Serrano himself to Berlin, Himmler to Spain and the October 1940 Hendaye meeting of Franco and Hitler. Around this same time, reporting to de Valera on the Ryan "escape", Irish Ambassador Kerney referred to the role of the "natural closeness" between the Spanish and German regimes and their police.³² As will be seen, this trip which Mayalde referred to as "the special mission with which he had been tasked" and Himmler's reciprocal visit to Spain that followed were politically significant.³³

Mayalde and his police delegation travelled to Berlin from Spain by train through France. While *en route* he ordered the aforementioned Urraca to expedite Companys' extradition. Pulling into Berlin on 28 August, Mayalde had his first face-to-face meetings with Himmler, Kurt Dalwege (Head of Germany's Order Police) and Heydrich. They concerned German policing techniques and also centred on police and intelligence operations in Spanish and German-controlled territory.³⁴ This was accompanied by visits to the barracks of the *Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (Leibstandarte)* as a model for a militarised police unit made up of the "best" of the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Sachsenhausen concentration camp as a model for treating the "worst" of the undesirable *Gemeinschaftsfremde* ("community aliens").³⁵ Mayalde obtained insight into how he might achieve his "totalitarian state" going by the compelling German model with its "perfect organisation and technique" to use Mayalde's own words.³⁶

³¹ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 183; Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust*, pp. 490-5

³² NAI: DFA A20/4, Irish Ambassador Leopold Kerney to Ireland's Department of External Affairs, 26 Aug. 1940; Whelan, *Ireland*, pp. 85-96

³³ AGA: TOP13/165, Letter from Mayalde to his deputy, 22 Aug. 1940

³⁴ BArch NS19/3954: Mayalde's visit to Berlin; Markus Moors and Moritz Pfeiffer (eds.), *Heinrich Himmlers Taschenkalender 1940* (Paderborn, 2013), pp. 323-5; "Spaniens Polizeichef beendete Deutschlandreise", *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Sept. 1940

³⁵ Moors, Pfeiffer, and Schoening (eds.), *Heinrich Himmlers*, pp. 323-5; *Völkischer Beobachter*, 31. Aug. 1940, p.

3

³⁶ ABC, 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5

The *Leibstandarte* was the first of the military combat “*Waffen-SS*” units that were institutionally part of the SS and by extension beholden to the Nazi Party. Hitler’s intention was that the *Waffen-SS* occupied a line between army units and elite police according to the needs of the Nazi leadership in wartime or peacetime. Mayalde was witnessing the prime example in fascist Europe of an “elite”, politicised, “disciplined”, loyal and obedient military-police unit not too far removed from DGS intentions.³⁷ Regarding Sachsenhausen, it might be noted that Franco’s Civil War violence had already derived in part from years of enforcing an oppressive Spanish colonial presence in the Moroccan Rif and his regime’s police had already solicited Axis technical assistance during the Civil War. However, the circumstances were different now that Franco’s DG had an opportunity not only to actually meet these senior Nazis in person but also see much of their apparatus at work. Furthermore, while Mayalde’s “special mission” can be put into the context of Spain’s overall “wartime pivot” with the prospect of a “fascist Europe”, Mayalde’s itinerary was not actually too different from the cancelled 1939 visits by Kendal and Hoover – only that Sachsenhausen was chosen instead of Dachau.

Mayalde left Berlin satisfied with Himmler’s diplomatic niceties and was also impressed seeing Himmler’s organisation at work. Mayalde says he wondered how he and the Falange might themselves achieve something impressive.³⁸ It was this visit that was reciprocated by the *de facto* state visit to Spain by Himmler in October 1940 following Mayalde’s invitation, in anticipation of an updated agreement.³⁹ Mayalde suggested Himmler might like to visit Spain after Himmler had proposed the idea of Spanish and German operatives operating with diplomatic immunity in each other’s territories. Arguably this was a proposal for cooperation of such an extent that required Francoist Spain’s ideological compatibility. This invitation enhanced Mayalde’s status as DG, although Serrano himself made a higher-level visit to Berlin as “extraordinary Ambassador” in mid-September, meeting Hitler, Ribbentrop and Himmler, which was expressly about Francoist Spain’s wartime pivot. This was before Serrano actually and finally became Foreign Minister in October.

Himmler arrived in the Basque Country on 19 October, four days after Companys’ execution in Barcelona. This visit, which was officially to reciprocate Mayalde’s Berlin visit, in fact had all the trappings of a state visit. Himmler was the most prominent Nazi and one of the most prominent politicians received by Spain in the first decade of Franco’s rule, especially in the context of WWII.

³⁷ “La provision de siete mil plazas de Policía armada”, *ABC*, 28 Sept. 1939, pp. 1-2; “La reorganización de los servicios de policía” *ABC*, 9 Apr. 1941, p. 9

³⁸ AGA: AR 82/03697, Letter from Espinosa to Beigbeder, 31 Aug. 1940; *ABC*, 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5; Moors, Pfeiffer, and Schoening (eds.), *Heinrich Himmlers*, pp. 323-5

³⁹ *Arriba*, 20 Oct. 1940, p. 1; Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 184

Spain had the opportunity to receive a high-profile politician and their treatment of Himmler boosted an international statesman dimension to his prestige. There were meetings with all key figures including Spain's *Caudillo* Franco himself. Mayalde ensured that Himmler reviewed Spanish police units. At the culmination of a dinner in Himmler's honour at the Madrid Ritz one evening where both parties spoke highly of one another, Himmler recommended that Mayalde be awarded the Grand Cross of the German Eagle.⁴⁰ With Mayalde feeling reassured by Himmler's review of his police and the Falange, Himmler's reciprocal visit can be credited with increased assistance, on-the-ground involvement, training, instruction and influence by Himmler and his SS-police "micro-reich".

Attaché arrangement

Mayalde reached a supposedly unwritten agreement with Himmler that improved on previous arrangements. Certainly no document for this agreement has been found, unlike with the prior Martinez Anido agreement of 1938. It has even been suggested it was orally negotiated.⁴¹ In this sense there is a commonality with repressive Nazi policy where the SS was involved. The full extent of the agreement is not known but there are documents which relate to the arrangements and from there the main points have been established.⁴² The 1938 agreement had laid the founding provisions. Spanish and German police were able to operate in each other's territories to apprehend opponents and to inform each other on enemy activity. They were also meant to share new policing techniques. Under this updated agreement with Mayalde, the police would now be able to operate and even perform arrests under diplomatic immunity. There would also be more police *attachés* operating in diplomatic missions across each other's countries, however the approval of the actual Foreign Ministries was still required. The Spanish police would receive further training and reorganisation by the Germans while the Germans would also have on-the-ground involvement in Spain.

⁴⁰ ABC, 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5; 26 Mar. 1941, p. 9

⁴¹ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 199

⁴² Ibid.; NARA: M1270, Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 10 Jan. 1946: Schellenberg said he did not know any specific details and according to his recollection this agreement was concluded in 1941 between Himmler and the then Chief of Spanish police "whose name I do not remember. The intermediary was the Spanish ambassador in Berlin, Mayalde"; "I may be in error about the time, but it was at the time when the Spanish Chief of Police visited Germany and negotiated personally with Himmler in regard to this agreement. The entire question of the Spanish Reds played an important role in this agreement. All these negotiations were based upon the close contact which existed already between Himmler and the Spanish Chief of Police during the Spanish Civil War."; OSS-Madrid, "Consolidated list of persons who worked for the German intelligence services in Spain, compiled from sources within Germany", 26 Sept. 1946, found in both NARA: RG226/127/3 and Kew: KV3/272

German police *attachés* would operate in German diplomatic missions in Spain beyond Madrid.⁴³ They answered to Paul Winzer, an operative close to Mayalde, whose power was ever increasing and who also had been provided with a new police bureau. Ros Agudo writes that Winzer wasted no time in using the new Mayalde provisions to install *attachés* in German missions across Spain.⁴⁴ In 1941 the new head of RSHA Section VI (Foreign SD) Walter Schellenberg and his representative in Spain Walter Eugen Mosig also took advantage of the situation and increased their own agents' presence. Mosig had independent communications channels with Berlin and a high-security cipher system. Contrary to Himmler's terms with Ribbentrop, most of the reports would not go through the German Ambassador but rather be transmitted directly to Schellenberg's office. Winzer and his *attachés* were to operate more easily in apprehending political opponents and other German expatriates.⁴⁵ Mosig and his agents were to gather all sorts of military and political information about the Allies and Spain itself. At least 35 personnel were employed by the Gestapo and the SD in Franco's Spain.⁴⁶ Serrano decided not to publish the nominations of German personnel in Spain.⁴⁷ Naturally, the end result was an increase in German influence in Spain, a subject to be expanded on later. Himmler had a greater foreign policy influence to the annoyance, but nevertheless with the consent, of Ribbentrop. This would also irritate Spain's pro-Allied General Jordana as Foreign Minister in 1943.⁴⁸

With the reciprocal nature of the agreement, Falangists would serve as *attachés* in Spain's foreign missions in Germany. Obviously, the ramifications of an increased Spanish police presence in Germany and its occupied territories were not going to be as great as a German presence in Spain and the territories Spain held including Tangier. Nevertheless the ability for Spanish police to operate in German-dominated Europe during the war remained both important and useful as in the aforementioned Companys case among others. When Mayalde later served as Spanish Ambassador to Berlin, through which he was Head of the Falange in Germany and its occupied territories, Spanish police played an important role dealing with "reds" in Germany itself as Chapter 3 shows.⁴⁹

⁴³ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 199; OSS-Madrid, "Consolidated list of persons", 26 Sept. 1946

⁴⁴ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 199; Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y Tercer Reich* (Madrid, 1986), p. 312 n22; José María Doussinague, *España tenía razón (1939-45)* (Madrid, 1950), pp. 324-6; Samuel Hoare, *Ambassador on Special Mission* (London, 1946), pp. 306-7; Kew: KV2/104, 12 May-5 Dec. 1945, Appendix VI

⁴⁵ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 200

⁴⁶ OSS-Madrid, "Consolidated list of persons", 26 Sept. 1946

⁴⁷ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, p. 199; AMAE: R2197/44, memo from the German Embassy, Madrid to MAE, 2 Mar. 1943

⁴⁸ Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, pp. 199-200; AMAE: R2197/44, memo from the German Embassy, Madrid to MAE, 2 Mar. 1943; Longerich, *Himmler*, p. 505

⁴⁹ PAAA: 29742, telegrams on meetings between Mayalde and AA, Jan.-Feb. 1942

The "8 March Law" and German influence

In April 1941, the momentous so-called 8 March Law 1941 drastically reorganised the police.⁵⁰ Promulgated during Mayalde's last couple of months as DG, the 8 March Law has since been identified by historians, often writing under the patronage of Spain's Interior Ministry, as a watershed moment in the history of the Spanish police.⁵¹ Mayalde himself would be acknowledged for his role in these reforms as late as 1970 when as Vice-president of the Francoist *Cortes* legislative he was involved in a discussion on the state of the police.⁵² Promoting the Falange as the "best" Spaniards who were "decisive" in Civil War victory, Mayalde again cited the "demands of victory" to justify a "permanent vigilant force" which had to be centralised, politicised and militarised. Mayalde wanted to inject political spirit into a permanent repressive force to demonstrate that the "totalitarian state" was "better" than "weak liberal democracy". At the same time as building towards a new Spanish police for Franco in the long-term, in the short-term of WWII the Mayalde-era of reorganisation also indulged the strengthening of Himmler's hand beyond Germany.⁵³ The "blue ideology" agenda meant a heavily-politicised "dual-effect".

Coinciding with Franco's Law of the Security of the State in timing, the Law legislated a tightening centralisation of the police management in the "totalitarian state" inviting inevitable comparisons with Germany. It explained that enhancing preventive and repressive elements had been "necessary" and necessitated a "profound reform of personnel from top to bottom". The existing means of "safeguarding the *patria*" against "common crime and political disorder" were inadequate against "the great dangers from within and outside of Spain". "Profound reform" was not going to merely entail changes in names of departments and agencies. The Law specifically asserted the need for the regime to have a police force operating at maximum strength and efficiency in order to avoid the "errors and defects" of the old "weak" politics of liberal and democratic organisation. The Law considered police forces without political spirit as organisationally deficient and moribund. Civil War victory "demanded an injection of political spirit". In "totalitarian states", combining technical perfection and loyalty "invigorated the life of the political police" as a more efficient organ which could carry out its activities for the "defence of the state". "Accentuated professional spirit and discipline" and a maximum "sense of responsibility and sacrifice" were considered "indispensable".

⁵⁰ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

⁵¹ Julio de Antón, *Historia de la policía español* (Madrid, 2000), pp. 98, 335

⁵² ACdD: Transcript of session, 18 Nov. 1970

⁵³ NWCDA: OSS-Madrid, "Analysis of certain reports about the Spanish Secret Service and their relations with the Germans", 15 Aug. 1944 (hereafter "OSS report")

The state of the police in September 1939 reflected the chaotic circumstances of the Civil War and moreover Franco's determination for "retribution" against the vanquished. Franco's wartime *junta* had created its own proto-state security bodies which overlapped with Falange militias and other party organs. Although Franco eventually appropriated the older Spanish state bodies following the military defeat of the Republic, the integration of organisations and delineation of responsibilities was anything but seamless. For Mayalde especially, functional harmony meant that wartime conditions in fact had to be kept permanent. Not only was Mayalde not going to reverse the recent wartime dependency on the Falange militias which remained mobilised, but also stated that *never before* had party militias been as involved in matters of public order.⁵⁴ After all these were the conditions in which the Falange had so far proved best able to thrive. The way forward was escalation and permanency by completely fusing the apparatus of state and party. Additionally, Mayalde was being assisted by Himmler whose own SS-police ambition was itself "evolving" in wartime conditions. Mayalde's desire for "political spirit" meant there was no doubt the DGS envisioned a Falangised professional political corps along similar lines to the "successful" Nazi-SS-police corps of Germany. In mentioning the exemplary "totalitarian state," Mayalde was of course invoking José Antonio who had originally previously declined to cite either Germany or Italy as ideal "totalitarian states".⁵⁵ However this was of course before the Civil War and WWII. Since then Mayalde had visited Germany in an attempt to identify a concrete example or at least blueprints for the needs of the "new Spain" in 1940.

There were different types of DGS-related organisations to be coordinated whose varying names appear throughout this chapter. Franco's notorious wartime "Police Brigades" or *Brigadas*, often identified as "secret police", were to be retained.⁵⁶ They had cropped up across Spain either as appendages of the official state police or the Falange each with specific *antipatria* purposes as will be explained. Older DGS-agencies considered tainted by the Republic were to be overhauled entirely. Notably the bulk of the old security corps known as *Seguridad y Asalto* had remained loyal to the "anti-Spain" Republic. In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 1, its Lieutenant José Castillo had already been killed by Falangists a few days before the outbreak of war. Succeeding organs had to be politically Francoist and coordinated with the Falange. Police reform shared the discourse of Franco's 1940 "Law for Suppression of Freemasonry and Communism" which criminalised political opponents for their affiliations going back to 1934.

⁵⁴ ABC, 9 Apr. 1941, p. 9

⁵⁵ Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio*, p. 68; ABC, 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5

⁵⁶ OSS Report; Kew: HS6/921, Report on the DGS, 27 Jun. 1942; FO371/79687, "Spanish Police", 9 Aug. 1949

The 8 March Law wanted to “fully equip” the new police with the “political spirit” that animated the “National-Syndicalist Revolution” – a specifically Falangist view. To start with, recruits would be those that “enthusiastically” supported Franco and upheld his “glorious victories” and had proved their “unshakeable” adherence with their “most-valued services” before and during the Civil War. Duly chosen by the police command, these fresh recruits would bring the “right political fervour” in order to properly complement and complete the cadres of the current officials who had been acknowledged for their “professional competence and industry”. This was so that the new Spanish police could carry out their function of “total and permanent surveillance indispensable for the service of the lifeblood of the nation”. Shortly before Mayalde became DG, the first intimation of a police-Falange merger was made with the issue of a detailed bulletin about the provision of 7,000 places in the new *Cuerpo de Policía Armada y de Tráfico* (Armed and Traffic Police Corps, CPAT).⁵⁷ The project was already being conceived but the bulletin was not issued until Mayalde replaced Colonel Ungría and gave the Falange agenda its flexibility with his immediate political assertion. Anyone who had served in the “red” (Republican) zone during the conflict was, naturally, not eligible to enlist. Applicants were to request personal records from either their local Mayor, Civil Guard officer or a local FET y de las JONS boss for their application references. Mayalde was also frank that his aforementioned Falange DSII (party intelligence service) would have a role to play in the political “perfection” of the new police. The DGS also encouraged ex-combatants to join its new force, just as Himmler desired SS recruits to have had undertaken military service for a certain time.⁵⁸

By cooperating with Himmler, the reform agenda meant the organisational structure in Spain of the police adjusted, at least in part, to reflect its German designers and Nazi aspirations.⁵⁹ The US Office of Strategic Services (the WWII forerunner to the CIA) reported that one of the DGS bodies introduced under Mayalde was the *Servicio de Extranjeros* which dealt with foreigners and passports. In cooperation with Himmler the *Servicio* carried out its function of targeting alien groups with greater intensity. A parallel to the German services was identified in the structure of the “secret police” under the DGS which was considered the most important section for the purposes of intelligence work. The parallel started with the division of Spain’s “secret police” into four sub-divisions: first the “Comisaria General Politico-Social”, then the “Brigada de Investigación Criminal”, next a civil corps of plain clothes detectives who investigated minor felonies and issued identification papers and finally, a special force of men who covered transportation terminals. The “Comisaria General Politico-Social” performed the functions of both Germany’s inland *Sicherheitsdienst* and the

⁵⁷ ABC, 24 Sept. 1939, p. 8

⁵⁸ ABC, 28 Sept. 1939, pp. 1-2; Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 181-3

⁵⁹ OSS report; Kew, HS6/921, British report and diagram attempt on the DGS, 27 Jun. 1942

Gestapo while the *Brigada de Investigación Criminal* corresponded to the Kripo (RSHA Office V for Germany's Criminal Police). The OSS considered the "Comisaria General Politico-Social" the most interesting of these agencies – it is unclear how it relates to "Brigada Politico-Social" mentioned in other sources. It was entrusted with the tasks of investigating political crimes. It carried out the arrests following both its own investigations and the military intelligence investigations carried out by the SIM (the Spanish military's postwar *Servicio de Información*). As the "secret police" was entrusted with the responsibility of making arrests on the recommendation of local and national DGS authorities and on the request of SIM leaders, in the eyes of the OSS the parallel with the German services was made complete. In the German case information-gathering agencies of both the state and Armed Forces relied on the Gestapo to a large extent to make the actual arrests.⁶⁰ On this note, it is also significant that British reports identified the "Comisaria General Politico-Social" as having subdivisions concerned with "intelligence gathering" on Freemasonry, Judaism and "other sects" which will be borne in mind.⁶¹

Himmler not only found a role in the constant redesign of Spain's security services but also in its operations.⁶² Himmler personally selected DGS personnel for training in Germany and for future dispatch to Britain, France, the US and Latin America where they would be attached to the Spanish consulates and receive orders. Himmler approved plans for the reorganisation of the DGS intelligence service, presumably in relation to the activities in Latin America, that had been originally formulated by the Nazis' "Ibero-Amerikanische Institut". This "Institut" was headed by former German Ambassador to Spain General von Faupel who submitted the plans to Himmler in 1942 for approval. The Spanish sub-committee which had contributed towards these plans and which was to act on their administration under the "Consejo de Hispanidad" included Serrano and his associates Ximenez de Sandoval, Fureta de Villavicencio, Antonio Tovar and Montes, all key Serranoists. Of these named Serranoists, Mayalde is not mentioned simply because he did not hold a post on this Consejo; he was away in the important post as Franco's Ambassador to Berlin in 1942. Serrano's men were to supervise Spain's contribution towards joint intelligence with Germany. Himmler reviewed the scheme with the above sub-committee and ratified the bulk of the details, but insisted that the "Consejo de Hispanidad" should be a separate organisation divorced from the Falange. The

⁶⁰ OSS report; Kew: FO371/79687, "Spanish Police", 9 Aug. 1949: "The records of the *Dirección General de Seguridad*, modelled on Nazi lines, are thorough and extremely well organised, ensuring systematic vigilance over all suspected enemies of the State. Here, it should be emphasised that the black spots of Spanish justice are centred as a rule in the police stations rather than the prisons themselves. All cases of a political nature fall within the jurisdiction of the *Brigada Political-Social* who act on the basis of an order for arrest issued by the *Jefe Superior de Policía*"

⁶¹ Kew: HS6/921, Report on the DGS, 27 Jun. 1942; FO371/79687, "Spanish Police", 9 Aug. 1949

⁶² OSS report

sub-committee agreed in part, but they insisted that they would have to rely on the Foreign Section of the Falange for agents for a while. One might discern that these concerns were more to do with practicality than Himmler disagreeing with the politicisation of Spain's police and intelligence services. It was following these conferences that Himmler personally supervised the selection of recruits who were sent to Germany for training before being dispatched.⁶³

So ostensibly while advising on the increased power of the DGS in Spain and assisting restructuring of the Spanish police along RSHA lines, Himmler now had personal involvement and even control of intelligence work in Spain which included personnel allocation.⁶⁴ Himmler appeared to influence appointments within the DGS and seemed to want to replicate his own RSHA. In all probability this was a model intended for extrapolation across German-controlled countries. However, Himmler may also have taken into account the structure of the Spanish police and also the Franco regime itself as a coalition of competing interests across the right-wing as opposed to a sole fascist party. He must have considered that his model was one which had to be adapted to Spain's circumstances before he could make any recommendations on organisation to the Spaniards.

It was in April 1941, eighteen months into Mayalde's DG tenure, that the major DGS overhauls were publicly set out.⁶⁵ Two new police corps – the *Cuerpo General de Policía* (General Police Corps, CGP) and the aforementioned CPAT – were officially introduced succeeding *Asalto* and other older bodies. Police schools were also overhauled as part of the Law for entry into the new bodies.⁶⁶ As far as the conditioning of the Francoist *Volksgemeinschaft* was concerned, the DGS's CGP and CPAT, the (longstanding) *Guardia Civil* governed by its own special legislation that operated in the countryside, and the Falange party militias were identified as the core components of what was the state's overall *Servicios de Vigilancia y Seguridad del Estado*. Auxiliary manpower would be employed in varying capacities subject to legal dispositions and notices from the DGS and Civil Governor. This point is significant as regardless of whoever ran the DGS, Franco's overarching political requirements meant the use of auxiliaries from the Falange in many capacities remained inevitable. Furthermore, the aforementioned party-state overlapping police "Brigadas" were retained and continued operating well beyond the Mayalde-era as did the Falange's DSII. As late as 1949, "alien residents" moving across provinces were advised to seek the "rubber-stamps" of both the Falange's intelligence service (DSII) and DGS.⁶⁷

⁶³ OSS report

⁶⁴ OSS report

⁶⁵ *ABC*, 9 Apr. 1941, p. 9

⁶⁶ Antón, *Historia*, pp. 98, 335

⁶⁷ Kew, HS6/921, "Notes on the Spanish police", 27 Jun. 1942

The CPAT fulfilled the Francoist intention for a force of permanent total surveillance and repression. It would draw from both battle-hardened Francoists and also fresh recruits who had responded to the September 1939 notices. There is an evident comparison with Himmler's SS-police organisation for not only the emphasis on politics but also on militarisation and "battlefield glory and achievement" placed by the DGS's Falangist leadership. By this point in time Mayalde had seen for himself the "example" of the *Leibstandarte*, which had originated as a small bodyguard unit for Hitler and had made its mark with the suppression of the unruly *Sturmabteilung* (SA) in the "Night of the Long Knives" on 30 June 1934.⁶⁸ The parallel here for Franco was the case the old *Seguridad y Asalto* headed by Castillo. The CPAT was to have an eminently military character and organisation even if they were not going to be deployed in the battlefield. For that purpose the Falange had the Blue Division in mind as covered in the following chapters. Aspiring recruits would be entered into the new schools by demonstrating sufficient political and "moral" convictions. Previously, rigorous exercises were required for mere entry into the police but no study had been required. Now, entrants would not simply undertake sets of physical exercises but live a militarised life in a police school comprising both physical and educational discipline.⁶⁹ The CPAT setting would be where recruits learned and worked under military-style command. Training encompassed physical, educational and above all political discipline as conceived in Falangist terms. Furthermore, police chiefs were expected to have law degrees. The DGS expected that highly distinguished officials would be able to rapidly advance in their careers. The new arrangements would, it was believed, produce the fittest and most capable recruits. All this would ensure that the police officers in command posts would have the right preparation.⁷⁰

Mayalde was optimistic but also cautious in his presentation. He indicated that the anticipated reform improvements would not happen immediately and would require time. He had plenty of reason to not expect any immediate effects let alone positive effects so soon.⁷¹ Regarding the Falange, by the time Mayalde publicised the Laws in April 1941 he would not be at the DGS for long enough to cement his intended Falangist vision. The Army officer corps was about to manoeuvre back into the MdG in May 1941. American and British documents seem to suggest Spanish police reorganisation was not actually implemented until early 1942 by which time the anti-Falangist Colonel Valentin Galarza Morante was appointed as Interior Minister and Lieutenant Colonel

⁶⁸ Moors, Pfeiffer, and Schoening (eds.), *Heinrich Himmlers*, pp. 323-5; *ABC*, 28 Sept. 1939, pp. 1-2; 9 Apr. 1941, p. 9; *Völkischer Beobachter*, 31. Aug. 1940, p. 3

⁶⁹ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

⁷⁰ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

⁷¹ AHN: H24132, "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941

Gerardo Caballero Olabazar as DG, an assertion supported by the fact more key developments including the "November 1941 Law" transpired under Caballero.⁷²

As far as the short-term of the WWII years was concerned, the Office of Strategic Services reckoned it was evident from developments that the Spanish system was organised by the Nazis to give them substantial aid in the field of intelligence. The OSS did not have any "incontrovertible evidence" of the efficiency of the machine but had information that it had not worked out as well as the Nazis had hoped. Apparently DGS agents did not take kindly to German tutelage as they resented the "German worship of system". Spaniards were individualists and preferred to operate on a more freelance basis than was possible under the Nazi-inspired centralist style of organisation that was evident in the 8 March Law.⁷³ Literature on the CPAT shows that it took time before it became an important and notorious instrument for Franco which cracked down on political dissent in the towns and cities over the next few decades of the regime's existence. Mariano Aguilar writes that for the first few years of its existence the CPAT was badly equipped, which was unsurprising for post-Civil War, economically destitute Spain.⁷⁴ Torture of detainees with or without interrogation was not uncommon. On the other hand, by the end of the decade, British diplomacy reported that "the records of the DGS are modelled on Nazi lines, are thorough and extremely well organised, ensuring systematic vigilance over all suspected enemies of the State".⁷⁵

On this basis, it might be safe to assume that in the short-term of WWII it was Himmler who benefited the most from even the basic reorganisation of the Spanish police. Himmler's gain was achieving extended foreign influence. Much of the evidence which explicitly referred to Himmler was compiled in 1944 when the OSS prepared a report after studying certain documents received since early 1942. This concerned not just the state DGS and Falange DSII but also the Army's Information Service, giving an overview of police and intelligence in Spain beyond the jurisdiction of Serrano and Mayalde. This was not a study of personalities, unlike British diplomatic documents, which is probably why Mayalde is not mentioned despite the reciprocal police visits' mention.⁷⁶ Furthermore the aforementioned Schellenberg perceived Mayalde as an important contact for German operations.⁷⁷ Interestingly enough, although by 1942 Serrano no longer controlled the Interior Ministry he appears to have held great influence with the *Consejo de Hispanidad*,

⁷² Antón, *Historia*, p. 373

⁷³ OSS report

⁷⁴ Mariano Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército español durante el franquismo* (Madrid, 1999), p. 74

⁷⁵ FO371/79687, "Spanish Police", 9 Aug. 1949

⁷⁶ OSS report

⁷⁷ Kew: KV2/94-99, OCCPAC Schellenberg interrogation, 19 Sept. 1945

presumably because that organisation related to Foreign Affairs and the Falange, while Mayalde was abroad serving as Ambassador in Berlin.

***Antipatria* – Anti-Freemasonry and data sharing**

Freemasons, undesirables both in Nazi Germany and especially in Franco's Catholic Spain, were considered part of a conspiracy to undermine "traditional Europe". Paul Preston shows how anti-Freemasonry influenced Franco personally and how he made it a priority with the creation of the anti-Masonic archives in Salamanca and the 1940 "Law for Suppression of Freemasonry and Communism".⁷⁸ Although the "Freemasons" in question may just have been targeted for being social or liberal democrats, the scope of persecution remained determined by Franco's own preoccupations. Since the Civil War, the principal force in persecuting and repressing "Masons" was not the DGS but the Salamanca-based DERD (Document Recovery Delegation) under Marcelino Ulibarri. Nevertheless it remains important to try quantify the DGS role in what was meant to be Franco's most significant endeavour of repression and data gathering. Furthermore as mentioned earlier the DGS itself had anti-Freemasonry subdivisions. Addressing this area contributes to vital insight into Mayalde, his conduct, his cooperation, and the environment he was working in and helped shape, that will be addressed in Chapter 4.

The DERD followed in the rearguard of Franco's army as they "liberated" cities such as Bilbao from "the machinations of International Masonry and Jewry".⁷⁹ The atrocity at Guernica in 1937 by the Luftwaffe crippled the Basque resistance against Franco during the Civil War. The DERD followed the Francoists pressing onto the Basque country and gathered records for the anti-Masonic archives being prepared in Salamanca. These archives would be shared by Marcelino Ulibarri with the Nazis, a practice which Mayalde supported and encouraged.⁸⁰ Paul Preston writes that even before the Civil War the right-wing propagandist, Father Juan Tusquets, who is highlighted in Chapter 4, was hard at work elaborating lists of alleged Jews and Freemasons. A "Judeo-Masonic Section" of the Army's own information service was created under Tusquets' direction with Franco's personal encouragement.⁸¹ Tusquets coordinated the early regime's Police "Brigada Politico-Social" concerning Judaism and "sects" which may have preceded later DGS arrangements.

⁷⁸ Preston, *Franco*, pp. 563-4

⁷⁹ CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA/CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.43, "RECUPERACIÓN DE DOCUMENTOS", Servicio Nacional de Prensa del Ministerio de la Gobernación

⁸⁰ CDMH: DNSD-CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.38, Mayalde to Ulibarri, 14 Jul. 1938

⁸¹ Paul Preston, *Franco* (Spanish Edition, 2015), new appendix

With regard to DGS-DERD relations, Mayalde had a significant professional relationship with Marcelino Ulibarri. Ulibarri was not a Falangist but a Carlist monarchist. However, as he had recognised that Serrano was a key advisor to Franco, Ulibarri had ingratiated himself with Serrano and therefore worked professionally with both him and Mayalde since 1938. The good relationship can be seen to be personal as well as professional despite occasional tensions evident in their correspondence. Ulibarri could relate his amusement to Mayalde over an article from California that to him said the progress of the great Spain depended on the "reestablishment of Masonry", presumably uproariously funny to a Falangist and a monarchist each leading a Francoist department of repression including Masonry. There was still a formality being maintained between the two. In their letters Mayalde remained on formal *usted* terms addressing Ulibarri whereas he was on familiar *tu* terms with closer Falangist colleagues.⁸²

As to operational matters, there were movements of data and personnel between the DGS and the DERD. After having met René Bayer in July 1938, Mayalde was keen that Ulibarri could furnish the Nazi correspondent with whatever he could about the forming Freemasonry Archive.⁸³ All of this was taking place before both the July 1938 Himmler-Martinez Anido agreement and the October 1940 Himmler-Mayalde agreement. This can be seen as an early enthusiasm for data sharing by Mayalde and the Serrano-Falange camp with the Nazis about so-called international Jewry and the problems of the world. Gabriel Coronado Zaragoza, a trained lawyer and Mayalde's deputy as DGS Secretary General, visited the Salamanca Archives in order to obtain copies of documents.⁸⁴ Ulibarri accepted an offer by Mayalde to subsidise expenses in producing reproductions of parts of the Archive that interested Mayalde. Ulibarri arranged 100,000 reproductions to be sent to the DGS Archive.⁸⁵ There were other international and domestic dimensions to Mayalde and Ulibarri's cooperation in their move against Freemasonry. On 6 April 1939, Mayalde introduced the Jesuit priest Father José Ledit to Ulibarri. Ledit was visiting Spain on the recommendation of Franco's Ambassador to the Holy See, José Yanguas Messía. (Freemasonry was condemned by the Vatican until the 1970s.) Mayalde referred to Ledit as a "person of complete competence in anti-communist studies" and discussed affairs relating to Ulibarri's DERD.⁸⁶ Domestically on 7 November 1939, a delegation on behalf of Mayalde, in his capacity as Madrid's Civil Governor, visited Salamanca for information. On 19

⁸² CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA EXP. 35, Ulibarri to Mayalde, 28 Jan. 1940; 4 Apr. 1940; 18 Jan. 1941

⁸³ CDMH: DNSD-CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.38, Mayalde to Ulibarri, 14 Jul. 1938

⁸⁴ CDMH: DNSD-CORRESPONDENCIA EXP.38, Ulibarri to Coronado, 30 Oct. 1939

⁸⁵ CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA EXP. 35, Ulibarri to Mayalde, 28 Jan. 1940

⁸⁶ CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA EXP. 35, Mayalde to Ulibarri, 6 Apr. 1939

January 1940, Ulibarri sent DG Mayalde a letter with attached documents, originally provided by the Alicante Office, that referred to the persistence of "Masonic-type" activities.⁸⁷

In terms of cooperation with Germany, Mayalde had brought in people like Bayer and had people such as his own cousin coordinating efforts even in the south of France and before June 1940. Following on from the Ulibarri-Bayer connection in 1938, while in Berlin in September 1940, Serrano invited Werner Haas, Director of Foreign Office Services in Germany, to Salamanca to review DERD work on Freemasonry. Haas was provided with books and documents of "all sorts". He would take names for a similar project to be carried out in Germany. Following France's surrender, both the Spanish and the Germans were happy to go over data seized in France regarding "international Masonic connections". The Germans already had material found in France of interest to the Spanish which they would offer. Haas' visit was summed up as "the start of close relations for the future" with the aim of chasing down Freemasonry as part of promoting their "Glorious Crusade". Haas suggested a Spanish mission also visit Germany to help inform their records and Ulibarri accepted an invitation.⁸⁸ The MAE was happy to lend personnel to assist the Spanish Mission at the same time that the Blue Division was sent to fight with the Germans on the Eastern Front in June 1941, which itself seen was part of the "Crusade".⁸⁹ By that time, Mayalde had been succeeded by Caballero as DG, who was said to be interested in choosing books and documents for an "essential political-social library" for DGS reference.⁹⁰

DGS-tolerated German activities in Spain: illegal cooperation and political repression in practice

Considering the "Glorious Crusade" with the convergent European fascist "consensus" in which the Himmler-Mayalde agreement was framed, the DGS and Civil Governors (CGs) were complicit with German activity in Spain. Consistent with the aforementioned significance of France in "Masonic operations" was a view that the nationalistic Catalan and Basque regions close to the Pyrenees were nexus of international Jewry. The association of regional politics and people and ideas coming from the Pyrenees drove the stated mission of the March 1939-December 1940 CG Wenceslao González Oliveros in Barcelona, to purge out non-central Spanish influences. In fact German Jewish exiles were congregating in Barcelona, so the Germans had already set up covert intelligence operations in

⁸⁷ CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA EXP.35, Ulibarri to Mayalde, 19 Jan. 1940

⁸⁸ CDMH: TERMC-1274.11-12, Gregorio Prieto to Jose Lorente Sanz, 11 Nov. 1940; Felix Diaz Mateo to Marcelino Ulibarri, 18 Nov. 1940; List of Masonic works copied for the Germans, 18 Nov. 1940; Ulibarri to Serrano, Mar. 1941; Letter pertaining to MAE, 17 Jul. 1941

⁸⁹ CDMH: TERMC-1274.11-12, Letter from MAE Subsecretary to Ulibarri, 1 Aug. 1941; Julius Ruiz, *Franco's Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 199-208

⁹⁰ CDMH: DNSD-SECRETARIA EXP.42, Eduardo Martin Colomer letter, 11 Jun. 1941

that city before the Civil War.⁹¹ González represented the Francoist sentiment that underpinned Mayalde's own conduct and may also have helped inspire it. González became CG shortly after Gestapo-led raids against German Jews living in Barcelona who were arrested and their synagogues desecrated, six months following the Himmler-Martínez Anido agreement.⁹² González refused to meet local Jewish delegates concerned over the incidents or the closure of a specific synagogue.⁹³ González received Himmler in October 1940 on his final Spanish stop in Barcelona before returning to Germany. Among Himmler's concerns for making his visit had been the reports from Himmler's operatives in Spain in relation to German expatriates, refugees and Jews in which Barcelona was a key region.

Elsewhere in Gipuzkoa on 5 August 1938, a few days after the 31 July Himmler-Martínez Anido agreement, the German Embassy then located in San Sebastian was expected to relay an official or semi-official stance on the "Jewish problem" by Spain to Berlin. It also seemed the German Embassy was preparing antisemitic leaflets for circulation pertaining to the so-called "Institute for Study of the Jewish Question".⁹⁴ In 1939, when Caballero was CG, the German Consulate contacted a police commissioner in San Sebastian and inquired if the likes of several individuals were Jewish.⁹⁵ The German Consulate interest seems to extend beyond German expatriates but also individuals with Spanish names be they German or not. Caballero accompanied Mayalde and Himmler when the latter started his Spanish tour in Gipuzkoa in October 1940. Caballero would succeed Mayalde as DG and go on from presiding over regional antisemitism in Gipuzkoa to directing central antisemitism in Madrid with *Circular 11* as will be discussed.⁹⁶

In Madrid verbal notice by the German Embassy to the MAE on 22 July 1939 appealed to the authorities to prevent the naturalisation of 20 – 25 Jewish families of German origin living in Madrid, pointing out that "they embraced the Catholic religion as a means of naturalisation so that they can throw off the Spanish authorities".⁹⁷ While the inquiry was not made by Himmler's SS nor was this about non-German Jews, a certain German expectation for friendly countries to act through police

⁹¹ CDMH: PS-ANTECEDENTES-BARCELONA 179.21, Republican report on Gestapo activities, no dates specified but prepared sometime between 1936 and 1939; Kew: FO371/24154 British Consulate Reports, 6 Feb. 1939 and 28 Jul. 1939; Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews* (Eastbourne, 2007), p. 83

⁹² CDMH: PS-ANTECEDENTES-BARCELONA 179.21, Republican report on Gestapo activities; Kew: FO371/24154 British Consulate Reports, 6 Feb. 1939 and 28 Jul. 1939; Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 83

⁹³ Jacobo Israel Garzón, *España y el Holocausto (1939-1945): Historia y testimonios* (Madrid, 2007), p. 16; José Antonio Lisbona, *Retorno a Sefarad* (Barcelona, 1993), p. 110

⁹⁴ PAAA: R103195, German Embassy "Jewish Question" correspondences regarding Jewish Cultural Institutions in Spain, 5 Aug. 1938 and 10 Feb. 1939

⁹⁵ AHN: H71803 on Adolfo Pfeifer, 12 Aug. 1939

⁹⁶ ABC, 11 May 1941, p. 1

⁹⁷ Garzón, *España*, p. 22

cooperation on antisemitism was still evident. It has to be presumed, unless demonstrable otherwise, that Spanish government ministers and bureaucrats of the level of Mayalde were privy to such correspondence. Mayalde may have considered it inappropriate that Jews and other non-Catholics who converted to Catholicism would benefit from the legal system. It should be noted that the regime itself was largely responsible for the fact that some Jews appeared as "ordinary Spaniards". Many Jews had converted to Catholicism following the regime's restriction of religious freedom to non-Catholics. Around this time in 1939, Mauricio Carlavilla was put in charge of the Madrid "*Brigada Politico-Social*", in fact at Mayalde's behest, and may have been tasked with monitoring the lifestyles and activities of Jews in Spain.⁹⁸

With the Nazi-occupation of Europe, Jews and other "undesirables" attempted escape by crossing the Pyrenees. As Isabelle Rohr shows, Franco was unsympathetic and unwilling to aid them. The DGS imposed and maintained a restrictive border policy which was tightened in the autumn of 1940. While Isabelle Rohr analyses a consistent Francoist antisemitism, she also considers that Franco might have been motivated primarily by ingratiation, to get Empire following Germany's victory over France. Nevertheless there remained ideological consistency considering that both of the "dual goal" aspects were influenced by the atmosphere of the Civil War and WWII, as discussed in Chapter 4. As well as tightening borders the near-reciprocal extraditions of Ryan and Companys took place around this time anticipating the Himmler-Mayalde agreement. A May 1940 petition for Franco to allow Jewish emigration to Spain was forwarded by the MAE to the DGS which rejected the appeal for unexplained reasons.⁹⁹ This might have been what happened to an appeal by a German Jewish refugee in Ireland who wanted a visa for his wife living in Germany. Barry Whelan says the vehemently antisemitic Ambassador Juan García Ontiveros simply passed the request back to Madrid where it would be lost in the labyrinth of bureaucracy – a possible reference to the MAE's referral to the DGS that would probably have resulted in rejection.¹⁰⁰

Ten days before Himmler's visit, Serrano's MAE decreed that Spanish Consuls could no longer grant any transit visas themselves but had to telegraph all visa applications to Madrid. Before doing that they had to verify that the applicant had a genuine overseas visa, a transit visa from Portugal and had paid for passage on a ship sailing from Lisbon on a fixed date.¹⁰¹ The refugee coordinator Varian Fry was sure that the DGS submitted every name received to a Gestapo agent and that no

⁹⁸ José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, *Franco: Historia de un conspirador* (Madrid, 2005), p. 268

⁹⁹ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 102; AMAE: R1260/3, MdG Letter 12 Nov. 1940; Letter from Jesus Carrero, Undersecretary to the Presidency, 9 Jun. 1940

¹⁰⁰ Whelan, *Ireland*, p. 30; AMAE: R1056/E10, Letter from Ontiveros to MAE, 17 Sept. 1939

¹⁰¹ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 109; Antonio Marquina and Gloria Inés Ospina, *España y los judíos en el siglo XX* (Madrid, 1987), pp. 148, 164-5; Bernd Rother, *Franco y el Holocausto* (Barcelona, 2005), p. 139

authorisation for a visa would be granted until the Gestapo agent gave consent.¹⁰² Interestingly, when asked about border policy by Vichy French diplomat Count Renom de la Baume, Mayalde blamed Portugal saying that because its government was turning Jews back at the Spanish-Portuguese border Spain had become reluctant to allow them passage.¹⁰³ Varian Fry did not believe this motivated Francoist policy and was convinced that “the only adequate explanation” was “a political one”.¹⁰⁴ It was two weeks after the decree that, along with Spain’s execution of Companys, the Himmler-Mayalde agreement allowed the German police an increased and more official presence in Spain. Winzer upgraded his functionaries in San Sebastian to being actual *attachés*.¹⁰⁵

José Antonio Lisbona writes about an archive, similar to but smaller than the supposed central 1941 *Archivo Judaico* (AJ), put together in 1940 for Barcelona specifically. In December 1939 González Oliveros, who it must be remembered despite serving Serrano Suñer’s MdG was a monarchist and not a Falangist, ordered a file of Jews living in the city to be created. A copy of this miniature “Jewish Archive” was shared by González with the local Gestapo in June 1940, another instance of Hispano-German data sharing.¹⁰⁶ This can be seen as part of the DGS or at least the MdG working towards the outcomes of the Berlin and Madrid visits. Mayalde’s own role either as DG or fellow Civil Governor is not clear but again he can be presumed to be involved by the level of his office. The Barcelona directive may have been German expatriate Jew-targeted but Spanish Jews may possibly have been included. The Barcelona archive can be perceived as a precursor to *C11*.

Circular 11 and the Jewish Archive(s)

On 5 May 1941, the DGS issued to all Spain’s Civil Governors (CGs) what has been considered as Francoism’s most significant and most dangerous antisemitic initiative.¹⁰⁷ Bearing Mayalde’s name and signature, *Circular 11* has been subject to some keen discussion and speculation since its discovery and ensuing article by the Spanish Jewish-cultural writer Jacobo Israel Garzon in 1997. As mentioned there had been prior Francoist police endeavours pursuing “Judaism and religious sects”,

¹⁰² Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 109; Marquina and Ospina, *España*, p. 94; Among the refugees aided by Fry was Hannah Arendt.

¹⁰³ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 110; Robert Belot, *Aux frontières de la liberté: Vichy-Madrid-Alger-Londres: s'évader de France sous l'Occupation (Pour une histoire du XXe siècle)* (Paris, 1998), p. 56

¹⁰⁴ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 110; Varian Fry, *Surrender on Demand* (New York, 1945), p. 95

¹⁰⁵ NARA: Schellenberg Interrogation, 10 Jan. 1946; Ros Agudo, *La guerra*, pp. 199-200

¹⁰⁶ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 102; Lisbona, *Retorno*, p. 110. According to Lisbona the government made a first file in December 1939 and a second one in June 1940. The files are held by the *Comunidad Israelita de Barcelona*.

¹⁰⁷ AHN: H36145, *Circular 11*, 5 May 1941; Jacobo Israel Garzón, “El Archivo Judaico del Franquismo” in *Raíces*, 33 (1997), 57-60; Garzón, *España* (2007), pp. 16-23; Danielle Rozenberg, *La España contemporánea y la cuestión judía* (Barcelona, 2010), pp. 189-92

involving the likes of Tusquets, Carlavilla and the secret police brigades. *C11* has been taken to be the inception order for a central Jewish archive (AJ) of a similar ambition to the anti-Freemasonry archives. In the eyes of José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, it is an entire step up from the earlier police endeavours dealing with "Jews and other sects".¹⁰⁸ Arguably persecution of Jews at an individual level was to be elevated. This was beyond the targeting of foreign Jews in the regions associated with refugees and foreign influences as discussed earlier.¹⁰⁹

C11 specifically instructed the CGs to have the police collect the names and details of individuals – with "Jewish sounding" names or known relations – resident in Spain. Comparable to how the 8 March Law had emphasised the need for the Spanish police to maintain permanent vigilance and maximal repression in the interests of the new "totalitarian state", *C11* essentially reiterated a DGS view in stressing "the need to know in a detailed and conclusive way the places and individuals, who at a given moment, are a danger to the postulates of the new state". This emphasis said that special attention needed to be paid to the Jews "living in our *patria*", notably "those with ties abroad". Hence "information about their background and as many details as may be needed to determine the ideology of each of them and their possible activities, inside and outside our national territory" was required. Whereas the regional antisemitic policies of Francoism and Nazism concerned foreign Jews who to them were causing trouble locally, *C11* alluded to a point of "the extent to which this task must be fulfilled" – that the individuals subjected to this apparently new measure were mostly of Spanish origin, those known as the Sephardic Jews.

Evoking what was a Spanish antisemitism now proximal to Nazi antisemitism (to be discussed in Chapter 4), *C11* warned that "with [the Jews'] capacity to adapt to the environment and similarities in features to us, they have the best guaranteed means of concealing their origins and going by unnoticed, making it impossible to contain their facilities for perturbing manoeuvres". *C11* also said "nevertheless, bearing in mind the notoriety of this race and their almost public efforts to obtain Spanish nationality during the Republican period through serious popular campaigns across all spheres, it is given that one can determine the personality of the Spanish Jews living in each province, though many difficulties may arise such as their lack of retained ties with their peculiar 'Israelite Communities', synagogues or special schools". On the other hand communities in the Balearic Islands, Spanish Morocco and (indeed) Barcelona "may provide more detailed figures of their numbers and reach, both individually and collectively". *C11* was not satisfied with the population count, "in publications going back to 1933, the minimum Israelite population in Spain is

¹⁰⁸ Rodríguez Jiménez, *Franco*, p. 269

¹⁰⁹ "Spaniens Polizeichef", *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Sept. 1940; Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 315-351

supposed to be some 5,000 (with the exception of Morocco)". In a possible allusion to the context of WWII which was bringing about changes and reassessments in Francoism, it pointed to a "universal confederation of Sephardic Jews that was convened in Paris last year." "International Jewry" was being demonised. *C11* continues "This is important owing to the quantity as much as the quality of the Spanish Jews involved and above all, that they maintained extensive contacts with peoples of the same origin, resident in our territory and with such connections facilitated by the favourable political circumstances of those times". *C11* was instructive and educative to the CGs, requesting that they have the police corps, "assisted by individuals of the best reputation", to remit to the DGS detailed records of both national and foreign Jews living in their jurisdictions. Once again the DGS emphasised the most "reputable" individuals – in all likelihood this meant the Falange.¹¹⁰

Contradicting a recent history of Spanish right-wing "philo-Sephardism",¹¹¹ *C11* maintains that as "historical enemies of Spain" the Sephardic Jews especially were to be treated with suspicion in order to safeguard Spain. They were to be distrusted and investigated based on the antisemitic treatise of their well-known methods of deceit, their public representation during the Republic era and continued foreign contacts with Jews abroad. No matter how well integrated Jews may have been, for the regime they were to be treated as untrustworthy *conversos*.¹¹² Their status in society, regarded as disguises, just made the task of uncovering "undesirables" difficult, or so the theory continued. The DGS was anxious to trace the ancestry of these individuals in order to assess the supposed danger. Thus, as *C11* concluded, police records were not only necessary but also urgent.

The most significant known record identified with *C11*'s criteria is about a citizen called María Sinaí León in Barcelona. It took between July 1941 and May 1944 for a police commissioner in Barcelona to prepare and produce the record for the DGS in Madrid. At the same time González Oliveros' Barcelona archive was still in force and Nazi cooperation was still ongoing in Barcelona and throughout Spain. The war was continuing in Europe. The record describes how Sinaí León goes about her daily life supported by her father and without any political inclinations. However, she remained under surveillance because of the "danger posed by the race in general".¹¹³ These reports, often produced at a micro-level, went to great lengths to justify any "danger" posed by individual Spaniards with Jewish ancestry, even if they did not engage in anti-regime activity. The functional significance of *C11* will be discussed in Chapter 4.

¹¹⁰ AHN: H36145, *Circular 11*, 5 May 1941

¹¹¹ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 7

¹¹² Medieval term stigmatising converts from Judaism to Catholicism.

¹¹³ AHN: H63593 on María Sinaí León, 30 Jun. 1944

Expulsions and extraditions

There were various incidents in Spain facilitated by police cooperation – i.e. reactions by other foreign diplomats, and intelligence over Spanish bias towards Germany despite so-called “neutrality”. These events transpired along with the tightening of Spain’s borders by the DGS. British Ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare blamed the Gestapo when Spanish police interned transiting Allied personnel in Spain as they did not have visas. British diplomats succeeded in preventing any handovers to the Germans. Affluent British subjects were marked for eventual expulsion – Hoare mentions one such subject who was handed a notice during a banquet with Francoists that he had helped during the Civil War. Hoare says the Falange and the Germans saw some Britons like the Jews and Moors.¹¹⁴ Jacobo Israel Garzón mentions that in April 1943, a German Jew, León Hoffmann, was handed over to German *attachés* in San Sebastian after they made the request to the Civil Governor with which the DG Rodriguez Martinez complied.¹¹⁵ All of this shows the efforts the Germans were making to exercise powers which would become rights under the 1940 Himmler-Mayalde agreement.

Returning to the summer of 1940, the specific extraditions of Ryan and Companys stand out the most for illustrating the build-up to the agreement. A great deal is written about the Ryan “escape” or “release” from Spain to Germany. As Barry Whelan describes, Ryan was the most contentious issue in Irish-Spanish relations. Eamon de Valera himself took a personal interest in a former Irish Republican comrade-in-arms.¹¹⁶ Germany had a purpose for Ryan in relation to the war against Britain, possibly to influence Ireland. In July 1940 Ryan was handed over to the Germans despite Irish diplomatic efforts to repatriate him. Mayalde’s DGS engineered the departure of this third-party national from a Spanish jail to WWII-belligerent Germany. Germany’s extradition of Companys and prominent Republicans from occupied France appears to have been the *quid pro quo*. Within days of Ryan’s transfer and Mayalde’s strengthening bond with Himmler, Companys was arrested in Nantes and handed over to Spain.¹¹⁷ Companys’ arrest was accompanied by others. Working with the aforementioned Pedro Urraca, the Germans made arrests from lists provided by the Spanish Embassy and handed over the politicians to the Spanish police who took them to Madrid. There was no judicial process. After being transferred to Madrid in early September, Companys spent five weeks in solitary confinement in the cellars of the DGS. He was tortured and beaten, with senior

¹¹⁴ Samuel Hoare, *Ambassador on Special Mission* (London, 1946), pp. 79-80

¹¹⁵ AHN: H48681 on Leon Hoffmann, 5 Apr. 1943

¹¹⁶ NAI: DFA A20/4, Irish Ambassador Leopold Kerney to Ireland’s Department of External Affairs, 26 Aug. 1940; Whelan, *Ireland*, pp. 85-96

¹¹⁷ ANC: ANC2-4, Reproduction of AHN: H338 on Lluís Companys, 1940; Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (London, 2012), pp. 492-3

regime figures participating. Afterwards he was summarily tried and executed on 14 October, within days of Himmler's visit to Spain including Barcelona.

The political significance of the reciprocal visits

Himmler's visit was a *de facto* state visit and the highest-level visit from Nazi Germany to Spain during WWII. Both parties had reason to feel satisfied. In itself the visit appeared to be a foreign policy coup by Mayalde and Serrano for the Falange. It was also to Mayalde's credit that Spain had further technical assistance in place by a longer-established fascist regime. As explained, although reorganisation took time it formed at least some basis for police development towards the end of and beyond WWII. Mayalde also played an important role in any resultant intensification of Falangist influence with his "diplomatic" achievements that laid the groundwork for Franco's systematic repression of his opponents. As Mayalde was the one getting Himmler's help, this should have helped ensure coordination of German police and intelligence work could be arranged not only through the state DGS but also the Falange, even to some extent outlasting Mayalde's DGS tenure. The Falange and its mobilised militias could have their way in the organisation and running of Franco's *Volksgemeinschaft* in line with Serrano and Mayalde's view to post-Civil War consolidation. Any significant ideological differences brought in by the Falange however have to be questioned in Chapter 4. Most significantly, receiving the Grand Cross of the German Eagle boosted Mayalde's WWII-era career by both elevating his position as a pro-German partner and an important wartime diplomat, as will be seen.

Himmler's gain seems to have been a foreign policy autonomous from Canaris or Ribbentrop because he now had forced Ribbentrop to accept that his police *attachés* could operate in German missions abroad albeit accountable to the Ambassadors who answered to Ribbentrop.¹¹⁸ Himmler's SS were acquiring an international role and interfering with the more orthodox Canaris' intelligence relationships conducted through military *attachés*. Above all, Himmler's gratification from Falangist indulgence and lavish pomp was not the simple exertion of influence through the Spanish police system but also demonstrating prestige as a "statesman" to other European countries even while directing Nazi repression. Therefore, Falangist "alternate diplomacy" elevated both Mayalde and Himmler as "diplomats".

After WWII, Walter Schellenberg claimed this formed part of a wider strategy by Himmler to bring Spain into the Axis ambit.¹¹⁹ In fact this was perceived by British intelligence in Barcelona at the

¹¹⁸ Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 504-7

¹¹⁹ NARA: M1270, Schellenberg Interrogation, 10 Jan. 1946

time.¹²⁰ Given the timing of the war and Mayalde's belonging to the Falange which appeared to be growing in prestige and having the most in common with Nazi Germany, Britain was uneasy about the police cooperation and Himmler's visit to Spain. A few weeks before Himmler's *de facto* state visit, Serrano had made the highest-level visit from Spain to Nazi Germany. If anything it seemed Himmler's visit was better paired with Serrano's as opposed to Mayalde's earlier smaller and officially limited-scope visit. However, Serrano insisted to Samuel Hoare and US Ambassador Alexander Weddell that Himmler was merely reciprocating Mayalde's visit and this detail was maintained by the Falange's own *Arriba*.¹²¹ Although Serrano disagrees, there was a strategic significance in the Madrid visit to the German prosecution of war against Britain. Franco and Hitler went on to meet at Hendaye soon afterwards where strategies of the war were discussed and the Gibraltar question was raised. Hitler had asked Himmler to use his visit to prepare prior security and report his observations back to him. Cooperation also heavily influenced the Francoist agenda of reorganisation and persecution. Supposedly the British scope of vigilance increased its focus on Mayalde as a Falangist integral to Serrano's agenda and as a significant contributor to wartime Spanish-Axis relations. This would be unsurprising if even regime politicians themselves credited Mayalde for such a major event.¹²² Chapters 3 and 4 will further explore this theme along with Himmler's SS-related interests when it came to Hispano-German cooperation.

The May Crisis 1941

Despite the gains made by Serrano and Mayalde and the concurrent developments, the fact they would lose the MdG in May 1941 meant they failed to truly secure their agenda of consolidation. As mentioned, Mayalde himself recognised domestic Falangism with police "reform" would not fully realise its goals by that spring. In the lead-up to promulgating the 8 March Law and *C11*, unease across the regime about the ambitions of the Falangist Serrano Suñer naturally increased. Franco had his own anxieties which were fuelled by Serrano's aforementioned rival Arrese. While Arrese

¹²⁰ Kew: FO371/24529/10370, "Visit of Herr Himmler and Herr Funk to Madrid", 23 Oct. 1940

¹²¹ "Telegram: The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State MADRID, October 17 1940 9 p. m." in United States Department of State: *Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1940. General and Europe*, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1940v02&entity=FRUS.FRUS1940v02.p0829&isize=text>; *Arriba*, 20 Oct. 1940, p. 1

¹²² Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo and Iñaki Ellakuría, *La guerra ignorada: Los espías españoles que combatieron a los nazis* (Barcelona, 2008), p. 144, supposedly citing Kew: HS6/927, "Intelligence Reports from Agent T", summary spanning 1940-1942. Allegedly, Agent T, a disgruntled Falangist in the employ of the British SIS, helped bring about Mayalde's DGS departure through a propaganda campaign. However, Mayalde does not seem to appear in the reports. In any event the summary does not provide great detail on Agent T's campaigns.

exacerbated the tensions, the Army still could put pressure on Franco and showed it was strong enough to regain control of the MdG from the Falange.

In what became known as the "May Crisis", Franco saw fit to "clip Serrano's wings". His first move was to appoint the aforementioned anti-Falangist Colonel Galarza as Interior Minister. The post had been vacant since October 1940 while remaining under Serrano's *de facto* control, now this arrangement was to end. Some hours after having issued C11, Mayalde's resignation from the DGS was prompted, both igniting and crowning the ensuing fallout which brought an end to the Serranoist regime. With Galarza's reshuffling of the MdG and its answerable CGs, the aforementioned Caballero succeeded Mayalde as DG. Caballero was Gipuzkoa's Civil Governor at the time of Himmler's tour of San Sebastian. Caballero was a Germanophile and also on record as an anti-Falangist like Galarza. The reorganisation of the Spanish police went through a pattern not too different from 1939. Just as Serrano and Mayalde had picked up from General Martínez Anido, Galarza and Caballero proceeded from Mayalde's advances but reversed many Serranoist decrees as well as the rhetoric favouring the Falange.¹²³ However, as illustrated earlier, as long as Franco kept Civil War-era conditions intact, they did not actually end Falange participation. There remained a practical need for Falange militias. Overlap in operations between Falange and state police units thus continued for many years.¹²⁴ The significance of the post-May 1941 non-Falangist DGS agenda was the reduced reference to the Falange in DGS bulletins and the absence of specific Falange references such as "National-Syndicalism". As a result this meant the rejection of Mayalde's work to complete and certify fusion of the police with the Falange.

Mayalde's police reforms, which were by no means the last to occur during the Franco regime, were nevertheless an important step towards establishing a repressive, efficient police during the long term of the Franco regime beyond WWII. This was acknowledged in political debate and the

¹²³ NARA: M1270, Schellenberg Interrogation, 10 Jan. 1946; Kew: FO371/24529/10370, "Visit of Herr Himmler and Herr Funk to Madrid", 23 Oct. 1940; "Telegram: The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State MADRID, October 17 1940 9p.m." in United States Department of State: *Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1940. General and Europe*, <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS1940v02&entity=FRUS.FRUS1940v02.p0829&size=text>; Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust*, p. 493; Kew: HS6/966, "Situation after recent Ministerial changes", 21 Jun. 1941: "it was only natural that the Conde de Mayalde should be relieved of his post as Head of the Police, as he is very pro-German. The position is now filled by Caballero, a man of great energy who will perhaps create order out of continual disorder"; "Recent Changes in the Spanish Government", 12 May 1941: "The changes in the Chief and Secretary General of Police are particularly significant as Mayalde and his subordinate were on particularly good terms with Himmler. The changes in Civil Governorships are of interest because the combination of CG and Provincial Party Leader was one of the methods by which the Falangist Party increased and consolidated its power"; HS6/921, "Notes on the Spanish Police", 27 Jun. 1942: "[Caballero] is definitely anti-Falangist"; On the May Crisis, see Preston, *Franco*, Lines 9780-9875

¹²⁴ Kew: HS6/921, "Notes on the Spanish Police", 27 Jun. 1942

aforementioned police histories.¹²⁵ Caballero himself paid tribute and respect to his predecessor, saying that Mayalde left an indelible mark as DG.¹²⁶ The next major step which would be carried out under Caballero, the November 1941 Law, retained the mission of empowering and professionalising the police but also eschewed references to the Falange.¹²⁷ It was also shortly after Caballero became DG that his successor as Gipuzkoa's CG had acknowledged *C11* from his predecessor as DG and ordered its regional enforcement to the Police Commissioner in San Sebastian. Galarza and Caballero continued police cooperation with Germany as part of Franco's *Volksgemeinschaft* requirements.¹²⁸ Caballero may not have been pursuing Mayalde's political ideal of synthesis between the police and the Falange but was nevertheless delivering a pro-German and antisemitic policy so long as it suited Franco.

The other issues to be addressed in light of continued reorganisation, *antipatria* activity and cooperation with Germany include Allied observations and the actual circumstances of Mayalde's resignation. Paul Preston writes that British propaganda did play into Franco's own overarching anxieties about Serrano's growing ambitions as far as any clear contribution is concerned. In light of aforementioned Allied concerns, British intelligence singled out Mayalde's departure as DG as a welcome development describing him as too close to Germany.¹²⁹ Additionally Mayalde was described as a "low, unscrupulous intriguer" and a "blackguard of the worst type".¹³⁰ While it was true Mayalde as a fervent Falangist looked to outmanoeuvre his regime rivals by indulging an ambitious *Reichsführer-SS*, nevertheless, as the chapter has shown Franco's police always sought German help regardless of who was in charge. For Franco the May Crisis was not about pro-German cooperation nor really cutting down the Falange but simply preserving a delicate balance of power between the Army, Serrano, other Falangists and other regime factions.

While Serrano was not intending on forfeiting control of the Interior Ministry, it remains unclear whether Mayalde resigned or was sacked. According to Serrano there was surprise when Galarza appeared in a cabinet meeting midday on 5 May as the new Interior Minister. There is reason to believe that while Mayalde was not going to be retained by Galarza as DG, he voluntarily resigned and had been preparing to do so. Both German intelligence and diplomacy highlighted longstanding

¹²⁵ ACdD: Transcript of session, 18 Nov. 1970

¹²⁶ *ABC*, 11 May 1941, p. 1

¹²⁷ Antón, *Historia*, p. 338

¹²⁸ Aguilar Olivencia, *El ejército*, p. 74; Antón, *Historia*, p. 338; *ABC*, 11 May 1941, p. 1; Rozenberg, *La España*, pp. 189-92

¹²⁹ Kew: HS6/966, "Recent Changes in the Spanish Government", 12 May 1941; "Situation after recent Ministerial changes", 21 Jun. 1941

¹³⁰ Kew: HS6/966, "Falangist Personalities", 2 Dec. 1941, p. 3; Kew: FO371/49663, "Spain's pro-German Policy (1940-1942)", 8 Oct. 1945

speculation of Mayalde's resignation as DG and candidacy as either Ambassador to Rome or Berlin by spring 1941.¹³¹ As well as dismissals there were other voluntary resignations by Falangists in protest at perceived marginalisation by Franco in government during the crisis. In this context, the fact that Mayalde also issued *Circular 11* on the same day as his resignation warrants further discussion, to take place in Chapter 4.

Although the domestic agenda was stifled, Serrano still retained the Foreign Ministry. That was where Serrano and Mayalde had to concentrate their efforts in relation to the dual goals, not least in the interests of political survival. But particularly at this point control of the official diplomatic corps was very much valued as it seemed the Axis was on course for victory. Serrano had lamented the lack of a Falangist Ambassador to Germany, but through "alternate diplomacy" and the reciprocal visits, Mayalde and Serrano acquired a sufficiently high standing in Germany and successfully positioned themselves at the highest level of diplomacy. By the time he was out of the DGS, Mayalde was prepared to not simply start but in fact continue to represent Spain at this highest level of Spanish diplomacy and continue doing so for the Serranoist agenda.

After Franco's regime provided manpower, the so-called Blue Division, to support Germany on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941, Mayalde was appointed to the most sensitive post of Ambassador to Berlin. The Ambassadorial appointment to further Serrano's agenda was far more important than his recent role as DG. The stakes were at their highest yet with a "European fascist crusade" against the Soviet *contubernio*, especially after the May setback. With Mayalde's credentials it is no wonder he was a candidate for Ambassador to Berlin to replace Serrano's enemy General Espinosa. Building on previous cooperation with Germany, and as Ambassador, Mayalde looked to maximise the fulfilment of the "dual goals" for the Falange's agenda and to repeat his practices of political assertion by means of regular contact with the Blue Division and by exploiting the press. Competition with the Army and with Arrese intensified accordingly.

Conclusion

In pursuing political consolidation in Franco's new Spain in relation to both of the "dual goals", police cooperation strengthened Serrano and Mayalde's agenda but it did not mean they were unassailable by their Francoist rivals. Serrano and Mayalde could manoeuvre the Falange into a strong position but could not write the Army and other opponents out of the picture. Despite Serrano's position in the Interior Ministry and Mayalde's gains, the "May Crisis" demonstrated that

¹³¹ Kew: GFM33/408, Eberhard von Stohrer to Heinrich Müller (Gestapo Chief), citing Paul Winzer, 20 Mar. 1941; PAAA: 29741, Stohrer to AA, 6 May 1941

Serrano not only remained vulnerable in Franco's government but also that he had insufficient control over the Falange meaning even greater vulnerability. The fact that Germany did not achieve a quick victory with Franco at the "victor's table" certainly meant Serrano's vulnerabilities manifested with the passage of time. Even then, as reliant as Serrano and Mayalde appeared to be on German victory, it was not a guarantee of security. Serrano and Mayalde's principal competitors themselves had pro-Axis affinities which meant the basic issues of police cooperation and *antipatria* could continue even without Mayalde's "blue ideologue" leadership. Although Serrano's star would ascend again before his demise in 1942, "consolidation" really began its shift to survival in May 1941.

As a fascist, administrator, bureaucrat and even diplomat, as he identified professionalism with political spirit after the Civil War, Mayalde as DG demonstrated with the 1940 visits that he could further things for his cause and bring about some results. Again, these visits along with on-the-ground German involvement and the *attaché* agreements were all very impressive in terms of Falangist influence, diplomatic achievements and the groundwork for retribution against Franco's opponents. It showed he could take advantage of the opportunity of WWII to enhance Spanish standing with Germany and reach "anti-Spain" threats lingering beyond Spain's borders. The scope of persecution was certainly broadened during Mayalde's tenure. In terms of his desired outcomes for the police, the 8 March Law and C11 impacted Spain by helping perpetuate wartime conditions in which the Falange could thrive, but only in as far as this suited Francoism as a broad church rather than "Falangism" specifically. Policing and persecution retained the fascist impress yet the Falange did not secure control of the agenda. Police cooperation with a high ambition short of entry into WWII helped the Falange assert itself, but Mayalde never achieved his complete "totalitarian state objectives". Franco himself benefited from police cooperation with Germany in the long term even after WWII and this must at least in part reflect Mayalde's professional merits as recognised by Franco. In the short term, Himmler benefited more than Mayalde from the domestic perspective by getting his extended influence up until German defeat in 1945. The significance of the fascist, Falangist and Francoist dynamics will be discussed in Chapter 4. What the Allies should have come to realise was that May 1941 was not "the restoration of order through removing the pro-German Falange". Over the coming years, Spain's police as a hybrid of Falangist, non-Falangist and pro-German elements all accountable to Franco would actually demonstrate functionality and efficient organisation.

Serrano and Mayalde's real prize was official Foreign Affairs control in time for the rallying call of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. With his accumulated diplomatic experience and accolades,

Mayalde was ready to serve Serrano and Franco as “Ambassador of the Blue Division” in the months to come. It was appropriate that Mayalde’s status as Serrano’s most important subordinate in this endeavour was recognised with his appointment to the post in Berlin, which could not have happened if Franco had wanted to cut the Falange down politically. “Alternate diplomacy” paved the way for official diplomacy. It was imperative to concentrate on official diplomacy for survival let alone leadership of José Antonio’s envisioned Falangist Empire, which required cooperation and coexistence with Nazism and Fascism. Significantly, when considering the importance of German victory to Serrano’s domestic and imperial “dual goals”, Mayalde’s elevation would bring out the potential of any contribution through police cooperation to Francoist Spain’s wartime pivot which was now “moral belligerence”. Simultaneously, this elevation would also more clearly illuminate any issues in Mayalde’s conduct, not least any gulf between professionalism and “political spirit”.

Chapter 3

The Ambassador in Berlin 1941-2: Ambassador of the Blue Division

Introduction

In July 1941, José Finat y Escrivá de Romaní, Conde de Mayalde, the most important subordinate of Franco's "cuñadísimo" Ramón Serrano Suñer, became the most important envoy in continental Europe not just for Spain's fascist Falange party but also for Spain's *Caudillo* Francisco Franco himself. Through policing and "alternate diplomacy", as described in Chapter 2, Mayalde was elevated to the highest level of official diplomacy. Mayalde had helped intensify links with Nazi Germany during WWII, principally through cooperation and political aggrandisement with his German police counterpart, *Reichsführer-SS* Heinrich Himmler. Mayalde's endeavours were supposed to advance the Falangist cause in both the domestic and international spheres of state and government through the tumultuous atmosphere of the Spanish Civil War and WWII. He aspired for his faction, the Falange, to govern a "totalitarian state" as envisioned by its founder and Civil War "ausente" José Antonio Primo de Rivera along with the intended restored Spanish Empire in North Africa.¹ The basic Francoist ambition for a Spanish state and Empire modelled on the medieval *conquistadores* could be referred to as the intertwined "dual goals" as mentioned in earlier chapters.

The diplomatic accolade of "Grand Cross of the German Eagle", as Chapter 2 explained, was the real prize and provided much needed assurance in the summer of 1941. Serrano and Mayalde had become confined to their official control of Foreign Affairs (MAE) having lost the Interior Ministry (MdG) along with control over Spain's Civil Governors and *Dirección General de Seguridad* (DGS, state police) in May 1941. A view to consolidation following the end of the Civil War in 1939 had started to shift towards survival. Not long afterwards Hitler promulgated the Eastern campaign against the "Judeo-Bolshevik" Communist Party-led USSR. This was the campaign with which Franco and other European right-wing dictators could more comfortably and eagerly identify than with war against the capitalist British and French Empires, although Francoist Spain was already pro-Axis. This gave momentum to the inception of a force that came to be known as the "División Azul" or the Blue Division (BD) – the name being a reference to the blue shirts worn by Falangists. The creation of the BD itself encapsulated the increased antagonism facing Serrano and Mayalde in their pursuit of their specific agenda, as emphasised in Chapter 2. Serrano officially touted the idea for a Spanish contribution to Hitler's Eastern Front which would be the contribution of Franco's *Falange Española*

¹ AHN: H24132 "8 March 1941 Law" for police reorganisation, published 8 Apr. 1941; José Antonio Primo de Rivera, "Guidelines of the Falange: 26 Points", Nov. 1934 and "Spain and Barbarism" speech, 3 Mar. 1935 in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings* (London, 1972), pp. 132-7, 141-8

Tradicional y de las JONS.² However the generally pro-Axis but anti-Falangist Army asserted authority over the nature of the contribution and had Army regulars dominate what was supposed to be a unit of Falangist "volunteers". The "Blue Division" name was the contribution of José Luis de Arrese, a longstanding Falangist who had been rehabilitated by Serrano and Mayalde in 1940 but as Secretary General of the Falange became their rival for direction of the Falange itself as Chapter 2 mentioned.³

The thrust of this chapter shows that as a Falangist and now an official diplomat, Mayalde once again imposed the Serranoist "blue ideologue" line for Franco's "dual goals" as "Ambassador of the Blue Division".⁴ As the Ambassador in Berlin, he reinforced his status as Serrano's most important subordinate by being Franco's most important Ambassador. He was also made Head of the Falange in Germany and its occupied territories, in other words the most important external Falangist leader in Europe if not the world. During the period of coexistence between Franco's and Hitler's regimes, Mayalde was Spain's only ideologically fascist Ambassador to Berlin and the Falangist Ambassador that Serrano long desired.⁵ As "Ambassador of the Blue Division", Mayalde aimed to exploit Spain's Eastern Front contribution through regular visits, manipulation of the press and media, and representation to state authorities for the sake of politics rather than professional diplomacy or military perspective. This is unsurprising as it has already been seen that Mayalde equated "professional" and "political spirit". The Falangist element had to be emphasised in the overall Spanish contribution and this all had to be identified with the patronage of Serrano Suñer, especially as the earlier question of political consolidation now shifted towards survival. It can even be seen that the eventual possibility of political defeat may have reinforced this contribution. Mayalde's time as "Ambassador of the Blue Division" would engender further developments as regards his relations with rivals within the Falange and the broader regime, as well with Nazis including Himmler and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. This in turn may once again raise questions about Mayalde's contribution from the overall WWII perspective. Certainly, in 1941-42, the Francoist experience of its most important representation in Europe if not the world was how Mayalde conducted himself as a Falangist and a diplomat.

² On the FET y de las JONS, consult Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987), pp. 57-74. The official Francoist state organisation was the *Falange Española Tradicional y de las JONS*. As time went on this became known as the *movimiento* (movement). On the Blue Division, consult Xavier Moreno Julià, *Blue Division: Spanish Blood in Russia, 1941-1945* (English edition, Eastbourne, 2004)

³ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 273

⁴ Ramón Garriga Alemany, *Las relaciones secretas entre Franco y Hitler* (Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 355

⁵ Kew: FO371/60332, Serrano-Hitler meeting, 17 Sept. 1940

The chapter spans the period following the May 1941 Francoist ministerial crisis, Hitler's declaration of war against the USSR, the creation of the BD, Mayalde's dispatch to Berlin, his contact with the BD and visit to the front, his interactions with the press as well as relationships with Nazis and fascists, both officially and unofficially, and ends with Serrano's political downfall and Mayalde's resignation from frontline politics. These episodes of official diplomacy show how Mayalde's "blue ideologue" line contradicted professional or pragmatic considerations. The evidence is vastly greater than when Mayalde was a lawyer turned parliamentarian in Chapter 1 and considerably more so than when he was a police chief in Chapter 2.⁶ Furthermore, the episodes highlight the limits and extent of ideological sympathy and compatibility with Nazism as well as the reality of the Falange's and Serrano's limited influence in Foreign Affairs and the overall "dual goals". Chapter 4 will address the question of proximity to Nazi atrocities including the Holocaust as well as set both this chapter and the previous chapters in the context of Mayalde and the European fascist connection.

Emerging from the May Crisis 1941

Obviously, control of foreign policy in government was politically vital in WWII. Although Franco's Spain could not enter WWII, the very existence of the regime let alone any accommodation of Spanish Imperial ambitions depended on the benevolence of the victors to Franco's Spain. As previously covered, Franco wanted an Empire. This motivated Francoist and Falangist support for the Axis powers short of official belligerence. Serrano wanted a specific direction of that Empire by the Falange which he himself would head. The Axis powers which had been decisive to Franco's Civil War victory were considered the most compatible partners during the SCW-WWII era. "Alternate diplomacy" over 1939-1940 through control of Franco's Interior Ministry and police was an avenue for Serrano and Mayalde before they officially controlled Foreign Affairs. Himmler was their German partner. Through the use of "alternate diplomacy" and the "dual effect" of advancing the Falangist programme and indulging Himmler's parallel German foreign policy, Mayalde was awarded the Grand Cross of the German Eagle which he collected in March 1941. This was the most important achievement – Mayalde was recognised as a suitable diplomat for Serrano's purposes. In the course of this "alternate diplomacy" Serrano had eventually taken over Foreign Affairs in October 1940 when Himmler officially reciprocated Mayalde's August 1940 Berlin visit with a *de facto* state visit to Spain courtesy of Franco's government. The turn of events during the ongoing war reinforced for Serrano the need to assert control over Foreign Affairs and to make Spain's Axis case on his terms.

⁶ Ramón Garriga, *Berlín, años cuarenta* (Barcelona, 1983), p. 192: Garriga describes the stage of foreign policy with Mayalde as "Ambassador of the Blue Division" as a "blue ideologue" period and contrasts "blue ideologues" with "professional diplomats".

With the 1941 "May Crisis" Serrano and Mayalde lost their major domestic powerbase of the MdG. The Army regained the control it had prior to 1939. Serrano and Mayalde were politically confined to Foreign Affairs and by this point Mayalde's candidacy for Ambassador in Berlin had been speculated.⁷ Obviously, Francoist Hispano-German cooperation relied on German wartime predominance. Although Franco remained convinced of eventual Axis victory over Britain, his belief in imminent victory following the Fall of France in June 1940 ceased after the Battle of Britain in October 1940 and the war with the British Empire dragged on in the Mediterranean. Neither Franco, Serrano nor anyone else in the regime could afford to end up on the losing side if Britain were to have seized one of the Canary Islands or taken other drastic action in response to formal Axis cooperation.⁸

Creation of the Blue Division (June – July 1941)

With the stakes for Franco, the Falange and the other regime factions firmly centred on the flow of WWII in the spring of 1941, once again opportunities were identified when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against the USSR on 22 June. This opened the Eastern Front of WWII. Spain still could not formally enter WWII but after having had changed its wartime position to Axis-inclined "non-belligerence" in June 1940 from its original position of neutrality, Franco was now able to change this to "moral belligerence" in the case of war with the USSR.

The Francoists resented the British, French and American Empires and from time to time associated them with "Judeo-Masonic" *contubernio* notions as will be addressed in Chapter 4, but not with the same gravity or frequency as with the USSR. In terms of the facts, Germany and Italy gave Franco the decisive help in his victory against the democratic Second Republic in the Civil War. Britain and France were always better positioned than Russia to undermine Spain looking at both geography and history, but they did not intervene on behalf of the Republic. Soviet support to the Republic was not as extensive as German and Italian support for Franco but it was deemed justification by the Francoists for a continued "crusade" against the USSR. Franco considered that widespread European aversion to Soviet Communism made it easier to explain to Britain the dispatch of manpower against the Soviets, even if Franco may still have seen Britain's government as being influenced by "Jews" and "Masons". In the case of the USSR, Franco was facilitated by the ability to indict a distant power long considered the epicentre of the machinations of *contubernio* against Spain and "Christian Europe".⁹ A European "fascist crusade" against communism to continue

⁷ PAAA: 29741, Stohrer to AA, 6 May 1941

⁸ Paul Preston, "Franco and Hitler: the Myths of Hendaye 1940", *Contemporary European History* 1, 1 (1992), 1-16

⁹ Paul Preston, *Franco* (London, 1993), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 9958

the 1936-1939 *reconquista* (reconquest) or *cruzada* (crusade) once again reinforced the importance of WWII for political aggrandisement.¹⁰ This recalls how the medieval *reconquista* had historically been subsumed in the European Crusades from 1095. Francoist Axis sympathisers on balance supported the idea of providing a more significant pro-Axis contribution. Serrano identified fervour in Spain or at least tried to conjure the image of fervour yet again to achieve his Falangist vision. He conceived or at least secured credit for the creation of a Spanish contingent to actually fight against the Soviet Union in WWII.¹¹ Franco's regime found a solution to include Spain in WWII without formal entry. Franco, at least from his point of view, could do more for the Axis to gain a Spanish Empire by providing manpower against the Soviets than he could if he were to attack Britain in Gibraltar.¹²

With Franco's agreement, Serrano presented to German Ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer an offer of Spanish manpower to Germany and this was accepted. As Xavier Moreno Julià describes, it is impossible to determine the exact origin of the idea of the BD. But what is known is that Serrano came up with the initial concept of a volunteer unit for the Germans that was supposed to be comprised of Falangists.¹³ An 18,000 strong unit of men came to be put together and thus it achieved Division status. Known as *divisionarios*, the participants were fighting as the 250th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht. They pledged the Oath of Allegiance to Adolf Hitler and received training, equipment and pension arrangements from the Germans. The Division was attached to the Wehrmacht Army Group North, commanded by Field Marshall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, making the northern push towards Leningrad covering the Baltics and Novgorod.¹⁴ In addition to a military contribution, Spanish labour power was offered to Germany's factories. This was meant to help sustain the German war effort and provide employment for Spaniards left destitute after the Civil War. Spain pledged 100,000 workers who were to fulfill their contracts to a certain length. Each Spanish worker was to benefit from the same working conditions, social security and labour protection as German workers with close cooperation and support from the relevant German authorities and Spain's diplomatic corps.¹⁵

Serrano was successful in as far as observers understood a Falangist volunteer unit equipped with the uniform, insignia and other trappings of the *Falange Española Tradicional y de las JONS* was

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.; Moreno, *Blue Division*, Lines 1925-42

¹² Denis Smyth, "The Dispatch of the Spanish Blue Division to the Russian Front: Reasons and Repercussions", *European History Quarterly* 24, 4 (1994), 537-553

¹³ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 1868

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Garriga, *La España de Franco: las relaciones con Hitler* (Puebla, 1970), pp. 366-70; PAAA: 29742, Hans Lazar to Madrid, 23 Aug. 1941; ABC, 18 Oct. 1941, p. 10

going to fight for Germany against the Soviet Union as the *División Azul* or the Blue Division. Nominally, the Division was a Falangist enterprise comprised by its volunteers. It was maintained that younger Falangists who did not get the chance to fight in the Civil War were taking up the opportunity for "revenge" against the Bolsheviks. The reality was rather different. Serrano's propaganda ploy ended up deceiving not just observers but also Serrano and the Falange themselves. The truth was the "Blue Division" was neither a traditional volunteer unit nor a Falangist unit. In terms of the Division's proportional composition, José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez writes that less than half of the Division were actually volunteers and that even fewer were Falangists.¹⁶ Spanish army regulars were not only present among the *divisionarios* but also dominated the Division's officer complement. The Division's commanders Generals Agustín Muñoz Grandes until December 1942 and Emilio Esteban-Infantes from January 1943 are the main examples. Muñoz Grandes is described by historians as a "blue general" because he was also a Falangist, albeit out of opportunism in the early years of Francoism when fascism looked to dominate politics.¹⁷ He did not like Serrano Suñer and eventually grew to dislike Serrano's "creature" Mayalde in their attempts to capitalise on the BD.¹⁸ While the leadership of the Falange in Madrid appeared to present some authority with the Division on the Eastern Front, it did not actually exert the authority held by Franco's military household and military *attaché* in Berlin. This was in significant part because the Army were horrified that Serrano and the Falange should have a monopoly on such a venture.¹⁹

In stark contrast with the International Brigades, and with other volunteer formations on either side in the Civil War, the Spanish BD had support and oversight from home given by the Spanish State and Armed Forces. It was used as domestic propaganda to promote Spanish prestige. This military adventure with potential for elevating Spain within the Nazi New Order was being accomplished without contribution of excessive Spanish resources. The Falange had a vested interest but the Army had the final say. The Army accepted Falangist rhetoric, symbols and blue shirts as part of ceremonial uniform while retaining control. This ensured that Spain was part of the Axis operation without inviting a declaration of war from Britain or even the USSR itself. Of course Russia was perceived as an enemy anyway by Franco and America had not been drawn into the war yet.²⁰ Furthermore, while the Army begrudgingly acknowledged Serrano's role in the initial concept of a Spanish contribution and the name "Blue Division" was used for the sake of appearances, it had

¹⁶ José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, "Ni División Azul, ni División Española de Voluntarios", *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 31 (2009), 265-296

¹⁷ Kew: FO371/79687, British Embassy in Madrid Memorandum, 8 Nov. 1949, p. 1

¹⁸ PAAA: 29744, Muñoz Grandes report, 31 Aug. 1942

¹⁹ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 1938

²⁰ *Ibid.*

not been Serrano but Arrese who came up with the name. The Army denied both of them a purely Falangist BD and certainly did not want Serrano nor the Falange having any control of the military. This came after Serrano and Mayalde's attempts to completely fuse the Spanish police with the militias of the Falange had been thwarted with the May 1941 crisis, as Chapter 2 explained. Now the Army pre-empted what might have been the development of a situation akin to that in Germany with the fledging of the Nazi Party's *Waffen-SS* as a rival to the standard Army units. At a moment when he was trying to recover his ground, Serrano wanted to leap ahead of the competition with his rivals but ended up exacerbating it and raising the stakes.

With this competition for what might be described as the "fatherhood of the Blue Division", Serrano needed his candidate for the post in Berlin to finally replace the pro-German but Monarchist and anti-Falangist General Espinosa de los Monteros who was the Army's man in Berlin. Espinosa had held the post since the Fall of France in June 1940. Throughout that time Serrano and Espinosa's relationship had become increasingly strained. Like other generals Espinosa was hostile to Serrano and had even insulted Serrano in person at a function in the presence of Germans and Spanish Embassy officials. But Espinosa was a professional diplomat who spoke German and knew Germany going back to his youth.²¹ In contrast, Mayalde apparently spoke little to no German in spite of his pro-German enthusiasm but nevertheless he was the Falangist Ambassador Serrano had been waiting to rely on.²² It was during an 18 July Embassy commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War that Espinosa announced Mayalde's imminent arrival.²³

One can imagine Serrano must have been satisfied that his military antagonist found himself making such an announcement. For Serrano, Espinosa would have been tying the continuation of the Civil War *cruzada* against the USSR with the important role to be played by Mayalde in Berlin. Serrano managed to injure the Army who would have desired Espinosa's continued presence. It is difficult to imagine General Espinosa feeling extra strain to pose as "Ambassador of the Blue Division" let alone promote Serrano's Falangist cause. Mayalde on the other hand needed to emphasise volunteers and Falangists, both in internal correspondence and public propaganda, in order to promote Serrano and the Falange before Spain and Germany so they were acknowledged as protagonists in Hitler's "glorious" campaign against "Judeo-Bolshevism".²⁴ By styling himself as

²¹ Wayne Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Missouri, 2000), p. 88

²² DGFP: 95/107127, Weizsäcker to Stohrer telegram, 6 Oct. 1941

²³ ABC, 19 Jul. 1941, pp. 7-8

²⁴ AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Military *attaché* Spanish Embassy Berlin to *Estado Mayor Militar* Madrid, "Informe num. 81, Adjunto remito", prepared 24 Feb. 1942 and received/addressed 2 Mar. 1942:

Example of internal correspondence where Mayalde refers to "volunteers"; ABC, 27 Jul. 1941, p. 8 as an example of numerous public instances; Garriga, *Las relaciones*, p. 287: Arriba affair where Arrese refuses to reproduce Mayalde's "inspired by Serrano Suñer" remarks.

"Ambassador of the Blue Division", Mayalde was there to emphasise the "Blue" Falangist credentials of Spain's contribution to the Wehrmacht.²⁵ His previous service as a soldier doubtlessly factored into his desire for proximity up to visiting the BD at the front just as it indeed underpinned his entire political trajectory. His Civil War service as a provisional soldier was his affinity with his BD "volunteers". Again, just as described in Chapter 2, Mayalde would appeal to the demands of the "glory", "prestige" and "Civil War victory" of the Falange. With this new "Eastern Crusade" he expected the fulfilment of José Antonio's aspirations as he interpreted them. However, as convinced of his claim to being the BD's "Ambassador" as he may have been, and however much he tried to convince everyone else in correspondence and propaganda, time would show that he could not convince everyone, particularly the Army.

Mayalde's claim to represent the blue shirts of the Falange in the BD was helped with his designation as *Jefe* (Chief) of the *FET y de las JONs* in Germany and its occupied territories. Once again Mayalde had to have a "dual-role" as recounted in Chapter 2 when he had been both the state *Director General de Seguridad* (police commissioner, DG) and the Falange party's Intelligence Chief. A "solemn ceremony" at the Falange's Berlin outpost for this assumption of duties was a typical opportunity for Mayalde celebrate his "duty" as "Ambassador of the Blue Division" with press and propaganda in mind. All Falangists based in Berlin attended. As Mayalde would often do, he spoke of Germany's "struggle against Bolshevism for the defence of Europe", Spain's obligation to never forget its Civil War-debt to Germany and that this was the time to honour it.²⁶ He stated that Spain believed in the victory of Germany and all Falangists resident in Germany ought be proud to live in the nation that began "the final battle against Bolshevism."²⁷ Chapter 4 will address the extent to which Mayalde could maintain such fervour.

Reception (July – September 1941)

Mayalde arrived in Berlin on 26 July and was greeted by representatives of Germany's Foreign Ministry (AA) and the Wehrmacht. When Mayalde arrived at the Embassy he was greeted by the outgoing Espinosa.²⁸ However rather surprisingly, despite Mayalde's warm welcome on his previous trip to Berlin, his major role in Himmler's October 1940 trip to Spain, subsequent receipt of the Grand Cross of the German Eagle to celebrate their working relationship, and the attention given by the Spanish press to his present post, Mayalde's official reception by the Nazi regime turned out to

²⁵ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, p. 353

²⁶ ABC, 17 Aug. 1941, p. 7

²⁷ Ibid.; Arriba, 5 Aug. 1941, p. 7; 12 Sept. 1941, p. 8; 3 Feb. 1942, p. 11; David Wingeate Pike, *Franco and the Axis Stigma* (London, 1982), p. 170; Wayne Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Missouri, 2006), pp. 46-7

²⁸ ABC, 27 July 1941, pp. 7-8

be not at all straightforward. Already, the strength of the relationship between Mayalde, representing Serrano, and the Nazi regime in competition with his rivals was being questioned. Mayalde was disappointed to not be able to present his credentials to Hitler until a date was set for 11 September, almost two months after his initial arrival. The official reason which came to be accepted by Serrano and Mayalde, following the assurances of Stohrer and the AA, was that Hitler was preoccupied with the Eastern Front. He was unable to receive Mayalde nor other Ambassadors for the time being.

However, Serrano and Mayalde also sensed political hostility. Certain Nazi newspapers highlighted the departure of the outgoing Ambassador Espinosa and did not give as much attention to Mayalde's appointment as Ambassador. Serrano felt indignant having received the reports on the situation by his press *attaché* in Berlin Ramón Garriga, who reported discreetly on Mayalde's behalf.²⁹ Serrano expressed resentment that during the summer while his confidant was overlooked, Espinosa allegedly paid not just one but two farewell visits to Hitler and was even transported by special plane on the alleged second visit. The treatment given to the incoming Mayalde was grossly inconsistent with that given to the outgoing Espinosa. Reporting back to Berlin, Stohrer needed to reassure the Germans that as Serrano's recognised confidant in Berlin, Mayalde like Serrano offered "unconditional friendship to Germany" and held the conviction that "Germany had to win the war not only in the interest of Spain but also in the interest of Europe".³⁰ Stohrer also highlighted how Serrano contrasted Mayalde's "certain friendliness and reliability" against "the well-grounded doubts concerning the honesty of Espinosa's sympathies".³¹ Serrano was also convinced that the German Government had "not learned of the undisciplined and ugly fashion in which Ambassador Espinosa had spread propaganda against him in Germany after his recall" and further explained "the most unheard of thing, however, was that Espinosa spread that his recall was due to being too pro-German".³² Of course Serrano needed to portray his own opponents as anti-German just as he had cited his Falangism as a prerequisite conduit for Spain's pro-German relations.

Stohrer hoped he could notify Serrano and Mayalde in good time about when Mayalde could be accredited.³³ Ribbentrop responded instructing Stohrer to casually reply to Serrano by saying that

²⁹ Garriga, *La España*, p. 380

³⁰ DGFP: 95/107031-32, Stohrer to AA, 22 Aug. 1941

³¹ DGFP: 95/107031-32, Stohrer to AA, 22 Aug. 1941

³² DGFP: 95/107031-32, Stohrer to AA, 22 Aug. 1941; Serrano actually seized on these claims after the war to feign his own distance from the Axis. The key sources are Javier Tusell and Genevieve Quiapo de Llano, "El Enfrentamiento Serrano Suñer-Eugenio Espinosa de los Monteros", *Historia*, 16.128 (1986), 29-38; Espinosa to Franco, 25 Oct. 1941 in *Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, Documentos Inéditos para la Historia del Generalísimo Franco II* (Madrid, 1992), pp. 49-55

³³ DGFP: 95/107025, Stohrer to AA, 22 Aug. 1941

Mayalde's official reception would happen shortly. Furthermore Mayalde was to be told he had no reason to be impatient as two other Ambassadors had themselves already been waiting for some time due to Hitler's military preoccupations. In light of the situation, when Mayalde was met by Ribbentrop's Undersecretary Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker on 6 August – a few weeks after his arrival in Berlin – the Baron assured the Count that he was free to perform his functions as if he were already accredited.³⁴ When Mayalde asked Weizsäcker about Ribbentrop's travel plans and raised Serrano's grievances, Weizsäcker said that Ribbentrop mostly had to stay away from Berlin over the previous few months. Ambassadors were never able to see him unless they were summoned and they often complained about this among themselves.³⁵ Shortly afterwards Mayalde held a lunch for Spanish press agents, explaining developments in Germany and presumably his own activities.³⁶

Mayalde was eventually received by Hitler in the *Wolfsschanze*,³⁷ on 11 September in what was his first ever meeting with the *Führer* himself. The year before Serrano and Franco themselves had met Hitler. Also present were the other waiting Ambassadors as well as Ribbentrop.³⁸ On 20 September, Mayalde gave his first reception in honour of German authorities and other diplomatic corps based in Berlin. Spain's *ABC* described the occasion as "beaming".³⁹ Among the numerous attendees were Weizsäcker, Education Minister Bernard Rust, Kurt Dalwege (who Mayalde had met on his police visit to Berlin), the Monsignor Orsénigo representing the Vatican and the representatives of Brazil, Chile, Hungary, Portugal, Venezuela, Finland, Turkey, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Ecuador, Colombia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Denmark and Romania. A convergence of Spanish interests might be seen – especially in light of the "European crusade" discourse – including pro-Axis relations, relations with Latin America and arguably Catholicism in the case of Ireland and the Vatican. A few days later, Mayalde returned to Madrid to report to Serrano and Franco on his first impressions of Berlin and the situation with the BD. Mayalde expressed himself as very well satisfied with his reception by Hitler. Stohrer on the other hand had heard reports that Mayalde did not feel at all happy in Berlin.⁴⁰ This was possibly due to the disappointments of that summer.

As far as political antagonisms were concerned, Garriga suggested that Mayalde as Serrano's representative was deliberately obstructed by Ribbentrop and this explained the inattention given

³⁴ DGFP: 95/106985, Weizsäcker St. S. No. 496, 6 Aug. 1941; *ABC*, 7 Aug. 1941, p. 9; DGFP: 95/107047-48, Ribbentrop to Stohrer, 28 Aug. 1941

³⁵ DGFP: 95/107019, Weizsäcker St. S. No. 534, 18 Aug. 1941. The sender presumably is Ribbentrop

³⁶ *ABC Sevilla*, 10 Aug. 1941, p. 6

³⁷ Hitler's "Wolf's Lair" Headquarters on the Eastern Front.

³⁸ PAAA: *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, Oct. 1941, p. 879

³⁹ *ABC*, 21 Sept. 1941, p. 11

⁴⁰ DGFP: 124/123158-61, Stohrer to Weizsäcker telegram, 5 Oct. 1941

by the German press. Garriga even stated Mayalde risked incurring Ribbentrop's wrath should the Germans be intercepting any messages sent home. Garriga had to be discreet in contacting Serrano on Mayalde's behalf during the first few weeks in Berlin. Mayalde may have been perceived as an enthusiastic pro-German, but it seems his association with Serrano earned him Ribbentrop's contempt by extension.⁴¹ Ribbentrop had an antagonistic relationship with Serrano not too unlike his [Ribbentrop's] relationship with Italy's Count Ciano as a result of typical wartime disagreements. Ribbentrop apparently found Espinosa to be a good working partner while the latter's relationship with Serrano also deteriorated. Ribbentrop "never forgave" Serrano for replacing Espinosa. Garriga also writes that the Himmler connection made things easier for Mayalde. yet it would not be surprising if this contributed to Ribbentrop's contempt.⁴² As explained in Chapter 2, Ribbentrop resented Himmler's SS-police foreign policy which Mayalde had been indulging. Espinosa would continue criticising Serrano in Franco's government after returning to Spain. Perhaps significantly, Espinosa still had contact with Ribbentrop and Hitler and even allegedly was on the guest list for an eventual German victory parade.⁴³ This "guest list" inclusion brings to question whether Serrano and Mayalde ever supplanted Espinosa in the minds of Ribbentrop and Hitler himself. Mayalde's reception and 1942 farewell meetings are his only two confirmed meetings with Hitler – one has to wonder what impressions each had of one another in the absence of details.

As will be seen there was still the occasional tension with Ribbentrop, but Mayalde generally managed good or at least adequate professional relationships with Germany's AA and Weizsäcker in particular. After Stohrer reported Mayalde's supposedly mixed feelings about his time in Berlin, Weizsäcker said that he found Mayalde pleasant and that he had no cause for complaint. He tried to treat him well. His first impression was that Mayalde appeared almost too unassuming for his position. Weizsäcker had no doubt while Mayalde would accustom himself to things in Berlin as "no one had anything against him personally", nevertheless he was concerned that he could get hindered by "careless inattention when getting accustomed" and notably regarded his inability to speak German as "something of an encumbrance".⁴⁴ Weizsäcker said he would always be available if Mayalde wished to talk to him and appreciated the Ambassadors' concern about scarcely seeing Ribbentrop or Hitler.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Garriga, *La España*, p. 380

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ PAAA: 29742, Ribbentrop to Weizsäcker, 9 Oct. 1942

⁴⁴ DGFP: 95/107127, Weizsäcker to Stohrer telegram, 6 Oct. 1941

⁴⁵ Ibid.

It seems Mayalde himself generally managed to make a good first impression on Berlin despite a rather lacklustre reception. The year to come was going to be interesting as far the relationship between Mayalde and Weizsäcker was concerned. Weizsäcker would highlight how Mayalde would normally make his *demarchés* in a very restrained form, but also make note of those occasions when he did in fact get agitated.⁴⁶ So two months into Mayalde's tenure, there is a glimpse of how Franco and Serrano's Ambassador could make an impression on the Germans with his set of diplomatic and ideological credentials while having to deal with disappointment. Mayalde's placement in Berlin for continued and heightened Serranoist aggrandisement vis-à-vis the Nazi regime or at least certain Nazis was put before an ability to speak German.

Contact with the Blue Division (August – October 1941)

Despite the summer situation, Mayalde busied himself with BD affairs immediately which continued all summer and he assured his Serranoist allies that he had "not for one minute" turned his attention away from "the matter of Blue Division propaganda" which he considered to be of "extraordinary interest".⁴⁷ Mayalde immediately suggested to the press when he arrived that he ought to visit the BD training camp, once again asserting his politics just as he had done previously when he became DG.⁴⁸ One week later he visited the BD at a Wehrmacht training camp in Grafenwöhr, Eastern Bavaria. The occasion started with outdoor Mass and ended with a bugle-call in an atmosphere full of "patriotic enthusiasm". Upon returning to Berlin Mayalde told the Spanish press that he would "never forget those hours of contact with the spirit of the Division".⁴⁹ Throughout the month Mayalde continued participating in such events. On 16 August, along with other Embassy personnel and Falangists, he attended the "*acta de la jura*" of the Air Force volunteers at an airbase as well as a similar type of event on 23 August.⁵⁰ As well as making his own visits he also received senior personnel in Berlin. On 14 August Mayalde had lunch with BD Aviation officials in the Embassy.⁵¹ On 21 August, Mayalde hosted a lunch in honour of the BD's commander, General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, in anticipation of the BD's departure to the front.⁵² Among Mayalde's more assertive moves was to try push the General into appointing a Division Captain to take on propaganda responsibilities or otherwise he himself would make the request to Madrid,

⁴⁶ PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942

⁴⁷ AGA: AR 82/03697, Communication from Mayalde, 16 Aug. 1941

⁴⁸ ABC, 27 Jul. 1941, p. 8

⁴⁹ ABC, 5 Aug. 1941, p. 7

⁵⁰ ABC, 17 Aug, 1941, p. 9; 23 Aug. 1941, p. 5

⁵¹ ABC, 15 Aug. 1941, p. 6

⁵² ABC, 22 Aug. 1941, p. 6

precipitating an eventual degeneration in their relationship.⁵³ While Mayalde was free to conduct himself as if he were accredited and Weizsäcker did not identify Mayalde's BD routines as a cause for complaint, he may have also posed some inconvenience for the Wehrmacht leadership on the other hand.

The Wehrmacht was nearly two months into Operation Barbarossa. The Spanish press highlighted the Division's "rapid preparations" and "enthusiasm" for their contribution as bits of news came out of Germany.⁵⁴ This was largely promoted by Mayalde despite the fact that the BD and other foreign soldiers had in fact not yet been dispatched to the front. Hitler wanted German soldiers to make the preliminary breakthroughs, before other Axis militaries and foreign recruits. Mayalde was putting pressure on the German Foreign Office for the BD's immediate dispatch. Eventually the Wehrmacht reluctantly acquiesced to the Ambassador's wishes. On 11 August the BD began its deployment.⁵⁵ This came on the same day that the Soviet Red Air Force bombed Berlin in a brief campaign that lasted into September.⁵⁶ Meanwhile the Wehrmacht had made advances into Ukraine and the Baltic States while the Luftwaffe was bombing Moscow. By the end of August the Division was on its way to join Army Group North on the Baltic theatre of the Eastern Front through East Prussia.⁵⁷

A couple of months later, Mayalde himself was to travel to the front. This was not a particularly normal thing for an Ambassador to do and the circumstances preceding this are interesting. Before finishing his return trip to Madrid, Mayalde was instructed by Franco and Serrano to make immediate contact with the BD and visit them.⁵⁸ This was because no news nor information had arrived about the BD since its departure for the front. This had to be changed. British propaganda was allegedly "sowing the wildest atrocity stories about the Division in Spain".⁵⁹ There were even reports that the Division had been captured or destroyed. At the same time British propaganda warned Spanish workers not to go to Germany because the contracts would not be kept; that the workers would not be sent to the factories but to the front, and their dependants would not be paid. 20 to 30 dependants of these Spanish workers actually appealed to the German Consulate for help

⁵³ AGA: AR 82/03697, Communication from Mayalde, 16 Aug. 1941

⁵⁴ ABC, 5 Aug. 1941, p. 7

⁵⁵ *Informaciones*, 4 Aug. 1941, p. 3; AGM: DEV 28/28/4/3 GS, 2nd Section, 11 Aug. 1941, p. 22; AGM: DEV 29/36/12/1 DOPS, Second of 262, Aug. 1941, pp. 9-10

⁵⁶ Jon Guttman, "Red Stars Over Berlin", *Aviation History Magazine* (1998), <https://www.historynet.com/red-stars-over-berlin-march-98-aviation-history-feature.htm>

⁵⁷ *Informaciones*, 4 Aug. 1941, p. 3; Gerald Kleinfeld and Lewis Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia in WWII* (Pennsylvania, 1979), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 1037

⁵⁸ ABC Sevilla, 8 Oct. 1941, p. 8; DGFP: 95/107110, Weizsäcker Memo, 4 Oct. 1941; AGM: DEV 29/52/3/1, Roca de Togores to Madrid, Report 65, 30 Oct. 1941, pp. 18-20

⁵⁹ DGFP: 95/107110, Weizsäcker Memo, 4 Oct. 1941; AGM: DEV 29/52/3/1, Roca de Togores to Madrid, Report 65, 30 Oct. 1941, pp. 18-20

regarding their situation.⁶⁰ On 4 October Mayalde explained his situation to Weizsäcker and expressed his own belief that the Spaniards were *en route* to the front by train. Weizsäcker referred Mayalde to Hitler's words from a speech made the previous day that the Spaniards were now going into a battle.⁶¹ In these circumstances a visit to the Division would not be very easy. Weizsäcker proposed that Mayalde could consider a rendezvous with General Muñoz Grandes at a halfway point with permission from the Wehrmacht but he also said to Mayalde he would see what could be done. Although Mayalde recognised the existing difficulties, he was still insistent on accelerating the matter in line with Franco's wishes.⁶² Mayalde felt an obligation to visit the front as the "Ambassador of the Blue Division", as he was not just a diplomat but also a Falangist, soldier and Civil War veteran.

Additionally the Division suffered casualties. One of them was the pilot Luis Alcocer, the son of the Mayor of Madrid, a post Mayalde would eventually hold in the future. The father came to Berlin for his son's funeral and burial on 6 October and Mayalde spoke as Franco's representative. He praised Alcocer's bravery in fighting alongside the Francoists' old comrades from the German Condor Legion against the Soviet Union, their common old enemy, on the Eastern Front. Representatives of the Falange, the BD and the Luftwaffe were also in attendance.⁶³ Mayalde observed his duty to help the soldiers of the BD in light of these casualties and the concerns of the Spanish leadership. In the days before Mayalde's brief return to Madrid in September, his wife the Duquesa de Pastrana sought to visit a German military hospital in Grodno, where at least 20 BD soldiers were hospitalised.⁶⁴ On 8 October, before he could travel to the Eastern Front, Mayalde inaugurated another military hospital. Mayalde used the occasion to emphasise the friendship of Spain and Germany and the apparent satisfaction of the Germans to accommodate its volunteers against the "common foe to European civilisation".⁶⁵ The Ambassador would use hospital visits to check on wounded soldiers with the intention of sustaining BD morale and thereby that of pro-German cooperation. The following day Mayalde hosted Weizsäcker for lunch in the Spanish Embassy.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ DGFP: 95/107110, Weizsäcker Memo, 4 Oct. 1941: Weizsäcker attributes the atrocity stories to "British propaganda"; DGFP: 4894/E253933, Report registered in the Embassy in Madrid as No. 4753, 21 Oct. 1941; also see Maricío Janué i Miret, "'Woe Betide Us If They Win!': National Socialist Treatment of the Spanish 'Volunteer' Workers", *Contemporary European History* 23, 3 (2014), 329-357

⁶¹ Hitler's speech in Berlin to open the Winter Relief Fund, 3 Oct. 1941, a summary is given in *Bulletin of International News* XVIII, 1941, pp. 1741-3

⁶² DGFP: 4894/E253933, report dated 21 Oct. 1941

⁶³ ABC, 7 Oct. 1941, p. 9

⁶⁴ PAAA: 29741, AA Telegram to Weizsäcker from an "Albrecht", Berlin, 3 Sept. 1941; Albrecht to "Dr. Sethe," 26 Sept. 1941

⁶⁵ ABC, 9 Oct. 1941, p. 13

⁶⁶ ABC, 10 Oct. 1941, p. 11

There is a bit more background about what had been going on during a frenetically busy summer when on 17 October Mayalde found out why little or no information about the BD had been coming through to himself and the Spanish government. It was recorded by the AA's Ambassador to the Wehrmacht Karl Ritter that all information concerning foreign volunteer units was made available to the military *attachés* concerned, but that Franco's Spanish military *attaché* had not been transmitting the information to Mayalde. The Ambassador had been left in the dark about everything that his Embassy's military *attaché* was receiving.⁶⁷ There were signs of dysfunction within the Spanish Embassy which had to be fixed and it would not be surprising if the aim of dysfunction had been to spite Mayalde. If there was indeed dysfunction it may have been Army resentment of Serrano's interference. Mayalde was informed that the BD was deployed in such a way that a visit by the Spanish Ambassador was not feasible but eventually the situation changed and he received German permission to visit the Division. He departed Berlin on Tuesday 21 October, with the military *attaché* Lieutenant Colonel Roca de Togores and *Informaciones* editor Victor de la Serna among others as part of his entourage.⁶⁸ Mayalde also managed to learn from Weizsäcker of Wehrmacht successes in Kiev as they were making their way to Moscow.⁶⁹

Arriving at the front on Thursday 23 October, the first stop was at Army Group North's Headquarters, where Field Marshall Leeb told Mayalde that he had confidence in the Spanish troops but had not intended to immediately put them into an active sector. Leeb wanted the Spaniards to have a chance to acclimatise to the circumstances of weather and the enemy. Despite high casualties the division performed well. This confirmed Leeb's confidence in the Spaniards, which had led him to assign them to the crucial Novgorod sector.⁷⁰ This was part of the push to Leningrad. This probably explained how it became feasible for the Spanish Ambassador to visit the front.

Mayalde took a great interest in the details of the military engagements of the Spanish troops. The BD had participated in a successful repulse of a Russian counterattack on Sitno. They had "thrown the enemy back with heavy losses" and had "taken several hundred prisoners".⁷¹ Wehrmacht General Busch was able to greet Mayalde with the news of a Spanish victory and told him that he had awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class to Muñoz Grandes and some of his officers and men. Busch also granted the request made by Roca de Togores, the military *attaché*, for a daily telegram

⁶⁷ DGFP: 95/107113, AA minute, 17 Oct. 1941

⁶⁸ Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 2034; AGM: DEV 29/52/3/1, Roca de Togores to Madrid, Report 65, 30 Oct. 1941, pp. 18-20

⁶⁹ FNFF: 27035, Mayalde to MAE, 8. Oct. 1941

⁷⁰ Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 2044

⁷¹ Ibid.; *Völkischer Beobachter*, 25 Oct. 1941, p. 1

describing the activities of the BD in addition to a daily killed in action report. The Spanish Embassy could now play its role in keeping Franco informed by reporting to both the Defence Ministry in Madrid and Mayalde as "Ambassador of the Blue Division". This dual-arrangement is not necessarily considered a normal military chain of command let alone one which would have suited Spain's Army, but in spite of any potential tensions it at least meant that Franco would now be informed of updates on a steady basis as opposed to having received no updates at all prior to then. On the whole, Franco would benefit from an effective chain of command from the troops at the front.⁷² So in terms of outcomes, Mayalde improved fragile communications between his Embassy, Madrid and the BD. Mayalde had acted in the light of negative propaganda to protect the BD's reputation.⁷³ In this instance, Mayalde made political capital but not so much for its own sake as opposed to Franco having his Ambassador fix a problem that needed fixing.

Mayalde went onto meet with *divisionarios* and showed his solidarity through his interactions and involvement with activities. On the Friday morning, during the visit, Mayalde and his delegation drove over 46 kilometres for four hours from Korosten to the forest camp at Grigorovo. Muñoz Grandes welcomed Mayalde with an *abrazo*, clearly perceiving the visit in a different light to how he would look back on events and his general views on Serrano and Mayalde. He briefed Mayalde on the division's deployment and the logistics. Also present to make Mayalde welcome was his comrade Dionisio Ridruejo. Ridruejo was Serrano's press chief and described by Mayalde as the "most important writer" in contemporary Spain.⁷⁴ They were pleased to see each other.⁷⁵ With winter approaching, provisions for the *divisionarios* formed part of the discussions, including luxuries such as alcoholic-liquors from Spain.⁷⁶ Later during the visit Mayalde provided Ridruejo with a film camera courtesy of German press chief Otto Dietrich, a gesture of appreciation for Ridruejo's work in Berlin.⁷⁷ Afterwards Mayalde and his group went with Muñoz to a Division field hospital at Grigorovo. They were greeted by Wehrmacht General Karl von Roques. With Mayalde and Roca de Togores looking on, as Franco's diplomatic and military representatives respectively, Muñoz Grandes was formally presented with the Iron Cross 2nd Class by the corps commander. Muñoz himself proceeded in awarding several Iron Crosses and two *Medalla Militars* to his own soldiers. He awarded a certain Escobedo, who after leading a charge was injured in the chest, the *Medalla Militar* in the name of the Caudillo Franco and the Iron Cross in the name of the Führer Hitler. There was an

⁷² Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 2053; AGM: T312/544/8151490 KTB 16, Army Report, 23 Oct. 1941; *Informaciones*, 27 Oct. 1941, p. 1

⁷³ DGFP: 4894/E253933, MAE report, 21 Oct. 1941

⁷⁴ PAAA: 29741, telegram, 18 Dec. 1941

⁷⁵ Dionisio Ridruejo, *Cuadernos de Rusia* (Madrid, 1943), p. 100

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 299

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 302-3

interesting personal interaction by Mayalde, who had been an artillery officer with the rank of Captain in the 1920s and had later served in the Civil War for the Falangist cause.⁷⁸ Because Muñoz did not actually have any Medalla Militars to present, Mayalde unfastened his own Civil War *Medalla Militar* from his dark blue Falangist uniform for Muñoz to present to Escobedo.⁷⁹ The symbolism of linking his service for Franco's 1936-9 *reconquista* with this "Eastern Crusade" of the BD was evident. Mayalde fulfilled his duty as Franco's Ambassador of the Blue Division by liaising with the key representatives of the BD and its parent Army Group North at the front, obtaining news and information about the mostly positive situation of the Division, handling requisitions and reestablishing communications through the Embassy. He and his entourage returned to Berlin after a successful visit.⁸⁰ Mayalde thanked Weizsäcker for his help in arranging the visit and the courtesies shown to him by the Germans during the visit.⁸¹

Interest in all matters of press and propaganda⁸² (November – December 1941)

Three months after his initial arrival in Berlin, Mayalde had been to the Eastern Front and was talking extensively to the press over the next month, once again benefiting from an "enhanced" position. Immediately upon returning to Berlin he could capitalise on the BD. Mayalde returned just in time as the day afterwards was the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Falange by José Antonio in 1933, an event which transpired well before Mayalde and Serrano joined in 1936 just before the Civil War. Mayalde presided over a ceremony commemorating the fallen of the BD before Falange, Nazi Party and Italian Fascist Party members which was also broadcast on Berlin radio stations.⁸³ There was a Changing of the Guard before the Cross of the Fallen where the names of those who died in the "second campaign against Communism"⁸⁴ were commemorated. A "European fascist" solidarity was symbolised with representatives from the SS and Berlin-based Italian *Fascio* comprising part of this guard. At 5pm, Mayalde read his commemoration to the fallen. This was a typical opportunity for Mayalde to capitalise on the exploits of the BD as the cause of the Falange. Mayalde invoked the legacy of José Antonio and emphasised the continuity between the 1936-9 *cruzada* and the present campaign against Soviet Russia, thereby linking the Spanish Civil War to the Nazi project. He described how just as their German and Italian comrades fought beside them

⁷⁸ Letter from Rafael Finat, Conde de Mayalde to author, 26 Apr. 2017; Kew: HS6/966, "Falangist Personalities", 5 May 1941, p. 5

⁷⁹ Errando Vilar, *Campaña de invierno* (Madrid, 1943), p. 35

⁸⁰ Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 2077; Vilar, *Campaña*, p. 35

⁸¹ DGFP: 95/107166, Weizsäcker telegram St.S 712, 30 Oct. 1941

⁸² Derived from Ribbentrop's subordinate Paul Schmidt's remarks on Mayalde's "interest of all matters in press and propaganda" during this period.

⁸³ AGA: 51/20891, Falange Internal Correspondence Berlin-Madrid, 30 Oct. 1941

⁸⁴ The first being understood as the Spanish Civil War.

against "Communism" in Spain, once again they were fighting together in Russia.⁸⁵ For him it was only intrinsic to the values of the Falange that the soldiers of the BD had come to give their lives in foreign territory thousands of miles away from Spain. Once again the Falange had shown the world that their sacrifice was an act of service to the *patria* of "civilisation and honour". Recalling his visit, Mayalde celebrated the Division's successes and said the soldiers knew how to act for Spain's "glory". He recalled his time fondly and his pride at being able to associate with the German Generals. He wished for those "mothers, fathers and siblings" he expected to be listening on the radio to know that the "Falangist spirit" had prevailed in the face of adversity against the "global threat" of "Soviet barbarism". He rounded off by calling on the Falange in Germany and its occupied territories to answer him by honouring their fallen comrades for the "cause" of "God, Spain, and the National Syndicalist Revolution."⁸⁶

This persisted at a reception for the German press at the Spanish Embassy on the evening of 7 November. The press chiefs from Spain's Foreign and Propaganda Ministries also attended. Mayalde discussed his impressions of his recent visit to the front and highlighted the important role the press had to play in Spain and Germany's close relations: "At the service of the state under Franco's leadership ... the Spanish press is now an exceptionally important instrument to educate⁸⁷ the [Spanish] nation and enhance relations between friendly countries."⁸⁸ Mayalde pointed to the press campaigns of Spanish outlets such as the Falange's *Arriba*. He said they received direct inspiration from Serrano Suñer. Mayalde thanked the German press for the attention it gave to everything concerning the BD. He stated that the *Divisionarios* had given up their occupations to become soldiers for the cause. It was on this occasion that Mayalde concluded by saying that "We, the Spaniards, are on the side of National Socialist Germany, because we know that the profound transformation in the political, social and economic order in Spain means that the Falangist revolution cannot be achieved without the definitive and complete victory of National Socialist Germany".⁸⁹ As Wayne Bowen points out, a prominent Falangist was thereby acknowledging that the fate of the Falange was tied to the success of Nazi Germany in its endeavours – a prophecy which proved accurate, although not in the manner imagined by Mayalde.⁹⁰ Indeed Mayalde

⁸⁵ AGA: 51/20891, Internal Correspondence, 30 Oct. 1941

⁸⁶ AGA: 51/20891, Internal Correspondence, 30 Oct. 1941

⁸⁷ "To educate" in the original is "dar consignas al país".

⁸⁸ ABC, 8 Nov. 1941, pp. 1, 5

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Bowen, *Spain during World War II* (Missouri, 2006), p. 43

essentially admitted the Falangist aims of his persistent conduct on which his fervent Nazi support remained conditional. Of course, Nazi success was not a guarantee against internal Francoist rivals.

The Nazis themselves noticed Mayalde's increasingly aggressive use of the press and admission of his ambitions. Paul Schmidt, a press chief for Ribbentrop, witnessed Mayalde host a similar press reception a week later. He expressed satisfaction with how Mayalde offered words of friendship and said that in Mayalde he saw a "comrade who not only felt the idea of national-revolution like the Germans" but also showed great interest in all matters of press and propaganda with a studious mind and understanding that the older generations lacked. He also appreciated the connection made between the Civil War and the Eastern Front.⁹¹ As will be seen it is significant this contrasts with Ribbentrop's alleged disdain for Mayalde. It was also revealing to start with that *ABC*'s subtitle referred to Mayalde's 7 November *charla* as "interesantisíma" and that the title used by the newspaper *El Alcazar* was "The Falange has been the key link in friendly German-Spanish relations".⁹²

Inevitably Mayalde's Francoist competitors resented his "great interest in all matters of press and propaganda" and comments such as the "inspiration of Serrano Suñer". Although the remarks were republished in *ABC* and other outlets, Arrese as Falange Secretary General blocked republication in the Falange's *Arriba*. This was not the first time that Mayalde was censored in a press reproduction for his enthusiasm, recalling when in 1938 he described how his friend José Antonio had "carried out violence with a cold head" and had set an example for Mayalde and others to follow.⁹³ In Berlin in 1941 there was no need for such censorship. Mayalde expressed frustration recalling his delayed accreditation and inattentive German press back in July. Now his endeavours as "Ambassador of the Blue Division in Berlin" were being stifled by Spanish press at home, in this case the very outlet of the Falange. Mayalde complained that "it was impossible to do politics in Spain if he could not have a free hand in propaganda".⁹⁴ Serrano and Mayalde had taken credit for Arrese's ascent to Secretary General of the Falange, so given Mayalde's opinion that Arrese "owed too much to Serrano" the censorship was unacceptable.⁹⁵

⁹¹ *ABC*, 15 Nov. 1941, p. 11

⁹² Rafael Ángel Nieto-Aliseda Causo, *El periódico El Alcázar: del autoritarismo a la democracia* (Madrid, 2014), p. 49; *El Alcázar*, 7 Nov. 1941, p. 1

⁹³ Ian Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 1981), p. 194; *Radio Nacional* broadcast, 4 Dec. 1938. The primary source was provided to Gibson by Eutimio Martín. In the broadcast, Mayalde appeared to endorse the "execution of violence with a cool head" by José Antonio. This detail was omitted in subsequent transcripts.

⁹⁴ Ramón Garriga, *Franco-Serrano Suñer: un drama político* (Barcelona, 1986), p. 117

⁹⁵ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, p. 287

Mayalde was again somewhat admmissive about his aims when saying that he wanted a “free hand” but did not fully admit that he wanted *Arriba*, the Falange, the Blue Division and the Spanish and German press in general to all be operating on his own terms. He should also have anticipated Arrese’s opposition not least after his role in Serrano’s loss of the MdG. Serrano and Mayalde were indeed at fault for having had ingratiated Arrese with Franco in 1940. Unlike Serrano or Mayalde, Arrese had been a member of the Falange since before 1936. During the Civil War Arrese had opposed Franco’s appropriation of the Falange. After his rehabilitation by Serrano and ingratiation with Franco in 1940, Arrese then arranged for his own allies to fill important Falange and regime posts for the purposes of propaganda. These were posts that had been neglected by Serrano prior to losing the Interior Ministry.⁹⁶

Garriga suggests a connection between this mute press in Spain and the inattentive press in Germany the previous summer. His memoirs highlight how Ribbentrop had even insinuated Mayalde was relaying unfavourable reports about Germany to the Spanish press all the while Arrese was being obstructive. Garriga even quoted Mayalde as going as far to say if Ribbentrop caught onto internal Francoist tensions he would cultivate Arrese for his hostility to Serrano. In turn, Arrese would “sell out” Spain to Germany. The aim of this suggestion appears to be continuing the Serranoist line that Serrano was the necessary conduit for successful and mutually-beneficial Hispano-German relations and thereby spiting Arrese’s ability and intentions.⁹⁷ Furthermore around this time that Mayalde was posing for the press, he met Josef Goebbels, Germany’s Propaganda Minister. Goebbels did not reflect positively on this meeting. He was not convinced by Mayalde that Germany benefited from Spain’s choice of “moral belligerence” as opposed to formal entry into WWII.⁹⁸

The supposed contrasts between the positions of Schmidt and Weizsäcker on the one hand and Ribbentrop and Goebbels on the other suggest that so long as Spain did not formally enter WWII as an Axis belligerent, it remained difficult for Mayalde to completely convince the Nazi regime of his support, not least of course because it was conditional on his Falangist “dual goals”. Spain meanwhile continued to make gestures towards a meaningful alliance with the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact. On Monday 25 November Mayalde was reunited with Serrano Suñer. This came a day after a Mass held in the Embassy commemorating the fifth anniversary of the death of José

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, pp. 291-3

⁹⁸ Joseph Goebbels in Elke Fröhlich (ed.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels: Oktober-Dezember 1941* (Munich, 1996), p. 518

Antonio on 20th November at which Mayalde spoke.⁹⁹ Serrano came to Berlin to add Spain's signature to the renewed Pact. The Pact was completed in the early afternoon and followed by lunch given by Ribbentrop at the Adlon Hotel. Serrano, Mayalde and their associate Antonio Tovar attended.¹⁰⁰ Mayalde and Serrano had another meal in their Embassy on 27 November, the night before Serrano left.¹⁰¹ Mayalde briefly returned to Madrid sometime around Christmas. The Sunday before Christmas Day he relayed a message by Franco to the BD in Berlin. On 27 December he went to see Serrano in the Palace of Santa Cruz along with representatives from Germany, Italy and the Vatican.¹⁰² While Mayalde was back in Madrid, Franco himself wanted to see him as recent reports about the BD came to trouble him.¹⁰³

The Challenges of 1942

In the New Year of 1942, Mayalde returned to Berlin with a noticeably tough winter of diplomacy ahead for representing Spaniards serving Germany on both the military and labour fronts. The political "Ambassador of the Blue Division" was ordered by Franco himself to negotiate an overhaul in the deployment of the Division during the Russian winter.¹⁰⁴ The Embassy was also obliged to protect Spanish workers per the stipulations of the earlier agreements. Mayalde's diplomatic ability as well as the extent of his political sympathies and understanding of military matters would be tested. In fact his equation of professionalism and "political spirit" would be tested.

Things began to go wrong for the Spanish Blue Division. The Russian winter had arrived. Hitler's Wehrmacht was ill-prepared and the Spanish soldiers especially so. The casualty lists were climbing, with a third of the division affected by death, injury or frostbite from lack of proper winter clothing. The logistics and supplies were failing to arrive. Mayalde's friend Ridruejo had also been taken ill on the front and Mayalde was anxious that he convalesce in Germany.¹⁰⁵ Franco had both Mayalde and the military *attaché* asking the AA and the Wehrmacht respectively for the BD's relocation on the front.¹⁰⁶ Franco wanted removal from the line and relocation of the Division to the rearguard and for troop rotation. Mayalde was involved in the request directly under Franco's orders. Although in this

⁹⁹ ABC, 25 Nov. 1941, p. 19

¹⁰⁰ ABC, 26 Nov. 1941, p. 8

¹⁰¹ ABC, 28 Nov. 1941, p. 1

¹⁰² ABC, 26 Dec. 1941, p. 1; ABC, 28 Dec. 1941, p. 15

¹⁰³ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5374 (for Mayalde meeting Franco himself); PAAA: 29742, Weizsäcker to Stohrer, 10 Jan. 1942

¹⁰⁴ The general situation is explained in "Combat in 1942: The Petition for Rest and Recuperation" in Moreno, *Blue Division*, Lines 5324-5456. I have also looked at the sources on Mayalde in PAAA 29742-43 and the AGM.

¹⁰⁵ PAAA: 29742, Weizsäcker report, 18 Dec. 1941

¹⁰⁶ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5377

respect there was a practical military element to Mayalde's requests, Serrano Suñer was once again also heeding domestic political considerations and wanted to minimise Falangist casualties within the BD.¹⁰⁷

Once again Mayalde made his petition to Weizsäcker in a series of meetings and communications between January and March 1942. Mayalde was informed that his concerns were understood but the requests were not feasible. After several meetings had taken place, things became tense between Mayalde and Weizsäcker, not least because Mayalde's own military *attaché* was having separate negotiations with the Wehrmacht which often contradicted the political advice that Mayalde was receiving from Serrano.¹⁰⁸ While Mayalde was negotiating through the AA, the military *attaché* was negotiating through the Wehrmacht. Despite their previous cooperation in October 1941, the military *attaché* came to opine that Mayalde's involvement was superfluous.¹⁰⁹ Basically Mayalde was trying to sidestep the military when it came to the Falangists on the front whom Serrano perceived to be invaluable in the future. Serrano wanted to repatriate Falangists whether they were alive or dead, irrespective of the opinion of the Wehrmacht or for that matter the opinion of General Muñoz Grandes.¹¹⁰ By early March 1942 Mayalde was reconciled that while a relocation of the entire division was not possible, fresh troops could be sent up and some could return home. This concluded the discussions. Meanwhile, strategically Spain remained committed to the Eastern Front and wanted a refreshed BD to contribute to Hitler's intended "spring offensive".¹¹¹

Spanish workers expected things to be better in Germany than in Civil War-torn Spain but they found conditions in wartime Germany even more oppressive.¹¹² In Garriga's words, they expected a big and heroic role in the new order but instead they not only were given jobs outside of their skill sets but they were also placed into rough accommodation and were routinely mistreated during work.¹¹³ They protested outside the Embassy and asked to return home to Spain well before their contracts were to expire. The German employers had failed to treat the Spanish workers with the

¹⁰⁷ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5389; AGM: C2030/CP8/D3 Mayalde to MAE, 22 Feb. 1942, pp. 7-9; PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942; DGFP: 205/5003, Weizsäcker report St.S 56, 5 Feb. 1942, p. 372

¹⁰⁸ DGFP: 109/458 Weizsäcker St.S Nr. 12, 10 Jan. 1942; Weizsäcker report St.S 56, 5 Feb. 1942; AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Mayalde to MAE, 5 Feb. 1942, pp. 6-7; Mayalde to MAE, 22 Feb. 1942, pp. 7-9; PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942

¹⁰⁹ AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Military *attaché* Spanish Embassy Berlin to *Estado Mayor Militar* Madrid, "Informe num. 81, Adjunto remito", prepared 24 Feb. 1942 and received 2 Mar. 1942

¹¹⁰ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5358

¹¹¹ PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker St S. 132, 5 Mar. 1942

¹¹² Marició Janué i Miret, "'Woe Betide Us If They Win!': National Socialist Treatment of the Spanish 'Volunteer' Workers", *Contemporary European History* 23, 3 (2014), 329-357; Garriga, *La España*, pp. 366-70

¹¹³ Garriga, *La España*, pp. 366-70

dignity they had been promised in 1941. Mayalde was given a problem that was “difficult to solve”.¹¹⁴ In January, Mayalde and Garriga went to a factory used by the Maybach firm for producing German tank engines where 100 Spaniards were employed. Upon arrival Mayalde faced complaints and alarming details of incidents that Garriga describes in his memoirs. This was happening in an important factory that was supposed to be up to standard for a visit by Spain’s Ambassador. This did not bode well for the guards who brutally treated the foreign non-German speaking workers even if they had been loaned by sympathetic states. Afterwards Mayalde asked Madrid to not send any more workers and focus on improving the situation of the 15,000 that were already in Germany – out of 100,000 that had earlier been pledged by Spain.¹¹⁵

Mayalde prepared a report which he submitted to Weizsäcker.¹¹⁶ Not only was the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Labour Front) brought into action but also Himmler’s Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) in light of followup reports received by Mayalde’s police *attachés*, whose presence in Berlin he had originally negotiated with Himmler eighteen months prior. The RSHA were part of a joint-visit made between the Spanish and the Germans to the main factory which employed Spanish workers in early February.¹¹⁷ While the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* identified why jobs were being misallocated, the RSHA investigated the violence. What Mayalde had heard from his police *attachés* was that there were “red” elements among the Spanish workers and they had links with “reds” among other worker contingents. The RSHA duly attributed at least part of the violence and unrest in the workplaces to “red”-related agitation. On this understanding, Mayalde went as far as to suggest that the Spanish side of the investigation would deal with the “reds” and punish them.¹¹⁸ Mayalde expressed his gratitude to Weizsäcker on 5 February for the effort undertaken by the AA and the other participating German authorities.¹¹⁹ It should also be remembered from Chapter 2 that while Mayalde was DG in 1940, Franco had decided to leave the “red” Spaniards in German hands.

The issue of troop rotation gives a glimpse into Mayalde’s ability to fulfil Franco’s and Serrano’s requirements and demands as he equated professionalism and politics. Franco asked him to make the military arguments and Serrano expected him to make political arguments. Franco wanted Spain

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ PAAA: 29742, Weizsäcker St S. 26, 16 Jan. 1942; also in an uncategorised memorandum the same day referring to Sts 26

¹¹⁷ The main factory (with Spanish workers) mentioned in the telegram is very possibly the same Maybach factory but it is unspecified.

¹¹⁸ PAAA: 29742, Weizsäcker St.-S. Nr. 56, 5 Feb. 1942: Bringing up the police *attachés* in Berlin; 29742, Document Subject: “Memorandum of the Spanish ambassador. St. S. No. 26 16 Jan. 1942”, 5 Feb. 1942

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

on the Eastern Front to be part of a fresh spring offensive rather than a winter casualty. Franco intended to reinforce the BD through regular rotation like Germany's Condor Legion had done during the Civil War. A few trainloads of replacements, mostly regular soldiers rather than Falangists or "volunteers", to be discussed again, were already being sent up but nothing substantial could be done until Franco's representatives finished negotiations with the Germans. Mayalde was anxious to satisfy Franco. When Weizsäcker gave Mayalde some disappointing news on 21 February, Mayalde – who Weizsäcker noted normally made his *demarchés* in a restrained form – did not completely lose his composure but became very insistent and noticeably agitated.¹²⁰ In a letter dated 24 February, Spain's Berlin military *attaché* observed that Mayalde became more energetic in his negotiations as they continued.¹²¹ Mayalde was afraid that Franco would not react well to the news, telling Weizsäcker that Franco would be unsettled and unpleasantly disappointed by this response. Only the previous day had Franco again impressed on Mayalde that the immediate relief of the BD was absolutely necessary.¹²² Mayalde expected to be able to perform without deferring to military channels. Mayalde therefore was tested on his ability to make his case to the Germans while staying calm and professional. He had to show Franco that he was an able diplomat and was evidently worried of the repercussions that would come from the *Caudillo* himself.

The need for Mayalde to admit the political dimension may explain why in a desire to make progress, he became more energetic. Serrano had told Mayalde in their December meeting that rotating out the Falangists should be his personal first priority.¹²³ He wanted to reconsolidate his domestic powerbase for the "dual goals". Although ironically there would have been fewer Falangists in the BD, Serrano now needed Falangist *divisionarios* back in Spain. He sought credit and gratitude for the well-being of Falangists who "went out and fought for the glory of Spain and Spanish prestige". He hoped they would reinvigorate his support base – this would certainly be important if Germany was going to lose the war. Once again, Mayalde invoked the demands of victory when pleading with Weizsäcker. Franco's government was worried that after the Division's "heroic and brilliant performance" as "demanded by Spanish prestige", the Division would get excessively tired and would not be in the right condition to keep this up.¹²⁴ Another explanation given by Mayalde to Weizsäcker in February was that "reds" were dominating politics at Spanish Universities in the absence of Falangists. Xavier Moreno Julià describes this as a "typically political

¹²⁰ PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942

¹²¹ AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Military *attaché* Spanish Embassy Berlin to *Estado Mayor Militar* Madrid, "Informe num. 81, Adjunto remito", prepared 24 Feb. 1942 and received 2 Mar. 1942

¹²² PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop, St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942

¹²³ Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 3453

¹²⁴ AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Military *attaché* Spanish Embassy Berlin to *Estado Mayor Militar* Madrid, "Informe num. 81, Adjunto remito", prepared 24 Feb. 1942 and received 2 Mar. 1942

argument”.¹²⁵ Indeed while Franco was repressing “reds”, Mayalde in all likelihood was painting a negative situation as a result of not having his way recalling what he had said earlier about Arrese. Mayalde also would not initially answer Weizsäcker as to whether the military officials were discussing the matter with the Wehrmacht, which can be seen as a way of sidestepping the Army officers and a reluctance to expressly admit that he was not properly balancing politics and professional diplomacy.

Weizsäcker himself came to be of the mind that the Francoist “military” and “political” points of view were the same with Mayalde speaking of them under the same breath. However Weizsäcker also proved inadequate on explaining military technicalities. Despite his own service history, Mayalde became confused and suggested that Weizsäcker was giving him obfuscated military points of view. Weizsäcker responded that this was absurd. Therefore Weizsäcker insisted it would be convenient that the Spanish *attaché* and other military specialists discuss these details in an exclusively technical matter with the German military representatives.¹²⁶ Weizsäcker commented that in the contact between the Spanish military experts in Berlin with German military authorities, such points of view were expressed with more prospect of clarity than between Mayalde and himself. The Wehrmacht Command needed to be involved so a solution could be properly and “expertly” determined on military grounds.¹²⁷ On later occasions Mayalde had to be clearer about politics when it came to talking to the military authorities and not just limit himself to the military arguments if the Spanish government was going to persist with its petitions. As far as the solution appears to be concerned, the Spanish were unsuccessful in withdrawing the Division to the rearguard while it took two months to agree to the idea of troop rotation.

In summary, although the outcome may not necessarily have been different, Mayalde’s persistent Falangist politics and inability to be more upfront about this were an encumbrance, as was his inability to speak German. His ability to fulfil Franco’s requirements let alone professionally conduct Spanish diplomacy was impeded if not undermined. Considering his political assertiveness most of the time, when it came to his aforementioned discussions with Garriga and also Weizsäcker he was actually quite reticent. It took Weizsäcker time to fully appreciate that politics was so important for Mayalde. Neither did Mayalde’s own service history help him understand military matters.

As ever Serrano fuelled antagonisms with other Francoists, chiefly with Muñoz Grandes who did not take kindly to Serrano interfering with his command. It is no surprise Muñoz should speak

¹²⁵ Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5390

¹²⁶ AGM: C2030/CP8/D3, Mayalde to MAE, 22 Feb. 1942, pp. 7-9

¹²⁷ PAAA: 29743, Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop on Mayalde’s reaction, St.S Nr. 102, 21 Feb. 1942

venomously of Serrano and his "creature" Mayalde in August 1942.¹²⁸ It took Hitler himself in March to allow Mayalde to read a document by Muñoz which illustrated aspects of the current situation.¹²⁹ Although Ambassadors are meant to represent their citizens within the jurisdictions of their host countries, perceived encroachment is often resented and it would not be surprising that Muñoz should resent Mayalde's classic Serranoist political encroachment. All sides were also wary of persistent Allied propaganda playing on fears in Spain of the *divisionarios*' demise and Weizsäcker understood this. Mayalde's anxieties over the Blue Division may have resonated with previously mentioned British propaganda back in October 1941. As described earlier, the same propaganda which had helped prompt Mayalde's visit to the front also caused alarm in Spain about Spanish workers.¹³⁰ Hence Mayalde's tough winter owed in at least some part to enemy propaganda.

Mayalde and Himmler

On 23 January 1942, Mayalde had his first known meeting with his old Third Reich working partner Heinrich Himmler since the *de facto* state visit to Spain in October 1940.¹³¹ Since Hitler had opened the Eastern Front, while Mayalde was now Ambassador Himmler had accumulated more responsibilities relating to the consolidation of "*Lebensraum*" and resettling racial "undesirables". This included the Holocaust which had now been underway for several months. The extermination of all the Jews in Europe was becoming policy. Himmler's meeting with Mayalde came three days after Reinhard Heydrich's Wannsee Conference. Earlier that day Himmler had also been in a "table talk" with Hitler who not only said that "The Jew must clear out of Europe" but also that he could "see no other solution but extermination".¹³² Wannsee and the Holocaust will be discussed in Chapter 4, along with any perspective Mayalde may have gleaned about Heydrich's administration of German-occupied Czechoslovakia from October 1941 up to his assassination in mid-1942.

Himmler enquired with Mayalde whether he could import 5,000 mules from Spain for his *Waffen*-SS 7th Mountaineer Division *Prinz Eugen* deployed in Serbia. Mayalde, who had previously accommodated Himmler's police foreign policy, was unable to deliver for Himmler's military effort

¹²⁸ PAAA: 29744, Muñoz Grandes memo, 31 Aug. 1942

¹²⁹ PAAA: 29743, Buro Ram. Ueber St. S. dated 3 Feb. 1942 (scarce in detail); unidentified document 24 Feb. 1942: Hitler's approval for Mayalde to receive a brief.

¹³⁰ DGFP: 4894/253933, MAE report, 21 Oct. 1941

¹³¹ Pete Witte, Michael Wildt, Martina Voigt, Dieter Pohl, Peter Klein, Christian Gerlach, Christoph Dieckmann and Andrej Angrick (eds.), *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42* (Hamburg, 1999), p. 324: Entry for 23 Jan. 1942 and footnote. This is the first recorded occasion in Himmler's daybook of him meeting specifically with Mayalde as Ambassador.

¹³² Martin Broszat, "Hitler and the Genesis of the 'Final Solution'" in H.W Koch (ed.), *Aspects of the Third Reich* (London, 1985), pp. 390-429

just as he had been ultimately unsuccessful in realising pure Falangist police units at home or military units with the BD. Spain forbade the exporting of mules due to their value.¹³³ Furthermore the significance of waiving this ban in Germany's favour would not have been lost on the Western Allies. They would surely have responded with sanctions and as mentioned in Chapter 2 had been observing Mayalde since his cooperation with Himmler in 1940.¹³⁴ Were Mayalde to have elevated SS-police cooperation to *Waffen*-SS military cooperation, Spain would not just have unnecessarily forfeited mules in its dire economic situation.

The discussions resumed in Himmler's headquarters in Hegewaldheim, East Prussia on 29 January and on 2 February.¹³⁵ In between Mayalde and Himmler took time together to visit a military hospital in Königsberg on 1 February. Again Mayalde was checking up on wounded *divisionarios*. On receiving Franco's Ambassador the soldiers expressed their gratitude and spoke with a "patriotic spirit" about their experiences.¹³⁶ Mayalde passed on the regards of the Caudillo to the soldiers. Himmler even gave a "splendid donation" for each of the injured *divisionarios*. Mayalde was satisfied that the soldiers were well attended to as he left the hospital. He was also happy to see the Spanish patriotic spirit in each of the soldiers as ever.¹³⁷ Mayalde again obtained at least some insight into SS organisation once Himmler hosted him in his headquarters. Still, despite their seemingly good relationship and the goodwill shown by Himmler over those days, Mayalde was not forthcoming on the mules. Whether he sympathised with Himmler's desires or not, Mayalde's own influence on the matter was limited. Himmler then considered contacting Spain's Minister of Agriculture. Eventually, come March 1942, Himmler abandoned trying to procure mules from Spain.¹³⁸ There was a limit to what even Himmler could get from Mayalde.

On 4 June 1942, Heydrich died after he was critically wounded by paratroopers in Prague on 27 May. Mayalde telegraphed home so that the DGS could express its condolences.¹³⁹ Mayalde had several more meetings with Himmler. They met on 29 June, just before Himmler went to eat with Hitler. Himmler and Mayalde next met on 16 November, in the Hohenlychen Klinik, a medical facility

¹³³ Mules are sterile crossbreeds between horses and donkeys. Hence breeding mules was time consuming.

¹³⁴ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, pp. 324, 332; BArch: NS19/2761 Loerner to Himmler, 21 Jan. 1942; "m GrF Wolff tel. In Berlin", 23 Jan. 1942; NS19/2878 "Der Reichswirtschaftsminister", 21 Jan. 1942, pp. 6-10

¹³⁵ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, p. 332: Entry for 29 Jan. 1942 and footnote; BArch: NS19/2878 "Der Reichswirtschaftsminister", 21 Jan. 1942, pp. 6-10. Himmler and Mayalde also met 27 January 1942. What they talked about remains unknown.

¹³⁶ ABC, 3 Feb. 1942, p. 11

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, p. 332: Entry for 29 Jan. 1942 and footnote; BArch: NS19/1292 Bl. 255 ff

¹³⁹ AGA: AR 82/03437, Communication from Mayalde, 4 Jun. 1942

in Lychen one hundred kilometres north of Berlin for the use of the SS during the war. Sometime before August 1942, Mayalde required a knee operation and afterwards convalesced at Hohenlychen. It is unclear what they talked about although Mayalde at this point was succeeded as Ambassador and was soon to return to Spain as will be discussed.¹⁴⁰

Downfall (August – December 1942)

Mayalde remained in Berlin until stepping down as Ambassador and Head of the Falange in Germany in the autumn of 1942. In August Franco finally politically neutralised Ramón Serrano Suñer following a major altercation in Bilbao between Falangists and rival Francoists. Serrano was out of the Foreign Ministry and out of government. He had become too ambitious for Franco. Serrano remained a significant Falangist but ceased having any political influence over Franco who was now consolidating his own powerbase which would last for decades. August 1942 meant the end of Serrano and retrospectively spelt a coming decline of the Falange, but Franco in exercising his “judgement of Solomon” was also using the fallout to consolidate his control in government not just against the pressure of the Falange but also the Army. Serrano and Mayalde’s Interior Ministry successors from 1941 were dismissed from those posts too. An anti-Serrano Falangist Blas Pérez Gonzalez became Interior Minister, holding the post well into the 1950s, while another Army officer was Police Commissioner (DG), ensuring a delicate balance of power accountable to Franco and no one else.¹⁴¹

Serrano’s replacement as foreign minister was General Francisco Gómez-Jordana who had previously been this while Serrano had been seeking domestic control in 1938-1939. Franco reluctantly reappointed Jordana after his preferred candidates were unavailable. Jordana was not pro-Axis and was in fact pro-Allied.¹⁴² But America was now significantly active in the war in the Atlantic and the Torch landings were imminent. German military attention was turning back to Western Europe. Mayalde himself acknowledged this possibility but had envisaged this in the circumstances that the Germans would have a quick victory at El-Alamein and even Stalingrad in which sector the BD was not involved.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, Germany was set for defeat and recognising the turning tide earlier than Franco himself, Jordana began to change Spanish foreign policy. Ramón

¹⁴⁰ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, pp. 84, 614: The entry, 13.00 16 Nov. 1942 reads “[T:] 13 h SS. Brig. F. Gebhardt Berlin, Besuch Botschafter Mayalde: Der spanische Botschafter Mayalde befand sich bis zum 21.11 in der Klinik Hohenlychen”. Mayalde was in the clinic, run by Professor Karl Gebhardt, until 21 Nov. 1942; BArch: NS19/1292, Gebhardt to Himmler, 26 Nov. 1942, pp. 255-257; Garriga, *Las relaciones*, p.353: Garriga visits Mayalde in the clinic.

¹⁴¹ Preston, *Franco*, Line 10631

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ José María Doussinague, *España tenía razón (1939-45)* (Madrid, 1950), p. 63

Garriga described the changes as the replacement of the "blue ideologues" with the professional diplomats.¹⁴⁴

Mayalde was out of place in Jordana's new post-Serrano diplomatic environment and felt out of place in the post-Serrano regime which he appeared to suggest was anti-Falangist. Unsurprisingly Mayalde was shocked when learning during his convalescence in Hohenlychen that Serrano had lost power, yet curiously there seemed to be no immediate inclination for him to resign or be dismissed.¹⁴⁵ Again as with May 1941, it is unclear whether Mayalde voluntarily resigned or was sacked when he was eventually replaced in October 1942. Garriga claims Mayalde chose to resign having felt let down after having had served "disloyal politicians" and accusing other Falangists of having forgotten their "sacred promises and commitments". British diplomats in Spain also reported that Mayalde resigned in solidarity with Serrano.¹⁴⁶ Mayalde decided that he was content with having served as "Ambassador of the Blue Division" as that was to be his destiny. He no longer wanted to continue playing a "ridiculous role" and felt that what was to come was Franco's problem – indicating his withdrawal from frontline politics.¹⁴⁷

Jordana replaced Mayalde as Ambassador in Berlin with Ginés Vidal. Vidal was a professional diplomat and anti-Falangist who spoke German and had served as *charge d'affaires* in Berlin under Mayalde's predecessor General Espinosa.¹⁴⁸ With regards to Spain's overall wartime pivot, Vidal was more appropriate in assisting Jordana winding down Spain's Eastern Front commitment while minimising offence, if possible, to Germany. Franco eventually withdrew the BD in 1943 under mounting Allied pressure. From now on it would be Arrese, representing the Falange, who provided the problems to Jordana by communicating extensively with the Nazis to the extent of visiting Germany and meeting Hitler.¹⁴⁹ "Moral belligerence" was now indeed "neutrality" and the timing probably saved the entire Franco regime from a postwar catastrophe that could have been inflicted by the Allies. Franco's adoption of "neutrality" and avoidance of interference with Gibraltar or in the Mediterranean, coupled with the eventual threat from the USSR, allowed America to look the other way. Any Falangist influence on Franco had to become more discreet. Mayalde would not hold another major political post until 1952, when he became Mayor of Madrid.

¹⁴⁴ Garriga, *Berlin*, p. 192

¹⁴⁵ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, pp. 353-5; AGA: AR 82/03697, Mayalde to Jordana, 6 Sept. 1942; Moreno, *Blue Division*, Line 5886

¹⁴⁶ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, pp. 353-5; Kew: HS6/966, Madrid Embassy report, 4 Oct. 1942

¹⁴⁷ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, pp. 353-5

¹⁴⁸ Garriga, *Berlin*, p. 192

¹⁴⁹ Preston, *Franco*, Line 11121

Vidal took over duties from Mayalde in November though the farewell formalities with Hitler and Ribbentrop did not take place until 1 December.¹⁵⁰ In his parting meetings in the *Wolfschanze* Mayalde affirmed support for Germany's "struggle" against the "Jewish enemy".¹⁵¹ Himmler was also present and a couple of days later they had lunch and tea.¹⁵² In the days before his departure, Mayalde had a fitting encounter in Berlin with Romanian fascist leader Horia Sima, whose own presence there was explained by the Himmler-Ribbentrop rivalry to be discussed in Chapter 4.¹⁵³ Mayalde departed Berlin on the night of Sunday 6 December 1942. He was seen off by Weizsäcker, numerous party officials and representatives of the Wehrmacht. Presumably he did not return to Germany until his eventual visit to West Berlin, under the German Federal Republic, as Mayor of Madrid in 1955.

Conclusion

By being in Berlin as a Falangist and a diplomat, Mayalde achieved a new importance that could yet have been a threshold for even further WWII political advancement if the Blue Division succeeded on the Eastern Front. Yet at the same time, principally by involving himself with the BD's affairs in excess of what might be considered standard diplomatic responsibility, he also created a host of other issues. Once again, internal Francoist rivals expressed resentment amid already intensified competition. Furthermore, the terms set by Franco and Serrano on which Mayalde could represent "moral belligerence" exposed the limits of Spain's selective pro-German cooperation short of a formal entry on the Axis side. Serrano and Mayalde faced the disdain of Ribbentrop and Goebbels for Franco's inability to formally enter WWII without Allied recrimination. Also, Mayalde's police cooperation as a qualification for his elevation to official diplomacy was a form of selective cooperation not only falling short of formal WWII entry but was also biased to the likes of Himmler. With respect to this Himmler dimension, the issue of the mules highlighted the limits of the Ambassador position. Mayalde could not satisfy Himmler's military wishes as he had done with his police wishes. The Allies were already uneasy with police cooperation as a relatively surreptitious form of Francoist pro-Axis cooperation, but Franco would have faced even greater recrimination by exporting mules. As a result, "moral belligerence" constrained Mayalde even as Ambassador.

¹⁵⁰ Kleinfeld and Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion*, Line 4684

¹⁵¹ PAAA: RZ101/35510, pp. 398-406, 415-418

¹⁵² Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, p. 628: Entry for 3 Dec. 1942

¹⁵³ Horia Sima, *Prizonieri Ai Puterilor Axei* (Madrid, 1990), https://archive.org/stream/CollectionOfWorksByHoriaSima/PrizonieriAiPuterilorAxei_djvu.txt

Mayalde's post-Civil War equation of professionalism and "political spirit" faced heightened scrutiny throughout his tenure by the time he realised that politicians at home had forgotten their "sacred commitments". Mayalde was not placed in Berlin because he was a professional diplomat and Germanophile in the manner of Espinosa or Vidal. While he was not an unconditional Naziphile, he was there because he was a suitable Falangist for Serrano Suñer as his most important subordinate and yes-man. Recalling Chapter 1, Mayalde unsurprisingly subordinated any skill or experience he might have derived from his history with Romanones, or from his military history, to the service of fervent *reconquista* Falangist ideological politics. The fact that Mayalde did not speak German reinforced the prevalence of politics over professionalism. This suited Franco in the pivotal summer of 1941. Mayalde's prioritised endeavours as Ambassador would be described as "practically useless" by his successor Vidal.¹⁵⁴ The abundance of evidence from the German Foreign Ministry in relation to that of police cooperation in the Spanish archives shows that the pervasiveness of "political spirit" did more to impede rather than optimise Mayalde's own performance. This pervasiveness not only stoked resentment but also presented practical problems for Weizsäcker in trying to discuss military matters. General Muñoz Grandes resented Serranoist interference with practical military matters. For the most part pragmatic considerations were set aside with the emphasis instead being on "Spanish glory" as determined by the ideological standards of the Falange.

This did not mean that Mayalde did not manage to make any positive impressions or continue to bring about results as he had earlier (see Chapter 2). Weizsäcker spoke favourably of Mayalde. Through his conduct he enhanced his own profile as well as that of Serrano and the Falange before other fascists working with Germany and apparently even received praise from Ribbentrop's own press chief. Mayalde fulfilled or helped fulfil instructions coming from Franco himself, including restoring communications at the front in October 1941 and achieving troop rotation in March 1942. In representing Spaniards in Germany he seemed to get both the German Foreign Ministry and German police on board with his concerns. It should be said despite stoking resentment, as long as Mayalde insisted on promoting his own brand of politics, then in an atmosphere of competition Mayalde *had* to be competitive precisely in order to attain his goals. Chapter 4 will discuss the "onus" of competition on the Falange. Although Mayalde had reached the peak of his early Francoist career, elevation from alternate diplomacy still paid dividends. The basic fact that Mayalde was

¹⁵⁴ PAAA: 29746, Woermann to Weizsäcker, 2 Dec. 1942

Ambassador in Berlin during WWII afforded much prestige and experience which in turn helped Mayalde's eventual return to politics where once again foreign relations were key, as will be seen.

Nevertheless, Mayalde's early Francoist career hinged on Serranoist fortunes being bound to a quick German victory. The lack of a BD victory in the summer of 1942 certainly contributed to Serrano's downfall. Even then, regardless of the circumstances, not only was control back in the hands of professionals but also in the hands of pro-Allied personnel. This fact in itself meant that, although Mayalde was never able to "fully" satisfy the Nazis, nor provide complete belligerence, Mayalde's departure helped Francoist diplomacy navigate the tide of the war. The tide was turning on the Eastern Front bringing about the effective failure of the 250th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, "*División Azul*", of which Mayalde had proudly called himself the Ambassador. Mayalde's time as Ambassador of the Blue Division was not only the high point of his wartime career but carried the risk of ending his entire political career. In the end José Finat y Escrivá de Romaní, the Conde de Mayalde, was unsuccessful in using WWII for Falangist advancement with the "cuñadísimo" Ramón Serrano Suñer in disgrace.

The BD represented the emphasis on foreign policy to improve Spain's prospects of Empire and the Falange's prospects of leading it. Naturally it predominated in Mayalde's agenda. Although Operation Barbarossa appeared to heighten the prospects of Spanish participation in the spoils of Axis victory, the Blue Division was in a sense more about the survival of the Falange in Franco's government in a way the policing era was not. In contrast, the Falange's role in policing had been taken for granted as part of the intrinsic construction of the new Francoist state before 1941. In the previous chapter Serrano and Mayalde actually controlled the police with the apparatus of both state and party, but in this chapter we have seen that the Blue Division operation was controlled by the Army and was not conferred on either Spain's Foreign Ministry or the Falange. With the ascent of Jordana in Foreign Affairs and Arrese in the Falange, Mayalde recognised he could not fulfil his intended, essential function as Serrano's diplomat.

Mayalde's conduct as a Falangist and a diplomat summed up the Francoist experience of its most important representation in Europe, if not the world, in 1941-2 – at the height of WWII, and in the broader period of war in Europe since 1936 up to 1945. Inevitably Mayalde's official diplomatic tenure was rife with disappointment, culminating in Serrano's demise. Now, for the foreseeable future, with the WWII failure of the intended-post Civil War consolidation of José Antonio's "totalitarian state", Mayalde was to "retreat to the wilderness" as he awaited "rehabilitation" alongside the post-WWII Franco regime itself.

Chapter 4

The Blue Ambition 1936-1945

Introduction

As Chapter 1 explored, Mayalde had entered politics for the cause of the “old order” in 1931. In 1936 he enlisted in the Falange led by his longtime friend José Antonio Primo de Rivera. José Antonio had founded the Falange in October 1933 while Mayalde had enrolled in the parliamentary CEDA. Mayalde liaised with José Antonio shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Mayalde then enlisted as a provisional artillery officer for Franco’s cause and gained his *Medalla Militar*. Afterwards Mayalde served as political secretary to another fellow traveller, Ramón Serrano Suñer, in constructing and organising Franco’s regime. Franco inducted Mayalde into the *Orden de Isabella la Católica* for his services. In 1939 Serrano became Interior Minister and made Mayalde his *Director General de Seguridad* or police commissioner as well as the intelligence chief of Franco’s single state organisation, *FET y de las JONS*.¹ As Chapter 2 then explored, Mayalde did not simply control the police for Franco and Serrano’s domestic consolidation. He also conducted “alternate diplomacy” with Nazi Germany and its police chief Heinrich Himmler, in parallel with and disdain for the traditional official diplomatic avenue between the countries’ Foreign Ministries. Although Spain never formally entered WWII, police cooperation as a potent form of Hispano-German cooperation – especially in wartime – prompted a grateful Himmler to recommend Mayalde be awarded the “Grand Cross of the German Eagle.” With this accolade Serrano could elevate Mayalde to the highest level of official diplomacy as “Ambassador to the Blue Division” and simultaneously Head of the Falange in Germany. As Chapter 3 explored, Serrano and Mayalde had to concentrate on foreign policy in the summer of 1941. Although Spain’s contribution of the Blue Division to the Eastern Front represented the peak of Francoist pro-Axis cooperation, Serrano and Mayalde were concerned with political survival just as much as consolidation and aggrandisement, in the face of exacerbated competition with the Army and rival Falangists. Mayalde resigned after Serrano’s downfall in 1941 which was followed by the withdrawal of the BD in 1943, the defeat of the Axis in 1945 and the gradual decline of the Falange’s “National Syndicalist” influence. Mayalde remained in the “wilderness” until Franco personally appointed him Mayor of Madrid in 1952. But in the intervening years Mayalde remained a committed Falangist, and along with many of his Francoist and Falangist peers, continued to associate with international fascists and Nazis.²

¹ Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987), pp. 57-74

² NWCD: Vol. 02/0028, Information Report distributed 2 Oct. 1951; Vol. 02/0026, Report printed 29 Sept. 1951; “León Degrelle, la última reliquia del nazismo, escribe sus memorias en Madrid”, *El País*, 14 Dec. 1982, http://elpais.com/diario/1982/12/14/espana/408668404_850215.html; “Wird Degrelle ausgeliefert?”, *Die Zeit*, 18 Feb. 1983, <http://www.zeit.de/1983/08/der-hitler-belgiens>

Now Chapter 4 seeks to assess Mayalde and Falangism, fascism, pro-Axis cooperation and Mayalde's value to Franco himself by selecting several distinct issues. The first is Mayalde and the Spanish Civil War "fascistisation" process including *antipatria* discourse. Mayalde's tenure as head of police is then revisited, extensively focusing on *Circular 11*. This leads onto Mayalde's proximity and thoughts when it came to Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust and, by extension, Mayalde's time as Ambassador with the question of the overall Blue Division contribution and the peak of fascist aspiration. Finally, Mayalde's situation when it came to his absence from "frontline politics" between 1943 and 1952 is addressed. The competing roles of ideology and expediency both within Francoist internal and external relations will be identified. In the end the chapter will explain the real significance of Mayalde's implementation of Francoist policy along with what similarities and differences there were between Mayalde and other Francoists.

Fascistisation

As seen in Chapter 1, Mayalde joined the Falange following right-wing electoral defeat by the Popular Front (FP) in 1936. Regardless of whether or not Mayalde and his fellow enlistees simultaneously embraced José Antonio's notions such as "National Syndicalism" and the "totalitarian state", the Spanish Right settled on removing the FP government by force. Although José Antonio was incarcerated when the Spanish Civil War broke out, the Falange adhered to his basic intention in as far as they served as a militia force against the government. As José Antonio had accepted to some degree, it was the more powerful Army eventually commanded by Franco that initiated and led the coup against the FP government. The Falange ended up by 1937 forming the basis of a single party for the regime because Franco and the Army had deemed them to be useful, at least when it came to mobilising civilian support against Republicans.³ With José Antonio having been executed by the Republic in 1936, Franco successfully exploited a cult of personality to win the support of the Falange. All this led the Falange to believe that Francoist victory in April 1939 was "their victory". Naturally they imagined the new order in Spain and a restored Empire would emerge along the lines of José Antonio's "National Syndicalist" programme. The Army of course, which actually won the war, never saw it this way, nor did they want this to happen.⁴

So by 1939 Mayalde did not deem the demise of the Second Republic and its "anti-Spain" or *antipatria* institutions as an ultimate end goal as he might have once felt as a parliamentary activist before the experience of the Civil War. Having participated as a supporting conspirator then a soldier

³ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, pp. 57-74

⁴ Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain Since 1936* (Cambridge, 2013), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 4030

while José Antonio perished, the war had radicalised Mayalde. He sought a clearer view of the “totalitarian state” that was to be built. As Chapters 2 and 3 showed, Mayalde consistently asserted his politics, seeking consolidation of the Falangist “National-Syndicalist” programme through advocating “political spirit”. For the purpose of sculpting a *Volksgemeinschaft* (“homogeneous community”) Mayalde promoted the Falange as the “best” Spaniards who were “decisive” in making the Spanish Civil War victory. Mayalde also claimed that “victory” demanded continued Civil War politicisation and militarisation, because to him that was how the “totalitarian state” was better than “weak liberal democracy”. This underpinned the momentous 8 March 1941 police reform Law which coincided with Franco’s Law for the Security of the State in timing and resonated in tone with the 1940 Law for the Suppression of Freemasonry and Communism that criminalised those who had not renounced any political association with the Republic dating back to 1934.⁵ By this time Mayalde had seen in Germany how he might construct José Antonio’s envisioned “totalitarian state”.

Mayalde’s constant expressions of Falangist fervour across available communications and correspondences appear to explain his motivations and conduct. However, sources remain limited if not scarce when it comes to Mayalde’s personal opinions about how he arrived at this position. Of particular concern other than his feelings towards the issues of fascism, José Antonio’s Falangism, and the German and Italian regimes, is antipathy he may have felt towards *antipatria* in the shape of left-wing political activists, Freemasons, and Jews. His political development must then be set in the context of his experience of political turmoil and Civil War, which are then reflected in his later goals, particularly in the work of police reorganisation and the function of the *antipatria* discourse in post-Civil War state- and nation-building under Franco. The analytical scope must also be further broadened by highlighting Falangists close to Mayalde, who were acknowledged theorists, from José Antonio to Serrano Suñer’s loyal ideologists such as Dionisio Ridruejo, who Mayalde praised as Spain’s greatest poet, and Antonio Tovar.⁶ On the face of it, though, Mayalde was not a theorist but rather a diligent enforcer.

The previous chapters have depicted Mayalde embracing Falangism and then from that position competing with rivals to achieve political outcomes that specifically favoured the Falange. In some ways, however, the differences between Francoist factions might appear to be more tribal than actually politico-philosophical. With reference to the studies of Spanish fascism by Ismael Saz and Ferrán Gallego, the atmosphere in which Mayalde acquired his views was not simply one where the “fascist Falange” was cast against conservative, non-fascist Francoists nor conversely that Franco’s

⁵ Kew: FO371/79687, “The Administration of Political Justice Under the Franco Regime”, 9 Aug. 1949

⁶ PAAA: 29742, cipher from Mayalde, 18 Dec. 1941

regime was “fully fascist”: for all Francoist factions were subject in varying proportion to what may be described as a process of “fascistisation” in Spain.⁷ If the process could be depicted as an expanding set of concentric circles, the Falange simply occupied a circle closer to the centre through its relatively early and overt identification with fascism. As Ferrán Gallego explains, the Falange was integral to the process but did not drive it all by itself.⁸ Fascism did not start to gain any real traction until 1936 although reception was reaching the likes of CEDA and *Acción Popular* to which Mayalde belonged. This accompanied an increasing desire to dismantle the Republic entirely and Mayalde had been in increasing contact with “catastrophist” advocates. In 1936, CEDA was superseded by the Falange but the convergence of “catastrophism” and fascism could not be realised until war broke out, as Gallego writes.⁹ War was the perfect soil in which to nurture and give rise to new ideas as well as enhance old ones. The Falange and Franco’s *Africanistas* (the Spanish career officers commanding Spain’s colonial Army of Africa in Morocco) made much of the virtues of violence, just as fascism in Europe celebrated what Ernst Jünger encapsulated as “renewal through war”.¹⁰ Ángel Viñas writes that with the war, the Francoists, in finding appealing the use of force and ideology to discipline Spain’s “unruly masses”, became more receptive to Italian Fascist and German Nazi influence.¹¹ Indeed the years of the Republic and the Civil War meant a new era of mass political mobilisation. The Falange celebrated this, but with the intention of harnessing it for its “novel” programme based on *conquistador* virtues. Franco accepted this, in that he had always intended to sculpt his new hierarchised Spanish “nation” through violence, in the same way that he had upheld the oppressive imperial presence in the Moroccan Rif. Hence the resultant government of the Civil War was a *fascistised* regime under Franco in which the Falange found its role.¹²

Unsurprisingly, Mayalde’s fascist position as of 1939 was the result of his earlier choice to link with José Antonio on his own concentric circle of the “fascistisation” process. In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 1, personal violence appeared to be common ground between the aristocrats and also seeped into his assertion of “political spirit” once in power. The appeal of fascistic elements seemed an inevitable consequence of any attempt in the 1930s to unite right-wing parties. This was certainly true when José María Gil Robles convened CEDA to harmonise traditional Romanones-type politics with youthful *Acción Popular* zeal. This helped facilitate an encroaching fascism and an opportunity for José Antonio, and ultimately Franco, to eclipse Gil Robles. Meanwhile, although Mayalde’s

⁷ Ismael Saz Campos, *Fascismo y franquismo* (Valencia, 2004), pp. 84-87; Ferran Gallego Margalef, *El evangelio fascista* (Barcelona, 2014), Amazon Kindle Edition, Lines 114-141

⁸ Gallego, *El evangelio*, Line 11890

⁹ Ibid., Lines 6325-6399

¹⁰ Richard Griffiths, *An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Fascism* (London, 2000), p. 29

¹¹ Ángel Viñas, “Natural Alliances” in Helen Graham (ed.), *Interrogating Francoism* (Eastbourne, 2016), p. 140

¹² Saz, *Fascismo*, p. 89

competitors rejected Falangist novelty, not only did they admire traditional German militarism but also became more keen on the evidently practical uses of fascist organisation – thus “interfaces” were found in the Civil War. The Army never liked the Falange, but, by supporting Franco’s continuation of a state of warfare against the vanquished, the conditions were set for the Falange to thrive and for a radicalised Mayalde to try to intensify such conditions. “National Syndicalism” on the other hand would turn out to be a superfluous novelty for Franco’s purposes, but unlike other Francoist groups the Falange was allowed to keep its own symbols and lexicon.¹³

Antipatria

Mayalde’s actions as a Falangist, bureaucrat, administrator and propagandist of Franco’s *antipatria*, are here all contextualised against the political environment and predominant ideology. When considering the *Gemeinschaftsfremde* (“community aliens”) or *antipatria* aspect, the Francoist view of the “Judeo-Islamo-Masonic-Bolshevik” conspiracy (*contubernio*) almost always focused on Jews as the leading “protagonists”. Mayalde had not only made his case thus for a Himmler-inspired politicised police (see Chapter 2) but also, on at least two occasions, including during a dinner with Himmler at the Ritz in Madrid on 23 October 1940, identified a common enmity with certain “hated international powers” characterised as the “Jewish enemy.”¹⁴ Serrano Suñer had declared Judaism “the enemy of the new Spain.”¹⁵ Franco himself alluded to this, remarking that his Spain of the *reconquista* could not “remain indifferent before the modern rise of avaricious egoists.”¹⁶ While Francoist antisemitism was not as integral as Nazi antisemitism, there was a growing opinion incorporated into Francoism and Falangism which depicted political Republicans as Jews, however bizarre the calculus seems today. But bizarre calculus is often a feature of antisemitism. This set the scene for persecutions that might affect Jews who were seen as conspirators with the Republic. This would not be too far from the way the Nazis associated the Jews with the Allied political leadership, which as David Cesarani argues, influenced the key decisions by Hitler during the Holocaust.¹⁷ The sending of the Blue Division to fight on the Eastern Front was justified for Franco because of the assistance given to the Republic by the Bolshevik (and “Jewish”) USSR. This ideology was certainly integral in Franco’s Spain, though not exclusive to the “National-Syndicalist” ideology that the Falange tried to imbue into the “new Spain” during this period of time. The scene was also set when Mayalde was cooperating with Himmler, who, as Chapter 2 established was a Nazi zealot himself,

¹³ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 110

¹⁴ *ABC*, 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5; PAAA: RZ101/35510, Mayalde’s parting meetings with Ribbentrop and Hitler, 1 Dec. 1942

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 15 Jun. 1939

¹⁶ Franco’s New Year Broadcast in *ABC*, 1 Jan. 1940

¹⁷ David Cesarani, *The Final Solution* (London, 2016), p. 448

competing with rivals in the German Foreign Ministry and the Army. This competition for influence beyond Germany included antisemitism. In this way, endeavours against the *antipatria* were marked by Falangist attempts to create room for itself and its own centre of power in Madrid.

The role of antisemitism is the most contentious aspect of Francoist discourse – because of relations with Nazi Germany which ignited and spearheaded the Holocaust, and because of subsequent Francoist attempts to rewrite its WWII record.¹⁸ This is also the case with any role played by “scientific” racism. Having taken Civil War turmoil into account, this thesis considers a potential evolution and radicalisation of Francoist and Falangist ideology during the fascistisation process as opposed to events being simply political expedience or appeasement of the dominant Nazi power regarding *Gemeinschaftsfremde*. Antisemitism in Francoist Spain was not an import from Nazi Germany but an old Spanish idea repurposed, along with other ideas such as economic self-sufficiency (autarky), to be enhanced with Spanish Civil War *reconquista* and “victory”. As Isabelle Rohr establishes, Francoist antisemitism blended modern racial antisemitism with traditional anti-Judaic notions and incessantly invoked the *reconquista* monarchs’ anti-Jewish policies and the alleged need to purify Spain.¹⁹ This rhetoric paved the way for the use of repressive practices reinforced by traditional prejudices. The Inquisition’s notion of *limpieza de sangre* (blood purity) was a key aspect. This modern *reconquista* ideology of Francoism underpinned Mayalde’s conduct.

Antisemitism was a pivotal binding agent between the different Franco factions in their shared hatred of the political left as well as liberal democracy. As Rohr explains it provided a straightforward way of explaining the “problem” and diverting attention from the real socioeconomic problems afflicting Spain throughout the first part of the twentieth century. As there was only a remnant of the old Spanish Jewish population which by 1939 only numbered 6,000, the suppression of the Spanish Jews did not seem to be an overwhelming issue *per se*.²⁰ The 1492 Edict of Expulsion for the Jews was all Franco “needed” for not introducing further antisemitic *legislation* while being fundamentally antisemitic. But Spain’s Republic in the 1930s was not considered merely an undesirable government that had to be removed by means of a traditional military coup or *pronunciamiento*. For Francoists, the Republic in fact had been a repeat of the medieval Muslim Al-Andalus: a Jewish “anti-Spain” conspiracy to destroy Catholic Spain. The violent Spanish Civil War *reconquista* was considered the modern necessary response just as the initial *reconquista* had forged Spain in the fifteenth century. Once again, the Spanish Jews were caught in the crosshairs. Franco’s

¹⁸ Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews* (Eastbourne, 2007), pp. 1-9

¹⁹ Isabelle Rohr, “Productive Hatreds” in Helen Graham (ed.), *Interrogating Francoism* (Eastbourne, 2016), p. 99

²⁰ Ibid. It is unclear whether this accounts for movements out of Spain during the Civil War.

General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano had even declared that the Spanish Civil War was “not a Spanish Civil War but a war of western civilisation against world Jewry”, a theme repeated by fascists during WWII, including Mayalde.²¹ Leading Republicans were cast as descendants of the *conversos* and accused of being “judaizers”, “illegitimate children of Israel” or “camouflaged Jews” who hated Spain for the forced conversion of their ancestors and plotted against it with their co-religionists abroad. Hannah Arendt noted that “even Franco, in a country where there are neither Jews nor a Jewish question is battling the troops of the Spanish Republic while mounting antisemitic slogans”.²² Indeed “antisemitism” without Jews is now a historically-recognised phenomenon across the world and will be addressed later in this chapter.

In 1930 a Spanish translation of the notorious 1903 antisemitic forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* had appeared. The Spanish Right accepted its central argument in the promotion of the Jewish conspiracy. This was the basis for the numerous works of Francoist propagandist Father Juan Tusquets who declared, after his visit to Dachau concentration camp in 1933, that Nazi Germany showed what had to be done in Spain. Serrano Suñer cited Tusquets as contributing to the “creation of the atmosphere which led to the National Uprising”.²³ Mauricio Carlavilla, the policeman and propagandist who became a colleague of Mayalde’s, also published antisemitic tracts praising Hitler.²⁴

While instances of antisemitic persecution did indeed happen, such as Queipo de Llano’s fine on the Jewish community of Seville for “their conspiracy” in 1938, the focus of Francoist antisemitism was on the political Republicans.²⁵ Juan Pujol, Franco’s Press Chief, editor of *Informaciones* who received subsidies from the Nazis, had a role in casting the Republic as Jews, just as the Nazis alleged the governments of both the USA and the USSR were Jewish. Pujol asserted that while some Republican leaders such as Indalecio Prieto did not know they were Jewish, others tried to conceal their true name and religion. Pujol associated Jewish agitation with one of the most significant and opprobrious Republican-tolerated political currents that threatened the Spain united by the *reconquista*: the regional nationalisms of the Basque Country and Catalonia. Pujol claimed President of the Catalan Generalitat Lluís Companys, a devout Catholic, was another example of a camouflaged Jew.²⁶ Perhaps it was in relation with this most aggressive nexus of the “Jewish conspiracy” on which

²¹ Rohr, “Productive Hatreds”, p. 102; PAAA: RZ101/35510, Mayalde-Ribbentrop meeting, 1 Dec. 1942

²² Rohr, “Productive Hatreds”, p. 102

²³ Ibid., pp. 100-1, 107; Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, pp. 51-2

²⁴ Alejandro Quiroga, *Right-Wing Spain in the Civil War Era* (London, 2012), p. 189

²⁵ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 83

²⁶ Rohr, “Productive Hatreds”, p. 103

Companys' eventual extradition from France by Mayalde was premised.²⁷ This association is significant as Barcelona in Catalonia and Gipuzkoa in the Basque Country, interestingly Himmler's first and final destinations respectively on his October 1940 policing-related visit to Spain, are coastal regions close to the Pyrenees and the French border. These regions figured in the flight of Jewish refugees from Northern and Eastern Europe following Hitler's ascent to power in 1933. It was because of the geographical proximity of these two northern regions and the proximity to France that the Francoists drew a connection between the Basque and Catalan nationalisms and the "Jewish conspiracy", through liberal Enlightenment thought seeping from France, and now associated with Marxism. This was despite the fact that Basque nationalism had been ideologically Catholic conservative and also itself racist. In terms of the perception of French influence, Franco's monarchist Civil Governor (CG) Wenceslao González Oliveros of Barcelona was an ardent antisemite who praised German racism in *Acción Española* in the early 1930s and was the first CG to be appointed by Franco. He saw Jews as disseminators of foreign ideas. His program was to "purify" Barcelona of Marxism, separatism, and French influences.²⁸ The writer and journalist Jacobo Israel Garzón refers to Gonzalez as an example of antisemitism among Franco's ministers.²⁹ Gonzalez ordered the creation of a regional registry of Jews in December 1939 and provided a copy to the Germans.³⁰

As historian Wayne Bowen indicates, in Pujol's example it was not only antisemitism specifically but also racism and eugenics that brought Francoism onto close ground with Nazism.³¹ Appealing to the virtually racist concept of Republicans as degenerate "anti-Spain" was the notion that Spain's Visigothic heritage had always been vital to *reconquista* ideology against "Judeo-Islamo-Masonic-Bolshevism" which was rooted in a common Oriental or African racial stock. José Antonio himself had come to credit the "Aryan minority" with the *reconquista* and for the maintenance of the traditional order of monarchy, church and aristocracy.³² By 1940 Mayalde's fellow Serranoist Antonio Tovar attributed Spain's greatness to its Roman and Visigothic heritage which he suggested qualified Spain to have an empire in coexistence with Nazism.³³ Tovar found Nazi support chiefly

²⁷ ANC: ANC2-4, Reproduction of AHN: H338 on Lluís Companys, 1940; Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (London, 2012), pp. 492-3

²⁸ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 102; Josep Benet, *Cataluña bajo el régimen franquista* (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 275-7

²⁹ Jacobo Israel Garzón, *España y el Holocausto* (Madrid, 2007), p. 16

³⁰ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 102

³¹ Wayne Bowen, "De españoles a alemanes: Himmler, la Falange y el ideal visigótico" in Joan Maria Thomas (ed.), *La historia de España que no pudo ser* (Barcelona: 2013), Amazon Kindle Edition, Lines 2051-2344

³² José Antonio Primo de Rivera, "España: Germáños contra bereberes", 13 Aug. 1936 in Miguel Primo de Rivera y Urquijo (ed.), *Papeles póstumos de José Antonio* (Madrid, 1996), pp. 160-6

³³ Bowen, "De españoles", Line 2252; Antonio Tovar Llorente, *El Imperio de España* (Madrid, 1941)

through Himmler as Germany's Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germandom. Himmler, who had been invited into Spain by Mayalde, offered the controversial opinion that Francoist Spain was sufficiently Visigothic in racial makeup to be acceptable Germanic "allies". Looking back further, in 1916 César Peiró Menéndez, a prolific Spanish antisemitic author, had asserted that the descendants of *conversos* caused Spain's degeneration as "racial bastards". Francoism did also turn to "scientific eugenics" to demonstrate "anti-Spain's" degeneracy.³⁴ Antonio Vallejo-Nájera, the military psychiatrist who Franco made Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Madrid for his "intellectual" contribution to the Francoist *Volksgemeinschaft*, claimed to diagnose the "red gene" in certain "undesirables". In Francoist captivity, Irish International Brigade Commander Frank Ryan was diagnosed by Vallejo with the "red gene" before his clandestine transfer to Germany.³⁵ While there was ideological compatibility between Francoism and Nazism, those ideological differences that still remained could be bridged because of compelling reasons for both sides in terms of political expediency. As Bowen writes, Himmler's anxiety, in the course of his competitive politics, was to find "racially acceptable" allies while Peter Longerich also highlights the "methodical arbitrariness" of Himmler's racial criteria from around this time.³⁶ The Falange's and Himmler's sub-factions did share a strong desire for their own political aggrandisement which would be harvested in the "dual effect" of benefits to both regimes. At this point politics motivated the extensive interest in racial origins rather than the other way round. Francoist politics and ideology with its pseudoscience and cultural racism found closer ground but never embraced pseudoscientific Nazi racism. Antisemitism was a ladder to promotion in Spain and in Germany. Officially, Franco pointed to the 1492 Alhambra Decree as Spain's "Jewish" problem having had been solved, but there were of course forces pushing for more change and reassessment. Mayalde had evolved his political philosophy in this environment.

Eschatological matters helped prevent Spanish and Nazi fascist ideologies from ever becoming identical. From the view of Catholic Francoism, Nazi antisemitism extended to all religious practice and therefore made the transgression of subverting baptism entirely, whereas Spanish *limpieza de sangre* did no more than doubt or at worst deny the sincerity of individual converts to Catholicism. This perceived threshold of racial impurity attitude was inadequate for the Nazis. So Francoism could never embrace Nazi antisemitism but neither would it acknowledge converts completely, based on *limpieza de sangre*. Of course the real Franco policy might have been uncertainty as to whether or not converts were subversive "fifth columnists". Another striking departure was the irony of

³⁴ Rohr, "Productive Hatreds", p. 107

³⁵ NAI: DFA A20/4, Irish Ambassador Leopold Kerney to Ireland's Department of External Affairs, 26 Aug. 1940; Barry Whelan, *Ireland and Spain, 1939-55* (Maynooth, 2012), pp. 85-96

³⁶ Bowen, "De españoles", Line 2252; Peter Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler* (Oxford, 2008), p. 599

Himmler's Visigothic position having seemingly predisposed him against *reconquista* repressive practices. In November 1935 he had gone as far as to attribute not just the French and Russian Revolutions among other historical events but also "the courts of the Inquisition which depopulated Spain" to "Jewish machinations."³⁷ In 1940 he repeated this theme after he was alarmed with the extent that Franco was killing political opponents who were otherwise "racially pure". Himmler argued that they ought to be used as slave labour, however his advice for Spain was insufficiently repressive for Franco. Franco was not convinced, believing that their politics marked them as "anti-Spain" which had to be eradicated.³⁸ National Socialist biological racism was irrelevant to this.

Nevertheless, there was a compatibility in place for the achievement of the Francoist "dual goals" through various forms of cooperation short of formal entry into WWII, as covered in the previous chapters. Francoist antisemitism was also compatible with Nazism for the purposes of cooperation, which can probably be seen in the circumstances of *Circular 11 (C11)* in 1941, the most significant antisemitic initiative by the Spanish Police (DGS) which was signed by Mayalde. The Falange in particular cited a peculiar sense of "Christian violence and justice" in order to defend their repressive practices.³⁹ The practically reciprocal extraditions of Ryan and Companys after the subjugation of France further symbolise the significance of Mayalde's contribution. To Franco, Companys represented the "Jewish-influenced threat". With Ryan, Franco would not have someone diagnosed with the "red gene" free to cause trouble, so it suited him to have Germany take him.⁴⁰ It is this specific logic, which defined Franco's aforementioned Law for the Suppression of Freemasonry and Communism, that also underpinned Mayalde's agenda to reform the police politically.

The *Archivo Judaico* (AJ)

The key controversy concerning Mayalde, Francoism during WWII and Francoist relations with the Jews, is *Circular 11* and the supposedly-resultant Francoist *Archivo Judaico* (AJ) or "Jewish Archive" as raised in Chapter 2. Issued in May 1941, *Circular 11 (C11)* is considered Francoism's most significant and most dangerous antisemitic initiative.⁴¹ The controversy to be addressed concerns how *C11* is actually meant to be understood in terms of Franco's relations with Nazi Germany, relations with Spanish and foreign Jews especially taking into account the Holocaust, and prior

³⁷ Longerich, *Himmler*, p. 215

³⁸ Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust*, p. 495; Ramón Garriga, *La España de Franco: las relaciones con Hitler* 2 edición (Puebla, 1970), pp. 208-9

³⁹ ANC: ANC2-4, Reproduction of AHN: H338 on Lluís Companys, 1940; Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust*, pp. 492-3; Pedro Laín Entralgo, *Los valores morales del nacionalsindicalismo* (Madrid, 1941), p. 8

⁴⁰ Whelan, *Ireland and Spain*, pp. 90-1; NAI: DFA A20/4, Kerney report, 26 Aug. 1940

⁴¹ AHN: H36145, *Circular 11*, 5 May 1941; Jacobo Israel Garzón, "El Archivo Judaico del Franquismo", in *Raíces* 33 (1997), 57-60; Garzón, *España y el Holocausto*, pp. 16-23; Danielle Rozenberg, *La España Contemporánea y la cuestión judía* (Barcelona, 2010), pp. 189-92

Francoist police endeavours pursuing “Judaism and religious sects” involving the likes of Tusquets, Carlavilla and the “secret police” or the “Brigadas”. Indeed the present chapter needs to address how it fits with Francoism overall. *C11* is especially controversial because so far no higher-level correspondence concerning it has been found. There is a tendency to assume either that it was a special and pure indulgence by Franco of Nazi Germany (during the peak of their cooperation), or that Spain had become National Socialist.⁴² Both assumptions risk overlooking how the Spanish antisemitic tradition described earlier, had become increasingly comparable to Nazism, even while staying culturally Spanish.

Previously mentioned police antisemitic endeavours that predate *C11* appear in sources outlining the structure of the DGS at the time – it is possible that the “Jewish Archive” that a British report mentions is the same as the one associated with *C11*.⁴³ Should this be the case it may be supposed that with *C11* Mayalde wished to redefine the parameters of police antisemitism as part of his overall Falangist police agenda, so the language and the scope of *C11* must be analysed accordingly. It seems significant that it was on 5 May 1941 that the DGS issued *C11* to all Spain’s Civil Governors (CGs) who were also answerable to the Interior Ministry (MdG). As Chapter 2 discusses, the “May Crisis” resulting in Serrano’s loss of the MdG was ignited when Franco appointed the anti-Falangist Colonel Valentín Galarza as Interior Minister earlier that day. Over the coming weeks CGs and other Serranoist associates either resigned in protest or were sacked in Galarza’s attempt to purge the Falange from government. Mayalde’s resignation as DG, the “crowning loss” in Paul Preston’s words, happened the evening following Galarza’s appointment. At the time Mayalde’s move to the Foreign Ministry as Ambassador to Berlin was anticipated, but it is clear Serrano and Mayalde still wanted influence in domestic politics.⁴⁴ Whether or not antisemitism held any specific significance in their “dual goals” agenda, *C11* was a good opportunity to ensure the Falange were still playing a role in the expectation that they would regain the MdG.

In any event *C11*, and other antisemitic endeavours must be situated in a consistent ideological train of thought that promoted European fascist cooperation. Arguably it was in this situation of complicity and ideological development, both in the broader Francoist “dual goals” agenda and the “National Syndicalist” version of Serrano Suñer and Mayalde, that *C11* came about. Fitting into the broader DGS preoccupation at the time with the reorganising, training and re-education of the Spanish police under the MdG, *C11* directs CGs on the “Jewish problem”. Mayalde recognised that

⁴² Jorge Martínez Reverte, “La lista de Franco para el Holocausto”, *El País*, 20 Jun. 2010, https://elpais.com/diario/2010/06/20/domingo/1277005953_850215.html

⁴³ Kew: HS6/921, British report with diagram on Franco’s police structure, 27 Jun. 1942

⁴⁴ PAAA: 29741, German Ambassador Stohrer to Ribbentrop, 6 May 1941

re-education was part of his agenda and he had learnt from attending Himmler's lectures.⁴⁵ Indeed *C11* was the closest that Francoist antisemitism came to the Nazi variant, for the 6,000 Jews in Spain whom it targeted. European antisemitism in the 1930s was being advanced by Germany and resonated in Eastern Europe where there was an appetite for "racial cleansing". It had influenced Mussolini in the 1938 race laws in Italy. It had made advances in Britain when Oswald Mosley soon placed more emphasis on antisemitism.⁴⁶ It appealed to Vichy France which deported Jews to the Germans. *C11* should be regarded as the high point in Spain. It was an antisemitism that, along with rest of the fascist package, was only halted by the defeat of the Axis. The question must be asked about what would have happened in Spain if the Axis had not been defeated, given the train of developments going back to the Civil War. Whether or not Serrano and Mayalde drove the agenda there was a Spanish fascistisation process which was, especially in regard of antisemitism, arrested by Axis defeat. But for the earlier period, and to respond to the "Jewish threat", Mayalde effectively wanted González Oliveros' Barcelona directive from November 1939 to be replicated nationwide.

The life of the *Archivo Judaico*

Only one copy of *C11* has ever been found. It was the copy sent to Zaragoza and received around 15 May 1941. DGS reports from Zaragoza reported on the movements of Jews within the region. The Zaragoza police told the DGS that they considered the refugees who had been coming through to be "subversive elements" and dangerous "communists".⁴⁷ Discovered by Spanish Jewish cultural writer, Jacobo Israel Garzón, the *C11* copy is available on special request in Madrid's National Historical Archives (AHN). Historian Danielle Rozenberg identifies a second document which further evidenced that *C11* was indeed being circulated among the governors – a directive that reproduced *C11* along with an accompanying document. This second document had been sent on 30 May 1941 by DG Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Caballero Olabazar's successor as Civil Governor of Gipuzkoa to the Police Commissioner in San Sebastian, with the order to carry out the DGS' instructions.⁴⁸ This was ten days after Caballero had switched from Civil Governor to the DG role, succeeding Mayalde – with Caballero as the anti-Falangist Galarza's subordinate.

Nearly 100,000 records of individuals were produced which were consistent with the criteria outlined in *C11*. The words "ARCHIVO JUDAICO" were stamped on the records, which share their

⁴⁵ *Völkischer Beobachter*, 4 Sept. 1940, p. 7; Longerich, "Himmler as Educator" in *Himmler*, p. 315

⁴⁶ Nigel Jones, *Mosley (Life & Times)* (London, 2004), p. 100

⁴⁷ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 141; AHN: H53553, Zaragoza report, 9 Sept. 1943

⁴⁸ Rozenberg, *La España*, pp. 189-92. Rozenberg cites Basque Country Police Archives, specifically San Sebastián *comisaría*. However, going by experience and information from archivists I have had to go to AHN and AGA for police files.

font with the regime's "ARCHIVO MASONICO" stamp, suggesting the contemporary existence of such an archive. Despite the fact the Spanish Jewish population was only estimated to be 6,000, which is closer to the figure given in *C11*, there are a variety of explanations for why there were 100,000 records made under *C11*.⁴⁹ The available documents, which are small rectangular cards, fit *C11*'s demanding criteria which might indicate enthusiasm among the Spanish police for writing records of all investigations. Therefore, the search of 100,000 citizens seems to have been overzealous for a population of 6,000 Jews unless the criteria of *C11* based on disguised and hidden threats are considered. Basic details such as name, date of birth, parents, residence and family are included along with a brief commentary. On the other hand, administrative disorganisation was another likely potential explanation for the quantity of records. It may have been that the work was never properly defined in relation to other Francoist surveillance targets. For example, some records which meant to concern the *AJ*, apparently referred to Masons who were definitely not Jews. In this respect, and because of the scarcity of available documentation, the existence of a specific *AJ* separate from other projects might be debated. If *C11* was meant to influence a pre-existing *AJ* then perhaps simultaneously there had already been confusion between the "Masonic" and "Jewish" Archives. Rozenberg mentions a hypothesis – seemingly about a "Central Registry" – which may still be uncovered by future research. Disconcertingly, it appears that *C11* continued in operation for decades after the defeat of the Axis as this chapter will consider below.

The most significant known record identified with *C11*'s criteria is about a citizen called María Sinaí León in Barcelona.⁵⁰ It took between July 1941 and May 1944 for a police commissioner in Barcelona to prepare and produce this record for the DGS in Madrid. At the same time, González Oliveros' Barcelona archive was still in force and Nazi cooperation was still ongoing in Barcelona and throughout Spain. Yet the war was continuing in Europe and the tide was progressively going against the Axis, from Stalingrad through to D-Day in June 1944. The record describes how Sinaí León went about her daily life supported by her father and without any political inclinations. However, she remained under surveillance because of the "danger posed by the race in general".⁵¹ These reports, often produced at a micro-level, went to great lengths to justify any "danger" posed by individual Spaniards with Jewish ancestry, even if they did not engage in anti-regime activity. Particularly, as this was about a Jew in Barcelona and *C11* expected that local Jews might be more politically engaged, the police must have been disappointed. As Garzón says, this determination to justify suspicion exemplifies what Francoism had in common with other fascisms. Even in 1944 the

⁴⁹ Garzón, "El Archivo", p. 58

⁵⁰ AHN: H63593 on María Sinaí León, 30 Jun. 1944

⁵¹ AHN: H63593 on Maria Sinai Leon, 30 Jun. 1944

regime was using the same vehement tone as in 1941, which then would have been consonant with the entire Axis' sense of urgency.

Records were made even for Spanish Republicans who were in exile such as Margarita Nelken, who had sat across the aisle from Mayalde in the Republican Parliament of the pre-war 1930s, and who was in the 1940s living in Mexico.⁵² Rozenberg gathered a dozen records from postwar police investigations of individuals, spanning topics such as left-wing political activities and trafficking of goods and foreign currency. All of these items explicitly referred to the *AJ*, and they indicate that the *AJ* must have remained active into the 1950s. She identifies the fact that the records came from Ceuta, Melilla, Seville, Zaragoza and Burgos, confirming that the DGS instructions were being carried out in at least five provinces.⁵³ From this Rozenberg proposed that, taking into account the nature of the Francoist state, the orders were being carried out throughout the country. Garzón believes that other records about significant individuals may also exist. Considering the extent of inaccessible material in the official state archives in Spain, to this day, this may well be true. Writer and journalist Jorge Martinez Reverte indicates how the writer Samuel Ros "earned himself" his own file in the *AJ*. Ros was a writer for the Falange's *Arriba* and a friend of Dionisio Ridruejo, himself an important friend of Mayalde's and Serrano's. However, Ros was of Jewish descent. Reverte adds that the request for a creation of a record for Ros came from Nazi functionaries operating within Spain who resented someone of Jewish background being allowed to write in official outlets such as *Arriba*.⁵⁴ Of course this is Reverte's inferred analysis, in the absence of a specific citation.

In 2007, Garzón wrote that the *AJ* was conserved up to the late 1950s in the *División de Investigación Social* ("Archivo Judaico").⁵⁵ In other words, that the *AJ* came under pre-existing secret police operations going back to Tusquets, Carlavilla and the "Brigadas" as opposed to being an entirely separate operation of the DGS. This would be consistent with British information on Spain's police structure.⁵⁶ Should this have been the case, along with the *AJ* stamps being similar to the Freemasonry ones, then *C11* may have merely redefined the scope and parameters of police antisemitism in a manner that made it a tool for Mayalde's DGS-Falange agenda in the spirit of the new Police Reform law of 8 March 1941. Garzón states further that police documents from 1957 which refer to the *AJ* have been found – making it unlikely that there was an order to abandon the *AJ* during WWII. This despite any slowing of fascist development in Spain.⁵⁷ In relation to examples of

⁵² AHN: H29 on Margarita Nelken, 6 Dec. 1943

⁵³ Rozenberg, *La España*, pp. 189-92

⁵⁴ Jorge Martinez Reverte, "La lista de Franco"

⁵⁵ Garzón, *España*, p. 20

⁵⁶ Kew: HS6/921, "Notes on the Spanish Police", 27 Jun. 1942

⁵⁷ Kew: HS6/921, "Notes on the Spanish Police", 27 Jun. 1942

documents referring to either foreign or national Jews after WWII, Rozenberg refers to her discovery of police records pertaining to two residents, Concepción Barrera Jurado of Palencia and Robert Klein of Madrid from 1950 and 1957.⁵⁸ In these records the police refer to earlier records about the subjects from the *AJ*, confirming the existence of the *AJ* and the ability for the police to review *AJ* documents as late as 1957. Robert Klein's *AJ* record was compiled in 1943 and would have been fifteen years old. There remains thus a great deal to be learned about the extent and longevity of Mayalde's *C11* initiative of 1941.

One of the reasons that the *AJ* is so inaccessible is, as Rozenberg says, that any files beyond the 1950s could not be probed due to subsequent privacy legislation. Garzón and Rozenberg conducted their research in the 1990s and 2000s, before the expiry of a 50-year-rule which may have been retriggered by their very inquiries. In 2014, the present author attempted to request a document with an adjacent archival number to *C11* in the AHN and was subsequently told the document was from the 1960s – two decades after 1941 – and hence the 50-year rule applied. Along with the longstanding state of archival organisation, such research has also been further stifled by tightening privacy legislation which is argued to have been triggered precisely to block historical research into areas considered sensitive. It would have been hoped more records would become available for investigation in Madrid or in the regions, although nothing has yet been available in Seville, Cadiz, Valencia, Salamanca, Zaragoza or Burgos. The regional archives have documents sent to the DGS concerning the transit of refugees through the country. The archivists believe that documents prior to mid-1941, by which time Mayalde was no longer DG, were misplaced or destroyed. Given the history of Francoist destruction of incriminating documents, it is not impossible that this was the fate of the *AJ*, yet the evidence of police reference to the *AJ* in more recent investigations suggests that it may well be a referenced resource that is simply closed rather than destroyed. It is also interesting that the absence of documentation is not only an aspect shared with the 1940 Himmler-Mayalde accord, but also with Nazi policy where the SS was involved, especially the Holocaust.

***C11* and the "Final Solution"**

Clearly by 1941 the Franco regime came to see the "Jewish Question" as a "threat" on one side and a lever of influence with the Nazis on the other, whether or not the post-Mayalde DGS' implementation of *C11* helped the Falange specifically. It is debatable how ambitious *C11* was supposed to be when it actually came to international fascist cooperation. Chapter 2 discussed Himmler's own agenda for his own foreign policy. This included the "Jewish Question" in Europe

⁵⁸ AHN: H1211 on Concepción Barreras Jurado, 15 Apr. 1947; AHN: H8717 on Roberto Klein, 6 Nov. 1943

especially as its “Final Solution to the Jewish Question” (*Endlösung*) unfolded with the Holocaust. Joachim von Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry had inquired about the activities of Jews in Spain, also covered in Chapter 2. However, as Peter Longerich and David Cesarani show, it was the SS which were more aggressive on this matter albeit when it came to formal Axis military allies.⁵⁹ Yet despite the picture of data sharing and extraditions as presented by these chapters, no documents explicitly linking *C11* or the *AJ* to the Nazis have been uncovered yet, and it seems unlikely that if such links did exist, that they would not already have been destroyed by the Franco regime. Unlike the 8 March Law, *C11* does not contain an explicit justification based on the “totalitarian state” despite this thesis’ inferences of language. It is tempting to link *C11* to Himmler and therefore the 1942 Wannsee Conference chaired by his security chief Reinhard Heydrich. Paul Preston considers the plausibility of this, highlighting the endeavours of Tusquets since 1933 and the proven history of data sharing.⁶⁰ There are many ways in which the Germans could have obtained a figure of 6,000 Jews in Spain even if not through the spirit of Hispano-German cooperation. Indeed somehow, the Germans acquired different counts of the Jewish population in Spain. In the German Foreign Ministry’s 1942 *Jahrbuch für Auswärtige Politik*, the number of Jews in Spain is given as 40,000.⁶¹ It is unclear if this is an exaggeration under Nazi antisemitic criteria or even a reference to the number of records produced in any “*AJ*” – which included miscategorised “Freemasons” – or other Francoist targets by that stage. This makes it odd and rather more disturbing that in the Wannsee European census of Jews, the figure is given as 6,000, which was Franco’s own estimate of Jews in Spain and clearly is not the German statistic. Much of the supporting documentation for the Wannsee Conference was lost or destroyed. Only one copy of the Conference minutes has survived and this cannot not be taken as a verbatim account.⁶² It seems unlikely the *AJ* could have provided a great deal in the way of supporting documentation only mere months after *C11* had been issued. It could well be that 6,000 was a provisional figure which therefore did not accord to Heydrich’s “proper racial standards” which would of course identify a lot more Jews in any examined population based on Nazi race laws. However 6,000 was close to the figure that Mayalde himself wrote on *C11*. If there was Spanish collaboration with the census, then circumstantially *C11* carries the figure of 5,000 and is seeking a more reliable count while Mayalde was in Berlin from July 1941 to December 1942. The circumstantial and non-evidence-based nature of this type of speculation should not be underestimated.

⁵⁹ Longerich, *Himmler*, p. 618; David Cesarani, *Eichmann* (London, 2005), p. 183

⁶⁰ Preston, new appendix in Spanish edition of *Franco* (Barcelona, 2015)

⁶¹ PAAA: *Jahrbuch für Auswärtige Politik* (Berlin, 1942), p. 503

⁶² Mark Roseman, *The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution* (London, 2003), p. 68

C11 was issued on Mayalde's final day as DG coincident or consequent to the May Crisis and was received by the CGs in the following weeks. This was two months before Mayalde made his anticipated move to Foreign Affairs and became Ambassador to Berlin. Within that space of time Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's long-intended invasion of the "Judeo-Bolshevik" USSR, was launched. This was the official start of genocide but not yet on a pan-European scale of *Endlösung*. The war in the East was planned as *Vernichtungskrieg* ("war of extermination") but preceded a decision to kill all European Jews. Before June 1941 the Nazis looked to expel the Jews or concentrate them into brutal work camps. In June 1941, the decision was taken to kill all Jews in newly-occupied Eastern territories, unleashing the Holocaust. But even this was not yet a decision for the *total* eradication of all Jews. Even after the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the Nazis were only resolved at that stage on *Vernichtungskrieg* with the use of *Einsatzgruppen* (shooting squads) against Jews, partisans and ultimately all "inferior Slavs" on the Eastern Front. The Franco regime's understanding of the significance of *Vernichtungskrieg*, when it decided to contribute the Blue Division to the "Eastern Crusade", seems uncertain. The significance of *C11* to the overall Nazi agenda is uncertain. Wannsee was significant in the timeline of the Holocaust, but it was not where the actual decision to exterminate European Jews was made, as opposed to being a meeting to determine who would control and organise the killing agenda. Heydrich wanted the SS to assert a monopoly and mostly succeeded. It was in this respect that the conference was consequential for whenever Hitler made the decision to exterminate all European Jews.⁶³ While there is evidence of Jews from occupied Europe being delayed or denied refuge by the DGS, there is no proven link between *C11* and any aspect of the Holocaust at this time.

In any event, considering how the timing and the language used seems to bear on domestic Francoist politics, Mayalde was likely using *C11* to give the Falange more room in setting the *Volksgemeinschaft* agenda inside Spain through the police. If there was already an *AJ* being constructed, redefining "Jews" certainly provided more opportunity for the Falange to take credit for building Spain's "totalitarian state" in fascist Europe after their Spanish Civil War "victory" which the "Jews could not forgive".⁶⁴ The loss of the Interior Ministry would certainly have motivated such a desire. Any successor as DG would not have been inclined to rescind the order as the aforementioned evidence shows. Naturally this would contribute to the acceptance of the Falange, enthusiastically or reluctantly, as practical police manpower which Serrano and Mayalde could return to cement in the Spanish police. Above all, redefining "Jews" would be consistent with the aforementioned observations by Arendt and explanations by Rohr on how, despite the lack of Jews

⁶³ Roseman, *The Villa*, p. 111; Cesarani, *Eichmann*, p. 107

⁶⁴ Kew: FO371/60332, Letter from Hitler to Franco, 6 Feb. 1941

in Spain, antisemitism and overall *antipatria* discourse seemed to suit a Francoist function of diverting attention away from social and economic issues.

Perhaps there is one irony about *C11* – on the whole the Germans remained dissatisfied with the Spanish efforts concerning the “Jewish Question”, to the extent that Heydrich decided to have Franco himself, the son of a Freemason, investigated for possible Jewish heritage. It is difficult to miss the irony in that the results were inconclusive.⁶⁵ Of course Mayalde himself had a Spanish aristocrat’s typical confidence that his family lineage did not include Jewish ancestors.

Knowledge of the Holocaust and Nazi atrocities

There remain inevitable questions concerning the extent to which Mayalde was aware of Nazi atrocities and, furthermore, how he reacted. Through police cooperation he certainly knew a good deal of the extent of German repression and surely expected a consistency with the Franco regime’s own record where prisoner treatment was concerned. As Chapter 2 mentions, Mayalde was shown Sachsenhausen concentration camp in August 1940. Only days before some Polish inmates had been shot for certain infractions. Towards the end of Mayalde’s visit, Spanish Republicans interned following the Spanish Civil War expressed their outrage upon recognising Mayalde as Franco’s envoy and in response they were beaten by SS guards.⁶⁶ Despite this, Sachsenhausen’s initial function had been more about the presentation of Nazi Germany’s “hard but fair treatment” of prisoners to the outside world including the International Red Cross.⁶⁷ For Mayalde it may be argued Sachsenhausen featured in a similar manner to how Dachau was going to be presented for the earlier cancelled visits by British, French and American commissioners, also mentioned in Chapter 2. The conditions for prisoners in Sachsenhausen were not as severe as those in Poland which was on the Eastern Front. Mayalde however, through reports generated by Serranoist colleagues, would also have been aware of the conditions of Spaniards held in other camps, particularly Mauthausen. A correspondent to Mayalde’s predecessor as Ambassador from the “Ministerio de Negociones Exteriores” even justified their harsh treatment, because of their “red” political affiliations.⁶⁸ The Franco regime itself in any event was responsible for the lack of protection, having stripped these Spaniards of their legal nationality.

⁶⁵ Ramón Garriga, *Ramón Franco: El hermano maldito* (Barcelona, 1978), p. 20

⁶⁶ Jens Westemeier, *Himmlers Krieger: Joachim Peiper und die Waffen-SS in Krieg und Nachkriegszeit* (Paderborn, 2013), p. 165

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.; AGA: AR 82/03437, *Ministerio de Negociones Extranjeras* in Berlin to Ambassador Espinosa in Berlin, 23 Apr. 1941

As “Ambassador to the Blue Division”, Mayalde should have been in an even better position than most in the Franco regime not only to be informed about these matters but also realise the true nature of the Nazi *Endlösung*. He involved himself with correspondences on both policing and military matters and endeavoured to maintain communications concerning Eastern Front developments. The disenfranchisement of Jews by the Nazis in occupied territories featured often in Spanish diplomats’ reports. Above all, Mayalde was close to the theatre of Hitler’s *Vernichtungskrieg* by being in Berlin and the Eastern Front at the time it was taking place. David Wingeate Pike writes of one occasion where the Ambassador was petitioned for help and information by Father Luis García, in a letter dated 16 September 1941, concerning a Spaniard incarcerated in Mauthausen named Juan de Diego. García did not receive a response until mid-1942. The letter, dated 14 April 1942 and signed *per pro* by an aide, referred to information received by the Spanish Embassy from the German police who said Juan de Diego was “in good health and fit to work.”⁶⁹ On 10 October 1941, Mayalde raised an issue concerning Spanish Jewish businesses in occupied France. The Spanish government were anxious to know about the fate of the businesses and were concerned about the arrests of their owners. As Isabelle Rohr writes, such concern was not about the welfare of the businesses’ owners as opposed to their economic value for Spain.⁷⁰ Mayalde sent his aide concerned with business matters to talk about the issue. Due to the “sensitive nature” of the matter, Mayalde could not make a written statement.⁷¹ This is the only known occasion so far where Mayalde as Ambassador expressed any form of “concern” regarding Germany’s treatment of Jews.

One would expect Spain’s Ambassador in December 1941 to be in the lines of communication when supposedly the earliest reports about the Holocaust reached Spain. The DGS too was one of the intermediaries receiving Blue Division reports of atrocities. According to the historian Bernd Rother, reports by the Blue Division in the autumn and winter of 1941 about allegations of atrocities serve as the earliest indicators of Francoist knowledge of the Holocaust.⁷² The Blue Division was attached to Army Group North under Field Marshall von Leeb, putting them in the opportune sector to at least be able to hear of atrocities. Much of the *Einsatzgruppen* killings took place in this sector and Wehrmacht divisions also participated in killing civilians. By visiting this sector, as covered in Chapter 3, Mayalde too should have been able to learn things for himself. As Kleinfeld and Tambs write, at one stage during the journey from Berlin in October 1941, Mayalde and his entourage had witnessed long-columns of ill-clad and famished prisoners. Apparently they were appalled at the

⁶⁹ David Wingeate Pike, *Spaniards in the Holocaust* (London, 2008), p. 134

⁷⁰ Rohr, *The Spanish Right*, p. 116

⁷¹ PAAA: 29741, Spanish Embassy telegram, 10 Oct. 1941

⁷² Bernd Rother, “El conocimiento de España sobre el Holocausto”, in Bernd Rother *Franco y el Holocausto* (Barcelona, 2005), pp. 125-9

sight.⁷³ It is unlikely these prisoners were supposed to be on exhibition for foreign observers, unlike those in Theresienstadt, in occupied Czechoslovakia, or those in Sachsenhausen. But there is no mention of killings and it appears these were POWS rather than persecuted Jews. The Francoist entourage were still not witnessing mass killings of Jews by bullets nor death camps being erected. But they did see with their own eyes that the Wehrmacht had destroyed most of the Russian city of Novgorod.⁷⁴

The Blue Division has a particularly good deal of proximity, but surprisingly there is a lack of available evidence for BD participation in atrocities. The BD does not appear to have been implicated in any war crimes in the theatre of *Vernichtungskrieg*. This is even despite the fact that the BD had taken prisoners in combat, about which Mayalde was informed, yet no information appears to be available about the prisoners' treatment. Xosé Núñez Seixas considers evidence and testimonies which suggest that the BD soldiers were not inclined to treat Eastern European Jews and Slavs with any prejudices from either Spain or Germany. However Núñez determines that the BD were bystanders rather than protectors while the atrocities were going on.⁷⁵ The state of the evidence at the moment seems to point to non-complicity. In the years after the end of WWII, Serrano Suñer publicly defended the BD on the grounds that "the Spanish combatants had gone to the USSR to destroy Soviet communism but not the Russian people."⁷⁶ However, few perpetrators ever freely admit to war crimes. Those in the Wehrmacht were no exception. Absence of evidence is never by definition evidence of absence.

Nothing has been found when it comes to Mayalde's continued association with Himmler either. Their 1942 meetings did not seem to concern Jews, other *antipatria* in Spain or German police in Spain. Their first recorded meeting was only three days after the Wannsee Conference where a figure of 6,000 Jews living in Spain was included as mentioned earlier, and the afternoon after Hitler

⁷³ Gerald Kleinfeld and Lewis Tambs, *Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia in WWII* (London, 1979), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 2060; AGM: DEV 29/52/3/1 Report 65 by Roca de Togores to Madrid, 30 Oct. 1941, pp. 18-20

⁷⁴ Dionisio Ridruejo, *Cuadernos de Rusia* (Madrid, 1943), p. 100

⁷⁵ Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, "¿Testigos o Encubridores? La División Azul y el Holocausto de los judíos europeos: entre historia y memoria", *Historia y Política* 26 (2011), 259-90; A prior study was Wayne Bowen, "A Great Moral Victory", in Rudy Rorlich (ed.), *Resisting the Holocaust* (London, 1999), pp. 45-64; Stan Nadel's review of *Resisting the Holocaust*, <https://networks.h-net.org/node/6088/reviews/7210/nadel-rohrlich-resisting-holocaust>. Bowen cites soldiers' testimonies as sources and was unable to find evidence of war crimes in either German or Spanish military archives. Nadel describes Bowen as being a long way from claiming a "great moral victory." Nadel attributes the lack of references to the lack of Jewish eyewitnesses. Furthermore Nadel criticises a "lack of more impressive instances of protection" in Bowen's study, compared to those cited by Meir Michaelis' *Mussolini and the Jews* (Oxford, 1978) for Italian soldiers.

⁷⁶ Ramón Serrano Suñer, "Hacia un patriotismo europeo", *ABC*, 29 Sept. 1959, p. 3

told Himmler about there being “no other solution but extermination”.⁷⁷ All that is known though is that Himmler’s and Mayalde’s main discussion concerned the looming military situation and the role of Himmler’s *Waffen-SS*. Likewise, Mayalde was mainly concerned with the Blue Division situation and they both visited injured soldiers, as covered in Chapter 3.⁷⁸ It is also interesting that following a knee operation in 1942, Mayalde convalesced at a clinic where SS medical experimentation on “racial inferiors” was taking place under the supervision of Himmler’s favourite doctor, Professor Karl Gebhardt.⁷⁹ Hohenlychen had previously received foreign dignitaries, but during the war this was not the case. Mayalde may have been an exception and it can be assumed he was there through Himmler’s goodwill. He may well even have been treated by Gebhardt himself. Yet again despite proximity, it is not yet known whether Mayalde was aware of the crimes being committed there.

So, at the moment, despite the circumstances, there is far from enough to suggest Mayalde knew a great deal about the Holocaust of Jews or what he actually thought about it. It does not seem that the available state archives will reveal anything new concerning Mayalde. The investigative writer José Antonio Lisbona has suggested that it is highly unlikely that the Spanish Foreign Ministry archive would reveal anything new about Francoist knowledge of Nazi genocide of the Jews, not least as it is probably the single state archive that was most massively purged for the WWII period.⁸⁰ Most of the German material available concerning the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, in relation to antisemitism, is from the Ambassador Vidal period of late 1942-1945 as opposed to the Mayalde era. This can be seen in Rother’s and Rohr’s publications for example. It remains difficult to determine whether Mayalde at any stage considered any full potential outcome of his WWII cooperation with the Nazis and of his having created a central “Jewish Archive”, although the Spanish police had certainly furnished data and even individuals to the Nazis, before Mayalde left the police for the diplomatic corps. There was one significant episode in 1946, when Ramón Garriga implied a series of publications about Mauthausen had provoked Mayalde. Garriga reminded Mayalde that he had been Ambassador while Spaniards were suffering in the “hell” of Mauthausen. Mayalde was aware of Mauthausen and the ordeals of Spaniards, as we have seen. And it was none other than the Falange’s *Arriba* that was publishing in 1946 a monthly serial featuring a Spanish inmate. Garriga does not write much about this meeting of his with Mayalde or whatever thoughts Mayalde may

⁷⁷ Martin Broszat, “Hitler and the Genesis of the ‘Final Solution’” in H.W Koch (ed.), *Aspects of the Third Reich* (London, 1985), pp. 390-429

⁷⁸ BArch: NS19/1292 Bl. 255 ff; Pete Witte, Michael Wildt, Martina Voigt, Dieter Pohl, Peter Klein, Christian Gerlach, Christoph Dieckmann and Andrej Angrick (eds.), *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42*, (Hamburg, 1999), pp. 84, 614

⁷⁹ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, and Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, p. 614

⁸⁰ Bernd Rother speaking at the London School of Economics, 20 Oct. 2016. Working with the Spanish Foreign Ministry, Lisbona went over the collections for his publication *Más allá del deber* (2015)

have had when confronted with the facts. He just claims that provoking Mayalde helped result in bringing the *Arriba* serial to an end.⁸¹

The Blue Division and the peak of fascist aspiration

It has been suggested that Mayalde's change of posts from DG to Ambassador was impelled by the agenda of persecuting *antipatria*.⁸² Supporting evidence seems to include reports of Mayalde's candidacy for an Ambassadorial post, including the Berlin post only just after issuing *Circular 11* on 5 May 1941, along with statements by Nazi Foreign Intelligence Chief Walter Schellenberg that Mayalde's main contacts in Berlin were with Hitler and Himmler and concerned policing.⁸³ However there is no sufficient evidence yet that continuity of repression specifically was at the heart of Mayalde's Ambassadorial appointment. Neither would such an appointment have been necessary just for any Francoist to share data with Germany. The essential aspect of the appointment was that Serrano wanted a Falangist answerable to him as his representative in Berlin not only as Ambassador but also simultaneously Head of the foreign Falange in Germany and its occupied territories, even if Mayalde's "qualification" for the post resided with his "alternate diplomacy" with Himmler as explained in Chapter 2. The elevation to official diplomacy had been the real prize. On the other hand, *antipatria* policy may once again have been important for political aggrandisement – this time ironically for domestic considerations while in official diplomacy. After all, in light of the May Crisis, political survival over and above consolidation was a Serranoist priority in the summer of 1941. As has been suggested, repression would have given the Falange more work in domestic politics following the May Crisis. Domestic considerations would naturally help explain Mayalde's continued relations with Himmler and had motivated Mayalde's arguments for the withdrawal of BD personnel

⁸¹ Ramón Garriga, *La España de Franco: de la División Azul al pacto con los Estados Unidos* (Puebla, 1971), p. 450; Sara Brenneis, "Carlos Rodríguez del Risco and the First Spanish Testimony from the Holocaust", *History & Memory* 25, 1 (2013), 51-76. Although Garriga does not mention Rodríguez by name and neither does Brenneis include Garriga in her work, evidently Garriga is describing the Rodríguez memoirs because the case involved *Arriba* having to abruptly discontinue publishing Holocaust memoirs. Brenneis explains that Rodríguez had to promote Franco and refrain from condemning fascism so that he could be published through the censors of Franco and the Falange. Here it may be argued that by depicting a "valued Spaniard" as a Nazi victim, *Arriba* saw value in helping Francoist attempts to rewrite its WWII history following Allied victory. Garriga says that he visited Mayalde and asked him for his opinion on *Arriba's* attitude. As Mayalde said he was surprised and that he didn't like it, Garriga made the observation that "You were Spanish Ambassador in Berlin when these Spanish workers were so badly treated by the Nazis in Mauthausen". It is unclear whether Mayalde's "surprise" was in reaction to the story itself or *Arriba's* attitude. Garriga says he achieved what he sought when Mayalde announced that he would immediately speak with Ibañez Martín, chief of press and propaganda, to put an end to the scandal. Garriga claims that after he prompted Mayalde as well as a representative of Blue Division General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, *Arriba* had to cease publishing the series. Thanks to Dan Stone for alerting me in 2013 to Brenneis' article.

⁸² Reverte, "La lista"

⁸³ Kew: KV2/94-99, OCCPAC Schellenberg interrogation, 19 Sept. 1945

as earlier described. The need to survive would certainly explain why Mayalde so persistently promoted himself as "Ambassador of the Blue Division", with his constant BD contact and conduct in official correspondence and publicity. Mayalde was someone reliable to make Serrano's case.

The Falange had already been prevented from becoming a major militarised force that could threaten the hegemony of the Spanish Army, which would accept no challenge after overthrowing the hated Republic. From Chapters 2 and 3, it can be seen that Serrano and Mayalde looked to the SS's control of the police and designated military units as the way forward in Spain for the Falange through the 8 March Law and the Blue Division. While the 8 March Law promoted a militarised politicised police, this was meant to be a domestic force, while the Blue Division or at least the Falangist Blue notion had greater comparability with Germany's *Waffen-SS*. This Blue notion was that Falangists would acquire combat experience beyond their prior Civil War role in the pursuit and consolidation of a Spanish Empire. This would follow the manner of Franco's *Africanistas* as past examples, and the Wehrmacht and SS as contemporary examples. However this did not work out as hoped. Although the *Waffen-SS* too had to accept regular Army officers as top commanders, it still had its own divisional commanders. The Blue Division was not only under overall Wehrmacht command once it arrived in Germany, but its officers were overwhelmingly Spanish Army regulars since its inception. Also, as Chapter 2 explained, Falangist plans for the police, in progress with the 8 March Law, had been abandoned with the 1941 May Crisis (even though the 8 March Law was later updated with the November 1941 Law under Caballero). With the Blue Division, the Army pre-empted at a much earlier stage what was arguably a more dangerous initiative by Serrano. Thus Mayalde had failed in a key post-1939 ambition and one that arguably made him stand out among senior Falangists. The Falange was never even remotely able to challenge the power of the Spanish Army in the form of the truly militarised force to which it aspired.

It can be seen that WWII cooperation with Germany was the peak of Francoist aspiration under a fascistised consensus involving a mixture of largely compatible ideological affinities and expediency. Mayalde's contribution from his particular Falangist standpoint was symbolised by his relations with Himmler who oversaw the Holocaust. However the role of "fascistisation" in relation to internal Francoist competition makes it difficult to ascertain how Mayalde could have uniquely enhanced any "dual-effect" of benefits for both Spain and Germany. As Chapter 2 showed, pro-Axis Spanish Army officers made headway with police cooperation with Himmler. This itself reflected longstanding cooperation within and across European regimes between fascists and traditional conservatives, regardless of competition within regimes and variances between regimes. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier Himmler became "methodically arbitrary" in his wartime cooperation with other countries. Thus it did not particularly matter that Franco himself never embraced "full fascism".

Hitler was not interested in bringing fascists to power in other countries provided he had functioning and even friendly relations with governments headed up by traditional authoritarians, such as Admiral Horthy in Hungary and Field Marshal Antonescu in Romania.⁸⁴ Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister adhered to Hitler's line rather than support a 1941 Iron Guard putsch against Antonescu.⁸⁵ Traditional conservative sensibilities prevailed in the diplomatic corps most of the time. The Army Officer Corps of both Spain and Germany were predominantly traditional Conservatives. But despite not being fascists, they were both indisputably radicalised by their experiences of war, and complacent and frequently complicit with murderous policies. In all likelihood the willing cooperation between Himmler and the Spanish Army could have developed without Serrano and Mayalde. Thus the impact of a much broader "fascistisation" problematises any assessment of Mayalde's specific input.

Mayalde's contribution then can be seen through a specific common ground with Himmler. Both were born in the 1900s. Each possessed an ideological zeal typical of the younger generations in the 1930s who did not fight in either WWI, as Hitler had, or on colonial campaigns as Franco had. Mayalde operated amid a distinct division between older military veterans and younger fascist activists. Military officers still had greater sense of caution as exemplified by the pro-Axis Franco never formally entering WWII. Younger fascists had more zeal and especially so when they found themselves in internal regime competition. This explains why Himmler supported Horia Sima's Iron Guard against Antonescu in Romania in 1941 – Sima, who was born in 1907, suited Himmler better as a working partner. In 1944, Nazi Germany installed the fascist Arrow Cross into power in Hungary after Horthy had surrendered to the Red Army. In addition to pro-Nazi compliance, Himmler's benefit was cooperation that included increased Hungarian participation in the Holocaust. Additionally, Himmler needed channels that would be available when his own rivals had their relations with Spain's Army and diplomats. Although Himmler would have readily invited any Spanish police commissioner to Berlin in 1940 knowing that he could use Franco's needs to his own advantage, the reciprocal visit to Madrid probably required Mayalde's intervention on Serrano's competitive urges. The Falangist aspect of both the 8th March Law and choice of timing to issue *Circular 11* provided fascist security for the Nazis if they did indeed find any use in such Spanish efforts, whether or not the Spanish and German standpoints were identical. In Mayalde's case, he definitely needed allies at the top of the Nazi New Order who would be more "sympathetic". Because Himmler was an ideological zealot when compared to the rest of his regime, he was the natural choice for such an ally even if he had his own self-serving motives. Indeed, in Chapter 3 it

⁸⁴ Griffiths, *An Intelligent Person's Guide to Fascism*, p. 107

⁸⁵ Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 504-7

was seen the Nazi Paul Schmidt alluded to generation when praising Mayalde's grasp of propaganda and its importance. On the other hand, unlike Himmler, Mayalde had battlefield experience for which he was decorated.

So, while the sculpting of *Volksgemeinschaft* was clearly integral to the agendas of both Mayalde and Himmler and the persecution of *antipatria* or "community aliens", it was not so much that specific aspect as opposed to a broader sense of "fascist ideological disposition" that determined their cooperation. Personal indulgence through the politics of expediency was a consequence which stood out. Himmler was not completely satisfied with military prowess and glory through his *Waffen-SS* on the battlefield, the cultivation of Hitler's *Lebensraum* by overseeing the Holocaust and the further extension of SS-police operations beyond German-controlled territory. He wanted to be able to associate with foreign governments at the highest levels and thereby exercise a greater degree of dexterity with an additional, greater profile as a "respectable diplomat". So Himmler also needed someone who could indulge his desire for a status as a preeminent statesman in the Nazi New Order in Europe. Parallel foreign policy and constant arbitrary enquiries into race functioned to help Himmler exercise pan-European influence ahead of his rivals.⁸⁶ Cooperation based on compatibility may well have included some degree of sympathy towards the other's agenda, but obviously each party's own agenda came first. For Mayalde, "alternate diplomacy" through policing and the Blue Division were tools of consolidation and eventually means of survival for his Falangist agenda. Above all, Serrano and Mayalde wanted to be at the head of their Falangist Empire existing in parallel with the Nazi New Order. These factions were useful to one another at least in the short term depending on the inclinations of Nazi Germany should the Axis have won WWII. As a result, arguably, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, Mayalde was more indebted to Himmler than any other Nazi, and Himmler to Mayalde more than any other Francoist. Mayalde had not rendered other Nazi officials a service as tremendous as the 1940 police agreements. No other Nazi official had given Mayalde as distinguished an accolade as his 1940 German award. He had ensured that Mayalde would be available as not just an ideological fascist and DG but also as a diplomat. Himmler could take credit for Mayalde's promotion to Franco's most important envoy in 1941. Even after Mayalde had long ceased to be in charge of Spain's state DGS and Falange party intelligence and nor could he indulge Himmler with the provision of Spanish mules, indulgence of each other's ambitions still ensured their continued relationship.

⁸⁶ Longerich, *Himmler*, pp. 504-7, 599; Bowen, "De españoles", Line 2333

This said, it can also be seen that Mayalde's award of the "Grand Cross of the German Eagle" on Himmler's recommendation did not necessarily mean things would be straightforward in Berlin. Mayalde's association with Serrano was not particularly appreciated and the Himmler association may not have helped his situation before Ribbentrop either.⁸⁷ Ribbentrop was particularly displeased with the replacement in Berlin of the monarchist anti-Falangist General Espinosa by the fascist Mayalde, owing to his dislike of Serrano. Nor did Ribbentrop and Goebbels consider the Blue Division the best WWII contribution Spain could make. Selective cooperation therefore as a basis for advancement also brought resentment which would make it a basis for disappointment, despite the security offered by fascism that Himmler could perceive. In light of his experiences as explored in Chapter 3, Mayalde may have felt prompted to reconsider or revise his pro-Nazi enthusiasm in some manner. He also noted that the Blue Division had been perceived as "*conjuntos de indeseables*" and he witnessed the mistreatment of "desirable" Spaniards who had offered their labour to Germany.⁸⁸ Taking into account Mayalde's expressed belief that Nazi Germany needed to win the war and his relationship with prominent Nazis, these developments damaged Falange prestige and undermined the perception of Spanish standing in the eyes of the Germans. Clearly, he must have felt a sense of unfulfillment, frustration, underuse and even betrayal from his lacklustre scarcely-announced arrival to his disappointing departure.

The feeling of betrayal would have come with the ultimate wartime failure of 1942. As Chapter 3 explained, in the midst of the changing tide of the war, Serrano Suñer fell from grace while the pro-Allied General Jordana took over the Foreign Ministry and José Luis de Arrese became the leading light in the Falange. Mayalde could not adapt and accepted his replacement by Ginés Vidal as Ambassador in Berlin. At that point, in spite of his confidence and determination in the preceding years, for Mayalde the cause of José Antonio had been betrayed. Seeing no reason to continue serving in a public post in which he had no confidence, he withdrew from public life at least until he found a new way of adapting as Mayor of Madrid some ten years later.⁸⁹ There was no appeal in taking up thankless governmental posts just for administration of the status quo.

With Axis defeat, hopes of a reestablishment of a Spanish African Empire within a European New Order had faded. Franco's regime was internationally ostracised by the victorious Allied powers between the end of WWII in 1945 and the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s. The United Nations Security Council deemed that Francoist pro-Axis cooperation had breached the 1907 Hague

⁸⁷ Garriga, *La España*, p. 380

⁸⁸ Fernando de Bordejé y Morencos, *Galería de personajes españoles* (Madrid, 2007), p. 239; Garriga, *La España*, pp. 366-70

⁸⁹ Garriga, *Las relaciones*, pp. 353-5

Convention on Neutrality.⁹⁰ Israel also described Francoist Spain as the “last surviving expression” of the Nazi-Fascist alliance that perpetrated the Holocaust although Spain itself was not a participant.⁹¹ However, due to the Cold War, Franco was able to disassociate himself sufficiently, including from active involvement on the Eastern Front, achieving a status with the Americans in 1951 as the “Sentinel of the West”.

The dismissal of Serrano and the imminent obscurity of Mayalde usefully contributed to the illusion of Spain’s WWII neutrality. Although self-evidently the Blue Division were potentially party to the charge of crimes against peace made against the Nazi leadership, no atrocities have been attributed to the Blue Division and there were no war crime charges against any of the Spanish leadership nor members of the Division. Nor is there evidence of any questioning of Mayalde or other Francoists in Germany. However, Mayalde’s name arose in postwar interrogations which denotes a continued Allied interest. In 1946, when the aforementioned Schellenberg was questioned by the US OCCPAC (Office for Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality) about the Conde de Mayalde he stated that Mayalde’s main contacts in Berlin were with Hitler and Himmler and that they mainly concerned policing matters.⁹² It has been seen in Chapter 3 that Mayalde did continue cooperation with the Spanish police *attachés* whose presence in Germany he had originally negotiated with Himmler. He asked the German authorities to address the complaints against Spanish workers and in return the Spanish police dealt with the “reds” involved. Furthermore, Mayalde along with his Italian and German counterparts did meet concerning the situation of Himmler’s police *attachés* in their countries when the lines of communication were in doubt.⁹³ Yet, beyond this, the archives do not appear to be forthcoming. The published Himmler day-schedule entries for his specified meetings with Mayalde neither mention policing nor indeed the ongoing Holocaust. Regarding how things played out, the surviving BD prisoners of war taken by the Soviet Union in 1943 were released in 1954. Mayalde must have been satisfied that he was back in political office at this moment to welcome them.⁹⁴ Over the subsequent years, various Germans, collaborators and the members of the Blue Division, were able to socialise in Madrid freely. As the next paragraph mentions this was observed by the Allies and countries affected by collaborators.

⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council Official Records: *First Year 2nd series*, “Special Supplement, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question”, 13, (New York, June 1946), 83-9

⁹¹ Haim Avni, *Spain, the Jews and Franco* (Philadelphia, 1982), p. 1

⁹² Kew: KV2/94-99 OCCPAC, Schellenberg interrogation, 19 Sept. 1945. Schellenberg had met Mayalde during a social occasion in 1942. As Schellenberg was often unreliable in his testimonies, it is likely he may have been confusing dates when it came to the role of Mayalde in policing.

⁹³ Witte, Wildt, Voigt, Pohl, Klein, Gerlach, Dieckmann, Angrick (eds.), *Dienstkalender*, p. 84. This was *not* one of the specific day-entries for meetings with Mayalde.

⁹⁴ “En honor de los ex prisioneros de la División Azul”, *ABC*, 2 May 1954, p. 9

The Wilderness Years

Mayalde's time in the political wilderness until 1952 seems to parallel the Franco regime's own diplomatic wilderness. While Mayalde was given a permanent seat in the newly-opened *Cortés* in 1943, which was meant to serve as a "sounding board" for Franco's policies, this was not an executive post. Otherwise Mayalde's notable activity mainly concerned continued fascist activity which the Allies still observed. In 1945, he commended Irish Taoiseach Eamon de Valera's controversial condolences following Hitler's death.⁹⁵ It was rather fitting that Mayalde should have met up with the exiled Iron Guard leader Horia Sima just before departing Berlin in December 1942, especially when remembering the Himmler-Mayalde *attaché* agreement. Sima had escaped Romania for Berlin following the aforementioned Himmler-backed Iron Guard coup and its fallout, where Himmler was confronted by Ribbentrop then reprimanded by Hitler. After the Nazi downfall Sima fled to Spain to live out the rest of his days. Mayalde also had some involvement in the activities of other international fascists in Spain. The Allies reported he remained on close terms with the famed *Waffen-SS* commando Otto Skorzeny as late as September 1951.⁹⁶ Mayalde also helped accommodate the Belgian fascist leader Leon Degrelle who apparently pleaded for Mayalde's help.⁹⁷ Degrelle had collaborated with Germany and enlisted in the *Waffen-SS* on the Eastern Front. The Belgian government protested at Franco's refusal to repatriate Degrelle.⁹⁸ While the Franco regime tried to make itself palatable as an eventual Cold War ally to the capitalist West, the likes of Skorzeny conceived of themselves as using Spain to foment an "elite", fascist vanguard against Communism. This saw Spain become a hub and network for postwar international fascism, as demonstrated by Oswald Mosley's 1948 visit where he developed a friendship with Serrano, although there is no evidence of him meeting Mayalde.⁹⁹ Mayalde continued to have an involvement

⁹⁵ Dermot Keogh, "De Valera, Hitler & the visit of condolence May 1945" *History Ireland* 5, 3 (1997), <http://www.historyireland.com/20th-century-contemporary-history/de-valera-hitler-the-visit-of-condolence-may-1945/>; Mayalde wrote to Kerney "The sympathy which both as Spaniard and as Catholic I have always felt for the noble people that you represent has continually increased during the war before the Christian and dignified attitude of its government. Today, in the presence of the noble [cabelleroso] gesture of Mr de Valera, president of Ireland [sic], I desire to manifest to Your Excellency my admiration and respect."

⁹⁶ NWCD: Vol. 02/0028, Information Report distributed 2 Oct. 1951; Vol. 02/0026, Report printed 29 Sept. 1951

⁹⁷ Helena Saña, *El Franquismo sin mitos: conversaciones con Serrano Suñer* (Barcelona, 1981), p. 306

⁹⁸ "León Degrelle, la última reliquia del nazismo, escribe sus memorias en Madrid", *El País*, 14 Dec. 1982, http://elpais.com/diario/1982/12/14/espana/408668404_850215.html; "Wird Degrelle ausgeliefert?", *Die Zeit*, 18 Feb. 1983, <http://www.zeit.de/1983/08/der-hitler-belgiens>

⁹⁹ Graham Macklin, *Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the Postwar Reconstruction of British Fascism* (London, 2007), p. 100; Kew: KV3/45-6, Evidence of post-war contact between British Fascists and Fascist individuals and organisations in Spain, 1946-1954

with the Blue Division during the postwar decades- when he was Mayor of Madrid he was involved in at least one reunion of *divisionarios* released from Soviet captivity.¹⁰⁰

Concerning Mayalde's thoughts and activities during this time, although the pan-European fascist project of 1939 appeared to have collapsed, it cannot be simply presumed that in 1945 he would have abandoned fascism as a vanquished and discredited ideology. It should be expected that Mayalde saw the situation as being one of survival and eventual vindication, just as others in the regime including Franco himself did. Despite being downplayed from 1945, the Falange and other ideological fascists residing in Spain expected a victorious role once again. With the increasing emphasis by the Western Allies on the Soviet Communist threat, Francoists and Falangists expected they could become politically relevant and serviceable as bulwarks against communism in Europe. Franco promoted himself as the "Sentinel of the West." Mayalde himself probably continued to associate the fascist cause with victory as he did from 1939. The association of fascism, Falangism and the Blue Division with "victory" explains the continued justification for the flourishing of fascism in Cold War-era Spain, despite some international criticism.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, this is not necessarily to say that Mayalde's views remained static. One might even attempt a distinction between holding certain principles and clinging onto 1930s and 1940s practices. It is likely he reconsidered aspects of his politics according to changing developments, as Chapter 5 will show. He had experienced disappointment in Germany and soon the Falange would be divided on the future of Spain and the role of the monarchy. As Mayor of Madrid, not all the traces of Mayalde's Romanones, traditionalist past appeared to have disappeared.

Conclusion

Having considered the circumstances, the key components of Mayalde's trajectory as a Falangist and fascist can be identified as victory, consolidation, survival and vindication. The privileges of the old order that had been "lost" to the Republic were ultimately "restored" through the atmosphere of Franco's brutal *reconquista* with the convergence of violence and totalitarian ideology. The alleged *contubernio* had been militarily defeated and needed to be excised from Franco's envisioned *Volksgemeinschaft* and Empire. Bizarre calculus came into play as a result of constant reassessment of the environment and old *reconquista* concepts through fascistisation. Having been radicalised by turmoil and war, Mayalde "realised" that Spanish Civil War victory demanded that the defects of previous "weak" governments were fixed by perpetuating this atmosphere. Mayalde saw responsibility for ensuring Spain did not fail in its bid for *reconquista*, *Volksgemeinschaft* and empire

¹⁰⁰ "En honor de los ex prisioneros de la División Azul", *ABC*, 2 May 1954, p.9

¹⁰¹ Kew: FO371/118479, Activities in Madrid of Degrelle, 1955

as lying clearly with the Falange. Mayalde would accept no obstruction. Soliciting the support of Himmler for the Falange in the context of the expanding "Nazi New Order" was the "logical" choice. For each party's ideological and political goals, there was an interplay between compatibility and expediency. Antisemitism and anti-Freemasonry were part of the integral Francoist framework. Although bizarre calculus would have Francoist Archives suggest there were many "dangerous" Jews and Masons in Spain, the real resulting function of such archives would appear to be more about maintaining repressive apparatus in which the Falange could thrive. The Blue Division was also clearly the peak of pro-German Spanish cooperation and encouraged the belief that Spain could share in the spoils of German victory. However, while the Falange was not going to face extinction as it would have done under the Republic, after the 1941 "May Crisis" the emphasis began to shift from consolidation to survival because the Francoist atmosphere had become more competitive. Mayalde resented any suggestion that the "dual goals" agenda of *Volksgemeinschaft* and Spanish Empire were not necessarily tied with the Falange and thus the notion that the prestige of Franco's Spain did not lie with the Falangist vision of Serrano Suñer. Mayalde was forced to make his case with greater strain and some desperation. Again, he had to portray Francoist rivals as not having the right "political spirit". As will be reinforced in Chapter 5, plain thankless administration was not what Mayalde had in mind when directing Franco's police from Madrid or representing his Blue Division in Berlin. The appeal was forging a whole new system, and demonstrating prestige.

To grasp what has been seen in the chapters, Mayalde did not single-handedly "fascistise" Spain, conceive ideology nor cultivate relations with Germany. He was an enforcer occupying sensitive posts at pivotal moments for Serrano Suñer. Serrano had been charged by Franco with organising his political apparatus and thus had a share in but not total responsibility for Spain's "fascistisation". Even though Mayalde was a late "convert" to Falangism, what he did by pushing a fairly maximalist relationship with Himmler was to represent the most high-level bellicose attempts to fulfil the Falange's highest and most dangerous ambitions for dominance in Spain. The cultivation of relations with Himmler to push both a Falangist Armed Police and Blue Division made Mayalde Serrano's most important subordinate. The basic fascistised agenda was not exclusive to the Falange, but the determination and zeal involved in pursuing "political spirit" through a "blue ideologue" regime helped entrench fascism and resistance to pragmatism even in the face of Axis setbacks. This is what should have been of distinct concern to anti-Francoists and the Allies and also the basis for any relief found each time Serrano lost control of a Ministry. As a result this helped define the overall Francoist experience during the Civil War and WWII with its potential consequences for the "enemies of Spain" perhaps including collaboration beyond what Franco himself was willing to offer. Yet it must be remembered this did not equate to unconditional Naziphilia. Mayalde would not

necessarily have insisted on recklessly pledging Spain to formal belligerence in WWII. The question of participating in Nazi genocide remains in the realm of conjecture.

Eventually, despite the evident failure of pro-German cooperation with WWII not resulting in the achievement of the "dual goals" but international ostracism, fascism and Falangism remained synonymous with Civil War victory against the *contubernio*. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, Spain became a haven for fascists and Nazis precisely so the ideas of victory were ready for vindication once Franco came to be acknowledged as the "Sentinel of the West." As the final chapter will show, Mayalde as a Falangist was content to serve his masters as a reliable enforcer, presumably as long as he believed a victory was in sight. On the other hand, Mayalde may also have gone on to revise his definition of "Falangism" through opportunism and/or pragmatism. As will be seen, Mayalde certainly managed to escape Serrano's shadow, by being deemed useful to Franco himself.

Chapter 5

The Mayor of Madrid 1952-1965

Introduction

On 10 May 1960, Edmund Stockdale, Lord Mayor of London took his guest around central London before a press conference at his official Manson House residence. Stockdale's counterpart, the *Alcalde* or Mayor of Madrid – His Excellency the 17th Conde de Mayalde – described to reporters how he was able to appreciate the labour that had been put into reconstructing the many buildings which had been destroyed during the then-recent WWII.¹ He also expressed his hopes of making Spain and Madrid better known in Britain and cementing good relations with London through his visit. That evening Mayalde dined at Mansion House and used the occasion to celebrate Britain and Spain's shared historical maritime and colonial experiences. He said that Britain and Spain shared a bold and adventurous spirit and despite having had gone to war from time to time each side always fought valiantly.² Mayalde stated he sincerely believed that at this stage in time, in the 1960s, a loyal friendship between all "Christian countries in old Europe" was necessary as it was "an old Europe that seemed to be getting smaller".³ Mayalde's official visit to Britain lasted for several days. Once back in Madrid, Mayalde told the Spanish press that during his stay not only had he been treated to "extraordinary and traditional British magnificence" but also much cordiality which pleasantly surprised him.⁴ These events transpired a year after Mayalde had been awarded France's *Legion d'Honneur* by no less than President General Charles de Gaulle.⁵ The brief chapter which follows here glimpses Mayalde's tenure as Mayor of Madrid between 1952 and 1965. Firstly it considers the extent of any political change for Franco and Mayalde, then attempts to assess Mayalde in terms of both domestic policy and foreign relations. This chapter is not a chronology of this long period of time but considers Mayalde once again on his role as an administrator and a diplomat along with his politics and overall significance to Franco.

Change

Mayalde reached such prominence after becoming Mayor of Madrid in June 1952 at Franco's behest. His accomplishments represent a drastic leap for both himself and the regime as well after the 1940s. Following Axis defeat in 1945, Spain was internationally ostracised and its economy

¹ *ABC*, 13 May 1960, p. 55

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *ABC*, 17 May 1960, p. 63

⁵ *ABC*, 8 Nov. 1959, p. 77; S. Olives Canals and Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), *Who's who in Spain* (Barcelona, 1963), p. 316

further debilitated on top of post-Civil War destitution and Falange-promoted autarkic policies of economic self-sufficiency. Furthermore, in the wake of fascist defeat, Franco was facing calls to restore Spain's monarchy – principally from activists operating outside Spain contesting his personal dictatorship but also to some degree from within government. This resulted in Franco agreeing to name Juan Carlos, grandson of Alfonso XIII, as his eventual successor in a restored Spanish monarchy which he hoped would continue Francoism after Franco's death.

Francoist Spain in the 1950s required significant policy changes in order to survive, let alone prosper and keep the monarchist challenge at bay. Autarky was abandoned. As Paul Preston describes, agricultural and industrial production had reached a ceiling which internal conditions and inter-relationships would allow to develop no further.⁶ Further recovery would mean large-scale imports of essential materials and equipment.⁷ Franco's changes in government were part of this approach. This included the transfer of economic control from the Falange to non-Falangist "technocrats". As Borja de Riquer i Permanyer describes, "the years between 1960 and 1975 were riddled with contradictions and contrasts. This period saw the most accelerated, deep-seated social, economic and cultural transformation in Spanish history".⁸ Spain also once again needed powerful external support. Franco's regime, even as one of Europe's last WWII-era extreme-right dictatorships following Italian and German defeat looked to the capitalist West.⁹ Spain reached a military alliance with the US which provided crucial economic support in exchange for allowing a US military presence on Spanish territory.

Significant changes seemingly verging on fundamental regime changes were made, but Franco was reluctant. Franco's regime remained a police state and continued to appoint executives from the Army and even the Falange who understood what Franco wanted.¹⁰ Franco was never completely reconciled to an alliance with the USA. It was simply necessary for survival and rehabilitation. At the same time, Franco's Spain also pursued a politics of "*Hispanidad*" with Latin America. Historians including Haruko Hosoda and David Brydan show this was surreptitious postwar imperialist politics.¹¹ At home, the Falange still held a privileged albeit reduced role under Franco. Its long-sought

⁶ Paul Preston, "Spain", in Andrew Graham with Anthony Seldon (eds.), *Government and Economies in the Postwar World: Economic Policies and Comparative Performance, 1945-85* (London, 1991), pp. 125-153

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, "Adapting to Social Change: Social and Economic Change in a Climate of Political Immobilism", in Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (eds.), *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction: The Struggle for Modernity* (Oxford, 1995), p. 259

⁹ ABC, 13 May 1960, p. 55

¹⁰ Paul Preston, *Franco* (London, 1993), Amazon Kindle Edition, Line 13902

¹¹ Haruko Hosoda, "The Franco regime's contradiction: Its foreign policy toward Cuba", *Waseda Global Forum* 5 (2008), pp. 15-24; David Brydan, *Franco's Internationalists: Social Experts and Spain's Search for Legitimacy* (Oxford, 2019), p. 122

"National-Syndicalist" revolution as mentioned in earlier chapters, was in doubt. However, it now played a significant role supporting Franco as a counter-balance to political change be it from the left or the right, from monarchists or republicans.¹²

Attention is given to divisions between Francoist Falangists and "dissenters" from Franco's regime which increased as Civil War-era members were getting older, and younger members were filling the ranks. It also seemed the Falange and its ideology were being marginalised after 1945. Historians Michael Richards and Sheelagh Ellwood contest frequent misconceptions of the entire Falange being identified with the "dissenters". As Richards explains, under Franco's dictatorship Falangism was shaped in practice by provincial political opportunists serving as local mouthpieces of orthodox Francoism and guardians of narrow economic interests.¹³ Ellwood explains how a certain process of "proletarianisation" had even taken place within the Falange – before the 1940s the upper middle class and aristocratic elements constituted an important part of the Falange's militant base. By the 1960s these elements, with which Mayalde could long be identified, now formed part of the elite in Franco's apparatus. Rank-and-file militants now came mainly from the urban lower-middle and service classes and included some immigrants from the impoverished rural areas of the conservative Castilian heartland attracted by the relative prosperity of the urban centres.¹⁴ As Richards also explains, Falangist "dissenters" were limited to a small section of the intelligentsia and isolated "revolutionaries". Significantly, Mayalde's friend Dionisio Ridruejo led a disillusioned albeit somewhat isolated critique of Franco's "marginalisation" of the Falange. Ridruejo would be subjected to a process of internal exile and gaoled for supporting Falangist-syndicate students convening demonstrations in 1951.¹⁵ But as Ellwood points out: while the fluctuations of national and international politics depreciated the relevance of "National Syndicalism" in key areas including the economy and foreign affairs, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, it should also be recognised that in other spheres the Falange's hold remained formally intact up until Franco's death in 1975. Furthermore, no other Francoist faction with the exception of the Catholic Church was actually permitted to retain its pre-war structure, title, symbols, and lexicon nor to project them on society as the Falange did throughout the regime's existence.¹⁶

¹² Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987), p. 58

¹³ Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain since 1936* (Cambridge, 2013), Amazon Kindle Edition Line 4471

¹⁴ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 110

¹⁵ Richards, *After the Civil War*, Line 4471

¹⁶ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 110

Mayalde remained a Falangist and continued appealing to the memory and legacy of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and the role of the Falange in Spanish history.¹⁷ But he was also “considered one of the most loyal Franco supporters” having held “many important positions of trust, including that of National Chief of Police”.¹⁸ As earlier chapters have mentioned, Franco recognised and rewarded his services. The aristocrat’s qualifications for his post included earlier administrative and bureaucratic aptitude as a political secretary, a Civil Governor and a police commissioner. He also had diplomatic experience from his time as a pre-Civil War parliamentarian and of course Ambassador to the most important European capital during WWII. While seemingly remaining a staunch Falangist, Mayalde’s position was also helped by apparently still holding monarchist inclinations from his background with Romanones (as discussed in Chapter 1), or at least rediscovering them. During this time he appeared to be advising Franco while Juan Carlos was studying in Madrid and Falangist sections were expressing anti-monarchical sentiment.¹⁹ It is also significant that regardless of whether he may still have retained any personal association with Ramón Serrano Suñer, Mayalde was no longer under the shadow of the long-disgraced “cuñadísimo”. Unsurprisingly, it would have suited Franco that Mayalde would be situated somewhere between the extremes of the Falange and the staunch traditionalism of the Army officer corps and civilian monarchists. This was in order to maintain the balance of power Franco wished to consolidate since Serrano’s emasculation in 1942, at least for as long as Franco’s dictatorship could survive.

In as far as Mayalde may have been motivated by opportunism or pragmatism, Mayalde’s self-perception as a Falangist in 1952 may be gleaned in a 28 October 1953 speech by Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta, party secretary and close colleague of José Antonio. Speaking one month after the 26 September 1953 agreement with the USA, Fernández-Cuesta made the Falangist case for the idea of creating a West European bulwark against communism:

A new necessary mission, a new and imposing reason, broaden our horizons and accelerate our pace. Our national mission, ever ongoing, grows and spreads to become a universal mission. Spain has associated herself, decisively and contractually, with the defence of Europe. For us, this is above all the defence of Western Christianity. We defended it in our Homeland as the prime *raison d’être* of our Falangist being and we

¹⁷ BNE: VC/4805/25, “Felipe II, fundador de la capitalidad de Madrid” printed speech, 1961; FNFF: 15151, Mayalde’s address to the *Cortés*, 9 Dec. 1974

¹⁸ “Hispanic American Report 5”, *Hispanic American Studies* (Stanford 1952), p. 4

¹⁹ Paul Preston, *Juan Carlos* (1995), p. 156

shall have to defend it in the world. Now the dead of our Blue Division form the vanguard of the defence of Europe.²⁰

Fernández-Cuesta's position may be considered a Falangist view to political survival, coupled with an opportunism that took precedence over ideological consistency.²¹ Yet at the same time the Civil War and Blue Division references may still have suggested Falangist hopes and expectations for a future world order. As seen in Chapter 4, fascist defeat in 1945 did not seem to prompt an ideological reconsideration on quite the same scale as their victories had in 1939 and 1940. In a "Europe that seemed to be getting smaller", Falangists and fascists were expecting vindication through providing the "necessary" Cold War anti-Communist "way forward".²² This was rhetoric appealing to famed Nazi commando Otto Skorzeny's view of Spain as a "launchpad" for a fascist return and Oswald Mosley's postwar fascist notion of "Europe-a-nation" which allegedly involved Mayalde's colleagues including Serrano Suñer who never returned to government. Mayalde himself had helped accommodate Skorzeny and also the Belgian fascist Leon Degrelle among others.²³

Expanding from Chapter 4, some permanence could be seen while Mayalde's overall position metamorphosised between 1939 and 1952. Franco's nomination of Mayalde as Civil Governor of Barcelona in 1948, in the face of regional unrest, may encapsulate where Mayalde would stand between Franco and Ridruejo after 1945. Mayalde had declined this nomination after he suggested that food supplies be released in order to quell the protests, only to be told to forget that sort of approach and make use of the Civil Guard. Mayalde responded suggesting that a soldier would be a more appropriate choice for the post. On the face of things it appears he expected to be pursuing a "carrot and stick" policy – the former police commissioner Mayalde recognising that deterrents alone would not solve state problems.²⁴ His erstwhile German counterpart Reinhard Heydrich had governed German-occupied Czechoslovakia with "carrot and stick" methods before his 1942 assassination, something Mayalde himself would have had to be wary of in Catalonia recalling the execution of Lluís Companys in 1940.²⁵ Mayalde may even have recalled the treatment of Spanish workers in Germany as highlighted in Chapter 3. Basically, Mayalde was not pushing for "political

²⁰ Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, p. 103

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101

²² *ABC*, 13 May 1960, p. 55

²³ NWCD: Vol. 02/0028, Information Report distributed 2 Oct. 1951; Vol. 02/0026, Report printed 29 Sept. 1951; Graham Macklin, *Very Deeply Dyed in Black: Sir Oswald Mosley and the Postwar Reconstruction of British Fascism* (London, 2007), p. 100; Kew: KV3/45-6, evidence of post-war contact between British Fascists and Fascist individuals and organisations in Spain, 1946-1954

²⁴ Ramón Garriga, *La España de Franco: De la División Azul al Pacto con los Estados Unidos* (Puebla, 1971), pp. 595-6

²⁵ Robert Gerwarth, *Hitler's Hangman: The Life of Heydrich* (Yale, 2011), pp. 235-6: on Heydrich's implementation of "carrot and stick".

spirit" and violence by 1949. Nor would defending the status quo in the thankless position of Barcelona Civil Governor have appealed to what Mayalde would want out of taking up a governmental position.

Nevertheless, Mayalde, with his particular "adaptability", had the disposition Franco sought for the third of his five Mayors of Madrid.²⁶ With his 1952 appointment as Mayor of Madrid, a post that afforded prestige, Mayalde was once again determined to put his constituency of Madrid on a par with the preeminent European capitals of the time, London and Paris.²⁷

Domestic administration

Mayalde appeared to be able to answer the problems facing Franco as the 1950s advanced, and it was recognised that economic and political survival depended on improving living conditions. Mayalde succeeded Moreno Torres de Balio, who had been Mayor since 1946 and had been blamed for Madrid's poor transport system and the heavy cost of running the municipality.²⁸ Mayalde identified the need to improve housing as well as transport and end the trend of increasing shanty-town dwelling, known as "chabolismo".²⁹ A challenge was posed by mass migration from the countryside with the economic, social and political effects that demographic change would engender. By the early 1950s there were many thousands of families living a rudimentary existence in the shanty towns or "chabolas" of the bigger cities. As Paul Preston describes, mass migration into the expanding urban centres and particularly in Madrid threatened to overstretch the capacity of the cities to absorb new people. Generally, Spanish urban centres came to be blighted by poor apartment block developments, insanitary (or lack of) drainage and bad services. Furthermore the appalling living conditions of urban labour were a major factor contributing to the politicisation that took place in the late 1960s.³⁰ As Borja de Riquer points out, between 1955 and 1975 6 million Spaniards – 20 per cent of the population – moved from the provinces with 2 million alone to Madrid. The metropolis expanded as did ghettos for the new arrivals and public authorities almost immediately proved incapable with the increased demands placed on them by the new city-dwellers.³¹ As Michael Richards describes, the cost and conditions of living in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and other parts of the country fuelled widespread protests in early 1951.³²

²⁶ Tomás Borrás, "Los Cincos Alcaldes de Franco, III: El Conde de Mayalde", *Actos III* (Madrid, 1976), pp. 35-42

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "Hispanic American Report 5", *Hispanic American Studies* (Stanford, 1952), p. 4

²⁹ ABC, 26 Jun. 1952, p. 28; "Fallece el alcalde que inició la M-30", ABC, 11 May 1995, p. 64

³⁰ Preston, "Spain", pp. 125-153

³¹ Borja de Riquer, "Adapting to Social Change", p. 263

³² Richards, *After the Civil War*, Line 4391

During Mayalde's tenure, Madrid made considerable progress while enjoying economic prosperity with American support. Just a few days before his May 1960 London trip, it seemed Mayalde made progress with transport. The 5th May was a typical Thursday where the *Alcalde* would convene a weekly meeting with Madrid's Municipal Authority. On this occasion it was agreed that four new fire engines along with necessary modern materials would be acquired for Madrid's fire-services and more taxis would be procured for upcoming festivities. Mayalde himself had beforehand reviewed four newly-arrived German-built fire engines which had been much sought.³³ The London trip provided a typical occasion for the *Alcalde* to ask his host, in this case the Lord Mayor of London, how the matter of car parking in London had been resolved. When asked by the press about the traffic problems in London after his return, Mayalde responded that one of the things that eased things in an extraordinary manner was that the owners of the vehicles who resided in the outskirts and worked in central London left their cars several kilometres away from where they worked. The remainders of their journeys would be covered by train.³⁴ Also London was using sites cleared by firefighters for the construction of underground and high-rise car parks.

Despite Mayalde's endeavours, by the time he resigned he was hardly able to curb the key issues including housing and overpopulation. As Michael Richards highlights, the Francoist state could not keep pace with the scale of an internal migration as crucial as it was to the desperately sought economic growth. In 1957, the housing deficit in Madrid was estimated to be 1,067,452 family units and officially set at 60-70,000 dwellings.³⁵ Antonio Cazorla writes that the issues of the housing shortages, illegal shacks, overcrowding and disease on the periphery and in depressed areas at the centre had not been resolved.³⁶ The regime would attribute this to the destruction of working-class neighbourhoods during the Spanish Civil War, a failure to conserve older buildings by the Republic and attraction to workers of the economic take-off in the industrial sector in the capital. In reality, while the industrial sector was booming, the economy as a whole had been in trouble with the regime's authorities having had mishandled housing construction for the previous two decades. The closest the authorities had to a coherent plan to address the situation was through regulating "illegal workers" in 1957.³⁷ Although the controlled Francoist press gave the impression that the problems were being tackled through the construction and inauguration of new homes, in internal correspondence there was an admission that the houses were often of dubious quality and always too few. The press would appear at inaugurations but once they disappeared the problems

³³ *ABC*, 5 May 1960, p. 9

³⁴ *ABC*, 17 May 1960, p. 63

³⁵ Richards, *After the Civil War*, Line 4557

³⁶ Antonio Cazorla, *Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco's Spain* (Oxford, 2009), p. 115

³⁷ *Ibid.*

unravelling and many houses were often soon in need of repair. By the late 1960s, there were 50,000 unoccupied and unaffordable flats in Madrid. In 1965 the city had more than 18,000 families living in shacks; and there were "new" neighbourhoods, like Moratalaz, where only 43 per cent of the houses had running water and only 55 percent had a WC. Nearly 17 percent of school-age children in the city did not attend school at all, while close to 50 percent of children of working-class parents left school before they were 13 years old. Two out of three of those questioned stated that the main reason for this was the "lack of economic resources" of the family.³⁸ Neither Mayalde nor Franco were sure how to resolve these crucial domestic problems. When Mayalde stepped down in 1965, he had failed to end "chabolismo" and Madrid had become an "unwieldy metropolis". Although stifled by the apparatus of Francoist dictatorship, Mayalde was not alone among Mayors of European capitals dealing with such problems.³⁹

Diplomacy

Much of Mayalde's focus in any event was concerned with how he could best represent the Franco regime to the western European camp with which it had previously been at odds. With his particular disposition as an aristocrat and a diplomat, Franco dispatched Mayalde to Europe as an interface with the anti-communist, conservative and aristocratic elements of the European political class. He had the interface in particular for the "illustrious" personalities as portrayed by accounts of his receptions in London and elsewhere.⁴⁰ He could sell Spain and Madrid insofar as Spain was now a respectable part of the "new order" as a UN member state, though Spain did not join NATO nor the European Economic Community until after its eventual transition to democracy. This period would be marked by reciprocal visits with Charles de Gaulle between Madrid and Paris in 1958 as a result of which Mayalde was appointed Commander of the *Legion d'Honneur*.⁴¹ In 1959 Mayalde invited and received in Madrid that year's Lord Mayor of London Harold Gillett.⁴² The 1959 visit was the first ever official visit to Madrid by a Lord Mayor of London and was reciprocated to Mayalde by Stockdale the following year. Mayalde was also the first Mayor of Madrid to have visited London. This was in fact not Mayalde's first time in Britain – he had visited five times before, but not as a public official.⁴³ Mayalde also warmly welcomed President Eisenhower to Madrid in December 1959 and played a key role in his visit. As Paul Preston describes, although American military bases started operating in Spain with the Pact of Madrid in 1953, Eisenhower had not yet been able to visit Spain.

³⁸ Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, pp. 119-20

³⁹ "Fallece el alcalde que inició la M-30", *ABC*, 11 May 1995

⁴⁰ *ABC*, 17 May 1959, p. 96

⁴¹ *ABC*, 8 Nov. 1959, p. 77

⁴² *ABC*, 17 May 1959, p. 96

⁴³ *ABC*, 13 May 1960, p. 55

Therefore, this was an important visit which Preston also describes as “the peak of Franco’s international career”.⁴⁴ Additionally, and with a view to Franco’s *Hispanidad* politics, Mayalde made a number of trips to Latin American Countries including Peru and corresponded with leaders including Argentina’s Juan Perón.⁴⁵

There was a consistent train of diplomatic visits which Mayalde both received and made throughout his political career, not least as Mayor of Madrid. These included splendid dinners promoting common ties and common order as well as toasts to the Heads of State, guided tours of museums and other commercially and culturally significant sites which were typically rounded off by gifts of original or copies of exhibits. Of course, as was typical of Mayalde’s incidental diplomacy, there was also exchange of advice on management with a view to renovating and reorganising policy at home.⁴⁶ Interactions furthermore would beget other interactions. Mayalde said that his 1960 London trip also led to a visit to Bordeaux and from there a warm meeting with its Mayor Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who at that same time was President of the National Assembly.⁴⁷ In pursuing political and economic links with the leading European democracies, Mayalde defended Franco’s dictatorship. In London he argued that many Britons “didn’t know the reality of Spain” which had “lots of freedoms” under Franco. He appealed for closer union and friendship between the two countries in the difficult times that the world was going through.⁴⁸

Conclusion

Mayalde as Mayor possessed the qualities that Franco desired in 1952 with both his aristocratic background and Falangist history. He was an able bureaucrat and administrator. He had an interface with anti-communist and especially conservative politicians in Europe and America along with right-wing leaders in Latin America. Mayalde helped maintain the balance between fascists and monarchists and above all demonstrated his loyalty to Franco. Loyalty had helped him rise in government and ultimately saw him gain the post of Mayor where he could say that he “presided” over Madrid’s visibility in 1960s Europe. Mayalde was succeeded as Mayor by Carlos Arias Navarro, another Falangist former police commissioner who on this occasion came fresh out of the *Dirección General de Seguridad* whose Armed Police, created by Mayalde back in 1941, was now being mobilised to respond to new anti-regime protest.⁴⁹ These appointments offer a clear indication of

⁴⁴ ABC, 19 Dec. 1959, p. 56; 22 Dec. 1959, p. 49; 5 Feb. 1959, p. 39

⁴⁵ ABC, 16 Dec. 1953, p. 60; HIA: Juan Domingo Perón papers 4/5, “Mayalde, Conde de, 1972-3”

⁴⁶ ABC, 17 May 1960, p. 63

⁴⁷ ABC, 17 May 1960, p. 63

⁴⁸ ABC, 13 May 1960, p. 55

⁴⁹ “Spain’s New Premier Carlos Arias Navarro”, *The New York Times*, 31 Dec. 1973, p. 3

Franco's view of the need for continued firm executive management, which was certainly a reason for Mayalde's own appointment.

It is difficult to pinpoint how much control over infrastructural matters Mayalde really had, let alone determine whether Mayalde's management was on the whole positive or negative. In any event the results of his management and administration in general were not so important as the ability to achieve Franco's desired political balance. And once again, the real prize for Mayalde himself as Mayor of Madrid was the status afforded by his diplomatic duties in Spain, Europe and beyond. And through his particular position, he reached the peak of his career not just by attaining the Mayoral post but also quite crucially keeping it for a long period of thirteen years. This was much more time than he spent in his previous posts and the longest tenure of any Mayor of Madrid. It seems that, despite a long period in the wilderness, Mayalde had made such a good impression on Franco that he could yet attain greater heights. This was while on the whole Spain was making material progress. Mayalde would not have been able to preside over any "advances" by remaining a police commissioner, Civil Governor or serving as an Ambassador. After being Mayor, Mayalde next became Vice-President of Franco's *Cortés* which was a post through which he continued his inter-European diplomacy.⁵⁰ Mayalde finally retired after Franco died in 1975, and on what appeared to be a high-note as opposed to a setback, not realising that the new king, Juan Carlos, who he had helped accommodate, would end by playing a role in the dismantling of the dictatorship and the transition to Spain's liberal parliamentary democracy – albeit with the "safety net" of an amnesty to protect the servants of Franco's state.

⁵⁰ "Proceedings of the 63rd Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference held in Madrid", *Interparliamentary Bureau* 63, 2 (1976), 10: "...the Count of Mayalde, is not unknown to us. He has a great parliamentary record behind him and has been associated with the Inter-Parliamentary Union for many years, and he has much to his credit in the contributions he has made"

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to assess the significance of the role played by the Conde de Mayalde under Franco. In particular this has meant looking at Mayalde's key police role during the Francoist repression and also his relations with Nazi Germany during World War II. We have also seen that the aristocratic Mayalde's underlying distinction was to have been a political survivor. Despite having been an ardent pro-Nazi fascist, he apparently found little difficulty in refurbishing his underlying monarchist traits in order to continue his political service to Franco in the Cold War-era as the long-running Mayor of Madrid. In the new world order, Franco himself had become the "Sentinel of the West" and the eventual restoration of the Monarchy was by then being anticipated.

What we have seen throughout is that Mayalde was neither a theorist nor a doctrinaire in his position. Rather, he was an instinctive Francoist whose overall political significance resides in having been a steadfast servant to a higher Francoist authority which he never contested. In spite of all the regime changes in a changing international political context, Mayalde continued to believe that Franco and Francoism were defending core, rigid hierarchical social values which he shared and which he believed were primordial. In this regard we might posit that, through these core values and their implementation, something of Francoism's fascist inflection remained throughout the four decades of the dictatorship.

In the 1940s Mayalde was an enforcer of ideology which had been devised by others. In this framework, the present thesis has explored pertinent issues such as the specific role and function of antisemitism under Franco. It has also explored the extent to which Mayalde could promote and maintain any "Naziphilia" especially when given the inherent tensions in Francoist-Axis relations with the forging of police cooperation and as regards the functioning of the Blue Division on the Eastern Front. For all the tensions involved, however, neither police cooperation nor the Blue Division's military involvement were interests and objectives exclusive to the Falange. Indeed the Falange proved a useful tool of the regime in furthering these objectives, provided it could be kept under control. Above all, we can deduce that Mayalde was not beneath pragmatism: he wanted to further a Falangist agenda to which pro-Nazism was subordinated, but these goals apparently never overrode his instinctive loyalty to Franco.

Thus Mayalde's particular importance for Franco was as a loyal administrator, bureaucrat and diplomat, in spite or perhaps even because of his Falangism. During Mayalde's tenure as Serrano Suñer's most important subordinate his conduct was influenced though not completely handicapped by his competitive Falangism. By the time Mayalde retired along with Serrano in 1942, it was also indisputable that Mayalde had elevated his profile in a positive way in Franco's own eyes. In the later

Franco years, a “domesticated” Falangism remained a key part of the regime and was useful too in helping Franco offset other competing political factions that challenged his own pre-eminence as *Caudillo*. Mayalde’s Mayoral appointment in 1952 indicates Franco’s longstanding acknowledgment of Mayalde’s administrative aptitude. However it is clear that throughout his career it was in the diplomatic arena that Mayalde reaped the rewards of power and prestige. Franco himself clearly recognised that this was the sphere in which Mayalde could best pursue regime interests, and this explains his role in receiving President Eisenhower in 1959, visiting London in 1960 and his later participation in European Inter-Parliamentary Conferences.

In all, Mayalde came to appreciate and identify with this “enjoyment” and exercise of power for the prestige it afforded. When the Spanish Civil War had ended, Mayalde had seen his purpose as forging an ideological powerbase based on new values which incorporated Nazi-inspired techniques for managing Spanish society. Circumstances changed radically as a result of Nazi defeat in WWII, and yet one might surmise that Mayalde may even have decided that Francoism *tout court* was a sufficient “solution” to or “discipliner” of social change, and that the “new order” did not need to be made in the specific Falangist form that he had once thought was required. Whatever the case, Mayalde’s Falangism never seriously impeded his later political career. The WWII-era of “fascist political spirit” had ended, but after this defeat Mayalde identified the points where he actually achieved the equilibrium he desired between traditional blue-blood sensibilities, vested blue-shirt political interests, professional competence and loyalty to the *patria* and *Caudillo*. It was these points of “serviceability” and loyalty to Franco himself for which Mayalde was rewarded and which in subsequent years allowed him to construct a relatively prominent public profile that he could project through Spain and to an international audience beyond.

At the current time many state and diplomatic records relating to the themes dealt with in this thesis are inaccessible. These include some files which were once available to researchers. It is to be hoped that in the near to medium future the picture will be more promising and some files have been scheduled to be released. In the meantime, the present thesis has sought to harness previous scholarship while also expanding the detailed, empirical picture on Mayalde’s role and functions under Franco. It is clearer now that Mayalde was important not just for the ambitions of the Falange or speculative endeavours. Crucially, he helped advance what were core objectives of the whole Franco regime. As such, it is hoped that the present thesis can serve in the future as a route map for use by other researchers, once the archival situation in Spain becomes more open and accessible again.

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Appendix



Aristocrat

Mayalde (second from right) in the company of King Alfonso XIII (left)
La Esfera (Ministerio de Cultura) 15, 774, Madrid, 3 Nov. 1928



Parliamentarian


Mayalde (fourth from right) participating in a parliamentary delegation in Toledo receiving politicians from Toledo, Ohio
ABC, 18 May 1934, p. 32



Soldier
Mayalde as an *alferez*
provisional in Franco's
artillery during the
Spanish Civil War in 1936



Servant to the Cause
Mayalde celebrated
Alonso de Palencia, "FALANGE SIGUE... Un
duelo de batallas, victorias y esperanzas,"
Heraldo de Zamora, 23 Nov. 1938, p.3



Director General de Seguridad
Mayalde assumes his position with his Falangist program.
ABC, 27 Sept. 1939, p. 19



El Cuñadísimo
Ramón Serrano Suñer
BArch: Bild 121-1010, 22 Sept. 1940



El Ausente
José Antonio Primo de Rivera
GureGipuzkoa, 1933



Special Mission to Berlin, August-September 1940

Mayalde greeted by Kurt Daluege (right) and Reinhard Heydrich (centre). NAC, 28 Aug. 1940

Spanische Falangisten: José Conde de Mayalde
Spanish Falangists: José Conde de Mayalde



»Spanish Police Leader visits Berlin«

Das Schwarze Korps, 5th September 1940, Sachsenhausen Memorial and Museum

This delegation of Francoist Spanish police went to see Sachsenhausen concentration camp during a visit to Berlin at the end of August 1940. One year later, José Conde de Mayalde (centre of photo) was appointed Spanish ambassador in Berlin; from 1952 to 1965 he was Mayor of Madrid. As Spain's President of Police, José Conde de Mayalde (1904-1995) was responsible for the deportation to Nazi Germany of fighters of the International Brigades and numerous refugees.



A Spanish police delegation entering
Sachsenhausen concentration camp

30th August 1940, Sachsenhausen Memorial and Museum

Harry Naujoks, a communist from Hamburg, was imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp and became Camp Senior. He described the visit of the Spanish delegation as follows: »At the end of August 1940, a Spanish police delegation, led by the Count of Mayalde, visited Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Himmler led the group through the camp himself. There were loads of prominent SS leaders there too. This delegation obviously incited the SS so much against those of its countrymen who, as opponents of Franco, had been sent to the camp, that as soon as Mayalde had departed, the SS attacked the small group of Spanish prisoners.«

Mayalde meets Himmler

Above: Lichterfelde Barracks of the *Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler*

Below: Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp
Sachsenhausen Memorial and Museum



High-ranking Nazi official in Spain

Himmler's reciprocal visit to Spain, October 1940



ABC, 20 Oct. 1940, front page



ABC 24 Oct. 1940, p. 5



Reorganising the Police

ABC, 9 Apr. 1941

The aims of the 8 March 1941 Law


"The victory of Spanish arms, having established a regime that seeks to avoid the errors and defects of old weak liberal and democratic organisation, demands that the organisms charged with the defence of the State have greater powers and scope, like those models which impose the necessity of rigorous and tight vigilance and surveillance of all enemies"

"Some of the pre-existing means in the present struggle against crime are inadequate. The present police organs with their lack of political feeling, typical of systems in an irreversible state of decomposition, cannot today serve to defend against great threats from within and beyond"

"The recent reorganisation of the DGS concentrating on preventative and repressive elements has been the first step to achieve these aims. But in order for this to mean something, a profound reform is necessary ... so that the new Spanish Police can carry out its mission of total and permanent vigilance, indispensable to the life of the Nation, that in totalitarian states owes to a certain combination of technical perfection and of loyalty evident in the activities and the life of the political police, as the most efficient organ for the defence of the State."

"An indispensable consequence of this reform has to be an accentuated professional spirit and discipline in this Corps, with a maximum sense of responsibility and sacrifice, that has to be put towards achieving security in action when the Government requires it and the constant safeguarding of the Regime and the interests of the *patria*."

Circular 11 and Franco's "Jewish Archive", 5 May 1941




"The need to know in a detailed and conclusive way the places and individuals that, at a given moment, may be an obstacle or contraband to the postulates of the New State, requires that especial attention be paid to the Jews living in our fatherland, thus, gathering in due form information about their background and as many details may be needed to determine the ideology of each of them and their possible activities, inside and outside our national territory.

I shall not emphasise to Your Excellency the extent to which this task must be fulfilled —that Your Excellency may already have deduced from its major importance— especially when the individuals subject to this measure are mostly of Spanish origin —the so-called 'Sephardim'— and with their capacity to adapt to the environment and similarities in features to us, they have the best guaranteed means of concealing their origins and going by unnoticed, making it impossible to contain their facilities for perturbing manoeuvres.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind the notoriety of this race and their almost public efforts to obtain Spanish nationality during the Republican period through serious popular campaigns across all spheres, it is given that one can determine the personality of the Spanish Jews living in each province, though many difficulties may arise such as their lack of retained ties with their peculiar 'Israelite communities', synagogues or special schools (except in places as Barcelona, Baleares and Morocco) that may provide more detailed figures of their numbers and reach, both individually and collectively.

In publications going back to 1933, the minimum Israelite population in Spain is supposed to be some 5,000 (with the exception of Morocco), and, on the other hand, I should report that a Universal Confederation of Sephardic Jews was convened in Paris last year. This is important owing to the quantity as much as the quality of the Spanish Semites involved and above all, without their maintained extensive contacts with peoples of the same origin, resident in our territory and with such connections facilitated by the favourable political circumstances of those times.

Therefore, I urge you to have the Police Corps, with aid by individuals of the best reputation, to send back to this Head Office detailed records of those Israelites —nationals and foreigners— living in this province; specifying, as stated in the attached form, as many details as possible that may determine each of their personal and socio-political affiliations, means of living, commercial activities, current situation, degree of dangerousness, criminal background, and the grade or activity that they may have had achieved in sects or other political organs and trade unions; in the absence of such, then state the place in which they were found, means of subsistence of their families at home, and any other detail until completing their background, adding to those from foreign origin, their original nationality and motives to stay in Spain. At the same time, I expect a review on the general impression and importance of the Jewish activities in each province, as well as from their institutions and other available sources. I emphasise the urgency of everything referred to here."



Entries in the "Masonic Archive" (27 Sept. 1941) and "Jewish Archive" (6 Dec. 1943) for Republican politician-in-exile Margarita Nelken

AHN: H 29

Report on Maria Sinai Leon, 30 Jun. 1944
AHN: H63593

Inclusion of Lluís Companys in the "Masonic Archive", 1940
AHN: H338


Land	Zahl
A. Altreich	131.800
Ostmark	43.700
Ostgebiete	420.000
Generalgouvernement	2.284.000
Bialystok	400.000
Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren	74.200
Estland - judenfrei -	
Lettland	3.500
Litauen	34.000
Belgien	43.000
Dänemark	5.600
Frankreich / Besetztes Gebiet	165.000
Unbesetztes Gebiet	700.000
Griechenland	69.600
Niederlande	160.800
Norwegen	1.300
B. Bulgarien	48.000
England	330.000
Finnland	2.300
Irland	4.000
Italien einschl. Sardinien	58.000
Albanien	200
Kroatien	40.000
Portugal	3.000
Rumänien einschl. Bessarabien	342.000
Schweden	8.000
Schweiz	18.000
Serbien	10.000
Slowakei	88.000
Spanien	6.000
Türkei (europ. Teil)	55.500
Ungarn	742.800
UdSSR	5.000.000
Ukraine	2.994.684
Weißrußland aus- schl. Bialystok	446.484
Zusammen: über	11.000.000

Speculation and Conjecture

The Census of Estimated Jewish populations in European countries at the 1942 Wannsee Conference included occupied territories, enemy territory which had not been occupied nor invaded and neutral or "non-belligerent" countries, using whatever available sources. The figure obtained for Spain was 6,000

Interest in Press and Propaganda

ABC, 15 Nov. 1941, p. 11



Ambassador of the Blue Division

Mayalde (centre) with German Officials and Blue Division Aviation Commander Ángel Salas Larrazábal to his right
Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe: 2-12884,
 Jul. 1941



Axis

Mayalde (second from right) in Berlin reunited with Ramón Serrano Suñer (left of Mayalde), who was being received by Ribbentrop (right of Mayalde) for the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact. *GettyImages*, 25 Nov. 1941



Released POWs of the Blue Division

As Mayor, Mayalde (centre) presided over their reception in Madrid following their release from Soviet captivity
Museo del Ejercito: MUE-210185, 4 May 1954



Mayor of Madrid

Mayalde (right) in London with Edmund Stockdale (left)
ABC, 12 May 1960, p. 9

Open for Business

Mayalde (right) meets Charlton Heston at the set of *55 Days in Peking* in Madrid. Europhoto, 1962



Interparliamentary Relations

Mayalde (centre) as Vice-President of the *Cortés* receives British MPs led by Albert Roberts, Labour MP for Normanton. *ABC*, 16 May 1973, p. 5



Mayalde before Franco

Cifra Graphica, 1959