

**The role of Genoa in the Latin Kingdom of  
Jerusalem: political and diplomatic struggles between  
1250 and 1291**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis is an analysis of the role of Genoa in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem across the last forty years of its existence. Looking at numerous primary sources, as well as a variety of secondary works from different disciplines, it seeks to establish the importance of the Genoese in the Levant as well as their responsibilities with regards to the fall of Acre in 1291. It argues that the Genoese were involved economically but also socially and politically in the kingdom throughout its existence and that they attempted to retain a major presence via diplomacy with other major powers when necessary.

This thesis seeks to bridge the gap in the historiography of the kingdom with regards to the smaller parties, such as the Italian mercantile cities. It focuses primarily on Genoa due to the sheer volume of documentation available but will also look at Venice and Pisa for comparison when appropriate.

The first chapter looks at the events surround the Seventh Crusade, in particular the contract signed between Louis IX and Genoa in 1246 for the transport of the army. It also suggests the existence of a close relationship between the commune of Genoa and the crown of France. The second chapter discusses the War of Saint-Sabas and its impact on Acre, and on the Genoese. Multiple archaeological sources are used in order to provide a clear geographical layout of the conflict. Chapter three analyses the relationship of Charles and Genoa, linking it to the first chapter. It also outlines the diplomatic efforts of the Genoese in the Levant. The final chapter examines the treaties between Mamluks and Latins, particularly the Genoese. It focuses on their treaty of 1290 in order to outline Genoa's attempts to survive.

<b><u>The role of Genoa in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: political and diplomatic struggles between 1250 and 1291</u></b>	<b>1</b>
<b><u>Acknowledgements</u></b>	<b>5</b>
<b><u>Abbreviations:</u></b>	<b>7</b>
<b><u>Introduction:</u></b>	<b>8</b>
<i>Historiography</i>	9
<i>Sources</i>	11
<i>Chapter Outlines</i>	12
<b><u>Historical background</u></b>	<b>22</b>
<i>Genoa in the thirteenth century</i>	22
<i>Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean</i>	30
<b><u>Chapter 1</u></b>	<b>37</b>
<b><u>Louis IX in the Holy Land and the Italian Dilemma: Profit and Duty</u></b>	<b>37</b>
The Role of the Italians in the Holy Land During the Seventh Crusade	38
The Contract between Louis and Genoa	39
<i>Content of the Contract</i>	41
<i>The relationship between France and Genoa</i>	45
The role and responsibilities of the Italians in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem	48
Relations between Italians and Louis	54
Conclusion	56
<b><u>Chapter 2</u></b>	<b>57</b>
<b><u>The War of Saint-Sabas and its consequences on the stability of the Holy Land</u></b>	<b>57</b>
The location of the Mercantile Cities' Quarter	64
The location of the building of Saint-Sabas	72
Why was the building so important?	80
<i>The Nature of the conflict</i>	80
<i>Why this building?</i>	84
The involvement of others in the conflict:	88
Conclusion	93
<b><u>Chapter 3</u></b>	<b>96</b>
<b><u>Genoa and Charles of Anjou</u></b>	<b>96</b>
Introduction:	96
Charles: his policies, attitudes, and deeds towards the Holy Land	99
The Italians and Charles	109
<i>Trade, contracts and the merchant in the thirteenth century:</i>	111
Italian expansion in Acre:	117
<i>The Grimaldi:</i>	118
<i>The Italians in Acre:</i>	124
Conclusion:	126
<b><u>Chapter 4</u></b>	<b>129</b>
<b><u>1282-1291: a historical black hole, or a diplomatic struggle for survival?</u></b>	<b>129</b>
The crusader kingdom of Jerusalem without crusades	132
<i>Genoa, Tyre and Tripoli</i>	134

<u>The treaties of the Mamluk Era .....</u>	<u>141</u>
<i>Treaties of Baybars .....</i>	<i>142</i>
<i>Treaties of Qalawun.....</i>	<i>145</i>
<i>Treaty with Genoa .....</i>	<i>149</i>
<u>Conclusion.....</u>	<u>158</u>
<b><u>The fall of Acre and its aftermath .....</u></b>	<b><u>160</u></b>
<b><u>Conclusion .....</u></b>	<b><u>165</u></b>
<b><u>Appendix .....</u></b>	<b><u>169</u></b>
<u>Maps .....</u>	<u>169</u>
<u>Contract between Louis IX and Genoa (1246).....</u>	<u>176</u>
<u>Table of Alliances and Wars: in the West versus in the East.....</u>	<u>182</u>
<b><u>Bibliography .....</u></b>	<b><u>185</u></b>



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Olivier Berrou

### **Abbreviations:**

*HIC – Histoire de l’Ile de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, ed. by M. L. de Mas Latrie, 3 vols (Paris: 1861)

*LIRG – I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, eds. Puncuh, D., Rovere, A., Dellacasa, S., Madia, E., Bibolini, M., and Pallavicino, E., 9 vols (Rome, 1992-2002)

Mayer, *Urkunden* – Hans Eberhard Mayer, *Die Urkunden der Lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, *Diplomata regum Latinorum Hierosolymitanorum*, 4 vols (Hannover, 2010)

*RCA – I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, ed. by Riccardo Filangieri, 49 vols (Naples, 1950-2006)– *RCA*

*RRH – Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII – MCCXCI)*, Röhricht, Reinhold, ed. (Innsbruck, 1893)

*RRR – Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII – MCCXCI)*, Röhricht, Reinhold, ed. (Innsbruck, 1893), Revised by Jonathan Riley-Smith (2016 - )

Tafel, Thomas, *Urkunden* – Dr. G. L. Fr. Tafel und Dr. G. N. Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handels und Staats Geschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante, von neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 3 vols (Vienna, 1856-7)

*TT – The Templar of Tyre, Les Gestes des Chiprois*, ed. by Gaston Raynaud (Geneva: 1887), pp. 139-334

*RHC, doc. Arm. – Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, documents Armeniens*, 2 vols (Paris, 1906)

*RHC, doc. Occ. – Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, Historiens Occidentaux*, 5 vols (Paris, 1895)

## **Introduction:**

The aim of this thesis is to study the role of Genoa in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem from the time of the Seventh Crusade (1248-1254), down to 1291. During this time, relatively little is known of the kingdom of Jerusalem compared to earlier periods, and even less is known about the Italians in the kingdom. The crusade of the Lord Edward (1271-72) and the accession of Charles of Anjou as king of Jerusalem (1277) are some of the last major events that have been written about, at the time, and nowadays.<sup>1</sup> The primary concern of this study is to engage with the gap in the historiography of the kingdom of Jerusalem's last decades, with particular emphasis on Genoa. The two other principal Italian cities of Pisa and Venice also feature in this work, largely as points of comparison to the Genoese.

This thesis will offer several new perspectives on this subject. It will discuss Genoese relationships with various powers of the kingdom, and also the contracts with Western players, particularly Louis IX, looking especially at his two crusades and the contracts he drew up with the Genoese. These contracts will argue in favour of a continuous involvement in the crusading movement, but also in a permanent presence of the Genoese in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. It will also examine Genoa and Pisa's relations with the papacy, particularly Innocent IV whose bull giving the Genoese free rein in the East was noteworthy and unusual. It will be debated that this document may or may not have a role in the conflict between Genoa and other powers in the east. It will also consider, where appropriate, Genoese relations with Venice and principally during the conflict known as the War of Saint-Sabas.<sup>2</sup> We will also see how these recurring conflicts between the Italian cities impacted upon the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and how it affected the local and foreign factions vying for power.

Underlying and alongside Genoa's political engagement in the Latin East were the twin engines of economic and religious motivation. This is not, however, a detailed work of economic history; others have considered this matter in exhaustive detail.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The main source for events of the thirteenth century, are the works of Philip of Novara and the Templar of Tyre. These document the years between 1230 and 1314, and in particular the fall of Acre in 1291. However they briefly describe the events following the ascension of Charles of Anjou as king of Jerusalem, and quickly discuss the war between Genoa and Pisa, before going into the fall of Acre and the rapid end of the kingdom. For modern studies on the subject, see below, n. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter 2 will deal with the war in more detail, especially regarding the dates of the conflict, which are not entirely certain.

<sup>3</sup> See Quentin van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements and the Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* (Cambridge, 2009).

Likewise it is not a chronicle of Genoese engagement in holy war per se, although in both of these instances there are many times when these matters closely intertwine with political issues.

The situation in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the period studied in this thesis was very different to that of the twelfth century. The lack of royal power and central authority provided the perfect conditions for the Italian communes and other independent communities such as the military orders to evolve and expand. After the recapture of Acre during the Third Crusade, a particular phenomenon can be observed: after four years of Muslim occupation, the city served as a new platform upon which the kingdom could be rebuilt.<sup>4</sup> The Italians (as well as the military orders) resettled their own quarters and also took the opportunity to acquire more lands, thus becoming more important as political and economic players.<sup>5</sup> From the second quarter of the thirteenth century onwards, the king of Jerusalem was absent from and as a result, the political strength of the kingdom gradually declined. The rise of the Mamluks in Egypt, the arrival of the Mongols on the scene, the gradually increasing political and diplomatic distance between the kingdom and the principality of Antioch, the return of the Byzantines to Constantinople, as well as major political and religious tensions in the West cumulatively contributed to the kingdom's gradual decline.<sup>6</sup> By the same token, they all had an effect on the Italian communes and their economic policies in the Mediterranean.

The kingdom of Jerusalem fell in May 1291, and the crown of Jerusalem then became more of an honorary title, passed down the lines of numerous houses in the West, such as the kings and queens of Cyprus, those of the kingdom of Naples, the crown of Aragon, up until nowadays with the Spanish King, Felipe VI who has a claim through the Spanish Bourbon line.

## **Historiography**

Some of the material to be used in this study will be as follows: studies and narratives of the thirteenth-century crusades have tended to focus more on the Western world and

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<sup>4</sup> David Jacoby, 'Aspects of Everyday Life in Frankish Acre', *Crusades* 4 (2005), pp. 73-105 (p. 73).

<sup>5</sup> Denys Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 4 vols (Cambridge, 2009), 4. See below for more, Ch. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Christopher Tyerman, *God's War. A New History of the Crusades* (London: 2006), p. 806, Andrew Jotischky, *Crusading and the crusader states: second edition* (Oxon, 2017), p. 184.

the Byzantine powers especially the 1260s with the end of the Latin Empire, the rise of the house of Anjou in Sicily, the end of the Hohenstaufens in Germany, the rise of Aragon, and the seeds of what became known as the Hundred Years war between France and England. Thus the works of Steven Runciman, Kenneth Setton, René Grousset, and Jean Richard, give very little mention on the roles of smaller powers such as the Italians.<sup>7</sup> The War of Saint Sabas is often the only action that is covered, albeit briefly. Recently however, specific studies have starting to emerge regarding the conflict. David Jacoby and Antonio Musarra have both offered different chronologies that are of great relevance to this present research.<sup>8</sup> Jacoby, with his numerous articles on Venice and Acre for example, offer us a vast amount of documentation on the activities of the commune in the crusader kingdom, but one in particular, on the topography of Acre, will prove invaluable in order to present a plan of the city at the time, and to be able to give an overview of each commune's position within the city. Musarra has also written the most recent volume on Genoa during the Crusades (2017), and his research on the commune is one of the most important during that period. His latest volume covers a large amount of information on Genoa and their relationship with the crusading movement from the twelfth century to the end of the thirteenth century, and makes use of an extensive amount of sources. As a result, a number of his works will be used throughout this thesis, however, the argument presented here will diverge from his, as his research focuses primarily on the commune as a whole, rather than on the individuals and their impact. Steven Epstein's work on Genoa will be also of importance.<sup>9</sup> It is his account on the Ligurian commune that sparked my interest in the history of this city, and will also feature extensively throughout my work. That said, my research will extend their work further. Other secondary writers will also be used, but will be dealt with in the relevant sections.

With regards to economic history, van Doosselaere analysed a large volume of Genoese charters and placed them in an economic context in his book *Commercial*

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<sup>7</sup> Kenneth M. Setton, ed. by, *A History of the Crusades*, 6 vols (Philadelphia, 1962) 2, 3; Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, 3 vols (London, 1990), 3; René Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 3 vols (Paris, 2006), 3; Jean Richard, *The Crusades, c.1071 – c.1291* (Cambridge, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> David Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant: les Vénitiens à Acre dans la seconde moitié du treizième siècle', *Journal of Medieval History*, 3 (1977), pp. 225-264 ; Antonio Musarra, *La guerra di San Saba* (Pisa, 2009), *Acri 1291, La caduta degli stati crociati* (Bologna, 2017) ; *In partibus Ultramaris. I Genovesi, la crociata e la Terrasanta (secc. XII-XIII)* (Roma, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> Steven Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1996), *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250* (Cambridge, MA, 1984).

*Agreements and the Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa* (Cambridge, 2009).<sup>10</sup> He uses this material to argue that Genoese trade was heavily influenced by the crusades. This is not a surprising conclusion, in and of itself, but van Doosselaere provides the specialised insight of an economist and thus offers an important contribution to the bigger picture examined here. Other historians such as Balard, and Heyd have also written about the mercantile class in the Holy Land, and to some extent about the impact that commerce had on the Crusades.<sup>11</sup>

Concerning relations between the Italian communes and the Frankish nobility, historians such as Riley-Smith and La Monte have assessed them well.<sup>12</sup> However, the relations between the Italians and the crusaders themselves have only been touched upon. In her doctoral thesis, Linda Ross has brilliantly explained the relationship between the Latin East and the West, also discussed the relationships between the feudal nobility and the crusaders, but she did not include the Italians in her study.<sup>13</sup> Merav Mack did consider the Genoese involvement and motivations during the Third Crusade, and during the Fourth and Fifth Crusades as well, but stopped there.<sup>14</sup> Other studies, such as Elisabeth Crouzet-Pava's *Venise triomphante, les horizons d'un mythe* give us insight into Venice's attitude towards these expeditions,<sup>15</sup> and the studies of the Seventh Crusade which look into all aspects of Louis' preparations and conduct of warfare briefly mentioned the topic of Italian relations with individuals; that said, overall, there is very little is available.

## Sources

Primary sources that will be seen in this thesis include volumes of the *Libri Iurium* of Genoa,<sup>16</sup> as well as the continuations of the annals of the city by Caffaro.<sup>17</sup> The

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<sup>10</sup> Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements and the Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa*.

<sup>11</sup> Michel Balard, 'Notes on the Economic Consequences of the Crusades', in *The Experience of Crusading*, ed. by Peter Edbury and Jonathan Phillips, 2 vols (Cambridge, 2003), 2, pp. 233-239, Wilhelm von Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1985-6).

<sup>12</sup> Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (Basingstoke, 1974), John La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in Jerusalem, 1100-1291* (Cambridge, MA, 1932)

<sup>13</sup> Linda Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291' (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2003), pp. 266-73.

<sup>14</sup> Merav Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade,' *Crusades* 10 (2011), pp. 45-62.

<sup>15</sup> Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan, *Venise triomphante: les horizons d'un mythe* (Paris, 2004), pp. 105-110.

<sup>16</sup> *I Libri Iurium della Repubblica di Genova*, later referenced as *LIRG*, eds. D. Puncuh, A. Rovere, S. Dellacasa, E. Madia, M. Bibolini, and E. Pallavicino, 9 vols (Rome, 1992-2002).

<sup>17</sup> Caffaro, *Genoa and the Twelfth-Century Crusades*, trans. by Martin Hall, Jonathan Phillips, *Crusade Texts in Translation*, 24 (London, 2013).

numerous cartularies in the *Archivio di Stato di Genova* are also of great help as a large quantity of charters and contracts for the city of Genoa can be found: most notably those of the notary Bartolomeo de Fornari, which are comprised of numerous documents relating to Louis' crusades.<sup>18</sup> The chronicles of Joinville,<sup>19</sup> the Rothelin and Acre Continuations of William of Tyre's chronicle,<sup>20</sup> *Li Estoire de Jerusalem et d'Antioche*,<sup>21</sup> and a few letters are available, most notably those of Jean Sarrasin and Louis himself. Louis' charters have yet to be published and thus remain difficult to access. The manuscripts of the Registers still exist; they are stored in the Archives Nationales of France in the J collection. For the period concerned in this thesis, only the manuscript JJ26 needed to be looked at.<sup>22</sup> The main feature of this source is that it is the Register started by Guérin, bishop of Senlis (d. 1227), and principal advisor to Philip II and Louis VIII. It was used until 1272 and we know that Louis IX took one copy with him to Egypt in 1248, while he also might have taken it on his second crusade in 1270.<sup>23</sup> Letters and registers will also be used in this study: the ongoing project of the *Centre Interuniversitaire d'Histoire et d'Archéologie Médiévales de Lyon*, *The Ecole française de Rome*, and of the *Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes* published and digitalised by Brepols, *Ut per litteras apostolicas*, allows for the study of numerous papal letters and correspondence from the thirteenth century, both from published material, but also utilising previously unpublished sources. The registers of popes Alexander IV, Innocent IV, Nicholas III and IV, and those of Urban IV and Gregory X are also pertinent.<sup>24</sup>

## **Chapter Outlines**

In order to assess the role of the Genoese in the kingdom of Jerusalem, this study will be divided in four parts, each analysing a separate major event. The first section will

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<sup>18</sup> Genoa, Archivio di Stato di Genova, MS UA0027.

<sup>19</sup> Jean de Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', in *Joinville and Villehardouin, Chronicles of the Crusades*, trans. by Caroline Smith (London, 2008), pp. 137-336.

<sup>20</sup> M. R. Morgan ed., 'La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)', *Documents relatifs à l'histoire des Croisades*, 14, (Paris, 1982).

<sup>21</sup> In *RHC, His. Occ.*, Vol 5, pp. 621-648.

<sup>22</sup> This manuscript unfortunately remained out of my reach, as I was never able to go to these archives.

<sup>23</sup> Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), p. 909.

<sup>24</sup> *Les Registres d'Alexandre IV*, ed. by M. Bourel de la Roncière, 3 Vols (Paris: 1895), *Les Registres d'Urban IV*, ed. by Jean Guiraud (Paris : 1901-6), *Les Registres de Gregoire X*, ed. by Jean Guiraud (Paris: 1892), *Les Registres de Nicolas IV*, ed. by E. Langlois (Paris: 1886), *Les Registres de Nicolas III*, ed. by Jules Gay (Paris: 1898),



look at the Seventh Crusade (1248-1254), and will consider the effect it had on the Genoese, but also on the Holy Land. The first crusade of Louis IX is critically important, and has been studied in detail by many; William C. Jordan in particular, whose work in *The Challenge of the Crusade* addresses many questions on the preparation and execution of this expedition.<sup>25</sup> One of the reasons for looking at the Seventh Crusade in this present study is simply due to the role the Genoese played in it. Since the Third Crusade (1189-1192), crusading armies no longer favoured the land route: it was too long and arduous and the death of Frederick I during the journey to the Levant in 1190 reinforced this point. Instead, armies preferred the maritime route, which despite being quite the adventure for the medieval man, was shorter and relatively safer. This meant that the mercantile communes of Europe, especially Genoa, Venice and Pisa, enjoyed a significant degree of importance in this role, and soon, the different courts of Europe had their favourite port of departure. Since the Third Crusade therefore, France had started negotiations with Genoa for the supply of ships for the journey, and Louis IX continued this policy throughout his reign:<sup>26</sup> Genoese ships made up the majority of his fleet for his two crusades.<sup>27</sup> The relationship between the French and the Italians will play a major role in this study and consequently, the analysis of the contract between Louis IX and Genoa for the transport of his army in 1246 will be examined in detail in order to clarify this.

Another significant relationship of the time was the one between Genoa and Pope Innocent IV (1243-54), who was a from the Ligurian city. This proved to be a great benefit to the city as they have received a document that legally enabled them to act in the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus without fear of excommunication and protected them from intimidation by other parties, including the local Church (1247).<sup>28</sup> This document is significant in that it only appears a few years before the start of what became known as the War of Saint Sabas, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This document is remarkable because to my knowledge, it is the only one of its type for a city not officially on crusade. Papal protection for crusading kingdoms was common, as it was meant to offer some security against invasion at a time the army was fighting

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<sup>25</sup> William Chester Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princeton, NJ: 1979, 2015).

<sup>26</sup> The contract between the representatives of Phillip II of France and Genoa can be found in *LIRG*, 1/6, §935, and translated in Hall, *Caffaro*.

<sup>27</sup> Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A History*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition (London: 2014), p. 220.

<sup>28</sup> *LIRG*, I, p. 45-47.

the enemies of the Church.<sup>29</sup> One has to look at the underlying context in order to understand it: the Guelf/Ghibelline conflict was still going strong during that time and Frederick II's influence in northern Italy was spreading once more, with Pisa once more joining in against Genoa.<sup>30</sup> One of the main questions regarding this document focuses on its role in Genoese policies in the East and whether Genoa used it in such a way to increase their power in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Their position had become precarious and their physical position in Acre did not always play to their advantage. Divisions within Genoa itself also meant that Levantine issues were not always at the forefront of their mind.<sup>31</sup>

The study of Genoa takes priority in this and the following chapters for various reasons: it was the commune with the most unique policies in the Levant, mostly due to fractured political state, which allowed for individual endeavours such as that of Zaccaria and the Embriaco family;<sup>32</sup> its role in the kingdom tends to be downgraded following the War of Saint-Sabas, yet they are still present in the sources; it is also one of the communes with the least amount of research, especially for the time period studied.<sup>33</sup> Venice and Pisa will not be sidelined, as they both had very peculiar relationships, especially that between Pisa and the Holy Roman emperors. The city had always been a strong supporter of the emperor and thus received strong privileges in return during the reign of Frederick II as king of Jerusalem.<sup>34</sup> This was another strong and long-lasting relationship. Pisa can be considered as the 'weakest' of the three Italian Communes in the Levant – they were the last of the three to arrive in the kingdom, had the smallest quarter in Acre, and were the first to crumble – and yet, their role is once more underestimated. We will see in the next chapter that they were decisive in the War of Saint-Sabas.

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<sup>29</sup> The protection is found from *Quantum Praedecessores* (Eugenius III, 1145) onwards.

<sup>30</sup> David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (Oxford: 1988), p. 310.

<sup>31</sup> Throughout his study, Epstein makes it clear that business in Genoa took priority over the affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The tables that he uses are also a good indication of where the focus of the commune was. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp., 58, 97, 142.

<sup>32</sup> We will see in the final chapter one of their most controversial treaty with the Mamluk sultanate, most commonly used to prove their lack of participation in the defense of the kingdom in the final years, but also to prove that their involvement was primarily due to their greed, rather than religious reasons. This theory however will be rebuked.

<sup>33</sup> Compared to Venice for example, whose role and history in the Levant has been looked at in details by Jacoby, Madden and many more. Musarra and Georg Caro are to my knowledge the only ones to have looked at Genoa in Acre in the second half of the Thirteenth Century. This is strange considering the amount of primary material available in the Genoese archives.

<sup>34</sup> *RRR*, §2116, §2117, §2118, §2119, §2120.

The second chapter will look at the events surrounding the War of Saint Sabas (1256-1261/70/99).<sup>35</sup> This war was one of the most brutal, if not the most brutal, internal conflict within the kingdom of Jerusalem. Acre is described in the sources as having suffered a full siege, with towers and houses destroyed, and stones from the walls used as projectiles for catapults and siege engines.<sup>36</sup> This conflict symbolised and confirmed the loss of any centralised power within the kingdom, and the lack of united responses from the West during the second half of the thirteenth century. The War of Saint-Sabas is one of the most significant events in the kingdom of Jerusalem, however, it was not the first internal conflict between the Italians to spark an all-out conflict in the Levant.<sup>37</sup>

This chapter will be structured differently to the others because it will rely more heavily on archaeological fieldwork. The great majority of historians who have looked at the events in the last half-century of the kingdom of Jerusalem, have omitted archaeological materials, and the same can be said of the work of archaeologists of the period who omitted historical sources. This chapter in particular will attempt to bring the two disciplines together in order to draw a clearer picture of the War of Saint-Sabas, but also of Acre in the 1260s.

The chronology of the war has already been analysed by at least two historians, David Jacoby and Antonio Musarra, with also Caro also offering his version of it, one that Jacoby relied on quite heavily.<sup>38</sup> This thesis will not propose further new chronology, but will instead try to answer a very important question: where was the contested building? This is a subject possessing a certain mystique amongst historians. None have yet to offer a proper location and all relied heavily on contemporary sources, which are very vague on the subject, and sometimes avoid the question all together. Archaeologists on the other hand rely heavily on modern survey reports and therefore

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<sup>35</sup> The three different end dates will be analysed in this chapter as historians have yet to agree on a final date for the conflict. Antonio Musarra is the only one to have stated that the conflict ended with the defeat of the Venetians in the Black Sea in 1299. These events will be looked at in order to provide a final date for the conflict.

<sup>36</sup> *Histoire de l'Île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, ed. by M. L. de Mas Latrie, 3 Vols (Paris, 1861), 1, p. 375.

<sup>37</sup> More will be said about the different internal conflicts in Chapter 2.

<sup>38</sup> Antonio Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*; David Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on Crusader Acre', in *The Experience of Crusading, II: Defining the Crusader Kingdom*, ed. by Peter Edburly and Jonathan Phillips (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 240-256; Georg Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittellemeer, 1257-1311: Ein Beitrag zur geschichte des XIII Jahrhunderts*, 2 Vols (Halle a. S., 1895-9).

tend to mix up the chronology of events, giving us a very blurry picture.<sup>39</sup> Finding the location of the contested building will require us to look at the locations of the inner port of Acre and the walls of the city. While this seems to be rather superfluous, we will see that the crusader port and walls were different from where they stand nowadays, and therefore, one cannot rely on modern maps in order to answer the original question. Locating this building will allow us to understand the struggle in greater detail, especially the reasons behind it.

This chapter will also make clearer the political and diplomatic outcomes of the conflict. The war engulfed the entire society of the Holy Land, including the military orders and the nobility of the kingdom. Some families, such as the Ibelins, used it to reinforce their power within the city, while others seem to have suffered from it, such as the Montfort family, whose participation in the conflict created a break in its relations with the powers of Acre. The clash involved all three of the leading Italian communes; therefore one has to look at the conflict in terms of trade. Another question that has to be answered is regarding the purpose of the dispute. The communes were fighting over a building as we know, however, why this particular building? What were their reasons? Once more, the documentation available to us is scarce and, as the vanquished party, Genoa did not leave much trace of the conflict in its archives while the *Libri Iurium* is silent on the matter. Venice is also surprisingly quiet on the subject, with Martin da Canal (1275) being one of the few to talk about the war. On the other hand, it is still possible to spot some movement in the numerous cartularies as despite their losses in Acre, the Genoese did make some gains in Tyre following the expulsion of the Venetians; some also moved to Cyprus, where they founded a community. These documents will be analysed in order to ascertain Genoese attitudes following the events. It is also possible to get some idea on how to answer those questions from the papal archives: at least two letters survive from Alexander IV (1254-1261) addressed to both Genoese and Venetians.<sup>40</sup> These will shed more light on the war, and its origins.

The War of Saint-Sabas was an incredibly important event in the life of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and the lack of dedicated research on the subject has left a gap in the historiography of the kingdom. This chapter will attempt to reduce that gap by

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<sup>39</sup> Alex Kesten is one of them, especially regarding the War of Saint-Sabas for which he fails to mention any documentary evidence, and claims the contested building was a nuisance to Acre. Alex Kesten, *The Old City of Acre: Re-Examination Report 1993* (Acre, 1993), p. 38-39.

<sup>40</sup> These can be found in *Les Registres d'Alexandre IV*, 1, §390, for the Genoese one, and the Venetian one is mentioned in Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 55.

answering these few fundamental questions, and then taking the analysis into new areas of research.

The reduced status of the Genoese in the East after the War of Saint Sabas was counter-balanced by their situation in the Byzantine Empire following the return of Constantinople to Byzantine hands under Emperor Michael VIII in 1261. Genoa's relations with the Byzantines helped them achieve victory in the Black Sea, and thus ensured their economic survival in the Mediterranean. As the loser in this conflict, Venice did not suffer greatly however: they were able to hold on to some of their trade in the area, but also with their base on Crete. New deals on Cyprus also helped them to survive as well. This also allowed them to concentrate on Acre, and we will see that their interest in the city was far from fading.<sup>41</sup>

Chapter three will also look at a new protagonist, Charles of Anjou. In 1277, he bought the claim of Maria of Antioch to the kingdom of Jerusalem and assumed the title of king. This divided the kingdom because the crown of Cyprus and the Lusignan family already disputed the claim, and yet another succession crisis erupted. The role of Charles in Acre has, however, been analysed briefly, primarily by Jean Dunbabin, and her work will help to determine the exact extent of involvement of this other absent king of Jerusalem in the East.<sup>42</sup> It will also be seen that Charles was active in the Byzantine Empire, having territorial claims to the area. He therefore became involved against the Genoese, in Byzantium, but also in Sicily, where the new power of Aragon was also rising. The conflicts with Charles in Sicily and in the Byzantine Empire left the kingdom of Jerusalem on the side lines once more. Charles also became a major focus for appeals from inhabitants of the Levant because of his familial connections, especially through his brother Louis IX of France – whom, despite having died on his crusade directed at Tunis, was still held in a certain degree of admiration amongst the population<sup>43</sup> - but also through his nephew, Phillip III of France, over whom Charles held great influence. He was also close to, although not always on friendly terms with,

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<sup>41</sup> Their expansion and concentration in Acre is clearly highlighted by Jacoby in his research and will be seen in the chapter.

<sup>42</sup> Jean Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe* (London: 1998)

<sup>43</sup> Tyerman, *God's War*, p. 805.

the papacy at the time, having invaded, and received the crown of Sicily following his involvement in the papal crusade against the Hohenstaufen dynasty in Italy.<sup>44</sup>

The only Latin royal power left in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time was the kingdom of Cyprus, where the Italians were still in a struggle for economic supremacy.<sup>45</sup> The house of Ibelin was also active and remained so until the fall of the island to the Ottomans in 1489. They formed the basis of the anti-imperial faction that rose against Frederick II in the first half of the thirteenth century, but they also symbolised the oligarchic system which had gained power and which had helped to throw the kingdom of Jerusalem in disarray.<sup>46</sup>

The role of Genoa during the 1270s will be classified in two categories: actors and spectators. With the rise of Charles, conflicts were on a royal/imperial level and therefore, the Italians (mostly the Genoese at this point) were left to act according to the whims of the royal houses of the West and East: Louis' second crusade, as well as plans for another crusade towards Constantinople are good examples of a change of attitude from the western powers.<sup>47</sup> On the other-hand, the conflict in Sicily, and the tensions in Cyprus and what was left of the kingdom of Jerusalem directly involved the Italians, and they became active contributors to the problems and events. These conflicts were becoming more and more isolated. Linda Ross for example, has argued in favour of a change in the way the Western world viewed the kingdom of Jerusalem, and has claimed that there was a lack of enthusiasm from the old kingdoms, such as France, England, or even the Empire, to engage in foreign conflicts, when there were already troubles at home.<sup>48</sup> This chapter will analyse all of the 'minor' conflicts that involved the cities of Genoa, Venice and Pisa in order to fill this lacuna in the history of the kingdom. This chapter will also try to form a verdict on the notion that these conflicts might in fact be a continuation of the War of Saint Sabas, as recently argued by Musarra.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 19-20. Housley also discusses the theory that Charles may have been protected by God, *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>45</sup> It should be noted here that by 'royal', one means having a king, or queen present in the kingdom. In the case of the kingdom of Jerusalem, the last king or queen to have reigned on site was John of Brienne, who reigned as king consort with his wife Maria of Montferrat, Queen of Jerusalem, until her death in 1212. He then acted as regent for his daughter Isabella II of Jerusalem until her marriage to Frederick II in 1225.

<sup>46</sup> Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980), p. 247.

<sup>47</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', pp. 266-73.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 223-4.

<sup>49</sup> Musarra, *La guerra di San Saba*, pp. 87-8.

Finally, while being another absentee king of Jerusalem, Charles nonetheless stands out for multiple reasons, first amongst them being the way he acquired the crown. He also offers us the last grant given by a king of Jerusalem to a mercantile commune, in 1284, when he confirmed the grants of the city of Marseille in Acre.<sup>50</sup>

The fourth and final chapter of this thesis will focus on the last decade of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Much like the rest of this work, not much is known about this period and most studies skip over directly to the fall of Acre. It is however a period that saw many changes in the East, most of them involving rulers and personalities: the death of Charles in 1285 for example, and the subsequent return of the crown of Jerusalem to the king of Cyprus, Henry II, whose father, Hugh III had unsuccessfully tried to reclaim some of the territories lost to the Mamluks. With the death of Charles, Henry could therefore reclaim Acre for Cyprus, and the city more or less accepted his rule despite having been strongly pro-Angevin during Charles' reign.

Another death affecting the Levant was that of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars in 1277 and then the ascension to power of Qalawun (1279-90). Mamluk military prowess against the Mongols meant their hold on Egypt and the Islamic lands was reinforced. We will have noticed their role in the Seventh Crusade; however, it was during the reign of Qalawun that their true influence and role in the fall of the kingdom took shape. Baybars' armies had gradually eroded Latin borders: their power over the crusader lands was such that even when Muslim armies were raiding, the Latin armies could do nothing but watch from the cities.<sup>51</sup> Baybars was an extremely aggressive ruler, however, this aggression was primarily directed at the Mongols during his reign, as they were the principal threat to his power. As such, we see that a few treaties were passed between the Mamluks and the Latin Christians. These documents provide us with an insight into not only the political situation of the region, but also of the relative power of both, the kingdom of Jerusalem and that of Cyprus.<sup>52</sup> Under the rule of Qalawun (1279-1290), the kingdom of Jerusalem continued to fall, and Tripoli, one of

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<sup>50</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, §742, §743, pp. 1290-1294.

<sup>51</sup> 'The Templar of Tyre', *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, ed. by. Gaston Raynaud (Geneva: 1887), pp. 139-334, §308, p. 164; §318, p. 167; the Frankish garrisons were also left defenceless in the face of Mamluk troops, and opted for retreat instead of fighting, such as at Mount Tabor, part of the Hospitaller possessions, in 1263, see Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1992), p. 147.

<sup>52</sup> They are found in P.M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260-1290: treaties of Baybars and Qalawun with Christian rulers* (Leiden: 1994), and will be extensively discussed in the chapter.

the last cities in crusader hands, was conquered in 1289. The loss of the city renewed the war between Venice and Genoa, whose return to Acre following Saint-Sabas was very extremely slow, to the point that it has been argued they were never allowed back: we will see however that some Genoese were definitely present in Acre in the 1280s. A treaty signed by the Genoese and Qalawun further aggravated the war between these two Italian cities in 1290.<sup>53</sup> This treaty is in my opinion the most important diplomatic encounter of the thirteenth century. It could be taken as an indication that the Italians were driven by the prospect of economical gain rather than religious motives in their participation in the crusading movement.<sup>54</sup> The period is also marked by the death of Qalawun in 1290, succeeded in turn by his son, Al-Ashraf Khalil. The latter finished the work of Baybars and Qalawun and led the siege of Acre in 1291, marking the end of the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem.

This period comprised of a succession of rapid events, which are linked to one another, and this chapter will analyse them all in order to reassess the fall of Acre, and to consider who was responsible. This blame has more or less been attributed to the Italians and their incessant conflicts and ‘disregards for the good of the Christian faith’, as seen with their numerous alliances and treaties with Muslim powers.<sup>55</sup> However, was it really the case? This chapter will take a more diplomatic focus and assess events from the time of Louis’s last crusade (1270), to the fall of Acre. We will also look at a possible change of motivation from the western world regarding Jerusalem, the Holy Land, and the survival of the kingdom. We will then take the opportunity to examine one of the most infamous<sup>56</sup> Genoese names of the period, Benedetto Zaccaria, victor of the Battle of Meloria in the Ligurian Sea (1284) against the Pisans, who was sent to the eastern Mediterranean in order to help solve the situation in Tyre. His involvement went beyond Tyre, as his actions were directly responsible for the signing of the 1290 treaty between Genoa and the Mamluks.<sup>57</sup>

The city of Tyre had become the main base of operation for Genoa after Saint-Sabas. With the help of Philip of Montfort, the Genoese managed to expel Venice from

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<sup>53</sup> *LIRG*, 7, §1189, p. 78-83.

<sup>54</sup> Christopher Marshall, ‘The crusading motivation of the Italian city republics in the Latin East, 1096-1104’, in *The Experience of Crusading*, 1, ed. by Marcus Bull, Norman Housley (Cambridge: 2003), pp. 60-79 (p. 61).

<sup>55</sup> Sofia Menache, ‘Papal Attempts at a Commercial Boycott of the Muslims in the Crusader Period’, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 63 (April 2012), pp. 236-259.

<sup>56</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 144.

<sup>57</sup> See below.



the city and were therefore able to safeguard their commercial interests in the region. Philip's son however, was pro-Venetian, and he allowed the commune back, thus sparking once more their conflict in the Levant. Zaccaria's involvement came following the death of Philip's son in 1283, which started a succession crisis in which the Genoese, and in particular the Embriaco family, were heavily involved. These events will highlight important issues regarding the view of the kingdom from Genoa's perspective, but also from the Genoese living in the East on a more permanent basis. This view will form one of the major points in this thesis and will be consolidated in this chapter.

Finally, this chapter will focus on the different treaties of the period, and in particular, the one already mentioned above, between Qalawun and the Genoese. This treaty is important in many aspects, but it is even more so in its actual context. Once dissected, we will see that this treaty is not really what it seems, and that in the end, cannot be taken as proof of Italian, and Genoese particularly, lack of interest in the kingdom.

This thesis will conclude with a brief analysis of the years following the fall of Acre. We will see that the Italians returned to Acre and the rest of Syria and that trade had never really stopped in Egypt. This will enable us to determine whether or not the communes of Genoa, Venice and Pisa had anticipated the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem and had acted accordingly. It will also allow for the possibility that the communes were acting according to their faith as much as their economic desires. Overall, it will provide a study of specific events and material from the last fifty years of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Despite the continuous struggle for mercantile supremacy fought mainly between Genoa and Venice, can part of the responsibility not be placed on the barons of Jerusalem?

## **Historical background**

### **Genoa in the thirteenth century**

Before going into the Genoese presence in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, one has to understand their political and social structure, as it shaped their motives throughout the thirteenth century.

The commune (or *compagna*) of Genoa was created at the time of the First Crusade, and the consuls making up its ruling class, were elected from members of the prominent families. Epstein states that while Caffaro says it was the first time such organisation saw light in Genoa, his description clearly indicates that there was a precedent.<sup>58</sup> As a rule, the consuls had control over the city, but also over trade and taxation in general.<sup>59</sup> This government however, resembled a lot that of a business partnership after 1100, and was therefore very sensitive to political tensions.<sup>60</sup> These tensions were more often than not, solved via street fighting between factions, but also through political assassinations.<sup>61</sup> In 1187, one of the consuls, Lanfranco de Turca, assassinated another consul, Angelerio de Mari at his home.<sup>62</sup> Their political situation was also influenced by social standing of the different families, as well as the intervention of outsiders such as the popes and the emperors. During most of the eleventh to the thirteenth century, and after, politics in Genoa was typically divided between two main factions: the Guelfs, who were on the papal side, and the Ghibellines, who followed a more Germanic stance and had a tendency of allying themselves with the German emperors.<sup>63</sup> As such, the major families of the commune allied themselves according to their own desires and principles and vied for power within. The names of prominent families such as the Fieschis, Grimaldis, as well as the Spinolas, Dorias, Della Voltas, which were some of the most influential people in Genoa remain present throughout Genoese history, and always involved in large

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<sup>58</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 33.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 36-7.

<sup>60</sup> David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (London, 2011), p. 276.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 86.

<sup>63</sup> This can be traced back to 1087 when the bishop of Genoa, Conrad, favoured the German emperor, while the people, or the families with power, were inclined to follow the reforms of Gregory VII and that of Victor III. H. E. J. Cowdrey, 'The Mahdia Campaign of 1087', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 92, No. 362 (January 1977), pp 1-29 (p. 15). The papal/imperial conflicts also fell in line with the rise of the Lombard communes, and their struggle against imperial power in Northern Italy. For more information on this topic, see Gianluca Raccagni, *The Lombard League, 1167-1225* (Oxford, 2010).

expeditions. It was their membership in the *compagna* or commune that allowed them to take part.

Membership was one of the ways with which these families could maintain power over time, and one reason why the majority of those seen above remained powerful up until the thirteenth and fourteenth century, and for longer for some.<sup>64</sup> Membership was by invitation only and tended to remain a family affair, thus keeping the poorer and less influential families out of any governing position, or any position of power.<sup>65</sup> That is not to say however, that the Genoese system was unfair to lower classes, or ranks of citizens. As Epstein states, in criminal matters, there was a sense of equal justice amongst Genoese laws. Penalties were the same for members of the *compagna*, as non-members.<sup>66</sup> This helped increase the loyalty of the Genoese towards their governing body, but also towards the city itself.

It was also via these memberships that the families organised their factions and kept their followers faithful. Avner Greif explains that political manipulation through patronage, but also through marriage was common and uses the example of the Della Volta family, who established a domination over trade with the crusader states via a discriminatory tariff overseas.<sup>67</sup> He explains that with their control over the consulate in Genoa, other families were eager to please them and receive rewards as a result, primarily in the form of lease of Genoese possessions overseas.<sup>68</sup> With this, it could be insinuated that whenever a new family gained control of the consulate, they attempted to strengthen their hold over the commune in a similar fashion. It was of mutual benefits, as the newly rich gained access into the ruling oligarchy, and the older families gained the reputation of the newer families, usually gained through good trading, or through battle.<sup>69</sup>

The consulate however was not always a popular government, and the crusades had a direct effect on its abolition in the late twelfth century. As the military expeditions took away large portions of the ruling families, it made the city safer, to a certain extent, but also more likely to witness changes in government. This happened

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<sup>64</sup> The Grimaldis for example. See more below.

<sup>65</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 35.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>67</sup> Avner Greif, 'On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *The Journal of Economic History*, vol 54, 2 (June 1994), pp. 271-287 (p. 276).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, p. 276.

in 1190, during the Third Crusade, when the commune elected its first *Podesta*, a professional leader, whose reputation and previous employments guaranteed further positions.<sup>70</sup> Other events included the rise of the *popolo*, and the movements associated with the rise of the lower classes across medieval Europe. Genoa's first rise of the *popolo* (1257) was perhaps, one of the direct result of Louis IX's first crusade. With his choice of less powerful families as allies during his expedition, these families may have wanted a change of government. This change also came at the time of the War of Saint Sabas and may have been influenced by the events in the east.

The next twelve pages are a short narrative of Genoese and Italian involvement in the crusading movement, as well as of trade in the Mediterranean.

Many studies have been made of the Italian cities regarding the economic impact they had on the kingdom and the Near East.<sup>71</sup> It was long accepted that their wish for profit was a powerful contributor to internal conflicts that arose within Frankish lands.<sup>72</sup> Recently however, studies are starting to emerge in favour of a counter-argument, stating that these cities did not join the crusading movement solely out of greed, but out of a blend of religious fervour, desire for commercial gain and for the honour of their home city, at least during the twelfth century.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> The works of Eugene H. Byrne, Claude Cahen, Wilhelm von Heyd, or the more recent works of Michel Balard, Benjamin Z. Kedar, Steven Epstein, David Jacoby, David Abulafia and Antonio Musarra all studied the economy of the Italians and of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. See bibliography for more.

<sup>72</sup> Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, 2, p. 131; Gino Luzzatto, *An Economic History of Italy from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the Sixteenth Century*, trans. by Philip Jones (London, 1961), p. 72, argues that the Italians were more interested in the financial rewards given to them for their help than their duty towards God; Crouzet-Pavan, *Venise triomphante*, p. 106. Other works, such as Eugene H. Byrne, 'Genoese trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century', *American Historical Review*, 25 (1919-20), pp. 191-219 (p. 193); William Heywood, *A History of Pisa: Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 115-6; Philip K. Hitti, 'The Impact of the Crusades on Moslem Lands', in *A History of the Crusades: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, ed. by K. Setton (Madison, 1985), pp. 34-58 (p. 38), have also stated that greed was still a more powerful motivation than faith. Byrne portrays the trend very well in his article 'Genoese Trade with Syria in the Twelfth Century', pp. 191-219. The motivation behind the Italian involvement in the Crusades has been described as being simply their lust for profit, and their love of money. Despite the durability of this statement, a new wave of research is slowly emerging in favour of a more religious motivation, at least in regards to the twelfth century. In the thirteenth century however, fewer religious responses from the Italian communes can be discerned, as their struggle for economic supremacy in the Mediterranean intensified. All three major Italian communes in the Holy Land, Genoa, Venice and Pisa, already had extensive privileges all along the Syrian and Palestinian Coast, and were working hard to increase their influence from one end of the Mediterranean to another. See the article by Franco Cardini, 'La société italienne et les croisades', in *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*, 109 (1985), pp. 19-33. Also Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade', pp. 45-62 (p. 60).

<sup>73</sup> Cardini, 'La société italienne et les croisades'; Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade'; Hall, *Caffaro*, p. 35; see also Jonathan Phillips, 'Caffaro of Genoa and the Motives of Early Crusaders', in *Religion as an Agent of Change*, ed. Per Ingesman (Leiden, 2016), pp. 75-104.

Italian involvement in fighting for the faith, dates back to before the launch of the First Crusade, with Genoa and Pisa launching a number of expeditions against Muslim territories.<sup>74</sup> Their involvement in the crusading movement itself can be traced back to the First Crusade, as two contingents of the crusading army crossed northern Italy on their way to Constantinople – one was led by Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse, and Adhémar of Le Puy, papal legate, while the other was led by Hugh of Vermandois, brother of Philip I of France – and these must have picked up men from the regions they crossed.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, there was the important presence of Bohemond of Taranto, who, despite his Norman origins, brought an army, composed of a large contingent of Southern Italians.<sup>76</sup>

These communes were already present in the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean before the call of Urban II: Alexandria was, with Constantinople, the most profitable port of the Mediterranean, and it is not surprising to find Italian merchants established in Egypt. The ninth century saw Venice trading heavily with Egypt and Syria,<sup>77</sup> and Amalfi opened a hospital in Jerusalem for its merchants and pilgrims towards the beginning of the eleventh century.<sup>78</sup> Economic expansion of the Italian communes meant that conflicts were inevitable; clashes against Muslims were recurring phenomena from the tenth and eleventh centuries onward. Genoa and Pisa

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<sup>74</sup> Karen Rose Mathews, *Conflict, Commerce, and an Aesthetic of Appropriation in the Italian Maritime Cities, 1000-1150* (Leiden, 2018), pp. 1-2.

<sup>75</sup> A letter from Urban II had been sent to Genoa in July 1096 already, discussing the plans for the crusade following the vast response from Clermont. Richard, *The Crusades*, p. 28. Genoa also sent a small fleet in 1097 that reached Antioch with twenty-five knights and six hundred foot soldiers. Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>76</sup> Cardini, 'La société italienne et les croisades', pp. 19-33 (pp. 25-6).

<sup>77</sup> Menache, 'Papal attempts at commercial boycott', pp. 237-8.

<sup>78</sup> H. J. A. Sire, *The Knights of Malta* (London, 1996), p. 3, see also Emmanuel Guillaume Rey, *Les colonies franques de Syrie aux XIIème et XIIIème siècles* (Paris, 1883), p. 69. The Amalfians had also provided naval support in 969 to the Fatimids during their conquest of Egypt, while after a fire which destroyed some Fatimid vessels and for which the Italians were blamed by some and attacked, the Fatimid government sided with the Latins and restored their property. David Jacoby, 'Les Italiens en Egypte aux XIIème et XIIIème siècles: du comptoir à la colonie?', in *Coloniser au Moyen Age, Methodes d'expansion et techniques de domination en Méditerranée du 11ème au 16ème siècle*, ed. by Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris, 1995), pp. 76-89 (p. 76). For the sake of this study however, prior encounters between Italians and Muslims will not be analysed, and will only be mentioned briefly when necessary. Italians are believed to have started trading with the East as early as the 7th century, with the city of Amalfi, and although sources regarding the city are sparse, trade with Muslim Sicily and later with Fatimid Egypt is recorded in various documents. See Patricia Skinner, *Medieval Amalfi and its Diaspora, 800-1250* (Oxford, 2013), pp. 223-224. Genoa and Pisa both were also involved with Muslims at an early stage, mostly in Spain, Sardinia, Corsica Sicily and North Africa, and the Crusades were a continuation, or a vessel to further their contacts with the Islamic world. In the case of Venice, the commune was more involved in the Byzantine Empire than with the northern African coast, or the Syrian cities, however, it is more than likely that contacts had been made with Muslims prior to the First Crusade, especially in Constantinople.

both had dealings with Muslim powers during their respective growth in the Mediterranean and in 1087 they attacked Mahdia in northern Tunisia with the blessing of Pope Victor III.<sup>79</sup>

There is a general misconception as to the reasons behind the communes' involvement in the crusades, and it has led to some strong accusation being made against them.<sup>80</sup> The intrinsic religiosity of the cities of Genoa, Venice and Pisa, should not however, be doubted. There are many examples of their zeal across the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the relics that were brought back to medieval Europe should be seen as a manifestation of that religiosity.<sup>81</sup> Genoa's 'Holy Grail' being a great example, along with Venice acquiring the Crown of Thorns amongst other relics for a short time after the Fourth Crusade.

The participation of Italians in the crusades came in different forms. From merchants to fighters, transportation to bankers, their role was ever changing and multi-dimensional, yet, it seems that the majority of their involvement is stereotype in modern general histories as 'greedy merchants', more interested in their profit than the good of Christianity.<sup>82</sup> As we will see with the contract between Philip II and Genoa from 1190, those grants became part of the crusading tradition from the First Crusade up to at least the middle of the thirteenth century. These were given in return for military help, mainly naval, but also because of the trade revenues that were always brought in by the presence of these mercantile cities. However, these privileges were not the only benefits that the communes could gain in the East and, or, from crusading. Pisa, by siding with the emperor during the Lombard Wars, was able to increase its political and financial influence over the kingdom, and during the short stay of Frederick in the East, we see that only the Tuscan commune was able to secure privileges from the crown.<sup>83</sup> After 1204, the Venetians were able to control the majority of the Black Sea trade through the diversion of the Fourth Crusade towards Constantinople; in 1261, it was Genoa's turn to establish itself in the Black Sea with the Treaty of Nymphaeum (which will be

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<sup>79</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 23. Some have even stated that this expedition was a fore-runner of the First Crusade. See, Cowdrey, 'The Mahdia Campaign of 1087', pp 1-29.

<sup>80</sup> More about those theories and misconceptions in the final chapter.

<sup>81</sup> V. Polonio, 'San Bernardo, Genova e Pisa', San Bernardo e l'Italia. Atti del Convegno di studi, Milano, 24-26 maggio 1990, ed. P. Zerbi, Bibliotheca erudita 8 (Milan, 1993), pp. 66-99. Genoa's Holy Grail being another example, along with Venice acquiring the Crown of Thorns amongst other relics for a short time after the Fourth Crusade.

<sup>82</sup> Marshall, 'Crusading motivations of the Italian city republics, 1096-1104', p. 61.

<sup>83</sup> *RRR*, §2117; Genoa was on the other hand able to secure privileges in Cyprus through their connection to the Ibelins. *HIC*, 3 Vols (Paris: 1852), II, p. 39.

seen below), and the commune was also able to acquire certain advantages during Louis's two Crusades.

However the view that they took part in the crusades purely out of greed is gradually changing. What is certain is that the Italians were not only present in the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the First Crusade onwards, but were also involved in the politics, and part of everyday life in the cities. The context and chronology of the events prior to Louis IX's first crusade are well documented, and while it does not affect the outcome of this thesis, it will nonetheless help to put it into context.

A second element of their engagement in the Latin East was that of obligation to the kingdom. What had to be done in order to secure a stronghold on a newly conquered land? Genoa's participation in the siege of Antioch in 1098 enabled them to establish a presence in the newly created principality, while later on they were able to acquire quarters in all major coastal cities of the kingdom.<sup>84</sup> While Venice and Pisa were later comers, they ultimately achieved a similar feat, Pisa perhaps in a different manner as will be shown, but all three were, by the beginning of the thirteenth century firmly established in the Holy Land, and were already holding a level of power which enabled them to be involved also with the military orders and the barons of the kingdom.<sup>85</sup> Survival in the East however could not be achieved only on the basis of their own communal power and influence over the economy. The Italians, to some extent, directly exported the multitude of factional conflicts that took place in the Latin East during the thirteenth century. In this highly fluid political scene, the communes had to adapt and side with different parties.

The thirteenth century was another age of Papal-Imperial conflict, and as such, Genoa, following its own pope, Innocent IV (1243-54), was once more fighting against the emperor. The need to survive as a commune, and to expand as a mercantile city was fundamental. One of the major events of the early thirteenth century, which did have an impact on the socio-political scene of the crusader kingdom, was the arrival of Frederick II on the throne of Jerusalem. In 1224, John of Brienne regent of Jerusalem, agreed that his daughter be married to Frederick II.<sup>86</sup> They were married in 1225 in

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<sup>84</sup> *RRR*, §75.

<sup>85</sup> See below for more on the political power of the Italian communes in the Holy Land.

<sup>86</sup> Philippe de Navarre, *Les gestes des Chiprois*, §109, p. 30, the decision was made at the conference of San Germano in July 1225, Guy Perry, *John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c. 1175-1237* (Cambridge, 2013), p. 125.

Brindisi, and the reign of Frederick as king of Jerusalem officially starts here.<sup>87</sup> This union would prompt great changes in the history of the kingdom, and his arrival also proved difficult for the Italians, at least for the Genoese and the Venetians as political tensions back in northern Italy between the Guelfs and Ghibellines were growing and were exported to the Levant by the Imperial faction.<sup>88</sup> What is interesting is that during Frederick's crusade, in 1229, power within the kingdom of Jerusalem shifted to the barons, in particular the Ibelins. This transition is one of the major pillars upon which the Italians built their rise within the crusader lands. It enabled them to grow in size, but also to act more independently from the other powers, especially royal ones.<sup>89</sup>

Frederick's crusade was a complex episode, yet it managed to recover Jerusalem, albeit via diplomacy rather than war. The fact that he did so while being excommunicated was a cause of enormous controversy.<sup>90</sup> Another problem was the broader imperial context of his rule: he tended to treat the kingdom of Jerusalem and its people as an extension to his empire, something which did not fit well with the relative independence of the noble families of the Latin East.<sup>91</sup> His crusade is also marked by the division of the baronage of the kingdom, and his conflict with the Ibelin family and the royal house of Cyprus.

The period of this crusade aside, direct royal power had been absent from the kingdom since the start of his reign and the Holy Land found itself drawn into the ongoing Lombard conflicts (1228-1243), as well as the emperor's desire to assert his authority over the kingdom of Jerusalem. Philippe of Navarre tells us that Frederick used tricks and ruses so that his opponents would accept his conditions, mainly that the

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<sup>87</sup> Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, p. 206.

<sup>88</sup> A powerful ruler would have potentially treated the kingdom as secondary, or as another part of their already large domain, and thus would not have necessarily worked towards its benefit. Frederick II, once married to Isabella, quickly moved to take control of the kingdom from John of Brienne, showing what a powerful ruler could do. See Thomas W. Smith, 'Between two kings: Pope Honorius III and the seizure of the kingdom of Jerusalem by Frederick II in 1225', in *Journal of Medieval History*, 41 (2015), pp. 41-59 (p. 45).

<sup>89</sup> The Haute Cour of the kingdom was in effect controlling royal power by that time. Richard, *The Crusades*, pp. 377-8.

<sup>90</sup> Having failed to depart for his crusade on numerous occasions, and after having postponed his departure date as many times, Pope Gregory IX excommunicated him in 1227. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*; Smith, p. 7.

<sup>91</sup> This is further shown by the emperor's recovery of Jerusalem: the city remained in Christian hands for another 15 years however, it was never incorporated back into the kingdom of Jerusalem, and seems to have been administered by Frederick, or one of his agents, directly, as a city of the empire. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, p. 206. Another indication of the independence of the barons of the kingdom, albeit prior Frederick's arrival, is the fact that they were involved in the choice of husband for Isabella, and may have been influential in choosing the German emperor. Smith, p. 34. It may be that they had wanted a ruler who was far away from them, yet with sufficient funds to help them in the defence of the kingdom.



king of Cyprus, the young Henry I of Lusignan, become his vassal.<sup>92</sup> This created an era of conflict and division, which ultimately helped in the slow but increasingly exponential decline of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

By the time of his departure from the Levant in 1229, his wife, Isabella had died (1228) and their son, the future Conrad IV (II of Jerusalem), was only an infant. This meant that he found himself in the same situation as his predecessor, John of Brienne, regent of the kingdom for his son, the rightful king. Frederick had sent his bailiff, Ricardo Filangieri, to the kingdom in 1231, in order to reassert his rule over the barons, but this turned out to be controversial.<sup>93</sup> Frederick's agents in the kingdom had tried to exert a 10% custom duty from the Genoese; however, the latter refused and stood on tradition.<sup>94</sup> Genoa was starting to have real difficulties with the emperor in Italy, and as a result, Frederick ordered all Genoese and their possessions to be seized throughout his empire, including Sicily.<sup>95</sup> from 1232 up until 1240, there was virtually no trade between Genoa and the south of Germany.<sup>96</sup> As a result of this, a fleet of ten galleys was sent from Genoa to Acre in order to protect Ligurian shipping and assets.<sup>97</sup> The War of the Lombards continued up until 1243, however, in 1239, Frederick and the papacy had re-started their long conflict.<sup>98</sup> This meant that any imperial forces in the Levant were now left on their own, and by 1243, Filangieri was defeated and the Italians were free to resume their activities in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Another event that has a direct connection to Frederick's rule was the launch of the Barons' Crusade, 1239-1241. Following the handover of Jerusalem in 1229, the emperor and the sultan, al-Kamil (d.1238) had agreed on a ten-year truce, which was about to end. In order to prepare, Pope Gregory IX issued a new crusade proclamation in 1234, giving the Dominican Order permission to preach.<sup>99</sup> This crusade also suffered a few setbacks, and was nearly diverted to Constantinople once more;<sup>100</sup> however, in 1239 contingents from France arrived in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The crusaders

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<sup>92</sup> Philippe de Navarre, §127, pp. 39-43.

<sup>93</sup> *RRR*, §2155.

<sup>94</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 121.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> James Powell, 'Genoese Policy and the Kingdom of Sicily, 1220-1240', in *Medieval Studies*, 28 (1966), pp. 346-54 (p. 353).

<sup>97</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 122.

<sup>98</sup> Richard, *The Crusades*, p. 321.

<sup>99</sup> Michael Lower, *The Barons' Crusade: A Call to Arms and Its Consequences* (Philadelphia, PA, 2005), p. 21.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.

seemed to have departed from Marseille primarily, with a few embarking from Sicily.<sup>101</sup> While its ultimate outcome was to bring the kingdom of Jerusalem closer to its pre-1187 borders than ever before, the majority of this gain was lost by 1244 with the arrival of the Khwarazmians, and the subsequent disaster of the Battle of La Forbie, in which nearly the entire Frankish host perished.<sup>102</sup> After La Forbie, the kingdom of Jerusalem was on the defensive, and would never fully recover.

During those times, the Italian communes continued their struggle against one another for mercantile supremacy in the Mediterranean, both in the western sea between Genoa and Pisa, or the eastern basin with the Black Sea trade involving the Venetians and the Genoese; they contented for control over various islands, and even within port cities such as Acre, where all three were in close proximity. Their engagement in the affairs of the kingdom however became increasingly stronger as the years passed, and especially following the Seventh Crusade of Louis IX, during which they were particularly involved.

### **Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean**

Trade in the Eastern Mediterranean flourished, and the Italians greatly profited. Pisa had gained from the rule of Frederick II following its alliance with the emperor and received grants in Jerusalem, as well as the confirmation of previous grants, along with new concessions in Acre, Tyre and Jaffa.<sup>103</sup> In 1248, they also nominated a *consul communis Pisanorum Acco et totius Syriae*, highlighting the extent of their power within the kingdom.<sup>104</sup> With regards to Genoa and Venice, both had *consuls* in Acre responsible for all their Syrian trade, however, Frederick did not renew or confirm any of their privileges during his reign as king of Jerusalem.<sup>105</sup> On the other hand, Genoa was granted freedom of trade in Beirut by John of Ibelin in 1221,<sup>106</sup> grants that were renewed in 1223,<sup>107</sup> as well as similar privileges and reduced taxes in Haifa in 1234;<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., pp. 45, 112.

<sup>102</sup> Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, pp. 216, 255.

<sup>103</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, 3, §669, §670, §673, pp. 1132-1140.

<sup>104</sup> Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, p. 254.

<sup>105</sup> Frederick II did confirm Genoese rights and possessions in Europe and overseas in 1220, Mayer, *Urkunden*, 3, §App. III/2., pp. 1484-6.

<sup>106</sup> *RRH*, §950, p. 252.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., §963, p. 254.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., §1050, p. 275.

while Venice received such grants in Beirut.<sup>109</sup> Both Genoa and Venice composed an inventory of their possessions in Acre in the 1240s, which as we will see below, shows how rooted they were within the kingdom itself.<sup>110</sup>

The merchant Communes were in fact following the goods. Following the advance of the Mongols throughout central and western Asia (1220s onwards) culminating in the siege and fall of Baghdad in 1258, trade routes became disrupted in Syria, thus leading profit away from the Syrian coast and the Latin cities.<sup>111</sup> Armenia was the direct beneficiary of those changes. Already opening itself up to Western trade in 1201 through the chrysobulls of Leon I given to Genoa and then Venice,<sup>112</sup> a systematic flow of high value silver can be observed.<sup>113</sup>

We have seen above that Italians had dealings with Muslims prior to the crusades, and this continued throughout the thirteenth century, perhaps to a greater extent than previously thought. Jacoby has shown that continuous relations were maintained throughout the twelfth century, pausing only briefly during the Third Crusade.<sup>114</sup> The same is seen during the Fifth Crusade, except this time the Latins were arrested by the authorities. Remarkably, a number is given (three thousand were arrested between May 1215 and April 1216) proving that trade with Muslim powers was far from restricted.<sup>115</sup> Their increasing presence in Egypt is also reflected in the fact that during the thirteenth century, consuls are mentioned.<sup>116</sup> Interestingly however, it seems that Genoa lagged behind Venice and Pisa in Egypt.<sup>117</sup> They received their *fondue* after the Third Crusade,<sup>118</sup> and it seems that in the early thirteenth century,

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., §951, pp. 252, RRR, §957.

<sup>110</sup> RRR., §1114, §1116, §1182, §1184, pp. 289-97, 297-8, 310-11, 311-13. These inventories are important because they give us a clear picture of how large both Quarters were, but it also allows us to understand their layout, especially with respect to the *fondue*s, since Genoa seemingly did not have one.

<sup>111</sup> D. M. Metcalf, 'East meets West, and Money changes Hands', in *East and West in the Crusader States, Context-Contacts-Confrontations*, ed. by K. Ciggaar and H. Teule, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, Vol III (Leuven, 2003), pp. 223-234 (p. 230).

<sup>112</sup> LIRG, 1/2, §344, pp. 164-166; V. Langlois, *Le trésor des chartes d'Arménie, ou Cartulaire de la Chancellerie royale des Roupéniens* (Venice: 1863), p. 110.

<sup>113</sup> Metcalf, 'East meets West, and Money changes Hands', pp. 223-234 (p. 225).

<sup>114</sup> Jacoby, 'Les Italiens en Egypte aux XIIème et XIIIème siècles: du comptoir à la colonie?', pp. 76-89 (p. 80).

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-89 (p. 81).

<sup>116</sup> Pisa for example put into effect a new system of election for their consuls in Egypt, allowing only Pisans born in Pisa or its contado to run for election. Ibid., pp. 76-89 (p. 82).

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-89 (p. 86).

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., pp. 76-89 (p. 79).

treaties between the Ayyubids and the Italians favoured more the Venetians and Pisans than the Genoese.<sup>119</sup>

Trade restrictions and bans imposed on the mercantile communes had become a recurrent aspect of crusade preaching.<sup>120</sup> These bans however were seldom listened to, as the repeated proclamation of the prohibition shows.<sup>121</sup> Expeditions to Egypt for example in 1163, 1164 and 1167 did impede trade to and from Egypt but to a certain extent only.<sup>122</sup> Italians were already well established in Alexandria and Damietta, and were vital for the Egyptian war efforts.<sup>123</sup> As a result, other counter measures can be observed on the Latin side with Baldwin III of Jerusalem for example offering grants only to Pisans who were not involved in the Egyptian trade.<sup>124</sup> Throughout the Third Crusade, trade was also reduced, this time to a more severe extent.<sup>125</sup> Overall however, the bans and restrictions had little effect on the Communes and trade with Muslims continued on throughout the thirteenth century. From the Third Lateran Council (1179), a special clause gradually emerged specifically mentioning those braving the ban - *facto Alexandrie* – which ‘defined illegal commercial activities with the Muslims, whether in the Latin East, the Iberian Peninsula, and /or Northern Africa.’<sup>126</sup> The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) gave further emphasis to the issue, extending the ban for four years, thereby enabling the recruitment of more ships towards the crusade.<sup>127</sup> Trade was still flowing in Alexandria at the time of the Fifth Crusade.<sup>128</sup> At the Council of Lyon (1245) Innocent IV issued the ban once more, adding ships to the list of forbidden commodities, which shows that during previous bans, wood and iron could be sold in the form of ships and then rebuilt in war supplies.<sup>129</sup> The same pope also complained about acts of piracy being committed against Christians by other Christians.<sup>130</sup> Another

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<sup>119</sup> David Jacoby, ‘Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean: Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt and Italy’, *Variorum Collected Studies Series*, 836 (London, 2005), p. 104-105. More will be said about those treaties below.

<sup>120</sup> Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, pp. 236-259 (p. 238).

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236-259 (p. 242).

<sup>122</sup> Table 1, in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 58; Trade relations were restored fully in 1173 only. Jacoby, ‘Les Italiens en Egypte aux XIIème et XIIIème siècles: du comptoir à la colonie?’, pp. 76-89 (p. 78).

<sup>123</sup> Jacoby, ‘Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean’, p. 103.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106. It should be noted that much like the papal bans on the sale of war materials, these restrictions were not always applied.

<sup>125</sup> Table 1, in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 58.

<sup>126</sup> Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, p. 242.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236-259 (p. 244).

<sup>128</sup> Table 4, in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 97; Jacoby, ‘Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean’, pp. 112, 114.

<sup>129</sup> Norman Tanner, ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, (London, 1990), §51, §52.

<sup>130</sup> Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, p. 244.

aspect that appears in this ban is that relating to ‘services’ given by those guilty of ‘*facto Alexandria*’, whereby a Christian would pilot a Muslim ship transporting Muslim cargo.<sup>131</sup> In 1263, the ban was no longer restricted to Italians and mercantile cities as letters from Urban IV were sent as far as Scotland.<sup>132</sup> After the fall of Acre in 1291, Pope Nicholas IV envisaged the establishment of a special navy made up from ships belonging to the military orders in order to stop those engaging in trade with Muslims, but also to stop acts of piracy.<sup>133</sup>

These failed attempts at boycotting trade with Muslim powers during the age of the crusades cannot be taken as proof of Italian greed over their religious fervour. At certain times, the bans were actually enforced in the communes, such as in Genoa in 1151 – abandoned in 1170s however due to the Genoese good relations with Saladin – or in Venice in 1224, 1226 and 1280.<sup>134</sup> These however, as Menache argues, were more or less gesture of good faith in line with the papal ban rather than enforced policies, as the importance and the value of trade in general for the mercantile cities as well as individual citizens were too great.<sup>135</sup>

Trade with Muslims in the Eastern Mediterranean therefore continued well into the Crusading era, and in the case of Egypt, it seems that there might have been some reluctance from the Italian communes to follow the war. In the case of Genoa however, it seems that the less important families were willing to risk a crusade.

Jacoby describes that exchange points in the Islamic world were under tight control from their Muslim rulers, and as such, Italian and other Western merchants were restricted from going further than the port cities and other points of exchange.<sup>136</sup> The rulers were thus able to control the trade passing through the city and to tax it as they pleased, allowing them to make a profit. The same is seen under Latin rule, but to a lesser extent as the ports were under non-Frankish influence.<sup>137</sup> As seen with the case of Armenia, the influx of trade shaped the economy of the country. Thus, the control of the principal ports allowed for the control of the flow of goods that in turn led to the control of the economy. In the words of Cicero, ‘the sinews of war are indefinite

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. The full text of the council can be found in, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. by Giovan Domenico Mansi *et al*, 53 Vols (Paris, 1903), xxiii, col. 628-32.

<sup>132</sup> *Les Registres d’Urban IV*, §468.

<sup>133</sup> Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, p. 246.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., pp. 236-259 (p. 247).

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Jacoby, ‘Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean’, p. 103.

<sup>137</sup> Non-Frankish, ie: Italian, Provençal.

money', and in the case of the kingdom of Jerusalem, tangled in a constant struggle for its survival, money was desperately needed.<sup>138</sup> Richard states that the wealth of the kingdom previously attributed to the entire Latin-held lands, was in fact restricted to a small section of society, mainly the merchant communes.<sup>139</sup> This statement is even more relevant for the period explored in this study. With internal and external conflicts rising in the decade following Louis' crusade, the wealth of the kingdom of Jerusalem drastically decreased, prompting more concessions to be made to the military orders and the Italian communes.<sup>140</sup> The custom of granting privileges to the mercantile communes, for which the first recorded evidence in the Latin Kingdom is Baldwin's grant to the Genoese after the fall of Acre in 1104,<sup>141</sup> helped increase Italian presence and influence in the East. The communes however, never launched an 'invasion' on their own in order to acquire more land, a situation that is reflected in Italy as well, where Genoa, Venice and Pisa never organised wars of expansion that went beyond their direct area of authority.<sup>142</sup> Their main goal was the control of the Mediterranean trade, and the continuation of trade relations with Muslim powers after the fall of the Latin States does not suggest that their wish was purely material, but more of a necessary adjustment in order to survive.

With regards to Italian involvement in Egypt, it can be observed that although the rise of the Ayyubids did not provoke a major change in the trading patterns of the Mediterranean for the Western world, a slow increase in the importance of the Syrian ports for the mercantile communes can be seen.<sup>143</sup> This trend ultimately reversed at the time of the Mongol invasions in the 1240s whose conquests now provided stability and security for the silk roads, which was redirecting trade towards the Black Sea. Louis' crusade to Egypt on the other hand, provides a very interesting fact with regards to Italian involvement in the East, and their impact on Latin lands. Because of the spice trade routes, which entered the Mediterranean via Alexandria, the presence of

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<sup>138</sup> Linda Ross explored the appeals for money, supplies and manpower. Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', p. 88.

<sup>139</sup> Jean Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 357-8.

<sup>140</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', p. 89.

<sup>141</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, 3, §App. II/9, p. 1470.

<sup>142</sup> That said, all three communes did in fact, at one point during their respective history, assert control over another region: Genoa in Corsica, Pisa in Sardinia, and Venice in Crete, and later on Cyprus. However, during the Crusading era, all three were more or less interested only in establishing stable 'colonies' in which their respective merchants could safely retire and work.

<sup>143</sup> Tables 1 and 4, in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 58; 97.

merchants in the city is attested from an early time, and after the Battle of Hattin, at least thirty-eight Christian ships were accounted for in the harbour.<sup>144</sup> We know that the Venetians were very active in Alexandria before the Third Crusade, and this heavy concentration may explain why they did not take part in Louis' expedition. Genoese merchants on the other hand issued no contracts for Alexandria for the period of 1250-1254.<sup>145</sup> This reinforces the theory that Genoa's interest in Egypt had suffered from the rise of the Ayyubids<sup>146</sup> and that the prospect of a successful invasion by the French king, with whom they were already on good terms, would be very profitable for them.

Genoese interest in Alexandria was not however completely extinct, even after the defeat of Mansoura. After the king's departure, the Genoese slowly increased their trade with Egypt as a result of the conflicts in the Holy Land between Communes, and between the years 1272-85, the bulk of their Eastern trade was going through Alexandria instead of Syria.<sup>147</sup>

Crusading and warfare did not translate into reduced income for the merchant communes.<sup>148</sup> If trade was reduced during the war, the money lending activities would have increased as a result.<sup>149</sup> This is what can be seen with Louis' first crusade, where Italians, and especially Genoese, acted as money-lenders to the king and his knights.<sup>150</sup> Was profit however the principal reason for Italian involvement in this aspect of crusading movement? The mid-thirteenth century was a turning point in the history of the Latin East. With the first of the 'Royal Crusades', the death of Frederick II and the loss of royal power in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the East found itself at the mercy of attacks, coming from both the outside and the inside. In this situation, a new reason to fight presented itself to the Italians.

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<sup>144</sup> *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, pp. 74-5.

<sup>145</sup> The values are taken from the year 1252 only; however, it can be assumed that no contracts were made during the years 1250 and 1251 due to the Genoese close involvements with Louis. Table 7, in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

<sup>146</sup> Genoese involvement in Egypt is attested from at least the mid-twelfth century, however, Venice and Pisa's presence seemed to be prominent thought the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century. Jacoby, 'Commercial Exchange Across the Mediterranean'.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> Balard, 'Notes on the economic consequences of the Crusades', pp. 233-239 (p. 237).

<sup>149</sup> The prospect of war was also the source of major income for the Italians, as ships were always needed.

<sup>150</sup> André E. Sayous, 'Les Mandats de Saint-Louis sur son trésor et le mouvement international des capitaux pendant la Septième Croisade, 1248-1254', *Revue Historique*, 167 (1931), pp. 254-304 (p. 276).

Studies are now starting to concentrate on the impact of the Crusades on the development of Communes such as Genoa, Venice and Pisa. As van Doosselaere explains, because the Italians were trading in Muslim territories prior to the launch of the Holy Wars, and in one sense they felt concerned by the prospect of invasion, which could damage their economy, if other parties were in control.<sup>151</sup> On the other hand, a successful campaign could bring numerous advantages to anyone involved. The resulting effect however was different, and the crusades ultimately helped shape those communes' economy and helped them rise in power and influence. Contemporary studies tend to focus more on the actual physical gains such as the quarters they received in conquered towns rather than the monetary aspects.

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<sup>151</sup> Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*, p. 31.



## **Chapter 1**

### **Louis IX in the Holy Land and the Italian Dilemma: Profit and Duty**

The Seventh Crusade led by Louis IX of France was without a doubt the best-organised military expedition of the twelfth and thirteenth century to the East. From the planning to the initial execution, Louis demonstrated a level of control over his army and over the many different contingents from so many different regions that had not been seen before.<sup>152</sup> The failure of the crusade itself was therefore one of the biggest disappointments of the thirteenth century. It has been suggested that it was because of this calamity that enthusiasm for future expeditions to the East drastically diminished, to the point that in 1270, when the king of France embarked once more wearing the cross, he was able to assemble his army only with great difficulty.<sup>153</sup>

To make amends for the collapse of the invasion of Egypt in 1250, for which Louis believed he was largely responsible, the king of France decided to stay in the Holy Land to help free the remaining prisoners from the Muslims but also to help strengthen the position of the Latins in the East, which, as a result of the Battle of La Forbie (1244), was at its weakest since the Battle of Hattin (1187). During his four years' stay in the kingdom of Jerusalem, Louis was successful in freeing the prisoners, his principal goal, but he was also able to strengthen the kingdom and the crown, which by this stage, was ruled by an oligarchy formed around the leading barons, the military orders, and the mercantile communes, particularly those of Italian origins. With regards to the Italian communes, especially Genoa, it is important to consider what was their role and status during Louis' crusade, and to examine how the presence of the king of France affected their position in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

What was Louis's attitude towards these independent entities within the kingdom? As the most powerful sovereign in the Western world after the emperor, Louis was a natural ally for any party in conflict at the time. What did Genoa, Venice and Pisa gain, or lose as a result of Louis' expedition?

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<sup>152</sup> This can clearly be seen in the extensive diplomatic negotiations that happened prior to the launch of the expedition between Louis and other nobles, but also in his implication in the financing of the crusade, especially regarding loans taken by knights and sergeants in his army. Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, pp. 14-34, 103.

<sup>153</sup> Richard, *The Crusades*, p. 425; Jean Richard, *Saint Louis* (Paris, 1983), p. 549.

## **The Role of the Italians in the Holy Land During the Seventh Crusade**

Commercial activity in the Eastern Mediterranean was defined by three main destinations for Italian merchants: Romania, that is the area roughly covered by the Byzantine and later Latin Empire; *Outremer*, that is Syria, Palestine and Cyprus; and Egypt.<sup>154</sup> In *Outremer*, by the start of the thirteenth century, Genoa, Venice and Pisa had become independent landowners on a similar level to the military orders and held a number of privileges including the freedom to have their own court of law.<sup>155</sup>

As a result the role and status of the Italians in the Holy Land during the years 1249 to 1254, aside from their position as merchants and their involvement in the transport of troops and food, is difficult to specify. During Louis's campaign in Egypt, Italians were to be found in Damietta as merchants and businessmen, which shows that they were already involved in trade in Egypt, but their involvement in actual combat outside the walls of the city is uncertain.<sup>156</sup> After the defeat of Mansurah and the capture of the king, the queen retained them for the defence of the city but it is not specified exactly what their actual role was to be: it is entirely plausible that the Italians were simply employed in order to provide ships for the returning crusaders, rather than as an actual fighting force.<sup>157</sup> On the other hand, crewmembers for the ships - which numbered 50 for the bigger vessels - could also have been used as a fighting force when ashore.

We do have one particular role relating to the Italians. In a letter from Louis to his brother Alphonse of Poitiers dated 11 August 1251, the king mentions a fleet that he was maintaining at his own expenses to face off pirates in order to keep the sea route clear and safe.<sup>158</sup> In another letter, mentioned by Claverie in his article 'Un nouvel éclairage sur le financement de la première croisade de Saint Louis', this time addressed

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<sup>154</sup> Balard, 'Notes on the Economic Consequences of the Crusades', pp. 233-239 (p. 236).

<sup>155</sup> *LIRG*, 1/1, §59, §60, §61, pp. 97-102.

<sup>156</sup> In comparison, we know for certain that during Louis' second Crusade in 1270 Genoese troops took part in combat, and were responsible for the capture of a fort on the site of Ancient Carthage. Strayer, 'The Crusades of Louis IX', pp. 487-518 (p. 516).

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244.

<sup>158</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know whether this fleet was Genoese, or even Italian. Peter Jackson, ed., *The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254: Texts and Documents*, Crusade Texts in Translation, 16 (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 210-11.

to the Genoese commune in Syria, Louis refers to the capture of pirates by his fleet and the discovery of mandates addressed to the commune.<sup>159</sup> This strongly suggests that Louis was employing Genoese as a naval force, specifically as corsairs, emphasising once more the relationship between the French crown and the Commune of Genoa.

The benefits they obtained during the crusader conquests did not stop with the acquisition of land. By the time of the Crusades, the Italian Communes owned the most extensive navies in the Western world and were therefore contracted by different parties, such as Louis IX and Charles of Anjou<sup>160</sup> for the continuous supply of pilgrims, crusaders and food. Thus we see a rise in contracts made for ships and transport throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries coming from both the West and the East.

### **The Contract between Louis and Genoa**

One of these contracts is the one that was drawn between Louis IX and the city of Genoa in 1246 with regards to providing ships for the king's upcoming crusade. This document can be found in the study by Champollion-Figeac<sup>161</sup> in Latin and in the vernacular form; however, another edition can be found in the compilation of documents relating the two crusades of the royal saint by Luigi Tommaso Belgrano.<sup>162</sup> The contract was written in March or April 1246 and the text seems to have suffered over time, as sections are missing from the vernacular text, while the Latin seems to have been mixed with parts of other documents. The content however is still very clear. Mention of this contract can be found in a footnote in the work of Jordan. Jackson also mentions the contract in his *The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254: Sources and Documents*, but once

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<sup>159</sup> [...] *Vobis notificare volumus quod cum centum et viginti paria litterarum aliquibus de dicta communitate vestra civibus, per nos ipsos pro tribus paribus, et per quisdam milites, armigeros, aliosque cruce signatos pro residuis obligatarum, in quidam pyratice vase per galeas nostras nuper capto, reperta fuerint, nobisque per dilectum et fidelem nostrum magistrum balistariorum tradita, ad vos ipsa destinamus restituenda.* [...] Pierre-Vincent Claverie, 'Un nouvel éclairage sur le financement de la première croisade de Saint Louis', *Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome, Moyen Age*, 113 (2001), pp. 621-635 (pp. 624, 626, 634, annexes, no. 1).

<sup>160</sup> See Chapter 3 for more detail.

<sup>161</sup> Jacques-Joseph Champollion-Figeac, *Documents Historiques Inédits tirés des Collections Manuscrites de la Bibliothèque Royale et des Archives ou des Bibliothèques des Départements*, 4 Vols (Paris: 1841), 2, XXX, Document 3, pp. 51-67.

<sup>162</sup> Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, *Documenti Inediti riguardanti le due Crociate di San Ludovico IX Re di Francia* (Genoa: 1859), pp. 3-27. Musarra also mentions it briefly in *Acridi 1291*, p. 58, but also in his newest work, *In partibus Ultramaris*, p. 298.

more in a footnote. No complete work or document mentions the contract in detail until now.<sup>163</sup>

There are two reasons why this contract is of considerable importance for both the Seventh Crusade and the study of Franco-Genoese relations in the thirteenth century. The first of these relates to the raw content of the text. It gives us a considerable amount of technical detail regarding Louis' ships. For example, it would allow for a hypothesis on a maximum number of men, horses and material that the king would have been able to transport with him. It can also give us an idea of how much money was involved in the building and the preparation of a ship in the thirteenth century, as numerous documents regarding individual transactions between different families in order to build the ships, or to arm them survive in manuscripts in the Genoese cartularies.<sup>164</sup>

The second aspect of this contract, is the assumption that can be made regarding the relationship between the French crown and the city of Genoa in the thirteenth century. The contract was made between Louis IX and citizens of Genoa, that is individuals of some status. The ship building arrangements can be said to be based on the Roman tradition from the *Codex Theodosianus* (in particular the *corpora naviculariorum*, fifth century), and which states that landowners have the responsibility to build, maintain, and operate ships for the transport of food.<sup>165</sup> Mor also states that this obligation was passed on to heirs and future owners of the land.<sup>166</sup> This procedure is different from that used by Philip II for the Third Crusade in which he contracted with the city of Genoa directly.<sup>167</sup> On the other hand, the names that are written in the contract with Louis do not represent the primary mercantile families of the period. In fact it seems that only smaller families, that is those whose reputation has not come down to us as strongly as the Embriaco, della Volta and so on, with one notable exception, one member of the Doria family.

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<sup>163</sup> Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, p. 70, n. 44., Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254*, p. 22.

<sup>164</sup> MS UA0027

<sup>165</sup> An analysis of the text is found in Hadas Mor, 'The Socio-economic Implications for Ship Construction: Evidence from Underwater Archaeology and the Codex Theodosianus', in *Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval Mediterranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor*, ed. by Ruthy Gertwagen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (Farnham, 2012), pp. 39-64.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 39-64 (p. 48).

<sup>167</sup> Hall, *Caffaro*, pp. 218-20 (p. 218).

## Content of the Contract

The contract seems to be divided in four sections, all but one bearing a title on the verso: "*De navigiis preparandis*" for the first; "*Hec sunt scripta et conventiones navium*", the second; and "*Conventiones navium*" for the fourth.<sup>168</sup> The third section has been given the title "*Scrittura diversa delle antecedenti*" by Belgrano. The whole of the document is comprised of thirteen clauses. The first section simply introduces the parties, and stipulates the main terms: that is, the ships are to be ready within two years and that the fleet is to sail from the port of Aigues-Mortes. The other three go into considerable details regarding the building of the ships, and who was to provide what, in what condition, and in some occasions, who was to command the particular vessel. For example, the three main ships in Louis's navy, the only three to be built at the expense of the commune, were to be readied to transport one hundred horses each, while the smaller ones, those described by Joinville in his account, and to be built by individuals, were to transport twenty horses each.<sup>169</sup> Another particularity of the document is that the captains, crews, and all Genoese present on board the armada, were under the orders of Louis, which reinforces the argument that the king clearly saw the Genoese as part of his army. It is stated that, all captains and sailors were to swear on the Holy Gospels that they will obey the king and protect in during the entire journey (it is not specified when it is to end exactly), but more importantly that they will be in the service of the king.<sup>170</sup> The same paragraph also indicates that they were not allowed to load any other items than those ordered by the king.<sup>171</sup> This could have economic implications for the Genoese and would perhaps also indicate the reason behind the reluctance from certain families to accept the contract as mentioned below.

The document also gives us a list of names of people, most of them prominent merchants, who were supposed to oversee the building of the ships, and those who were supposed to take command on board, indicating that they were taking part in the

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<sup>168</sup> See Appendix for the full document.

<sup>169</sup> Joinville mentions these in his account, although he does not state how many men and horses could board each. Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', pp. 137-336 (p. 177).

<sup>170</sup> '..., et quod patroni nauium et omnes marinarii teneantur iurare ad sancta euangelia quod ipsi bona fide saluabunt et eustodient dominum regem gentem suam et omnes res suas. Et quod complebunt uiagium fideliter. Et quod obedient domino regi et amiraudo ipsius in omnibus. Quamdiu erunt in seruicio domini regis.' Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 17).

<sup>171</sup> '... Et quod nihil honerabunt in dictis nauibus neque recipeient sine asensu et uoluntate domini regis, uel illorum quis ad honerandum dictas naues dominus rex uiluerit deputare.' Ibid.

crusade, or that at least their families would be represented.<sup>172</sup> The number of names indicates that the contract was divided between the city of Genoa and some of the powerful families of merchants. These families do not represent the entire commune of Genoa as the names given do not reflect the power structure of the period.<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, the contract also gives us the names of those who opposed the clause stating that the king should not be able to dictate his wishes to the commune, meaning that not everyone in the city was in favour of this arrangement, perhaps due to the memory of previous crusades, or even out of fear of competition. This list once more does not reflect the social structure of the commune, but may in fact, indicate those with prior contracts in the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>174</sup> It should also be noted that the city was plunged into financial crisis (1149-51) following the expeditions to Almeria and Tortosa, an episode that had severe political repercussions too.<sup>175</sup>

*Nomina illorum qui convenerunt nobiscum de dictis navibus faciendis, nec tamen voluerunt quod esset in voluntate domni regis : Nicholaus Barrularius, Saonus Theobaldi, de Saona. Honoricus Papelardus de Saona. Sardeninus, dictus Sardenne. Jacobus Carsaficus. Obertus Boca-Nigra. Pascarius de Albario. Albrainus dictus Poca-Visui. Otho, dictus Scorchu. Guillelmus, dictus Aubain. Georgius de Mari.*<sup>176</sup>

Some of the names cited throughout the document are well known, like the de Porta family, whose name appears as one of the witnesses to the contract,<sup>177</sup> and whose origins can be traced back to the viscounts of the eleventh century.<sup>178</sup> The most interesting name however is that of the de Mari family,<sup>179</sup> which appears once with regards to Henricus providing a ‘nave’<sup>180</sup> that he was to captain himself, and a second

<sup>172</sup> Champollion-Figeac, pp. 51-67 (p. 54).

<sup>173</sup> See section in the Introduction for more information.

<sup>174</sup> This would definitely benefit from further research on familial commercial activities.

<sup>175</sup> Hall, *Caffaro*, pp. 127-37 (p. 133).

<sup>176</sup> Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 19).

<sup>177</sup> Champollion-Figeac, pp. 51-67 (p. 52)

<sup>178</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 22.

<sup>179</sup> ‘de la Mer’ in the Old French translation of the text.

<sup>180</sup> Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 18).; a ‘nave’ is a smaller vessel, or one that is not new, see Auguste Jal, *Glossaire Nautique, Répertoire plylotte de termes de marine anciens et modernes* (Paris: 1848), p. 1043. In this case, judging by the size of the vessel, it was to have a crew of 50, plus 5 per barge, not including servants, and the fact that it was to be captained by Henri de Mari himself, the ship was most likely his own flagship used for trading originally and now to be converted to a transport.

time as Facius de Mari who would provide, with two other nobles, 12 ‘tarides’.<sup>181</sup> These were those seen and described by Joinville upon embarkation.<sup>182</sup> A Georgius de Mari also appears in the list of names that are opposed to the conditions dictated by Louis.<sup>183</sup> The de Mari name is important because it appears twice in the Holy Land as consuls through Lanfranco de Mari and Pietro de Mari who were elected in 1211 and 1233 respectively.<sup>184</sup> It is also very plausible that Lanfranco de Mari was a consul in Genoa before being posted to the East.<sup>185</sup> They both are mentioned in other charters, the first one as a witness to a charter (1211), alongside another de Mari, and a Spinola, while Pietro (or Petro, Petri), is mentioned in a charter in which John and Balian of Ibelin, Odo of Montbéliard, John of Caesarea, and the lord of Haifa,<sup>186</sup> promise not to make any alliances, or agreements with the city of Pisa for a duration of six years (1233) without the consent of the city of Genoa.<sup>187</sup> This charter is also a good indication of the relationship between Pisa and Genoa, and is in line with the various altercations that were seen in the first half of the thirteenth century, such as with the War of Saint-Sabas, as we will see later. This not only reveals that Genoa had attained a high level of influence within the kingdom of Jerusalem, but also that they were recognised as being part of the ruling elite.<sup>188</sup>

The contract between Louis and Genoa is therefore important in that it implies that Louis dealt initially with the commune of Genoa itself, but then made individual

<sup>181</sup> Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 19); the ‘tarides’ were longboats, usually made to transport very heavy cargo, but could also be used in a similar role as a galley. In his glossary, Jal points out that they were very common, and in some instances, were able to fight off a superior enemy force. Jal, *Glossaire Nautique*, p. 1430-1431. In our case, the ships had oars, marking them perhaps as galley rather than transport.

<sup>182</sup> Joinville, ‘Life of Saint-Louis’, pp. 137-336 (p. 177). They were equipped with the famous doors allowing horses to get in easily, according to the text, there was to be 20 horses in each. With a simple calculation, it is easy to have an idea of the size of these vessels. In the document, their length is specified as 48 goues, or *coudées*, which Jal converts into 35 metres or 108 feet long, while their width at the bottom as 13 palmes or a bit more than 10 feet, or 3 metres.

<sup>183</sup> Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 19).

<sup>184</sup> RRR, §1639, §2210, RRH, §1049.

<sup>185</sup> Merav Mack, *The Merchant of Genoa: The Crusades, the Genoese and the Latin East, 1187-1220s* (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Cambridge University, 2003), p. 156.

<sup>186</sup> In his edition of the ‘Histoire de l’Ile de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan’, M. L. de Mas Latrie identifies the lord of Caiphas (Haifa) as Rohart or Renald, the chamberlain of Cyprus in 1201, or perhaps one of his sons with the same name. *HIC, Documents*, I, p. 58. This family has yet to be studied in detail however, we know that in 1236, it was linked with the Ibelin family through the marriage of John of Arsur and Alice of Haifa, highlighting their status within the kingdom. See the Ibelin Family tree in Peter Edbury’s *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1997).

<sup>187</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, §786-7, RRR, §2210.

<sup>188</sup> Interestingly enough, a ‘Guilelmum de Mari, *sindicus universitatis Massilie*’ appears in the contract passed between Louis and the city of Marseille on the 19th of August 1246 as messengers to the king, *Layettes du trésor des Chartes*, II, 1224-1246 (Paris: 1866), §3537, p. 632. Whether it is the same branch of the family in Genoa is not known, and would be rather surprising as Genoa and Marseille were rival, but the prospect of an expedition may have improved relations between the two communes.

and separate contracts with Genoese citizens, and possibly entertained longer.<sup>189</sup> The contract could also be taken as an indication that the Genoese were taking advantage of the pontificate of Innocent IV (1243-54), and of their ecumenical protection, and were trying to combine it with their dealings with Louis. This connection with Louis would also have been advantageous for those families in establishing new contracts. Despite the de Mari family being involved as part of a larger group of people in the contract, their inclusion does appear to be because they were important in the Holy Land. Interestingly enough, the obvious Genoese names usually associated in the Crusade movement are not included. The Embriaco family for example, lords of Gibelet, or the Spinola family, which included many consuls both in Genoa and in the Holy Land, or the della Volta, all of which were powerful, all of whom were to be found at the siege of Acre during the Third Crusade.<sup>190</sup> This change came about with the improvement of contracts, and especially the *commenda*, which will be seen further down, and which is directly connected to the social events in Genoa at the time, during which the smaller families, and those with less capital, were slowly becoming more prominent in the economy of the commune, but also in its political affairs.

This omission is surprising since Philip contracted with Genoa for the Third Crusade and the names mentioned above all took part. Despite both contracts having been made by the kings of France and the entire Commune of Genoa, the significance of the signatories is different. Philip Augustus dealt with the powerful, and in exchange, offered the return of past conquests.<sup>191</sup> On the other hand, Louis dealt with the commune, but also with families whose names do not appear to have had any significant connection to the East, with the exception of a member of the Doria family, whose role was insignificant, suggesting that the task was to be accomplished by a lower ranking member of the family, rather than one of the leading figures. This expedition would have therefore helped to increase their presence in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, but more importantly also enabled them to establish themselves in Egypt in order to counter

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<sup>189</sup> If the fleet that Louis employed in the Levant was Genoese, it is very likely that they would have been originally named in the contract.

<sup>190</sup> Guido Spinola for example was the *Ianuensium consul* in 1189-1190 and left a mark in the Holy Land for the Genoese. His name is mentioned in two charters giving grants to the Genoese, one by Conrad of Montferrat in Tyre, found in *LIRG*, vol. 1/2, §331, pp. 137-40, and another, by King Guy in Acre, found in *LIRG*, vol. 1/2, §332, pp. 140-42. Rosso della Volta was a prominent member of the Genoese merchant elite. He met Saladin in 1177 in Alexandria, and on the eve of the Third Crusade, he travelled to England to discuss the events of Hattin and the fall of Jerusalem with Richard. Both of them were joined by Nicola Embriaco and Simone Doria and many others and sailed to join the siege of Acre. Hall, *Caffaro*, p. 148.

<sup>191</sup> Hall, *Caffaro*, pp. 218-20 (p. 218).



the Venetian advance in the area following the Fourth Crusade and their establishment in the Black Sea. Louis's expedition was one of conquest, and his attitude, or more to the point, his choice of 'allies' in this expedition does reflect that.<sup>192</sup> This was, to an extent therefore, a speculative venture and the bigger families may have taken a cautious approach. Likewise, as we will see, the nature of the contract may also have deterred these more senior families from becoming involved.

### **The relationship between France and Genoa**

So what was this relationship? What made the Genoese and French kings look to each other during three crusades? And lastly, how did this relationship evolve with time?

There are no documents that specifically state a formal alliance between the kings of France and the city of Genoa, nor are there any indication of any having ever existed. By examining the two surviving contracts however, an idea can be formed as to what this relationship was based on. The contract between Philip II and Genoa, which can be found in Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hall's translation and edition of Caffaro's work,<sup>193</sup> is a standard contract relating to crusading expeditions. Duke Hugh of Burgundy, treasurer and ambassador of Philip II of France negotiates the transport of the army of the king to the Holy Land with the consuls of the commune. Only their names are given, and it is specified that the commune will decide which ships to use - whether or not any were to be built is unknown - how many, and whom to choose as admirals.<sup>194</sup> The crusaders will assemble in Genoa or in any port under the Commune's jurisdiction in the year following the signing of the contract or in the year thereafter. This contract is simple. It does not point towards any cooperation between the two parties apart from the privileges accorded to the Commune in any conquered city.<sup>195</sup> It highlights the role of Genoa as the transporter, and that of the French army as the passenger. This in turn would affect their role and opportunities.

This contract sheds some light on Philip's motives at the time, and in hindsight, we know that he was reluctant to be drawn in by the events in the East due to his situation at home, and therefore did not look to develop the relationship beyond that of

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<sup>192</sup> The 'French' nature of the expedition, whether intentional or not, reinforces the idea of a French conquest rather than a 'traditional' crusade. Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, p. 69.

<sup>193</sup> Hall, *Caffaro*, pp. 218-20; *LIRG*, 1/6, §935, pp. 11-14.

<sup>194</sup> Hall, *Caffaro*, pp. 218-20 (p. 218).

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 218-20 (p. 219).

a carrier/passenger one. By looking at this contract and comparing it with the one drawn during Louis' reign however, we can see that the motives, but more importantly, the power and ambition of the French crown changed direction, and consequently, the contract of 1246 differs greatly from its predecessor.

Nearly all aspects of the contract are different. Philip left the choice of ships and admirals to Genoa, while Louis and his ambassadors explicitly stated which were to be built and by whom, and whom was to command each of them.<sup>196</sup> The king, and this is a critical point, did not promise any restoration of rights, or the establishment of new ones. He merely wished to employ the Genoese as a means of transport and as a fleet and does not state to have wanted them as a fighting force. There is also no indication that he intended them to remain in the East in the form of a fighting force, except perhaps as a naval force, which would have greatly benefited the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>197</sup> This coincides with his desire to conquer and establish French rule over Egypt. He did not want to create a separate new kingdom, which would require constant financial and military aid, but more a colony, under full French rule.<sup>198</sup> Thus, the only promises the king could and did offer were contracts with individuals rather than with the commune, such as the ones given to the two Genoese admirals commanding his fleet who were given exclusive contracts, amongst which was the supply of crossbow bolts.<sup>199</sup> In other words, this was a far less attractive proposition than the agreement with Phillip Augustus. This type of agreement however, would have definitely worked better in Genoa, rather than in Venice, due to the political structure of the commune. As stated above, Genoese politics were fragmented, and revolved around the *compagna*, and around the consul of the time. If one family happen to have fallen out of favour, they would not be receiving advantageous contracts from the commune and therefore, would have found it difficult to trade. Louis' proposition may have been a way around the commune's restrictions in place at the time. This theory would therefore

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<sup>196</sup> *Thomas dictus raparinus de ianus, unam debet in eadem esse patronus*. Belgrano, pp. 3-27 (p. 18).

<sup>197</sup> From Joinville's account, Queen Marguerite retained the services of Genoese and Pisan men for the defence of the city of Damietta following Louis' capture and the Mamluk counterattack. Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', pp. 137-336 (p. 244).

<sup>198</sup> The term 'colony' is used here on purpose in order to highlight the level of control that Louis exerted over the army but also over the different parties involved. I believe that Louis truly wanted to establish his own rule and that of the French crown over Egypt, rather than handing it over to the kingdom of Jerusalem, whose king at the time was Frederick II, and his son, Conrad. The lack of promises to the Italian communes for their help emphasises the idea that Louis wanted full control of the captured cities.

<sup>199</sup> Strayer, 'The Crusades of Louis IX', pp. 487-518 (p. 492).

imply that Louis' choice of families was directed by the political situation in Genoa at the time, and that the families chosen were not direct allies to the consul.

Dealing with individuals as opposed to the commune and the consuls, is the main aspect of this document. In the 1246 contract, numerous names are mentioned, all from lower ranking families. This is in stark contrast from the Third Crusade as many powerful families took part, such as the Doria, Spinola, and Della Volta.<sup>200</sup> Only a small number are known to have had connections with the East and the crusades, which could point towards the fact that Louis targeted them for a reason: they would have been more inclined to follow him in order to potentially secure holds in a newly conquered Egypt, or to secure contracts as a result of the expedition. Of all the names, a few also reappear in the crusading texts after the expedition, such as the De Maris for example. Louis' choice could also have to do with the fact that following Genoa's participation in the Third Crusade, the commune received numerous grants in Acre for example.<sup>201</sup> Enthusiasm for his expedition from lesser families could also be a result of their hope to acquire similar rewards; they were also perhaps more willing to take risks. That said, if the crusade succeeded, it would surely give the Genoese a prime position for the Egyptian trade and would also enhance their standing in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

The targeting of smaller families could also have been because of the memory of the Third Crusade, and the delay between the arrival of King Phillip and King Richard in Italy, which caused many investors to sign smaller contracts while waiting for the army to set sail: from July 1190, Genoese, travellers and individual crusaders left for the kingdom of Jerusalem without waiting.<sup>202</sup> Another consequence of this delay was the lowering of the prices by the Genoese, and thus of their profit margin.<sup>203</sup> On the other hand, the benefits obtained from the crusade would have been enough to entice more smaller merchants and families to take part.<sup>204</sup>

The king dealt with individuals but also with the Consuls. The three main ships of his new fleet were to be built by the Commune itself, loaned to the king, and placed under his authority. This was done perhaps in order to not be seen as going against the commune by contracting only with lower ranking families, or those families which

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<sup>200</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 87.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade,' pp. 45-62, (p. 52).

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., pp. 45-62, (p. 53).

<sup>204</sup> Rivalry in Tyre, but also Genoese investments in the region all played in favour of Genoa. Ibid., pp. 45-62, (pp. 55-56).

were out of favours. The king was now the leader of the fleet, not a simple passenger, and Genoa had become a subordinate. During Louis' next crusade, Genoa would once more be solicited for the provision of ships. That time however, Louis did not rent the ships, but instead bought some for his own use. He also did not employ Genoese as admirals and instead promoted a Frenchman.<sup>205</sup>

Some evidence however, suggests that the Italians did what they could to ensure that future contracts would go to them. The lending of money to crusaders was common, and the Italians, alongside the military orders, were more or less the main lenders.<sup>206</sup> The communes also acted as bankers for the army, and Strayer argues that they remained loyal all along Louis' campaign, which can explain why the royal treasury remained untouched for most of the duration of the expedition.<sup>207</sup> This is also supported by the fact that for his second crusade, Louis still made use of Genoese bankers for credit, as well as to buy ships.<sup>208</sup> We know that crusading was an expensive venture.<sup>209</sup> Thus it is more than accepted that some knights found themselves out of money very quickly, consequently, Joinville tells us that many had to take a loan from the king, or enter his service in order to continue on.<sup>210</sup> Loans from the king however were on most occasions, loans given by Italians, with the king acting as guarantor, the merchants preferring to deal with Louis rather than his vassals.<sup>211</sup> The money loaned by the Italians was therefore vital for the maintenance of the troops.

### **The role and responsibilities of the Italians in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem**

The first clue relating to the Christian obligations of the Italians in the thirteenth century, in particular the Genoese, came when in 1243, Innocent IV was consecrated pope.<sup>212</sup> Genoese by birth, Innocent IV readily allied himself with the commune against

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<sup>205</sup> Richard, *The Crusades*, p. 427.

<sup>206</sup> Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade,' pp. 45-62, (pp. 61-62).

<sup>207</sup> Strayer, 'The Crusades of Louis IX', pp. 487-518 (p. 492).

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., pp. 487-518 (p. 511).

<sup>209</sup> Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', pp. 137-336 (p. 174).

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., pp. 137-336 (p. 260); Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade*, p. 102.

<sup>211</sup> Sayous, 'Les Mandats de Saint-Louis', pp. 254-304 (pp. 265, 273).

<sup>212</sup> Again, the word "duty" here is to be taken in the purest terms, ie: the moral obligation and commitment to someone or something.

the emperor and in 1247, rewarded it with the ultimate prize: a protection against excommunication and interdict given by bishops and archbishops in Cyprus and the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>213</sup> This did not however imply that any actions had no consequences. The text specifies that only matters related to the testaments are protected by the document, implying that any encroaching on the part of Genoa on for example papal trade embargoes, would perhaps be overlooked, but more importantly, that Genoese expansion to the detriment of religious institutions may well have been endorsed.<sup>214</sup> The stipulation that Genoa would receive relative freedom to trade with Muslims is especially important. A canon of the First Council of Lyons (1245) stipulates that anyone who shall cause or facilitate the death of a Christian shall be excommunicated, but could also risk losing his or her freedom, and be reduced to slavery on account of the crimes committed.<sup>215</sup> On the other hand, the text also indicates that any excommunications and interdicts placed on the Genoese for reasons of intimidation or extortion were forbidden, and this is the most important part of the text. The Genoese were therefore free to move and do business within the kingdom of Jerusalem and on Cyprus without anyone to impede them. The pope's final words in the document emphasise the attitude of the latter towards the commune: *Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumpserit, indignacionem omnipotentis Dei et beatorum Petri et Pauli apostolorum eius se noverit incursurum.*<sup>216</sup> As such, the Commune was free to expand its borders of influence to the detriment of its opponents, mainly Pisa and Venice. This document could also be one of the driving force behind Genoese motives in the War of Saint-Sabas, although it did not protect them from secular law. Guillaume de Nangis briefly explains that in 1249, the Genoese-Pisan conflict that was brewing in the kingdom of Jerusalem and that followed the killing of a Genoese noble by a Pisan, ultimately escalating into the War of Saint Sabas, together with an altercation between

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<sup>213</sup> *LIRG*, I/6, §955, pp. 45-47.

<sup>214</sup> The Genoese were not fully exempt from excommunication or interdict. The Pope specifies that an appeal can be made to Rome if necessary and that a decision will be made accordingly. On the other hand, it is interesting to see that the Genoese were relatively safe compared to other mercantile cities. While Venice remained quiet during the decades prior to Louis' arrival, Genoese encroachment within the kingdom of Jerusalem as a result of Louis' expedition forced them to re-emerge on the political scene. Pisa also remained quiet after Frederick's failed seizure of power and was more or less focused on Italy and the wars of the Emperor. With this document in their hands, it seems that Genoa felt safe enough to improve their situation in the East which had somewhat suffered from the establishment of an imperial faction led by Ricardo Filangieri. It could also be argued that this was therefore an incentive for Genoa to acquire the building of Saint-Sabas in Acre.

<sup>215</sup> Stefan K. Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford, 2014), p. 48.

<sup>216</sup> *LIRG*, I/6, §955, pp. 45-47.

Genoese and the Viscount of Beaumont in which the latter's soldiers killed a Genoese noble nearly proved catastrophic to the French army upon Louis' arrival in Cyprus, as the Italians were the only ones with the necessary ships for the journey to Egypt.<sup>217</sup>

The second important effect of the Papal bull of 1247 was the re-emergence, if only short-lived, of French influence, and French targets of diplomacy, within the kingdom of Jerusalem after the rule of the Hohenstaufen in the previous two decades.<sup>218</sup> Already with the Barons' Crusade in the early 1240s, French influences were revived within the governing circle of power, with the arrival of Thibaut of Champagne.<sup>219</sup> To the Genoese, the French intervention was a catalyst through which they could improve their situation. Thus, it was their duty to help the king, and in turn help the city of Genoa in this conflict. This idea of duty was not new. Genoese were, and still are, renowned for their independent tendencies and it would have made them the perfect allies for Louis. Also, their hatred of the Emperor Frederick II and their good relations with the papacy provided an extra momentum to this relationship that had started under Philip II during the Third Crusade. The relationship between the French crown and Genoa from Philip II until the Eighth Crusade is, it is argued here, one of the forgotten aspects of the crusades. The idea that each European crown had a preferred Italian commune is perhaps too clear-cut, however, the fact that Pisa and the emperors always remained close, and that Genoa seem to have continuously followed the French kings from the time of Philip II still remains worthy of note. The struggle between emperor and pope was one of the main conflicts of the century and despite the relative neutrality of the king of France, the arrival of the pope in Lyon, and the subsequent 'protection' by Louis, pushed the kingdom of France towards a pro-papal attitude, albeit an unofficial one.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> Guillaume de Nangis, *Vie et Vertue de Saint-Louis*, ed. by Marius Sepet and René de Lespinasse (Paris: 1877), pp. 108-10.

<sup>218</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe', p. 146.

<sup>219</sup> With this statement, I do not imply that French influence, culture and way of life had disappeared during the reign of Frederick II and during his regency for his son, Conrad. The Frankish nobility still had strong ties to the nobility of France: the royal line of Cyprus was strongly related to the house of Champagne and to the Lusignans for example. For more on the relations between the Frankish nobility and the nobility of Europe and in particular that of France, Linda Ross' thesis provides a detailed account of the search for husbands for princesses and heiresses of the kingdom during the two centuries of its existence, while Jonathan Phillips' *Defenders of the Holy Land* also details these relations from the First Crusade until the Battle of Hattin. Guy Perry also discusses the links between the Western nobility and that of the Latin East in his *John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem*, p. 3, pp. 71-6, for his connection to the Church.

<sup>220</sup> The proximity of Lyon to the borders of the kingdom of France meant that Louis had some influence on the city, but also that if the Emperor was to advance towards the city, the French armies could quickly react and without crossing into imperial land, influence the course of events. Also, it should be noted that Lyon, much like what had happened in Avignon during the Albigensian Crusade, was a more or less self-

This position – compounded in the case of the Genoese pope Innocent IV – ensured the support of Genoa; however, it was not the case for the other communes.

Pisa's sympathies lay with the emperor. It was the only Italian city to continuously support the imperial cause, throughout the entire duration of the Lombard Wars from 1167 to the death of Frederick II in 1250.<sup>221</sup> In 1220, Frederick also confirmed the privileges of the commune within imperial lands, but also on the seas.<sup>222</sup> The interesting aspect of this document, which is very common for privileges, is that the list of the entire area under Pisan control in Tuscany is given.<sup>223</sup> This reveals the power of Pisa in 1220 in Italy, but the document also gives us an idea of the power that the Pisans gained by allying with the emperor: they were allowed to trade freely within imperial land the document also gives them full ownership, or control, over their land.<sup>224</sup>

Their role within the kingdom of Jerusalem is harder to isolate than that of Genoa, because of the lack of studies on the subject, but also because the commune has always been labelled as the least important of the three trading cities. One should remember on the other hand that the first Patriarch of Jerusalem, Daimbert, was from Pisa, and that the Tuscan city had a presence in Egypt prior to the crusades, until the end of the Latin East and after.<sup>225</sup> Their presence in Louis' army during the Seventh Crusade is uncertain: the contract between Genoa and the king mentions Pisa as one of the possible waiting points for the ships,<sup>226</sup> while Joinville states that Queen Margaret paid Genoese and Pisans to stay in Damietta after news of the defeat of Mansourah.<sup>227</sup> It is more than likely that the commune was preoccupied mainly by the conflict in Italy to worry about the prospect of another invasion of Egypt that might have damaged

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governing city, with little influence from Frederick and his agents. The Pope was therefore inside a 'safe-zone', albeit without officially influencing the political balance of the two powers.

<sup>221</sup> Emilio Cristiani, *Nobiltà e Popolo nel Comune de Pisa, dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei donoratico* (Naples, 1962), p. 20.

<sup>222</sup> *Historia Diplomatica Friderici II* (Paris: 1852), pp. 19-24.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19-24 (p. 21).

<sup>224</sup> 'Et in omnibus prenomatis locis jurisdictionem et districtum vobis concedimus et confirmamus, et quicquid aliqua persona habet ibi ab imperio et quicquid ibi imperio pertinet et quecumque alia intra predictos confines et terminos continentur tam in castris quam in locis, villis et habitationibus, terris, aquis, fluminibus, stagnis, paludibus, pascuis, piscariis, argentifodinis et omnibus venis metallorum et salinis et silvis cum omni plenitudine et integritate vobis concedimus.' *Ibid.*, pp. 19-24 (pp. 21-22).

<sup>225</sup> See Jacoby, 'Les Italiens en Egypte aux XIIème et XIIIème siècles: du comptoir à la colonie?', pp. 76-89.

<sup>226</sup> 'Des galees trouvera li Rois tant comme li plaira a Marseille, a Genne et a Pise...', Document XXX, Champollion-Figeac, *Documents historiques*, p. 67.

<sup>227</sup> Strayer, 'The Crusades of Louis IX', pp. 487-518 (p. 503). Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', pp. 137-336 (p. 244).

imperial power in the East. Pisa's duty lay without any doubt, alongside the emperor. The animosity between Pisa and Genoa also pushed away any possible alliance between the two, even during a crusade, and aside from the short lived alliance at the beginning of the War of Saint-Sabas, both were in frequent conflict with one another. Pisa therefore had very little to do with Louis' crusade, the only point to remember being the altercation between the two communes in Acre quickly put down by the king through his envoys, which was the last altercation before Saint-Sabas.<sup>228</sup>

The last of the Italian communes, Venice, remained very quiet during Louis' expedition. This has mostly been attributed to the outcome of the Fourth Crusade, and the establishment of Venetians in the Black Sea. The sudden increase in Venetian dependencies meant more manpower was needed in the newly formed Latin Empire, and as Thomas Madden explains, the Venetian colony in Constantinople grew considerably, to the point where a *podestà* was elected.<sup>229</sup> The election of a *podestà* shows how significant their power over there had become. The word *podestà* designates "the supreme magistrate".<sup>230</sup> This individual would have had similar powers to those held by the doge in Venice. They would be supreme leader of the community, but also of the armies. In comparison, the consuls elected by Genoa, Venice and Pisa in the Holy Land and in Egypt for the latter two were reporting directly to the Commune.<sup>231</sup>

As Mohamed Tahar Mansouri also points out, the Venetians had a lot of interests in Egypt. Despite the sudden rise of the Mamluks, they were still able to continue trading operations if not to increase them.<sup>232</sup> Any successful intervention by an outside power would result in the establishment of a new regime and would subsequently change the balance of economic power in favour of the Genoese for example. This aspect is emphasised in the events following the fall of Acre in 1291. With the return of Constantinople to the Greeks in 1261, and the loss of the majority of Venetian trading centres in the Black Sea to the Genoese, Venice had come to rely

<sup>228</sup> Guillaume de Nangis, *Vie et Vertue de Saint-Louis*, p. 109.

<sup>229</sup> Thomas F. Madden, *Venice, a new history* (New York, 2012), p. 152.

<sup>230</sup> Charles DuFresne du Cange, *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, 7 Vols (Paris: 1845), 5, p. 378.

<sup>231</sup> It should be noted that after 1261, the Genoese also had a *podestà* in Constantinople.

<sup>232</sup> Mohammed Tahar Mansouri, 'Les Communautés Marchandes Occidentales dans l'Espace Mamlouk (XIIIe-XVe siècle)', in *Coloniser au Moyen Age, Methodes d'expansion et techniques de domination en Méditerranée du 11ème au 16ème siècle*, ed. by Michel Balard and Alain Ducellier (Paris, 1995), pp. 89-101 (p. 90); This wish to continue trading relations with Egypt is also shown by the sending of an ambassador to Alexandria in August 1291, F. Thiriet, *Délibérations des assemblées vénitiennes concernant la Roumanie: 1160-1363*, 2 vols (1966-71), I, 201-202, pp. 62-63.



heavily upon the flow of trade passing through Acre.<sup>233</sup> Even more so since Genoa had been defeated in the city and expelled as a result of the War of Saint-Sabas. The loss of Acre to the Mamluks therefore proved nearly catastrophic and forced Venice to attempt to restore some of its trade in the Black Sea, but with no effect, until 1299 when both Venice and Genoa signed a peace treaty allowing the former to restore some of its trade in the region.<sup>234</sup> With this in mind, it is unlikely that the commune would have supported an expedition against the Egyptians, with whom the Venetians still entertained good relations.

Louis did not approach Venice for his crusade, mainly because of their role in the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, but also because of the tensions created by this expedition.<sup>235</sup> The only interaction between the two being his successful purchase of the Crown of Thorns, which had been on loan to the Venetians, who, as Madden points out, were in no hurry to have their money returned, and had already prepared the transport of the relic to Venice.<sup>236</sup>

The duty of Venice is easy to pin-point. As the history of the city shows, faction-led strife so characteristic of Genoese life for example, was relatively non-existent in Venice. The reason behind this aspect of Venetian life is explained by Madden as being the result of their particular internal politics.<sup>237</sup> As such, the political life of the city was very much led by a sense of patriotic obligations and this means that any individual action taken against the interest of the city would have been heavily reprimanded.<sup>238</sup> This meant that the commune acted as a whole, and that contracting single families would be more difficult to achieve than in Genoa, where divisions were always visible.

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<sup>233</sup> Madden, *Venice*, p. 180.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., p. 182; Also, the Venetians tried to establish some relations with the Tunisians by sending an ambassador to Tunis, Roberto Cessi, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia*, 3 vols (Bologna, 1934), III, 314-315, p. 65.

<sup>235</sup> Relations between Venice and the French Crown had been degraded by the Fourth Crusade, when excommunication threatened the army for attacking Zara and Constantinople, as well following the Venetians' demands for the money that was due to them, and the French contingents' attitude towards that payment. Madden, *Venice*, pp. 133-140. Louis however did approach Venice for his second crusade, however their demands were unacceptable to the French king and the negotiations broke down. Richard, *Saint Louis*, pp. 542, 543, 545.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., pp. 154-55.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., pp. 173-183; Frederic Lane also explains the special political structure of the city which enabled it to develop with very little internal strife, Frederic Lane, *Venice, a Maritime Republic* (London, 1973), pp. 109-111.

<sup>238</sup> Such was the case in the first decade of the fourteenth century when an attempted coup failed and resulted in the beheading of one of the leaders, but also launched a series of reforms which were meant to quell any insurrection before they happened. Madden, *Venice*, pp. 187-189.

## **Relations between Italians and Louis**

Relations between Italians, Genoa in particular, and Louis are noteworthy. Because of the previous contract between the commune and Philip II during the Third Crusade, Louis already had a strong basis upon which he could build a new relationship. This was to last until his death when an imperial faction led by members of the Doria and Spinola families took power in Genoa and severed ties with Charles of Anjou, by then king of Sicily, and the Capetian dynasty.<sup>239</sup>

The relations between the three communes and Louis can therefore be classified in three simple categories: friendly, neutral and hostile. Venice and Pisa were both absent from the expedition, but as seen above, they still had a role in it, if only minor: Pisa as an opponent, and Venice as a nervous observer. Genoa was the only commune to actively take part in the expedition. What were the reasons behind this action then? Merav Mack has already outlined the motivations behind Genoa's involvement in the Third Crusade, and together with the study by Cardini, we can deduce that the Ligurian commune's motives had in the past, some religious aspect to them. The relics that were brought back to the city upon the return of the first fleet in 1098, followed by those taken in 1101 are proof of this devotion.<sup>240</sup> This point is further expanded by their display of piety during the preaching of the First Crusade, which led to the departure of many men.<sup>241</sup>

Having been excluded from the Fourth Crusade due to their relations with the Byzantine Empire, their commercial activities in the North East (Romania) suffered, and thus their interests were redirected towards Northern Africa (which had always enjoyed a high reputation due to the gold mines of the region), Egypt (the Ayyubid power provided a stable environment in which to prosper) and Sicily (where Genoa could openly and easily increase its influence to the detriment of the Empire), while their commercial activity in the Levant remained more or less the same.<sup>242</sup> The election of one of their own at the head of Christianity therefore could have incited a renewal of

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<sup>239</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 156.

<sup>240</sup> The first fleet sent by the commune brought back the bones of Saint-John the Baptist from Antioch, while the second brought back the Holy Basin after the capture of Caesarea.

<sup>241</sup> Epstein estimates a number of perhaps 1200 men left for the Holy Land with the first Genoese fleet in 1097. Ibid., p. 29. See also John H. Pryor, 'A View From the Masthead: the First Crusade From the Sea', in *Crusades*, Volume 7, ed. by Benjamin Z. Kedar, Jonathan Phillips, Jonathan Riley-Smith (London, 2008), pp. 87-152 (p. 93-94).

<sup>242</sup> See Table 4 in Ibid., p. 97.

religious fervour when the recent times had required a more materialistic approach to the Orient.

Unfortunately for us, the years between 1250 and 1254 with regards to the communes' involvement in the Holy Land remain scarce of material. Some conclusions however can be drawn with regards to the impact of Louis' expedition and stay on these communes. Firstly, because of Innocent IV's protection, Genoa was relatively free from prosecution by other ecclesiastical powers; however, their actions remained minimal, due to the threat of secular repercussions, and the conflicts between Pisa and Venice stopped during Louis' presence. A truce had been drawn up in 1249 between Genoa and Pisa, however, it can be suggested that it would have been broken prior to Louis' departure had the chance arisen.<sup>243</sup> Out of respect or out of fear of the French king, the three communes remained peaceful, and this period has been described by many as being the most stable years of the kingdom of Jerusalem since the Fifth Crusade while trade coming from *Outremer* would not reach such levels during the rest of the century. The second point that can be deduced revolves around the motivations of the Italians. With Louis' failure, and the subsequent limited interest from the Western rulers or lords to journey to the East<sup>244</sup> - with the exception of the Lord Edward in 1271 - the Italian cities had to reshape their foreign policies. The first of these changes was in Cyprus, where Pisa and Genoa continued to establish courts and colonies.<sup>245</sup> After the fall of Acre, the island became an important point of exchange, and as stated previously, a very rich one. The absence of Venice in Cyprus can easily be explained by their acquisition of Crete, which acted as roundabout for merchandise coming from the Black Sea and Egypt. The Italians it seems, were already in the process of deserting the kingdom of Jerusalem, or at least, trying to set up contingency plans in order to safeguard their interests in the region. It however remained an important centre of commerce, as the other mercantile cities of Marseille, Siena and Ancona all had their privileges confirmed after the departure of Louis.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>243</sup> Guillaume de Nangis, *Vie et Vertue de Saint-Louis*, p. 109.

<sup>244</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe', p. 272.

<sup>245</sup> *RRH*, §1518; Genoa had already established commercial links with the island in 1218 when Alice of Champagne granted them freedom of sale without tax as well as lands in Nicosia and Famagusta. The Genoese would continue to establish themselves on the island until after the fall of Acre in 1291. *RRR*, §1802, *RRH*, §1037, §1049.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, §1259, §1360.

## **Conclusion**

In many respects, given the outcome of the crusade, the nature of Genoese involvement in the expedition remained unfulfilled. Nonetheless, it gave them the potential to secure transformative economic benefits in Egypt, coupled with enhanced financial and political stability in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>247</sup>

The crusade of Louis also provided a stable period during which trade could be concluded, and it did not affect trade to the point of making a significant impact on the economy of the communes. The supply of warships to Louis' army by Genoa did perhaps put a considerable strain on individual merchants, as some were to loan their own ships to Louis and would therefore not be able to bring in trading revenues, but the commune itself did profit from it, and would have profited more had it been successful.<sup>248</sup>

The Seventh Crusade has already been well studied. The contract seen in this chapter shows that while many connections have been made, the relationship between the French kings and the Genoese is still underestimated. This episode therefore, and the reasons underlying it, remain important to understand.

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<sup>247</sup> Mack, 'A Genoese Perspective of the Third Crusade', p. 17. Merav Mack argues that Genoa, as well as Venice and Pisa, but to a lesser extent, profited from the Third Crusade and other such expeditions. Therefore the Seventh Crusade was no exception. The Genoese admirals commissioned by Louis to lead his fleet were before everything else, merchants, and crewmembers were also traders. Ibid., pp. 9, 11.

<sup>248</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142, table 7. Trade with Tunis and Bougie was quite important up to 1270 and Louis' second crusade. From Epstein's work, it does not seem that they regained the same level in the fourteenth century. See table 11, p. 231.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The War of Saint-Sabas and its consequences on the stability of the Holy Land**

Throughout its existence, the kingdom of Jerusalem experienced many conflicts, both internal and external. Some are well known, such as the constant struggle with different Muslim rulers of course, or the internal tensions sparking from the succession crisis of the post-Hattin era (1187-1192), or the one that followed the coronation of Frederick II as king of Jerusalem (1225). Some episodes however are relatively less known. Such is the case for the war of Saint-Sabas, spanning from 1256 to 1261 and which left Acre in near ruins.<sup>249</sup> Historians such as Jean Richard, Steven Runciman, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and René Grousset have mentioned the conflict in their general histories of the Crusades or of the Levant, and David Jacoby looked at the chronology of the War in his article 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre'.<sup>250</sup> Others, such as Georg Caro, Joshua Prawer, Roberto S. Lopez, Hans E. Mayer and William Heyd have also examined the war, and their conclusions point to three types of conflict: colonial, the cramped condition within Acre made it impossible for factions to acquire more land without frictions; commercial (or patriotic)<sup>251</sup>, the war was the result of economic tensions between the communes, as well as the result of the sale of the house to one commune instead of another; and civil, the war was an inter-communal conflict with no commercial or military goal, but having for reason the simple arrival of the stolen Venetian ship in Acre.<sup>252</sup> Recently, the chronology of this war is being looked at in more details by younger historians such as Antonio Musarra of the University of the Republic of San Marino.<sup>253</sup> Overall however, the interest in Saint-Sabas stops there. There is very little attempt to understand its origins, or its purpose. Most historians

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<sup>249</sup> This span is due to the fact that it is very difficult to pinpoint the exact chronology of the war. One of the purposes of this study is to identify the key aspects of the conflict and to try to produce a raw chronological timeline.

<sup>250</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on Crusader Acre', pp. 240-256.

<sup>251</sup> I placed Patriotic in the same group as Commercial as both politics and economics were closely related within Genoa and Venice.

<sup>252</sup> Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age*; Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittellemeer, 1257-1311*, Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, II (Paris: 1970); Hans E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. J. Gillingham (Oxford: 1992); Roberto S. Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo*, Prefazione e aggiornamento bibliografico di Michel Balard (Milano: 1996).

<sup>253</sup> Musarra has written a series of works on Genoa in the Eastern Mediterranean, and mentions Saint-Sabas in all of them, including his most recent one (2017).

place the war between the years 1256 and 1261, or 1256 and 1268, the latter coinciding with the time of Louis IX's plans for his second crusade,<sup>254</sup> but Musarra goes much further by stating that unofficially, it did not end until 1270 (1299) and the agreement which simultaneously ended the long conflict in the Bosphorus and the disputes over the control of the Black Sea shipping lanes.<sup>255</sup>

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to Italy, before the Fourth Crusade, when Genoa and Venice were competing for commercial contracts in the Byzantine Empire.<sup>256</sup> Following the fall of Constantinople, the Genoese were chased out of the Black Sea trade and were left with the Levantine and Egyptian trade in the East. The Venetian purchase of Crete (1205) is perhaps one precursor to Saint-Sabas: Genoa was offered the island first but the Venetians moved quicker and in the process started an 'unofficial war' between the two powers.<sup>257</sup> Thus, numerous altercations sparked out between the communes and were to continue intermittently well into the fourteenth century.

The war of Saint-Sabas itself was, at root, a commercial war. It was the continuation of the long on-going conflict between the Italian cities to gain as much control over the trade routes of the eastern Mediterranean as possible. On the other hand, the spark that lit up the fight in Acre, and which ultimately lent its name to the war, was the monastery of Saint-Sabas.<sup>258</sup> In its immediate sense, this would make the war fall into the category of being a territorial, or colonial war, rather than an economic one: a monastic building having more or less no significance for trade. The question of the location of the building will be at the centre of the study, as no precise site is given,

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<sup>254</sup> Lane, *Venice, A Maritime Republic*, pp. 77-8.

<sup>255</sup> Musarra states that the war ended in 1270, however, he links it with other conflicts which erupted between then and 1299 when a treaty was signed between Venice and Genoa. Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, pp. 77-86; Madden, *Venice*, pp. 181-2.

<sup>256</sup> Madden, *Venice*, pp. 85-86. Emperor Manuel Comnenus opened the city of Constantinople and the Byzantine markets to Genoese and Pisans as a result of Venetian arrogance and desire for freedom of action. By 1170, both newcomers had considerably grown in strength and their navy was able to rival that of Venice and thus, could offer significant protection to the Byzantine Empire if needed, 'without Venetian arrogance'.

<sup>257</sup> Thomas F. Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice* (Baltimore, 2003), pp. 184, 187, 198-200.

<sup>258</sup> Musarra, Jacoby and Kesten however state that there is no archaeological evidence of a church having stood in the area that had been estimated by previous historians. They claim that it was more than likely a territorial war over a large building or warehouse, which escalated to the conflict that we know. Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 56; The *Annales de Terre Sainte* describes Saint-Sabas as a "maison", *Annales de Terre Sainte*, ed. by R. Röhrich and G. Raynaud (Paris: 1884), pp. 22-3; Martin da Canal also describes the building as a fortified house, named Saint-Sabas, Martino Da Canal. *Les estoires de Venise. Cronaca veneziana in lingua francese dalle origini al 1275*, ed. Alberto Limentani (Florence, 1972), <http://www.rialfri.eu/rialfri/testi/martindacanal002.html>, Seconda, IV.

and no concrete evidence has appeared regarding the subject. The surveys done by Alex Kesten will therefore help us determine this location, and perhaps also help us define the nature of the war at the same time.<sup>259</sup> Other archaeological surveys will be employed, as well as Jacoby's article on the topography of Acre, which itself uses archaeological data to specify the locations of the parties involved.<sup>260</sup> The overall result of the war, that is the expulsion of the Genoese from Acre, and in turn, that of the Venetians from Tyre, lead me towards the conclusion that the war was one of colonisation, as both parties were after more 'territory'. However, can it really be called as such? It is difficult to say, but with careful analysis of the events prior to the war, and those that followed, it is possible to come up with a straight answer, as we will see below.

By the middle of the thirteenth century, communal power in Italy and the kingdom of Jerusalem was mainly divided between particular families. In this manner, the struggle for supremacy within the communal entities became family or faction orientated. Genoa is perhaps the prime example of that, with inter-factional conflicts erupting continuously; after the death of the Emperor Frederick II the city found itself divided, and also in difficulty in Sicily with the rise of Charles of Anjou. Pisa, which found itself at the mercy of Genoa after 1251, was struggling to survive around this time and ultimately stopped being a major trading power in trade after its defeat by the Genoese at the battle of Meloria in 1284.<sup>261</sup> Their role in the earlier War of Saint-Sabas was minimal, but important nonetheless. Venice was more stable, but was not immune to internal strife as trouble arose and the city found itself excommunicated in the early fourteenth century.<sup>262</sup> These internal inter-factional events may have had a role in the war, as twice during the thirteenth century, murders committed by one commune against members of another occurred, in 1222, and in 1249.<sup>263</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*.

<sup>260</sup> David Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century: Urban Layout and Topography', *Studi Medievali* 3a serie, 20 (1979), pp. 1-45. For the other archaeological work, I am extremely grateful to the people at the *Israel Antiquities Authority*, as well as those in *International Conservation Center* in Acre for all their help and for giving me the use of documents, which would have been impossible to find on my own. The work of Denys Pringle on the Churches of the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem will also be used. Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 4.

<sup>261</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 158, Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittellemeer*, 2, p. 40.

<sup>262</sup> Crouzet-Pavan, *Venise triomphante*, p. 177.

<sup>263</sup> *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 18.

What was the War of Saint-Sabas? This question is at the centre of the argument related to the fall of Acre and of the second kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291, and the studies that look at the war, whether in detail or in passing, have yet to give a conclusive answer as to its influence on the fall of the kingdom. The first step towards this question is to establish the nature of the war - commercial, colonial, or civil or a combination? This nature has yet to be properly analysed, however Prawer has described it as a 'patriotic' or nationalistic endeavour.<sup>264</sup>


The first question relates to the overall topography of Acre. Where were the Genoese, the Venetian, and the Pisan Quarters located? What about the so-called 'Quarter of the Chain'? Sources relevant to these questions are rare. Two fourteenth century maps survived and reached us: the first by Pietro Vesconte (1320), and the second by Paolino Veneto (1323).<sup>265</sup> Eight copies of the Vesconte map survived, while three remain for the Paolini version. The pros and cons of using these maps have been highlighted by Jacoby and will therefore not be retold here, however, it will be noted that these maps should be used with caution, as they were drawn after 1291, and by Venetians, or for Venetians, and therefore tend to overlook some details, while emphasising others.

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<sup>264</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, p. 361.

<sup>265</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (pp. 2-14).





These will form the basis of our analysis; recent surveys, mainly by Kesten, have shown discrepancies in the two maps, and will therefore add to our understanding

of the topography of the Old City. Jacoby also identifies numerous grants that provide some information on the extant of each Italian city's Quarter.<sup>266</sup> He is also the only one to provide a credible explanation regarding the location of the Quarter of the Chain, within which the building belonging to the monastery was supposed to be located.<sup>267</sup> Kesten, who also mentions the Quarter of the Chain, takes an alternative approach in stating that it did not actually exist, and that the term *ruga Catena*, which is used in some documents, actually stands for the *street of the Chain*.<sup>268</sup> Both authors used completely different approaches in order to come with a conclusion, Jacoby using mainly documents, and Kesten relying on his archaeological surveys. Both will be used here in order to come up with a definite answer as to where exactly the Quarters were located. While diverging on some points, the two documents, along with the two fourteenth century maps actually complement each other, and allow us to draw a clearer picture of the topography of thirteenth-century Acre, and its harbour.

The second question that needs to be addressed regards the location of the building in question. Originally, the building of Saint-Sabas was thought to have been situated on a hill between the Genoese and Venetian Quarters.<sup>269</sup> This theory has now lost credibility as no topographic and archaeological evidence of such hill has been found. It is now accepted that the building in question was located on the southern border of the Venetian Quarter, *in vico ruga Catena*, overlooking the harbour.<sup>270</sup> Its exact location has remained unclear as of yet. Jacoby does not attempt to place it in a geographical context, and our best option at the time is to follow Kesten's survey, which offers the only plausible location for it.<sup>271</sup> His theory does offer some interesting ideas: mainly that it was located near a church, and may have itself have been used as a religious building prior to Latin or Muslim occupation. This indicates why some historians and contemporaries have mistaken the building for a church.<sup>272</sup> His theories however are sometimes difficult to corroborate with contemporary sources and documents, as Kesten lacks the historical background and relies only on archaeological data. The fact that he places the building in what appears to be the perfect spot for it with regards to what historians already know, and yet, does not acknowledge the

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<sup>266</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-45 (pp. 19-39).

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-45 (pp. 14-19).

<sup>268</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 38.

<sup>269</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, p. 363.

<sup>270</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (pp. 246-7).

<sup>271</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, pp. 38-9.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.

existence of the Quarter of the Chain and in fact, replaces it with an extension of the Quarter of the Genoese shows that his data needs to be looked at with care.

The third question simply is: what exactly was the building in question? And most crucial to my work, why was it so important for both Venetians and Genoese to start a small ‘civil war’ over it? The results of the War of Saint-Sabas are profound: the Genoese were thrown out of the city, and the Venetians sent out of Tyre. Both Pisa and Venice took over the majority of the Genoese Quarter in Acre, but not all of it, as some districts were barely repopulated.<sup>273</sup> The building over which the war started was completely destroyed, and the Venetians quickly moved to buy the area over which it stood at a very high price.<sup>274</sup> This in effect, gives us the certainty of the strategic position of this location. It shows that the building in question was not fought over because of what it was, but for *where* it was. It is this aspect that will be looked at in this part, as the nature of the building is by now fully understood as being something other than a church. Kesten’s survey, and the conclusion to the previous part will help in determining the strategic importance of this building, with regards to the needs of both the Genoese and Venetians. These will also be looked at and compared to that of the Pisans, who have been more or less given the role of silent partners in all of this. It is true that their change of heart sealed the fate of the Genoese, but one wonders, considering Pisan relations with the latter, why they decided to invade the Venetians Quarter in the first months of the conflict alongside the Genoese. Was the building in question more important than previously thought? Or did their intentions have more something to do with their own situation in Acre, as Jacoby suggests?<sup>275</sup>

These are the main questions that will help us determine exactly what the War of Saint-Sabas was, and what really caused it. Throughout this chapter, references to the timelines that have been proposed will be given, and attempts at recreating this timeline will be made. Through the answers to the three questions asked above, it will be possible to determine the exact nature of the conflict, as well as to once and for all, place each side precisely on a map.

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<sup>273</sup> Jacoby, ‘Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 1-45 (p. 29).

<sup>274</sup> Jacoby, ‘New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre’, pp. 240-256 (p. 248).

<sup>275</sup> Jacoby, ‘Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 1-45 (p. 24).

## **The location of the Mercantile Cities' Quarter**

Jacoby states that evidence in the form of single business deals, loans, transfers of real estate and so forth, once placed together, create a broad picture of the political, economic and social life in the Levant.<sup>276</sup> Such materials are invaluable, and many still remain unpublished. It is through their analysis that he highlighted the changes orchestrated by Venice in the post-Saint Sabas period, as well as those prior to 1291.<sup>277</sup> A similar approach can be taken with regards to the pre-Saint-Sabas era, for which not many sources remain.

Let us look at the start of the war, or rather, of the conflict involving Saint-Sabas, which definitely began after the departure of Louis IX from the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1254. Jacoby and Musarra both pinpoint this start to 1256, when Genoese merchants sailed in on a ship, which they had purchased from pirates, but which was originally Venetian; both also agree that the tensions, which ultimately led to the eruption of violence were already looming well before 1251 and the arrival of Louis in Acre.<sup>278</sup> A series of conflicts in Acre between the three Italian cities can be reported during the early thirteenth century, some remained blood-free and mostly involved property disputes, or personal grievances regarding agreements or contracts, but on a few occasions, they did become violent. Such was the case in 1222 between Pisa and Genoa, when the Genoese Quarter was put to the torch by the Pisans, and the Venetians acted as negotiators between the parties. The matter was finally resolved in 1224 after the intervention of Frederick II.<sup>279</sup> Another instance of violence between the Italians preceding Saint-Sabas happened in 1249. The conflict lasted thirty-two days and was especially harsh, as stone-throwers were used.<sup>280</sup> John of Ibelin resolved this outcome before he passed on the regency of the kingdom to Philip of Montfort.<sup>281</sup> The result was a 'peace treaty', which was to last three years. 1251 saw another murder, committed by a Venetian on a Genoese, which resulted in an armed mob that destroyed a palace.<sup>282</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on Crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 256).

<sup>277</sup> Ibid., pp. 240-256 (p. 248).

<sup>278</sup> Ibid., pp. 240-256 (p. 241), Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 54.

<sup>279</sup> Guido Bigoni, 'Quattro Documenti Genovesi sulle Contese d'Oltremare nel Secolo XIII', in *Archivio Storico Italiano*, Ser. 5, 24 (1899), §1, pp. 8-10.

<sup>280</sup> *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 18.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII*, 5 Vols (Genoa : 1890), 4, p. 31.

This happened prior to June 1251, and before Louis' arrival in Acre. It was followed by a period of relative calm during which the two powers showed an increasing interest in territorial expansion in Acre. This relative peace was mainly due to the lack of immediate external threats to the kingdom, as the emerging Mamluk state was facing the Mongols, but also to Louis's presence in the Holy Land. It is this territorial expansion that was at the heart of the conflict.

Land within the walls of Acre was very precious, and difficult to come by.<sup>283</sup> The rush for property that can be seen after the Third Crusade, and the re-shuffling of property as explained in Kesten's study, as well as by Jacoby, shows that everyone was after more assets.<sup>284</sup> It is also very noteworthy that by 1257, a date which falls right into the War of Saint-Sabas, there were no more large plots of vacant land in the Old City aside from two gardens located on the northern side of the city.<sup>285</sup> In order to develop their respective quarters past this point, the different parties had to acquire and annex property around their territory, and by looking at the maps provided by both Kesten and Jacoby, the pre-Saint-Sabas situation becomes comprehensible.<sup>286</sup>

Let us have a closer look at the two fourteenth-century maps which have come down to us, and compare them to Kesten's survey in order to understand more about the origins of the conflict. By the mid-thirteenth century, Venetians, Genoese and Pisan communities had reached the peak of their expansion within the Old City. The maps show that their quarters actually aligned along a triangular section of the city (which was in fact part of the Genoese quarter), the Venetian and Genoese quarters connecting along one axis.<sup>287</sup> From the fourteenth-century maps, as well as Kesten's, Jacoby's and Benvenisti's, the overall layout of the Quarters of the Mercantile communes align relatively well.<sup>288</sup> The main difference however seems to be with the relative position of the Quarter of the Marseillais, which both Benvenisti and Kesten place behind the Venetian boundary, next to the eastern section of the Hospitaller Quarter, while Jacoby places it at the junction of the Venetian and Genoese Quarters, as well as the Quarter of the Chain. The second major difference is the position of the latter, which differs

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<sup>283</sup> Map 2.

<sup>284</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*; Jacoby, 'Aspects of Everyday Life in Frankish Acre', pp. 73-105 (p. 78).

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> Vesconte and Veneto maps, above p. 47, as well as maps 2, 3, 4 in Appendix.

<sup>287</sup> This axis was identified as the Quarter of Marseille by Jacoby in *Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century: Urban Layout and Topography*, 1979, Map C in Kesten.

<sup>288</sup> See maps in Appendix.

greatly in all proposed maps. In this study, the position of the Quarter of the Marseillais, or Provençal Quarter, does not affect the outcome of the war, and therefore, its relative position will only be addressed briefly: The Marseillais owned houses in the vicinity of the church of Saint-Demetrius, which we know was located on the southern side of the Venetian Quarter, close to the harbour.<sup>289</sup> Jacoby does warn us that forged grants were very common, and in the case of Marseille, the 1212 grant was forged in 1249 in order to acquire lands closer to the harbour.<sup>290</sup> Their eastern border was located close to the Hospitaller Quarter, as a charter from the latter tells of a gate that was allowed to be built, leading to the Provençal Quarter.<sup>291</sup> Their Quarter therefore extended from the south of the Old City, to the borders of the Hospitaller Quarter, bordering therefore both the Genoese Quarter on the east, and the Venetian Quarter on the northwest.

This leaves us with the problem of locating the Quarter of the Chain, however, before looking at its position, one first needs to properly identify the locations of the Genoese, Venetian, and Pisan Quarters. As stated above, the relative position of these Quarters in the different maps is reasonably similar. The Pisans controlled the southern section of the Old-City, with the Templars on their western border, and the Genoese on the north. The Pisans controlled the smallest area compared to the Genoese and Venetians. They did however have a *fondueq*, located where the *Khan as-Shuna* stands today. The Venetian Quarter was located on the other side of the harbour, extending from the church of San Marco to the south, to the Royal Arsenal to the north. We have seen that their Quarter was bordered by the Quarter of the Marseillais to the east and south. It is the Genoese Quarter that poses the most problems. While its northern and western borders seem to be properly identified by our maps, its southern and eastern boundaries are not. This lack of consistency is directly related to the position of the Quarter of the Chain, which has yet to be properly identified. Looking at Kesten's survey, we see that the Genoese quarter actually extended to the modern harbour, and included a great square building, the *Khan al-Umdan*, thus cutting right through what Jacoby identified as the Quarter of the Chain, and running between the Pisan and

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<sup>289</sup> *RRH*, §855; Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, p. 17; Jacoby states that the church of Saint-Mary of the Provençaux, which he located slightly further north of the church of Saint-Demetrius, belonged to the Marseillais, and the Saint-Demetrius, was acquired post-Saint-Sabas by the Venetians. This fact points towards the belief that Jacoby was right in placing the Marseillais Quarter between the Venetians and the Genoese. Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 37).

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-45 (pp. 38-39).

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-45 (p. 37). This gate however has yet to be found on the site of the Hospitaller compound by archaeologists, therefore this statement is liable to change in due time.

Venetian quarters.<sup>292</sup> Kesten identifies this square building as being the Genoese *fondug*, or commercial headquarters of the commune in Acre.<sup>293</sup> As stated by him, some have rejected his theory that this area was indeed where the Genoese *fondug* was; however, we will see that his theories may be wrong but still produce some interesting ideas.

Let us go with the theory that Kesten is indeed wrong (as the existence of a Quarter of the Chain is indeed attested in several documents which will be seen below), and that this building was not the Genoese *fondug*, and instead, was the main administrative building of the 'Quarter of the Chain'.<sup>294</sup> We find that the fourteenth-century maps fail to locate the Genoese *fondug*, while the Venetian and Pisan ones are clearly shown.<sup>295</sup> This may be attributed to the fact that these maps were drawn nearly a century after the War of Saint-Sabas, after the Genoese were thrown out of the city, as well as the fact that both maps were drawn or commissioned by Venetians. Furthermore, there is the 1249 inventory, which was drawn up for taxation purposes, and recording buildings owned by the commune, and analysed by Robert Kool. This document also fails to mention any building of importance belonging to the Genoese adjoining the port, and instead, would point toward the belief that Genoa did not have such a building in Acre: a building of such importance would surely have been mentioned in it, had it existed.<sup>296</sup> The inventory however, names six 'Palaces' (*Palacio*) belonging to the commune of Genoa. Two of these, the 'Old Palace' – most likely indicating a building from the pre-Third Crusade period, for which no indication of location is given – served as a meeting place for the Court and consuls of the commune, and the Palace of the Commune, which, according to the inventory was located in the Covered Street, one of the main thoroughfare running on the east-north axis from the port to the main central axis running from the Venetian quarter to the Pisan one.<sup>297</sup> The exact location of this 'Palace' has yet to be found, however.<sup>298</sup> While the term 'Palace'

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<sup>292</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, map 10.

<sup>293</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>294</sup> Pringle identified this building as the Court of the Chain, and although he was more interested in the churches of Acre, it does coincide with Jacoby's theory that there was indeed, no Genoese *fondug*. Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, p. 17.

<sup>295</sup> In fact, no *fondug*, or important building is located near the port on these maps.

<sup>296</sup> Robert Kool, 'The Genoese Quarter in Thirteenth-Century Acre: A Reinterpretation of its Layout', *Atiqot*, 31 (1997), pp. 187-200.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., pp. 187-200 (p. 191). See the different maps in the Appendix for reference. It is interesting to note that Kesten's and Kool's, the latter relying on M. Benvenisti, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1970), do not seem to place the 'Covered Street' in the same spot.

<sup>298</sup> Kool, 'The Genoese Quarter in Thirteenth-Century Acre: A Reinterpretation of its Layout', p. 195.

could well describe a building in which a very wealthy family and its servants and other house-staff were housed, the fact that the commune owned six such structures would suggest that some were at least used for official purposes, the same way the ‘Old Palace’ was. Kool clearly identifies them as large edifices, therefore could these ‘Palaces’ be used as *fonducs*?

To answer that question, we need to explain what a *fonduc* was. A *fonduc* was traditionally a rectangular or square building with an internal courtyard in which travelling merchants could stay, and where their merchandises could be stored, alongside the horses, camels or other animals used as a means of transport. It would seem rather odd to believe that the Genoese had not established such a place within the Old City of Acre, considering the fact that they were the first to form a community there after its capture in 1104. Following their early arrival within the city they were quickly followed by the Venetians (1111), and later by the Pisans (1168), both of whom established *fonducs* close to the harbour.<sup>299</sup> It is very unlikely that the Genoese rented out lodging and storage space for merchants from either of them, or from the crown. The solution to that problem is actually in the 1249 inventory. In it we find that some of the ‘Palaces’ are described as having storage space, or being close to some.<sup>300</sup> It is these storage spaces that are important. It is there that the passing merchants would have stayed and housed their wares. Some of the ‘Palaces’ locations can be identified, the four which are known, were located on or near the ‘Covered Street’ – which was one of the main arteries of the Genoese Quarter, and according to the different maps, led to the main road running north-south to the harbour; it can also be suggested that the other two were located close-by.<sup>301</sup>

Therefore, I suggest that the Genoese did not possess any *fonduc* in the same manner as the Venetians and Pisans did. They possessed however six ‘Palaces’ which were used as residences for passing merchants, and which were always located near storehouses in order to accommodate wares. If this theory was therefore reality, how did it fit into the build-up towards the War of Saint-Sabas?

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<sup>299</sup> Map 2.

<sup>300</sup> Kool, ‘The Genoese Quarter in Thirteenth-Century Acre: A Reinterpretation of its Layout’, pp. 197-199.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., p. 191. Archaeologists are near certain that the layout of the streets in modern day Old Acre follow the same pattern as that of Crusader Acre. This therefore allows historians to not only pinpoint certain streets mentioned in the documents, but also to form certain hypothesis from there. This however cannot be taken entirely at face value as some streets could have been ‘moved’ during Ottoman occupation.



Once more the maps will help us to answer that question. Without the *fondue* located near the port, the Royal Quarter, or the Quarter of the Chain, would have taken the major part of the southern section of the harbour, Pisa, the most southern tip, while Venice would have been close to the northern part. This left Genoa with no direct access to the sea, and to the port, and potentially stranded between its two main rivals. It therefore needed some access to the harbour in order to feel relatively safe. None of the fourteenth century maps report the existence of a Royal Quarter, or of a Quarter of the Chain. They therefore favour Kesten's argument (see below) regarding the lack of existence of one. One however should not use those maps as definite proof that one did not exist. As stated above, these were drawn after the fall of Acre, where royal power had been very weak for a long time. Both maps however agree on the location of the Pisan Quarter on the southern side of the harbour, while both indicate a 'Porta Ferrea' (Iron Gate) on the most southern edge of the harbour.

The existence of this gate is recognised by Jacoby on his 1979 map, and is also attested in Pringle's map; however, Kesten fails to locate it.<sup>302</sup> He does however state that the Royal Offices of the Chain (which he claims to be what others identified as the Quarter of the Chain) were located around this area, as a rounded building, directed towards the harbour, and close, if not connected to the building he attributes to the Genoese.<sup>303</sup> The main question revolves around the Latin phrasing which is found in the documents from Innocent IV, *in vico qui Catena dicitur*.<sup>304</sup> What is really meant by this? The literal translation would be that the house was located in the vicinity of the Chain. Kesten has suggested that the words *ruga Catena*, which most have interpreted as being the 'Quarter of the Chain', actually mean the street of the Chain.<sup>305</sup> Maigne D'Arnis wrote as such in his *Lexicon*, stating that both *ruam* and *ruga* translate to street.<sup>306</sup> This however seems improbable, as other documents use the term *ruga* with the words *Pisanorum* for example, appear in the charters and clearly mean 'Quarter' rather than street.<sup>307</sup> There may however be another translation for the word '*vico*'. It could be a mixture of Italian and Latin, the Italian translation being village or hamlet,

<sup>302</sup> Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 4, p. 17; Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, map C and 23.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>304</sup> *LIRG*, 4, §684, p. 70.

<sup>305</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 38.

<sup>306</sup> W. H. Maigne D'Arnis, *Lexicon manuale ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis* (Paris, 1866), pp. 1960, 1962.

<sup>307</sup> *RRH*, §1453.

which could be interpreted as Quarter. The closest Latin translation that would make sense is the word '*vicine*', meaning being close to, or in the neighbourhood. Again, no specific mention of a Quarter, however, it shows that there might have been an area near the Chain that was designated as a *ruga Catena*. Furthermore, a document from 1277 also mentions the *ruga Catena*, but also notes a *ruam Catena*, which means that a street, as well as a Quarter, or 'area' of the Chain, existed in Acre in the thirteenth century.<sup>308</sup>

Therefore, it is very likely that there was no Royal Quarter as such because no indication of the name appears in any documents. There was however, an area that could be said to be 'of the Chain', albeit not a large one, as well as a Street of the Chain, although its location however has yet to be defined.<sup>309</sup> Since the boundaries of the Pisan and Venetian Quarters are known, we can suggest that the area of the Chain was located in between the two, and extended along the entire span of the modern harbour, from the *Porta Ferrea*, to the northern part of the harbour, where the Chain could have been located.<sup>310</sup>

This section was more than likely under royal jurisdiction. The gate located at the southern end of the harbour was the only access point from the harbour into the Old City, and therefore must have been the main taxation point for the crown.<sup>311</sup> No other gates are mentioned in any documents, or shown on the fourteenth century maps. This would therefore explain the presence of the squared building that Kesten identified as the Genoese *fondueq*, but may have in fact been what Jacoby suggested: the offices of the Court of the Chain.<sup>312</sup> It is therefore possible to state that the area of the Chain did in fact exist, and that it was placed under the control of the crown. Now that its western and eastern borders are defined, let us focus on its northern delimitations.

According to Kesten's archaeological survey, there is no evidence of any large populated area in the vicinity of the modern harbour between what is now the *Khan al-Umdān* and the *Khan al-Ifranj*. He also states that it would not be logical to have a dense area in the middle of what would have been the most travelled axis of the city.<sup>313</sup> While twentieth century planning logic cannot be applied to the thirteenth century, an

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<sup>308</sup> Bigoni, 'Quattro Documenti Genovesi sulle Contese d'Oltremare nel Secolo XIII', pp. 64-65.

<sup>309</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (pp. 15-19).

<sup>310</sup> The location of the Chain does however pose some problems, as archaeologists and historians do not seem to agree on a precise location. More details will be given further down.

<sup>311</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 16).

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 38.

area of dense population would have left some traces over time, and the fact that none have been found would indicate very little habitation in the area. Jacoby diverges from that theory and states that residential areas were located on the north and east of the *Khan al-Umdān*.<sup>314</sup> It would seem very improbable to have no habitation in a Quarter, and in a city which by then had already reached maximum capacity and where therefore, all available space would have been used. Kesten's theory that 'planning logic' dictates that nothing should have hindered traffic in this very busy area cannot be applied in this case. As stated above, modern logic and thirteenth century planning do not go hand in hand. This however, does not mean that Kesten's survey should be totally overlooked with respect to this. Looking at his map of the Old City, one can see that there were buildings that reached the harbour wall on the eastern side, just west of the church of Saint-Demetrius. Furthermore, Kesten identifies two other buildings within this section, one of which he suggests was a small seafarers' chapel or church.<sup>315</sup> The presence of a religious building would probably mean that some houses were located nearby. From the 1277 document, we also know that numerous houses were privately owned in this area, some even being close to the harbour wall, some even belonging to the Genoese, the Venetians, and the Templars.<sup>316</sup> The name of three of the streets of the Quarter of the Chain is also given – *ruam cathene*, *ruam Cipri*, and a third street which lead to the chain, and it is also stated that houses were lined up along these streets.<sup>317</sup>

Although we have no evidence of it in the 1277 document, the north of the Quarter would also have had residential areas, and it is clearly visible on Kesten's maps that there are in fact remnants from the period, just north of the *Khan al-Umdān*. Because Kesten placed the area under Genoese control, he fails to identify all the buildings within the zone. As seen above, the Genoese Quarter did not extend to the harbour. In fact, none of the mercantile communes seemed to have had a direct access to the sea.<sup>318</sup> Residential areas could therefore be placed within the borders of the Quarter of the Chain, as Jacoby suggests.<sup>319</sup> On the other hand, the precise northern border of the Quarter remains to be analysed. The location of the Genoese southern gate

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<sup>314</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 18).

<sup>315</sup> Building 32, 33, Map 5.

<sup>316</sup> Bigoni, 'Quattro Documenti Genovesi sulle Contese d'Oltremare nel Secolo XIII', p. 65.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> It has been suggested previously that Pisa may in fact have had its own private harbour on the western shore of the Old City. This will be discussed further down, and it will be seen that there are no indication of any harbour having existed in the area in question.

<sup>319</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 18).

is known, as well as that of a row of stalls and shops on the same line as the gate, alongside a south-northeast axis.<sup>320</sup> These would be the boundaries of the Genoese Quarter on the south-eastern side. It is therefore possible to state that this would be the limit of both Quarters up to the level of the Venetian *fondue*. One has to remember however, that the Quarter of Marseille has been shown to be located between the Genoese and Venetian Quarters, going down nearly as far as the church of Saint-Demetrius. This would indicate therefore that the eastern limits of the Quarter of the Chain were bordering their Quarter for the major part, and then the Venetian Quarter from the church of Saint-Mary of the Provençaux up to the wall.

The locations of all participants in the War of Saint-Sabas are therefore as such: the harbour was controlled by the royal authority and was part of the Area of the Chain; to the west, the Pisan Quarter was following the coastline before meeting the southern section of the Templar Quarter; north of the Pisan Quarter lay the Genoese Quarter, which was the biggest of the Mercantile communes and cut off the Templar Quarter to the east and north before meeting with the Hospitaller Quarter to its north. Its southern and eastern borders went along one axis, which was bordered by the Marseillais or Provençal Quarter; along this latter one, to the east of the harbour, lay the Venetian Quarter, which went up to the Royal Arsenal to the north-east. Amongst all of these Quarters, was located the building of Saint-Sabas, the ownership of which sparked one of the most brutal internal conflicts of the thirteenth century, and which nearly destroyed the city of Acre.

### **The location of the building of Saint-Sabas**

We have seen above that the documents that mention the building of Saint-Sabas describe its location as being either, in the vicinity of the Chain, or in the Quarter of the Chain. This meant a close proximity to the harbour, and therefore would indicate that the move to acquire the house or building was deliberate and planned. While the strategic implications of this move will be looked at in the next part, let us now focus

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<sup>320</sup> See map 23 in Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*.

on the location of this building, which has yet to be found through documentary analysis or archaeological surveys.

Earlier work on thirteenth century Acre and the economy of the Holy Land in the same time period reveal that the conflict of Saint-Sabas was fought over a church located on a hill standing between the Venetian and Genoese Quarters. Heyd, for example, states that the hill is name *Montjoie*, and that it can be found on the Vesconte map.<sup>321</sup> This however is wrong, as the name and topographical point that he highlighted happen to be the Genoese tower of Lamoncoia.<sup>322</sup> The Venetian writer, Martin da Canal, one of the few contemporaries to mention the struggle for Saint-Sabas does not tell us much regarding the location of the house. He states that in Acre, there was a tower called the tower of *Musques*, and there was also a house, which the Genoese had fortified, and which was called Saint-Sabas.<sup>323</sup> He fails however to mention a hill or any topographical clues as to where the house would be located. One could however, point to the following sentence in his account: *et avoient fait li Genoés une chaene de gros fust tres parmi le port, que les Veneciens n'entrasent dedens*.<sup>324</sup> This could be taken as a location clue: the house may have been close to the harbour and the chain that the Genoese put to block Venetian access to the port from the sea.<sup>325</sup> Prawer also mentions the hill, stating that the house was controlling the road leading to the chain. He also adds that the house was in fact located within the boundaries of the Genoese Quarter, albeit not belonging to them, which he says explains their interest in acquiring it.<sup>326</sup> Both Heyd and Prawer rely heavily on the Vesconte map, which explains why they argue in favour of the existence of the hill. On the other hand, Prawer's argument about the house controlling the road to the chain makes sense. As stated above, the Latin phrase, *in vico qui Catena dicitur*, means in the vicinity of the chain. This clearly means that somehow the two are connected. This connection however poses another question: where was the chain located?<sup>327</sup> According to archaeological surveys, this

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<sup>321</sup> Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age*, 1, p. 345.

<sup>322</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 31.

<sup>323</sup> '...il trova armee une tor que l'en a pele la tor des Musques; et avoient il armee une maison ou il avoient porfait un chastel - cele maison avoit a non saint Sabe...', Martin da Canal, *Seconda*, IV.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

<sup>325</sup> This 'clue' is of course evident with the background knowledge that is available nowadays.

<sup>326</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, pp. 363-364.

<sup>327</sup> The location of the chain with regards to the building of Saint-Sabas is important. Strategically speaking, if the chain was located at the entrance of the inner harbour, the building of Saint-Sabas would have been located right next to it. This means that whomever controled this area, most likely would have had control over the chain, and if not, over the entrance of the inner harbour. Had the chain be located at the entrance of the eastern basin, the building of Saint-Sabas, would still hold the same strategic purpose,

chain would have been drawn between two large barges, or floating platforms, and not connected to the main land.<sup>328</sup> Martin da Canal, who reports the event, is unclear exactly as to where this chain was located, as he states that the Genoese invaded the Pisan Quarter, took possession of their tower, and blockaded the inner harbour.<sup>329</sup> In his work on Acre's churches, Pringle drew a map of the city during the crusader period that provides important clues for the conflict of Saint-Sabas. One notable annotation on his map is the Chain, which he places between the Tower of the Flies and the southern breakwater.<sup>330</sup> There one can see that he did not take into account the location of the port of Acre, and seems to be basing his analysis on the modern layout of the harbour.<sup>331</sup>

This once more gives rise to another important question, which may sound obvious and unnecessary, but does in fact pose a few problems: namely, where was the harbour? When reading about Crusader Acre in secondary material, one has to notice the references to its harbour, or harbours. Two are clearly mentioned, the inner or western, and the outer, or eastern, while the existence of a third one has been suggested by some, and is even marked on tourist maps of the city.<sup>332</sup> The existence of the last of these however is very dubious due to the topography of the city, the coast line and due to the fact that primary sources make no mention of it; thus it is generally accepted that there were no third harbour in Acre. These harbours, together with the walls of the Old City, still pose problems for modern historians and archaeologists, as their exact position is not fully plotted. The work of Kesten, Stern, and Jacoby, amongst others, are extremely valuable in order to determine the layout of the Old City, but there is still a lot more work to be done on the subject: for example, only one excavation has been done in the plaza in front of the Khan Al-Umdan.<sup>333</sup>

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however, the control of the chain would have been passing through either the Pisan Quarter, or through the Quarter of the Chain which was under Royal jurisdiction, and the Iron Gate.

<sup>328</sup> Ehud Galili, Barush Rosen, Dov Zviely, Na'ama Silberstein, Gerald Finkielsztein, 'The Evolution of Akko Harbor and its Mediterranean Maritime Trade Links', *The Journal of Island and Coastal Archaeology*, 5.2 (2010), pp. 191-211, (p. 204).

<sup>329</sup> Martin da Canal, *Seconda*, IV.

<sup>330</sup> Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 4, p. 17.

<sup>331</sup> This is entirely acceptable considering he studied the churches of Acre, and not the harbor, nor the chain.

<sup>332</sup> Located on the western coastline of Acre, it would have been directly under the control of the Pisans, and therefore free from royal or city control. This port's existence is extremely doubtful, especially considering the position of the Templar Quarter and of the so-called Templar Tunnel, the purpose of which is still debated, but it is now generally accepted that it was a tunnel linking the port of Acre to the Templar Quarter. This effectively renders the existence of another port void.

<sup>333</sup> Edna J. Stern and Eliezer Stern, 'Akko: Historical Background and Survey of Archaeological Research', in *Akko, the Excavations of 1991-1998: The Late Periods* (IAA Reports, Forthcoming article), pp. 15-16. The map is taken from the same article.



Locating these two landmarks is important in our case due to their connection with the Italian cities, and the War of Saint-Sabas. The harbour of Acre was the heart of the city, and later on, of the kingdom of Jerusalem. It was where ships from Europe anchored and pilgrims arrived, while at the same time, merchants unloaded their merchandise and loaded new ones bound for the West. It was therefore a major point of taxation for the crown and the city itself, as references to the Royal Quarter, or the offices of the crown highlighted by Kesten and Jacoby, suggest.<sup>334</sup> The walls on the other hand, are important with regards to the war of Saint-Sabas itself, they will help with locating the building of Saint-Sabas, as its position is connected to both walls and port.

During the crusader period, Acre had two basins, the western one made up the harbour area, surrounded by the Old City on the western and northern side, and by the breakwater on the south side. The eastern basin was much bigger, and extended from the western basin, to the Tower of Flies, and to the shore on the north-east, protected by the eastern rampart on the east.<sup>335</sup> Historians have agreed on the fact that the crusader harbour would have been located where the western basin is; however, the location of

<sup>334</sup> See above for more information.

<sup>335</sup> Galili et al., 'The Evolution of Akko Harbor and its Mediterranean Maritime Trade Links', pp. 191-211 (p. 193, Fig. 2).

the chain is still debated.<sup>336</sup> Acre harbour was connected to the city via the Sea Gate, or what is marked as the Iron Gate on the fourteenth-century maps. It was one of the only two access points in and out of the city, the other being the Land Gate on the north eastern corner of the Old City. The harbour was also linked to what is now a major tourist attraction, the famous Templar Tunnel, which runs from what used to be the Templar citadel, to the northern side of the *Khan al-Umdan*. E. Stern suggests that this tunnel could have extended to the inner harbour, and provided therefore a discreet and safe route for the Templars.<sup>337</sup> This theory does pose one major problem: the modern harbour and the entrance to the tunnel do not meet, and are not even close, relatively speaking, to one another. Archaeologists are in agreement that the Tunnel does not extend further than what has been excavated, which therefore mean that the problem lies with the harbour itself.<sup>338</sup> On this topic, we have very little information, both archaeologically and historically. Kesten's survey, upon which this chapter heavily relies, indicates that the area which now forms the Venetian Piazza is bare of crusader remains, and he therefore implies that there were no buildings in the area.<sup>339</sup> Furthermore, the two fourteenth-century maps that have reached us clearly highlight two harbours, and confirm the fact that there were indeed one inner and one outer. There is one feature however of particular importance. On both maps, one can see a square harbour going right into the Old City. This feature can also be seen on maps and drawings from the eighteenth-century Napoleonic campaigns.<sup>340</sup> While this could easily be interpreted as being an over-exaggeration from the cartographer in order to differentiate the inner harbour from the outer one, the fact that the area can roughly be superposed with the area bare of any crusader remains identified by Kesten in his study shows the significance and perhaps the reliability of earlier cartography. While only one archaeological survey has been done, one has to wonder as to how the two fit together, and if they could actually be related. Could this therefore be the inner harbour? The train of thought that is starting to gain momentum amongst archaeologists studying Old Acre is that the modern harbour does not follow the same outlines as the crusader

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid., pp. 191-211 (p. 204).

<sup>337</sup> Stern and Stern, 'Akko: Historical Background and Survey of Archaeological Research', p. 16.


<sup>338</sup> Surveys done by the city and archaeological engineers discusses this fact and does show that the theory is gaining strength. See map 10.

<sup>339</sup> Kesten in fact agrees with Stern and states that the inner harbour was located in the area, but he does push it a bit further by stating that it actually occupied the whole area between the two present Khans. Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 37.

<sup>340</sup> Maps 6/7.



one.<sup>341</sup> A building conservation file from 2013 focussing on the area of the harbour clearly explains this and gives us an idea as to how the crusader-era harbour would have looked like.<sup>342</sup> This aligns perfectly with the two contemporary maps that we do have. It therefore seems very likely that the inner harbour was indeed located between the two *Khans* and went right in the modern Old City.



<sup>341</sup> The work of Eliezer Stern and the civil engineering surveys reflect that.

<sup>342</sup> Map 10.

One of the main reasons behind the search for the inner harbour lies with the term of *ruga Cathena*. As explained above, it is extremely difficult to assess exactly what the word *ruga* actually defines. During the war, as we have seen, the Genoese rushed to gain control of the harbour chain, and to block access to the city from the sea. The fact that during the crusader period, the western, or inner basin was too shallow to allow big vessels to enter, would suggest that the chain was located at the entrance of the eastern, or outer basin, and not of the western one.<sup>343</sup> This is further emphasised by the remains of a thirteenth century wooden pier that was most likely attached to the southern breakwater.<sup>344</sup> This pier would have been an anchorage point for bigger vessels located in the eastern basin. It should also be noted that most underwater archaeological finds from the crusader period were found in the eastern basin.<sup>345</sup> If Martin da Canal placed the inner harbour in the western basin, which is very likely, it meant that the access to the chain would have been through two points: the Pisan Quarter, via the southern breakwater, and directly opposite, where nowadays stands the El Marsa restaurant.<sup>346</sup> There is however another possibility with regards to the location of the Chain. It could have blocked access to the inner harbour. With the location of the inner harbour during the crusader period aligned between the two *Khans*, one can see an interesting fact emerging: could the term *ruga Cathena* actually define the inner harbour? This is at the moment a vague theory, as there is only archaeological evidence to back this up, however, it would definitely benefit from more research. Kesten's survey of the area therefore was not entirely wrong: he does account for the lack of building between the two *Khans*, and this combined with more recent surveys clearly confirm that the inner harbour could have been located there.

After having looked at the position of the inner harbour and the plausible location of the chain, if the building of Saint-Sabas was therefore located close to that chain, it would be at one of two points. It was definitively not located close to the Pisan Quarter, as no mention of the Pisans is being made in any of the documents, and had it been located close to their Quarter, they most likely would not have joined in with the

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<sup>343</sup> Galili et al., 'The Evolution of Akko Harbor and its Mediterranean Maritime Trade Links', pp. 191-211 (p. 205).

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., pp. 191-211 (pp. 201-2).

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., pp. 191-211 (p. 203).

<sup>346</sup> Interestingly, it seems that archaeologists are not entirely sure either as to where the Chain was located, and in the 1980s-90s, some recreated the Chain going from 'the northern end of an eastern pier northward to a tower situated on the beach, near the present northern end of the quay. Stern and Stern, 'Akko: Historical Background and Survey of Archaeological Research', p. 17.

Genoese in the early stages of the war. This leaves us with the northern extremity of the inner basin. According to Kesten, the building of Saint-Sabas was located east of a mosque, which would now be the Sinan Basha Mosque.<sup>347</sup> The building would therefore have been located somewhere between this mosque and the city walls, approximately where the El Marsa restaurant now stands. This location is more acceptable than the theory of the house being located on the road leading to the chain, within the Genoese Quarter, advanced by Prawer, although the building was still most likely located on a street that overlooked the chain.<sup>348</sup> Another argument contradicting this theory of the building being within Genoese jurisdiction is that any individual living within the Quarter of the Genoese would have been under Genoese rule with regards to all offences, aside from murder.<sup>349</sup> Thus, the house of Saint-Sabas would have been located closer to the harbour, and definitely within the Area of the Chain, as explained above. The proposed location by Kesten does make sense, and the study of the conflict would definitely benefit from further archaeological surveys of the northern area of the inner harbour. Another argument supporting this location is Pringle's study. He is the only one to locate Saint-Sabas on his map. There is one problem however, in that he labels it as a church, and places it on top of the Sinan Basha Mosque.<sup>350</sup> This problem does perhaps provide a clear picture of the location of the contested building. Pringle clearly states that there was a church in the area, and that it had been given to the Monastery of Saint-Sabas in 1229.<sup>351</sup> This is particularly important because it would clearly indicate that a building belonging to the monastery would be located close by, thus reinforcing the theory that it was indeed where Kesten places it.

Despite this however, one has to remember that the modern city does not reflect crusader Acre completely. As seen with the inner harbour, there were differences between the two, and another one seems to be with the outer wall lining the eastern edge of the city, going right up to the inner harbour and along the Venetian Quarter. The modern outline is Ottoman, and it has now been agreed by archaeologists that the crusader walls were in fact further inland. The position of the inner harbour also affected this. What this means is that the location of the building of Saint-Sabas as

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<sup>347</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 38-9

<sup>348</sup> The tower of Lamoncoia was described by da Canal as being the strongest and best built tower in the world, and just happened to have been located exactly as such, *Da Canal*, Seconda, VIII.

<sup>349</sup> La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in Jerusalem, 1100-1291*, p. 235.

<sup>350</sup> Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, 4, p. 17.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

proposed by Kesten is not totally accurate, as the building he identified seems to be attached to the wall.<sup>352</sup> What it does show however is its proximity to the harbour, and potentially to the chain, and how important it might have been to the Italians.

### **Why was the building so important?**

After having located the general position of the house of Saint-Sabas, it is now possible to determine the reasons behind its connection to the conflict. This discussion will revolve around two major points, the first one relating to the inter-communal tensions which had risen in the thirteenth century, and the second, which will concern the relations between the communes and the local nobility and powers. In this section, the chronology of the conflict will also have to be looked at in order to understand more about the events, and thus, Georg's, Jacoby's and Musarra's theories will be examined, as well as augmented when appropriate.

### **The Nature of the conflict**

Historians have categorised the conflict based on their own findings. These will be explained below in order to understand the multi-dimensional aspect of the war, but primarily in order to explain why I believe this clash was a combination of two of these.

Prawer's theory that Saint-Sabas was a patriotic war, as explained at the beginning of this chapter, is possibly the most logical explanation.<sup>353</sup> The first indication of this is the fact that historians now know that the building of Saint-Sabas was not a church, but a normal house, and did not seem to have any mercantile purpose. The second point which would support the 'patriotic' war is the fact that the building was actually destroyed during the conflict, but was still important enough for the Venetians to spend a lot of money on the site afterwards.<sup>354</sup> This would indicate an ulterior motive: that of winning at all cost. This is also further emphasised by the events

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<sup>352</sup> See map 5.

<sup>353</sup> The Genoese arrived in Acre on board a ship that was originally Venetian, thus provoking the Venetians of Acre.

<sup>354</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on Crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 248).

in Tyre, where the Genoese, together with Philip of Montfort, 'threw' the Venetians out of the city in retaliation for the events happening in Acre.

Contrasting with Prawer, Marco Tangheroni placed the War of Saint-Sabas in a long series of conflicts for commercial supremacy and a struggle for Mediterranean dominance.<sup>355</sup> While he does not spend long on the subject, and does not specifically describe the war as a commercial one, his theory is based on the fact that all inter-communal conflicts in the western and eastern Mediterranean are linked. He states that it all started as a war for commercial supremacy, with the different struggles changing between commercial and territorial fights, for example in Sardinia and Corsica, where Genoa and Pisa were particularly involved, or Sicily, where both were also present together with Venice. He also places these wars in the context of the Crusades explaining the importance of the Italians to the kingdom of Jerusalem, but also strengthening his ideas with regards to the commercial commitment and goals of the mercantile cities.<sup>356</sup> This theory revolves around the concept that the Italian communes participated in the crusades mainly for financial and commercial reasons, but also for religious ones, and that if their commercial interests had reached their maximum potential, they would not try to go further. With regards to this chapter, only his assertion of there being one main conflict spread across two centuries and branched out into multiple smaller conflicts all linked, is relevant. In the case of the War of Saint-Sabas, and as stated above, the struggle had no commercial or financial purpose. Therefore, it must have fallen in the territorial, or the national (patriotic) category. In the former case, we know that the Italians were already present in the area, or Quarter of the Chain, as were the military orders and other institutions.<sup>357</sup> As seen above, we know that the Pisans and the Provençaux for example, used forged documents in order to increase the dimensions of their respective Quarters.<sup>358</sup> Furthermore, Venice started to expand its Quarter westwards with the acquisition of the church of Saint Demetrius from 1258.<sup>359</sup> Venice also continued to purchase property up until 1291, thus confirming their territorial expansion policy.<sup>360</sup> The acquisition of the building of Saint-Sabas by Genoa may therefore have been part of this territorial growth by the mercantile

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<sup>355</sup> M. Tangheroni, 'Trade and Navigation', in *Italy in the Central Middle Ages*, ed. by David Abulafia (Oxford, 2004), pp.127-146 (p. 135).

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.127-146 (p. 132).

<sup>357</sup> Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 18).

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-45 (p. 23).

<sup>359</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 247).

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240-256 (p. 248).

communes. This would show that the conflict was therefore part of a major 'programme' of territorial expansion.

Venice, Genoa and Pisa were all major rivals for commercial supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. And this competition did spark small acts of 'spontaneous' conflicts for national pride. One of the main examples is the acquisition of the island of Crete by Venice. Genoa had been offered the island by Boniface of Montferrat after the coronation of Baldwin as emperor of Byzantium, but Venice was quicker and secured the island for itself.<sup>361</sup> Genoa retaliated in 1206 by launching an invasion and thus declaring war on Venice, which lasted until 1211.<sup>362</sup> We also know that Genoa used pirates in this war, and that they would usually make use of them in order to fight its enemies, in particular Venice, at sea.<sup>363</sup> The acquisition of the building of Saint-Sabas by Genoa, and the subsequent Venetian claim that it was to be delivered into their hands, could be part of this 'guerrilla' trend.

To understand the tensions that erupted between Genoa, Venice and Pisa in the kingdom of Jerusalem, one first needs to understand their political relations in Italy, but in the East as well, as they can sometime contradict one another, as is the case with the War of Saint-Sabas, and the relationship between Genoa and Pisa.<sup>364</sup> While historians have relied primarily on the relationships between Venice and Genoa, due perhaps to their importance in the Holy Land, and in the western world, Pisa nonetheless held a very important role in the politics of the kingdom of Jerusalem. An example of this lies in the maps of thirteenth century Acre, where, as we saw above, Pisa's Quarter was located on the southern tip of the Old City, and was perhaps the best placed commune in terms of access to the harbour. Pisa was the key to Saint-Sabas, and the chronology of the events, as it came down to us, is in agreement with this statement: Pisa was first allied with Genoa, and Venice was overrun by the two forces, however, as soon as Pisa changed side, Genoa found itself on the losing end, and would never recover its status in Acre.

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<sup>361</sup> Madden, *Venice*, pp. 148-150.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 150.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156. As Madden points out, the social situation in Genoa and Venice was different. While Venice had a strong centralised government that was able to direct and command large fleets at the same time, Genoa usually was plagued by in-fighting amongst the numerous powerful families, thus preventing the grouping of vessels to form large fleets.

<sup>364</sup> See previous chapter for more information on the relationships between these three powers with regards to the Seventh Crusade, as well as more information on their relations in the first half of the thirteenth century.

Let us therefore look more closely at the Genoese-Pisan relationship. Pisan history has not been studied as well as that of Genoa or Venice, however, William Heywood does cover the twelfth century very well, and Emilio Cristiani adds to this history, the complex relationships between commune and the people of Pisa in the thirteenth century.<sup>365</sup> Prawer gives us a very brief idea of the situation in the thirteenth century kingdom of Jerusalem with regards to the Italian communes: *La rivalité entre les communes était permanente, la guerre pour les marches devenait une affaire 'nationale': le patriotisme des Pisans, des Génois, des Vénitiens, peut en un sens être taxé de nationalisme.*<sup>366</sup> This rivalry was perhaps more common between Genoa and Pisa, as both were inclined to expand towards the western Mediterranean due to their relative geographical position.<sup>367</sup> It also explains their choices with regards to alliances: Genoa preferring to ally with the papacy, Innocent IV, and Pisa with the Emperor.<sup>368</sup> These conflicts (or one continuous conflict) between the two seem to have originated in 1119, with the privileges accorded to Pisa by Gelasisus II.<sup>369</sup> This clash was then exported to the Latin East, and in 1222, when the Pisans put the Genoese Quarter to flame, the Venetians were chosen as arbitrators.<sup>370</sup> The conflict with Frederick II also provided an opportunity for the two to renew their struggle, and it continued until Frederick's agent in the Holy Land, Riccardo Filanghieri, was defeated in 1243.<sup>371</sup> The next part of the 'war' was just prior to the Seventh Crusade of Louis IX, in 1249, when Pisa and Genoa were once more fighting – a continuation of the same conflict.<sup>372</sup> In 1256, the two were once more at war, in Sardinia. This conflict is what makes an alliance in Acre at the start of the War of Saint-Sabas strange, albeit an unofficial one.

Alliances between Genoa and Pisa did take place more than once however. In 1087, both attacked Mahdia in northern Tunisia.<sup>373</sup> On the other hand, these were always short lived and more often than not, the two powers were fighting against one another. The 1256-1258 war in Sardinia makes it tricky to understand the reasons behind the Pisan-Genoese agreement at the beginning of the War of Saint-Sabas. No documents have come down to us to explain this, however, by looking at other

<sup>365</sup> Heywood, *A History of Pisa*; Cristiani, *Nobiltà e Popolo nel Comune di Pisa*.

<sup>366</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, p. 361.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> See previous chapter on the relationship between Genoa and Innocent IV.

<sup>369</sup> *Annali Genovesi*, 1, p. 16 ; The translated edition can be found in Hall, *Caffaro*.

<sup>370</sup> Bigoni, 'Quattro Documenti Genovesi sulle Contese d'Oltremare nel secolo XIII', §1, pp. 8-10.

<sup>371</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, p. 301.

<sup>372</sup> Caro, *Genoa und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 2, p. 16.

<sup>373</sup> Cowdrey, 'The Mahdia Campaign of 1087', pp 1-29.

documents from the period, it may be possible for historians to understand why the two communes acted together.

More is known regarding Genoese relations with Venice prior to Saint-Sabas. Despite the competitiveness of their environment in Acre, the two cities seemed to co-exist on friendly terms, as shown by a treaty signed in 1251 promising ‘peace and harmony for the next eight years, ensuring full justice to the Venetians/Genoese following Genoese/Venetian aggression’.<sup>374</sup> Despite the Fourth Crusade and the subsequent trade monopoly in Constantinople going to the Venetians, the two were allied during the conflict against Frederick II, and the Seventh Crusade did not seem to shift its policy to an aggressive one. The shift in attitude that appeared at the time of the War of Saint-Sabas seems to be improbable, and would indicate that the war was indeed part of a continuous conflict. This is further emphasised by the events that followed the war, in particular the status of the Genoese in Acre post-1258. They had lost their Quarter, which was annexed by the Pisans and the Venetians. Both victors also destroyed important buildings, symbols of Genoese power, such as the Lamonoia Tower, and used the stones to build new walls. Only the church of San Lorenzo remained standing.<sup>375</sup> It remains unclear whether or not the Genoese were completely thrown out of the city after this. Jacoby tells us of two documents dating from 1273 and 1277 which mention a Genoese Consul in Acre and which would attest to some Genoese presence in the city at the time.<sup>376</sup> What is certain however is that Genoa never fully recovered its possessions in the city by 1291.<sup>377</sup>

### **Why this building?**

The location of this building has been shown to be close to the harbour. This in itself made it a strategic place for expansion.<sup>378</sup> With it, the Genoese could have

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<sup>374</sup> *LIRG*, 4, §722, §723, pp. 180-194. A similar treaty was also signed in Constantinople between the Venetians and the Genoese of the region. See Tafel, Thomas, *Urkunden*, pp. 457-61. This treaty really reinforces the differences and the individuality of the different communes from Genoa and Venice around the Mediterranean.

<sup>375</sup> Jacoby, ‘L’expansion occidentale dans le Levant, pp. 225-264 (p. 228).

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>377</sup> *TT*, §505, p. 255

<sup>378</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, p. 38-9; Jacoby, ‘New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre’, pp. 240-256 (p. 246).



acquired increased control over the Quarter of the Chain, which would have been a neutral area within the Old City.<sup>379</sup> The proposed location for the building of Saint-Sabas is adjacent to the Venetian quarter, on the northern entrance of the port.<sup>380</sup> This would effectively mean that Venetian influence and expansion in the area would have been threatened. On the other side of the bay, the Pisans would have been in a similar situation. With the smallest of Italian Quarters, they would have been wary of any possible Genoese or Venetian expansion at their expense.<sup>381</sup> The acquisition of the building of Saint-Sabas after the war by the Venetian bailiff at the time, Marco Giustiniani, for an enormous amount of money, reveals the strategic importance of the site, and Jacoby suggests that the Venetians may have envisaged the construction of a military structure on the spot.<sup>382</sup> As well as being important in terms of defence, or military purposes, the location may have had some importance with regards to the politics of the city. Being located within the boundaries of the Quarter of the Chain, any Italian expansion would have been at the expense of the crown, or the city. The willingness of the mercantile communes to expand into this Quarter is also attested by the Pisan and Provençal forgeries, both of which imply that the respective communes' Quarter was encroaching on 'royal land'.<sup>383</sup>

This show of force from the communes gives us an idea of the political situation of the kingdom: these factions were growing in power as the power of the crown was decreasing, the very eruption of the conflict over Saint-Sabas demonstrating this clearly.<sup>384</sup> The military situation of the kingdom at the time should also be taken into account. As more assistance was needed, more concessions were given to either the military orders, or the mercantile communes.<sup>385</sup> In the thirteenth century, help from the West gradually declined, as conflicts closer to 'home' started to emerge in greater number.<sup>386</sup> This is highlighted by the actions taken by the papacy in order to redirect

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<sup>379</sup> This Quarter would have been placed fully under the control of the Crown, and the City. In theory, it should have been free of Italian influence and politics. However, as seen above, this was far from the truth, and a house which was positioned as such would have become 'prime estate' if for sale.

<sup>380</sup> Kesten, *The Old City of Acre*, map 10.

<sup>381</sup> See above for the size of the Pisan Quarter, as well as the Pisan forgeries. There have been some suggestions that the Pisans had access to another harbour located on the western side of the city. However, archaeological surveys and evidence has proven that it would have been impossible for ships to have anchored in this area. Galili et al., 'The Evolution of Akko Harbor and its Mediterranean Maritime Trade Links', pp. 191-211, (p. 207).

<sup>382</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (pp. 247-8).

<sup>383</sup> See above; Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century', pp. 1-45 (p. 23).

<sup>384</sup> The crown of Jerusalem was at the time held by Conradin, or Conrad III, a six year old boy.

<sup>385</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe', p. 54.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 223.

knights towards the Latin East and the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>387</sup> This enabled the powers that had established a permanent base in the kingdom to gain from the situation. As stated above, space in the Old City was scarce, and the policy of territorial expansion that was started by the three Italian cities meant that sooner or later, they would fight for the same area. The conflict over the building of Saint-Sabas was the perfect spark for two reasons. The first is related to its location. As seen above, it was close to the harbour, but also it most likely was close to the Venetian Quarter, and could have potentially blocked their expansion westward. A letter from Alexander IV to the abbot of Saint-Sabas (in Acre) from 1255 states that this house was located in the Quarter or Area of the Chain, as it has been shown above, but that it was also located next to other houses belonging to the Genoese.<sup>388</sup> This is not surprising, as Jacoby has shown the existence of Genoese properties in this Quarter, however, what is interesting is the fact that the Genoese appeared to have tried to group these together: they had already started to acquire houses from the Templars for example, as well as from people without any affiliation, prior to the start of the conflict.<sup>389</sup> We know that the Venetians also managed to increase their territory post-Saint-Sabas in such a manner, by requiring a Venetian who owned property outside of the limits of their Quarter to build a wall around his property, and to have it joined to the Venetian wall.<sup>390</sup> It is perhaps along these lines that the surprising alliance between Pisa and Genoa came into being: Pisa may have been after more property, and allying itself with the likely victor at the time seemed to be the perfect way to do so.

The number of letters by the papacy to Acre regarding the building of Saint-Sabas is quite surprising. Innocent IV and Alexander IV both wrote letters ordering the handover of the building to the Genoese. In the case of the former, one suspects local loyalty; the latter on the other hand, also sent a second letter, this time to the prior of the Order of Saint-John of Jerusalem, ordering that the building be left to the monastery.<sup>391</sup> There was also a third letter that the Venetian consul in Acre, Marco Giustiniani, had in his possession. This one was passed on to the patriarch of Jerusalem

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<sup>387</sup> People fighting in Spain and Southern France were no longer given crusading indulgences and privileges in 1213, while crusaders fighting against the Emperor Frederick II in 1250 were redirected towards Syria by Innocent IV. Ibid. See *Patrologiae cursus completus*, serie Latina, ed. by J.P. Migne (Paris: 1855), cols. 817-822, 28, for 1213 ; and *Epistolae Saeculi XIII e Regestis Pontificum Romanorum Selectae*, MGH, ed. by C. Rodenberg, 3 Vols (Berlin: 1883-94), 3, 20, for 1250.

<sup>388</sup> ..., *juxta domum ipsorum Januensium habent*.... *Les Registres d'Alexandre IV*, §390.

<sup>389</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant', pp. 225-264 (p. 227).

<sup>390</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 245).

<sup>391</sup> *Les Registres d'Alexandre IV*, §606.

stating that the building should be left in the care of the Venetians.<sup>392</sup> Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this letter was real, and the likelihood of two letters, one ordering the building to be given to the Genoese, and the other, stating that it must go to the Venetians is very low.<sup>393</sup> Furthermore, Alexander IV states in his second letter that the handover of the building would cause a ‘great scandal’, and therefore, one must suggest that the Venetian letter is a forgery.<sup>394</sup> On the other hand, there is the matter of the 1247 Genoese document (see Chapter 1), and the ecumenical protection it offered the Genoese in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Could it have anything to do with Genoese motives, and the letters? Let us therefore examine these two letters in order to understand a bit more about the attraction of the building of Saint-Sabas. There is an important piece of information that should be retained from the second letter. It appears that it was the Monastery of Saint-Sabas itself that opposed the sale or rent of their building.<sup>395</sup> If this was indeed the case, it could potentially mean that the first order, to hand the building to the Genoese, was perhaps influenced by Genoa. This would also indicate that the other letter, apparently sent to the Venetians, was definitely a forgery. This also demonstrates the importance of the location of the building.

We know that the Venetians had the intention to build a military structure on the site of the building, and we also know that the Genoese may have done the same at the beginning of the conflict.<sup>396</sup> The location of the site does support the theory that the building could have been transformed into a military structure. The Venetians for example, had a tower that overlooked the entrance to the inner harbour and the chain.<sup>397</sup> This shows the strategic importance of the location. After Pisa’s alliance with Venice, the Genoese were able to blockade the harbour and take control of the chain.<sup>398</sup> This may provide a certain insight into the motives of the Genoese. Jacoby argues that they were trying to gain access to the harbour, by acquiring properties and adding them to their Quarter.<sup>399</sup> As seen above, the commune was the furthest away from the harbour of the mercantile cities. An opening on the harbour, or at least more power and influence

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<sup>392</sup> Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 55.

<sup>393</sup> Musarra, *In partibus Ultramaris*, pp. 444-446. He also states that it is from then on that the question became complicated.

<sup>394</sup> ..., *in grave ipsius monasterii dispendium redundaret et alias ex ea nimium scandalum oriretur...*, *Les Registres d’Alexandre IV*, §606.

<sup>395</sup> *Les Registres d’Alexandre IV*, §606.

<sup>396</sup> *Da Canal*, Seconda, IV; Jacoby, ‘New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre’, pp. 240-256 (pp. 247-8).

<sup>397</sup> Jacoby, ‘Crusader Acre in the Thirteenth Century’, pp. 1-45 (p. 33).

<sup>398</sup> *Da Canal*, Seconda, IV.

<sup>399</sup> Jacoby, ‘L’expansion occidentale dans le Levant’, pp. 225-264 (p. 227).

over the governing body and the other mercantile cities would have sealed Genoa's 'victory' in Acre.

It is for these reasons, for a territorial supremacy and better access to the harbour, that the house of Saint-Sabas found itself at the centre of the conflict. I believe that the house itself was perfectly located for control over the harbour, but most importantly over the chain. It is this location that made the house important enough to fight for.

### **The involvement of others in the conflict:**

The conflict is also important in that it engulfed most of the city of Acre, but also the military orders and the nobility of the kingdom. The major involvement came from Philip of Montfort, who allied himself with the Genoese and fought against the Venetians, as well as the baronage of Acre. In this part, the chronology of the conflict will be important as outside events did play a major role in shaping the outcome of the war, and despite the lack of sources, it should be possible to formulate a rough outline of what happened and how. In this sense, Georg Caro offers the most comprehensive and detailed study of the conflict, and Jacoby follows in his footsteps by offering some more details regarding the house of Saint-Sabas and the Venetian ambitions at the time.<sup>400</sup> Despite Mussara's attempt at re-interpreting the war, and giving it a Genoese perspective, new theories regarding the chronology of the war are sparse, which means that some portions of the 1256-61 period are dark. Some of the episodes for which we lack information are the reasons behind the Pisan change of heart (or for their joining the Genoese in the first place), but also the ulterior motives of Philip of Montfort, as well as the link with the military orders. There may also be connections with events happening in the West which may coincide with those in the East, and which may explain some actions taken by a party during the course of the war.

Mussara's timeframe of 1256-1270 is an interesting one, but the most important aspect of this theory is the link he makes between the 1261 conquest of Constantinople by the Greeks, the Mamluk-Mongol conflict, and the fall of Acre in 1291, as well as

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<sup>400</sup> Caro, *Genoa und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 1, pp. 28-43, 69-76; Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256.

the final peace treaty between Venice and Genoa signed in 1299.<sup>401</sup> Musarra's theory that the conflict actually continued on from 1251 could also mean that the fighting was itself a continuation from previous altercations. We have seen that this was a very likely scenario and one that is put forward in this thesis as Genoese, Venetians and Pisans had been in competition with one another for decades, and thus full-out war in some form was highly likely. Furthermore, Jacoby discusses a series of previously unpublished documents dating from the pre-Saint-Sabas period, which highlight the fact that Venice was already preparing for a conflict to erupt.<sup>402</sup> Two loans were imposed by the Venetian bailiff in Acre, the first in 1255, on Venetian merchants in transit, while the second, from the same year, on the Venetian settlers in Acre.<sup>403</sup> The War of Saint-Sabas was indeed fuelled by the already tense political scene of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Both sides' tensions added to one-another, and the War of Saint-Sabas came into being. But how did it start and how did it develop? When did it end as well? 1261 or 1270?

The starting point of the conflict that is commonly accepted is an event that happened in 1256 when a Genoese ship entered the harbour in Acre. Jacoby has placed the arrival of the ship in the spring of that year.<sup>404</sup> This ship had previously been owned by the Venetians, but had been seized by pirates. In turn it was purchased by the Genoese, and arrived in the port of Acre, where it was immediately recognised by the Venetians, who rushed to take possession of it.<sup>405</sup> The second starting point which Mussara mentions is the murder of a Genoese which had taken place five years earlier, and which almost certainly raised tensions between the two communes, and which perhaps led to the call to arms from the Genoese when one of their ships was captured.<sup>406</sup> The chronology of the conflict as described by Caro and Jacoby is simple, yet, the lack of information on the subject does not allow us to go into more details than this. Musarra's chronology, despite being more detailed, still remains simplistic. Very little datable information is given in these.

The arrival of the Genoese vessel in the harbour of Acre provoked the anger of the Venetians, who rushed to it claiming it as theirs. The Genoese could not let that happen, and therefore took arms, captured several Venetian ships anchored in

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<sup>401</sup> *LIRG*, 7, §1226.

<sup>402</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 247).

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 9-10.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240-256 (p. 245).

<sup>405</sup> Caro, *Genova und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 2, p. 30.

<sup>406</sup> Mussara, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 54.

retaliation, and forged an alliance, or an accord, with Pisa to raid the Venetian Quarter up to the Church of San Marco.<sup>407</sup> There is no written evidence of an alliance between Genoa and Pisa, which does add to the theory that their cooperation was more spontaneous than planned, especially when their past relationship and conflicts are taken into account.<sup>408</sup> The rest of the conflict is blurry. As stated by Jacoby, only two dated events help us in placing it in context: the Venetian-Pisan treaty of 1257 in which both agreed to a ten-year 'alliance' against Genoa, and which ultimately decided the fate of the war; and the naval battle of 1258 – which was the result of the tense atmosphere between the three communes, and involved the Genoese fleet which was sent from Liguria during the summer of 1258, and comprised of forty-eight galleys and four *naves*, as well as the combined Venetian-Pisan fleet anchored in Acre, which comprised (after extensive drafting done by both communes), more than seventy ships<sup>409</sup> – during which the Genoese were annihilated, and which ultimately forced them out of Acre.<sup>410</sup> The expulsion of the Venetians from Tyre by Philip of Montfort can also be placed towards the end of 1256 or the beginning of 1257.<sup>411</sup> We also know that after the Venetian-Pisan alliance, Genoa invaded the latter's Quarter, and blockaded the harbour with a chain, which means entry into Acre by sea would have been entirely controlled by Genoa. As soon as the Venetian fleet, led by the Doge's son, Lorenzo Tiepolo, and which had left Venice sometime after July 1257, and which arrived in the autumn of the same year, broke through the chain, the Genoese were entrenched into the Quarter. There was an attempt at negotiating, and envoys met in a house belonging to Philip of Montfort, which indicates that at this point, before 1258, Philip was still considered a neutral party.<sup>412</sup>

Let us take a closer look at Philip of Montfort, as his importance in the conflict is contrasted with his sudden appearance on the political scene of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1239. The first mention of Philip came when he landed in the Holy Land with Theobald of Champagne, as part of the so-called Barons' Crusade (1239-1241). He was the nephew of Simon of Montfort (d. 1218), the leader of the Albigensian

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<sup>407</sup> Ibid., p. 30-1; Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 241). Mussara calls it an alliance, however, no document corroborate this. On the other hand, the alliance between Venice and Pisa is mentioned in all sources discussing the War of Saint-Sabas.

<sup>408</sup> The Genoese and Pisan were at this time engaged in a war in Sardinia, and near Florence. See Caro, *Genoa und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 2, pp. 16-27.

<sup>409</sup> *TT*, §279, §284.

<sup>410</sup> Caro, *Genoa und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 2, pp. 16-27.

<sup>411</sup> *TT*, §275.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., §270.

Crusade, and the son of Guy of Montfort and of Helvis of Ibelin. After his father's death in 1228, he inherited two small lordships in France, La Ferté-Alais and of Castres-en-Albigeois, but did not seem to hold any power comparable to that of his uncle.<sup>413</sup> His success in the kingdom of Jerusalem came with the help of his mother's family, the Ibelins. He was a cousin of John of Ibelin, and in 1240 he became Lord of Toron by marrying the Lady of Toron, Maria of Antioch-Armenia, eldest daughter of Raymond-Roupen of Antioch, thus enabling him to acquire much influence over the political affairs of the state.<sup>414</sup> Furthermore, as part of the Ibelin family, he was pulled into the already existing conflict involving the Emperor Frederick II's representative in the kingdom, Ricardo Filangieri: he personally led a contingent of Genoese and Venetians through Acre in order to arrest him and two of his supporters.<sup>415</sup> His position within the nobility of the kingdom was sealed when he was part of the small council that Balian of Ibelin called, which sat to decide on the situation with regards to Filangieri, and upon the latter's defeat, he received the city of Tyre. He was one of the few survivors of La Forbie, and one of the commanders of the armies of the kingdom that joined the crusade of Louis IX in Cyprus.<sup>416</sup> By 1256, Philip had certainly become one of the most important and influential barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Due to this, his involvement in the War of Saint-Sabas was inevitable. His animosity towards the Venetians most likely went back to his role in the capture of Tyre, and the latter's involvement in it. The Venetians were promised the restitution of the privileges and of their property in Tyre as it was stipulated in the 1123 *Pactum Warmundi*, giving the Venetians one-third of any city they helped to capture. This deal was made with Alix of Cyprus, the regent of the kingdom, however, the Ibelins and Montfort taught them 'the laws of the kingdom', and placed Philip of Montfort in Tyre, who in turn, did not return the Venetians to their original privileges.<sup>417</sup>

The *Templar of Tyre* also gives us an indication that the armed struggle lasted fourteen months.<sup>418</sup> This would bring the end of the conflict to around spring 1259, and not summer 1258. This date however coincides with the arrival of the Papal Legate, Tommaso Agni da Lentini (future Patriarch of Jerusalem), with the letter from Pope

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<sup>413</sup> Lower, *The Barons' Crusade*, p. 44.

<sup>414</sup> *TT*, §221.

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, §222.

<sup>416</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, pp. 313, 326.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303.

<sup>418</sup> *TT*, §270.

Alexander IV announcing the signing of a treaty between the communes to the inhabitants of the Holy Land. Alexander IV had published the signing of the peace on the 6<sup>th</sup> of July 1258 in Viterbo, and had mandated these communes to announce his decision to their citizens in the East.<sup>419</sup> This is important because it shows the *Templar of Tyre*'s chronology is relatively correct. We also know that Alexander IV expected all reparations to have been given, and all infrastructures taken during the war to have been given back by September of the next year, meaning 1259.<sup>420</sup> Jacoby has also pointed out that by the autumn of 1259, Venice had acquired the land upon which the building of Saint-Sabas stood, which means that by then, the Genoese were definitely out of Acre.<sup>421</sup> We can therefore assume that by 1259, the armed conflict between the Italian cities was ended. On the other hand, as we saw with Philip of Montfort, the Italians were not the only ones to have taken advantage of the political atmosphere of the kingdom of Jerusalem to settle things.

It is again the *Templar of Tyre* which tells us of the events which transpired during the war. There were tensions in the kingdom with regards to the rights over the regency. Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch and Tripoli had arrived in Acre in 1258 to help in the mediation process between Venice and Genoa. He arrived with his sister, Plaisance and his nephew, King Hugh of Cyprus. We also know that Bohemond was called to Acre by the Templars and John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, and that some agreement was passed between them.<sup>422</sup> Bohemond did not take part in the conflict; however, his presence in Acre did have some effect on the events.<sup>423</sup> According to the *Templar of Tyre*, the prince hated the Genoese and sent an armed mob against their Quarter. The massacre was only averted thanks to the Hospital, whose Quarter lay in between the two. The text also states that Philip of Montfort was able to send help to the Genoese through the Hospitallers, which would suggest that they had entered the conflict on the side of the Genoese.<sup>424</sup> This involvement came later on when the master of the Hospital is described as being part of the land assault on Acre during the decisive naval battle between Venice and Genoa.<sup>425</sup> On the opposite side, Venice and Pisa, who

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<sup>419</sup> *Les Registres d'Alexandre IV*, §2608, §2609, §2610, §2611.

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid.*, §2612.

<sup>421</sup> The annexation of the Church of Saint-Demetrius prior to that also attest to the absence of the Genoese in Acre, or at least to their weakness in the city.

<sup>422</sup> *Eracles*, p. 443. This agreement was the recognition of Hugh of Cyprus as Regent of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. *RRH*, §1266.

<sup>423</sup> *TT*, §272-3; *Annales de Terre Sainte*, B, p. 24.

<sup>424</sup> *TT*, §274-5.

<sup>425</sup> *TT*, §280.



were afraid for their Quarter if they went to fight at sea, went to the Temple and obtained the protection of their houses by the Order during the battle, thus pitting the Order of the Templars against the Hospital. The confirmation of the involvement of the military orders (including the Teutonic Order) is found in the confirmation of a peace treaty (treaty which included the kingdoms of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Armenia, and the Principality of Antioch-Tripoli).<sup>426</sup> The participation of the military orders in the conflict is therefore evident. Concerning the nobility of the kingdom however, it is more difficult to say so. Philip of Montfort was obviously a part of it, and John of Jaffa was also implicated, albeit unofficially.<sup>427</sup> The conflict was also exported to Tripoli and Antioch as Bertrand of Gibelet and Bohemond VI came at odds over the fact that Bertrand had apparently asked for help from the Genoese while in Acre.<sup>428</sup>

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, we have seen that the War of Saint-Sabas was more than a simple conflict of interest between three Italian cities. We have also seen that there are many points that remain unclear and that some would benefit from a more precise analysis and interpretation, but analysing in detail the numerous documents from the period in the Genoese archives, focussing on property exchanges, as with Venice; also by looking more towards the archaeological scholarship, trying to clearly place all location within the Old City. Overall however, three major points should be retained.

First of all, the war itself was not just a commercial war, but it clearly had a commercial impact. In hindsight, despite the advantages that Venice may have gained from evicting the Genoese from Acre, Genoese trade to *Outremer* did not slow down until 1261 and the conquest of Constantinople by the Greeks, and in 1263/4, Tyre was officially established as the Genoese port of call in the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>429</sup> Trade in *Romania* made a slow start due to the fact that the Genoese/Greek alliance was more of a military alliance rather than a commercial treaty, but eventually, exchanges in the

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<sup>426</sup> *RRH*, §1269.

<sup>427</sup> By this I imply that we have no evidence of his involvement in open conflict. We know that he did open the way for negotiations between the belligerents and that the creation of the 'Commune of Acre' was done so that a neutral party could have enough influence over matters. On the other hand, he died before the war was over and thus we do not know what he may have done.

<sup>428</sup> Bertrand of Gibelet was a member of the Embriaco family, and therefore Genoese originally.

<sup>429</sup> Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 77.

Black Sea increased.<sup>430</sup> The war was a combination of two factors. Its primary factor was the lack of space and the desire to acquire more in Acre, which could also translate into more commercial advantages, especially if that space was closer to the harbour. The secondary attribute was simply the need to win over your adversary, and obtain greater prestige for your city. Therefore, the war was a combination of three attributes: territorial, commercial, and pride.

The second point which needs to be remembered is the fact that the violence may have started in 1256 and ended officially in 1259, while the conflict should be placed into a long series of small conflicts which started before the thirteenth century and which continued on beyond the fall of Acre.<sup>431</sup> The year 1261, despite not being chosen to mark the end of the conflict, is connected to the war. The reason being that it is also the year of the decisive alliance between Genoa and the Greek Emperor Michael Palaeologus.<sup>432</sup> This conflict could actually be considered a continuation of the War of Saint-Sabas. I believe Musarra is correct in assuming that the two conflicts are indeed connected. His choice of date to mark the end of the conflict, 1270, coincides with the return of Venice in Tyre.<sup>433</sup> He, on the other hand, does not follow up on his theory and establishes a link with conflicts between Venice and Genoa until 1299. As interesting as this theory is, he does not take into account the fall of Acre in 1291 and the outcome that it had on the commercial activities of the Italian communes. For this reason, I believe that the dates to remember are indeed 1256-1259, while perhaps taking into consideration the return of Venice in Tyre of 1270. What is evident on the other hand, is the connection between the War of Saint-Sabas and other conflicts of the century. With respect to this, I believe that the war was also connected to events that happened prior 1256, such as in 1249, or 1251, and that it may be possible to connect it with events beyond the scope of this study.

The third and final point to remember is the impact of Saint-Sabas in the kingdom in the thirteenth century. The chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre* describes the

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<sup>430</sup> *LIRG*, 4, §749, pp. 271-285. See also the figures from Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe – début du XVe siècle)*, 2 vols (Rome : 1978), p. 489.

<sup>431</sup> The year 1261 is chosen here rather than 1258 due to the fact that despite the treaty being signed in 1258, the official recognition of its terms in the kingdom would not have happened prior 1259. The year 1261, which has been used as well to pinpoint the end of the conflict refers to the year during which the participants were ordered to place their fortresses in the hands of the papal legate, however, due to their refusal to do so, this date does not seem appropriate to use in order to place the end of the conflict. Ludovico Sauli, *Della colonia dei Genovesi in Galata*, 2 vols (Torino: 1831), 2, pp. 199-204.

<sup>432</sup> Steven Epstein, *Purity Lost* (Baltimore, MD, 2006), p. 101.

<sup>433</sup> Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 69.

events of the War of Saint-Sabas as a full out war, where stone throwing machines were used, and in a manner which resembles more the retelling of a siege than a ‘simple’ conflict.<sup>434</sup> The war also spread amongst the nobility of the kingdom, as well as through the military orders, as if the enmity of the Italians was the spark that spread throughout the kingdom. It is in such a manner that one should see the War of Saint-Sabas.

The War of Saint-Sabas was definitely one of the defining events of the thirteenth century for the kingdom of Jerusalem. Its effects were far greater than those of the previous internal conflicts in the kingdom. The expulsion of the Genoese from Acre, as well as the increased rivalry which followed between the Italians could be said to be one of the major reasons behind the failure of the Italians, and the Genoese in particular as their numbers would have been reduced compared to the pre-Saint-Sabas era, to defend Acre in 1291, as well as the failure to coordinate the defence of the lands which remained in Latin hands in the East.

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<sup>434</sup> *TT*, §270.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Genoa and Charles of Anjou.**

#### **Introduction:**

What happened in the Holy Land during the years directly following the War of Saint-Sabas remains difficult to assess due to the lack of sources for the period. From 1259 until 1291, the events recalled in the chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre* focus mainly on the post-Saint-Sabas conflict between Genoa and Venice, as well as between Philip of Montfort and the barons of the kingdom for the years down to 1270. The second crusade of Louis IX also receives a brief mention before the chroniclers rush through the years to 1288 when the Mamluk forces strengthened their push into Frankish-held land.<sup>435</sup> This gap however is important because it highlights the change in views from the Western powers with regards to Jerusalem and the kingdom: crusading in the Levant was no longer the top priority for some Christian rulers.<sup>436</sup> This change in attitude however should not be taken as a total lack of enthusiasm for the crusading movement, and in particular, the liberation of the Latin East, because some lords still had strong desires to embark on this journey: such was the case for one of the most controversial figures of the time, Charles of Anjou.

His connection with Genoa and certain families in particular need to be addressed here, as I believe Charles's arrival on the throne of Jerusalem changed trading patterns in the Eastern Mediterranean. Genoa's reaction to his coronation was different to that of Venice and Pisa. Charles was a new political as well as economic threat to the Ligurian commune, and they had to adapt to this new situation.

The sale to Charles of Anjou of Maria of Antioch's claim to the throne of Jerusalem initiated his involvement in the political sphere of the kingdom.<sup>437</sup> It also

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<sup>435</sup> The chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre*, which provides us with the best recollection of the years 1250-1291, is the best example of this lack of information regarding the years 1270-1288. These years however, seemed to be vital in the survival of the Italian Communes in the east post-1291, as numerous treaties were signed between Genoa and the Mamluk sultanate, as well as between Pisa and the latter. These treaties are extremely important as they provide the basis for the theory that the Italians saw the end coming and did everything they could to ensure their survival after a possible Muslim conquest.

<sup>436</sup> The papacy was entangled in its own personal conflicts in Italy and in mainland Europe and was willing to divert funds and crusaders towards its own wars, such as with the Italian Crusades, see Housley, *The Italian Crusades*.

<sup>437</sup> His involvement with the kingdom however dates back to his crowning as king of Sicily.

affected the internal affairs of the kingdom that were evolving after the conflict of Saint-Sabas and are a notable and neglected aspect of the state of Acre. The time frame of 1268 to 1282, is particularly devoted to the situation in Sicily – which also involved the cities of Genoa, Pisa and to a lesser extent, Venice – and this therefore means that very little attention is given to the kingdom of Jerusalem, with the exception of the crusade of the Lord Edward which was the last major expedition to the Holy Land in the thirteenth century.<sup>438</sup>

Despite not being part of the kingdom of Jerusalem, Sicily was closely involved in the affairs of the Holy Land. The ports of the island were often used as a departure point for crusaders but were most important for trade.<sup>439</sup> In 1267, the patriarch of Jerusalem, William II of Agen even recommended that a fleet of six galleys be kept permanently in Acre by the king of Sicily.<sup>440</sup> The Italian communes also had a strong presence on the island, with both Genoa and Venice relying on Sicilian grain in order to survive.<sup>441</sup> Another connection between the two was the Hohenstaufen influence. Both kingdoms were previously ruled by the Hohenstaufen dynasty. It is perhaps this connection, which enabled the now ‘old’ Ghibelline/Guelf struggle to establish itself more firmly in Sicily and the Holy Land and to evolve to the point of engaging Charles, the military orders, the crown of France, and of course, the Italian communes. Perhaps the most noteworthy fact, which linked Charles of Anjou, the kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Italian communes, and which provides one more clue into the relationship between the Italians and the Capetians, are traces of the former in the records of the Angevin chancery. As an example, both Pisa and Genoa are mentioned with regards to the shipments of grain and food, and are named as places to which the shipments must not be delivered.<sup>442</sup> As a side note, it is interesting to see that while Genoa and Louis

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<sup>438</sup> See Christopher Tyerman, *England and the Crusades, 1095-1588* (London, 1988), pp. 124-132. The year 1282 (Sicilian Vespers) was chosen instead of 1285 (Charles’ death) because after 1282, Charles was too busy in Italy to worry about matters in the Holy Land.

<sup>439</sup> The presence of all Italian mercantile communes indicate its strategic importance.

<sup>440</sup> *RRH*, §1347. William’s recommendations also included the use of a permanent company or archers and arbalesters to be maintained by the Military orders, as well as a ban for all non-combatant pilgrims, showing the desperation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and their dire need of soldiers.

<sup>441</sup> Trade with Sicily accounted for a large portion of Genoese contracts in the first half of the thirteenth century, while in the second half, during Charles’ reign, this number dropped rapidly. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 97, 142.

<sup>442</sup> These mentions are found over a number of years and in a number of documents. Pisa appears first and up until 1275, while Genoa appears first to be on friendly terms with Charles as the latter hired three merchants in order to transport two clerics in order to pay homage to the new pope in the Holy Land, but in 1274, the commune is mentioned in the same manner as Pisa, and again in 1275. The fact that Venice on the other hand is never mentioned as such, and that the city was the only Italian one to recognise Charles’ rule in Jerusalem in 1277 may show that the commune was supporting Charles in his conflict

IX seemed to have entertained good relations, Charles had troubles with the Ligurian commune.<sup>443</sup>

His arrival on the throne of Sicily in 1268, followed by the acquisition of the claim to the crown of Jerusalem in 1277, naturally increased his dealings with the Italians. In order to assess these relations between Italians and Angevins, it is necessary to establish some further context about Charles, a man who has been traditionally depicted in two particular ways. One follows a 'Germanic' approach and see him as a ruthless and vicious ruler who was to blame for all the atrocities committed in the kingdom during his rule, while the other group follows a more 'French' approach, and sees him as the unfortunate scapegoat upon which all the blame has been placed.<sup>444</sup> Another separation is seen in crusades historians with regards to the claims to the throne of Maria of Antioch and Hugh of Lusignan. As argued by Philip Baldwin, many crusading historians place Gregory X at the centre of the subject, suggesting that it was the pope who pushed in favour of the sale of Maria's claim. On the other hand, he convincingly counters this view, stating that both Maria and Charles were already in contact before Gregory's time, and that the sale itself was made after the latter's death.<sup>445</sup> He shows that Charles was indeed interested in the affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem prior to Gregory's involvement, but he also shows that his connection was more important than might appear at first. Charles had a very strong influence in the Holy Land. Because of his role in exporting food supplies to the kingdom, and with the ongoing Muslim raids on the remaining Christian lands, food was scarce, and William of Beaujeu's letter to Rudolph of Habsburg tells us that starvation was running strong in 1275, due to Charles withholding the supplies.<sup>446</sup> His chancery records show that the kingdom of Jerusalem had become a significant importer of food, most notably wheat and barley, thus, when Charles withheld some of the shipping to the kingdom, it was directly affected by starvation.<sup>447</sup>

These relationships are at centre stage in our period. The lack of central government, the recent internal strife as well as the threat posed by the neighbouring

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with Hugh of Lusignan. Philip P. Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', *Journal of Medieval History*, 38, IV (2012), pp. 424-442.

<sup>443</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 143.

<sup>444</sup> See David Abulafia, 'The state of research: Charles of Anjou reassessed', *Journal of Medieval History*, 26, I (2000), pp. 93-114.

<sup>445</sup> Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', pp. 424-442.

<sup>446</sup> Oswald Redlich, ed., *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches und der österreichischen Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna: 1894), p. 64.

<sup>447</sup> Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', pp. 424-442 (p. 427).

Muslim rulers created an environment which encouraged the development of new alliances and relationships. The links between the Italians and Charles, as well as between Charles and the Holy Land are crucial in order to understand how the former affected the situation in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The most important aspect however, is the connection between the crown of France, and the commune of Genoa. We will see that despite the fact that it appears to the reader as if Charles broke the pattern identified in the previous chapters. This was not entirely the case, and in fact, Charles was actually following in the footsteps of his brother, Louis, and his grand-father, Philip II. It is this last theme which will be analysed in most detail, as it not only shows how the Italians managed to adapt to the shifting political scene, but also how Western perceptions of the Holy Land and the crusades gradually changed as the focal point of those expeditions became closer to 'home'.

### **Charles: his policies, attitudes, and deeds towards the Holy Land**

Charles's physical image has come down to us in the form of the Arnolfo di Cambio statue in the Museo Capitolino in Rome, while his supposed character has been projected through Michele Amari's 1842 work on the history of Sicily, and which is written in a very patriotic manner, portraying Charles as the evil overlord.<sup>448</sup> Another description of Charles is seen in Verdi's *I Vespri Siciliani* of 1855, which Abulafia describes as a 'historically worthless source'.<sup>449</sup> Steven Runciman has also added to the view of Charles as the archenemy of Christendom in his work on the Sicilian Vespers by stating that Charles 'failed as a man', and that 'his policies were driven by a selfish ambition, which resulted in a lack of service to his people and kingdom.'<sup>450</sup>

New studies however are emerging and are bringing to light further information with regards to his policies and attitude towards Sicily, such as the works of Henri Bresc and of Luciano Catalioto.<sup>451</sup> These policies however do not concern this study and the

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<sup>448</sup> M. Amari, *Un periodo delle istorie siciliane del secolo XIII* (Palermo, 1842).

<sup>449</sup> Abulafia, 'The state of research: Charles of Anjou reassessed', pp. 93-114 (p. 95).

<sup>450</sup> S. Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers. A history of the Mediterranean world in the later thirteenth century* (Cambridge, 1958; new ed. with illustrations, 1982).

<sup>451</sup> Henri Bresc, *Politique et société' en Sicile, XIIe-XVe siècles* (Aldershot, 1990); *Un monde méditerranéen. Economie et société en Sicile, 1300-1450*, 2 vols (Rome-Palermo, 1986); Luciano Catalioto, *Terre, baroni e città in Sicilia nell'età di Carlo I d'Angio* (Messina, 1995).

works of Baldwin and Dunbabin, as well as the Angevin charters will remain the principal sources here.

It is Dunbabin who gives us the best general explanation as to why Charles is so important to historians studying the second half of the thirteenth century Mediterranean world. She states that:

‘Although he left behind him abundant records of his administrative acts, his motivation remains contentious, his personality enigmatic. Yet it is impossible to discuss thirteenth-century European history without coming up against him in context after context. In his own time, he was a colossus, admired, feared and hated in almost equal amounts.’<sup>452</sup>

On account of his dealings in Provence, his involvement with the cities of Marseille and Montpellier, and in turn, his relations with the Piedmont and Genoa, as well as of course, Sicily, Charles had become a super-power of the Western Mediterranean. Furthermore, his connections with the Muslim community in Sicily placed him in direct contact with the Mamluks of Egypt, and thus, he became a major player in the affairs of the Holy Land, in broadly the same manner as Frederick II was in his time.<sup>453</sup>

One of the best sources of material available with regards to Charles’s policies towards the Holy Land is Mayer’s *Urkunden*.<sup>454</sup> These charters range from the sale of Maria of Antioch’s claim to Charles in 1277, to Charles appointing a vicar, seneschal, and other officials, as well as him authorising the sale of a house in Acre.<sup>455</sup> The most pertinent ones however are the last two acts, §742 and §743.<sup>456</sup> These are both dated from September 1284, after the Sicilian Vespers (1282), and both concern the Commune of Marseille. In these, Charles confirms the privileges of Marseille but also rewards the commune with what ultimately was, free rein in the city of Acre. While these types of acts are not uncommon, it is the circumstances of their handing out that

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<sup>452</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, p. 3.

<sup>453</sup> Again Dunbabin gives us a general conclusion with regards to Charles’ imperial ambitions. She states that there is not enough evidence to suggest that he was after an empire, nor does the evidence point towards a desire to become emperor. Charles actually broke from the Hohenstaufen imperial tradition and presented himself in his official correspondence to the popes as the successor of the pre-Hohenstaufen Catholic kings.

<sup>454</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*.

<sup>455</sup> Charles’ title of king of Jerusalem is shown here as being taken for granted, despite the fact that Henry II of Cyprus, who succeeded Charles in 1285, contested it. See below for more. It should also be noted that Charles never stayed in the kingdom during his time as king, which means that his tenure may not have been fully accepted in Acre, whose ‘tradition’ meant that a king or queen’s ruler would only be fully recognised once the ruler visited Acre in person in order to receive the homage of the barons, as was so often repeated during the Hohenstaufen rule from 1225 to 1268.

<sup>456</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, §742, §743, pp. 1290-1294.



are interesting, as such privileges were commonly given out at the beginning of a new reign, or as a reward for the capture of a city, and which in effect, reflect very well his attitude towards the Holy Land in general.<sup>457</sup>

It was the acquisition of Provence via his marriage to Beatrice of Provence (1246) that opened the door to Mediterranean politics to Charles, and it was this geographical area that dominated his policies during his lifetime. His French demesnes were mainly left in the care of a *bailli* and a cleric, something that he used as well with regards to Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>458</sup> In Provence, he was to encounter the mercantile communes of Marseille and Genoa. He was to have serious dealings with the former, as the city proved rebellious and twice required his intervention. Down until 1264, he set out to eradicate town consulates which had enjoyed a certain degree of independence and therefore could prove difficult to manage.<sup>459</sup> This affirmation of power did not translate into a decline of trade and trading profit. In fact, it was the opposite, and Dunbabin suggests that the 'townsmen gained more by submitting to comital power than by resisting it.'<sup>460</sup> Due to Marseille's position in the county of Provence, Charles reduced the influence of the neighbouring communal city of Montpellier, and increased in return that of Marseille.<sup>461</sup> It is therefore possible that Charles entertained the same plans with regards to Genoa. In Sicily, Charles seems to have favoured Florence, Marseille and Nice when it came to giving out commercial rights, something that is again reflected in his lack of privileges handed out to the Genoese in Acre.<sup>462</sup> In 1270, Marseille received the exact same grants the Genoese enjoyed in the kingdom (of Sicily), as well as the protection of its rights and grants in Acre, for which the two acts of 1284 are the confirmation but also the affirmation of their affiliation with Charles. Nice greatly benefited from Charles's conquests in Piedmont, because it opened the way for trading without going through Genoa and its heavy tolls, but also from the Arsenal that Charles had ordered built in 1251. Both also benefited from the 1270 crusade greatly through shipping contracts.<sup>463</sup> Amalfi also enjoyed certain benefits in Sicily under Charles. Their services as financial advisors

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<sup>457</sup> These two grants are also the only ones handed out by Charles to a mercantile commune in the Holy Land. See La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy*, Appendix D for an overview.

<sup>458</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, pp. 27-40, 41.

<sup>459</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-6.

<sup>460</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.

<sup>461</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>462</sup> Florence for example, ended with the monopoly of trade in Anjou and Main during Charles' reign. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

had already been used under Manfred and the new king did not see why they should be replaced.<sup>464</sup>

By contrast, the three Italian cities of Genoa, Pisa and Venice are scarcely mentioned in the Angevin Charters, and in the Genoese *Libri Iurium*, very little pertains to Charles.<sup>465</sup> All of them however, crossed paths on a regular basis. On the other hand, only the relationship between Pisa and Charles was clear from the beginning to the end. Both Genoa and Venice were at some point or another, allies or enemies of Charles. These relationships will be discussed further below, however, what can be said for now is that, unlike what had been seen in the previous chapter, the actions of all participants in the West, were reflected in the Levant.

As mentioned above, Charles' interest in the Holy Land predated his acquisition of Maria's claim to the crown of Jerusalem. In effect, it was his invasion of Sicily and his coronation as king which ensured that his focus be directed there. Frederick II had shown before him that the kings of Sicily were ideally placed to deal not only with the affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem, but also to deal directly with Egypt. We know that Charles received and sent embassies from and to Egypt, in 1270 and 1271 for example.<sup>466</sup> Here lies another connection with Frederick II, and Dunbabin has described Charles as following in the footsteps of the emperor. With regards to Muslims, and the non-Christian population, this does seem to hold. Charles was fascinated by Muslim science and medicine, and he had many Muslim medical texts translated in order to 'improve Christian knowledge'.<sup>467</sup> Another point is the confirmation of the privileges of Sicilian merchants in Egypt during Charles' reign.<sup>468</sup> It also appears that both he and Baybars entertained 'friendly' relations in the same manner as Frederick and al-Kamil (1218-1238) did.<sup>469</sup> These points show that despite his lineage, Charles was very much exercising his rule in a similar manner as his predecessors. As Abulafia points out, he

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>465</sup> There is a recurring trend in the *Libri Iurium* regarding mentions of antagonists, in that it tends to omit events or people against which the commune struggled and ultimately failed to win. This lack of mentions of Charles could therefore mean that Genoa never achieved to assert their authority against the king and therefore did not see fit to mention their failures in the city's archives.

<sup>466</sup> *I Registri della Cancelleria Angioina*, ed. by Ricardo Filangieri, 49 Vols (Naples: 1950-2006), 6, §819, §913, thereafter referred to as *RCA*.

<sup>467</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, pp. 222-223; Abulafia, 'Charles of Anjou reassessed', pp. 93-114 (p. 113).

<sup>468</sup> Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age*, 2, p. 420.

<sup>469</sup> M. Michaud, M. Reinaud, *Bibliothèque des Croisades*, 4 Vols (Paris: 1829), 4, p. 483.

diverges from a traditional Capetian, or even French line of policies, and rather adopts a more Italian style.<sup>470</sup>

Furthermore, Louis' first crusade also had a particular effect on Charles and the Holy Land. Charles' character, but also his influence in the kingdom of Jerusalem could be linked to his relationship with his brother. Despite what has been suggested by Joinville for example, regarding tensions arising between the saintly king and the headstrong and ambitious younger brother,<sup>471</sup> evidence put forward by Dunbabin shows that both were on friendly terms, and enjoyed a close relationship particularly uncommon between royal brothers in the thirteenth century.<sup>472</sup> This relationship would help explain the reasons why Charles's rule and his claim to the crown was not overtly contested by Hugh of Cyprus, the other claimant, or by his supporters (the Hospitallers for example), because an open conflict risked the wrath of the French King Phillip III, and therefore the possible withdrawal of the French regiment from the kingdom.<sup>473</sup>

The *Templar of Tyre* however gives us another version for the years 1277 to 1279. The author states that it was Hugh who had come to the conclusion in 1278 that he could not govern the kingdom of Jerusalem and therefore, sailed back to Cyprus 'abandoning the city of Acre and its inhabitants.'<sup>474</sup> After the arrival of Charles' representative however, Hugh sailed back to Acre with an army in order to 'recover' the city, but failed in his attempt due to the opposition of the Templars.<sup>475</sup> It seems that Charles did act in order to defend the city of Acre against the king of Cyprus by sending

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<sup>470</sup> Abulafia, 'The state of research: Charles of Anjou reassessed', pp. 93-114 (p. 114).

<sup>471</sup> On the way back from Egypt to Acre, Louis is described as being very saddened by the death of his brother Robert, but also as being angered by Charles playful attitude and complete lack of respect, as he is enjoying a game of dice. Joinville, 'Life of Saint-Louis', pp. 137-336 (p. 245).

<sup>472</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, pp. 14-16. Her interpretation of this relationship is extremely interesting. Louis IX was the most respected sovereign of his time, and was often the target of other rulers in search of powerful allies in their conflict, most notably the popes and the German emperors. The close knit relationship between Louis, Robert, Alphonse and Charles was quite uncommon at the time, and the fact that Louis VIII had elevated his younger sons to such a position as to not only protect them, but also to ensure their loyalty to the crown, made it so that a strong bond was formed between them. This bond is seen between Charles and Louis when the former was allowed not only to acquire the county of Provence through his marriage to Beatrice of Provence in 1246, which made him on par with his brother Alphonse in terms of land ownership and power, but also through the accession to the Sicilian crown in 1268. Furthermore, the trust placed in Charles by Louis is shown in 1252 when the latter entrusts both his brothers with the affairs of the kingdom after the death of Blanche of Castille and during the king's stay in Acre.

<sup>473</sup> As the Hospitallers held numerous lands in Sicily, it could be argued however that it was for these reasons that they did not so much oppose Charles' claim. As stated before, Sicily was the main source of grain for the Holy Land, and the order could not have risked a shortfall of supplies. For the French Regiment, see Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 77-85.

<sup>474</sup> *TT*, §396.

<sup>475</sup> *Ibid.*, §401.

a fleet carrying food and war supplies from Brindisi.<sup>476</sup> The next attempt on the city by the kings of Cyprus would be in 1285, following the deaths of both Hugh of Cyprus and his son John, as well as those of Charles, Phillip III, and Peter of Aragon.<sup>477</sup> The *Templar of Tyre* does not talk about Charles himself other than with regards to the Sicilian Vespers when recalling the events in Acre. The only reference to him as king of Jerusalem comes after his death during the assault of Henry of Cyprus, when Charles' representative refuses to give up a castle.<sup>478</sup> This omission would suggest that Charles did not do much for the kingdom, as opposed to what has been mentioned before, or that his rule in general as another absentee king, did not overtly influence the everyday matters of the land.

The best source however with regards to Charles and the Holy Land, and which would support the storyline highlighted in the *Templar of Tyre* is perhaps the un-ratified treaty between Hugh of Cyprus and Baybars of 1268.<sup>479</sup> This treaty was written following a series of attacks by the Mamluks on Frankish lands, and deals primarily with land possessions and boundaries within the kingdom of Jerusalem and the surroundings of Acre. It has been linked to two other treaties, one from 1272, and another from 1283, both of great value to those studying the kingdom of Jerusalem in terms of size and land, as they do allow for the drawing of a near exact map of the kingdom in the late thirteenth century. In the document, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir states that Hugh did not sign the treaty due to his fear of Charles of Anjou.<sup>480</sup> Whether or not Hugh failed to sign the treaty for this reason, as Holt believes,<sup>481</sup> it is important to note that Charles' interest in the kingdom of Jerusalem was already recognised in 1268. This would confirm the argument put forward by Baldwin, and one that has been explained above: that Charles' connection to the East came as a result of his conquest of Sicily, and not as a result of Gregory X's negotiations with Charles. This would also confirm

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<sup>476</sup> *Document en français des archives angevines de Naples (règne de Charles 1er)*, trans. by Paul Durrieu and A. de Bouard, 2 Vols (Paris: 1933, 1935), 1, 15, n.1, pp. 57-58.

<sup>477</sup> *TT*, §435.

<sup>478</sup> *Ibid.*, §437.

<sup>479</sup> The treaty is mentioned by Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Baybars' biographer, and can be found in Abdul-Aziz Khowaiter, *Baibars the First: His Endeavours and Achievements* (London, 1978), pp. 102-103. Holt has also discussed the treaty in his *Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260-1290*, p. 70. It is however analyzed in a deeper manner in Rabei Khamisy, 'The Unratified Treaty between the Mamluks and the Franks of Acre in 1268', *Al-Masaq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean*, 26:2 (2014), pp. 147-167.

<sup>480</sup> Khamisy, 'The Unratified Treaty between the Mamluks and the Franks of Acre in 1268', pp. 147-167 (p. 151).

<sup>481</sup> Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 17, 72.

the argument that Charles' investment in the kingdom dwindled in the later years, and that his rule was merely recognised as an absentee king.

Overall, it does seem that Charles, while being interested in the eastern Mediterranean as a result of Sicily's geographical position, was not so much affected by the events in the kingdom of Jerusalem, nor did he do much to alter them. His only visible 'contribution' is his acquisition of Maria's claim to the throne, after which, Charles seemed to have let the events run their course, aside from the sending of a relief convoy to Acre during the short conflict with Hugh III. One wonders therefore why he would take an active stance in the Latin East prior to his coronation, to then slowly decrease his contributions. Schein has pointed out that it was during the years 1269-80 that Charles invested in the Holy Land, most of which happened prior to his coronation as king of Jerusalem.<sup>482</sup> As Abulafia pointed out, it does not appear as if Charles had a strong sense of religious duty, like his brother.<sup>483</sup> His dealings with the Muslims, but also his treatment of Jews support that theory.<sup>484</sup> Another point to add is that, we know Maria and Charles had contact before 1277, most notably in 1270, when a ship carrying Maria's possessions sunk and Charles ordered all stolen items to be tracked down.<sup>485</sup> This was followed by a payment from Charles to Maria in 1271 of an unspecified amount, most likely to cover the costs of her lost belongings.<sup>486</sup> Baldwin also makes an important point. He states that Charles, through his 'donations' of supplies, made the kingdom of Jerusalem dependent on him.<sup>487</sup> This dependence has also been noted by Housley, who states that the first three Angevin kings allowed the military orders to export grain and horses from the ports in their kingdom, sometimes without paying duties.<sup>488</sup> The state of the kingdom of Jerusalem with regards to food is well described in Ross' work on relations between east and west. In it, she shows that not only did the kingdom need shipments of grain and supplies from the west, but also that the little

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<sup>482</sup> Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis* (Oxford, 1991), p. 60.

<sup>483</sup> Abulafia, 'The state of research: Charles of Anjou reassessed', pp. 93-114 (p. 114).

<sup>484</sup> We have seen that Charles was very much interested in Muslim science, and he in fact employed Jews for the translation of Muslim works. Charles stands out from his brother Louis IX, but also from his son, Charles II, in allowing the Jews to enjoy respectable statuses in his lands. For more information on the treatment of Jews in Sicily and Angevin lands, see: J. Shatzmiller, 'Les Angevins et les juifs de leurs états: Anjou, Naples et Provence', *Collection de l'Ecole française de Rome*, 245 (1998), pp. 289-300; and J. Shatzmiller, *Shylock Reconsidered. Jews, moneylending and medieval society* (Berkeley, 1990).

<sup>485</sup> *RCA*, 6, §982.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, 7, §127.

<sup>487</sup> Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', pp. 424-442 (pp. 427-30).

<sup>488</sup> Housley, *The Italian Crusades*, p. 67.

land that they had could only be cultivated with the permission from Baybars.<sup>489</sup> This dependence on Sicily was clearly felt in 1275 as stated above, but it was also felt on a political level. Throughout his reign, Charles very rarely dealt with the feudal nobility of the kingdom of Jerusalem. In fact, only Philip of Montfort is named in person in one of the charters.<sup>490</sup> This was due to the fact that Philip still held land in the south of France. Philip was also to join Charles for the conquest of Sicily and the crusade to Tunis.<sup>491</sup> Apart from him, Charles dealt primarily with the military orders, and the Templars in particular, through their master, William of Beaujeu. This desire to avoid the barons could be due to the lack of central leadership in the kingdom, especially in the aftermath of Saint-Sabas, but also due to the power the powerful baronial families held: Charles would have been reluctant to deal with the Ibelins for example, whom, as the most powerful and influential family in both the kingdom of Jerusalem and the kingdom of Cyprus – which also implies their connection to the kings of Cyprus – meant that they would have most likely been opposed to any change.

Charles' dealings with the military orders also affected the Italians. By reason of the war with Pisa, and with Genoa (1272-1276),<sup>492</sup> Charles restricted their access to food supplies accordingly, in Italy, but also in Acre. As such, supplies sent in 1270 were not to be sold to Pisans,<sup>493</sup> while in 1274 the restriction was also placed on the Genoese.<sup>494</sup> The 1270s were also a period during which both Venice and Genoa continued their conflict, albeit being officially at peace. Both cities had signed a peace treaty prior to Louis' second crusade in 1270, to last five years, and which was renewed for another two.<sup>495</sup> There lies also the connection between Philip of Montfort and Charles. As explained in the previous chapter, Philip of Montfort was more important than previously acknowledged. Between 1266 and 1270, his role in the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus is very difficult to ascertain, however, his presence and involvement in the affairs of the kingdom have to be noted. We have seen that Philip was very close to the Genoese, and remained so until his death, and that by blood, he was also close to the Ibelins. We also know that Philip's son, John of Montfort married

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<sup>489</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', pp. 99-109.

<sup>490</sup> *RCA*, 4, §661.

<sup>491</sup> Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', pp. 424-442 (p. 429).

<sup>492</sup> The war between Genoa and Charles erupted as a result of an attempt by the king to isolate the Ghibellines, which resulted in him arresting all Genoese in his realm. Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, p. 82. The peace treaty between Genoa and Charles can be found in *LIRG*, 6, §1129.

<sup>493</sup> *RAC*, 5, §124.

<sup>494</sup> *Ibid.*, 11, §1.

<sup>495</sup> Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*, 2, p. 353.

Hugh III's sister, and that the city of Tyre was at war with Venice from the War of Saint-Sabas to 1277 when John of Montfort restored them in their previous privileges and possessions.<sup>496</sup> The relationships between Charles and Philip, and between Charles and Genoa, as well as with the Venetians, were therefore active.<sup>497</sup>

Charles never went to the Holy Land during his reign, and his connection with the Italians in particular remained strongly affected by events in the West rather than in the Levant. As stated above, his dealings with the kingdom of Jerusalem were primarily through the military orders, and as Baldwin points out, Charles may even have planned to influence the kingdom and even buy Maria's claim before the need arose, by stating that the Templars had no reasons to support Maria against Hugh unless they knew she was going to sell her claim to Charles.<sup>498</sup> Furthermore, the Hospitallers did nothing to prevent the sale, as they also knew that Charles was too important for the kingdom due to the supplies arriving from Sicily.<sup>499</sup> The Sicilian Vespers were the most important event in terms of Charles' influence on the Holy Land. It is in its aftermath that Charles granted his only privileges to a mercantile city in the kingdom of Jerusalem, something that was usually done by a new monarch upon arriving on the throne. Marseille was in effect rewarded for their support during the conflict in Sicily.<sup>500</sup> This preference for Marseille in particular was mainly at the expense of Pisa, whose alliance with the Hohenstaufen meant that they were opposed to Charles' invasion of Sicily from the beginning, but also at the expense of the Genoese, who were already in a difficult position in the kingdom of Jerusalem: the Venetians were back in Tyre, and Genoese presence in Acre was minimal. Marseille was already well integrated in Charles' policies. Ships from the commune made up most of his navy, and it was this navy, along with ships from Nice, which was able to safeguard Sicilian ports against the Genoese during their conflict.<sup>501</sup>

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<sup>496</sup> *RRH*, §1413; David Jacoby, 'The Venetian presence in the crusader lordship of Tyre: a tale of decline', in *The Crusader World*, ed. by Adrian J. Boas, pp. 181-196 (p. 190). For the history of the Montfort family, see Charles du Fresne, Sieur du Cange, *Les Familles d'Outre-Mer*, ed. by M. E.-G. Rey (New-York: 1869, 1971), pp. 499-501.

<sup>497</sup> Philip was one of the commanders in Charles' army making its way down to southern Italy in 1265 and was also to take part in the crusade to Tunis, before going back to Tyre, where he was killed in 1270. Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, p. 78-79. Philip may have therefore been of some influence on Genoa during his time in Charles' service, as the city only started becoming suspicious of Charles' motives after Philip's death.

<sup>498</sup> Philip B. Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (Woodbridge, 2014), p. 117.

<sup>499</sup> Baldwin, 'Charles of Anjou, Pope Gregory X and the crown of Jerusalem', pp. 424-442 (p. 434).

<sup>500</sup> Mayer, *Urkunden*, §742, §743, pp. 1290-1294.

<sup>501</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, p. 177.

Despite the lack of evidence pointing towards a strong Angevin involvement in the kingdom of Jerusalem, one cannot deny that Charles worked hard to acquire, and keep his title of king of Jerusalem, and the same could be said about his heirs.<sup>502</sup> The result is that even nowadays, two major royal families are contesting the title of king of Jerusalem, the Habsbourgs of Austria, and the Bourbons of Spain. The title of king of Jerusalem became a card, around which negotiations could take place, especially in the aftermath of the Sicilian Vespers and Charles I's death.<sup>503</sup> This was the extent of Charles' policies in the kingdom of Jerusalem. His reign did not affect it very much, albeit perhaps safeguarding it for a short time due to both, Charles' reputation and family, as well as his donations of supplies to the needy region. The fact that he was another absentee king meant that the everyday affairs of the kingdom were left to the local baronage. Also, the lack of willingness from Charles to negotiate on a more personal level with the nobility of the Holy Land meant that he never established close links with the noble houses such as the Ibelins, or even the Montfort, as while Philip remained a strong ally, his son John was closer to the kings of Cyprus. The only possible clues that would indicate some attempt at acquiring powerful allies were two marriage proposals: the first between the son of his admiral and the princess of Antioch-Tripoli from 1277, which may, or may not have taken place, although a son is mentioned by Du Cange;<sup>504</sup> the second between Margaret of Beaumont and Prince Bohemond VII of Antioch.<sup>505</sup> Despite these not amounting to much – as the principality of Antioch had already become a separate entity from the kingdom, as well as the fact that in 1286, Henry II of Cyprus was back to power in Acre – the first of these marriages proved influential with regards to Genoese actions later on.<sup>506</sup> These two marriages proposals are on the other hand very intriguing. Why would Charles establish a link between one of the most important families in the Holy Land, and the family of his admiral, and not his? This question would definitely benefit from further study, although it is outside the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, this gives historians a certain insight into the objectives of Charles, and his opinion on the kingdom of Jerusalem.

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<sup>502</sup> Stephen Rhys Davies, 'Marriage and the Politics of Friendship: The Family of Charles II of Anjou, King of Naples (1285-1309)', (Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, 1998), pp. 147-154.

<sup>503</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 149, 151.

<sup>504</sup> Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 60; Du Cange, p. 208-9. Interestingly, one of Charles' daughter, Eleanor of Anjou, married this son, who was called Philip. Despite the fact that this marriage was dissolved by Pope Boniface VIII in 1300, it shows the close relationship between the two families.

<sup>505</sup> *RRH*, §1422.

<sup>506</sup> See next Chapter for more.



## **The Italians and Charles**

Having looked at Charles, it is now possible to consider the Italians and their relationship with him on a closer level. The most notable fact with regards to these relationships is the continuation of the ‘Capetians’ Italian policies’ of entertaining contacts with certain families, most notably in Genoa. In the previous chapter, we have seen how Louis used different families in order to secure ships for his crusade without giving them too much independence, which would have reduced his own. Charles’ methods and reasons were somewhat different, but his aim was similar. It was his position in Sicily, but mostly in Piedmont and Northern Italy which prompted him to form certain bonds with different mercantile families of the commune, and his choice was largely influenced by the city’s own internal conflicts.

The Grimaldi family was, and still is, one of the oldest and most influential families in the commune. During the Guelf/Ghibelline conflict, they took the papal side and became, along with the Fieschi family, one of the cornerstones of the anti-imperial power in Genoa. Their authority as well as their political affiliations, were probably the reasons why Louis did not involve them, or any of the other major families in Genoa, in the plans for his crusades, after all, they were one of the four major families in Genoa, along with the Fieschi as stated above, but also with the Spinola and the Doria.<sup>507</sup> This therefore makes the fact that they found an ally in Charles worth mentioning.

There are more surviving account books for this period than for previous years, which means, Genoese trading trends in the Mediterranean in the thirteenth century have already been analysed by historians such as Abulafia, Lopez and Epstein. They have drawn up tables from Genoese cartularies which give us a general view of the ‘preferred’ destinations for merchants, however these are specific to certain years. These tables identify trade to *Oltramare* as amounting to 26.4% prior to Saint-Sabas, and 26% in 1270, just before the war with Charles.<sup>508</sup> As the Grimaldis were one of the major families in Genoa, however, and therefore one of the most powerful, it should be possible to assume that they would not only follow those patterns, but also be one of

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<sup>507</sup> Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittlemeer*, 1, p. 156.

<sup>508</sup> Those figures are taken from the Notary Cartularies in the Genoese State Archives. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142. The number of those notary contracts that are available reaches the thousands, and are described by Van Doosselaere as being unique in Europe due to their ‘precocity, continuity, and quantity.’ Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*, p. 2.

the major participants.<sup>509</sup> During the war against Charles, Genoese trade with the Levant slowed drastically, amounting to only 0.5%.<sup>510</sup> Would this have affected the Grimaldis in particular? Unfortunately there is to my knowledge, no study of individual family trading patterns, which means we cannot be sure as to the extent the family was affected, however, another interesting point to note is that with the slowed down trade to Syria, there was an increase in trade with Alexandria.<sup>511</sup>

In addition to these tables, another study can help define the ‘trends’ of the later thirteenth century. The study of Genoese commercial contracts has been largely avoided by historians by reason of the sheer volume of surviving documentation, but also because of the fact that they would require an analysis of an economic nature. Having spent time in the Genoese archives researching Genoese-Capetian links, I can verify the fact that one would need more time than available to be able to go through all documents. Van Doosselaere, an economic historian, has studied a large portion of this material and compiled for us a study of commercial agreements. In it he has identified Genoese thirteenth century trade as being opportunistic in nature, often initiated by military expeditions.<sup>512</sup> His conclusion seems to confirm the idea that Genoese trade was heavily influenced by the crusades, and especially by their targets. If one was to follow this line of argument, then the two major crusading expeditions of the latter thirteenth century which targeted Northern Africa rather than Syria, would therefore imply that trade routes would have been diverted towards Alexandria for the most part (had they been successful), and would therefore suggest that the mercantile communes had thus lost some interests in the Holy Land, something that is clearly reflected by the number of contracts for the period between 1270-85. Epstein’s table however does not always support this theory, as it not only shows the percentage of trade to Alexandria in 1252-3 as 0%, but also that at the destination of the Holy Land

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<sup>509</sup> Van Doosselaere and Lopez both wrote that Genoese merchants, as well as Venetians and Pisans merchants, followed the same pattern of rules and norms. This therefore makes it possible to assume that one of the major families in Genoa can speak for the Commune in terms of trading habits. Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*, p. 64; Lopez, p. 291.

<sup>510</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

<sup>511</sup> Familial trade patterns would benefit from further detailed study, incorporating economic history, social history, but also political history of Genoa, and of the Mediterranean. The scope of such study per family, and especially that of the Grimaldi, would be too much for this present thesis. Ibid. This trade increase is also interesting in that one would expect Genoese trade in the Black Sea to increase as a result, but it did not. This is also to be looked at with the increase in trade with ‘Other’ partners, which included Cyprus.

<sup>512</sup> Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*, p. 5.

as 26.4%.<sup>513</sup> This discrepancy clearly shows how little we know about how the crusades influenced trade in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, one should remember that in 1252-3, and 1270, the two dates in Epstein's table of the thirteenth century with 0% trade to Alexandria, coincide with Louis IX's crusades, in which the Genoese played an active role. It would seem rather improbable though that Genoa and Genoese merchants would forfeit any trade with the lucrative commercial hub that was Alexandria, and Epstein rightly states that percentage of trade going labelled as unknown, or as 'where it seems best', could actually represent trade going to 'forbidden places', such as Egypt.<sup>514</sup> Thus, Van Doosselaere's, and Lopez's theory would seem to hold, at least 'on paper'. It is also possible that Charles' Byzantine ambitions would have influenced these patterns in a similar way, and pushed them further north towards Constantinople.

### **Trade, contracts and the merchant in the thirteenth century:**

Analysing trading patterns is a complicated aspect of history, especially for one not familiar with economics. The origins of the *commenda* remains unknown. John Pryor details briefly that it originated from numerous other contracts, from different Mediterranean regions, and that it may have evolved from the earlier *societas*.<sup>515</sup> He analyses the differences and the similarities with four other types of contracts in order to find an answer but ultimately, there is not enough information to be able to pin-point its exact background.<sup>516</sup> With respect to this Van Doosselaere's work is extremely helpful. Interestingly, we can observe two changes in the way trade was conducted coinciding with that time. Firstly, the pay-out aspect of the typical trading contracts seemed to have changed in the last quarter of the century. Whereas the usual ratio of profit sharing remained the same for larger contracts (3 for the investor: 1 to the merchant), the shares became larger for the merchants for smaller contracts.<sup>517</sup> This, Van Doosselaere attributes to the rise of prices and the diminution of profit, and claims was the start of the decline of this type of contract, as larger investors were reluctant to

<sup>513</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

<sup>514</sup> Ibid. Although trade to Alexandria was suspended during the Third Crusade. Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>515</sup> John H. Pryor, 'The Origins of the Commenda Contract', *Speculum*, vol. 52, 1 (January 1977), pp. 5-37 (pp. 5, 22).

<sup>516</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-37 (p. 5).

<sup>517</sup> Van Doosselaere, *Commercial Agreements*, p. 67.

share in their profit to such a margin with others.<sup>518</sup> It should be noted however that this change in attitude came about the time of Charles's accession to the throne of Jerusalem. Could the two be linked? The second change is seen in how trade was done. Once again, Van Doosselaere did most of the work by analysing thousands of contracts and by creating graphs.<sup>519</sup> These graphs give us a simple visual way of understanding how trade was performed between individuals and how it evolved over time.




FIGURE C.1. Commenda network, 1154-64.

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<sup>518</sup> Ibid.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid., pp. 219-224.




FIGURE C.4. Commenda network, 1245-68.




FIGURE C.5. Commenda network, 1269-95.

Graphs taken from Van Dosselaere, pp. 219, 221.

Each dot represents an individual entity, for example a family, and each line represents a connection, whether a contract, or investment. The first graph shown here shows a system very much centred on a few individuals, who contracted between one another and created commercial hubs around themselves, while smaller merchants did business with one or two contractors, some forming a chain consisting of a few links. This model highlights not only the economic model of the city of Genoa in the second half of the twelfth century, but also its political situation, as the centre of those clusters would be the most influential families, and thus the most powerful ones. Another aspect can be deduced from those graphs, and especially with the first and third one, when dealing with international trade. We have seen that the pay-out ratio, between investor and merchant, changed over time to adapt to the rise of prices and of the risks involved; however, one has to consider the money involved in trade between, for example, a Genoese merchant, and a merchant from Alexandria. One can assume that with long distance trading, connections were everything, as foreign merchants preferred to deal with people they already knew, or had dealings with in the past. Outsiders were thus worse off than already established merchants.<sup>520</sup> It is perhaps one reason why groups were forming, and why for instance, in the third graph, these groups seem to be connected to one another, forming thus a vast network.

Van Dosselaere divided the period between 1154 and 1315 into six graphs, three of which I have shown above. These three summarise the overall trend of the different patterns used by merchants. Initially, trade was centred on powerful individuals (i.e. families), however, we see that during the time that coincides with Louis IX's first crusade, these powerful individuals were less influential, and thus, trade was nearly evenly distributed amongst the different families. This graph also coincides with the first popular insurrection in Genoa, which resulted in Guglielmo Boccanegra becoming *Captain of the People* in 1257.<sup>521</sup> In the aftermath of the War of Saint-Sabas, and of the conquest of Sicily, powerful families were once more at the centre, however, these families seem to have entertained closer links amongst each other, in order to create a stronger trade network able to compete with Venice on an economical scale, but also on a military one, as is seen in Genoa's position in the Black Sea for example, where Venice remained on a secondary level to Genoa up until the end of the thirteenth century.

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<sup>520</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>521</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 146-147.

Of the three Italian cities, only Pisa established a relationship with Charles that did not change throughout his reign in Sicily. Both were at war from the onset of the invasion of Sicily, and officially at peace in 1270. This was before Charles acquired the crown of Jerusalem. The terms of their surrender are described in the Angevin charters and are more or less a formality, as the city of Pisa continued to thrive and disrupt Genoese interests in the Tyrrhenian Sea up until their defeat by the latter at the battle of Meloria in 1284. We have seen in the previous chapter that Pisa had been granted substantial powers by Frederick II in 1226, in and around the commune. Charles's descent on Sicily as part of the 'crusade' against the Hohenstaufen would have threatened their position in the region. Added to that was Pisa's continued alliance and support to the Hohenstaufen family, and their on-going conflict with Genoa. In Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem however, their situation was slightly better, due for the most part to their victory in the War of Saint-Sabas, but also because of their alliance with Venice. Charles' lack of involvement there also meant that their commercial activity in Syria as well as Egypt remained relatively safe from his hands, although as stated above, the sale of shipments of grain from Sicily to the kingdom of Jerusalem was at times restricted, and the Pisans were more than often, included in the restrictions. In fact, the only mentions of the Pisans in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the *Templar of Tyre* from the period highlighted here are from the year 1282, and related to the death of the lord of Gibelet and the events of Tripoli.<sup>522</sup> They are represented as rejoicing, and dancing in the streets of Acre as a result of the Genoese defeat.<sup>523</sup>

The post-Saint-Sabas period however is difficult to assess with regards to the Genoese and the Venetians: after the fall of the Latin Empire in 1261, Venice lost its trading monopoly in the Black Sea, albeit not entirely, to the benefit of Genoa.<sup>524</sup> This sparked – or rekindled – their conflict, but the setting was now Constantinople and the Golden Horn. Schein has argued that the Italians were losing interest in the crusader kingdom, due firstly to the internal struggles but most importantly because of the lucrative trade in Egypt and the Byzantine Empire.<sup>525</sup> Interestingly, if one were to follow Van Dosselaere's theory about Genoese trading, one would be inclined to agree with Schein. We have however seen that it was not the case, and that trade to the Levant

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<sup>522</sup> See next chapter.

<sup>523</sup> *TT*, §412.

<sup>524</sup> The number of contracts to *Romania* from 1261 onwards remained high up until 1313, the last date given by Epstein. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

<sup>525</sup> Schein, *Fideles Crucis*, p. 41.

was still strong. On the other hand, she also argues that the communes were not afraid of papal sanctions and continued trading despite the bans on trade and war material with Muslim powers, while also stating that they did not contribute to the economy, nor to the defence of the cities.<sup>526</sup> These bans, and their effect, are analysed by Menache and Stantchev.<sup>527</sup> Her conclusions are somewhat different to those of Schein. Menache does state that the bans were ineffective, however, she does not specifically state that the Italians did not listen at all.<sup>528</sup> Madden found evidence of that, at least for Venice. In his work on the commune, he found that not only did they condemn trade with Muslims, but also that they actively searched for transgressors.<sup>529</sup> Although no such evidence is found for Genoa, we do have a proclamation from the consuls of Genoa given in the church of San Lorenzo in 1151, which confirms the prohibition of arms and timber to the Saracens, without the specific authority of the consuls of Genoa.<sup>530</sup> This confirms the hypothesis that the lines between piracy and trade were clearly known, despite being blurry at times, and that they were crossed from time to time to allow the commune to expand and continue trading as usual.<sup>531</sup> To add to this line of argument, due to their geographical profiles, both of these could not afford excommunication, as the loss of trade, as well as imports, would be too great.<sup>532</sup> Furthermore, it would be wrong to assume (as Schein does) that the Italians did not contribute to the economy of the Holy Land. Despite their numerous privileges, the mercantile communes created a trading hub in Acre. The graphs above show that nearly every contract was connected to one another, thus showing that where one Genoese group went, the rest followed. This in turn attracted many other merchants, mostly Muslims, or Syrians Christian. They would in turn have to pay certain taxes on imports and exports, thus contributing to the economy. Additionally, the bulk of pilgrim traffic took place through the Italians. Without their fleets, the constant influx of pilgrims would not have been the same and thus could not have help raise the income of the

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<sup>526</sup> Ibid.

<sup>527</sup> Stantchev, *Spiritual Rationality*.

<sup>528</sup> Menache, 'Papal attempts at commercial boycott', p. 242.

<sup>529</sup> Madden, *Venice*, p. 118.

<sup>530</sup> *LIRG*, §151, p. 223, a translation can be found in Hall, *Caffaro*, Selected documents, p. 191.

<sup>531</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 27. As Hall and Phillips note, the key phrase in the proclamation is the reference to the specific approval of the consuls in order to be able to trade with Muslims. This shows that exceptions were made to the rules, and that some trade with Muslims was taking place during papal bans.

<sup>532</sup> Once again, Madden highlights the troubles encountered by Venice in the early fourteenth century when the commune found itself under excommunication and therefore cut from the rest of Europe. Ibid., p. 185.



kingdom. This little interlude is to counter Schein's argument regarding the Italian communes' loss of interest in the Holy Land. With regards to the period spanning the years 1261 to 1282, the Italian Communes would have been mending the scars of Saint-Sabas, as well as re-enforcing their position in the Holy Land. This should by no means be interpreted as a loss of interest on their part, and this is seen clearly in the case of Venice.

### **Italian expansion in Acre:**

In the aftermath of the forced departure of Genoa from Acre, Venice continued its policy of expansion and as such, bought numerous buildings within its own quarter, but also outside of its boundaries.<sup>533</sup> This actually highlights a very interesting phenomenon. Jacoby shows that the commune was actually buying properties and land from Venetians, which could suggest that some individuals sold all their assets because they saw 'the end' coming. This is implied through the will of Pietro Vassano, a rich Venetian who owned numerous properties in Acre and in Venice.<sup>534</sup> In it, he instructs his son, Andrea, to sell off his belonging in Acre within a year of his death. The will was drawn up in 1289 and gives us quite a detailed inventory of his possessions, especially in the Holy Land. The most surprising aspect of this however, is that Andrea is shown to have sold his properties within a year of this will being drafted.<sup>535</sup> Interest in these properties by the Venetian commune is attested through the authorisation of a loan from Venice to purchase them.<sup>536</sup> This definitely shows that continued involvement from the Italian communes,<sup>537</sup> in Acre and the Holy Land had undeniably not vanished, and as Jacoby states, in the case of Venice, territorial expansion in Acre can be seen up until the city's fall to the Mamluks in 1291.<sup>538</sup> This policy of expansion by Venice, but also the numerous documents regarding the sale of property in Acre are

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<sup>533</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant', pp. 225-264 (p. 229).

<sup>534</sup> Tafel, Thomas, *Urkunden*, pp. 398-99.

<sup>535</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 249).

<sup>536</sup> Roberto Cessi, *Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia*, 3 (Bologna, 1934), p. 71, §111.

<sup>537</sup> Although we only have evidence of such sales and buyings from Venice, it is again fair to assume that it was the case for all three of our Italian communes. The earlier evidence, as seen in the previous chapter, as well as the forged documents from Pisa and Marseille for example, clearly highlight the desire to acquire more property in Acre.

<sup>538</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 248).

an extremely interesting aspect of social and economic history that deserves more attention from crusading historians. After Saint-Sabas, Venice occupied a large portion of Genoese territory, and used stones from the destroyed houses to build a new wall around their quarter.<sup>539</sup> In 1269, a wealthy Venetian loaned a large sum to be invested in numerous trading ventures, while buying a house outside the walls of the commune's quarter to later build a wall around it in order to join it to the Venetian quarter.<sup>540</sup> This same person was also present in Acre in 1291, which implies that not all Italians had left the city prior to the siege.<sup>541</sup> Venice's attitude with regards to Tyre also shows that they were still heavily invested in the Holy Land. A Venetian consul was definitely present in Tyre before 1262.<sup>542</sup> He was subordinate from the one in Acre; however, it shows that their population, and interests were rising. This clearly challenges the argument placed forward by Schein, that Italians had lost interest in the Holy Land. In fact, it would actually suggest that they were more interested than before in establishing a more permanent and secure 'colony' in Acre.

In the case of Genoa, this period was not, as one would believe, a poor one. Despite their 'defeat' in the War of Saint-Sabas, their trade with the east did not diminish. As we will see in the next chapter, they made Tyre their new trading centre in the kingdom,<sup>543</sup> while their alliance with the Byzantines helped them regain some ground in the Black Sea. They also remained very present in the internal political conflicts of the kingdom, especially regarding the events surrounding the city of Tyre in the early eighties, as they are mentioned more than once providing galleys and ships, while they are also cited in the struggle between the prince of Antioch and the lord of Gibelet, originally a city under the Embriaco family.<sup>544</sup>

### **The Grimaldi:**

One of the most interesting facts about the Genoese in that period is their continuing relationship with the Capetians, and with Charles in particular. We have seen that both Philip II and Louis IX entertained relationships with the commune. While

<sup>539</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant', pp. 225-264 (p. 228).

<sup>540</sup> Jacoby, 'New Venetian evidence on crusader Acre', pp. 240-256 (p. 245).

<sup>541</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant', pp. 225-264 (p. 242).

<sup>542</sup> Ibid., pp. 225-264 (p. 232).

<sup>543</sup> See previous chapter for more. Musarra, *La Guerra di San Saba*, p. 77.

<sup>544</sup> *TT*, §409 - §413.

Philip concentrated more on the Commune itself, Louis concentrated more on individuals and families, which enabled him to increase his power on the city. Charles followed the same pattern as his brother, and developed close ties with families, and one in particular: the Grimaldi family.<sup>545</sup> This family fought with Charles against Genoa during his reign as king of Sicily, and are mentioned at least three times in the Angevin archives with regards to rewards given to loyal supporters of the king.<sup>546</sup> One of those charters is of particular note in that it names four members of the Grimaldi family, as well as the city of Lucca as allies, together with Marseille, and most importantly, states that Charles has been warned of Genoa's intent to attack him, by the Sultan's ambassadors.<sup>547</sup> This highlights the point made earlier that Charles was very much acting like Frederick II had. The mention of four Grimaldis also points towards the fact that it was not just a single member of the family who supported Charles in his conquests, but rather the whole family. Their support allowed Charles not only to assert some of his influence more easily in Lombardy, but also in Sicily and the Holy Land, where the Grimaldis had some influence: a Luchetto Grimaldi is mentioned as traveling to Acre to try to recover Genoese possessions in the city in the aftermath of the War of Saint-Sabas, which shows that not only was this family important enough to be trusted with negotiations of such magnitude, but also that their name was respected enough in the East.<sup>548</sup> Prior to that, he was also one of the Genoese ambassadors sent to Viterbo in 1258 to negotiate the deals of the treaty marking the end of the War of Saint-Sabas.<sup>549</sup> Caro also mentions a Luchetto Grimaldi being elected *Podesta* of Ventimiglia in 1270.<sup>550</sup> This is combined with further trade deals, which were made with Armenia, as well as others being developed in Cyprus. All of this highlights a clear desire from Genoa to keep open the trade routes to the eastern Mediterranean.

The counter argument to that, however, is related to the trade with the Muslims. Genoese trade in Egypt is closely linked to the slave trade. This type of trade has always been one of the main concerns of the papacy of the thirteenth century, and was the target

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<sup>545</sup> The importance of this family is to be found not only in its longevity, the House of Grimaldi is still very present nowadays, with at its head, Prince Albert II of Monaco, but also in its involvement in the politics of Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It should also be noted that this relationship lasted much longer than any others established by previous or subsequent French monarchs, as in 1304, Ranieri Grimaldi, the first Prince of Monaco, was named admiral of the French fleet, and was succeeded in the same post by his son Charles.

<sup>546</sup> *RCA*, 2, §31, §56, §320.

<sup>547</sup> *Ibid.*, §56.

<sup>548</sup> *TT*, §354.

<sup>549</sup> *LIRG*, 1/6, §798.

<sup>550</sup> Caro, *Genoa und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 2, p. 262.

of continuous bans, especially regarding Christian slaves. This forced the Genoese into a tight corner, as this trade was extremely lucrative – for all parties involved, Christians as well as Muslims – and would have been hard to replace. It is as a result of this that some divisions started to appear between Genoa and the Genoese in the east.<sup>551</sup> These divisions will be more prominent between 1285-1291 with the arrival of Benedetto Zaccaria and will be looked at in the next chapter, however, certain aspects of it can already be seen in the late 1260s and early 1270s.

The first aspect of division is directly related to Charles and his invasion of Sicily, which in turn was linked to the papal/imperial conflict (Guelf/Ghibelline). With respect to this, a city like Genoa whose political power shifted from one side to the other, and whose naval and economic power was one of the most important of the period, would have been placed right at the middle of the invasion; rightly so, as they had already had dealings with Charles with regards to Piedmont and Marseille, and following their own struggles against Frederick, would have welcomed a change of rule that might open new opportunities. Genoa helped Charles on numerous occasions between the years 1262 and 1270. Firstly against the Provençal communes of Marseille and Nice, where their naval power was instrumental in strengthening Charles' influence in the region against their own rivals, but most importantly in 1269 and 1270, where he made use of them against Pisa; they were also present throughout the crusade to Tunis.<sup>552</sup> During these years however, the internal political struggle within Genoa grew more important, to the point that in 1272, the Guelf supporters, the Grimaldis amongst them, were thrown out of the city and thus had to find allies.<sup>553</sup> Charles was the most obvious choice, not only because of his recent defeat of the Hohenstaufens, but also because his relations with the commune had degraded to the point of going to war.

The second aspect of these divisions, and which is one of the most important pieces of information regarding the Grimaldi in the Latin East, is the involvement of Luchetto Grimaldi in the affairs of the kingdom. As mentioned above, he was the one the commune sent to negotiate for the return of Genoese property after the War of Saint-Sabas, however, Martin da Canal tells of the events in a less diplomatic way. In his *Estoire*, he states that Luchetto arrived in Acre at the head of a large Genoese fleet,

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<sup>551</sup> The Genoese occupation of Caffa for example was based on the slave trade, and it is that trade that seemed to have dominated the area. Epstein, *Purity Lost*, pp. 56-58.

<sup>552</sup> Dunbabin, *Charles I of Anjou*, p. 82-3.

<sup>553</sup> Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittelleer*, 1, pp. 293, 299.

which had sailed from Tyre. He blockaded the port of Acre, preventing any ships from entering, and sinking or capturing any that escaped, and demanded the return of Genoese property in the city. After the obvious refusal of the Venetians, Luchetto sailed back to Tyre, leaving his second in command to continue the blockade. He, on the other hand, was defeated by the assembled Venetian-Pisan fleet, and withdrew back to Tyre, where he was seemingly chastised for his defeat. The Genoese sailors, unhappy with the situation, expressed their desire to return home and during the following night, Grimaldi quietly sailed back to Genoa.<sup>554</sup> Interestingly, the *Templar of Tyre* also recalls this event, and adds a few more details to the story: the Genoese fleet numbered 28 galleys and arrived on the sixteenth day of August 1267 in the port of Acre, where they captured some Pisan vessels and took control of the Tower of the Flies.<sup>555</sup> They stayed there twelve days, following which, Luchetto left for Tyre with fifteen galleys, leaving the rest in Acre.<sup>556</sup> The Venetian fleet arrived shortly after and scared the Genoese away. No mention is made of the ‘mutiny’ later on however, although we learn that both parties agreed a truce of three years.<sup>557</sup> These two versions of this episode recall the fact that tensions were still very high in the late 1260s – early 1270s – between the Genoese and the Venetians. If one was to look at Marin da Canal’s version only, it could also indicate a very real change in attitude from the Genoese lower class, or at least the sailors. The desire of the Genoese sailors to remain in and perhaps fight for the Holy Land had lost momentum to new areas such as the Black Sea, which brought new gains, and military successes. Despite the story being told rather differently in the *Templar of Tyre*, the desire for vengeance against the Venetians and Pisans is still present, however, Luchetto is said to have wanted to talk to the Master of the Templars, before learning of the defeat and hurriedly sailing back home.<sup>558</sup>

Another document sheds some light on these events. In 1268, a transaction between merchants from diverse backgrounds – Acre, Ayas, Tyre, Antioch-Tripoli, the king of Armenia, and even the Mongols – who refused to trade with Genoese merchants following the capture of a galley by Luchetto Grimaldi, and Genoa, who promised to

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<sup>554</sup> *Martin da Canal*, 2, §66 - §79.

<sup>555</sup> *TT*, §354.

<sup>556</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>557</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>558</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 186.

pay the sum of £14, 900 Genoese, as soon as all princes and lords involved, as well as the king of Jerusalem (at this time Hugh III), ratified it.<sup>559</sup>

This lack of interest from the lower classes, together with individual Venetians selling their property as seen earlier perhaps allows us to formulate a picture of the level of importance given to the Holy Land by the general population of Italy, and these cities in particular. It seems that while the communes themselves, and the most important families, were still heavily involved – Venice for example buying properties from Venetians in Acre – the lower classes, and the non-ruling families, were starting to lose some faith in these ventures, to the benefit of regions closer to home, or more lucrative. The prospect of new crusades for example would have attracted less powerful families in a similar manner as Louis IX's first crusade. This aspect of communal interest versus individual interest will be looked at closer in the next chapter when Italian-Mamluk relations will be analysed, however, one can already see a shift in attitude from the onset of Charles' arrival on the scene.

The last point that needs attention in this period is the different attitudes of the commune of Genoa both in Italy, and in the Levant. These have already been highlighted above, and linked with the shift in attitudes towards the Holy Land from the different classes; however, a closer look is needed in order to show that the divisions, which arose in this period, were not only on a social level, but also on a geographical one.

Genoese factions have always been one of the commune's greatest weaknesses, by this time more than often fuelled by the Guelf/Ghibelline conflict. As part of these factional conflicts, the rise of one man in particular is interesting and deserves attention. Guglielmo Boccanegra was elected *Captain of the People* in 1257, and his election is perhaps the best example of the difference in attitudes talked about above. Boccanegra was not a member of a powerful family on the same level as the Grimaldis for example, but he was still an influential personality.<sup>560</sup> The first mention of Boccanegra as *Captain of the People* in the *Liber Iurium* is when the ex-podesta, Filippo Della Torre from Milan was ousted and made to swear an oath not to seek retaliation against Genoa and its people from Milan.<sup>561</sup> One of the witnesses to the oath happens to be a certain

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<sup>559</sup> *HIC*, Vol 2, pp. 74-77. This is fully resolved in 1271, when all merchants happily receive full compensation from Genoa. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9.

<sup>560</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 137.

<sup>561</sup> *LIRG*, 1/6, §733.

Grimaldus Grimaldo. Boccanegra is also mentioned as *Captain of the People* in the treaty with Michael Palaiologos (1261), along with all the ‘important’ people of Genoa.<sup>562</sup> This treaty was signed by Genoa despite their knowledge of consequences it would bring them. When the Greeks took back Constantinople, Urban IV excommunicated the commune for their actions against Venice in consort with the Greeks.<sup>563</sup>

This list can help us to understand the situation in the Holy Land. Spreading over two pages, it includes members of the Grimaldi family, including Luchetto Grimaldi – probably just back from his failed expedition in the kingdom of Jerusalem – members of the Spinola, Della Volta, and Doria families. Amongst all of these names, one can see a number who are only distinguishable by trade, i.e: *ferrarius*, *balisterius*, *magister*. These show that a certain number of non-noble families had made their way up the social ladder in Genoa, and were important enough to be included in such a treaty.<sup>564</sup> One other name that stands out is *Nicolaus de Damietta*. At the time, it was customary to use the parish of origin as surname if one did not have a noticeable trade or was not a member of a noble family.<sup>565</sup> Identifying oneself as being from another city altogether is therefore unusual, but not necessarily surprising. Venice is again a good example. We know that Venetian expansion in Cyprus followed their establishment in both Constantinople and Alexandria, and we also know that the first document granting them rights on the island dates from 1136, and in 1244, Marsilio Zorzi, the Venetian consul in Acre, listed in his memorandum, a number of prominent Venetian families permanently established on the island. On the other hand, some Venetian residents of Cyprus opted to identify themselves as being from, for example, Paphos, instead of their Venetian parish.<sup>566</sup> Jacoby attributes this to the long-term establishment of this family in this particular city over numerous generations.<sup>567</sup> If therefore Venetian and Genoese practices were to be taken as being similar, and this can clearly be done so, *Nicolaus of Damietta* would therefore have been living in Damietta for a while, yet was still an important member of the Genoese ruling class, or

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<sup>562</sup> Ibid., §749.

<sup>563</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 151.

<sup>564</sup> Interestingly, this list does not include members of the De Mari family.

<sup>565</sup> Venice is a great example of this trend as Jacoby explains in a few of his papers, including ‘The Venetians in Byzantine and Lusignan Cyprus: Trade, Settlement, and Politics’, in Angel Nicolaou-Konnari, ed., *La Serenissima and La Nobilissima: Venice in Cyprus and Cyprus in Venice* (Nicosia, 2009), pp. 59-100 (p. 61).

<sup>566</sup> Ibid.

<sup>567</sup> Ibid.

had strong connections with them and Genoa. This also shows the clear presence of Genoese families in Muslim-held lands.

Let us go back to the list of witnesses to the 1261 treaty. The number of tradesmen listed is in itself a testament to the so-called *rise of the popolo*, which is seen in both Genoa and Venice around the end of the thirteenth century. In comparison, the number of tradesmen, which are mentioned in the treaty with Charles, is down to two, highlighting thus the end of this first popular movement in Genoa.<sup>568</sup> This rise is directly linked to what we have seen happen in the kingdom of Jerusalem, with Luchetto's sailors not wanting to continue the attack on the Venetian fleet, and it also in effect, reflects the attitude of the smaller Venetian families as explained above.

### **The Italians in Acre:**

Surprisingly, there is no mention of the excommunication of Genoa of 1261 in the chronicles of the Levant, or of the interdict placed on them again in 1274 by Gregory X for their war against Charles of Anjou. The rise of the Dorias and Spinolas to power in Genoa is also missing, despite their consular connection with Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem; the last recorded 'full time' consul of Genoa in Acre was a Jacobus Spinola in 1260.<sup>569</sup> There could be two reasons as to why these events were not recorded in the east, as opposed to the mention of Genoa receiving protection against interdict and excommunication placed on them by anyone but the pope in 1247. The first of these was once more the aftermath of Saint-Sabas, and the fact that the Genoese were nearly completely evicted from Acre. We know the Genoese from the kingdom relocated to Tyre under the protection of Phillip of Montfort, however, we do have references to two Genoese consuls being in Acre in 1273, and in 1277.<sup>570</sup> Jacoby goes as far as saying that the Genoese were reluctant to return to Acre.<sup>571</sup>

This would explain the lack of Genoese sources mentioning Acre, or even the kingdom of Jerusalem in general. There is probably a simpler explanation as to why the

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<sup>568</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 156.

<sup>569</sup> *RRH*, §1294.

<sup>570</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant: Les Vénitiens à Acre dans la seconde moitié du treizième siècle', pp 225-264 (p. 228) ; Caro, *Genua und die mächte am Mittlemeer*, 1, p. 301 ; Bigoni, *Quattro Documenti Genovesi*, III, p. 13.

<sup>571</sup> Jacoby, 'L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant: Les Vénitiens à Acre dans la seconde moitié du treizième siècle', pp. 225-264 (p. 228).



Genoese were either reluctant, or disinterested, to return to Acre. As explained above, there were many internal, and external problems plaguing the commune in Italy. This is in my opinion one of the major reasons behind the lack of focus from the sources on the kingdom of Jerusalem. Jacoby argues in favour of a theory that would indicate that the Genoese were completely absent from the running of the kingdom, as opposed to the cities of Venice and Pisa.<sup>572</sup> This theory would also explain why both Venice and Pisa were free to expand their quarters in Acre unimpeded. On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that there were no more Genoese in Acre at that time. Indeed, while instances of Genoese in the charters for example, remain scarce, there are a few that stand out. From 1279, there seem to be a certain resurrection of references to the Genoese, not in Acre specifically, but *Ayacii*, meaning Ayas.<sup>573</sup> This place seems to be the new political centre for Genoa.<sup>574</sup> Interestingly, we find again mentioned the Grimaldis, in the name of Enricus, brother of Luchetto, present in *Ayacii*.<sup>575</sup> Mentions of these two in 1279 would indicate that Genoa did not necessarily abandon the Levant. This is further emphasised by the mention of a Guilielmo Bixia Spinula, *consule Januensium Birutensium*.<sup>576</sup> Moreover, in 1282, Guy of Ibelin is said to have hired Genoese men at arms and marched to Tripoli during the events regarding Gibelet.<sup>577</sup> However, the fact that Acre, or even Tyre is not mentioned as being their consular city does show that their interests were fading, or at the very least, that their political power was gradually disappearing.

In the case of Venice, one can see a similar situation, albeit for different reasons. With their ‘victory’ in Acre, they were free to expand. Expansion however did not only come in the form of territorial possessions, which have already been discussed above, but also in the form of commercial expansion. With the loss of the Black Sea monopoly, Venice established new trading links, and reaffirmed old ones. In 1271, Leo III of Armenia ceded and confirmed privileges to the commune;<sup>578</sup> in 1272, it is reinstated in its right in Tyre (Genoa is not mentioned in the document, whereas Pisa is).<sup>579</sup> Most

<sup>572</sup> Ibid.; Beugnot, *Assises de Jérusalem ou Recueil des ouvrages de jurisprudence composé pendant le XIIIe siècle dans les royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre*, RHC LOIS, II (1843), XII, p. 215.

<sup>573</sup> *RRH*, §1428.

<sup>574</sup> If the city were part of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, it would suggest that the Genoese had established themselves relatively well in the kingdom, which would have been placed in the perfect area for the slave trade.

<sup>575</sup> *RRH*, §1428.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid., §1430, §1431.

<sup>577</sup> *TT*, §409.

<sup>578</sup> *RRH*, §1376 the full text is found in Tafel, Thomas, *Urkunden*, 3, pp. 115-117.

<sup>579</sup> *RRH*, §1413.

importantly however, it is the treaties with the newly reformed Byzantine Empire, which helped Venice expand the most in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite the loss of Constantinople and the Golden Horn, Venice opened a new trade route and outpost in Trebizond.<sup>580</sup> This new trading outpost, which grew into a fortified colony in the fourteenth century, in effect by-passed the need to trade in Constantinople, and therefore the need to compete with the Genoese in the same area. With the Genoese and Byzantine alliance breaking apart following the Veneto-Byzantine peace in 1268, Venice was now free to engage in trade with Romania once more, and their major diplomatic victory came with the formal and imperial recognition of Venetian supremacy and ownership of the island of Crete in 1268.<sup>581</sup> This deal enabled the commune to establish a strong and secure outpost halfway to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, providing not only a vital safe port for its ships, but also creating a powerful commercial hub linking Alexandria, the Black Sea, Cyprus, and Venice. While Venice was expanding territorially in Acre and Tyre, it was expanding economically throughout the Mediterranean, thus increasing its commercial power.

## **Conclusion:**

This period is one of changing attitudes and of consolidation, but also of expansion. Saint-Sabas was a turning point for all Italian communes, especially Genoa, not only in terms of commercial activities, but also in terms of political outreach. From focussing on the Levant to a large extent,<sup>582</sup> to spreading throughout the Mediterranean and further (in the case of Genoa, which in the 1270s, established naval trade routes to Bruges and England), the Italians went further than anyone else had before, while still vying with one another for naval and commercial supremacy. Both Genoa and Venice were mainly focussed on their war over the Black Sea trade, while Genoa and Pisa were still engaged in their on-going sporadic conflict in the western Mediterranean, which, combined with the rise of Charles in Sicily made the political situation in northern Italy tense, and required most of the political and military focus of the Ligurian commune.

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<sup>580</sup> Lane, *Venice, a maritime Republic*, p. 128-129.

<sup>581</sup> Donald Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study of Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1992), p. 191.

<sup>582</sup> Genoa seemed to have stopped trading in Spain and northern Africa from Louis's second crusade, both Bougie and Tunis amounted to 0% of trade destinations in 1270, while Spain's percentage was reduced to null only around the period of the Sicilian Vespers. See table 7 in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

Schein's argument that the Italians were starting to lose interest in the Holy Land should not however be taken for granted as has been explained before, but it should still be noted that there was a change in attitude from their part towards the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish position in the Levant. While it seems obvious that these changes were due to a desire to acquire certain commercial gains and advantages, it should be pointed out that these were vital for both Venice and Genoa. Furthermore, one has to accept that none of the communes abandoned the kingdom of Jerusalem. Venice's expansion in Acre, Genoa's treaty with Qalawun in 1289, which will be analysed in the next chapter, are proof that not only did the Italians keep an interest in the eastern Mediterranean, but also that they kept an involvement in its affairs up until the end. The events surrounding Benedetto Zaccaria are one other such indication of continuous involvement, albeit a small one.

Individuality versus communality is one of the major differences in this period however. This is one of the reasons as to why historians have reached the conclusions that Italian involvement in the kingdom of Jerusalem was fading. With the Venetian acquisitions in Acre as described by Jacoby, together with their continued efforts to have their properties returned in Tyre, the Genoese struggled to remain present in the kingdom. Their lack of recorded evidence of consular activity, which would indicate that not only did they fail in recovering their quarter, or even parts of it, in Acre, also points toward the fact that their communal powers were seriously reduced. On the other hand, the few mentions of consuls outside of Acre in the *Regesta* do indicate that whereas there might not have been a Genoese consul in Acre, or even Tyre, Genoese consular activity was still present in the region, albeit perhaps on a reduced level.

Crusading activities also prompted a change in perception towards the Holy Land. With Louis's second crusade to Tunis, and Edward's expedition, which did not amount to much and was more or less the result of chance,<sup>583</sup> western powers seemed to have gradually 'abandoned' the kingdom for destinations closer to home.<sup>584</sup> With van Doosselaere's theories, one should see a similar attitude change from the Italians; however, this was not entirely the case. Trade was definitely high on the priority list, and the kingdom of Jerusalem was still a major source of revenue for them. It also happened to be half-way between the Black Sea and Egypt, and together with Cyprus, remained a profitable stop for merchants, whether Genoese, Venetian, or Pisan. Thus it

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<sup>583</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', p. 266.

<sup>584</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 267-8.

could actually be argued that their 'greed', as some have called it, actually kept their interests in the Frankish lands alive, the Venetian acquisition of Cyprus in the fifteenth century surely is a good example, whereas the crowns of Europe lost interest in the lands, and kept the title of king of Jerusalem more for honour and prestige than anything else, something that is clearly seen with Charles II of Anjou at the end of the thirteenth century.

## **Chapter 4**

### **1282-1291: a historical black hole, or a diplomatic struggle for survival?**

Following the death of Charles of Anjou in 1285, the crown of Jerusalem passed on to his son, Charles II, and simultaneously, to the Lusignan of Cyprus, who had never recognised the Angevin claim to the throne. Because of the lack of primary material relating to the kingdom of Jerusalem, its history in this period is rather vague. 1291 is also marked by the fall of Acre, and thus of the Latin Kingdom. Many historians, contemporary and modern, have generalised this time and summarised it briefly before launching into a close analysis of the fall of the city, and the impact it had.<sup>585</sup> In the case of Genoa, Steven Epstein states that by this stage the commune had lost interest in the kingdom, and when Benedetto Zaccaria received a third of the city of Tyre for the commune, the captains at home were quick to blame him for wasting the peoples' money, while the news of the siege of Acre only prompted the Genoese consul of Caffa to send three ships, which ultimately arrived too late.<sup>586</sup> A similar attitude may have also been reflected by Venice on an individual level, as some families were eager to sell off their properties within Acre during the years before 1291. Although we have seen that the city continued to purchase property in order to increase the size of its 'colony'. This interestingly highlights a difference in approach between Venice and Genoa in the last decade of the crusader kingdom: on one hand, Venice as a whole, was keen to increase its holdings in Acre, however, Venetian citizens were less enthusiastic and were rather keen on selling their property. These different attitudes fall in line with the theory put forward in this thesis regarding the separation between home city and colonial outpost. On the other hand, we have Genoa, who as a commune, was very much trying to separate itself from the kingdom of Jerusalem, or at least seemed to be acting as such, while individual Genoese were eager to gain some advantage, or to have pre-Saint-Sabas Genoese possessions returned, such as Zaccaria and the Embriaco.

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<sup>585</sup> It is interesting to see that very few modern historians have analysed this period in depth, and were rather quick in attributing the blame to the Italians for example. It seems that most have looked at it from a Western perspective, and analysed the view of Jerusalem from the West, rather than having looked at it from the eyes of those present in 1291. As for those studying the Italian communes for example, Epstein and Jacoby for Genoa and Venice respectively, they likewise glanced over the events in the East before returning to the study of the mercantile cities at 'home', or in other places.

<sup>586</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, pp. 179-80.

One of the main events of this period, which involved our Italians, but which does not directly relate to the Latin East, is the rise of the kingdom of Aragon and its conflict against Charles I, and Charles II in Sicily. While their struggle in Sicily remained superficial to the study of the Latin East, it is the Aragonese sponsorship of Barcelona, which directly impacted the Italian communes as trading powers in the Mediterranean.<sup>587</sup> This direct competition resulted in added pressure for Genoa in the western Mediterranean, and in Sicily, thus increasing the need for a more stable eastern trading system. As we have seen previously, both Genoa and Venice did benefit from some new grants in Beirut and Haifa following the departure of Frederick and prior to Louis's first crusade, which would have strengthened their economic position in the kingdom. This was particularly true for the Genoese in the 1260s-70s, as those grants would have counterbalanced their loss in Acre following the War of Saint-Sabas. On top of this, one can see that with the decline of the political stability in the kingdom, the communes seemed to have established secure holds in Cyprus, either in preparation of the fall of the Latin Kingdom, or, in the case of Genoa, due to their lack of success in re-establishing themselves in Acre following Saint-Sabas.

In the Levant, this period is also marked by a multitude of treaties being made between the different local powers. These treaties reflect both the dire situation of the area, but also the attitude that western powers took towards it. This is seen in the fact that the last 'proper'<sup>588</sup> crusade to the Holy Land was that of Louis IX in 1270, which was directed to North Africa and not Jerusalem. While Lord Edward of England reached Acre following the death of Louis, his contribution amounted to very little, aside from encouraging Baybars to return to Egypt for a short while. It is generally accepted that Louis' 1250 crusade was the last expedition which had a significant impact on the kingdom.<sup>589</sup> One treaty that is extremely important to this study and will

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<sup>587</sup> This sponsorship began in 1258 when James 1<sup>st</sup> of Aragon allowed royal funds to be used for the development of trade in the city, while in 1266, he allowed for the appointment of consuls in all of their trading ports. In 1227, James 1<sup>st</sup> also protected Barcelona trade by forbidding foreign merchants taking goods out of the city if a local captain was available, while the city was able to establish a trading colony in Alexandria by 1264. Olivia Remie Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The commercial realignment of the Iberian peninsula, 900-1500* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 106-7, 248-9.

<sup>588</sup> The last preached, organised and with a clear structure of leadership.

<sup>589</sup> The Seventh Crusade resulted in numerous fortifications being built or renovated, as well as the French contingent being left on a permanent basis for the defence of the kingdom. Edward's Crusade, while lasting a little over a year, consisted of a few attacks and raids on neighbouring Muslim lands in conjunction with Mongol raids. On the other hand, these amounted to very little gain if any, and had no part in the ten years truce passed between Hugh III of Cyprus and Baybars in 1272.

be analysed in detail: that between Genoa and the Mamluk in 1290.<sup>590</sup> This document has been linked to the theory that the Italians, and the Genoese especially, had a role in the fate of the crusader kingdom as it was produced right before the fall of Acre. On the other hand, this chapter will show that this document should not be taken as proof of that same theory, and that on the contrary; it shows that the Genoese were still very much involved in the fate of the kingdom of Jerusalem. This involvement took different forms, from individual contributions, as in the case of Zaccaria, familial participation, as is seen with the Embriaco, or communal interest, which, relates mostly to the economy of the city, and its trade rights in the eastern Mediterranean.

This chapter will therefore take two different approaches to the fall of Acre and the impact thereof. The first will continue from the aftermath of Louis's last crusade and the apparent lack of interest from the western powers in the fate of the Latin Kingdom.<sup>591</sup> The continued struggle between Venice and Genoa will also be analysed, together with the arrival of Benedetto Zaccaria and his role in the affairs of the kingdom. The importance of Tyre will also be looked at, as it became the centre of Genoese affairs in the kingdom.

Secondly, this chapter will look extensively at the different treaties made between Latins and Mamluks. These documents, which have been translated and edited by Peter M. Holt, have yet to be fully analysed together.<sup>592</sup> Some have been discussed briefly, but no concrete analysis of their meaning has been made, despite the fact that they may give us some answers as to why the kingdom of Jerusalem fell, and, if one was to point the finger, whom, apart from the Mamluks of course, were 'responsible', or contributed to its fall. These treaties will form one of the cornerstones of this thesis, and added to the rest, should provide us with a clearer picture of the situation in Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem in its last decade of existence.

This chapter will conclude by looking at the fall of Acre and its consequences. It will not detail the events, because they are already well documented in the

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<sup>590</sup> 'The treaty of Al-Mansur Qalawun with Genoa: 689/1290', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151.

<sup>591</sup> See Linda Ross' work.

<sup>592</sup> Some of these treaties have been looked at in relations to the slave trade, especially that between Michael Paleologus and the Mamluks, and the Genoese-Mamluk one in Reuven Amitai, 'Diplomacy and the slave trade in the Eastern Mediterranean: a re-examination of the Mamluk-Byzantine-Genoese triangle in the late Thirteenth century in light of the existing early correspondence', in *Les Relations Diplomatiques entre le Monde Musulman et l'Occident Latin (XIIE-XVIE siècle)*, Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie, Anno 88, 2 (2008), pp. 349-68.

contemporary sources.<sup>593</sup> The fall of the city will however be looked with regards to the Italian communes, which were obviously affected by the loss of an important economical centre. In the case of Venice, Cyprus became a refuge, while Genoa concentrated on Egypt and Galata in the Byzantine Empire, where they benefited from having their own quarter, relatively safe from imperial influence.<sup>594</sup> This, combined with the aforementioned Genoese-Mamluk treaty of 1290 will contribute to an overall answer to the question posed at the beginning of this thesis and will allow us to determine the exact role of Genoa in the affairs of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the last forty years of its existence.

### **The crusader kingdom of Jerusalem without crusades**

As noted above, the second half of the thirteenth century, when compared to the first half of the same century, is remarkably devoid of large expeditions directed towards the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant in particular.<sup>595</sup> This highlights one of the major aspects of the diplomatic situation of the kingdom of Jerusalem: it no longer benefited from a strong crusading enthusiasm from the western powers, such as was seen in the twelfth century, and even at the beginning of the thirteenth century with the expedition of Frederick II.<sup>596</sup> This lack of stimulus from the part of the Western world was due to a few factors, which are described by Ross as being: the time and money it took to organise an expedition, but most importantly by the frequency of the calls, which prompted a certain cynicism to grow ‘about the purpose for which any aid given would be used’.<sup>597</sup> She also points out that this lack of motivation was reflected in the type of aid given, which most of the time, fell short of Frankish expectations.<sup>598</sup> Sicilian grain convoys may be one example: while being drastically needed, they were restricted

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<sup>593</sup> *TT*, §489-§531; the most recent work describing the fall of Acre would be Musarra, *In Partibus Ultramaris*, pp. 583-9.

<sup>594</sup> See below.

<sup>595</sup> See Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, pp. 209-242 for more details on each crusading expedition from the thirteenth century. Abulafia, ‘The state of research: Charles of Anjou reassessed’, pp. 93-114 (p. 112).

<sup>596</sup> I do not say here that there was no one willing to go on a crusade to Jerusalem, or Acre. Phillip III in fact was willing to organize and lead a crusade, in a similar manner than Louis IX did; however, the pope, who at the time was more focused on enemies at home, or in the Byzantine Empire, refused to support this.

<sup>597</sup> Ross, ‘Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291’, p. 266.

<sup>598</sup> *Ibid.*



to certain regions, and sometimes certain people or city. The crusaders were also a problem themselves, often refusing to hear the advice of the local nobility, preferring only to fight against the 'infidel', rather than establishing a permanent and secure conquest. One of the major aspects of calls for help from the Frankish nobility was their familial connection to the west, especially to the French nobility. This can easily be seen in the earlier appeals, as well as in the early thirteenth century, with the case of the Brienne family.<sup>599</sup> These ties however seemed to have shifted towards the German nobility once Frederick II arrived on the scene.<sup>600</sup> Despite the difficult relationships between Franks and Staufens, Ross highlights the shift in attitude with regards to embassies sent from Acre to the west.<sup>601</sup> The death and effective end of the Staufen line with Conradin in 1268 meant that a different target had to be found. We have seen in the previous chapter how Charles made himself essential to the survival of the kingdom of Jerusalem through his food donations, however, with his death in 1285, and his seeming lack of interest from the early 1270s onwards, he did not become the target of pleas as the Franks would have intended. Instead, it seems that it was towards England, as well as towards the rising kingdom of Aragon, that the Frankish nobility turned. Lord Edward had shown a clear interest towards the survival of the crusader states when he decided to push on eastwards following the death of Louis in Tunis and the ultimate dissolution of the crusader army.<sup>602</sup> Indeed, as Ross highlights, there are numerous entries in the records of the Exchequer, which point towards a connection.<sup>603</sup> Despite this interest however, Frankish appeals were not successful. The survival of the kingdom of Jerusalem therefore cannot be explained in terms of noble, western help as such, but more in terms of the involvement of others in its running.

What should be noted as well is the rise in treaties related to the recovery of the Holy Land during that period, and the years following the fall of Acre. These were written by people with experience in crusading, Philippe de Mézières wrote *Le songe du vieil pelerin* in 1389 in which he advises the reformation of Christendom before any expedition could be launched, led by Charles VI of France<sup>604</sup>; Marino Sanudo Torsello

<sup>599</sup> Ibid., p. 145, Perry, *John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem*, pp. 40-50.

<sup>600</sup> During the first half of the thirteenth century, Frederick II, as king consort of Jerusalem was the natural recipient of appeals from the Frankish nobility. On the other hand, his policies in the east, as well as Louis IX crusading zeal, may have reversed this trend briefly.

<sup>601</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', pp. 138-9.

<sup>602</sup> In June 1286, the Master of the Hospitallers in Acre, Nicola Le Lorgne writes to Edward I describing the miserable state of the kingdom and the Holy Land. *RRH*, §1470.

<sup>603</sup> Ross, 'Relations between the Latin East and Western Europe, 1187-1291', p. 153.

<sup>604</sup> Philippe de Mézières, *Le songe du vieil pelerin*, ed. by G. W. Coopland, 2 vols (New-York, 1969).

also wrote his *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis* between in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, and took a more Italian approach by allowing the trade between Christians and Muslims, albeit not any restricted material.<sup>605</sup> Some were also written by people who, as far as is known, have never been on crusade or in the Holy Land such as Pierre Dubois and Galvano de Levanto, who both wrote about how the recovery of the Holy Land should be conducted as well, and will be mentioned later.<sup>606</sup>

### **Genoa, Tyre and Tripoli**

In the last decade of the life of the kingdom of Jerusalem, Italian engagement took on a different aspect. It has already been suggested that the Italian cities of Genoa, and Venice both had some anticipation as to the fall of the kingdom, and both seemed to have planned accordingly, and differently. Venice seemed to have tried to consolidate their holdings in Acre, but they also started negotiations in Cyprus.<sup>607</sup> These were essential, and we will see that with the fall of Acre in 1291, they allowed for the commune to continue their trade in the further parts of the eastern Mediterranean. In the case of Genoa, we have seen that their attempts at re-establishing themselves in Acre failed, and they were forced to look to other places. While the majority of their trade and diplomatic power may have gone towards the Byzantine Empire, they remained on the other hand very active in the kingdom of Jerusalem up until the end, especially in Tyre.

The timing of these events have resulted in some suggesting that the communes simply abandoned the kingdom for more profitable and safer areas, or simply to continue their struggle over the Black Sea trade, following the line of argument portraying the Italian trading cities as having taken part in the crusades for monetary

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<sup>605</sup> Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross: Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, ed. by Peter Lock (London, 2013).

<sup>606</sup> 'Traité du recouvrement de la terre sainte adressé, vers l'an 1295, à Philippe le Bel par Galvano de Levanto, médecin génois', is found in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, Vol 6 (Paris, 1898), pp. 343-369, and analyzed by Charles Kohler.

<sup>606</sup> Pierre Dubois, *The recovery of the Holy Land*, trans. by Walther I. Brandt (New-York, 1893, 1956).

<sup>607</sup> David Jacoby, 'Refugees from Acre in Famagusta around 1300', in *The Harbour of all this Sea and Realm: Crusader to Venetian Famagusta*, ed. by Michael Walsh, Tamas Kiss, Nicholas Coureas, 17 (Budapest: 2014), pp. 53-67 (p. 56).

reasons rather than religious ones.<sup>608</sup> Benedetto Zaccaria's involvement in the Levant is however a clear argument against that theory. Not only did he actively fight for the return of Genoese property in Tripoli in 1288-89, alongside the Embriaco family, he could also be said to have become a symbol of Genoa's continued struggle to remain present in the kingdom. This is perhaps one reason why the commune, in the shape of its consuls, and the two most prominent families of the time, the Dorias and Spinolas, tried to distance themselves from him and his affairs.<sup>609</sup> As opposed to what Epstein suggested, and what is insinuated by the consuls' actions, Genoese feeling for the crusading movement, or the kingdom of Jerusalem may suggest otherwise.<sup>610</sup> Looking at the charitable donations left in wills and other documents, one can see that the crusading movement did not fade in Genoa. In the second half of the thirteenth century, donations to the crusades<sup>611</sup> amounted to 6.6% of all donations.<sup>612</sup> This might not seem to amount to much, however, when the wills of the first half of the century are analysed, one can see that those donations remained steady: the first quarter of the century saw 6.7%, while the second quarter saw 6.2%.<sup>613</sup> In comparison, donations to the Hospital of Saint-John fell from 6.8% in the first quarter, to 2% in the second half of the century. While these numbers may only represent an average, and while some might argue that donations to the crusading movement could also include 'other' crusades,<sup>614</sup> it is nonetheless important to note that it was still a movement that evoked some compassion from the general population. If the general populace of Genoa felt as such, why would the consuls of Genoa not support Zaccaria in his ventures?

The answer to that can be found in the actions of the man. While he was in command of the fleet that defeated the Pisans at the Battle of Meloria in 1284, his actions in Tripoli put the city and its possessions at risk in the kingdom. Antonio Musarra has already looked at his actions in the east, and it will therefore help us

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<sup>608</sup> Steven Epstein stated as much when he wrote that the consuls of Genoa did not think Zaccaria's actions in Tyre were to the benefit of the city, or worth the money. Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 179.

<sup>609</sup> See below for more.

<sup>610</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 180.

<sup>611</sup> Both Epstein and Musarra fail to explain where exactly the money is going. Ibid., Musarra, *In Partibus Ultramaris*, p. 636.

<sup>612</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 185.

<sup>613</sup> Ibid., pp. 117, 130.

<sup>614</sup> By other crusade I mean crusades against other Christian rulers, i.e. in Italy, against heretics, as well as the crusades against other non-Christians, i.e. the Baltic, and Spain.

understand why he was ‘let go’ by Genoa.<sup>615</sup> It is in this period that one can see the strongest division between the Genoese homeland and the Levant. While Genoa was trying to secure its economic survival in different geographical areas, those already established in the kingdom of Jerusalem did their best to secure their own survival in the crusader east, even if it meant going against the wishes of the commune. We have already seen that Genoa did not fully abandon its possessions in the kingdom of Jerusalem after their defeat in the War of Saint-Sabas, and that they were active in holding on to Tyre up until 1270 when John of Montfort came to power. Furthermore, consuls were active throughout the 1270s and early 1280s in different cities of the kingdom. Yet, there seem to be a slow decline of interest from the commune itself, to invest in more ventures in the area.<sup>616</sup> Although, it is important to note that in the peace treaty signed between Genoa and Pisa in 1288, the latter was required to pull down the defences of their quarter in Acre within eighteen months, highlighting perhaps a desire from Genoa to come back to Acre, but more importantly, confirming their presence still in the city.<sup>617</sup> This would definitely point towards some Genoese presence in Acre at the time or a desire to re-assert it, and that they felt strong enough to do so.

Once more, we see the shift of Western focus from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem to the Byzantine Empire. With the treaty of Nymphaeum (1261), Genoa had received particular privileges in the empire that enabled it to assume dominance over the Black Sea trade,<sup>618</sup> and the slave trade in particular.<sup>619</sup> On the other hand, it is the Byzantine peace with Venice (1268), and the return of the later in Constantinople, which provided the Genoese with the perfect opportunity to increase that dominance. In 1267 they received a quarter in Galata (Pera), which would become their main base of operations in the eastern Mediterranean for near two hundred years.<sup>620</sup> Musarra explains that we perhaps see one of the main reasons for the accusations made by contemporaries towards the Italians with regards to the fall of the Holy Land.<sup>621</sup> These accusations could have their roots in the 1274 Second Council of Lyon, where Gregory

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<sup>615</sup> Antonio Musarra, ‘Benedetto Zaccaria e la caduta di Tripoli (1289): la difesa di *Outremer* tra ragioni ideali e opportunismo’, in *Gli Italiani e la Terrasanta*, Atti del Seminario di Studio (Florence, 2013), pp. 219-237 (p. 219).

<sup>616</sup> See table 7 in Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 142.

<sup>617</sup> *LIRG*, 2, §114-124.

<sup>618</sup> Musarra, *In Partibus Ultramaris*, pp. 10, 329.

<sup>619</sup> Hannah Barker, ‘Egyptian and Italian Merchants in the Black Sea Slave Trade, 1260-1500’ (Unpublished doctoral thesis, Colombia University, 2014), p. 2.

<sup>620</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 153.

<sup>621</sup> Musarra, ‘Benedetto Zaccaria’, pp. 219-237 (p. 221).

X once more issued an interdict against any sort of trade with the Muslims.<sup>622</sup> Recurring calls to ban trade with Muslims were made from 1272 by the pope, and letters were sent to the mercantile communes ordering them, under threat of anathema and excommunication, to stop their trading with Muslim powers, especially regarding the sale of weapons, iron, and naval supplies, as well as acts of piracy.<sup>623</sup> These calls were not a novelty however, since the Third Lateran Council (1279), they tended to precede calls for a crusade, which does coincide with what we now know about Gregory's intentions: that he wanted a new crusade to 'liberate' the Holy Land.<sup>624</sup> Trade was extremely important to cities like Genoa and Venice, and it should come as no surprise to learn that they were rather lenient towards transgressors; yet, they did their best to remain faithful in the eyes of the Church as seen previously; however, this contrasts heavily with the punishments enforced on defeated admirals by Genoa in the last thirty years of the century.<sup>625</sup> These in effect, allowed for the rise in popularity of Zaccaria prior to his involvement in Tripoli. With his victory against Pisa in 1284, he led a fleet to the east to try to re-assert Genoese power in the fading kingdom of Jerusalem and in the Levant.

Tripoli had been part of the Principality of Antioch since Bohemond IV (1189-1233). In 1275, the Bishop of Tripoli – whom, alongside the Templars, and Guy II Embriaco, Lord of Gibelet, rebelled against the prince – opposed Bohemond VII's succession and the Genoese were put in charge of the city until his capture and death in 1282.<sup>626</sup> Zaccaria seemed to have been called on shortly after that. It is curious that the death of Embriaco, whose family had been present in the Holy Land since 1099, and lords of Gibelet since 1110, did not spark a more serious response from Genoa itself. This highlights perhaps best the division that existed between Genoa, and Genoese citizens living in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century, and also how deeply rooted some Genoese families were in the kingdom: the Embriaco had by then become part of the landed nobility.<sup>627</sup>

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<sup>622</sup> Menache, 'Papal attempts at commercial boycott', p. 245.

<sup>623</sup> *Les Registres de Gregoire X*, 1, §351-355.

<sup>624</sup> See Chapter 6 in Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X*, pp. 168-219.

<sup>625</sup> In 1266, the admiral Lanfranco della Turca received an impressive fine of £10,000 for his defeat, while others were given smaller fines, around £1,000. These were meant to 'encourage' others to do better.

<sup>626</sup> Musarra, *Acri 1291*, p. 150; Musarra, *In Partibus Ultramaris*, pp. 538-40.

<sup>627</sup> Kevin James Lewis, *The Counts of Tripoli and Lebanon in the Twelfth Century: Sons of Saint-Gilles* (Abingdon, 2017), p. 89.

Why was Tripoli so important for Zaccaria and the Embriaco then? Following Genoese help in the capture of Tripoli in 1109, and of the fact that Guglielmo Embriaco was given the city of Gibelet (Jubail/Byblos) the next year, Genoa had a strong and deeply rooted presence in the city and the area. This coastal city, located about half way between Tripoli and Beirut, which was part of the County of Tripoli, and therefore under the over lordship of the princes of Antioch, was given to the Embriaco in 1110 by Bertrand of Toulouse following their help in the capture of Tripoli.<sup>628</sup> From then on, the family remained lords of Gibelet up until the very end of the thirteenth century with the arrival of the Mamluks.<sup>629</sup> Their power in the crusader kingdom was high, and they had married into a number of other prominent families such as the princes of Antioch but also the Ibelins.

As seen with the War of Saint Sabas, Genoa faced strong opposition from the Venetians as well as the Pisans regarding their return to Acre. This, coupled with the lack of a Genoese consul in Acre, aside from the two mentions in the 1270s-80s, meant that a new stronghold had to be found, and this is where Tyre came into play. In the city, Genoa enjoyed some relative freedom, as Philip of Montfort continued his pro-Genoese policies to the detriment of Venice up until his death.<sup>630</sup> His son on the other hand did not continue this and in 1270, Venice was allowed to return to Tyre.<sup>631</sup>

The Italian struggle in Tyre in the 1260s and early 1270s formed the basis for the events of 1277-1282 in Tripoli; where Guy II of Embriaco, supported by the Templars and the Genoese against Bohemond VII, was asserting his power over the city. In this respect, one can assume the conflict was once again a case of Genoa versus Venice, Templars versus Hospitallers, and in this case, Embriaco versus Antioch. Once more, the politics of the kingdom of Jerusalem were tangled with those of the Italians. As a result of this, Tripoli had become a symbol of Genoese survival in the kingdom.<sup>632</sup> It also appears the Embriaco family – one of the oldest families of the crusader states – never seemed to have taken part in Genoese affairs in Acre or in the rest of the kingdom, as is the case for Saint-Sabas, where the prince of Antioch made a brief appearance.

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<sup>628</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>629</sup> This period was virtually uninterrupted, apart from the time of Saladin, who occupied the city from 1187 to 1197.

<sup>630</sup> Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*, p. 303.

<sup>631</sup> This was done in 1277 through the intervention of William of Beaujeu. Richard, *The Crusades*, p. 392.

<sup>632</sup> Aside from the fall of Acre, it is the only city in the Levant that received particular attention from the commune at the time. Musarra also dedicates a small chapter on Zaccaria's actions in Tripoli in *In Partibus Ultramaris*, pp. 561-578.

Despite their Genoese roots, it seems that they were firmly established as a Frankish house, and as such, were vassals of the counts of Tripoli, and later on, of the princes of Antioch, and seemingly no longer associating themselves with Genoa.<sup>633</sup> In 1282, the Embriaco family was placed at the head of the city. Is it therefore possible to see Tripoli as a bastion of Genoa in the Levant? Whereas in Tyre the Genoese were once more sharing the city with the Venetians and the secular powers, in Tripoli, they were to be free from both, and in fact could rule the city as an entity of Genoa. In this respect, the arrival of Zaccaria on the scene could be interpreted as an acknowledgment from some Genoese of such supremacy. Interestingly, the *Templar of Tyre* tells us that the situation was far from ideal as all the military orders, despite the *Templar's* original dispositions, as well as the Venetians, were on Tripoli's doorstep in order to negotiate between the city and Antioch when Zaccaria arrived.<sup>634</sup>

The actions of the Embriaco in Tripoli on the other hand did not seem to have been sanctioned by Genoa, and there are three reasons for them not doing so. First, the Embriaco coup was done at the expense of Bohemond VII, who upon his death in 1287, left no heir and was succeeded by his sister Lucia. We have seen in the previous chapter that she may have been married to Narjot de Toucy, admiral of Charles I of Anjou (d. 1285). Had Genoa sanctioned the takeover, it would have found itself once more against the Angevins of Sicily. Secondly, it would have placed them against the papacy, which most likely would have favoured Lucia and her Angevin husband; it would also have renewed the rivalry with Venice to a stronger degree.<sup>635</sup> Finally, it could have threatened their relations with the Mamluks, as Tripoli was on the slave trade route.<sup>636</sup> The lack of reaction from Genoa was also seen in the type of response they gave. The commune sent only two galleys under the command of Zaccaria, showing not only their lack of support to the city, but also their uncertainty as to how to proceed.<sup>637</sup> The Embriaco were still present in the city in 1288, with Bartholomew of Gibelet having been elected as *Captain of Tripoli*, following the proclamation of the city as a 'free city in honour of the Blessed Virgin Mary Mother of God'.<sup>638</sup> Ultimately, both Embriaco

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<sup>633</sup> This split can already be observed in the 1140s, and in 1154 to a greater extent when the two branches of the Embriaco family and between Genoa itself. See Mack, 'The Merchant of Genoa: The Crusades, the Genoese and the Latin East, 1187-1220s', p. 116. See also Hall, *Caffaro*, Selected documents, for translations of the Genoese leases to the Embriaco family in the Levant.

<sup>634</sup> *TT*, §467, p. 232.

<sup>635</sup> Musarra, 'Benedetto Zaccaria', pp. 219-237 (p. 222).

<sup>636</sup> *RHC, doc. Arm.* Vol 2, p. 527.

<sup>637</sup> Musarra, 'Benedetto Zaccaria', pp. 219-237 (p. 222).

<sup>638</sup> *TT*, §467, p. 231.

and Zaccaria achieved very little in Tripoli, as Genoa was offered one-third of the city, their original possessions.<sup>639</sup> This is in line with what Epstein suggests: Zaccaria's actions did not amount to any gain for the commune in Tripoli.<sup>640</sup> Overall however, he did manage to sign a treaty with Armenia, strengthening the commercial ties between Genoa and Armenia with regards to the slave trade.<sup>641</sup> This treaty was originally signed between Genoa and the kingdom of Armenia, the admiral serving as representative of the commune, in 1288. A further text was re-written after the fall of Tripoli, with an extra clause added, however, that text is now lost.<sup>642</sup> The treaty itself highlights the different products traded by the Genoese in Armenia, including precious spices such as pepper and ginger, but also materials such as iron, and silk.<sup>643</sup> Most importantly, is the mention of the slave trade done by the Genoese in the kingdom, which included Christian slaves.<sup>644</sup> There is only one restriction that is relating to the resale of the latter to Muslims. The Genoese are forbidden to resell Christians to Muslims, or to anyone who would be likely to do so in the future.<sup>645</sup>

The link with Armenia is to be noted also with regards to the Venetians, who had their rights confirmed by Leon III in 1271. While the confirmation does not give much details as to what was trade by the Venetians at that time, ie. slaves, it does confirm that their numbers were numerous enough to have their own church in the port city of Ayas, as well as some freedom of justice.<sup>646</sup> They also received tax exemptions on all wares they carry, except with regards to minting, which remained taxed.<sup>647</sup>

The whole situation on the other hand, was made worse by the return of Venetian merchants to Constantinople in 1285, and with the effective termination of the Treaty of Nymphaeum.<sup>648</sup> As stated, the majority of Venetian/Genoese struggles in

<sup>639</sup> Their original concession dates from 1109, given by Bertrand of Toulouse, *RRH*, §55, pp. 11-2.

<sup>640</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 179.

<sup>641</sup> This treaty is primarily a trade agreement. It gives us a detailed list of what trade was going on between Genoa and Armenia, but also what Genoa 'specialized' in. With reduced taxes on imports and exports, Genoa was making Armenia a stronghold of Genoese trade in the eastern Mediterranean. This treaty followed not only the signing of a treaty between Armenia and the Mamluks in 1285, but precedes as well the fall of Tripoli to Qalawun in 1289. *RHC, doc. Armeniens*, Vol. 1, pp. 745-754.

<sup>642</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 745-754 (p. 746).

<sup>643</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 745-754 (p. 753-754).

<sup>644</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>645</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>646</sup> Their presence is also attested by the fact that in the late thirteenth, early fourteenth century, a small 'war' erupted between Genoa and Venice for control of the town and port, which was located on the Silk Road. Barker, p. 166.

<sup>647</sup> Tafel, Thomas, *Urkunden*, pp. 115-6.

<sup>648</sup> Virgil Ciociltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Leiden, 2012), p. 79.



the period were over the Black Sea trade; these however, had important repercussions on trade and economic interests throughout the eastern Mediterranean. With the tightening of the Black Sea trade, Genoa was left with trading centres in Tyre, Beirut, Tripoli in the kingdom of Jerusalem, Ayas in Armenia, and of course, Alexandria. Zaccaria's role and actions therefore, enabled Genoa to retain some sort of supremacy over the slave trade, and also enabled them to continue their lucrative relations with the Mamluks. Genoese/Venetian relations in the area remained strained. In the two years prior to Tripoli's fall to Qalawun, Venetians in the region were becoming concerned with Genoa's attempted *coup*, and with Zaccaria, and *may* have 'invited' the Mamluk sultan to interfere in Tripoli.<sup>649</sup> This 'invitation', whether or not it actually happened, really does paint a clear picture of where all the different factions stood.

The fall of Tripoli in 1289 was a turning point for Genoa and the Genoese, not only because they had lost an important port, but also because it initiated the events leading to the signing of their treaty with Qalawun in 1290. After the failure of the *coup*, and the death of Embriaco, Zaccaria left to raid shipping lanes in the eastern Mediterranean. While Ciociltan believes that the raids were sanctioned by Genoa itself, it is more than likely that they were not: Genoa's attitude as shown in their treaty clearly states that they had nothing to do with the capture of the ship, its crew, and the merchants and their wares.<sup>650</sup> The treaty was a result of those events, and the importance of Alexandria is marked not only in this document, but also in the fact that by the second half of the fourteenth century, the Mamluk city had become the most important trading centre for Genoa, with nearly a quarter of the total trade going there.<sup>651</sup>

### **The treaties of the Mamluk Era**

The fall of Acre in 1291 was such a significant event for Western Christendom that it is extremely well documented in the contemporary sources, but also in the general

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<sup>649</sup> 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 141). This is Holt really taking a guess as to whom may have invited Qalawun. He does mention the Venetians may have done it, but that it could also have been Embriaco himself, who was disappointed with how the events were turning out.

<sup>650</sup> Ciociltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, p. 82, 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (pp. 142, 150).

<sup>651</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, table 11, p. 231.

histories of recent times. As such, little attention is given to the two years prior to the fall of Acre, but more particularly, to the complex yet intriguing diplomatic relations between Christian and Muslim powers, which took place from 1260 up until 1291. During this time, some of the most noteworthy relations happen to be between the sultans of Egypt and the Italian mercantile communes, balancing faith and trade; yet, other treaties are of vital importance to our understanding of the events leading to 1291.<sup>652</sup> Of these treaties, one will be the focus of this chapter, that between Genoa and the Mamluks of Egypt in 1290.<sup>653</sup>

### **Treaties of Baybars**

Holt analyses three treaties between the Sultan Baybars and Christian powers in the east: two with the Hospitallers (1267, 1271),<sup>654</sup> and one with Lady Isabel of Beirut (1269), who already had dealings with the sultan in 1261.<sup>655</sup> Both treaties with the Hospitallers are good examples of how fast Christian power was declining: they are truces of ten years, signed following a Mamluk push into Christian lands; while the treaty with Isabel of Beirut is a good indication of the complete lack of authority of Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem over its vassals. Of those three, the latter is perhaps the most significant due to not only the way it was signed, but also because of its similarities with the treaty of Genoa. Having said that however, one should not ignore the treaties with the Hospitallers either.<sup>656</sup>

As we have seen before, Beirut was one centre of power to the Genoese, and was one of the cities that had a *consule Januensium*.<sup>657</sup> Coincidentally, the consul at the time in Beirut (in 1279) was a member of the Spinola family. This indicates that the

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<sup>652</sup> A couple have already been mentioned previously, such as the supposed treaty between Baybars and Hugh of Cyprus in 1268, or that between Qalawun and Leon III of Armenia. Those two and more will be discussed here, and all will be taken from Holt's work.

<sup>653</sup> These treaties are also very important in trying to determine exactly how much land the Franks had left, and also how powerful the Mamluks were in diplomacy.

<sup>654</sup> The treaty of Al-Zahir Baybars with the Hospitallers: 665/1267', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 32-41; 'The treaty of Al-Zahir Baybars with the Hospitallers: 669/1271', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 48-57.

<sup>655</sup> 'The treaty of Al-Zahir Baybars with the Lady Isabel of Beirut: 667/1269', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 42-47 (pp. 42-3).

<sup>656</sup> While the two treaties between the Hospitallers and Baybars are interesting and important in their own rights, they do not contribute to this thesis, and will be left aside here. They are to be found in Holt's study of Mamluk treatises with Christian powers, Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 32-41, 48-57.

<sup>657</sup> *RRH*, §1431. The Genoese were granted freedom of trade, court and market in Beirut in the 1220s, *RRR*, §1891, §1947.

city was still of some importance to Genoa, or at least that one prominent Genoese family still had some interest in the kingdom. The location of the city, north of Acre, halfway between Tyre and Tripoli, was also perfectly placed for the transit between Cyprus and the kingdom; it was there that Frederick II landed from Cyprus during his crusade in 1229.<sup>658</sup> Its importance as a commercial centre is defined in the treaty as the author lists the regions – from which ‘merchants and every other kind of people’ were coming; to which they were going – that were included in the treaty. These regions included Antioch, Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Jerusalem.<sup>659</sup> The importance of trade for both parties is further insinuated at the end of the treaty, where it states that merchants from both sides will have a grace period of 40 days, from the end of the truce, to return home.<sup>660</sup> The treaty also covers the sea of Beirut, and forbids new customs being levied against merchants of any nations.<sup>661</sup> The most important point of this treaty however, and one that mirrors some of the major points in the treaty of Genoa with Qalawun, is clause twelve. This clause states that:

*Provided that the Lady N. shall not enable any of the Franks whomsoever to proceed against the Sultan's territory from the direction of Beirut and its territory. She shall restrain from that, and repulse everyone seeking to gain access with evil intent. The territory of both parties shall be protected from criminals and disturbers of the peace.*<sup>662</sup>

In his introduction to this treaty, Holt states that Baybars seems to believe that this document made Beirut some sort of protectorate.<sup>663</sup> One of Holt's reasons for stating this is relating to an event that happened in 1273. Following the death of Isabella's second husband, Hugh III of Cyprus demanded her return to the island so she could remarry. Baybars' reaction was to write to Acre to demand Isabella's return to Beirut. We learn that there was a truce between both Mamluks and Beirut, and that her now deceased husband had committed her to the sultan's majesty. He also states that it was

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<sup>658</sup> *Philip of Novara*, §135.

<sup>659</sup> Lady Isabel of Beirut', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 42-47 (pp. 45-6).

<sup>660</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>661</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>662</sup> *Ibid.*, p.47.

<sup>663</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4

her custom to leave her lands under his protection if she travelled.<sup>664</sup> This, while seemingly improbable, clearly shows that Baybars did indeed regard the city and Isabella as a protectorate, and that he should have a say in her remarriage, or that he was possibly reluctant for her to remarry. His dominant position is also highlighted by the fact that Hugh had no choice but to let Isabella go.<sup>665</sup> Baybars had therefore achieved a high degree of control over the city of Beirut and the surrounding areas to the detriment of the kingdom of Cyprus but also that of Jerusalem. The clause above certainly fits in this line of argument and does seem to support it, however, when the other Mamluk treaties are taken into consideration, another interesting trend appears.

As stated on numerous occasions before, central power in the kingdom of Jerusalem was gradually fading in the thirteenth century: imperial, baronial, and independent factions were all vying for power. As a result of this, small bastions of relatively autonomous power started to appear. Beirut was one of these: Isabel was a member of the powerful Ibelin family, and was also linked by marriage to the king of Cyprus. Looking at all the other treaties of the Mamluks (those found in Holt's study), one finds that agreements were being made on an individual level throughout Christian held-lands. This I believe is a good indication of this complete lack of central power within the Holy Land, and this can also be seen as one of the reasons as to why the agreement with Genoa cannot be looked at on its own.

What can we see in this treaty therefore is perhaps an attempt at creating a safe environment for both sides: for the Christians, it allowed them to continue their lives as they had done previously, without risking an assault, while to the Mamluks, it was a means to safeguard their flanks against potential attacks from both local forces but also crusader armies.<sup>666</sup> This was a relatively successful strategy for both parties as Beirut managed to survive until after the fall of Acre, albeit not for very long.

The two Hospitaller treaties on the other hand, were signed under different circumstances, yet are a good reminder of the diminishing power of Christian armies against the Mamluk sultanate. The first of these is primarily a treaty of cohabitation in the region (of *Crac des Chevaliers*, and *Margat*), with what seems to be the end of the

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<sup>664</sup> This is according to Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir. Holt gives a brief description of the events, although the text can be found Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed., *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders. Selections from the Tarikh al-Duwal wa'l Muluk of Ibn al-Furat*, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1971), 1, p. 209.

<sup>665</sup> 'Lady Isabel of Beirut', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 42-47 (pp. 44).

<sup>666</sup> With this in mind, it should be noted that Christian powers did not seem reluctant to co-operate with the Mamluk powers at the time, even if it was done as a means of survival

Hospitaller over-lordship of the Isma'ili territories: those were in effect 'stripped' from Hospitaller control, and transferred to the Mamluks.<sup>667</sup> The second on the other hand, was signed in a totally different context. Following a Mamluk push in the region of *Crac des Chevaliers*, which was taken by them in April 1271, the Hospitallers were convinced by the Templars of Tortosa to enter into a truce with the sultan.<sup>668</sup> This truce however, was written in a different manner, and in it, the Military Order had clearly been vanquished. In it, the Hospitallers were to give territories to the sultan, as well as renounce claims to others.<sup>669</sup> The most important part however, is the use of the same clause as with the Lady of Beirut '[...] *that the Order of the Hospital shall not enable any foreign invader to enter Our territories by land or sea* [...].'<sup>670</sup> The two Hospitaller treaties offer a good indication of the decline in power of the military orders in the region in the face of the advancing Mamluk forces.<sup>671</sup> In the first one, the Hospitallers are still treated relatively amicably, while the second one clearly shows an air of dominance from the sultan over his Christian counterpart.

### **Treaties of Qalawun**

Qalawun continued in Baybars' footsteps by concluding treaties with every Christian power that was willing to negotiate. Holt gives us eight treaties produced between 1281 and 1290. These were signed with numerous entities, ranging from the Byzantine Emperor, Michael VIII Palaeologus (1281), to the Lady Margaret of Tyre (1285), but also the King Alfonso III of Aragon (1290), and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (1283), and of course the Genoese (1290). Of the eight agreements, we will only look at four: with the Latin Kingdom (1283), with the King Leon III of Armenia (1285), with the Lady of Tyre (1285), and with Alfonso III (1290). These four treaties will help us understand the last treaty, and the most important one for us, that with Genoa in 1290.

The first three of these treaties were in essence, impositions of Mamluk power over the different Christian factions. All have restrictions on the building and restoring

<sup>667</sup> 'Hospitallers: 665/1267', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 32-41 (pp. 39).

<sup>668</sup> 'Hospitallers: 669/1271', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 48-57 (pp. 48).

<sup>669</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 55.

<sup>670</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>671</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

of defences, and the treaty with Leon III even has tributary terms.<sup>672</sup> All also have terms regarding trade, and the ones with the Latin Kingdom, and Armenia, have clauses about restricted merchandise (i.e: weapons).<sup>673</sup> Once more though, the Mamluks seem to have made an agreement with the local powers regarding foreign attacks, including from other Christian kings. With regards to the treaty with the Lady of Tyre, this clause resembles very much the one from the treaty between Baybars and Isabel of Beirut. The Lady of Tyre was to '*guard the territory of our lord the Sultan from criminals, disturbers of the peace, foreign invaders and all Franks penetrating the territory of our lord the Sultan from her territory for harm, raiding, disturbance of the peace or aggression.*'<sup>674</sup> The whole treaty in fact, also feels as if the Mamluks were acting as protectors of Tyre: the Lady was to keep the majority of her land, but the Sultan was to take possession of five of the most productive estates, as well as half the dues taken from the rest of the villages/settlements (78 in total), minus ten, which were to be kept by the Lady herself.<sup>675</sup> This could also be interpreted as tributary payment to the sultan, in the same manner as that of Leon III.<sup>676</sup> It clearly shows the amount of pressure the Mamluks were putting on the Latins in the last few years.

The rest of this treaty follows a similar pattern as the others; there are clauses about what happens when a merchant from one religion/faction dies outside his lands, and clauses about religious conversions.<sup>677</sup> The protection of commodities was important for both sides, and these treaties reflect this point perfectly well. Looking at their commercial aspect, it does seem that they were all signed with the interest of the merchants of both sides, as well as for the safeguard of the economy of the regions. The major imports for the Mamluk sultanate was of course of slaves. Their importance is clearly highlighted in the treaty with Leon III, in which the trade receives a clause to itself.<sup>678</sup> This clause is to my belief the highlight of this particular treaty. It was meant to secure properly the slave trade in the region, and provide a safe route through which

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<sup>672</sup> 'The Treaty of Al-Mansur Qalawun with the Latin Kingdom: 682/1283', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 69-91 (p. 81); 'The Treaty of Al-Mansur Qalawun with the Lady Margaret of Tyre: 684/1285', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 106-117 (p. 116); 'The Treaty of Al-Mansur Qalawun with King Leon III of Lesser Armenia: 684/1285', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 92-105 (pp. 102, 99).

<sup>673</sup> 'Latin Kingdom', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 69-91 (p. 81); 'King Leon III', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 92-105 (p. 101).

<sup>674</sup> 'The Lady of Tyre', *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 106-117 (p. 116).

<sup>675</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 112.

<sup>676</sup> 'King Leon III', *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 92-105 (p. 99).

<sup>677</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101

<sup>678</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.

not only Muslim merchants, but also Christian ones could travel. Three years after this treaty was signed, Zaccaria would secure good trading terms for Genoa, especially with regards to the slave trade, thus securing the routes from Armenia to Alexandria.

The treaty with Leon III is an important one; it has a strong connotation of imposition of Mamluk will and power over the kingdom. The relations between Armenians and Mamluks were tense due to the involvement of the Mongols of the Ilkhanate, and the relative proximity of the kingdom to the khanate: on two occasions, Armenia let Mongol armies through to attack the Mamluks in northern Syria.<sup>679</sup> Besides the clause about the slave trade, there is another, written in a more personal manner, which states that Leon will not pass on intelligence on Mamluks to their enemies.<sup>680</sup> This specific clause is more detailed than in other treaties, which as seen above, dictated that the Latins were not to 'help' any enemies of the Mamluks, and should safeguard the territories of the sultan against any invading armies. In the case of Leon III, it also states that he should not even 'talk' to the sultan's enemies, whether by 'sign, writing, embassy, letter or oral message';<sup>681</sup> however, it has an noteworthy twist, in that, it does allow for some leeway in case of self-preservation: *I shall defend myself and my territory*.<sup>682</sup>

This treaty, alongside the one signed by Zaccaria and Leon III, highlight the importance of trade in the eastern Mediterranean for all sides. Once more, it is necessary to state that after the fall of Acre, trade continued between Christians and Mamluks, and as stated before, a quarter of trade from Genoa was going to Alexandria by the mid-fourteenth century, but Venice also, would become a major trading partner with Egypt, if not the most important one by the same time.<sup>683</sup>

The last treaty signed by Qalawun that will be seen here is of course the one with the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. The treaty has twenty-five clauses, some dealing with what could be regarded as conventional or commonplace, such as the death of merchants, wrecks, fugitives and converts, but some also dealing with the territories of each party. This is particularly important for those studying the lands of the kingdom of Jerusalem: this treaty gives us a detailed description of what was left in Frankish

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<sup>679</sup> Ibid., pp. 92-3.

<sup>680</sup> Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>681</sup> Ibid.

<sup>682</sup> Ibid.

<sup>683</sup> Albrecht Fuess, 'Rotting Ships and Razed Harbors: the Naval Policy of the Mamluks', in *Mamluk Studies Review*, 5 (2001), pp. 45-72 (p. 46).

hands, and the extent of the Mamluk conquests of recent years. Also, the now familiar inclusion of a clause stating that the Franks will provide some security to the Mamluk lands is once again included, this time with the added information that the powers of Acre were to inform the Sultan two months in advance of any planned crusade against any of his lands.<sup>684</sup>

Mercantile terms are still numerous in this document, and Holt does state that *Shafi' ibn 'Ali*, who recorded the events in his *Fadj*, pushed for the treaty with the Franks, as Acre was an important centre of commerce for the Mamluks.<sup>685</sup> He even states that they had a *Fonduq* in the city itself, once more highlighting this importance.<sup>686</sup> These clauses on merchants and trade also cover a large (larger than usual) amount on naval trade, and naval terms in general. Firstly, the 'coastland' is referred to on numerous occasions, reinforcing the notion that the lands under Frankish rule were limited to the coast, but it also shows that naval trade was an important aspect of mercantile life. To my knowledge, this treaty is the only one in which the Mamluk navy is mentioned.<sup>687</sup> This reference may indicate the desire, from a Mamluk point of view, to increase their supremacy in the Mediterranean, but also their desire to protect their own merchants against pirates and enemies. This supremacy may have been achieved via two different ways.

The first would have been to have their own navy built and manned by their own soldiers. Baybars had already attempted this, however, their impact was minimal, as they failed twice to achieve any kind of victory against enemies.<sup>688</sup> Baybars, also seemingly had another fleet built, larger than before, however, no sources record any battles, and therefore one can presume it never set sail.<sup>689</sup> The 'dream' of a Mamluk navy was not to happen in his time, and the first recorded 'victory' for Mamluk ships was to happen after the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem, in 1302, when the last bastion of Frankish power, the citadel of Arwad, off the shores of Tartus, halfway between

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<sup>684</sup> 'The Latin Kingdom', *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 69-91 (pp. 84-5).

<sup>685</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>686</sup> Linda S. Northrup, *From Slave to Sultan: the career of Al-Mansur Qalawun and the consolidation of Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria (678-689 A.H./1279-1290 A.D.)* (Stuttgart, 1998), p. 157.

<sup>687</sup> 'The Latin Kingdom', *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 69-91 (p. 84).

<sup>688</sup> Fuess, 'Rotting Ships and Razed Harbors: the Naval Policy of the Mamluks', p. 50.

<sup>689</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.



Tripoli and Latakia, was captured.<sup>690</sup> One last attempt at building a navy was tried by the governor of Damascus in 1365, but failed to materialise following his death.<sup>691</sup>

The second way this supremacy could have been achieved was through the use of other nations' navies. The treaties seen above, and the rest of the treaties in Holt's study, all take into account potential threats to the Mamluks coming from the sea, and all seem to state the Christians should warn against threats coming from land and sea. The two treaties that will be seen in the next part, signed by Genoa and Aragon, reflect this change in attitude, and of policy coming from the Mamluk powers. The failure of Baybars to raise and maintain a fleet that could provide security on the seas, but also for the port cities, such as Alexandria for example, meant that they needed to look elsewhere for protection, and these two treaties certainly show us that agreement between them and the naval powers of the time was the best way forward.

### **Treaty with Genoa**

One of the most controversial documents of the period was a treaty signed between Genoa and the Mamluks in 1290. In it, an agreement safeguarding Genoese trade rights and privileges in Egypt could be implied, one that could also increase the economic and military strength of the Mamluk sultanate. This treaty could also be seen as an abandonment of the kingdom of Jerusalem by the Genoese, allowing them to secure their own economic 'empire' in the face of what seemed to be the inevitable fall of the kingdom. This theory could also be complemented by the return of Byzantine rule in Constantinople in 1261, which, with Genoa's involvement in the conquest, gave the latter trading supremacy in the Black Sea to the detriment of the Venetians, but was also at the expense of the Franks and the Latin Empire. The Genoese were strengthening their hold on trade and the slave trade in particular.<sup>692</sup>

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<sup>690</sup> Ibid.

<sup>691</sup> Ibid., p. 52. The ships that were built at this time were left to rot and were never used according to the fifteenth century chronicler, Salih ibn Yahya, in his *Tarikh Bayrut*.

<sup>692</sup> By the beginning of the fourteenth century, Genoa had established itself as the leader in terms of slave trade in Famagousta. Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, 'Liquid Frontiers: A Relational Analysis of Maritime Asia Minor as a Religious Contact Zone in the Thirteenth-Fifteen Centuries', in *Islam and Christianity in Medieval Anatolia*, ed. by A.C.S. Peacock, B. de Nicola, S. nur Yildiz (Farnham, 2015), pp. 117-148 (p. 136).

The Black Sea area was in fact one of the major points of origin of the slave trade,<sup>693</sup> a very lucrative business upon which the Mamluks, for obvious reasons, greatly depended. This trade was frowned upon by the Papacy: there were papal boycotts of trade routes and materials between Christians and Muslims in place; however they were more a formality by the 1290s, as it was by then customary for newly elected popes to re-issue a boycott concerning the trade of war material such as wood, iron, as well as foodstuff and slaves regularly during their pontificate, particularly prior to a planned crusade, or following a Christian defeat against Muslims.<sup>694</sup> From the Third Lateran (1179) onward in fact, and especially in the aftermath of Hattin, the bans become stricter, and more precise and new terminology appears. By the fourteenth century, a new term can be seen, *Alexandrini*, describing those engaged in the now illegal war material trade between Christians and Muslims.<sup>695</sup> As Sophia Menache explains in her article, these bans had very little effect, and the threat of excommunication had become a necessary tool for the papacy to force the cities concerned, mainly the Italian cities of Genoa, Venice and Pisa, to impose the bans on their merchants. The failure of these bans is more evident with the fact that we know both the Venetians and the Genoese traded with the Mamluks on a regular basis: there was one yearly Venetian convoy bound for Alexandria, and the Venetian government even considered organising a second one in 1278, before stating that one was more than enough.<sup>696</sup>

It is therefore in a context of this controversy that the treaty between the commune of Genoa and Sultan Qalawun was signed. As seen above however, the treaty itself falls into an established pattern of relations between Mamluks and Christians in the later part of the thirteenth century. It is by no means an anomaly, or out of ordinary to have such a treaty.

The treaty was signed following the fall of Tripoli and the actions of Zaccaria in the eastern Mediterranean and two versions of the text survive. One in Latin is found in the Genoese Archives, and one in Arabic is found in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s *Tashrif*.<sup>697</sup> The former seems to be a literal translation of an Arabic document, however, both

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<sup>693</sup> Ibid.

<sup>694</sup> Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, p. 242.

<sup>695</sup> Ibid., p.244.

<sup>696</sup> Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Middle Ages* (Princeton NJ, 1984), p. 10.

<sup>697</sup> The Arabic document can also be found in M. Silvestre de Sacy, *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque du roi et autres bibliothèques: pièces diplomatiques tirées des archives de la république de gènes*, Vol 11 (Paris: 1827). He also gives us a translation of the text.

surviving texts are two different sworn undertakings, taken according to Peter Holt, at a similar time.<sup>698</sup> In its form and content, the Latin text resembles one that was signed earlier in the year between the king of Aragon, Alfonso III, and the Mamluk sultan.

This treaty with Aragon is important because it provides us with a comparison for the treaty with Genoa. It was passed between Alfonso III and Qalawun in 1290 in a very particular context. The Aragonese had established themselves in Sicily following the Sicilian Vespers of 1282, and seemed to have continued the same 'imperial' tradition of entertaining friendly relations with the Muslim powers: when Alfonso came to power, he sent to Egypt an embassy and numerous Muslim captives as a gesture of friendship, which was happily accepted.<sup>699</sup>

By its nature, the treaty with Aragon is one of friendship and co-operation. Despite the fact that the title indicates Alfonso was the main Christian signatory, the treaty also includes his brothers: James, king of Sicily, and two others. The text offers no deadline, or timeframe for its duration, stating only that the 'amity, concord and friendship shall continue perpetually and continuously'.<sup>700</sup> This treaty is also the only one to be written between what appears to be equals, the opening statement making no mention of truce, imposition of wills, or of recognition of power. It is to my knowledge an exception, and indicates perhaps two things: first, it acknowledges the rise to power of Aragon in the eastern Mediterranean. The Aragonese trading commune of Barcelona was quickly gaining in importance and would quickly become Genoa's main rival in the western Mediterranean, replacing Pisa.<sup>701</sup> Secondly, it could indicate the need of the Mamluks to have an ally. As Sicily had always been a kingdom on friendly terms with the Muslim powers of Egypt, the trend was bound to continue. The Aragonese relations with Muslim powers on such terms were also to continue in the fourteenth century under James II, especially with the kingdom of Tunis.<sup>702</sup> Taking into account the other treaties with the Franks however, it is clear that the sultans feared another crusade, and with the Aragonese situation in Spain and their strained relations with the

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<sup>698</sup> 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 143).

<sup>699</sup> 'The Treaty of Al-Mansur Qalawun with King Alfonso III of Aragon: 689/1290', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 129-140 (p. 131).

<sup>700</sup> Ibid., pp. 129-140 (p. 138).

<sup>701</sup> Constable, *Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain*, p. 243.

<sup>702</sup> For more about Aragonese-Muslim relations see M. L. De Mas Latrie, *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au moyen âge publiés avec une introduction historique*, Suppléments et tables (Paris, 1872), pp. 32-69.

French, one could assume the Mamluks were using the old adage of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ to their advantage.<sup>703</sup>

Apart from the position of the two signatories, the treaty is important because it highlights a change in attitude coming from the western (Christian) powers towards the Mamluks. Firstly, we can find the now common clause about the territories of either party being safe from the other. This clause, while common, does contain some interesting aspects already discussed in the previous treaty, namely the Mamluk fleet, and the importance they were assigning to the seas in general.<sup>704</sup> The importance of the seas, and naval trade in particular is made clear in clause 16, which implies that Muslim merchants were frequently using Aragonese ships to trade.<sup>705</sup> Interestingly, there is one other clause in the entire document that defines this change of attitude: the sale of prohibited goods.<sup>706</sup> The text clearly provides the grounds for the sale of those prohibited goods via Aragonese ports:

*‘Provided that the king of Aragon shall permit the people of his territory and other Franks to bring to the Muslim ports iron, linen, timber, etc.’<sup>707</sup>*

This clause, combined with the implications of other treaties (mainly what has been seen above with the treaties of Armenia and the slave trade), really clears the way for trade with Muslim powers and the Mamluks in general.

Another indication of a change of attitude is visible in the diplomatic aspect of the document. Five of the twenty-two clauses relate to diplomatic ties between the two powers. Three of those five directly relate to the kingdom of Jerusalem and the powers involved in it. Firstly, clause 5, which, roughly interpreted, follows the statement from above, the ‘enemy of my friend is my enemy, and the friend of my friend is my friend’.

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<sup>703</sup> The war in Sicily was the major point of conflict between the two crowns, and it also involved the Italians, and the Genoese in particular, quite heavily. Carr, *Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean*, pp. 27-8.

<sup>704</sup> ‘Aragon’, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 129-140 (p. 134). The clause confirms the existence of a Mamluk fleet, and war galleys.

<sup>705</sup> Ibid., pp. 129-140 (p. 136). The inclusion of this clause is interesting because there (to my knowledge) is no other case of this information being recorded in a treaty, although it is found in other terms, in the Genoese treaty. This not only implies that Aragonese ships were trading with the Mamluk powers, but also that they were acting as transports for Mamluk merchants and their wares, which could include slaves.

<sup>706</sup> Prohibited goods were understood to be any type of material used in the construction of military technologies, such as iron, wood, slaves, linen (for sails), etc. Menache, ‘Papal attempts at commercial boycott’, p. 242.

<sup>707</sup> ‘Aragon’, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 129-140 (p. 136).

The list of those enemies is rather explicit, as it specifically mentions the Franks as possible opponents, as well as the pope, Genoese,<sup>708</sup> Venetians, Templars, Hospitallers, Greeks, and all Christian nations.<sup>709</sup> While other treaties had similar clauses identifying similar factions, this treaty goes further by indicating that Aragon was to actively oppose them, and implies that should one of those enemies go to war against the Mamluks, as in crusading, the kingdom of Aragon as well as Sicily should ‘prevent and repulse them, shall commission their galleys and vessels, proceed against their territory, and distract them personally. [...] They shall fight them by land and sea with their galleys, fleet, knights, horsemen and foot soldiers.’<sup>710</sup> The next clause deals specifically with the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish factions over there. While having less of an impact compared to the previous clause, it is still significant, as it basically removes any possibility of Aragonese help of any kind to the kingdom of Jerusalem. This clause also includes the kingdom of Sicily as part of the Aragonese party, thus implying that if any party of the Frankish kingdom were to go to war, they would automatically be cut off from supplies coming from Sicily. As what has been seen with the reign of Charles, the impact of withholding grain supplies from Sicily on the kingdom of Jerusalem was great, and the treaty with Aragon really takes its importance from this clause.

The treaty with Genoa takes a slightly different form to that of Aragon, and perhaps, cannot be seen as having been written in as friendly terms. On the other hand, it still provides us with some very interesting information on their relations with the Mamluks. In the treaty, the Genoese promise to respect and protect the sultan’s subjects in their persons and possession throughout their land and those of others.<sup>711</sup> This protection on the other hand, is primarily given on the seas rather than land, as the clause specifically mentions merchants going in and out of Muslim territories via galleys, fleets, etc.<sup>712</sup>

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<sup>708</sup> Their inclusion in this clause and treaty clearly indicates that the Mamluks did not consider them as allies. In the same year as their treaty was signed, they were still included in the ‘possible enemies’ group. This does really close the arguments that Genoa was changing sides and abandoning the kingdom.

<sup>709</sup> Aragon, in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 129-140 (p. 134).

<sup>710</sup> Ibid., pp. 129-140 (pp. 134-5).

<sup>711</sup> ‘Genoa’, in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (pp. 147-8).

<sup>712</sup> Ibid.

The title of the treaty in the French translation from the Arabic given by de Sacy calls it a treaty of peace and of trade, and further down, he mentions that the concessions given out by the sultan were indeed privileges, and privileges very similar to those given out to the Venetians half a century prior.<sup>713</sup> What does this therefore mean? Again, trade agreements between Christians and Muslims were not new, and the Italian communes had been present in Egypt for quite some time, some even before the onset of the First Crusade, however when these two privilege treaties are looked at in parallel with that passed between Aragon and Cairo, one starts to understand the deeper meaning behind Mamluk diplomacy.

First of all, it is clear that the sultans were trying to strengthen commercial ties with the Italians, not so much for economic profit but more for military and political security. As mentioned earlier, papal boycotts of the trade in war material between Christians and Muslims were technically in place. However, the treaty with Aragon, which also included Sicily, provided a clause for the protection of merchants and their wares, whatever they might be, in all lands of the parties involved.<sup>714</sup> A similar clause can be found in the treaty with Genoa, - and all the other treaties that have been looked at above – in which the commune is to protect all merchants coming and going to the lands of the sultan, mainly Alexandria, from all territories not only under the rule of Genoa, but also of other Christian nations, whether they travel aboard a Genoese vessel, something that was officially forbidden by the boycotts, or one from another nation.<sup>715</sup> This in effect provided secure trading links from Egypt to Anatolia and the Black Sea through which the slave trade could pass. This is consolidated further by two of the documents seen previously. The first, the treaty between King Leon of Armenia and Qalawun in 1285 in which it is specifically mentioned that the slave trade should be allowed and should be free from any prosecution, whatever the nationality of the merchant, or of the slaves, or the provenance or destination of the ‘cargo’.<sup>716</sup> The second, the privileges obtained by Zaccaria in Armenia in 1285 over the selling of slaves. Steven Epstein does mention this treaty, however, he describes it as ‘the only notable success of Zaccaria in the east’, something he admits, is reflected in Genoa’s attitude towards the man.<sup>717</sup> With this, one should note that the Mamluks were

<sup>713</sup> M. Silvestre de Sacy, *Notices et extraits*, p. 33.

<sup>714</sup> See previous page.

<sup>715</sup> ‘Genoa’, in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 148).

<sup>716</sup> ‘King Leon III’, in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 92-105 (pp. 101-2).

<sup>717</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 179.

responding not only to the tightening of the slave trade from the papacy, but also to the rapid decline of the crusader kingdom, and the subsequent rise of Armenia as a trading station.

The treaty with Genoa also gives us clear indication as to how trade was conducted between the two nations. As stated above, the majority of the clauses relate to naval trade rather than land trade. As Holt describes, the Genoese were rather free in their trading routines in Alexandria, being allowed to unload their cargo by themselves rather than through third parties for example,<sup>718</sup> but it seems that the Genoese were also ferrying Mamluk merchants on regular basis.<sup>719</sup> Clause 4 is clear on this point as it states the Genoese are bound to protect Muslim merchants travelling on their ships, rather than implying the possibility of it happening, in the same it is doing when vessels of other nations are brought in.<sup>720</sup> The role of Genoese as merchants for the Mamluks is also attested by William of Adam in his treaty, *How to defeat the Saracens*, written around 1317.<sup>721</sup> He identifies the Genoese in particular as being 'bad Christians', as well as skilled sailors but also driven by greed and profit.<sup>722</sup>

When discussing trade between Genoa and the Mamluks, and the way it is described in the treaty, one should always have the slave trade in mind. This trade is briefly mentioned in our treaty, as it is only discussed with regards to the protection that the Genoese were to give to Muslim merchants and their wares;<sup>723</sup> however, if one were to look into the treaty signed between Qalawun and the Byzantine emperor, one would see one more important treaty that highlights this pressure from the Mamluks to secure the slave trade routes. While signed in 1281, Qalawun and Michael VIII Palaeologus signed a treaty that in simple terms, legalised and protected the slave trade within Byzantine lands, unless they be Christians, and no matter to whom they were sold.<sup>724</sup> This idea of a clear mercantile link spreading from Byzantium to Egypt, which also included Armenia and the Genoese of course, and which has been touched upon here, is also attested in the work of Reuven Amitai. In an article, he clearly highlights

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<sup>718</sup> 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (pp. 144-5).

<sup>719</sup> Ibid., pp. 141-151 (p. 148).

<sup>720</sup> Ibid.

<sup>721</sup> William of Adam, *How to Defeat the Saracens*, trans. and ed. by Giles Constable (Washington, D.C., 2012).

<sup>722</sup> Ibid., pp. 26, 27, 110, 111.

<sup>723</sup> 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 147).

<sup>724</sup> 'The Treaty between Al-Mansur Qalawun and Michael VIII Palaeologus: 680/1281', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 118-128 (p. 124).

the connection between the two geographical areas with regards to slaves, but he also points at the role of the Genoese within this area.<sup>725</sup>

On top of this clear protection of the slave trade, the Mamluks were also trying to safeguard themselves against any potential crusades, as well as alliances between the Christian West and the Mongols in the east. As seen in the Aragonese treaty, the Latin party was made to swear to protect the sultan's interests by informing him of any alliances or preparations against him. This clause does not appear in the Genoese document however.

One of the most important themes of the crusader kingdoms, and one that is highlighted in this thesis, is the difference between Genoese from the commune and those already well established in the kingdom of Jerusalem, such as the Embriaco family. That difference is the main reason for the omission of this clause in the Genoese treaty. While a similar differentiation can be observed when Muslim chroniclers and historians write about the Franks of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Christians of the West, it can also be seen from the western powers, as with the treatment of Benedetto Zaccaria by Genoa itself, and the latter's reaction towards his actions shows. As mentioned before, it is following the capture of a Mamluk ship by Zaccaria that Genoa sought closer diplomatic relations with the Sultan in order to protect its citizens in Alexandria mainly, but also its economic interests in the region: they clearly separated themselves from him, and the Embriaco in the process, stating that it was not in their interest to set up a 'colony' in Tripoli, and that it in fact, would cost them more than what they would gain.<sup>726</sup>

On its own, the Genoese/Mamluk treaty of 1290 is a simple non-aggression treaty to which is added clauses concerning trade, and the protection of merchants and their wares, whatever they might be. Added to it, we have the document from the consuls of Genoa returning all the merchants and their possessions taken by Zaccaria. While his name is not mentioned in there, it is clearly implied in the use of the singular when the document mentions the culprit.<sup>727</sup> This again does not imply much; rather it simply highlights the difficult and tense situation of the Latin East, and of the

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<sup>725</sup> Amitai, 'Diplomacy and the slave trade in the Eastern Mediterranean', pp. 349-68.

<sup>726</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 179; the difference in attitude towards Zaccaria by the commune of Genoa and its consuls can be seen in the third part of the treaty, in the copy of the oath sworn by the envoys of Genoa, '*I have not brought with me or my company a sum to compensate them for their loss, either from the commune or from the Genoese who took them [...]*', 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 150).

<sup>727</sup> Ibid.



importance of Alexandria as a commercial hub for the Genoese. In fact when reading the treaty, one has to be slightly surprised at the dominant position taken by the Mamluks compared to the attitude of the Genoese; while they had valid grounds to be imposing following Zaccaria's actions, the Genoese were still a major trading partner, and were still a notable importer of slaves to the sultanate. A similar position is seen – to a greater extent – with Armenia. If one was to rearrange the Genoese treaty, reading it back to front, this position is made even clearer, with the apologies of the *Captains of the People* for the capture of the Muslim merchants, followed by what can be considered a small alliance on economic and diplomatic grounds. Was this therefore a formal alliance between Genoa and the Mamluk sultanate? No, it was not. In the same manner as Genoa and the kingdom of Jerusalem were not formally allied, neither were Genoa and Cairo. This treaty can be seen to be very similar to the privileges granted by the powers of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Italian mercantile communes. It was signed after the fall of Tripoli, and before the fall of Acre. Zaccaria's actions aside, it is easy to see why some may have taken this treaty as the proof the Italians' lack of involvement in the survival of the kingdom of Jerusalem. However, one should not jump to conclusions so hastily. It is true that after the fall of Tripoli, only Acre remained of the kingdom. Yet, that does not mean that the Italians had withdrawn completely from the area. In fact, both Venice and Genoa were still locked in diplomatic, and naval, conflict over the return of the Genoese Quarter in Acre following the end of the War of Saint-Sabas in 1259, and Venice was still in the process of increasing the size of its own Quarter within the city as we have seen previously. The number of merchants having fled to Cyprus after the fall of Acre, re-localisation that is analysed by Jacoby, is also a good indication that there were still a good number of Italians from the communes present in the city in 1291.<sup>728</sup> This treaty is not a proof of the abandonment of Acre by Genoa. It should be seen as a survival attempt yes, but not to the detriment of Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

This document is in fact very close to the privileges given out in the kingdom of Jerusalem. We have a clause promising the freedom of trade, but also one stating that the Genoese can unload their cargo without going through Muslim third parties.<sup>729</sup> On top of that, there is the freedom of justice for any Genoese, as long as it does not involve a Muslim, a clause that is very similar to that given out by the kings of

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<sup>728</sup> Jacoby, 'Refugees from Acre in Famagusta around 1300', pp. 53-67.

<sup>729</sup> M. Silvestre de Sacy, *Notices et extraits*, p. 36.

Jerusalem.<sup>730</sup> The listing of the tax rates on certain wares, such as silver or gold, is not uncommon as well, neither was the promise that some wares would not be taxed.<sup>731</sup> It is not surprising therefore that Epstein writes about this treaty in such a way as to place it in the continuous attempts of the Genoese to establish and secure new commercial outposts.<sup>732</sup> In fact, he states that Zaccaria's actions had nothing to do with the establishment of the treaty at all, and it does seem as if he is arguing in fact that Genoa had already decided to secure itself in Egypt before the very likely fall of Acre to the Mamluks.<sup>733</sup> Here we have the other major theme of this thesis: how much did the Genoese anticipate the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and whether or not they abandoned as a precautionary measure, establishing themselves in the Byzantine Empire, but also in Armenia, and of course Egypt.

According to Epstein, Genoa may have anticipated as such, and this may be reflected in this treaty; however, the text should not be treated as an affirmation of such. Commercial treaties, and the giving out of privileges was done regularly, and the major gain for the Egyptians at the time was the security of their merchants, and of the trade routes, something which was to the benefit of all.<sup>734</sup>

## **Conclusion**

This treaty, or treaties if one was to look at the series of texts signed in the years prior to the fall of Acre, had quite a significant impact on Christian/Muslim relations. It perhaps places the merchants and the Italian communes in general, in a certain category, completely different to the Franks, and the Western Christians. Trade was important to both geographical areas, however this treaty shows that the Mamluks knew how vital Italian galleys and merchants were to the survival of their sultanate. By ensuring that Genoese merchants could come and go in Alexandria and other ports within Mamluk territory, even when the Mamluks and Christians were at war, meant that a constant and steady flow of good could go in and out of the ports.<sup>735</sup> The fixed level of taxes on certain wares also meant that Genoese merchants would not go to other

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<sup>730</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>731</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>732</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 180.

<sup>733</sup> It is especially suspicious when he states that Spinola made a 'pact' with the sultan. Ibid.

<sup>734</sup> This Epstein does seem to agree on. It also seems that the Arabic document confirms this point as well. Ibid.

<sup>735</sup> 'Genoa', in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 141-151 (p. 146).

places to seek better deals, while the authorisation to use their own third parties to unload goods, as well as the use of their church, and of courts of justice ensured them a certain level of autonomy that was rather attractive.<sup>736</sup>

This treaty does not highlight the abandonment of the kingdom of Jerusalem by Genoa for their own economic benefit – something that could perhaps be seen in the Aragonese/Mamluk treaty – but more a confirmation that trade was vital to the east, whether Christian or Muslim. The text is not an alliance, neither is it an imposition of Mamluk authority and power over a Genoa wishing to ensure its survival in preparation of the fall of the kingdom, it is a text of acceptance, a text which, for the duration of the life of the parties and their heirs, would ensure continuous trade between two nations.

From the events in Tripoli and Zaccaria's actions, followed by the treaty of 1290, it is clear that Genoese involvement in the eastern Mediterranean was far from diminished. The fact that by the mid-fourteenth century, both Genoa and Venice would be major trading partners with Egypt does show that the fall of Acre may have been a slight drawback, but it was definitely not without effect. Furthermore, the aftermath of the fall of Acre and the kingdom of Jerusalem saw another change in attitude from both Italian communes. Firstly, the actions of the kingdom of Cyprus towards the Mamluk sultanate (Peter I's failed crusade to Alexandria in 1365) caused some major concerns for the Italians as trade was heavily disrupted.<sup>737</sup> Friendlier relations from Venice followed this, allowing them to become the most important trading partner in Egypt, but by more hostile actions from Genoa, who once more resorted to piracy in order to harass Mamluk merchants.<sup>738</sup>

The last decade of the kingdom of Jerusalem is a confusing one. The fragmentation of the kingdom was such that it would be impossible to look at one area only, and be able to come up with a general reason as to why it fell in 1291. The role of the Genoese in this time period however is clear: they were a vital part of the kingdom, not only in economical terms, but also as a Christian power. Their importance as trading powers, but also as a naval force was clear for both sides, and both were trying to use them to their advantage.

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<sup>736</sup> The Genoese church, Saint-Marie, is mentioned by name in the treaty. *Ibid.*, p. 38. This shows how integrated in the city the Genoese were.

<sup>737</sup> Fuess, 'Rotting Ships and Razed Harbors: the Naval Policy of the Mamluks', p. 53.

<sup>738</sup> *Ibid.* Fuess also talks about the capture of Famagusta by Genoa as a clear sign of not only Cypriot inability to wage war on the Mamluk, but also as a sign of Genoese impatience as a result.

## **The fall of Acre and its aftermath**

The fall of Tripoli in 1289 sent alarm bells ringing in medieval Europe, and in September of that year, a number of papal letters were written to different powers in order to mount something of a response against the rising threat of the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>739</sup> We have indications of crusaders being diverted from the Slavonic Crusades towards the Levant,<sup>740</sup> twenty galleys bound to the kingdom with provisions<sup>741</sup>, and in January of 1290, another similar reference is made with regards to Venetian and Genoese galleys being sent to Acre.<sup>742</sup> Both mentions seemed to have involved the French king, Phillip III, and as Musarra calls it, the move had all the makings of the ‘*Ultimate Crusade*’.<sup>743</sup> Throughout 1290, preparations were taking place to send supplies and soldiers to Acre in order to reinforce it, and both Venetians and Genoese were still involved.<sup>744</sup> There are also mentions of mercenaries being employed, but the majority of the crusaders ready to depart by January of 1290 were coming from Italy.<sup>745</sup> Doria’s chronicle seem to make mention of a fleet of twelve galleys being armed by the commune.<sup>746</sup> Venice was also arming galleys, and as Musarra states, these moves seemed to have given the Mamluks the ideal *casus belli*.<sup>747</sup>

These were not the only indications of an Italian response to the fall of Tripoli. Venetian galleys were sent to Acre as stated above, however, there also seemed to have been a large influx of Italian crusaders crossing the Mediterranean to join Acre.<sup>748</sup> While it can be argued that Venice had more to lose than the others should Acre fall due to their commercial activities in the area, what the *Templar of Tyre* calls ‘mout de menues gens d’Itaille’ clearly highlights that a large response from Italy was seen. Taking this together with the policies of Venice with regards to the buying of property in the city of Acre seen previously, it can definitely be argued that the Italians had no intention of abandoning the city to the Mamluks.

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<sup>739</sup> See *Les Registres de Nicolas IV*, pp. 396-400.

<sup>740</sup> Ibid., §2251

<sup>741</sup> Ibid., §2258.

<sup>742</sup> Ibid., §2269.

<sup>743</sup> Musarra, *Acra 1291*, p. 171.

<sup>744</sup> Ibid., p. 172. See also *RRH*, §1496.

<sup>745</sup> Musarra, *Acra 1291*, p. 172.

<sup>746</sup> Doria, pp. 331-332. He also states that another fleet of 120 galleys were to depart with 1543 men but that one seemed bound for Pisa instead.

<sup>747</sup> Musarra, *Acra 1291*, p. 172.

<sup>748</sup> *TT*, §480.

The siege of the city and its fall has already been studied in detail by many, including Mussara, who, in his most recent book (2017), devotes one chapter on the defences of the city, the siege, the fall, and the immediate aftermath, and therefore such matters will not be discussed here.<sup>749</sup> However, it should be mentioned that in the *Templar of Tyre*, which describes the siege and the fall in detail, only the Pisans seemed to have been involved directly with the defence of the city. They had a siege engine, named ‘*Mensour*’, whose location is actually given, and were most likely given responsibility of one tower.<sup>750</sup> On Map 1, one can also see that one tower seemed to have been given to the Venetians. Pringle’s map also shows one tower named after the Genoese, suggesting they may have had been in charge of one area.<sup>751</sup> The Venetians are also mentioned in the *Templar* with regards to the evacuation of the civilians and the rest of the crusaders following the loss of the city.<sup>752</sup> A convoy seemed to have reached the city prior to the siege and remained there during the attack. Could it be the twenty galleys sent by Nicolas IV in 1290? One question remains to be asked however: where were the Genoese? While they are not mentioned as having taken part in the defence of the city by the *Templar*, and according to Doria’s chronicle, they remained entrenched in their conflict with Pisa over Corsica and in the western Mediterranean, there are still references to them in the chronicle. Firstly, let us remind ourselves of their situation in Acre prior to the siege. Genoese numbers had drastically diminished following Saint-Sabas, their tower was destroyed, and only two mentions of *consuls* in Acre can be found, yet, they had not completely vanished from the region. As seen with Zaccaria in Tripoli, their involvement was still somewhat important in the economy of the area, and it is very improbable that they had completely abandoned the area. While they are not noted as having taken part in the defence of the city in the *Templar*, they are still present for the evacuation. They seem to arrive along with the king of Cyprus, in May, but only two galleys are mentioned.<sup>753</sup> The *Templar* however seems to be very grateful for their help as they rescued a lot of civilians, and even names one particular

<sup>749</sup> Musarra, *Acra 1291*, pp. 185-207.

<sup>750</sup> ‘*Engins*’, *TT*, §490; the machine was located in/near Saint Romano, *ibid.*, §497. While this area is not identified in any of the maps, nor in Kesten’s study, from the *TT*, it is possible to see that the Mamluk armies left the *barbaquane*, what the *TT* identifies as the outer walls of the city, towards the *Tour Maudite*, through which was a gate, and directly headed towards the Pisan siege engine. From Grousset’s map (8), as well as the one based on Sanudo’s (1), it is easy to pinpoint the area in question.

<sup>751</sup> See Map 11.

<sup>752</sup> *TT*, §503.

<sup>753</sup> *Ibid.*

Genoese, a certain Andre Peleau.<sup>754</sup> His connection with the events or with anything is unknown, but he is also referred to in Doria's chronicle as having taken a large amount of men and sailed off.<sup>755</sup> The involvement of Genoa does not stop there, as following the events, the pope called on for help to safeguard Cyprus from the Mamluks, and in response, Genoa armed ten galleys.<sup>756</sup>

The chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre* states that the majority of the population of Acre managed to escape the onslaught,<sup>757</sup> and Jacoby agrees with him, although he argues that immigration to Cyprus had existed prior to the fall of the city.<sup>758</sup> He states that Venetians and Pisans had already started to settle on the island from the time of La Forbie (1244), and in particular following Baybars' push in Palestine.<sup>759</sup> As for the Genoese, Jacoby states that the majority had already landed following their defeat in the War of Saint-Sabas.<sup>760</sup> Although he does not mention it, it is entirely plausible that the Genoese who had settled in Tyre following the war sailed to the island after its fall. The siege and subsequent loss of Acre sparked an interesting reaction from Genoa on the other hand. Aside from the arming and sending of the ten galleys mentioned above, there seemed to have been an enthusiasm for exploration. Epstein mentions that two Vivaldi brothers and a member of the Doria family announced that they were planning to sail the Atlantic in search of India.<sup>761</sup> This attempt was also a result of the troubles over the Black Sea trade, and their conflict with Venice in the region, and Kedar also mentions another similar endeavour.<sup>762</sup> Both seemed to have failed, however it shows a desire to change the way trade was conducted, Epstein even suggesting that they were trying to 'cut the middlemen' of the eastern trade, as well as their rivals, that is the Mamluks and Venice.<sup>763</sup> With the increasing papal sanctions against trade with the Muslims, and with the evident effect that the fall of Acre would have on the reputation of anyone seen trading with the enemies of Christ, it would seem that they were trying to adapt to the times, but it could be said that they were trying to fight the Christian fight on economic grounds, slowly attacking Mamluk trade and therefore revenues. It

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<sup>754</sup> Ibid.

<sup>755</sup> Doria, p. 337.

<sup>756</sup> *TT*, §524.

<sup>757</sup> Ibid., §503.

<sup>758</sup> David Jacoby, 'Refugees from Acre in Famagusta around 1300', pp. 53-67 (p. 56).

<sup>759</sup> Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>760</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>761</sup> Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 181.

<sup>762</sup> Benjamin Kedar, *Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of Affairs and the Fourteenth Century Depression* (London, 1977), p. 118, Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 182.

<sup>763</sup> Ibid.

would therefore seem that despite their treaty with the Mamluks, they were not clearly ready to abandon the region entirely.

The Genoese desire to recover the kingdom of Jerusalem is also manifest in a document from 1295 sent to Phillip IV of France by a Genoese named Galvano de Levanto.<sup>764</sup> Intriguingly, the plan that he proposes is based on the game of chess, and in his text, he claims that he is certain that the armies of Christ will be able to recover the kingdom.<sup>765</sup> His plans for the potential crusade link well with the theories that have been put forward in this thesis, especially the relationship between Genoa and the crown of France, as he states that only the king of France would be able to lead this crusade.<sup>766</sup> Pierre Dubois also wrote his treaty *The recovery of the Holy Land* to Philip IV in 1300.<sup>767</sup> His version is different as it was written more as a resume rather than a proposition. His mention of the Italian cities refers primarily to the internal strife as well as their wars that have gone unpunished, thus hindering any effort to recover the Holy Land.<sup>768</sup> Galvano focuses on the tactical aspect of the recovery however, but both texts remain theoretical rather than practical. Overall on the other hand, it seems that Genoa was focussing its attention on its conflict with Venice and their difficult relationship with Pisa.

Venice, or some Venetians at least, seemed to have taken advantage of the economic benefits that opened up following the fall of Acre. Viviano de Ginnebaldo was a merchant based in Famagusta, to which he fled following 1291. Jacoby argues that he most likely had dealings on Cyprus prior to his arrival, and that he had been active in Acre from the 1270s-80s.<sup>769</sup> His role in the events following the end of the kingdom of Jerusalem is not that important but may be an indication of individuals making the most of the situation and confusion. He seemed to have been fluent in Arabic, indicating that he had enough dealings with Muslim merchants in his career, and is known to have been trading prohibited materials to Egypt, as he was excommunicated for it sometimes between 1291 and 1300.<sup>770</sup> He also acted as interpreter and middleman for Genoese merchants in Famagusta.<sup>771</sup> Heavy sanctions

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<sup>764</sup> 'Traité du recouvrement de la terre sainte adressé, vers l'an 1295, à Philippe le Bel par Galvano de Levanto, médecin génois', pp. 343-369.

<sup>765</sup> Ibid., p. 361.

<sup>766</sup> Ibid.

<sup>767</sup> Dubois, *The recovery of the Holy Land*.

<sup>768</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>769</sup> David Jacoby, 'Refugees from Acre in Famagusta around 1300', pp. 53-67 (p. 62).

<sup>770</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>771</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

were in place with regards to the sale of commodities such as wood and iron, but it seems that Venice was keen to gain from the situation. New concessions from Egypt to Venice in 1302 enabled them to trade on advantageous terms with the Mamluks, but also allowed them to sell and invest profits from prohibited materials directly, without taxes.<sup>772</sup> Furthermore, the fourteenth century, which saw the rise of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia, also seemed to be a time in which the slave trade flourished, and both Venice and Genoa were two of the major protagonists.<sup>773</sup> Others, whose involvement in this trade should be noted, were the Hospitallers, based on Rhodes, and the communes of Marseilles and Barcelona.<sup>774</sup> This clearly shows that trade in the eastern Mediterranean had not dwindled following the loss of the kingdom, and treaties signed in that century, such as that of 1353 between the Turks of Aydin, Genoa, and Venice, emphasise the importance of the slave trade for the economic survival of the region.<sup>775</sup>

Overall, it seems that both Venice and Genoa were affected by the loss of Acre in different ways. While both actively sent support to the city in 1291, both scrambled as much as they could in order to compensate for the lost markets in their own ways, Genoa sending expeditions in order to by-pass Egypt and the Mamluks, while Venice tried to re-establish its economic relations with the Muslim powers. What is certain however is that following the fall of Acre, both cities had to settle their rivalry in the Black Sea, as their conflict was becoming a major one. That feat was not achieved until 1299, and from then, one could say that both were able to look towards a solution for the Holy Land and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

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<sup>772</sup> *Diplomatarium Veneto-levantinum*, ed. by G. M. Thomas and R. Predelli, 2 vols (Venice, 1880–1899), I, 5, p. 11.

<sup>773</sup> Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State: The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 37.

<sup>774</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>775</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.



## **Conclusion**

This thesis set out to establish the role of the Genoese in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem by focussing on four major events from the year 1250 to 1291. It has made a start on bridging the gap in the historiography of the Levant with regards to the smaller powers present in the region, and has provided new theories using historical, but also archaeological sources. It has tried to include as many detail as possible on the diplomatic policies of the Genoese, while keeping in mind that their attitudes and decisions taken in the Levant were also driven by economical and religious factors.

The role of the Genoese can therefore be identified first, through their involvement with Louis IX and his crusades. Despite the negative outcome of the first (1248-1254), they were keen to reciprocate their engagement during Louis' second crusade (1270). These expeditions gave them the potential to secure new, or better, privileges and advantages in the conquered lands, as well as an increased status back home, but also in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The contract that has been analysed gives us also a clear insight into naval preparations at the time. It has also enabled us to look into the socio-political dynamics of Genoa. The names of the families mentioned are not the most important families of the commune and this therefore highlights a shift in those dynamics that has also be seen during the time of Charles of Anjou on the Sicilian throne. The connections made with this contract demand further analysis, as the relationship established between Genoa and the French crown was clear, yet, it clearly remains underestimated. The other point that has been made is that of the impact of the 1247 papal *bull*, and its connection with the later events. It has to be stressed once more that these are clearly undervalued and need to be addressed properly. This thesis has made a start on the subject however, and it has also impressed the need to count this event as one of importance to the Genoese in the Levant.

The next chapter has shown that while I have tried to establish the political and diplomatic role of the Genoese in the kingdom of Jerusalem, it is impossible to entirely do so without discussing their mercantile agenda. As such the War of Saint-Sabas has demonstrated their attempt, and also that of the other two Italian cities, at establishing their dominance over the Eastern Mediterranean trade. The war itself was

not entirely a commercial clash. It had all the attributes of a territorial one, as well as of a war of pride, or honour. Because of the violent nature of the conflict, and the fact that it engulfed various political parties from the kingdom, the war has been seen as one factor that may have contributed to the fall of the Latin East. However, it has been stated in this thesis that the conflict could have been a continuation of past altercations between the two Italian cities, clashes that continued well after the official ceasefire of 1259. Musarra's theory of inter-connected wars up until 1299 has a strong case for itself, as the events of 1261 in the Byzantine Empire are clearly connected to that of Acre.

This chapter also set out to draw a clearer topographical picture of Acre in the later part of the thirteenth century. I believe that both historians and archaeologists should work closer together in order to understand not only the reasons that pushed the Italians to go to war against one another, but also to understand the true impact that this conflict had on Acre and its population. The chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre*, which describes the events of the War of Saint-Sabas as a full out war, using stone throwing machines, as if one was to recall a siege does support the theory that this was a truly influential event. The war also spread amongst the nobility of the kingdom, as well as through the military orders, as if the enmity of the Italians was the spark that spread throughout the kingdom, giving more validity to the above stated fact. This can also be used to support the idea that the Italians should not carry the responsibility for the fall of Acre on their own, but that it should be shared with the whole political sphere of the kingdom.

Ultimately, the war was to end badly for the Genoese in Acre, yet, they managed to survive up until the fall of the city in 1291, albeit in reduced numbers. This was perhaps one of the reasons why there was a lack of coordination between the cities, but also between the West and the East.

This concept of divisions between home cities and 'colonies' was highlighted in the next chapter. This section has tried to provide an answer as to why the period of 1268-1282 remains rather void of information regarding Genoa and the Genoese in the East, aside from their continued struggle in Tyre. The consequences of Saint-Sabas were that ultimately, the Genoese were forced to open up their frontiers, and look elsewhere for the trade that was vital to their survival. The events in Byzantium are one example, but one should also take into account Louis' second crusade, as the

Genoese were once more part of the expedition. There are also the continued wars with Venice and Pisa to consider, together with the arrival of Charles. The latter would chiefly be responsible for the shift in focus that can be seen from Genoa at this time. Their attention was clearly elsewhere and the kingdom of Jerusalem therefore remained on the side-lines. The Genoese did not simply lose interest, they were otherwise occupied in other areas to be able to augment their presence in the Levant. Their lack of attention allowed Venice to expand in Acre, but also permitted the rise of individuals. Individuality versus communality is one of the major themes of this thesis, and can be best described during Charles' reign in Sicily but also in Jerusalem. The apparent abandonment of the Levant by Genoa is further recognised by the low number of references to consuls in the chronicles. Yet it also contrasts with the events revolving around Benedetto Zaccaria and the Embriaco family. Both were responsible for the continued struggle of the Genoese in the kingdom of Jerusalem and its surroundings, but one could even go further by stating that without Zaccaria's actions in the East, the 1290 treaty between Genoa and Qalawun may not have passed.

Once more, their political agenda is closely linked to their economical motives. Van Doosselaere's theories highlight a change of attitude from the Italians, but this change was not exactly what it seemed. While trade in the kingdom of Jerusalem was a clear source of motivations to the Italians, their establishment in new areas, as well as their rising power in older ones, they retained a certain degree of enthusiasm for the Levant. Thus it could once more be argued that their 'greed', actually kept their interests in the Frankish lands alive, whereas the crowns of Europe lost interest in the lands, and kept the title of king of Jerusalem more for honour and prestige than anything else.

Finally, this thesis showed that the Genoese treaty of 1290 was not an isolated document, and that it fell in a then long established series of treatises signed between Mamluks and Christians. We saw that the Mamluks were aware of the importance of not only trade, to their survival, but also of the Italian naval forces, in particular that of Genoa. The benefits obtained by Genoa in this document may appear unique, but I have shown that they were in fact, similar to those given out by earlier Frankish rulers. I have also shown that the Genoese were not the only recipients of those benefits, as both the kingdoms of Armenia and of Aragon received certain advantages regarding trade. The connection between those three treatises, as well as the one

obtained by Zaccaria in Armenia, reveal a tactical attempt by the Mamluks to safeguard trade, particularly that of slaves, so important to their survival. Compared to other documents of the sort, the treaty with Genoa also reveals a change in attitude from the Mamluks, who were seemingly adopting a more diplomatic approach to their conquest of the Levant. Despite this statement, the 1290 treaty is not an alliance, nor an imposition of Mamluk authority and power over Genoa, the latter submitting to the former, ensuring thus its survival in preparation of the fall of the kingdom. The text is one of mutual acceptance, a text which, for the duration of the life of the parties and their heirs, would ensure continuous trade between two nations.


This chapter has also shown that Genoese involvement in the kingdom of Jerusalem did not end with the arrival of Charles. From the latter's death, it seems that they renewed their attempts to strengthen their presence in Acre and the kingdom. It has shown that the role of the Genoese was not only that of economic power, but they were also a strong political faction.

This thesis has achieved its purpose, and answered the initial question of what was the role of the Genoese between the years of 1250 to 1291. It has achieved in shedding more light on not only Genoa in the Levant but also on the other Italian powers present as well. While it is clear that more research has to be done on the subject, I believe I have managed to provide some answers to questions revolving around the Genoese and the four major events highlighted.

## Appendix


### Maps

#### Map 1




1937 map of Acre based on Sanuto's 14<sup>th</sup> century map (courtesy of the Conservation Centre)

Map 2



Kesten's map of Acre


Map 3



Jacoby's map




Map 4





Benvisti's map

Map 5



Kesten's outline of the Venetian Quarter and his proposed location for the building of Saint-Sabas.






Map of the siege of Acre by Napoleon




Map 8



Map of Acre by Grousset.

Map 9



Map of the series of building adjacent to the sea wall, including the proposed building of Saint-Sabas. Courtesy of the Conservation Centre.

Map 10



Map of the proposed inner harbour. Courtesy of the Conservation Centre.

## Contract between Louis IX and Genoa (1246)

II. Li Communs de Genne doit faire pour le roi par achat iii naves qui seront propres dou roi, desqueles l'une sera des mesures dessous escrites.

Premièrement, cele nave sera longue par carenne xxxi goues, et longue de rode en rode L goues, haute en la santine xvii paumes et demie, haute en la première couverte ix paumes, haute en la seconde couverte viii paumes, haute en l'ourle v paumes, large en miliu de la nave xL paumes et demi. Et doit avoir la devantditte nave une bargue de cantier, ii bargues de perascaline, et une gondele, furnies et aparillies de toutes choses que il appartient as devantdittes bargues.

*Item*, la devantditte nave doit avoir ii timons qui seront gros, afaitiés, ix paumes et demi, et seront lonc xxiiii goues; et doit avoir cele nave un arbre de proe qui sera lons Lii goues et gros xiii paumes, affaitiés. *Item* un arbre de miliu qui sera lons xLix goues et gros xii paumes. *Item* ele doit avoir viii pièces d'antennes desqueles les ii seront pennes pour l'arbre de proe, et sera l'une longue xLii goues et grosse vii paumes et demi, et l'autre sera longue xL goues et grosse vii paumes, et autres ii antennes que on dist Car, l'une longue xxxvi goues et grosse vii paumes et demi, et l'autre longue xxxv goues et grosse vii paumes. *Item* autres ii pèces d'antennes de miliu, dont l'une sera longue xL goues et l'autre de xxxv goues, et seront grosses chascune vii paumes mains quarte. *Item* les ii autres pièces d'antenne pour le voile, dont l'une sera longue xxxviii goues, et l'autre xxxii goues, et seront grosses chascune de vi paumes. *Item* ladite nave doit avoir vii voiles de coton de Marseille, ou autre si vaillant, et seront des mesures dessous escrites, s'est à savoir: i voile pour l'artimon de Lxvi goues, un tercervel de Lxii goues, *item* un voile de Lx goues, *item* i de Lvi goues, *item* i de miliu de Lx goues, *item* i de Lvii goues, et i autre de Liiii goues. *Item* laditte nave doit avoir xxviii ancras, desqueles les xx seront chascune de viii cantaires, et les autres viii chascune de x cantaires. *Item* laditte nave doit avoir iiii centenaires de chanve de Lombardie ou de Bourgoingne, filé et commis pour la sarce de la nave et de la bargue faire et acomplir. Et doit avoir laditte nave boutas pour aigue tenir jusques à ii<sup>m</sup> meseroles, et barris et bouteseles petites pour aigue lever jusques à c meseroles.

III. Les autres ii naves que lidis communs doit faire seront des mesures dessous escrites, s'est à savoir: chascune longue par la carenne xxix goues, longue de rode en rode xLvi goues, haute en la santenne xv paumes à droite lance; large dessous la première couverte xxxvii paumes, haute en la première couverte ix paumes mains quarte, haute en la seconde couverte vii paumes et demi, haute en l'ourle un paumes et demi. *Item* chascune de ces ii naves doit avoir i arbre de proe qui sera lons xLix goues et gros xii paumes. *Item* i arbre de miliu qui sera lons xLvi goues et gros xi paumes. *Item* chascune de ces ii naves doit avoir viii pièces d'antennes desqueles les ii seront pennes et seront longues xL goues et grosses vi paumes et demi, et autres ii pièces qui seront longues xxxv goues et grosses vi paumes et quarte. *Item* ii pièces longues xxxvi goues et grosses vi paumes, et les autres ii pièces seront longues xxxii goues et grosses v paumes et demi. *Item* les ii dittes naves doivent avoir chascune vii voiles de coton de Marseille, ou autre si vaillant, s'est à savoir i voile de Lxiiii goues, le second de Lx goues, le tierc de Lviii goues, le quart de Lvi goues, le quint de Liiii goues, le sixte de Li goues, et le septime de xLviii goues. *Item* chascune de ces ii naves doit avoir ii timons, chascun lonc de xxii goues et gros ix paumes, et ii et Lx centenaires de chanve de Lombardie ou de Bourgoingne, filé et commis pour la sarce; et doit avoir chascune desdittes naves xxvi ancras, et doit estre chascune de viii cantaires. *Item* chascune de ces ii naves doit avoir une bargue de cantier, et ii bargues de perascaline, et une gondole, furnies et aparillies de toutes chozes qu'il apartient as devantdittes bargues. *Item* chascune de ces ii naves doit avoir boutas pour aigue porter jusques à mil v<sup>z</sup> mezeroles, et barris et bouteseles petites pour aigue lever jusques à c mezeroles. *Item* chascune des trois naves desseusdittes doit avoir xvi res pour chargier lesdittes naves.

IV. Et doit chascune nave estre furnie et aparillie de estaubleries pour porter c chevas dedens chascune, et doivent estre aparillies et volées dedens le port de Genne, o toute la sarce et les aparas desseurdis, de mi le mois d'avril prochain à venir en ii ans; et puet li rois ou ses commandemens les devantdittes naves traire hors dou port de Genne sans nule coustume ne nule redevance paier au commun de Genne ou à autre.

Li communs de Genne doit faire la grant nave pour £vii<sup>m</sup> tournois, et les ii autres pour £xi<sup>m</sup> tournois, et de ces chozes fera li communs bonne seurté et

en obligera au roi tous les biens dou commun et des singulères persones de Genne, et sout bonne painne.

V. Guillaumes et Fransequins de Camilla de Genne doivent faire ii naves à loughier pour le Roi, des mesures dessous escrites, s'est à savoir: longue chascune par la carenne xxvi goues, longue de rode en rode xL goues, haute en la santinne en mi la nave xiii paumes à droite lance, large en laditte couverte par dessous xxx paumes, haute en la couverte des chevaus viii paumes et demi, haute en correont vi paumes et demi, haute en l'ourle iiii paumes et demi, et doit estre le paradis lonc xxiiii paumes, haute delès la rode vi paumes et demi; l'entrée dou paradis sera haute vii paumes, le chastel sera haut vi paumes et demi; et sera large chascune des naves en la pope en trasant xxiiii paumes. *Item* chascune des naves aura i arbre de proe, qui sera lons xL goues et gros viii paumes et demi, et i arbre de miliu qui sera lons xxxvii goues et gros viii paumes; et aura chascune des naves iii pièces d'antennes pour l'arbre de proe, qui seront lonc xxx goues chascuns, et gros v paumes; et autres iiii antennes qui seront lonc chascuns xxvii goues et gros un paumes et demi. *Item* chascune aura v voiles de coton de Marseille ou de Genne, s'est à savoir en la proe i de L goues, et i autre de xLvii goues, et i de xLv goues, et en miliu i de xLvi goues, et i autre de xLiii goues; et sera la sarce de chauve filé et commis, de cL centenaires au centenaire de Genne. *Item* xviii ancras, s'est à savoir viii chascune de vi cantaires, et x chascune de v cantaires au cantaire de Genne. *Item* ii timons qui seront gros chascuns de vii paumes. *Item* une bargue de cantier, qui sera longue xx goues et sera garnie et furnie de rimes et de sarces qui i seront nécessaires. *Item* ii bargues de perascaline et une gondele furnies et aparillies.

VI. *Item* boutes pour aigue porter jusques à mil mezeroles à la mesure de Genne, et barris et boutiselles petites pour aigue lever jusques à L mezeroles; et estaubleries pour chevaus aparillies, o les reis. *Item* en chascune nave doit avoir L mariniers et v en la bargue de cantier, sans les serviteurs; et doit avoir en chascune pattoir bon et souffisant, et doivent estre les devantdittes naves aparillies et sarcies et amarinées suffisamment en port d'Aigue-Morte, et aparillies de chargier à la volenté le Roi, en son commandement, d'en mi le mois de mai prochain à venir jusques en ii ans,

l'an de l'Incarnation courant mil CC LXXVIII <sup>776</sup>, en la forme des convenances qui sunt faittes entre les procureurs le Roi et eaus, lesqueis convenances sunt télés, s'est à savoir: qu'il doivent chargier les naves de toutes charges que li Rois ou ses commandemens i commandera à chargier, et doivent mener lesdittes naves à port auqueil li Roi vorra, et les doivent deschargier ileques, et doivent demourer après ce ileques par un mois avec lesdittes naves, et doivent servir le Rois à sa volenté; et doivent li patron des naves et tuit li maronnier jurer seur les sains Evangiles que il sauveront et garderont en bonne foi le Roi, sa gent et toutes ses chozes, et qu'il acompliront féaiblement le voiage, et qu'il obéirunt au Roi et à son amiraut en toutes chozes, tant qu'il seront ou service le Roi; et que riens il ne chargeront es devantdictes naves ne receveront sans l'assentement et la volenté dou Roi ou de ciaux que li Rois aura establis à chargier lesdittes naves, et qu'il garderont et acompliront et feront garder et acomplir les convenances qu'il ont as procureurs don Roi, ne ne venront de riens contre, sout double painne de tout le loughier. (Et lesdittes naves doivent couster chascune £iii<sup>m</sup> turnois, et de toutes ces chozes desseurditte tenir et acomplir denront-il bonne seurté; et de teles naves porra avoir li Rois à teil pris tant que li plaira à Genne et à Pisé et à Barselonne.)

X. Nicholas Daure de Genne doit faire une des naves desseurdittes et des conditions desseurdittes pour le pris desseurdit.

- Thomas Raparius de Genne, une pour le pris devantdit, et doit estre patrons de la nave.

Othelius de Noire de Genne, une et en doit estre patrons.

Simons de la Court de Genne, une et en doit estre patrons.

Henris de la Mer, une et en doit estre patrons.

Bonne Vie, pelote de Nole, une et en doit estre patrons.

Othes Gaitans de Pisé en doit faire ii et doit estre patrons en l'une et donner patron souffisant en l'autre.

Guilleusons de Nole, une et en doit estre patrons. *Item* cis Guillensons et Daniel de Nole doivent faire une grant nave en la fourme des convenances desseurdittes, dont il doit avoir £iiii<sup>m</sup> vii<sup>c</sup> turnois.

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<sup>776</sup> ' Cette année appartient au règne de française a écrit par erreur M ce LZXVIII au Philippe-le-Hardi, qui ne songeait point lieu deiiiccxLViii, terme des deux années & traiter avec les Génois pour un voyage accordées par le traité qui doit être de en Terre-Sainte ; l'écrivain de notre charte l'an M ce XLVI. T. n. 9

XI. Ce sunt li non de ciaus qui firent convenances as procureur le Roi, de faire lesdittes naves, liqueil ne vorrent pas qu'il fust en la volonté dou Roi. Nicholas li Barruliers, Saons Thiebaus de Saône, Ouris li Papelars de Saône, Sardennis Sardenne, Jaques Carsefigue, Obers Bouque Neire, Pascaires d'Albarie, Albrains dis Peu a Visiu, Othes Scorchus, Guillaumes Aubain, Jorges de la Mer. (End of the first membrane.)

VIII. (2\* membrane) Facius de la Mer, Guillaumes de la Tour et Jehans Boscuze, bourgeois de Genne, doivent faire pour le Roi xii tarides des mesures dessous escrites, s'est à savoir: chascune longue xLviij goues, et sera large en plain xiii paumes et demi, haute en milieu ix paumes, à droite lance, et de bouce paume et demi, large en l'enceinte xvi paumes et demi, et aura une pope ronde à trois rodes, et portes par lesquelles li cheval porront issir en entrer. *Item*, chascune doit avoir i arbre de proe qui sera lons xxvi goues et gros v paumes, et i autre arbre qui sera lons xx goues et gros iiii paumes. *Item*, iii antennes bones et souffisans selonc la raison des arbres. *Item*, iiii voiles, un de xL goues, le secont de xxxvii goues, le tierc de xxxiiii goues et le quart de xxxi goues, bons et souffisans, et pour chascun goue i fersum. *Item*, vi ancrs chascune de iii cantaires et demi; *item*, ii timons bons et souffisans; *item*, pour la sarce de chanve filé et commis, de Lombardie ou de Bourgoingne, xxv centenaires. *Item*, une bargue de perascaline de ix goues o xiv rimes; *item*, cL rimes pour la taride, boutes pour aiguë porter jusques à ccL mizeroles, et xxv barris pour aigue lever, et menut harneis pour compaignie pour xx maronniers. Et est à savoir que le devantdit doivent à leur propres despens avoir lesdittes tarides aparillies et furnies de sarces et de tous les aparas desseurdis, en Aiguë-Morte avec xx maronniers bons et souffisans, et bien aparillies à armer pour faire le passage d'outre mer, desqueis li uns doit estre nochiers bons et souffisans, et doit estre dou mi le mois de mai prochain à venir jusques à ii ans; et doivent avoir en chascune taride estaubleries apparillies pour xx chevaus se mestiers est; et doivent recevoir es devantdittes tarides chevaux et foules autres chozes que li Rois i commandera à charger; et doivent d'enqui lesdittes tarides ensi chargies, mener en l'ost le Roi à leur propres despens es parties d'outre mer, à tail port comme li Rois vorra, et ileques les chozes chargies et descharger, et doivent demeurer après ce ou service le Roi en ces parties esdittes tarides o xx maronniers desseurdis, par un mois à leur propres despens; et après ce, il doivent lesdittes tarides, o les



sarces et les aparas desseurdis, baillier et délivrer au Roi ou à son commandement comme les siennes propres. Et est à savoir que lidit maronnier jurront seur les sains Evangiles que il garderont le Roi, ses gens et toutes les chozes qui seront chargies esdittes tarides, et sauveront à leur pooir, et acompliront le voiage, et obéiront au Roi et à son commandement en toutes chozes, tant comme il seront en son service, et que riens il ne metteront ne receveront esdiltes tarides sans la volenté dou Roi ou de son commandement. Et est à savoir que les dittes tarides doivent estre faictes, asarcies et armarinées suffisamment, si comme il est desseur dit, à la connoissance et à l'esgart de preudommes et féaibles, lesqueis li Rois vorra à ce estaablr, et doivent avoir pour chascune taride £viii<sup>e</sup> turnois.

IX. Guillaumes et Francequins de Camilla doivent faire iiii tarides en la fourme et es conditions desseurdiltes, pour le pris desseurdit.

Paguenius de Marino en doit faire iiii en la fourme desseurdilte et pour le pris desseurdit.

(Des galées trouvera li Rois tant comme li plaira à Marseille, à Genne, et à Pisé, chascune pour £iiii<sup>e</sup> tournois ou environ, toutes prestes et aparillies sans mariniers.)

Et sanéties et panfis et autres vaisiaus menus, à assez convenable pris, là où il li plaira que ce soit fait.

*We read on the verso of the first membrane: "Ce sont les convenances faites à Genne des naves et des tarides à la volenté le Roi, par mon signeur Inguerran de Gouvin et Henri de Champrepus clerc."*

	<b>Table of Alliances and Wars: in the West versus in the East</b>			
	<b>Italians in Europe</b>		<b>Italians in the Kingdom of Jerusalem/Cyprus</b>	
	<b>Peace Treaties/Alliances</b>	<b>Conflicts/Wars</b>	<b>Peace Treaties/Alliances</b>	<b>Conflicts/Wars</b>
1250-1255	Venice and Genoa (1251, mutual aid treaty to last 8 years) Seventh Crusade truce (1250-1254)	Genoa vs Pisa (1228-1256)	Venice and Genoa (1251, mutual aid treaty to last 8 years) Truce due to the Seventh Crusade and the presence of Saint-Louis in Acre (1250-1254)	Beginning of the Saint-Sabas conflict (papal letters to the Genoese, and apparently Venetians, ordering the renting of the house of Saint-Sabas to either one, 1251-1255)
1255-1260	Genoese commercial agreement with Manfred of Sicily (1257, 1259)	War between Genoa and Pisa over Sardinia (1256-1258)	Genoa and Pisa against Venice (1256-1257) Venice and Pisa (1257, 10yrs mutual aids treaty against Genoa)	Saint-Sabas War (1256-1259/70)
1260-1265	Greek/Genoese alliance against Venice	Genoa vs Pisa (Genoese raids on Sardinia) Genoese war against Venice (retaliation for Saint-Sabas – no clash in Europe)	Greek/Genoese alliance against Venice Genoese/Montfort Alliance against all enemies (1264)	Continued conflict between Venice and Genoa post-Saint-Sabas (1263 – failed assault on Tyre by the Venetians)

1265-1270	Peace between Genoa and Charles of Anjou (1269) Peace between Venice, Pisa and Genoa (Louis IX's second Crusade – August 1270)	Diplomatic struggle between Genoa and Charles of Anjou (1266-1269)	Greek-Venetian Peace treaty (1265) Genoese-Venetian/Pisan truce (1267 – 3yrs truce) Return of Venice in Tyre (1270) marking thus the end of the post-Saint-Sabas conflicts	(1267 – Failed Genoese assault on Acre)
1270-1275		War between Genoa and Charles of Anjou (1273)		
1275-1280	Peace between Genoa and Charles (1276)		Nomination of Charles of Anjou as King of Jerusalem (recognised by Venice and opposed by Tyre and Genoa) Official treaty giving back to the Venetians their possessions in Tyre (1277) Alliance between Pisa and Hugh III of Cyprus (1278)	
1280-1285	Venetian-Angevin alliance against the Greek emperor (1281)	Sicilian Vespers (1282 – Genoese officially neutral, but favouring Aragonese claim) Genoese – Pisan war over Corsica (1282) Battle of Meloria (1284)		
1285-1290	Peace treaty between Genoa and Pisa (1288 – the end of Pisa as a naval power)		Peace between Genoa and Pisa (1288 – defences of Pisan Quarter in Acre to be demolished)	1287 – Genoese naval assault on the port of Acre against Pisan ships 1288 – Conflict in Tripoli involving the Genoese against Venice and Pisa

			Treaty between Genoa and Tripoli 1289 – (last) alliance between all three Communes for the defence of Tripoli 1289 – Treaty between Genoa and Cairo	(succession crisis of Tripoli following the death of Bohemond VII in 1287)
1290-1295		Tensions between Genoa and Pisa – 120 galleys armed commended by Enrico de Mari (1290) War between Genoa and Pisa (1292-3) War between Genoa and Venice (1291-1299)	1290-1 – truce due to the Mamluk assault on Acre	War between Genoa and Venice (1291-1299)
1295-1300	Peace between Genoa and Pisa (1299 – 25yrs peace) Peace between Genoa and Venice (1299)		Peace between Genoa and Venice (1299)	

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