

Dimensionality, ideology and party positions towards European integration

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Abstract

The rise of political contestation over European integration has led many scholars to examine the role that broader ideological positions play in structuring party attitudes towards European integration. This article extends the existing approaches in two important ways: 1) It shows that whether the dimensionality of politics is imagined in a one dimensional 'general left-right' form or a two dimensional 'economic left-right/social liberal-conservative' form leads to very different understandings of the way ideology has structured attitudes towards European integration, with the two dimensional approach offering greater explanatory power. 2) Existing approaches have modelled the influence of ideology on attitudes towards European integration as a static process. This article shows that the relationship between ideology and European integration has changed substantially over the history of European integration: divisions over social issues have replaced economic concerns as the main driver of party attitudes towards European integration.

For much of its history, the process of European integration seemed to be marked by a general consensus in favour of continued integration amongst both political elites and citizens. As many have noted, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 referendum appeared to mark an end to this period, ushering in a new phase of protest and public opposition to European integration and an increase in conflict between and within political parties over EU policy (Down and Wilson 2008; Hobolt 2006; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Scholars have been divided over the extent that this increased politicisation has impacted national political parties and party competition in EU member-states (Carrubba 2001; Evans 1999; Evans 2002; Mair 2000). Gradually a consensus has emerged that although European integration has yet to play a major role in domestic electoral competition, it has become a 'sleeping giant' that could become an important electoral issue in the future (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; de Vries 2007).

In response to these developments, a great deal of research has sought to explain the origins and structure of conflict over European integration between political parties. A consistent empirical finding has been the so-called 'inverted-U' pattern: when politics is envisaged as occurring in a two dimensional space with a general left-right dimension and a European integration dimension, party support for European integration is highest among parties at the centre of the left-right spectrum and lowest at both extremes (Aspinwall 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; 2002; Marks 2004; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002).

Many attempts have been made to understand this pattern and to untangle the relationship between the left-right dimension and support for European integration. Different scholars have reached resoundingly different conclusions: that left-right and European integration are orthogonal dimensions, that they are fused dimensions, that left-right structures some but not all aspects of European integration, or that we need to move beyond the one dimensional left-right framework and incorporate conflicts over 'new politics' into our models. To a large extent the scholars working on this question, perhaps because they work on different substantive aspects of European integration, have talked past one another. This article represents the first attempt to analyse competing models of the relationship between existing political dimensions and European integration. It finds, contrary to those who propose that European integration is an orthogonal political dimension, that party positions on European integration are structured by existing political dimensions. Testing different models of this relationship shows that a two dimensional (economic left-right and social liberal-conservative) conception of political competition provides more explanatory power than a unidimensional 'general left-right' model. Finally this article proposes that all existing models of the relationship between party ideology and party support for European integration have failed to account for one dimension: time. Incorporating a time dimension into models of the relationship between party ideology and party support for European integration reveals that the relationship has changed considerably over the course of European integration – shifting from a situation in which party positions are largely determined by attitudes towards economic issues to one in which positions are more strongly influenced by stances on social issues.

Existing approaches

One of the first explorations of the dimensionality of the politics of European integration was provided by Hix and Lord, who argued that attitudes to European integration represent an independent political dimension, primarily concerned with the question of national sovereignty (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 1997). In this approach the national sovereignty dimension is orthogonal to the left-right dimension

because they involve fundamentally different questions of resource distribution. The national sovereignty dimension involves questions about the distribution of resources between *territorial* groups while the left-right dimension is about the division of resources between *functional* groups, such as social classes.

Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the process of European integration, and the process of globalisation more generally, has created new winners and losers in society. European integration has created new social cleavages in areas such as protected and unprotected economic sectors, cultural competition between natives and migrants, and opponents and supporters of supranational governance. These divisions then structure attitudes towards European integration. According to this approach, the inverted-U pattern is explained because mainstream political parties have a strategic interest in maintaining the dominance of the left-right dimension in political competition and so mainstream parties have coalesced around a generally pro-European position. Similarly, but looking at the issue from the opposite perspective, Taggart (1998) argued that opposition to European integration constitutes a 'touchstone of dissent' for radical and extremist parties: an issue they try to use as a wedge to gain entry into a party system.

Other scholars have argued that rather than being a new cleavage, conflict over European Integration is structured by existing political cleavages (Marks and Wilson 2000). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) argue that the inverted-U shape is slightly misleading. They claim that when fringe political parties are eliminated from analysis there is a linear relationship between European integration and the left-right dimension, ranging from a pro-integration left to a anti-integration right. Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999), and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) go as far as to argue that the European integration dimension has become fused with the left-right dimension. These authors argue that debate about European integration focuses on whether or not there should be more or less regulation across Europe, rather than whether or not integration is a good thing in general. The more-less regulation dimension is congruous with the left-right dimension, and so the two are essentially the same.

Work by Hooghe and Marks (1999) showed that the left-right dimension shapes attitudes towards some, but not all, aspects of European integration, particularly policies concerned with redistribution and regulating capitalism. Initially Hooghe and Marks (1999) hypothesised that the remaining elements of European integration consisted of an orthogonal dimension in much the same way as proposed by the earlier Hix and Lord (1997) model. However in later work Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) came to the conclusion that the remaining aspects of attitudes to European integration can be accounted for by positions on a 'new politics' dimension which builds on the scholarship that examines the rise of political issues concerned with lifestyle, the environment, culture, nationalism and immigration (Franklin 1992; Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Müller-Rommel 1989).

Drawing on this work, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) argue that European integration is perceived as a direct threat to the principles of those on the 'traditional-authoritarian-nationalist' pole of their new politics scale: hostility to immigrants, foreign cultures, cosmopolitan elites, and international institutions. Conversely, parties on the 'green-alternative-libertarian' pole of the new politics scale have mixed motivations towards European integration. The EU offers the possibility of enhanced cooperation in policy areas such as environmental protection but might also pose a threat to democracy and public interest groups.

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's (2002) new politics theory can potentially explain variation in party competition over European integration in different countries. Marks et al. (2006) find that there is a geographic divide between western and eastern (post-Soviet) Europe in the pattern of party competition of European integration. As a result of different alignments of the left-right dimension

and the 'new politics' dimension in western and eastern Europe, competition over European issues tend to map more readily onto the existing party structures in eastern Europe, while in western Europe, European issues are more of a cross cutting issue. The consequence of this is that where attitudes to European integration do not align with existing party structures on the left-right and new politics dimensions they can act as a potentially volatile electoral issue.

The dimensionality of European political space

Despite the compelling nature of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's (2002) theory, scholars of European politics have failed to reach consensus on the dimensionality of the politics of European integration. Whether they have explicitly followed Hooghe, Marks and Wilson or not, many scholars have adopted an economic, social, and European integration dimensions approach to the structure of European political space (e.g. Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012). Others however, particularly those who study decision making within EU bodies such as the European parliament, have for the most part continued to use an orthogonal dimensions (left-right, and European integration/national sovereignty) approach (e.g. Hix and Høyland 2011; König and Bräuninger 2004; Warntjen, Hix, and Crombez 2008).

A problem with comparing different theories of the relationship between the left-right dimension and European integration (which faces scholars using the left-right concept in all contexts) is that different definitions of 'left-right' might be used by different scholars. In particular, two definitions of left-right are commonly used: The first, a 'general left-right' dimension uses left-right to denote a single 'super' dimension which structures political competition that involves both economic issues (left: government control of the economy; right: free market) and social issues (left: socially liberal/progressive; right: socially conservative/traditional). The second definition, an 'economic left-right' dimension, is only concerned with economic issues and social issues are considered to form a second political dimension.

Ultimately the question of the dimensionality of political space is one that might have different answers in different contexts. As Benoit and Laver (2012: 216) put it:

'Just as physical maps are spanned by physical dimensions, conceptual maps are spanned by conceptual dimensions, which we use to provide substantive orientation. Just as there is not one true map, neither is there 'one true dimensionality' for any given political setting. Sometimes... a one-dimensional map will tell us everything we want to know. Sometimes... it will not.'

It is not hard to see the potential impact of the choice left-right definition has on our understanding of the relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European integration. According to the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) model, attitudes towards European integration are structured by both economic *and* social attitudes. These effects might be obscured by a more general one dimensional conception of left and right – things that occur as a result of changes in social positions might be wrongly attributed to economic attitudes.

Although most scholars are explicit in which conception of left-right they are using, their conceptions of the overall dimensional structure of European politics are not always the same, and so arguments about the role of 'left and right' and European integration may simply be talking past one another. Additionally the restrictions of data availability limit the choices researchers are able to make. For example Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries (2012) make use of the combined Ray-Chapel Hill Expert survey

dataset (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) to test the effect of ideology on party positions towards European integration between 1984 and 2006. The scope of their analysis is necessarily restricted to a one dimensional approach by the fact that prior to the 1999 survey, the expert surveys only measured left-right ideology in the general sense. Similarly Hellström (2008) approaches the question of ideology and European integration using the MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2013). Although Hellström draws on the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson argument (2002), he is restricted to a one dimensional analysis by using a modified version MARPOR's general left-right RILE scale.

How much impact these different conceptions of the dimensionality of political space have on our assessments of the relationship between ideology and European integration is unclear. In many EU member-states the economic and social dimensions are closely aligned, and so the influence of dimensionality in those cases may well be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a potentially important issue which previous explorations of the relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European integration have tended to sidestep or ignore. This is the first potential improvement to existing analyses offered by the present approach – the models developed here will be tested using both one and two dimensional conceptions of political space. Following Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's (2002) finding that the economic and social dimensions affect attitudes to different aspects of European integration, it is expected that because it provides greater explanatory power a two dimensional approach will also provide a better fitting statistical model of the relationship between ideology and European integration

Hypothesis 1: A two dimensional conception of ideology will provide a better fitting model of the relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European integration.

Ideology and European integration over time

One dimension that has been neglected by all previous approaches to ideology and European integration is how this relationship has changed over time. That this is the case is perhaps surprising as even a cursory glance at the history of European integration suggests that European integration is not an enduring and amorphous concept. Although it is generally referred to as a single process, the reality is that there has not been one European integration: there have been many different European integrations. The early stages of integration focused on specific industrial areas: coal and steel, and atomic energy. Later economic integration gained a free market focus before the turn to 'Social Europe' began to affect areas such as labour market regulation. Finally in the last two decades non-economic areas such as social policy, military cooperation, and foreign policy, have begun to come under the remit of European integration as well.

Similarly, a brief examination of the history of the attitudes of certain political parties towards European integration reveals a relationship that changes across time. Much of this change has occurred on the left of the political spectrum: many parties on the left were opposed to European integration for much of its early history, perceiving it as a capitalist project to spread the free market across Europe. However the combination of the shift in European integration towards social policy in the late 1980s onwards and the move to a more moderate position by many left wing parties led many to a positive reassessment of European integration.

On the far-left, several west European Communist parties have moved from an openly hostile and Eurosceptic position to a positive (if still critical) stance (Charalambous 2013). Similarly many Green

parties have shifted from an anti-integration position to embracing European integration as a platform to pursue their policy goals (Bomberg 1998).

More mainstream left parties have also experienced a large shift in their positions on European integration as well. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the British Labour Party (Daniels 1998). Labour opposed Britain's involvement in the early stages of European integration and later became bitterly divided over Europe leading to the 1975 referendum and contributing to the 1981 Social Democratic Party split. By the time of their victory at the 1997 election however, Labour had embraced a wholehearted enthusiasm for Europe. Similarly in Greece, PASOK opposed Greece's entry to the EEC before eventually becoming the mainstream 'party of Europe' (before their electoral collapse) (Moschonas 2001).

Any model that does not include some sort of temporal component implicitly assumes that these changes can be accounted for by shifts in party ideology rather than changes to the nature of European integration. Although such shifts have undoubtedly played some role, changes to the nature of European integration suggest that they are unlikely to account for all the shifts in party attitudes towards European integration. Specifically two changes are expected to occur over time. First, as integration progressed from its 'common market' phase to an integrated regulated market, the economic ideological structure of attitudes towards European integration is likely to have moved from a situation in which attitudes towards European integration became more favourable as parties were more right wing (as support for economic liberalisation and free trade increases) to one in which attitudes towards European integration are most positive in the centre of the economic dimension and more hostile as parties move away from the centre, because they either object to the 'market' focus of the EU (left pole) or to the burden of EU regulation (right pole):

Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between economic left-right and European integration will shift from a left-right/anti-pro integration relationship to a centre-periphery/pro-anti integration relationship as European integration progresses.

Secondly, as European integration has progressed from a functionalist economic project to its contemporary form of supranational governance – with competencies ranging from immigration to foreign policy cooperation – the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension will have shifted from a relationship of centrist support for integration to a relationship marked by an increasing division between those who see European integration as a threat to national sovereignty and integrity, particularly as a result of migration, and those that support the goal of international cooperation as a means of solving political problems:

Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between social liberal-conservative positions and European integration will shift from a centre-periphery/pro-anti integration relationship to a liberal-conservative/pro-anti relationship as European integration progresses.

In the case of the one dimensional model, where left and liberal, and right and conservative are fused, the combination of these two hypotheses will result in a model which shows a shift from an anti-integration left and a pro-integration right, to a pro-integration left and an anti-integration right.

Hypothesis 2c: In the one dimensional model the relationship between left and right will shift from a left-right/anti-pro European integration alignment, to a left-right/pro-anti European integration alignment.

Data and Methodology

The hypotheses are tested using multi-level mixed effects growth curve modelling approach (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 343–349). This method can essentially be understood as a standard multi-level linear model with a time covariate that is allowed to vary at the level of the unit of interest (i.e. random slopes are calculated for the time variable). This method allows longitudinal changes in a variable of interest (position towards European integration) to be modelled for each unit of analysis (political party). The time variable is measured in years, and is set at 0 for the date on which the Treaty of Rome came into effect (1 January 1958). The data is structured using a cross classified approach with observations cross classified between political parties and elections, which are nested within countries, allowing differences due to party, election, and country effects to be modelled.

Data is taken from the MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2013). MARPOR data is chosen because it allows the widest range of cases, both across time and countries, of any available data source. It also allows the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) theory, which is based on expert survey data, to be tested on a new dataset. Policy positions on the general left-right, economic left-right and social liberal-conservative scales are measured using a comparable set of one and two dimensional scales (Prosser 2014).¹ Each scale is derived by an inductive process that begins from a ‘naive’ starting scale (based on earlier scales). A uniform selection process between scales insures a fair comparison between different scales in the analysis, rather than involuntarily comparing different selection methods by using scales developed by different means. For more details on the scales used, see the online appendix.

European integration positions are measured on a scale constructed from the two manifesto components relating to European integration (108 - European Community: positive, and 110 - European Community: negative). Each of the scales are constructed using the Lowe et al.’s (2011) logit scaling technique. The logit scale is calculated using the formula:

$$\theta^L = \log \frac{R + 0.5}{L + 0.5}$$

Where R is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘right’ of the scale and L is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘left’. The logit scaling method combines the advantages of both additive and ratio scaling methods for manifesto data, whilst avoiding the problem of polarisation found in ratio scales, with the additional benefit of a diminishing impact of repeated emphasis, mirroring natural language usage (For a more detailed account of the advantages and disadvantages of different scaling methods, see Prosser 2014, 91–92).

For ease of interpretation all scales are rescaled to a 0-100 (left-right/ liberal-conservative/anti-integration-pro-integration) scale as follows:

¹ The one dimensional general left-right scale is slightly modified before analysis: the European Community: positive component (108) is included on the left side of the general left-right scale and so to guard against endogeneity problems a scale is calculated without this component. As discussed in Prosser (2014), manifesto scales are remarkably robust to the exclusion of some components and this makes very little difference to the overall scale: the two are very highly correlated at 0.9993.

$$\text{Rescaled dimension} = (\text{Scale position} - \text{Scale mean} + 7) \times \frac{100}{14}^2$$

In an ideal world the cases included in analysis would be all parties running in all EEC/EC/EU member-states elections. However as the dataset relies on MARPOR data it is necessarily restricted to the cases selected and coded by MARPOR. Unfortunately, at the time of writing three member-states do not have any manifestos coded from any relevant elections (Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta, though future coding is planned for all three) and several member-states are missing at least one election.³ This leaves a total available data pool of 1,238 cases. Manifestos that do not mention European integration are excluded, which reduces the total number of cases to 1050.⁴ Unsurprisingly, given different lengths of EU membership and different party system sizes, the cases are not uniformly distributed between member-states. The distribution of cases is shown in table 1, along with summary statistics for each variable.

[Table 1 about here]

Results

Interclass Correlation Coefficients from an empty multilevel model (results not shown) confirm the importance of investigating positions on European integration at the party level. The bulk of the variance occurs at the party level (ICC = 0.5), with a much smaller proportion at the country level (0.12), and the election level explaining very little (ICC = 0.03). The analysis of the relationship between ideology and European integration positions begins with an examination of the one dimensional (general left-right) conception of political ideology, shown in models 1-4 in table 2. Comparing the results and fit statistics between models 1 and 2 confirms the importance of modelling the relationship between the general left-right dimension and positions on European integration as a curvilinear relationship, as suggested by the frequently made ‘inverted U’ observation. Model 1 finds no statistically significant relationship between the general left-right scale and party positions on European integration, appearing to support the ‘orthogonal’ dimensions interpretation of the relationship. However this is no longer the case once a quadratic term is introduced: model 2 finds a statistically significant relationship between the general left-right dimension and the European integration dimension, with support peaking around the centre of the dimension – replicating the traditional ‘inverted U’ pattern of party support for European integration. This supports the argument that party positions towards European integration are structured by other political dimensions but are not fused with them.

[Table 2 about here]

² The logit scales do not have a natural midpoint or endpoint and so the mean of each scale is subtracted from the scale (which gives a midpoint and mean of 50 once rescaled) and in practice the endpoint of each scale approaches ± 7 , suggesting the rescaling formula used here.

³ In total there are 14 relevant elections that were not coded by MARPOR at the time of writing: Cyprus 2006, 2011; France 2012; Greece 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012; Latvia 2006, 2010, 2011; Lithuania 2008; Malta 2008; Netherlands 2012; Poland 2011;

⁴ As a robustness check the regression models were run with the excluded cases included. Doing so does not affect the direction, approximate size, or statistical significance of any of the findings. However in keeping with best practise, the ‘structural zero’ cases are still excluded from analysis.

Model 3 introduces the longitudinal analysis. The statistically significant years and years squared coefficient confirms that changes in party positions towards European integration can be modelled as a growth curve. Model 4 introduces an interaction between the years variable and the general left-right variable, which is statistically significant. The fit statistics confirm that this model is superior to the other one dimensional models, supporting the argument in favour of introducing temporal variation to the relationship between ideology and European integration. The results of model 4, illustrated by predictive margins in figure 1 confirm hypothesis 2c: at the early stage of European integration positions towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards the right of the scale, peaking around the centre right. Fifty years later the model shows the reverse, attitudes towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards the left, peaking around the centre left.

[Figure 1 about here]

The analysis then turns to the two dimensional conception of political space. Model 5 and 6 again confirm the curvilinear relationship between left-right and European integration. Model 7 and 8 examine the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension and European integration and again confirm that the relationship is curvilinear. Also important to note is that the fit statistics between the social and economic dimension models indicates that, on their own, the social dimension explains more of the variance in European integration positions than the economic dimension, perhaps indicating that the emphasis on left-right in the literature has been misleading. Model 9 combines the two dimensions and shows that the effects for each dimension are not conditional on a party's position on the other dimension: the coefficients for each dimension are statistically equivalent between the individual models (shown in model 6 and 8) and the combined model. Models 10 and 11 introduce the longitudinal component, which, as with the one dimensional left-right, shows an interaction effect between each of the dimensions and the years variable.

The changing effects of each of the dimensions across time are illustrated by predictive margins in figure 2 for economic left-right and figure 3 for social liberal-conservative.⁵ In both cases the relationship changes as suggested in hypotheses 2a and 2b. At the early stage of integration the positions on European integration are structured by an anti-integration left and a pro-integration right, which by more recent times has shifted towards a relationship that is almost flat, but with peak attitudes at the centre of the left-right dimension. The social liberal-conservative dimension on the other hand shifts from a relationship where positions on European integration are most positive in the centre and are more hostile at each extreme at the early stages of European integration. By the later stages of European integration this relationship has shifted to one that has a pro-integration liberal end and an anti-integration conservative end.

[Figure 2 about here]

[Figure 3 about here]

⁵ Figures 2 and 3 are two dimensional slices through the three dimensional ideological space analysed here. Figure 4 combines these dimensions into a single figure and shows how they fit together.

Comparing the fit of the different models reveals a complex set of considerations that must be examined when assessing what is ultimately the 'best' model of the relationship between ideology and European integration. In terms of absolute fit of the model and the data, model 11 produces the highest overall R^2 value, indicating that the two dimensional ideological model is a better fitting model than a one dimensional model, supporting hypothesis one. Also supporting hypothesis one is the comparison of the fixed-effects only (the ideology and years variables without any of the country, election, and party effects) R^2 values between model 4 and 11, showing that the fixed-effects portion of model 11 explains more than double the variance of party European integration positions than model 4 does.

The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics reveal a more complicated story. AIC and BIC give an indication of the trade-off between model fit and model complexity, with BIC penalising additional model parameters more harshly than AIC. Although the AIC statistics indicate that model 11 is to be preferred to model 4, the BIC statistics suggests that the improvement in model fit comes at the price of model complexity.

Similarly although model 11 is the best fitting of the two-dimensional models in absolute terms, both the AIC and BIC statistics favour model 10 (which has no interaction between time and ideology) and the BIC statistics favour models 8 (the social liberal-conservative only model) and 9 (both ideological dimensions without a time variable).

A possible confounding factor to the analysis here is that the results are driven not by changes in the relationship between ideology and positions on European integration over time but by the emergence of many small, electorally irrelevant, anti-EU parties. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) show that when fringe parties are excluded there is a linear relationship between European integration and the left-right dimension. Similarly, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) show that when observations are weighted by their share of the vote the inverted-U shape is much less prominent (though some relationship does still exist). In order to test this possibility the final one and two dimensional models from table 2 (models 4 and 11) are re-estimated with observations weighted by their share of the vote, shown in table 2 of the appendix. The results for each dimension and their interaction with years are identical in sign and statistical significance, and the size of the coefficients is very similar, suggesting the results are not just being driven by small parties. For both one and two dimensional models the model fit statistics suggest that the unweighted models are better models of the relationship between ideology and party support for European integration by a considerable margin. Interestingly however the weighted model fit statistics show a much stronger distinction between the one and two dimensional models than the unweighted models, with the two dimensional model clearly outperforming the one dimensional model.

There is no final answer to the question of which of the models is the 'best' model – ultimately it depends on the research purpose of the model. Here the goal is not just to model the relationship between ideology and positions on European integration but to understand what factors influence that relationship (i.e. one vs two dimensions) and how that relationship has changes across time. For these purposes the statistical significance of the variables is more important than overall assessments of model performance. For other purposes the same may not be true: if the goal is simply to control for the effects of ideology as part of a wider model then the results here indicate that various formulations of ideology as a one or two dimensional construct and with and without an interaction with a time variable may be sufficient.

East, West, and the importance of time

There are two main findings from the preceding analysis: One, the two dimensional (economic left-right and social liberal conservative) approach generally offers better model fit and greater explanatory power than the one dimensional (general left-right) approach. This finding also essentially replicates the earlier Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) model with a dataset that is drawn from a different source (expert surveys vs manifesto data) and covers a wider timespan than the original Hooghe, Marks and Wilson model. Two, the relationship between the ideological dimensions and positions on European integration has changed considerably over time

The importance of taking the dimensionality of the relationship between ideology and European integration – particularly the role of the temporal dimension – seriously, and how failing to do so can lead to incorrect inferences, is easily illustrated by a comparison of parties in Western and Eastern Europe.

That party competition in Western and European Eastern Europe is structured differently is well established, with competition in the West being dominated by the economic dimension, whilst there is more emphasis on social issues in the East (Coman 2015). The origins of Western European party systems lie in shared historical developments, such as the industrial revolution and the rise of mass democracy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rueschemeyer 1992), and developed along similar lines during the post-industrial era (Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994). The much younger Eastern European party systems developed rapidly during the transition from Soviet rule and are characterised by a greater emphasis on ethnicity, religion, and region rather than socio-economic class conflict (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Markowski 1997; Evans and Whitefield 1998; Whitefield 2002; Grzymala-Busse 2006; Rovny 2014).

Despite the fundamental differences in the structure of political competition in Western and Eastern Europe, Marks et al. (2006) find that the relationship between the economic and social dimensions and European integration positions is fundamentally the same. To test this result with different conceptions of dimensionality a binary variable that measures whether a country is an Eastern European former Soviet state (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) is added to the previous models and interacted with the ideological dimension variables. As the multi-level model already controls for country level variance in European integration positions, this variable measures whether there is anything specifically 'Eastern European' or 'Post Soviet' in the relationship between ideology and European integration positions in these countries. The results of these models are shown in table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

The results from model 12 show that using a linear general left-right dimension, there is a significant interaction between left-right and Eastern Europe, with the model suggesting that Eastern European parties are much more pro-integration than Western parties, and that in Western Europe the relationship between left-right and European integration is essentially flat whilst in Eastern Europe the left is more pro integration than the right. Model 13 introduces the squared general left-right term and shows that parties in Western Europe conform to the 'inverted u' pattern whilst left and centre-left parties in Eastern Europe are broadly pro-integration whilst those of right of centre are less so. Model 14 reintroduces the time variable and the interaction with general left-right. Once differences

due to time are accounted for, the apparent difference between Western and Eastern European parties diminishes and is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the apparent difference between East and West found in the earlier model is in fact due to differences between past and present positions held by Western parties.

Models 15-17 repeat the analysis for the two dimensional conception of dimensionality, a more direct replication of the Marks et al. (2006) analysis. Models 14 and 15 both show that Eastern parties are more pro-integration than Western parties and that there is a statistically significant interaction between Eastern Europe and economic left-right. Again however, as shown in model 17, when the time component of the model is included, the apparent Eastern European effects disappear.

The original Marks et al. (2006) model did not include a time component in their analysis, but as it was based on more temporarily limited expert survey data this did not confound their results. A direct replication of their analysis on a dataset with a wider range of cases (i.e. model 16) would lead to the erroneous conclusion that there was a significant difference between the underlying relationship between ideology and European integration. Accounting for time however confirms the validity of the original Marks et al. finding – despite the different structural dimensionality of politics in Eastern and Western Europe, the relationship between the economic and social dimensions, and European integration is fundamentally the same.

Discussion and conclusion

One important implication of the results here is the understanding of *how* the way in which ideology structures attitudes towards European integration has changed over time. This is not simply a reiteration of the fact that there are longitudinal differences in the relationship between each dimension and positions on European integration – it is important to understand what we learn from the combination of the longitudinal approach with the two dimensional approach. The one dimensional general left-right approach models the data almost as well as the two dimensional approach, but the aggregation of economic and social preferences misses one of the key changes that is revealed by the two dimensional approach. Combining both dimensions, as shown in figure 4, reveals an important shift in the relationship between ideology and European integration.⁶ In the early stages, as illustrated for 1958, attitudes towards European integration were primarily structured by the economic left-right dimension with social liberal-conservative positions only influencing positions within the range determined by economic left-right: the slope with the steepest gradient occurs along the economic left-right axis. Fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome this situation had reversed: attitudes towards European integration are now primarily structured by the social liberal-conservative dimension, with economic policy distance shifting positions towards integration within the bounds determined by the social dimension: the steepest gradient of the graph is now along the social liberal-conservative axis.

[Figure 4 about here]

⁶ For reasons of clarity figure 4 does not include confidence intervals (which would be very difficult to show clearly in a three dimensional figure). However figure 4 is essentially a combination of the predictive margins shown in figure 2 and 3 (that include the confidence intervals for each dimension), which shows that the difference in slopes between years is statistically significant for both dimensions.

The end result of this change is broadly captured by the general left-right models (as shown in figure 1) but it would be impossible to disentangle the underlying change using a one dimensional approach, and it would be too easy to assume that attitudes towards economic aspects that tend to dominate our understanding of left-right, such as redistribution, are also the primary driver in the change in the relationship between the general left-right dimension and European integration. This conclusion would be entirely wrong. It is hard to overstate the importance of the social dimension in structuring attitudes towards European integration, a finding which differs considerably from most approaches to this topic which have tended to emphasise left and right. Although economic left-right certainly appears to be more important than the social dimension in the early stages of integration and continues to play a small but significant role, in the contemporary world social liberal-conservative attitudes are much more important.

This finding aligns with much recent research on the role of factors such as hostility to immigration and authoritarianism – which fit within the conservative side of the social dimension – play in structuring citizen hostility towards European integration (McLaren 2002; Tillman 2013; Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008). That the same can be said for political parties is probably of little surprise to even casual observers of European politics. In this respect, the analysis here has simply brought empirical models of party ideology and European integration into line with more general observations.

The analysis here also points to an important methodological consideration with implications for political science beyond the study of European integration. ‘Left-right’ is possibly one of the most widely used concepts in all areas of politics, from its academic study to popular discourse. It is also a term that is inherently ambiguous – there can be no definitive answer to the question of whether left-right ‘really’ means a general catch-all super dimension that covers economic and social policy preferences, just economic preferences, or something else entirely. Comparing the models which alternatively use left-right as a general catch-all dimension and as an economic dimension shows how easy it would be to draw erroneous conclusions about the role of economic and social preferences in structuring party behaviour.

The results also illustrate the importance of testing for nonlinear relationships. In both the one and two dimensional models the simply linear relationship between left-right and attitudes towards European integration (models 1 and 5) is statistically insignificant. Whilst further testing reveals that a squared left-right term is important in both cases, if the analysis was halted at the linear stage, a very different conclusion would be reached about the relationship between left-right and European integration: that there is no link between left-right attitudes to European integration. This is a conclusion that has previously been suggested in the literature but which is demonstrably incorrect. Of course, the structuring role of ideology is only one determinant of party positions on European integration. Other factors, from concerns particular to individual countries, participation in government, and electoral expediency – all of which have been identified in the literature – also play an important role in shaping the positions that parties take on European integration. The analysis here does not deny the importance of these factors, but has set them to one side in order to concentrate on long term shifts in the structure of party attitudes to European integration. Ideology may not be the only cause of the positions parties take on European integration but by structuring party attitudes to integration it influences the attractiveness of different strategic options – whether to shift, emphasise, or hide their position on European integration. The way ideology has performed this role has changed dramatically over the course of European integration. Undoubtedly, as the integration process continues, the relationship between ideology and European integration will continue to evolve.

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Country	Cases	European integration	General left-right	Economic left-right	Social liberal - conservative
	(Excluded)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Austria	24 (1)	55.66 (15.849)	47.091 (10.484)	43.021 (12.083)	55.795 (7.244)
Belgium	143 (11)	63.615 (9.008)	45.534 (8.258)	47.341 (10.73)	44.937 (9.339)
Bulgaria	3 (3)	59.96 (7.913)	55.163 (2.858)	58.5 (2.561)	62.224 (4.487)
Czech Republic	11 (1)	61.95 (9.405)	47.881 (4.727)	50.493 (8.044)	35.924 (8.595)
Denmark	82 (61)	40.881 (15.024)	49.778 (12.251)	50.585 (13.227)	49.558 (11.096)
Estonia	12 (0)	60.822 (8.025)	48.301 (6.447)	36.353 (8.852)	53.9 (7.851)
Finland	28 (13)	48.851 (14.547)	49.64 (8.452)	48.214 (9.823)	51.685 (9.326)
France	63 (21)	52.023 (14.191)	47.588 (11.435)	46.921 (12.59)	48.776 (10.358)
Germany	62 (4)	59.752 (8.034)	46.376 (9.352)	48.59 (10.123)	48.227 (9.402)
Great Britain	44 (0)	52.108 (14.719)	47.273 (7.459)	48.059 (9.631)	48.916 (11.908)
Greece	28 (1)	50.969 (18.701)	50.095 (7.977)	44.447 (11.591)	55.814 (10.98)
Hungary	11 (1)	63.193 (10.486)	50.26 (4.513)	45.55 (6.558)	53.355 (6.537)
Ireland	44 (15)	50.661 (13.257)	43.657 (9.28)	43.584 (11.535)	47.047 (12.065)
Italy	114 (28)	60.587 (13.177)	47.621 (9.531)	51.437 (10.535)	51.151 (11.722)
Lithuania	6 (0)	56.381 (11.308)	43.828 (9.406)	37.403 (12.451)	51.673 (5.198)
Luxembourg	50 (7)	52.67 (17.647)	42.153 (11.564)	42.714 (11.515)	40.328 (11.227)
Netherlands	109 (4)	58.84 (12.229)	47.633 (9.004)	49.955 (8.455)	43.779 (10.359)
Poland	10 (2)	54.923 (15.648)	45.936 (8.886)	39.503 (9.286)	55.148 (6.58)
Portugal	46 (5)	49.319 (17.43)	42.947 (7.165)	42.326 (10.209)	52.629 (7.631)
Romania	4 (0)	58.94 (5.708)	45.225 (6.05)	43.135 (11.641)	53.548 (7.387)
Slovakia	21 (0)	57.335 (15.889)	52.756 (7.856)	53.229 (10.027)	50.702 (8.195)
Slovenia	25 (0)	60.155 (13.628)	47.329 (3.906)	49.313 (4.312)	50.367 (6.966)
Spain	84 (5)	61.498 (15)	36.628 (10.482)	39.98 (11.533)	38.882 (9.172)
Sweden	26 (3)	50.072 (18.835)	45.903 (12.693)	47.538 (12.985)	37.24 (10.983)
Total	1050 (188)	56.087 (14.988)	46.079 (10.034)	46.993 (11.331)	47.252 (11.138)

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BETWEEN MEMBER-STATES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALES.

Variable	One dimensional				Two dimensional						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
General left-right	-0.054 (0.047)	0.891*** (0.202)	0.750*** (0.195)	1.309*** (0.231)							
General left-right squared		-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)							
General left-right X Years interaction				-0.012*** (0.003)							
Economic left-right					0.049 (0.041)	0.493*** (0.17)			0.499*** (0.166)	0.408** (0.162)	0.748*** (0.21)
Economic left-right squared						-0.005*** (0.002)			-0.004** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Economic left-right X Years interaction											-0.005** (0.002)
Social liberal-conservative							-0.155*** (0.036)	0.826*** (0.174)	0.873*** (0.175)	0.821*** (0.168)	1.01*** (0.181)
Social liberal-conservative squared								-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.01*** (0.002)
Social liberal-conservative X Years interaction											-0.009*** (0.002)
Years			0.283*** (0.102)	0.911*** (0.177)						0.287*** (0.104)	1.005** (0.19)
Years squared			-0.003** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)						-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003** (0.002)
Constant	57.141*** (2.609)	38.346*** (4.665)	35.268*** (4.798)	13.102* (6.949)	52.368*** (2.344)	43.151*** (4.141)	62.164*** (2.236)	41.637*** (4.19)	27.676*** (5.658)	24.343*** (5.773)	0.591 (7.857)
N	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050
Overall R ²	0.74	0.74	0.785	0.787	0.743	0.741	0.741	0.756	0.758	0.793	0.797
Fixed effects only R ²	<0.001	0.056	0.036	0.043	0.018	0.055	0.03	0.062	0.117	0.102	0.104
AIC	8111.796	8101.678	8076.784	8070.103	8112.028	8117.682	8095.547	8076.327	8081.996	8054.83	8057.807
BIC	8141.536	8136.374	8126.35	8124.625	8141.767	8152.378	8125.286	8111.023	8126.605	8114.309	8127.198

Statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

TABLE 2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).

	One dimensional			Two dimensional		
	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
General left-right	-0.0343 (0.0484)	0.861*** (0.202)	1.294*** (0.235)			
General left-right squared		-0.0106*** (0.00233)	-0.0112*** (0.00229)			
General left-right X Years interaction			-0.0119*** (0.00284)			
Economic left-right				0.101** (0.0429)	0.522*** (0.166)	0.718*** (0.212)
Economic left-right squared					-0.00422** (0.00181)	-0.00490*** (0.00187)
Economic left-right X Years interaction						-0.00476* (0.00260)
Social liberal-conservative				-0.169*** (0.0377)	0.871*** (0.175)	1.038*** (0.183)
Social liberal-conservative squared					-0.0117*** (0.00191)	-0.0101*** (0.00185)
Social liberal-conservative X Years interaction						-0.00948*** (0.00251)
Eastern Europe	31.54*** (11.23)	26.25** (11.09)	13.12 (11.88)	25.32** (11.61)	23.45** (11.31)	8.162 (11.91)
Eastern Europe X general left-right Interaction	-0.514** (0.224)	-0.414* (0.221)	-0.131 (0.238)			
Eastern Europe X Economic left-right Interaction				-0.284* (0.161)	-0.308** (0.157)	-0.174 (0.171)
Eastern Europe X Social liberal-conservative Interaction				-0.103 (0.167)	-0.0502 (0.163)	0.122 (0.174)
Years			0.917*** (0.181)			1.009*** (0.195)
Years squared			-0.00487*** (0.00171)			-0.00374** (0.00178)
Constant	54.30*** (2.723)	36.75*** (4.684)	11.88* (7.100)	56.20*** (2.875)	24.89*** (5.690)	-0.835 (7.945)
N	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050	1050

TABLE 3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).




FIGURE 1. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION IN 1958 AND 2008.




FIGURE 2. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION WITH SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008.




FIGURE 3. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION WITH ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008.




FIGURE 4. THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN 1958 AND 2008.

Appendix to Dimensionality, ideology and party positions towards European integration

Manifesto components used in each of the dimensional scales and the distribution of the scales in the dataset. For more information on the scales, see Prosser (2014) "[Building Policy Scales from Manifesto Data: A Referential Content Validity Approach.](#)" *Electoral Studies* 35: 88–101.

General left-right

General left-right scale			
Left		Right	
105	Military: Negative	109	Internationalism: Negative
106	Peace	401	Free Enterprise: Positive
107	Internationalism: Positive	407	Protectionism: Negative
202	Democracy	414	Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
301	Decentralisation	505	Welfare State Limitation: Positive
303	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency	507	Education Limitation: Positive
403	Market Regulation: Positive	601	National Way of Life: Positive
408	Economic Goals	603	Traditional Morality: Positive
411	Technology and Infrastructure	608	Multiculturalism: Negative
412	Controlled Economy: Positive	702	Labour Groups: Negative
413	Nationalisation: Positive		
416	Anti-Growth Economy		
501	Environmental Protection		
502	Culture		
503	Social Justice		
504	Welfare State Expansion: Positive		
506	Education Expansion: Positive		
602	National Way of Life: Negative		
604	Traditional Morality: Negative		
701	Labour Groups: Positive		
705	Underprivileged Minority Groups		
706	Non-economic Demographic Groups		

Table 1. Manifesto components included in the general left-right scale.




Figure 1. Distribution of the general left-right scale in the dataset.

Economic left-right			
Left		Right	
403	Market Regulation: Positive	401	Free Enterprise: Positive
411	Technology and Infrastructure	407	Protectionism: Negative
412	Controlled Economy: Positive	414	Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
413	Nationalisation: Positive	505	Welfare State Limitation: Positive
503	Social Justice	507	Education Limitation: Positive
504	Welfare State Expansion: Positive	702	Labour Groups: Negative
506	Education Expansion: Positive		
701	Labour Groups: Positive		

Social Liberal-Conservative			
Liberal		Conservative	
105	Military: Negative	109	Internationalism: Negative
106	Peace	302	Centralisation
107	Internationalism: Positive	305	Political Authority: Positive
201	Freedom and Human Rights	601	National Way of Life: Positive
202	Democracy	608	Multiculturalism: Negative
301	Decentralisation		
416	Anti-Growth Economy		
501	Environmental Protection		
502	Culture		
602	National Way of Life: Negative		
607	Multiculturalism: Positive		
704	Middle Class and Professional Groups		
705	Underprivileged Minority Groups		
706	Non-economic Demographic Groups		

Table 2. Manifesto components used in the economic left-right and social liberal-conservative scales.




Figure 2. Distribution of the economic left-right scale in the dataset.




Figure 3. Distribution of the social liberal-conservative scale in the dataset.

European integration




Figure 3. Distribution of the European integration scale in the dataset.

Robustness check – weighting by party vote share

Table 2 shows the final one and two dimensional models from table 2 (models 4 and 11) re-estimated with observations weighted by their share of the vote, as a robustness check against the possibility that the results are being driven by small and electorally irrelevant parties. The results show that the original results are robust to the weighting of the data.

	One dimensional	Two dimensional
General left-right	1.827*** (0.459)	
General left-right squared	-0.0176*** (0.00379)	
General left-right X Years interaction	-0.0145** (0.00672)	
Economic left-right		1.227*** (0.362)
Economic left-right squared		-0.00987*** (0.00278)
Economic left-right X Years interaction		-0.0115** (0.00582)
Social liberal-conservative		1.022*** (0.368)
Social liberal-conservative squared		-0.0106*** (0.00321)
Social liberal-conservative X Years interaction		-0.00683*** (0.00230)
Years	1.192*** (0.360)	1.316*** (0.297)
Years squared	-0.00624* (0.00358)	-0.00479 (0.00347)
Constant	0.450 (13.97)	-11.75 (14.18)
N	1049	1049
Overall R ²	0.849	0.849
Fixed effects only R ²	0.037	0.058
AIC	95207.78	94752.29
BIC	95262.29	94816.71

Table 2. Final one and two dimensional models (models 4 and 11 of table 2 of *Dimensionality, ideology and party positions towards European integration*) re-estimated with observations weighted by party vote share.