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Daniel Whistler

Schelling's Politics of Sympathy: Reflections on *Clara* and Related Texts

Abstract. *In this essay, I read F. W. J. Schelling's* Clara *alongside a number of his other texts from 1804–1815 in terms of the* concept of sympathy. *In so doing, I illuminate the implicit role of this psychological concept in Schelling's metaphysics, epistemology, metaphilosophy and political philosophy of that period, and thereby suggest that the most fundamental consequence of its employment is a* populist reorientation *of philosophy. Philosophy is to be undertaken not just for the people, but by them too: Schelling identifies the activity of philosophising with the public action of a community bonded by sympathetic ties.*

In diesem Beitrag wird Schellings Clara *in Zusammenhang mit anderen Texten von Schelling aus den Jahren 1804–1815 unter der Perspektive des Begriffs der Sympathie gelesen. Auf diese Weise wird die implizite Rolle dieses psychologischen Begriffs in Schellings Metaphysik, Erkenntnistheorie, Metaphilosophie und politischer Philosophie dieser Zeit deutlich. Es wird damit auch der Vorschlag gemacht, dass die fundamentalste Konsequenz des Einsatzes von Sympathie eine populistische Reorientierung der Philosophie ist. Philosophie ist nicht nur für Menschen gemacht, sondern auch von ihnen. Schelling identifiziert die Aktivität der Philosophie mit einer öffentlichen Handlung einer Gemeinschaft, die durch Sympathie verbunden ist.*

1 Introduction: Visions of a Schellingian Community

Clara is F. W. J. Schelling's only work to make sustained conceptual use of the psychological affect of sympathy. It enumerates numerous sympathetic bonds that hold (i) between the various characters in the dialogue; (ii) between Clara and her deceased husband, Albert; (iii) between the living and the dead more generally; (iv) between these characters and a grocer's wife who appears in Part V; (v) between occult practitioners and their subjects; (vi) between natural phenomena; and, most abstractly, (vii) between the real and the ideal. Indeed, the very dialogue itself is a performance of sympathetic sociability—a return to symphilosophy or 'the Jena mode of discourse' (Ziolkowski 1990)—and it contains, as a brief *mise en abyme*, a set of guidelines for implementing such sym-

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philosophising. Schelling's concept of sympathy is, nevertheless, not merely derivative of Romantic sources, but also influenced by seventeenth-century theories of universal sympathy found in Leibniz and the Cambridge Platonists, as well as mystic doctrines, like Swedenborg's. These different contexts result in a concept of sympathy in *Clara* that pertains to psychology, metaphysics, physics, mysticism, metaphilosophy—*and also politics.*[1]

Hence, I want to specifically argue that this focus on sympathetic sociability within *Clara* sheds light on a whole strand of Schellingian political thinking. That is, I maintain that, between (roughly) 1804 and 1815[2], Schelling was (at least, sometimes) committed to the following theses:

1. A group of religious believers bonded in sympathy is a condition of the possibility for political action;
2. Such communal political action is the correlate of genuine philosophical speculation (in Schelling's schematic terms: real : ideal = public action : philosophising);
3. Such speculation in turn fosters affects of sympathy that strengthen the community.

A mutually-reinforcing loop is thus generated between the elements of sympathy, belief, community and philosophy, and the overriding result of this feedback loop is, I suggest in what follows, a thoroughly *populist* philosophy, that is, a philosophising that comes from the people. In other words, in this strand of his philosophy, Schelling rejects any ideal of *Bildung* through philosophy: the philosopher does not rise above the masses, nor does her education conflict with the norms of public common sense; rather, she must become one with her public. What emerges here, I contend, is a thoroughgoing attempt to undertake *Volksphilosophie* or even *Populärphilosophie*, a philosophy that takes all its content, norms and modes of practice from 'the people'.[3] Philosophising is identified with the public action of a community bonded by sympathetic ties.

This vision of a politics of sympathy is, it must be admitted, a minoritarian tradition in Schelling's *opus*, and it has understandably been neglected in comparison to the other naturalistic, Eleatic or proto-existentialist Schellings more familiar from the scholarship. For this very reason, however, the value of what follows lies in contesting stereotypical images of Schelling that have built up over recent decades—that is, its value lies in:

a. falsifying a traditional image of Schelling as aloof to political actuality (particularly in comparison to Hegel), since his vision of a politics of sympathy constitutes some of his most explicit attempts at political philosophy prior to the late 1840s.
b. illustrating the non-elitist character of some of Schelling's philosophy—that is, his vision of a politics of sympathy rubs against the post-Lukácian reading of Schelling as a philosopher of aristocratic hierarchy (Lukács 1980; Sandkühler 1998), as well as any tendency in Schelling's own earlier work to make philosophising 'not within everyone's reach' (SW 5, pp. 218–219).[4]
c. contesting a common perception of German Idealism generally—and Schelling's writing in particular—as obscure esotericism to be deciphered solely by adepts (as exemplified by Schelling and Hegel's early claim that 'in its relationship to common sense, the world of philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world' [Hegel/Schelling 1985, pp. 282–283]). Instead, *Clara* should be aligned with the many other examples of popular writing in Fichte, Jacobi, Solger, etc.[5] Schelling, too, calls for a kind of mutated continuation of *Populärphilosophie.*
d. highlighting Schelling's reflections on the proper genres of philosophical presentation. That is, in opposition to images of German Idealists practising 'a somewhat rigid and disciplined form of writing [...] [which] from the perspective of the modern reader, can look somewhat tedious or pedantic' (Stewart 2013, p. 81), Schelling's appeal to the popular illustrates his concern with the different genres in which philosophy can be written, and, particularly, with the idea of writing philosophy *into* life.

1 I provide a synopsis of *Clara* in section three below.

2 Of course, Schelling's views on many topics change considerably between 1804 and 1815; my claim is merely that a number of his texts from the period make cumulative contributions to a broadly coherent account of the relation between philosophising, community and sympathy.

3 In what follows, I retain Schelling's indeterminate concept 'the people', which remains undefined throughout his writings (as in many *Volksphilosophien* of the period), and, indeed, is able to take on the many significant functions it does precisely, in part, because of such indeterminacy.

4 Although what follows contests this Lukácian charge of elitism, it does nothing to save Schelling from Lukács' more general critique of Schelling as 'reactionary'. A populist Schelling may not be a better Schelling politically, but he is certainly not aristocratic.

5 This comparison between *Clara* and other attempts at popular philosophy is briefly invoked by Grosos (2014, pp. 41–42); however, a fuller discussion of Schelling's contribution to this trend —something that stands outside the remit of this essay—is sorely needed. Likewise, a full treatment of the connections between *Clara* and Jena Romanticism's investment in 'new modes of participatory feeling' (Kneller 2014, pp. 110) lies outside the scope of what follows. A complete discussion would need to refer to Schleiermacher's *Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens* and consequently also Schelling's review of Schleiermacher's *Weihnachtsfeier.* The influence of Herder's 1765 *Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volkes allgemeiner und nützlicher werden kann* would also be pertinent to such a project.

2 Schelling's Call for a Populist Insurrection

> What is this current separation of academics from the people supposed to bring? Truly, I can see the time come when the people, having had to become thereby more and more ignorant about the highest things, will rise up and make those philosophers account for themselves, saying: You should be the salt of your nation; so why don't you salt us? (SW 9, pp. 91–92; Schelling 2002, p. 66)

This passage is taken, not from a right-wing demagogue's tirade against expertise, nor from the resentful polemic of an outsider unable to access institutional structures, but from F. W. J. Schelling, formerly Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Jena and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Würzburg, and, at the time when *Clara* was written[6], a leading member of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. From the very heart of early nineteenth-century academia, Schelling calls for a populist uprising that will break down the cloistered walls of the university and transform philosophy into a thoroughly public enterprise.

In a similar vein, the closing paragraph to Schelling's all-encompassing *Würzburger System* reads as follows:

> Philosophy is the goal of the science of philosophy, even if—so long as it lacks the public life in which it can be intuited—philosophy can live only within the limits of science and only as science, not in itself. Philosophy—which is no longer science, but becomes life—is what Plato calls *πολιτεύειν* [the political], life with and within an ethical totality. (SW 6, p. 576)[7]

In the penultimate proposition, § 325, Schelling had argued that, 'In the state, science, religion and art become objective in a mutually penetrating one and all [...]. Neither true science, nor true religion, nor true art has another form of objectivity than the state.' In particular, Schelling goes on to specify that religion is made objective specifically through 'public ethics and the heroism of a nation' and art through 'the living rhythmic movement of public life' (SW 6, pp. 575–576). § 326 is, then, devoted to the formula, 'Reason : Cosmos = Philosophy : State' (SW 6, p. 576). In other words, philosophy does not have a localised political function, as religion and art do, but encompasses the whole realm of political action as such. Philosophy is the non-objectivised state—or politics insofar as it remains ideal. And yet, the closing sentences of the final paragraph reproduced above do not limit philosophy's political vocation to the legitimisation, creation or restitution of the state in particular; rather, philosophy is called on to become 'political *life*', to take on 'public life'. This is one example of Schelling's rare forays into political philosophy between the *Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts* and the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen*, and he here argues that philosophy, freed from the constraints of science, becomes the very essence of life within a polis. Accordingly, the goal of philosophical activity becomes the liberation of thought, *bringing it back to life*—a resuscitation of thinking outside of any cloistered academy, an immersion of philosophy in community. The fulfilment of philosophy occurs, then, among the people. Once again, philosophy is to be a properly popular enterprise.

Populism is therefore an ideal to be found throughout much of Schelling's writing of the period—and *Clara* provides the most striking illustration of it. The quotation with which this section begins provides just one instance of a general trend in the work: to attack academic 'ivory-towerism' in the name of a 'turn towards the people' (Vĕto 2014, p. 24). What is thereby instituted is a thinking that is meant not just *for* the people, but is also to emerge *from* the people and even *by* the people too.

3 All Saints' Day and the Grocer's Wife

It is, therefore, on the basis of such a pervasive populism—discernible in many of Schelling's writings of the period—that *Clara* can be interpreted. Hence, in this next section, I want to summarise the 'plot' of this novel, and, once again, two quotations will serve as illustrations. These two passages are taken, respectively, from the very opening and from towards the end of *Clara*; both are, I submit, intended to tell the reader something about what it looks like to sympathise properly—that is, to sympathise in a way that forms a community of believers that is the correlate to genuine philosophical speculation.

> We saw a crowd of people thronging toward a gentle incline [...]. We joined them so that for once we, too, could watch the moving festival dedicated to the dead that is celebrated this day in Catholic towns. We found the whole area full of people already. It was peculiar to see life on the graves, forebodingly illuminated by the dully shining autumn sun. As we left the trodden path, we soon saw pretty groups gathered around individual graves: here girls in their bloom, holding hands with their younger brothers and sisters, crowned their mother's grave; there at the grave of her children who were lost so young, a mother stood in silence

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6 When *exactly Clara* was written is famously a matter of some debate. The traditional attribution is 1810–1811 (e. g., Vĕto 2014, p. 21, Lindberg 2013, p. 235), but Scheerlinck (2019) has recently argued that 1807–1808 is more likely. For an English-language discussion of the dating controversy, see Steinkamp 2002, pp. xiii–xvii. My focus across the period 1804 to 1815 allows for either option.

7 Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.

> with no need for consecrated water to represent her tears [...]. Here all of life's severed relationships were revived for the spectators who were familiar with the people and the circumstances; brothers came again to brothers and children to parents; at this moment all were one family again. (SW 9, pp. 11–12; Schelling 2002, p. 9)
>
> During this speech we'd noticed a woman below, walking around under the trees by the church [...]. I recognised her as the wife of a grocer from a small town three hours away from here. As she greeted us, I asked her what had brought her here; but she didn't want to say until I told her that I'd noticed her making an offering down there and that she must therefore have some matter of concern [...]. [After she finished telling her story,] I said to her: God has surely helped you, for He sees into the heart. Go home comforted and greet your husband and your children. The story had touched us all incredibly, so we remained in silence for a while before we set off again. (SW 9, pp. 102–104; Schelling 2002, pp. 73–74)

The first quotation sets the scene for *Clara*'s initial dialogue amidst the Catholic festivities of All Saints' Day[8], a festival that attempts to revive 'severed relationships' in order that all might be 'family again'. Indeed, Lindberg calls *Clara* as a whole 'a strange All-Saints'-Day novel of death and mourning' (Schelling 2013, p. 235). The first pages narrate how a 'crowd' of believers are intent on fortifying their sympathetic affinities with the dead by means of the festivities, such that the festival itself becomes a site for the renewal of bonds between this world and the next. *And yet*, exempted from the crowd, the protagonists of *Clara* themselves take no part in these festivities: they stand apart, unwilling and seemingly unable to participate in this celebration of sympathetic bonds with the departed. The priest and doctor merely watch, while Clara has shut herself away in 'solitude', in a 'secluded' Benedictine monastery (SW 9, p. 14; Schelling 2002, p. 11). Clara, in particular, practises an isolationist ascesis that impedes sympathetic bonds and so prevents any access to the spirit world. Moreover, the 'well-educated, young clergyman' (SW 9, p. 13; Schelling 2002, p. 10) who appears in this opening dialogue personifies such a failure of sympathy even more radically: his disconnection from the world and subsequent inability to recognise any positive connection between it and the next results in disparaging comments on the festival and ultimately to a sterile, pseudo-Kantian agnosticism (indeed, the part of town in which he resides is 'empty and deserted' [SW 9, p. 12; Schelling 2002, p. 10]). So, when the narrator comments, 'We should support all festivals and customs in which we are reminded of a connection with the world beyond', the clergyman responds:

> Today's commemoration certainly has something moving about it; however, if its purpose is to support the thought that we can be connected to the inhabitants of that other world, then I would hold this commemoration to be one that is almost detrimental and I would submit that it be abolished in your church [...]. We must honour these old divisions. (SW 9, pp. 16–17; Schelling 2002, p. 12)

It is to such comments that Clara responds with a demand to return from intellectual isolation into the festive state: 'What do cold words and merely negative concepts have to do with ardent longing? Are we satisfied in this life with a bleak existence?' (SW 9, p. 18; Schelling 2002, p. 13). An alternative is required, and this alternative must provide a means to sympathise.

This is a question of building 'community' (SW 9, p. 16; Schelling 2002, p. 12) —both with the dead and with the festive crowd; it is a matter of managing—despite their intellectual isolation in the cloistered academy—to foster those 'higher relationships' of 'friendship and love' in which 'a quiet, unconscious, but thereby all the more compelling, necessity draws one soul to another' (SW 9, pp. 19–20; Schelling 2002, p. 14).

The dialogues that follow respond to Clara's provocation in a number of ways: (1) by imagining better models of intellectual sociability than those of the cloistered university—'a Platonic academy should gather [...] men from all of the arts and sciences should live a truly spiritual life here, in harmony and free from worry: they shouldn't be locked up in towns, in the constrictive conditions of society and far from nature' (SW 9, p. 24; Schelling 2002, p. 17); (2) by recognising that wisdom also resides outside the intellectual elite—'I have learned more about physics from the farmers than from the academics' lecture halls' (SW 9, p. 26; Schelling 2002, p. 19); and (3) by insisting on the universal sympathy that holds both within nature and between the natural and the supernatural. Indeed, much attention is paid by the characters to sympathies in nature as derivative of more mystic affinities: 'everything speaks to us and would so much like to make itself understood' (SW 9, p. 35; Schelling 2002, p. 26). The person who learns to recognise such sympathetic bonds in nature, it is implied, will come to recognise higher interconnections, i.e. that 'everything is of course contained in everything else: the lower level prophesies of the higher' (SW 9, pp. 52–53; Schelling 2002, p. 39). The role of the soul in Schelling's anthropology of the period is crucial here, for 'it is just [the soul] that we love above all; that draws us, as it were, in a magical way, so that we immediately give our trust to those of whom we say in this respect that they have soul' (SW 9, p. 45; Schelling 2002, p. 34). Mimicking the language of Bonnet's *palingen-*

8 As a number of commentators note (Vëto 2014, p. 25; David 2014, p. 57), Schelling uses the antiquated 'Aller-Seelen-Tag' and not the more customary 'Allerheiligen' to designate this festival; he thus emphasises the significance of 'the soul' in its practices, as well as making conceptually productive use of anachronism.

esis, Schelling continues, the soul is 'the innermost germ of all', and so to 'transform that dark and obscure germ within [us] into clarity and light' is to intensify this 'magical' power of attraction and bonds of trust that make sympathy possible (SW 9, pp. 47, 69; Schelling 2002, pp. 35, 51). The soul acts as the condition of possibility for genuine community, the condition of returning to the festival and communing with the dead. We are already far from the clergyman's ascetic Kantianism.

It is at this point—the opening to Part V—that Schelling explicitly introduces the concept of sympathy, including the 'sensitivity' necessary for its correct employment and the 'wonderful entanglements of the internal and the external' it effects (SW 9, pp. 106, 110; Schelling 2002, pp. 76, 78). It occupies a crucial function in the philosophical architectonic there constructed: Schellingianism must be able to philosophise about everything, to become an absolute system that excludes nothing, and so it must *also* speak of the spirit world, life after death and the supernatural. To do so, the philosopher requires some access to these phenomena, some sympathy for them. Only through sympathetic description of the spirit world can Schelling's philosophy lay claim to the oneness, wholeness and absoluteness he craves. However, this recourse to sympathy still remains academic, part of an abstract discussion; the concept has not yet been 'brought to life' or 'become popular', as Schelling's ideal for philosophical practice at this period demands. And it is this demand for popularity that motivates the entry of the grocer's wife in the second passage reproduced above.

The narrator is in the middle of an extended theoretical speech on the mystic sympathies out of which language is constituted, when a woman (whom he recognises as the wife of a grocer from a nearby town) interrupts. She tells the story of an ill child and a neighbour's advice 'to make a vow to St. Walderich', for 'he has heard many vows already and has worked true miracles'. She continues,

> As the child was getting visibly worse and worse and there seemed to be no more help at all, I was overcome and inwardly I made a heartfelt, profound vow of a great offering to St. Walderich if he would help me in my need. And you see, she continued, hardly half an hour had passed when the child fell into a gentle sleep [...]. [The doctor] came and was completely astonished that the child was still alive, examined the child when he woke up, and said that the child had been saved; but it's truly a miracle, he said. (SW 9, pp. 102–104; Schelling 2002, p. 73–74)

The story evidently draws on themes present earlier in *Clara* including the value of popular religious practices, connections between the living and the dead and the causal effectiveness of the ideal. Nevertheless, what is most remarkable for my purposes is the other characters' reactions to this story. Rather than the disdain and condescension that characterised their response to the All Saints' Day festivities at the beginning of *Clara*, the characters now respond, in unison, with sympathy: 'The story had touched us all incredibly, so we remained in silence for a while before we set off again'. Clara continues—and one should note here the close proximity of concepts of belief, the people and being affected by others in the following: 'I, at least, am touched by the sight of a people who still have a protective spirit to which they can turn'. And it is at this very moment that she has the realisation towards which the whole series of dialogues had long been heading:

> 'Shouldn't we generally more often observe the same sensitivity to the departed that we believe we owe to the living? Who knows whether they partake more deeply with us than we think; whether the pain we feel so intensely, the excess of tears we weep for them, isn't capable of unsettling them?' At that moment we stepped out from the trees of the church and the whole area lay once more before us in a mild transfiguration. (SW 9, pp. 104–106; Schelling 2002, pp. 75–76)

This is Clara's *Aufklärung* and also her *Verklärung* (following David's conjecture that the name 'Clara' alludes to her role as *die Verklärte* [Schelling 2014, p. 52])[9]. Her transfiguration—along with that of the whole of the natural world[10]—is here accomplished by performance of and reflection on the power of sympathy engendered by the grocer's wife's story.

In other words, Clara and the others have learnt their lesson. The five dialogues chart a transition from a rejection of the popular, a rejection of supernatural beliefs and a rejection of sympathy towards a form of philosophical reflection that is achieved through a concrete instance of sympathising with a representative of 'the people'. The characters finally take the superstitions of popular belief seriously[11], and so the cloistered walls isolating academic discourse break down before the reader's eyes. It is a paradigmatic example of the Schellingian reunification of philosophy and life.

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9 Many commentators note the narrative of transfiguration across the series of dialogues: *Clara* forms 'an itinerary of reconciliation' (Mabille 2014, p. 98), and what is at stake in the content of the conversations is 'the art and means of converting a soul without compulsion' (Roux 2014, p. 76).

10 This is but one more example of how in *Clara* 'the place, the landscape, the seasons, the annual festivals possess a certain significance for the conceptual development as well as also having literary value' (Vëto 2014, p. 24).

11 As late as Part IV, one of the characters insists that some supernatural stories 'represent the very worst of society and were the real scum of mankind' (SW 9, p. 78; Schelling 2002, p. 56). On the contrary, as Marquet argues, the grocer's wife's story in Part V 'permits the recuperation of aspects of popular religion that had been most reviled by the Enlightenment' (1984, pp. 19–20).

4 Examples of Schelling's Own Practice of Sympathy

Schelling's most explicit allusions to the concept of sympathy are restricted to Part V of *Clara*, where, for example, he writes,

> Sympathy, which is a heavenly appearance here, only expressed much more dully and weakly, must reach a completely new degree of profundity there [in the ideal world]—just as we notice here that bodies transported into a more spiritual condition sense their relationships to each other more profoundly [...]. And I don't doubt concerning the expression of this sympathy that it's far more perfect than what's possible here. For even language contains a spiritual essence and a corporeal element. (SW 9, pp. 100–101; Schelling 2002, p. 72)

Nevertheless, sympathetic resonances are to be found throughout his writings of the period. Perhaps the most significant example is to be found at the very beginning of the *Freiheitsschrift:*

> Whoever takes the theory of physics as his point of departure and knows that the doctrine of 'like is recognised by like' is a very ancient one—such a one will understand that the philosopher maintains the existence of this knowledge, because he alone comprehends the god outside himself through the god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded. (SW 7, p. 337; Schelling 1936, p. 8)

Here Schelling repeats a long-standing epistemic principle in his philosophy: the subject of knowing must maintain some kind of identity with the object of knowledge; there needs to be some bond between them for knowledge and therefore philosophising to be possible. 'Training in philosophy' (SW 7, p. 337; Schelling 1936, p. 8) consists in cultivating such bonds. In other words, the philosopher cultivates sympathy with the outside. Such calls to philosophical sympathy are to be implicitly found throughout Schelling's philosophical trajectory: whether in the description of the Spinozist immersing herself in the absolute in the *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, in the definition of heroic action in the *Würzburger System*, or—most significantly—in the appeal to *Mitwissenschaft* (a kind of participative intuition) in the introduction to the *Weltalter* drafts. Indeed, it is precisely this identification of knower and known that motivates Schelling's introduction of sympathy into *Clara:* in order for philosophy to become one absolute system, it must speak *even* of the supernatural and the spirit-world; hence, some bond of identity between the philosopher and these phenomena—some sympathetic affinity between them—needs to be cultivated. This is the topic of the latter pages of *Clara*—a response to the problem of 'recovering the *one* philosophy' across the seeming break between this world and the next. The text thereby forms part of 'the Schellingian attempt to maintain the unity of philosophy' (Marquet 1984, pp. 15–17). To put it more bluntly: what all these moments in the Schellingian corpus have in common is that they implicitly rehearse—in an academic register, to be sure—the very 'heavenly appearance' of sympathy between subject and object experienced by Clara herself at the grocer's wife's story.

Moreover, a glance at the various influences on Schelling's use of the concept of sympathy is also worthwhile at this juncture. Generally put, he taps into a tendency in the Western philosophical tradition in which the affect of sympathy holds a privileged philosophical place, not just as a concept within psychology, but as a constitutive principle in metaphysics, theology, erotics, political philosophy and of course ethics. Indeed, it should not be very surprising that Schelling makes recourse to the concept of sympathy, considering 'sympathy's eighteenth-century explosion' (Hanley 2015, p. 174), on the back of its 'increasingly important role in philosophy over the course of the seventeenth century' (Mercer 2015, p. 108). 'Cosmological, physical and psychological accounts of sympathy' (Schliesser 2015, p. 7) would have been familiar to Schelling not just from Stoic texts, but also from Newton's flirtation with the concept, from Leibniz's commitment to 'universal sympathy, according to which all creatures correspond sympathetically to all others' (Mercer 2015, p. 108), from Spinoza's 'implicit rehabilitation of the idea of cosmic sympathy' based on a 'vision of the fundamental unity of nature, and in particular his belief that all finite things are just modifications of one fundamental entity' (Hübner 2015, p. 151). And, of course, the concept would also have been very familiar to Schelling from late eighteenth-century discussions—in, for example, Kant's ethics—of the 'general duty' to sympathetic feeling (Ak. 4, pp. 456–457; Kant 2013, p. 250), i.e. of sympathy as 'an action-motivating sentiment capable of serving to establish social bonds between individuals' (Hanley 2015, p. 177).

What, first and foremost, connects Schelling to these precedents is his commitment to what Schliesser has dubbed 'the likeness principle [...] a metaphysical background commitment that is presupposed in nearly all applications of the concept [of sympathy]'—that is, 'that it takes place among things/events/features that are in one sense or another alike' (Schliesser 2015, p. 7). Whether or not Schelling's metaphysics is interpreted as changing drastically over time, some claim to ontological unity—and so an interest in the *connexio rerum* that results—seems a fairly constant feature from at least 1795 to 1815. Indeed, Vëto argues, with respect to *Clara* in particular, that it 'conforms to the logic of his philosophy which professes the uninterrupted continuity between worlds and the mutual influence of all beings on each other' (Vëto 2014, p. 26), and to this ex-

tent, Schelling 'posits a sympathy between beings, in a Leibnizian vein' (Vëto 2014, p. 29).

Moreover, just like the other philosophers enumerated above, Schelling draws on the ubiquity of modern uses of the concept of sympathy, the concept's 'vitality' and 'heterogeneity' (Bernier 2010, p. 4). That is, he taps into the metabatic tendency in philosophical treatments of sympathy—the tendency to proliferate sympathies across domains: 'like is known by like'[12] is not merely pertinent to his ethics, politics and religion, but stands as the key orienting principle of his overall methodology. Speculation itself is motivated by the affect of sympathy—an attractive bond which draws the philosopher and her subject matter together. The philosopher's 'training', as the *Freiheitsschrift* puts it, is in sympathy.

5 Schelling, Demagogue

Schelling's remarks on political philosophy during the years 1804 to 1815 are often overlooked, because they are scattered rather haphazardly within writings devoted to seemingly non-political topics, and, even then, occurr at the margins. However, my focus above on Schelling's use of the psychological concept of sympathy makes them far more visible. Multiple examples of Schelling's political reflections in *Clara* itself could be reproduced here, such as this one:

> I too, I said, prefer to see a philosopher with a sociable garland in his hair than with a scientific crown of thorns, through which he presents himself as the truly tormented *ecce homo* of the people [...]. Depth behaves like what appears to be its opposite, the sublime, in that it has all the greater effect if it is clothed in the simplest words that even working people and craftsmen can understand. The language of the people is as it were from eternity; the artificial language of the schools is that of yesterday. (SW 9, p. 87; Schelling 2002, p. 63)

Another example of this strain of Schellingian political reflection is to be found in the very final paragraph of his 1803–1804 lectures on the philosophy of art:

> Music, song, dance, as well as all the various types of drama, live only in public life, and form an alliance in such life. Wherever public life disappears, instead of that real, external drama in which, in all its forms, an entire people participates as a political or moral totality, only an inward, ideal drama can unite the people. This ideal drama is the worship service, the only kind of truly public action that has remained for the contemporary age, and even so only in an extremely diminished and reduced form. (SW 5, p. 736; Schelling 1989, p. 280)

In line with much already described in this essay, Schelling here claims that the arts live 'only in public life', and that such public life is to be conceived as a 'real, external drama in which, in all its forms, an entire people participates as a political or moral totality'. He goes on to look to public organisations outside of the state (like the church) for a productive form of political life, and these alternative communities are understood as component parts of both a vital philosophising (as elucidated in section 2 above) and of participation in religious practices (as noted in section 3 above). Such communities are productive of speculation, belief and also the arts.[13]

The significance of Schelling's turn to community is even more striking in light of his critique of the state in the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen* as 'an expression of failed freedom' (Zöller 2014, p. 209; see SW 7, pp. 460–465; Schelling 1994, pp. 226–229). While such a critique stands in continuity with some of Schelling's earlier political views (such as *Das älteste Systemprogramm*'s call for the state to be abolished), it still marks, as Zöller argues, a 'sharp turn' from many of his political remarks around 1800. In 1810, he sees only 'insufficiency and unfreedom in the realm of the state' (Zöller 2014, pp. 206, 213). My contention is that Schelling's more constructive comments on those alternative political communities that are more conducive to a productive 'political or moral totality' complement this religio-anarchic attack on the state in the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen*. They form the basis of a positive vision of the type of society that ought to replace the state. The failure of established political institutions calls for alternatives, and the alternatives Schelling proposes are grounded on his sporadic recourse to the concepts of public action and sympathetic bonds.[14]

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12 Empedocles, who Schelling names explicitly as his source for the maxim 'like is known by like', was a common reference-point in seventeenth-century discussions of universal sympathy. See Mercer 2015, pp. 119–120.

13 On the importance of the concept of public action in Schelling's philosophy around 1804, see Marquet 1973, pp. 275–276; Whistler 2013, p. 218.

14 McGrath (2017) argues for a very different relation between Schellingianism and populism in the post-1815 work, suggesting that Schelling's philosophy of revelation can form a bulwark against theological appropriations of populist rhetoric. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the later philosophies of mythology and revelation continue the populist project of the years 1804 to 1815: they look to deposits of communal truth (e.g. Samothracian mythology) as moments of philosophical insight—deposits that are demonstrated to be *already* philosophical; the work of the philosopher is merely to identify them and analyse them, thereby making explicit the philosophical content they already contain. Speculation is anchored in a community of revelation and the philosopher must *tarry* with this community. Indeed, the more popular the language, it seems, the more revelatory of philosophical insight it is. The concept of tautegory

As I have argued above, this political vision of public action is developed by Schelling into a thoroughgoing populism—and the role of the philosopher is particular central to his account: she is to become 'one of the people', brought back into the community out of the cloistered academy. The first quotation in this section develops this vision. It comprises, once more, a critique of the philosopher who sets herself up as a messianic figure, 'as the truly tormented *ecce homo* of the people', writing the kind of artificial and esoteric prose only accessible to disciples; in contrast, the real task of the philosopher is the achievement of popularity. Simplicity becomes the ideal here—the ideal for a philosophy brought to life amidst the people. The passage ends with a reference to 'the language of the people', in contrast 'to the artificial language of the schools'. Philosophy must be reoriented towards the popular.

Such criticisms of the philosopher as tormented messiah recur in more well-known passages from the period too, such as the introduction to the *Weltalter:*

> Perhaps the one is still coming who will sing the greatest heroic poem, grasping in spirit something for which the seers of old were famous: what was, what is, what will be. But this time has not yet come. We must not misjudge our time. Heralds of this time, we do not want to pick its fruit before it is ripe nor do we want to misjudge what is ours. (SW 8, p. 206; Schelling 2000, p. xl)

The sentiments expressed here are not original to the *Weltalter:* invocations of the messianic occur frequently from *Das älteste Systemprogramm* onwards. In all such texts, Schelling characterises philosophy as 'at the end [becoming] what it was at the beginning—teacher of *mankind*' (Schelling 1995, p. 200).

And yet, what decisively distinguishes the *Weltalter* passage from such earlier invocations of an imminent philosophical poet-messiah is its *pessimism.* That is, in the 1810s, Schelling invokes the idea of a prophetic philosopher-poet only to hold it off, to postpone its coming indefinitely (see Lindberg 2013, pp. 238–239). Any suggestion in the earlier work that Schelling envisaged himself as the singer of the 'greatest heroic poem' is definitively laid to rest here. Schelling did of course write epic poetry, particularly during the late 1790s, and there is some evidence (see Whistler 2014) that these poems were envisaged as the speculative epic that would complete philosophy. Nevertheless, by 1811, he has officially renounced this ambition: he envisions his role as something far more preliminary and preparatory—an explorer of the contemporary 'time of struggle', rather than the ultimate narrator of 'what was, what is, and what will be'.

The messianic position is one that is forever associated with the obscure, with the creation of new languages that at first appear cryptic to all but adepts. In 1811, Schelling insists that this messianic position should at present be kept empty. It is not just Schelling himself who vacates it; he insists that all philosophers ought to do so. The point is that Schelling's 1811 pessimism towards the philosopher as 'educator of mankind' is consonant with his *Clara*-critique of the tormented and isolated Christ-figure writing obscure jargon for a few. After 1804, Schelling continually rejects the idea of the philosopher as teaching the people anything, in favour of 'the language of the people' as itself constitutive of philosophy. He is thereby rejecting a whole tradition of *Bildung* through philosophy: philosophy is not there to better us or educate us; it should not try to somehow raise the non-philosophical up to its lofty heights, but rather it must itself leave behind its cloistered walls and abandon 'the artificial language of the schools'. Schelling's and Hegel's 1802 insistence that 'in its relationship to common sense, the world of philosophy is in and for itself an inverted world' is definitively rejected by Schelling after 1804.[15] The philosopher must not strike out alone, must not aim to improve or even change the world from a position of isolation. The philosopher must rather place 'a sociable garland in his hair'.

6 Guidelines for Symphilosophy

If philosophy is to become popular, what should it look like? Answering this question is the task undertaken by Part IV of *Clara.*[16] The previous section already began to foreground the question of style at the heart of Schelling's populist reorientation of philosophising. A philosopher who places a 'sociable garland in his hair' writes in 'the language of the people', rather than the outdat-

employed in the lectures on the philosophy of mythology is particularly significant here: the task of tautegorical interpretation is not to interpret the popular languages of mythology, but to repeat them; myths are *not* basal units above which the *gebildete* philosopher ascends, but are themselves already sufficiently philosophical. Elsewhere, McGrath helpfully emphasises how central the connection between community and belief is to Schellingian philosophy (e.g. McGrath 2012, p. 163).

15 This is not just a critique of Schelling's earlier self and of Hegel (as shown below), but also of Fichte, whom—as Schelling well knew—Jacobi described as 'the true Messiah of speculative reason' (Jacobi 1994, pp. 501–506).

16 Part IV functions then as kind of justification of Schelling's own writerly practices in *Clara*, 'a dialogue on the very nature of philosophical dialogue' (Marquet 1984, p. 5). Particularly important is its emphasis on the need to combine dialogue and narrative (as *Clara* itself does), like a novel, such that unity of action is retained as something 'interior and spiritual' (Marquet 1984, pp. 9–10), i.e. 'a symbolic temporality of the interior path run by a soul in distress' (Roux 2014, p. 71).

ed 'language of the schools'. This is, Schelling goes on to elucidate, a language of simplicity—one that 'accesses the simple plenitude of human language' (Marquet 1984, p. 8)—through which the philosopher cultivates a social universality in her writings, such that conceptual content is as accessible to the 'craftsman' as it is to the academic.

Two additional quotations help further illustrate Schelling's engagement with this question:

> A few days or weeks or so later, a philosophy book arrived in which some of the excellent things it contained were written in a completely incomprehensible language and abounded, so to speak, with barbarism. Clara found it on my table and after she'd read it for a while, she said: Why do today's philosophers find it so impossible to write at least a little in the same way that they speak? Are these terribly artificial words absolutely necessary, can't the same thing be said in a more natural way, and does a book have to be quite unenjoyable for it to be philosophical? (SW 9, p. 86; Schelling 2002, p. 63)

> Germans have for so long philosophised among themselves alone that their speculations and their language has become further and further removed from what is universally intelligible [...]. After a few vain attempts to spread Kant's ideas beyond their borders, they have renounced the task of making themselves comprehensible to other nations and instead now regard themselves as the philosophical elect, forgetting that the original goal of all philosophy—a goal often forgotten but still necessary—is to obtain universal assent by making oneself universally intelligible. (SW 10, p. 204)

These quotations further develop the ideal of a simple, accessible philosophical style and its corollary, a critique of 'the philosophical elect'. Hence, the second quotation from Schelling's 1835 Preface to Victor Cousin's *Fragments philosophiques* takes up many of the themes at stake between 1804 and 1815 and redeploys them as part of his ongoing Hegel-critique. Schelling attacks the tendency to obscurity among post-Kantian philosopher-messiahs, and looks to France for part of the remedy: German philosophers must learn good style and analysis from the French, 'Who could not agree that for clarity and precision of style in scientific matters there is something to learn from our cousins in the west?' (SW 10, p. 204). Only through the absorption of French philosophical style into German systematising, Schelling argues, can a 'universally intelligible' philosophical style be attained.[17] A dose of clarity, precision and analytic thinking is required to cure philosophy of its Hegelian ills. This is Schelling as an ordinary-language philosopher *avant la lettre*.

Likewise the passage from *Clara* reproduced above. The literature typically identifies the unnamed 'philosophy book' which triggers Clara's critique of contemporary philosophy as the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, and, whatever the exact volume Schelling had in mind, it is clear that he is thinking of the sorts of philosophical developments that Hegel's *Phänomenologie* exemplified for him. Again, there is an appeal to natural, not artificial style, to cultivated, rather than barbaric phrases, to a text that can be read with enjoyment at leisure, rather than slowly deciphered in an academic library. The rest of the fourth part of *Clara* is spent working out more concretely what such a philosophy of the people would look like—a dialogue drawn from contemporary life, full of the 'speech of the present', 'all the grace and tenderness of [the spoken word], all the charm of unexpected idioms' (SW 9, p. 90; Schelling 2002, p. 65). The populism implicit in all these guidelines is encapsulated in Clara's statement, 'I don't think much of a philosopher who can't make their basic view comprehensible to any educated human being; indeed, if necessary, to any intelligent and well-behaved child' (SW 9, p. 91; Schelling 2002, p. 66).

And what is more, the *concept of sympathy* is central to these guidelines on populist style. I have already noted that Schelling's explicit appeal to this concept in *Clara* occurs in a discussion of language—that is, in a discussion of the sympathetic affinities that hold between the physical and the spiritual. Language too, Schelling writes, possesses a bond with the spiritual, an 'essence' that manifests spirit through matter; hence, writing involves a kind of 'sensitivity' to the beyond, to the immaterial (SW 9, pp. 100–101; Schelling 2002, pp. 72–73). Language is a trace of the spirit world in our current condition, and so to understand language correctly is to become sympathetically aware of the beyond from within the here-and-now. Moreover, in addition to such mystical discourse on the sympathies inherent in language, Clara demands that philosophical style appropriate the properties of a sympathetic conversation between friends or lovers: 'Why can't he also speak about higher things to everyone with the same language he uses with the one he loves?' (SW 9, p. 88; Schelling 2002, p. 64). Sympathetic intimacy—affinity between author and reader or between characters in a

17 A tension emerges here between the Cousin-preface's call for intelligibility that is *geographically* universal (i.e. a cosmopolitan account of stylistic accessibility) and the nationalist, even localist simplicity that Schelling advocates in *Clara* itself. In the latter text, he stresses the importance of idiom in the construction of a 'language of the people' (e.g. SW 9, p. 87; Schelling 2002, p. 63) and bemoans the fact that 'the Germans have to have foreign standards forced on them' (SW 9, p. 25; Schelling 2002, p. 18). This tension is perhaps explained by the later date (1835) or unusual audience (those interested in French philosophy) of the Cousin-preface. More generally, nationalism seems a key component of Schelling's appeal to the people, as in any late romantic *Volksphilosophie:* just as Hegel had claimed in 1805 'that I want to teach philosophy to speak German' (Hegel 1984, p. 107), so too Schelling. Schelling merely adds that Hegel fails at this task, because he in fact asks the German people to speak his own obscure philosophical dialectic.

dialogue—thus becomes a key metaphilosophical criterion of good writing ('Why can't discussions such as we have between ourselves be written down?' [SW 9, pp. 89–90; Schelling 2002, p. 65]). And, as always in Schelling's populist reworking of philosophy, the notion of *revitalisation*, of bringing philosophy to life lies close to the surface: philosophers should 'erect small stages upon which they could summarize the lengthy debate, pull it into focus, as it were, and *make it live before our very eyes*' (SW 9, p. 88; Schelling 2002, p. 64; my emphasis).[18] It is through these means that philosophy becomes 'public'.

7 Conclusion: Mysticism, Populism, Philosophy

Clara is a text immersed in the mystic tradition. This is evident even from the subtitle attributed to it, *Über den Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt*, but it is also clear from the themes already resumed in this essay: the sympathy between the living and the dead, spiritual sympathies in language, 'magical connections' between man and nature, and the value of occult practices. This seems, on first blush, difficult to reconcile with Schelling's philosophical populism: the language of the mystic is typically seen as *just as* gnomic and inaccessible as the language of the academic metaphysician. And yet, Schelling resists any identification of mysticism with obscurity: in *Clara*, he instead allies mystic practices for attaining the beyond with universally accessible style, and so definitively rejects that tradition of philosophy for which the mystic is unable or unwilling to communicate clearly.

To conclude my reflections, I want to briefly consider this problem of the relation between *Clara*'s appeal to mysticism and its trenchant populism by means of a schematic comparison of Schelling and Kant on the relation between mysticism, populism and philosophy. The aim of such a coda is to better illuminate how the foregoing account of a politics of sympathy intervenes into debates within German Idealism more broadly. That is, it explores Schelling's vision of the philosophical enterprise and its role in public life from an alternative angle—interrogating what it does to religion, via a sustained comparison with Kant's influential template for the philosophy-popularity-mysticism triad. What I want to suggest is that, while Kant positions philosophy as a practice that is *neither* mystic *nor* popular, Schelling's *Clara* advocates a philosophising consonant with *both* mysticism *and* popular style. It describes the philosopher in an anti-Kantian manner. Schelling may follow Kant in linking mysticism to the problem of popularity, but instead of thereby shunning both, he considers the affirmation of both radical religious beliefs and popular style to be integral to the philosophical enterprise.

Kant's *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie* provides a focused attack on recent 'philosophers of vision'—that is, the late Münster Circle of Stolberg and Schlosser which preached Catholic mysticism under the guise of exalted Platonism. In Kant's words,

> Things have lately gone so far that an alleged philosophy is openly proclaimed to the public, in which one does not have to *work* but need only hearken and attend to the oracle within, in order to gain complete possession of all the wisdom to which philosophy aspires. (Ak. 8, p. 390; Kant 2002, pp. 431–432)

The irony that Kant intends to trace through *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton* goes as follows: such a proclamation to the public is self-defeating, because the mystic—'brooding inwardly' (Ak. 8, p. 393; Kant 2002, p. 434)—is thereby attempting to communicate a private, ineffable feeling that by definition cannot be so communicated to a general public. Kant writes, these mystics make much of their possession of inner feelings, 'but are unfortunately unable to utter and disseminate [them] generally, by means of language' (Ak. 8, p. 389; Kant 2002, p. 431). Instead, only critical philosophy, founded as it is on 'the apodictic certainty which a *universally* binding law must possess', can be universally communicated (Ak. 8, p. 401; Kant 2002, p. 441). Only critical philosophy can be publicised, because it is founded on genuinely universal principles. Indeed, this is why the very test of good philosophy that Kant places at the heart of *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton* reads, 'As to how much sterling metal they contain at heart, who can offer a *publicly valid* testimony to this?' (Ak. 8, p. 402; Kant 2002, p. 442). Mysticism fails this test.[19]

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18 As Roux puts it, the aim is to give 'the illusion of a dialogue that unfolds under our eyes as in real life' (Roux 2014, p. 66). Emergent here is, as Grosos points out, an emphasis on *personality* in the philosophical text. He argues that such insistence on a character-centred presentation of philosophy is 'a response to the growing dissatisfaction Schelling himself experienced with the normative writing of philosophy as a *system* of knowledge' (Grosos 2014, p. 44). Or, in Schelling's own words, 'Philosophical discussions need certain types of people if they are not to be too dull' (SW 9, p. 88; Schelling 2002, p. 64).

19 In short, mysticism is esoteric. At best, as in Plato's letters, it can speak only to a few, to the initiated, and so it can never hope to gain the kind of universal acceptance that the critical philosophy will one day attain. Hence, Kant writes, 'Who can fail to see [in Plato's letters] the mystagogue, who not only raves on his own behalf, but is simultaneously the founder of a club, and in speaking to his adepts, rather than to the people (meaning all the uninitiated) plays the *superior* with his alleged philosophy!' (Ak. 8, p. 399; Kant 2002, p. 439).

On the basis of this fundamental opposition between mysticism as private-esoteric and criticism as public and universally-communicable, Kant goes on to set up a further opposition between poetry and prose. Kant writes at the very end of *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton*, 'At bottom, indeed, all philosophy is prosaic; and a proposal to now begin philosophising poetically again might well be received as one would a suggestion that the merchant should henceforth write his catalogues, not in prose, but in verse' (Ak. 8, p. 405; Kant 2002, p. 445). Such a claim draws on some earlier comments he had made associating mysticism with poetic talent and opposing such rhetorical ornamentation and showy ostentation to the plain simplicity of the moral law (Ak. 8, p. 393; Kant 2002, p. 434). The mystic writes beautifully, but such beauty necessarily falsifies and obscures the feelings that can never be clearly uttered. By rejecting mystic esotericism, the philosopher also rejects the poetic, and must instead act like a 'merchant' dully noting down the stocks of reason.

In fact, Kant slightly tempers this rejection of poetry elsewhere in *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton*. He distinguishes between his own style and an 'aesthetic way of presenting'. Here he does so not on the basis of an outright rejection of such aesthetic style, but because he considers it merely a *post factum* addition. It should only come after the fact of genuine philosophical labour, belatedly.[20] Kant writes of 'an aesthetic way of presenting [...] of which one can indeed *subsequently* make use, once the principles have been clarified by the first method' (Ak. 8, p. 405; Kant 2002, p. 444; my emphasis). There is a qualified acceptance here of the need to ornament philosophical prose in order, Kant continues, 'to vivify [pre-established] ideas by sensory, albeit merely analogical presentation' (Ak. 8, p. 405; Kant 2002, p. 444). Hence, another kind of popularity emerges here. There is the popularity of the universally-binding law, but also the popularity of a readable style. Kant may lay immediate claim to the first of these, but the second is always put off. Popular content is to be attained as quickly as possible, whereas popular style is a matter for a future date. From his early work onwards—but particularly in the wake of the Garve-Feder *Göttingische Anzeigen* review of 1782—Kant insists that he lacks 'the talent of a luminous, even graceful presentation'; it is, he emphasises throughout, 'something

20 Different models of temporality in the word/concept relation are notable here: whereas Kant insists that proper philosophical work—i.e. the labour of critique—always comes *before* its writing or communication, and one might conjecture that Hegel's 'owl of Minerva' signifies the belatedness of philosophical speculation, for Schelling, philosophy must exist as a component-part of public action—*present* in the very eruption of the event itself. As he puts it in *Clara*, 'speech [must] be *taken from the present*, or must once have been so taken, if it is to have a real effect on us' (SW 9, p. 89; Schelling 2002, p. 65; my emphasis).

I could not provide' (Ak. 8, p. 183; Kant 2007, pp. 217–218). In the Preface to the second edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, this lack of stylistic talent is explicitly connected to the ideal of popularity: bemoaning his own lack of 'talent for lucid exposition', Kant goes on to anticipate the future perfection of the critical project by means of 'the requisite elegance' provided by 'men of impartiality, insight and true popularity' (Kant 1929, B xlii). Kant's continual deferral of popular style to the future or to others stems from a number of grounds, such as anxiety about philosophy's inability to present mathematically; an ascetic sacrifice of good writing in favour of getting at the truth in the simplest manner; and a recognition, once more, of the dangers of such popularity denigrating into visionary enthusiasm. Ultimately, in his late work, Kant is adamant that the philosopher must be resigned to unpopularity: 'This [i.e. the systematic critique of the capacity for reason itself] can never become popular [...]. Popularity (common language) is out of the question here; on the contrary, scholastic *precision* must be insisted upon' (Ak. 4, p. 206; Kant 2013, p. 36).

Kant, then, seems to crave the neutrality of a style without style. In Nancy's words, Kant aims to speak in a 'language as the zero degree of all language use, of all linguistic deviation and inflexion' (Nancy 2008, p. 78)—a neutral language that occurs as the 'neither ... nor' of popular ornament and mystic obscurity. Or, in the very language of the title of *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton*, 'Philosophy installs itself thus *not as merely another tone* [...] but as *the absence of tone* [...] and thus as an atonal exposition' (Nancy 2008, p. 78). Such style without style protects the philosophical enterprise from dangerous impurities, such as mysticism, poetry or even the popular form that Kant often craves but always denies himself.

While Kant associates mysticism with private language (in contrast to the universal communicability of the moral law), according to the Schelling of *Clara*[21], mystical content is properly articulated *in ordinary language*—and this is the very ordinary language that is proper to philosophical presentation as well. Again, the figure of the grocer's wife is exemplary: her story is meant as an expression of 'the language of the people', of supernatural intercession and piety outside the bounds of mere reason. And yet—rather than frustrating the philosophical endeavours of the characters, rather than impeding their construction of an abstract concept of sympathy—they admit that 'the story had touched us all incredibly'. The grocer's wife's story serves as a catalyst to their

21 By the 1830s, Schelling is far more critical of mysticism and his position has reverted to a more Kantian one: the mystic fails because she cannot publicly communicate her thoughts; see Whistler 2013a.

own transfiguration, their realisation that sympathetic affinities ground belief, community and good philosophising. Indeed, in order for philosophy to become whole, to encompass the world of the dead as well as of the living, it must cultivate the affect of sympathy. Philosophers are to form sympathetic bonds, leading to non-statist communities and public action. The sympathy being theorised in Part V of *Clara*, before the appearance of the grocer's wife, is performed in their reaction to her story: it occurs in response to the most exemplary instance in the dialogue of 'the language of the people'. *Sympathy binds together mysticism, popular style and philosophy.*

In contrast to Kant, therefore, Schelling is happy both to run the gauntlet of popularity and to ally philosophising with mystic practice. It is here, I think, that the significance of *Clara* lies in the context of German Idealism as a whole: the work sets out a resolutely anti-Kantian conception of the philosophical project—one that understands philosophising as an essentially mystic, popular and communal practice, a practice built on ties of sympathy.

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Jeffrey Reid

Friedrich Schlegel and Romantic Psychology: The Fragmentary Self as Ironic System

"By their fruits ye shall know them."

Abstract. *This paper first specifies Romantic psychology in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Friedrich Schlegel's theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electrochemical wit (Witz) and animated by stimulating otherness. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open. The paper shows that the fragmentary self is phenomenological in nature. Romantic psychology's contemporary legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics.*

In diesem Aufsatz wird zunächst romantische Psychologie im Unterschied zur aufklärungsnahen Vermögenspsychologie charakterisiert, deren wissenschaftliches Paradigma fundamental materialistisch und mechanisch ist. Romantische Psychologie wird dann durch Friedrich Schlegels Theorie und Praxis des literarischen Fragments vorgestellt. Im Fragment entdecken wir ein Selbstsein, das selbstsetzend ist, angetrieben durch elektrochemischen „Witz" und angeregt durch stimulierende Andersheit. Romantische Psychologie bestimmt das Selbst als ein ironisches System, es ist vollständig und doch organisch offen. Als Fragment ist es phänomenologischer Natur. Sein heutiges Erbe kann in der Psychoanalyse und in psychoanalytischer Hermeneutik gefunden werden.

In this article, I attempt to establish the specificity of Romantic psychology. I do so, first of all, by distinguishing it from psychological science as it is conceived in the Enlightenment, in what might be broadly defined as faculty-psychology. To provide an idea of such Enlightenment-informed faculty-psychology, I examine the content of a college-level course in psychology as it was taught at the Tübingen *Stift* (Seminary) in 1789. I will then juxtapose this view with what I believe is the specificity of Romantic psychology, which I discover by examining the work of Early German Romanticism's main protagonist, Friedrich Schlegel, from around his *Athenaeum* period writings (1797–1800). My contention is that

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