

The Rhetoric of Leadership in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

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Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Declaration of Authorship

I, Jennifer Anne Winter, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

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Abstract

This thesis is a narratological and rhetorical study of the speeches made by leaders in the *Anabasis* as attempts at persuasion. It aims at interpreting the function of the speeches by linking a leader's use of rhetoric to the success or failure of his leadership. This thesis closely examines how the speeches relate to the narrative and how the narrator guides the reader's interpretation of speech, speaker and audience. It applies the rhetorical division of the three modes of persuasion, *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*, to the examination of the speeches, bringing out contrasts and similarities in how different leaders respond verbally to comparable situations.

This thesis proposes that Xenophon uses the speeches with three chief roles or effects in mind. Firstly, the speeches involve the reader by evoking tension, suspense and surprise. Secondly, when compared to the narrative, they characterise the speaker by illuminating the differences between real and proclaimed motives and attitudes, as well as highlighting a speaker's intention and ability to match his words and actions. The internal audiences are also characterised. Thirdly, the speeches provide positive and negative *exempla* in order to teach the reader that it is not enough simply to persuade others successfully. A leader must also approach persuasion with the right moral attitude and motives, live up to his words, and benefit his audience. To demonstrate this, the speeches are analysed according to three themes: the success or failure of leaders in evoking emotions in their audiences, the narrator's presentation of leaders verbally deceiving those on their side, and leaders using the concepts of honour and profit in their persuasion attempts. All the leaders that are scrutinised are lacking in one or more of the areas examined, except Xenophon, who is ultimately the only leader that the reader should emulate in his persuasion attempts.

Acknowledgements

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandmother.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Lene Rubinstein, whose enthusiasm for the project was limitless and whose generosity with her time was more than I could have hoped for. Her extensive feedback and her ability to redirect me when I lost my way were invaluable. I would also like to thank the other members of the Classics department at Royal Holloway who gave valuable feedback on my work, chiefly Dr. Chris Kremmydas, Prof. Jonathan Powell and Dr. Nick Lowe. Thanks are also due to those who discussed my papers with me at conferences, and academics who kindly sent me advanced copies of their work or copies of chapters that I was unable to obtain elsewhere. I would also like to thank Royal Holloway for generously awarding me a Crossland Scholarship, and those in the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric for their support.

I owe a tremendous amount of thanks to my mother, father and grandfather for their unending love and for their belief in me. Although this thesis has kept me further away from them than I would have wanted, they have always understood. I hope I have made you proud. Special thanks go to my mother for her proofreading and my father for his IT support. None of this would have been possible without the constant love and support of my fiancé, Jason. Only he has seen the full extent of the highs and lows of the past four years. He has remained a constant source of strength and reassurance.

No one has understood this journey as well as my PhD. partner in crime, Emma. I would like to thank her for sharing my tears, tantrums and self-doubt, and for knowing what to say to make me laugh. Love and thanks also go to my other best friends, Donna, Helen, Aless, Gemma, Nel, and Jen, who have always supported me and understood when deadlines and commitments have meant that I haven't spent enough time with them. Finally, thanks go to those other friends and acquaintances who have reassured me that I could complete this thesis. Whether this was said casually, or whether it was truly meant, such reassurance has sustained me to this point.

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Introduction

This thesis adopts a narratological and rhetorical approach in examining the speeches of the *Anabasis*, with the goal of interpreting the possible roles and effects the speeches had in relation to the work's aims and agenda. While the *Anabasis* is more than simply historiography, speeches formed an established part of the existing historiographical tradition, and so I am investigating how Xenophon uses this inherited element to serve his own preoccupations rather than why he included them at all. Because the majority of the speeches in the work show speakers who are leaders in some capacity attempting to persuade various audiences, this thesis links a leader's use of the tools of rhetoric to the ultimate success or failure of his leadership.

But why the *Anabasis* and why the speeches? Xenophon's popularity waned during the nineteenth century, but during the last forty years in particular, scholarly interest in Xenophon has increased dramatically, and scholars are again recognising that Xenophon is an important representative of his time, whose work contains important information relating to numerous fields of interest within the ancient world. This renewed interest can be seen by the number of recent volumes of collected papers covering an array of subjects across his *oeuvre*.¹ Two such volumes particularly focus on the *Anabasis*,² which is testament to the importance of this text but also to the many questions that still surround it. Two scholars have written commentaries on the work,³ and a general work introducing the main areas of interest in the *Anabasis* has recently been published.⁴ The last forty years have also seen a wealth of other monographs, important chapters and articles on the *Anabasis*. These can be roughly divided into topic areas. Some scholars have tried to classify the genre of the *Anabasis*, but because it encompasses elements from several different genres, and because genres were still evolving at the time in which

¹ Pontier (2014), Hobden and Tuplin (2012), Gray (2010) and Tuplin (2004a). Volume 45 of *Cahiers des Etudes Anciennes* and 26 (2) of *Polis* are also devoted to Xenophon.

² Lane Fox (2004a) and Briant (1995).

³ Lendle (1995) and Stronk (1995).

⁴ Flower (2012). Prevas (2002) has also retold the story of the *Anabasis* with various background information after retracing the army's route.

Xenophon was writing, it has proven impossible to pinpoint a definitive answer.⁵ Others have investigated certain passages in the *Anabasis*,⁶ and particular characters.⁷ Certain scholars have also investigated how the army and its ‘community of soldiers’ function, including decision-making processes, payment, motivations, organisation, day-to-day life, and comparisons with other armies and communities.⁸ Others have specifically investigated the terrain, route, landmarks, locations, tactics, difficulties and chronology of the march.⁹ Scholars have also examined the *Anabasis* in relation to Xenophon’s other works and to other authors and their works.¹⁰ There are also investigations concerning Xenophon’s presentation of different categories of people within the *Anabasis*, from the Persians to women,¹¹ and Xenophon’s political views.¹² Scholars have further explored particular ways in

⁵ See Gray (2011c), Bradley (2010), Roy (2007), Rood, (2007a), Laforce (2005), Reichel (2005), Cartledge (2002), Lee (2001), and Momigliano (1971). In their descriptions of the *Anabasis*, Flower (2012, 40-1 and 46), Rood (2005, xix) and Dillery (2001, 2 and 13) try to capture the variety of genres reflected in the work, although Flower emphasises that the modern conception of each genre would probably be unrecognisable to Xenophon. See also Nicolai (2014, 65-8, 78-9 and 81-4), who argues that ‘history’ and ‘fiction’ are modern divisions, and again emphasises Xenophon’s innovative adoption and adaption of genres.

⁶ For example, the arrest of the generals by Jansen (2014) and Bassett (2002); Orontas’ trial by Keaveney (2012); a possible gap in the chronology of the journey by Brennan (2012); Xenophon’s account of his estate at Scillus by Tuplin (2004b) and Ruggeri (2004); Cyrus’ death by Bassett (1999); and the battle of Cunaxa by Ehrhardt (1994, 1-2), Wylie (1992) and Bigwood (1983).

⁷ For example, Clearchus by Tritle (2004), Bassett (2001), Laforce (2000) and Roisman (1985-8); Clearchus and Cyrus by Braun (2004); Anaxibius by Roisman (1988); Cyrus and Tissaphernes by Ruzicka (1985); and Tissaphernes’ lying and oath breaking by Danzig (2007). Xenophon the character’s piety is examined by Parker (2004), the combination of Xenophon’s private and public religious devotion is analysed by Bruit-Zaidman (2005), and Xenophon’s mercenary status and interaction with money is discussed by Azoulay (2004a). Tuplin (2003a) examines the main leaders in terms of their heroism.

⁸ De Callatay (2009), Lee (2007 and 2004b), Roy (2004), Whitby (2004), Hornblower (2004), Cordano (2000), Dillery (1995), Dalby (1992), and Perlman (1976-7).

⁹ Paradeisopoulos (2014), Ma (2010), Brennan (2008 and 2005), Waterfield (2006), Manfredi (2004 and 1978), Tuplin (2003b), Mitford (2000), Lendle (1998, 1988 and 1984), and Glombowski (1994). See also the various chapters in Briant (1995).

¹⁰ See Sage (1991) for the *Cyropaedia*; Bartley (2008) for Caesar’s *Bellum Gallicum*; Schubert (2005), Tuplin (2003a), Tsagalis (2002) and Rinner (1978) for Homer; van Soesbergen (1982-3) for Isocrates; Howland (2000) for Plato’s *Respublica*; and Ehrhardt (1994, 3-4) for comparisons with Thucydides’ account of the retreat after the Sicilian expedition. Narcy (2014) and Lendle (1996) discuss Xenophon’s appreciation of Gorgias.

¹¹ See Hirsch (1985) for the Persians; Humble (1997) for Xenophon’s view of Sparta; Millender (2012) for Spartan relationships with barbarians; Lane Fox (2004b) for women and ‘others’; Boëldieu-Trevet (2010) for the various ‘others’ the army encounters; and Lee (2004a) for *hetairai*.

¹² Kuwabara (1979) investigates “the origin of Xenophon’s theory of the state”, although I have been unable to read this Japanese article. Rood (2015) critiques interpretations of Xenophon’s political thought in the *Anabasis* by Leo Strauss and several followers of Strauss, and Lenfant (2001) examines Xenophon’s possible transmission of Cyrus’ own propaganda against his brother.

which Xenophon the author constructs the *Anabasis*,¹³ and the language he uses.¹⁴ In addition, much work has been done on the modern reception of the *Anabasis*.¹⁵

Closer to the topic of this thesis, some scholars have discussed leadership in the *Anabasis*. Buzzetti (2014) and Ruderman (1992) examine Xenophon's vision of Socratic political rule, while Seelinger (1997) investigates how Xenophon's good leadership is revealed through his dealings with Seuthes, and how his leadership contrasts particularly with Seuthes' and Clearchus' leaderships.¹⁶ Humble (1997, 46-106) examines how the Spartan leaderships in the *Anabasis* compare to Xenophon's portrayal of his own ideal leadership, to determine whether Xenophon was pro-Spartan. Sears (2007), a Lieutenant Commander of the US Navy, enumerates what the modern reader can learn about being an ideal leader from the work.¹⁷ Narratological elements of the *Anabasis* have also been examined recently. In particular, much has been written about the narrator and his distinction from Xenophon the author and Xenophon the character.¹⁸ Further, some scholars have

¹³ Wencis (1977) examines the theme of suspicion that runs throughout the work, while Ferrario (2012) has investigated the characters' agency and ownership in how others remember them, and how the narrator and author ultimately control this. Bradley (2011) investigates how Xenophon's conversation with Eucleides (7.8.1-6) brings closure to Xenophon the character's story and affects the reader's understanding of the entire work.

¹⁴ Buijs (2005) examines Xenophon's use of sub and participial clauses in the *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*, while Goodall (1976) compares Xenophon's use of reflexive pronouns in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* to Herodotus' and Thucydides' use. Diggle (2002) discusses the unusual sentence construction at 3.1.6-8, Martin (2007) concentrates on the translation of πέλτη at 1.10.12, Nielsen (2000) focuses on Xenophon's use of the word πολίς, and Woronoff (1987) examines what Xenophon defines as a κώμη.

¹⁵ See Rood (2014, 2013b, 2013a, 2012b, 2010a and 2004a).

¹⁶ Nakamura (1986) also examines the difficult situation whereby the generals want to extend their authority while the soldiers do not want to submit to the generals' authority, although I have been unable to read this Japanese article.

¹⁷ See Gray (2011b, 372-6) for Xenophon and modern leadership theory. For Xenophon's interest in leadership as a central theme throughout his works and not just in the *Anabasis*, see Humble (2014, 213 and 1997, 1-2), Flower (2012, 30), Hobden and Tuplin (2012), Gray (2011b, 1), Pontier (2001, 404 and 408), Dillery (2001, 11), Hutchinson (2000), Zimmerman (1992), and Breitenbach (1950, 29-104). Gray (2011b), Woronoff (1993), and Wood (1964) discuss Xenophon's theory of leadership, while Tamiolaki (2012) discusses some of Xenophon's leaders in terms of the virtue they demonstrate or fail to demonstrate.

¹⁸ See Gray (2003 and 2004), for example, who discusses the narrator's objectivity and analyses moments when Xenophon the author intervenes in the text to praise or blame, or to cite his sources. Grethlein (2012) investigates the fine line between Xenophon as narrator and character and demonstrates that the two generally exist separately but also overlap in the narrative function they perform, as well as in perspective. Bradley (2010) also studies the narrator's perspective and the effect of his privileged position on the reader.

investigated focalization (or point of view),¹⁹ space, place, landscape and time,²⁰ and even naming techniques.²¹

Despite this wealth of recent scholarship, and despite speeches usually playing an important role in the investigation of the various areas that particularly interest narratologists, when we turn to the speeches in the *Anabasis*, there is still much research that needs to be undertaken. Tuplin (2014, 119) concludes that 33% of the *Anabasis* consists of direct speech.²² There are 269 direct speeches in the work, given by 63 different speakers, 40 of whom are specifically named. In Appendix 1, I have listed these by speaker and audience.²³ The speeches in the work have been examined previously, but, given their prominence in the text, to a much lesser degree than may be expected. In terms of scholarly works fully devoted to the speeches, there are only a small number. Tuplin (2014) reports the data he has collected about direct speech in the *Anabasis*, such as the distribution of speeches across books and the whole work. He also briefly discusses topics such as the interaction of the speeches with the narrative, and whether the speeches reflect what was actually said at the time. However, he does not analyse individual speeches. Rood (2004b) examines certain speeches to ascertain whether or not Xenophon is using them to advocate a Greek attack on Persia to his readers, and to investigate Xenophon's self-presentation through speeches assigned to Xenophon the character. He concludes that the speeches do not advocate a Panhellenic attack,²⁴ and that Xenophon is not simply defending his own leadership, but using the speeches to teach ethical and political lessons about leadership. Rood (2007b) also briefly examines some examples of giving and receiving advice in the speeches, including how this compares to advice and advisors in Herodotus and Thucydides. He discusses the complexities behind whether or not the speeches offering advice

¹⁹ Pelling (2013) and Harman (2013).

²⁰ Rood (2014, 2012a, 2010b and 2007a) and Purves (2010).

²¹ Tsagalis (2009).

²² Compare Tuplin's (2014, 80-1) figures for other works: 4.3% of Arrian's *Anabasis* is direct speech, 14.6% of Herodotus, 18% of the *Hellenica*, and 23.1% of Thucydides (26.6% without book 8).

²³ To put this in context, in the *Hellenica* there are 162 direct speeches, given by 76 different speakers, 50 of whom are individually named. In Herodotus, there are 409 speeches between 182 different speakers, 100 of whom are given a personal name. In Thucydides, there are 91 direct speeches across 37 speakers, 10 of whom are identified only by their ethnicity or their ethnicity and role and 2 of whom are unnamed. Only 39 of Thucydides' speeches are given by characters who are personally named.

²⁴ Flower (2012, 168ff.) also concludes this.

indicate a possible didactic aim for the work, and touches on some of the themes that recur in these speeches. He argues that while some of the speeches offering advice demonstrate Xenophon's good leadership in response to a variety of situations, a problem arises from the advice Socrates gives to Xenophon about the expedition. Socrates is correct about the problems the expedition might cause for the Greek participants, but is incorrect about the reasons for this. Rood concludes that Xenophon develops from being a man who receives advice to being a man who is able to give good advice to Seuthes.

Kelly's (1977) thesis examines the speeches in the first book of the *Anabasis* in terms of their content, how these speeches serve to characterise the speakers, how they compare with what the narrator presents about the characters elsewhere, and why the speaker is successful in persuading his audience. Kelly's main interest is in the language and style of the speeches, as well as who may have influenced Xenophon's mode of rhetoric. Kelly (1977, 70-97) argues that the speeches serve the functions of characterisation, individualisation and of demonstrating how the characters interact with each other. Also, he contends, they illustrate leaders' moral and military qualities and show leaders turning "crisis" into "opportunity", while strengthening their positions and improving relations with the soldiers. Further, he claims that the speeches serve the didactic role of illustrating the qualities needed in a leader, as well as the importance of persuasive speech to avert crises. Finally, he argues that the speeches explain events, add dramatic tension, involve the reader emotionally, and encourage the reader's "participation" in the episodes. He also argues that Xenophon emerges as an ideal leader.²⁵

Two Spanish articles each carry out a rhetorical analysis on one speech by Xenophon. Varias (2010) examines Xenophon's speech defending why he hits soldiers (5.8.13-26), and Morales Harley (2013) analyses Xenophon's speech encouraging Proxenus' captains to act after the Persians have killed the army's main

²⁵ Another thesis, by Oğuz Yarılgış (2008) investigates the significance of the speeches in the *Anabasis*, but as I am unable to read Turkish, my knowledge of its contents comes from the English version of the thesis abstract. Yarılgış firstly examines how previous historiographers used speeches. Then, after introducing the literary character of the *Anabasis*, he demonstrates how Xenophon uses the speeches to create a "persona" for his characters. He first examines Clearchus' "persona" and concludes that Clearchus "is unable to handle the leading role of the army". He then examines how Xenophon's speeches reveal Xenophon to be an ideal leader, particularly with regard to Xenophon countering criticism from the army.

leaders (3.1.15-25). Varias highlights some of the rhetorical aspects of the speech, such as the use of rhetorical figures and the progression of the argument, as well as the ideological messages the speech contains about discipline and good leadership. He argues that through his use of rhetoric, Xenophon the character is able to demonstrate that he has the right qualities for a leader. Morales Harley has a more systematic approach, analysing the rhetorical aspects of the speech section by section. He uses theory from Anaximenes' and Aristotle's rhetorical discussions, as well as modern theory about argumentation to explain why Xenophon successfully persuaded his audience with this speech. He argues that Xenophon presented a sound argument according to the recommendations made by classical rhetoricians and modern argumentation theory.

Other scholars comment on the *Anabasis* speeches as part of their wider investigations, and their findings will be discussed throughout this thesis. Three of the more extensive comments on the speeches in the *Anabasis* are by Pontier (2001), Grethlein (2013) and Farrell (2012). Pontier examines the function of the speeches in the whole of Xenophon's *oeuvre* as a way of revealing Xenophon's intentions and concerns. His methodology is to examine the overall structure of Xenophon's narratives and examine when speeches occur, what the common thread between them is, and what repeated message emerges. He concludes that, across Xenophon's *oeuvre*, the speeches tackle disorder and lack of courage in their internal audiences. Grethlein (2013) discusses the speeches as a technique used by Xenophon to make the past seem present for his reader, to allow the reader to experience proceedings as the protagonists did, and to make the reader realise that the course of history might have been different. Finally, as part of his thesis on Xenophon's relationship with Athens and democracy, Farrell (2012, 225-78) argues that, in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon presents himself as being an Athenian orator, who successfully uses *topoi* from Athenian rhetoric to advise, benefit and serve his community in a democratic way.²⁶ He argues that Xenophon's success and authority derive from his speeches, and that these are important in ensuring order and instilling virtue.

More often, scholars make a single generalised statement about the function of the speeches throughout Xenophon's *oeuvre*, without providing details about how

²⁶ See further Gray (2011a) and Kroeker (2009), who also question the common conception that Xenophon does not support democracy.

they arrived at their conclusions. For example, Humble (1997, 254) argues that Xenophon's speeches are didactic, depict character and provide historical explanation, while Walbank (1985, 246) argues that the speeches Xenophon writes reflect his own views rather than the characters'. Specifically in relation to the *Anabasis*, Flower (2012, 100) argues that the speeches are vivid, entertaining, and have the effect of characterisation, as well as being useful for revealing extra information not in the narrative. Some scholars directly connect the speeches to Xenophon's lessons for leaders. Often, this will be a general comment about how the speeches exemplify leadership qualities,²⁷ demonstrate that successful leaders need to be skilled at oratory and persuasion,²⁸ are good examples to use for composing speeches and indicate how a leader should speak.²⁹

From the above, it is clear that there are gaps in the investigation of the speeches that still need to be filled, and deeper studies that need to be carried out. Fundamentally, there remains scope for using the speeches in relation to their surrounding narrative as a starting point to reveal the wider aim of the whole work. It is worth bearing in mind Higgins' (1977, 93) argument that we do not necessarily have to assume that Xenophon had a set purpose for any of his works, but the speeches are important in understanding the aim if there is one. Scholars have used the speeches in their investigations of the aims of the work before, particularly in defining the work as an apology or a self-defence against another work or specific criticism,³⁰ as self-praising,³¹ as promoting a Panhellenic expedition against Persia,³² as revealing the difficulties of leading an army and creating a community out of it,³³

²⁷ For example, Wood (1964, 60-1).

²⁸ For example, see Stoll (2012, 251), Humble (1997, 51 and 54) and Wood (1964, 54).

²⁹ For example, Tuplin (2014, 105 and 1993, 29) and Jaeger (1945, 159).

³⁰ See Farrell (2012), Erbse (2010, 486), Azoulay (2004a), Cawkwell (2004, 59 n.31, 60, 63 and 67), Zimmermann (1992, 241-2), and Dürrbach (1893).

³¹ See Waterfield (2006, 190) and Anderson (1974, 83-4).

³² See Dillery (1995, 61) and Jaeger (1945, 161-2). See also Delebecque (1957, 83, 201-4, 288, 291-2 and 299) who believes that the *anabasis* section was written to oppose the King's Peace and to advocate an attack on Persia, while the *parabasis* was directed towards defending Spartan power in the face of the Second Athenian league, as well as being an apology for Xenophon.

³³ According to Rood (2004b, 328 and 2005, xx), Xenophon is examining "the fragility of the attempt to create order" while investigating how the community of the army operates and how different leaders try to stabilise or destabilise the group. Dillery (1995, 59) argues that Xenophon partly aims to examine the army as a "model society, a blueprint utopia in action" by charting the rise and then decline of an ideal community.

and as having a philosophical aim.³⁴ As we saw above, Rood (2007b and 2004b) suggested that the prominence of advice giving speeches, as well as the political and ethical lessons in Xenophon's speeches could indicate a didactic aim for the work. Other scholars concluded that the speeches reflected Xenophon's interest in leadership. This thesis likewise argues that Xenophon's aims centre around the leadership of the army and the didactic messages emerging from it, but this is arrived at by centralising a wider range of speeches than the scholars just mentioned did, by examining these in more depth and in closer relation to the narrative, and by focusing on how Xenophon represents leaders persuading others.

I believe that speeches from the whole work that have different aims and agendas behind them need to be examined for what they are: attempts by leaders at the persuasion of an internal audience. This analysis can then be used to attempt to ascertain the roles they play in Xenophon's aims and agenda, and the effects they have. This differs from the investigations mentioned above. Kelly's thesis is the closest in perspective, being concerned with how speakers are represented as persuading and how this relates to their leadership. However, my thesis differs in scale, because Kelly only examines the speeches in the first book of the *Anabasis*, and examines these in full and in order. Our conclusions are also similar, but reached in different ways. His conclusions are partly hypothetical, given that he did not investigate the speeches in books 2-7, and therefore did not examine Xenophon the character's speeches. In my thesis, Xenophon the character's speeches form a central part even of understanding the characters of Clearchus and Cyrus. Indeed, while Kelly argues that Clearchus and Cyrus are presented as model leaders to emulate, my thesis arrives at the opposite conclusion. Similarly, I expand on Pontier's investigation. Like him, I highlight passages across Xenophon's works that reflect different leaders responding in similar ways to comparable situations, and I concentrate on aspects of persuasion that recur within different speeches in the *Anabasis*, while looking for consistent messages. However, I examine the speeches as part of their immediate context rather than looking at them as structural elements

³⁴ Gray (1998, 102) argues that the work "comes close to being a kind of Socratic self-examination". Ruderman (1992, 129) describes it as "a guide for those who wish to return to or adopt "Greeknness", understood as civilization or human freedom as guaranteed by political rule or leadership". Buzzetti (2014, 229) argues that "the *Anabasis* is ultimately an introduction to philosophy in the guise of a chronicle and a soldier's memoir".

of whole works. Like Varias and Morales Harley, I examine why speeches in the work are successful or unsuccessful but on a much wider scale, and I relate individual successes and failures to the wider role of all the speeches.

In order to carry out this investigation of the speeches as persuasion attempts, I analyse the speeches using some of the theories of rhetoric that were current in Xenophon's time, like Varias and Morales Harley do, but I focus chiefly on the three modes of persuasion, *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*, rather than rhetorical figures and techniques. As part of this rhetorical approach, I examine how a speaker attempts to manipulate his audience's emotions and impression of himself, how the speaker understands his audience's motivations and mood, and how the internal audience interprets and react to the speech.

As well as a rhetorical analysis, I believe it is also necessary to undertake a close examination of how the speeches relate to the prior and subsequent narrative, and how the narrator guides the reader's interpretation of the speech, the speaker and the audience.³⁵ This approach continues the now well-establish application of narratology to Greek historiography as a theoretical framework.³⁶ Of course, scholars have examined speeches in other authors' works using the tools of narratology before, and so the application of this method is not new in itself.³⁷ The narrator can guide the reader's interpretation of the speeches through direct comment, through the content of the speeches themselves, or by careful selection of what to present before and after the speech, which can also bring out contrasts and comparisons with previous episodes in the story. He also controls basic elements of the speeches such as who delivers the speeches that he chooses to include and invent, in what form they are represented, how much space he gives to different characters' voices, why a particular speech is selected for inclusion, and why a speech appears where it does

³⁵ See Morrison (2006) for the importance of the reader analysing how speech and narrative interact in Thucydides. He examines interactions between a speech and its immediately preceding and subsequent narrative, between speeches and narrative within the same episode, and the different ways in which speech and narrative in one episode can interact with speech and narrative in other episodes.

³⁶ For clarity, however, I prefer not to use some of the more controversial terminology of narratology, such as 'focalizer', 'narratee' and 'focalizee'. De Jong (2004), Rood (1998 and 2004c) and Hornblower (1994) have been particularly instrumental in demonstrating the relevance of narratology to the study of Thucydides and Herodotus. De Jong's (1989) seminal narratological interpretation of the *Iliad* has also strongly influenced this thesis.

³⁷ See, for example, Lang (2011) on Thucydides, Lang (1984) on Herodotus, and Beck (2012) on the *Iliad*.

(especially if it details events which do not take place at that chronological point in the narrative). As part of this investigation, it is important to make clear the distinction between the author, the external narrator, and the internal characters.³⁸ Characters themselves can narrate and interpret the story or present their (or someone else's) point of view through their speeches.

When information about the speeches and speakers is revealed, and who this information is directed to is important. The narrator can deliberately create gaps between the knowledge of the internal audience and the reader, and the effect can vary depending on whether the relevant information is revealed before or after the speech. My approach also takes into account the narrator's and speakers' comments on the speakers' motives. There is a difference in effect on characterisation and interpretation depending on whether *the narrator* reveals a speaker's motivation for speaking, *the speaker* reveals his own motivation, or *the reader* has to infer the speaker's motivation from previous information about the speaker. By comparing the speech and narrative, the reader can further see whether a leader matches his motives, words and actions. The outcome of a speech in both the short and long term reveals whether the speech benefitted the leader himself and those he addressed, or whether it was misjudged in some way and caused harm. Also important is whether a speaker's leadership concludes well or badly for him in the work. It is particularly relevant if this can be linked directly to the leader's speeches. This suggests how the reader should interpret a leader's character, rule and use of rhetoric. Based on how

³⁸ It is unlikely that Xenophon's contemporary readers would have been able to separate the narrator and author. When discussing the Homeric poet and narrator, Aristotle argues that there are three different ways of representing objects. The poet can represent them in his own voice, through the characters, or by assuming a different character, as Homer does (*Poetics* 1448a.19-24 and 1460a.5-12). Aristotle seems to be describing a new concept here and because Aristotle post-dates Xenophon by some decades, only Xenophon's later readers may have been able to appreciate the distinction. However, Rabel (1997, 6) writes that it is really only since the 1950s that the author and the third-person narrator have been understood as being separate. One particular passage from oratory seems to confirm that Xenophon's readers would be able to differentiate the author from the characters at least. Lycurgus (1.100-1) refers to a speech in a Euripides play. He describes how Euripides made (ἐποίησε) a character demonstrate certain values but also discusses the qualities of the character themselves. This shows that Lycurgus is aware of the necessity to separate the author and character when reading or hearing speeches. In the *Anabasis*, it is also important to separate the character Xenophon from the narrator Xenophon. The narrator describes some events at which Xenophon was not present, without indicating how Xenophon came to know the details (e.g. 5.6.19-20). The narrator also sometimes reveals the motivation of individual characters, which Xenophon himself could not have known (e.g. 3.4.2). The character and narrator also sometimes know different information (e.g. 2.6.1/ 3.1.29). Despite this, from book three, events are seen mainly from the viewpoint of Xenophon as a character (e.g. 4.1.16-18).

the different leaders respond to similar issues that arise within the army and how they use the tools of rhetoric, the reader can compare the leaders and judge them favourably or unfavourably.

Based on such a rhetorical and narratological analysis, this thesis proposes three roles or effects for the speeches in the *Anabasis*: the speeches involve the reader, characterise the speaker and audience, and have the didactic function of teaching the reader how to persuade others both successfully and morally. The comparisons between the speakers, their speeches and their leaderships that generate these conclusions can be seen most effectively by examining the speeches according to certain themes of persuasion, which has not been done before. These themes are: leaders evoking emotions in their audiences (chapter 2), leaders verbally deceiving their friends (chapter 3), and leaders appealing to the concepts of honour and profit to motivate others and to represent themselves (chapter 4). Although this thesis separates out these particular elements of persuasion, a consistent picture emerges of the key leaders' abilities at persuasion, their real characters (compared to the *ethos* they attempt to project), and what can be learned from their speeches.³⁹

The first thematic chapter links Xenophon's interest in rhetoric with his interest in leadership to examine the success and failure of certain leaders in terms of

³⁹ In chapters 3 and 4, I refer to passages from Xenophon's other works that seem to reflect the same messages about how to persuade as are revealed in the *Anabasis*. Just as Gray (2011b, esp. 6 and 62-3) argues that Xenophon has consistent lessons across his *oeuvre* about how one should lead, I believe that Xenophon has consistent messages about persuasion. Gray is particularly arguing against 'darker' interpretations of Xenophon's works, and scholars who read 'between the lines'. Such interpretations, she argues, often render the passage in question anomalous to Xenophon's thought elsewhere, and this should indicate that the interpretation is incorrect. I follow Gray's argument to the extent that if something is represented positively in one work by Xenophon, it is likely to be positive in his other works. However, I also believe that Xenophon can make a comment about a leader by omitting information, for example, or condemn him without explicit criticism. This is reading between the lines to some degree. See further Johnson (2012, 124) who argues that we cannot simply dismiss Strauss' darker interpretations, and Hobden and Tuplin (2012, 32-6) who argue that Xenophon's readers must examine how what is said relates to what is not said, how what is said in different places interacts, how reality relates to appearances and what consequences spring from.

whether they can evoke or allay emotions in their audiences.⁴⁰ Xenophon's interest in contemporary rhetorical theory emerges particularly in the emotional appeals he writes, because we see that he pre-empts some of the recommendations that Aristotle and Anaximenes provide for evoking emotions. Thus, he is presumably engaging with existing theory on emotions.

It is important to be able to manipulate others' emotions because, when a leader has no tangible reward to offer in return for his audience acting or thinking in a certain way, he has to rely on altering his audience's perception of something they care about in order to persuade them to do as he wants. The emotional appeals that will affect an audience vary with the composition of the audience, the audience's previous experiences, the circumstances of the appeal, the current mood of the audience, and the audience's expectations and prior knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must make appeals that are fitting to his character, as his audience recognises it, and his reputation. The unsuccessful speeches give a clear indication as to what makes for a poor emotional appeal, such as the audience not respecting the opinion of the speaker, while the successful speeches indicate how emotional appeals can be made effectively, such as by relating an appeal to the men's desire to survive.

In the second part of this chapter, I examine how the interpretation of these speeches changes when we examine the motives of the speaker for making the appeal, and when we see whether the speech brought harm or benefit to the speaker and his audience. What emerges is that it is important to recognise that the outcome of a speech can determine whether an appeal should have been made and whether it should be emulated or not. The way a speaker's leadership ends in the work also affects how the reader regards him and his command, including his speech making. Thus, there seems to be a didactic function behind the speeches and their related

⁴⁰ Xenophon's interest in rhetoric has long been of interest to scholars (see Pomeroy 1995, 10-15 for references to numerous early German dissertations on the subject). More recently, Kelly (1977) focuses on the rhetorical techniques that Xenophon uses in the speeches in the *Anabasis* and argues (pp.76-7) that Xenophon was "well-versed" in them. Gray (1989b) analyses "the rhetorical theory of propriety" in Xenophon's *Apology* and also (1998) the use of the form and rhetorical techniques of real defence speeches and eulogies in his *Memorabilia*, while L'Allier (2012, esp. 478 and 486-7) discusses Xenophon's own sophistic style in the *Cynegeticus*. Xenophon also clearly admires Hermocrates, who taught (ἐδίδασκε) his fellow leaders to speak both unrehearsed (ἀπὸ τοῦ παραρρήμα) and after deliberating (βουλευσαμένου, *Hellenica* 1.1.30). Xenophon thus appears to believe that it is important for a leader to be able to speak well and to teach others in this field. See Buzzetti (2014, 305-6) for similarities in the careers of Xenophon and Hermocrates.

narrative. As well as a leader being characterised by how well he can anticipate his audience's frame of mind and achieve persuasion, his motive for making the emotional appeal distinguishes between those who persuade for selfless reasons and those who persuade for selfish reasons. Thus, the speeches also seem to have a characterising effect. Again, this helps to distinguish between which leaders should be emulated and which should not. Further, the direct speeches place the reader into the original situation, along with the internal audience, and allow him to hear the speeches in their original contexts. This involves the reader in events and makes the interpretation of the speeches important to him. Speeches evoking or calming emotions can have dramatic effects on the reader. The internal audience is usually in danger when the appeal is made and the reader may engage with the story, feeling the same emotions as the audience, and subsequently experiencing the emotions that the leader evokes. Because the reader may become involved in this way, he may engage with the subtleties of characterisation and the didactic messages that I argue exist. Thus, another effect of the speeches seems to be reader involvement. By analysing the speeches in this way, Xenophon emerges as the only leader who is motivated selflessly, who successfully makes appropriate emotional appeals for the benefit of others, and whose leadership ends well in the work. Other leaders variously cannot successfully persuade, cause more harm than good or are motivated poorly.

A gap in modern scholarship exists here because very little work has been done on Xenophon and the emotions.⁴¹ Regarding the *Anabasis*, there are some mentions of Clearchus' use of fear as a tool of leadership and of Xenophon's use of the fear of punishment when it becomes necessary, such as by Nussbaum (1967, 21-2, 72 and 110-17), but these do not focus primarily on the speeches, and indeed Clearchus does not verbally evoke fear of himself, as Nussbaum comments. Scholars often mention that a speaker appeals to certain emotions when commenting on a

⁴¹ Recently, however, Tamiolaki (2013) has examined Xenophon's use of emotions to reveal historical explanation in the *Hellenica*. She concludes (2013, 39-45) that Xenophon is innovative and experimental in the way he represents emotions felt by groups, that he puts greater emphasis on emotions experienced by individuals and the consequent alteration of their psychological states, and that, as a narrator, Xenophon offers his own theories on emotions and describes his own feelings. She argues that Xenophon's narratorial comments on emotions offer direct advice to leaders. Some of these conclusions seem to hold true for the *Anabasis*, as we shall see. See Higgins (1977, 126) who also recognises Xenophon's interest in emotions as causes for actions. In contrast to Xenophon, much work has been done on emotions in Thucydides, particularly on fear. See, for example, Sanders (forthcoming), Petersen and Liaras (2006), and Desmond (2006).

particular speech, but there is no investigation linking a leader's use of verbal emotional appeals in the *Anabasis* to his characterisation or the didactic aim of the work.

The second thematic chapter looks more closely at the disjunction between success, motives for persuasion, and the outcomes of speeches. I discuss a fundamental choice that leaders make when they consider how to persuade those who are on their side to act or not to act: whether to speak truthfully or to deceive. Despite the narrator and Xenophon the character claiming that deceiving friends is reprehensible, Cyrus, Clearchus, Timasion and Xenophon all successfully do this, raising the question as to how the author wants the reader to interpret their success and moral character.

The deceitful speeches involve the reader both in arousing the reader's suspicion and in recognising the deceit. When the internal audience is being deceived, tension arises because the narrator sometimes creates different levels of knowledge between the internal audience and the reader. The narrator may let the reader know in advance that a speech will be deceitful, or give him the tools to understand, as he is reading the speech, that it is deceitful. For example, the narrator may reveal information in the narrative before the speech that conflicts with what the speaker says. In such cases, the reader will be left in suspense as to whether the internal audience will recognise the deception or later become aware of it. Alternatively, the narrator may allow the reader to be taken in by the speech, along with the internal audience, which may make the reader feel a range of emotions when the deceit is eventually revealed, such as surprise and anger. By recognising that the leaders are practicing deceit, the reader can often appreciate that the audience's reactions are misguided.

The difference between the *ethos* that a speaker projects and the character that the narrator allows the reader to see in the narrative is particularly large when a speaker deceives. The speakers are characterised particularly by the motives for deceit that the narrator reveals or confirms. The reader can see whether a deceiver is motivated by his own interests or the interests of others, and thus whether the internal audience, and the reader, should trust him or not. In successfully deceiving, the leader is also characterised by his correct anticipation of his audience's

disposition. Further, these audience members are characterised by what they are willing to believe and whom they are willing to trust.

By examining the outcomes of the deceitful speeches, both short and long term, we can see whether the leader benefitted or harmed himself and others through his deception, and thus, whether or not he was justified in deceiving. We must also examine the way a leader's command terminates in the work. For example, Cyrus and Clearchus die after being deceived themselves. This seems to link their deception of others to their fate. This creates a clear didactic message to the reader about the unacceptable nature of their deception of friends. The didactic message that emerges from the deceitful speeches is that not all who deceive should be condemned, however. Sometimes deceit is necessary for the greater good of the army. Xenophon emerges as a leader who deceives but who does so with the right motives and benefits others as a result. He does not always have the trust of the soldiers but he continually acts in their best interests, while other characters are trusted but fail the soldiers. It is important that a leader tries to gain a reputation for trustworthiness, but this trust must not be abused. Thus, the narrator creates clear positive and negative *exempla* from the leaders who deceive others, which the reader may want to emulate or shun. That the internal audience can be taken in by a deceitful speech which leads to negative outcomes indicates the importance of audiences being certain that a leader is working in their best interests before they believe what he claims.

There is a gap in the scholarship for an investigation of the deceitful speeches used against friends in the *Anabasis*. There are two works on deceit in Xenophon's *Anabasis* already, but they do not examine the implications that leaders using speech to deceive friends has for exposing the real character of the leader. Nor do they investigate how such deceit relates to the way these characters' leaderships end in the work, how it can reflect badly as well as positively on a leader and his leadership, and the message the author wants the reader to understand regarding when it is acceptable and unacceptable to deceive friends. Danzig (2007) specifically looks at deception of the enemy, which I do not investigate, but he does highlight the importance of characters appearing trustworthy to others, which is also of prime importance when deceiving friends. Hirsch (1985) investigates all types of deceit, by Persians, Greeks, friends and enemies, and links it to the recurring references to trust

in the *Anabasis*. He constantly relates the presentation of deceit to Xenophon's representation of the Persians, however, whereas I relate it to Greek leadership.⁴²

On one occasion, the soldiers recognise that Cyrus is deceiving them but decide to continue under his leadership, partly because he is willing to give them money. Seemingly, once a leader has demonstrated that he gives others what they want, or has made convincing enough promises that he will do so, these people will be more inclined to stay with him, which makes any deception and manipulation of their emotions easier. Thus, the third thematic chapter looks in more depth at appeals to what a speaker knows his audience is motivated by or desires. As mercenaries, the soldiers and leaders are motivated by making financial gain or profit (κέρδος), as well as by obtaining honour (τιμή) and avoiding disgrace. There is a difficulty in appealing directly to profit and honour, however. Someone who appeals to and accommodates the soldiers' desires is not necessarily doing what will benefit the army and may give the soldiers license to be driven by greed rather than by what it is right to do. However, soldiers are not going to follow someone who repeatedly denies them their desires, even if this is beneficial for them. As part of his *ethos*, a leader will also need to represent his own attitude towards these desires and motivations, and meet his audience's expectations of how a leader should speak and act concerning them.

The speeches in which a leader mentions profit and honour involve the reader. Based on a leader's motivations and previous words and actions, the reader may become suspicious about whether a leader will prove true to his promises and claims regarding the gaining of honour and profit, and whether he is accurately representing his attitude. Suspense may further be generated for the reader who waits to find out what will happen if an audience realises that a leader cannot fulfil his claims. There is also tension for the reader in anticipating whether such appeals by leaders are best for the army or whether they will put the army into direct conflict with others.

A leader may present himself as someone who can be relied upon to fulfil his audience's desires and to act well in relation to his own pursuit of honour and profit,

⁴² Hesk (2000) examines deceit in Classical Athenian literature, but his section on Xenophon is only concerned with the *Cyropaedia*.

but the narrator either confirms or undercuts this picture. A leader's choice of what to appeal to in the particular situation, his real motives for doing so, as well as his ability and intent to fulfil his promises, characterise him. Thus, the narrator indicates whether the leader can be trusted to do what is best for others, or whether he has his own personal agenda. The audience is also characterised by its desires and its willingness to believe that a leader will fulfil his promises.

Examining how the different leaders choose to respond to certain scenarios, as well as the outcome of their appeals, and the end that befalls their command, gives a clear didactic message. Before appealing to desire in others, a leader must ensure that thoughts of the honour and profit that he can make do not prevent him from doing his duty to his soldiers, and he must represent his attitude accurately. Although he cannot preach to his audience about what it is morally right to do without alienating its members and making them think that he will not provide for them, he can educate them through his own example in words and actions and by making *exempla* out of scenarios and other people. Even though, outside of war, appealing to the desire for profit in others may be open to censure, sometimes, in the situation the army finds itself in, appealing to the desire for profit is the correct thing to do for the greater good. A leader must be able to judge an audience's character and often-changing needs and desires, and speak accordingly on each occasion in order to encourage an audience to positive actions. A leader is rendered a negative paradigm by causing his audience harm through his appeal, for example, by causing damage to the army's reputation, or by falsely representing his attitude to the detriment of the audience. Once a leader has made a promise, he must deliver on it. He must also be able to inspire belief when representing the army's outlook on obtaining profit and honour to outsiders. Finally, the reader learns that an audience must test a leader in order to be sure that he will fulfil his promises. In the *Anabasis*, only Xenophon the character successfully negotiates the difficulties inherent in appealing to others' motivations, while controlling his own desires, and emerges as a positive paradigm.

There is still room in the scholarship on the *Anabasis* to examine how a leader's appeals to honour and profit, as well as references to his own attitude towards these concepts, can be a tool for involving the reader, for demonstrating a leader's character, and for revealing the author's recommendations for how to persuade successfully and morally. In relation to these concepts in the *Anabasis*,

there has only been one investigation, and this concerns Xenophon the character making profit. Azoulay (2004a) argues that both Xenophon the narrator and Xenophon the character deliberately distance Xenophon the character from being regarded as a mercenary and from receiving money, in response to specific criticism he must have received. Although Azoulay's argument focuses on Xenophon's character, it does not focus on how he appeals to the concept of profit to persuade an audience to act or not act.

From these three different elements of verbal persuasion, the reader sees more than just whether a leader achieves successful persuasion. He learns whether the leader understands his audience, how he wants his audience to view him, how he manipulates others' emotions, what methods of persuasion he uses, whether he has selfless or selfish motivations, whether he makes recommendations and appeals to others based on what is morally right and acceptable, whether he brings benefit to others, and ultimately whether he succeeds in his leadership. All the leaders that this thesis examines fail in one or more of these particular areas, except Xenophon. Through the narrator's guidance, the reader learns what makes a successful speech, but also the vital importance of persuading morally, being motivated rightly and bringing benefit. The reader can then choose to either emulate or shun these leaders' examples. The idea that Xenophon has a didactic aim and presents his leaders, both in the *Anabasis* and elsewhere, as *exempla* to reject, imitate or learn from, as well as presenting himself as an ideal leader is not new.⁴³ Indeed, according to Stadter (2012, 59), this was already recognised by Plutarch. However, I arrive at this conclusion through the speeches and their relation to the narrative, which teaches that leaders must ultimately say and do what is best for those they are responsible for. It remains to demonstrate in the next chapter exactly what method will be adopted in this thesis and how this will produce fresh interpretations. To do this, the proposed method will be applied to certain speeches in the *Hellenica* that scholars have already examined.

⁴³ For this interpretation, see particularly Nicolai (2014, 66-8, 74, 81 and 84), Stoll (2012, 251 and 2010, 14, 66 and 82), Flower (2012, 118-19), Hobden and Tuplin (2012, 16-17, 34 and 39), Gray (2011b, 1 and 51), Rood (2004b, 324-5), Tuplin (2003a, 151-2), Hutchinson (2000, 18 and 21), Humble (1997, 242 and 245), Dillery (1995, 10-12, 15, 94, 130, and 249-51), Breitenbach (1950, 29-104) and Jaeger (1945, 159).

Method for the Analysis of Xenophon's Speeches

In the first part of this chapter, I outline the method that I shall adopt throughout this thesis to interpret the speeches in the *Anabasis*. In the second part, I discuss the previous scholarly approaches to examining the speeches in the *Hellenica*, in comparison to my own approach. In order to demonstrate how my approach and methodology can add to existing scholarship, in the third part, I use the method I have outlined to analyse three speeches from the *Hellenica* and compare existing scholarly interpretations to my own.⁴⁴

Method

Speeches in a historiographic work cannot be regarded as freestanding, and instead are part of a multi-layered representation. Firstly, this consists of an external frame. The author controls the voice of the narrator, who in turn controls the speaker and his speech. This speech is nominally directed at an internal audience, and witnessed by the reader. However, the author, via the narrator, may mould the speech to have relevance for the reader. Secondly, the speeches have an internal frame comprising of the external situation, the audience's mental state, the speaker's persuasive aims and the audience's susceptibility to persuasion. Therefore, I propose to investigate the following elements of the speeches, although I shall not always investigate these in the same order or separate them so clearly from one another.

Context: the circumstances surrounding the speech which led to it being given and which will influence the way the speaker attempts to persuade. In this and the following areas, it is important to ascertain whether the internal audience also knows the information provided by the narrator to the reader or not.

Relevant information that the narrator has revealed to the reader about the speaker before the speech: this may include, for example, judgements about the speaker by the narrator or another character, information on the speaker's past words and deeds,

⁴⁴ Despite the large number of speeches in the *Cyropaedia*, I shall not extend my analysis to them and shall only occasionally refer to individual speeches from the work. This is due to both reasons of scope and the complicated division in existing scholarship regarding whether Xenophon intends the reader to see Cyrus as an ideal leader or whether he undermines Cyrus' leadership by revealing the flaws in it. For particularly opposed readings see Gera (1993), Tatum (1989) and Due (1989).

or details of previous interactions between the speaker and his internal audience.⁴⁵ The narrator may also have revealed the speaker's long-term aims and motivations, and his reasons for giving the speech, sometimes presenting the character's internal thought processes and feelings. Such information will allow the reader to assess the character of the speaker, whether the speaker is trustworthy, why the speaker has chosen to speak or is advocating a particular course of action, whether the speaker is revealing his true motives or is being deceptive, and what feelings the speaker has previously evoked in the same audience either because of preconceived ideas about him or because of a speech or action.

Relevant information that the narrator has revealed to the reader about the internal audience before the speech: this information may allow the reader to assess what the internal audience expects from its circumstances and the speaker, as well as revealing the audience's motivations and mood. The reader can then begin to understand whether a speaker's arguments, the *ethos* he projects, and the emotions he tries to evoke or combat are likely to persuade the particular audience.⁴⁶

How the narrator introduces the speech: for example, the narrator may indicate visual or audial elements, or the general manner of delivery. As an example of a visual element, indicating that the speaker wept before delivering a speech may help the reader to understand that the speaker was trying to evoke pity in his audience. The general manner the speech was given in can be indicated, for example, by specifying that a speaker was sober when he gave his speech. This reveals that the speaker is in control of what he is saying. The narrator's choice of verb to introduce a speech can be important in interpreting what follows. For example, by indicating that a speaker reproached his audience, the narrator makes the reader aware of the tone of the speech, the speaker's intention, and also the speaker's emotions. Interpretive clues can also be revealed in the narrator's choice of how to name the

⁴⁵ For narratorial interventions in Xenophon, see Gray (2004 and 2003). She argues that these are a way of explicitly evaluating a character or event, often through praise or blame, but that the narrator can also use more implicit methods such as similes or metaphors to do this. Gray's work highlights that it will be particularly important to see where the narrator comments and where events and characters speak for themselves.

⁴⁶ For the vital importance of understanding a speaker's audience to both the speaker and the reader, see Debnar (2001) who examines the internal audiences in Thucydides' Spartan debates. She demonstrates that failing to take into account one's audience is significant in these speeches, and that Thucydides himself assessed the audiences when choosing the appropriate words for his speakers to say.

speaker. For example, if he provides a speaker's rank or ethnicity, he may be commenting on the speaker's suitability to speak, or political influence. The same may be said about how the narrator introduces the audience.

The arguments the speaker adopts in his attempt to persuade: this reveals what factors the speaker believes will most persuade his audience, such as thoughts of safety, advantage or reputation. Debnar's (2001) work highlights that the power an argument has over the same audience changes over time, as this audience's circumstances and motivations shift, and that opinions will differ even between members of the same audience.

*The ethos the speaker presents to his audience:*⁴⁷ a speaker can project his true character in his speech or he can manipulate an audience to believe in a specific *ethos* that he has contrived for the situation (*ethopoeia*). Narrators often directly or indirectly provide the reader with the knowledge to identify whether a character is presenting his real character or a false one.⁴⁸ The projection of a specific persona indicates the type of character that the speaker thinks will lend persuasive force to his arguments. For example, a speaker who claims that his interests coincide with his audience's interests, and therefore that he has the same aims as his audience, may calculate that the audience members will trust him as someone who can help them fulfil their aims and desires.⁴⁹

A speaker can build on a pre-established reputation if this is positive, or he may need to refute suspicions at the beginning of his speech if this is negative.⁵⁰ If

⁴⁷ Although I have separated *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* for convenience, these often overlap. See Carey (1996) for the overlap of *ethos* and *pathos*, and his argument that "in the hands of a master, ethos, in the sense of dramatic characterization, may fulfil the role of argument" (1996, 414).

⁴⁸ Regarding the *Anabasis*, Ferrario (2012) discusses the interplay between the way the characters want to be remembered and how the narrator or author allows them to be remembered as part of her discussion about the author's awareness of the role his work has in creating memory. Although she concentrates on *actions* that affect how a character is remembered, if the narrator presents a speaker portraying himself as having a certain character but also reveals to the audience that this is not an accurate representation, the narrator is effectively undercutting how the speaker wants to be seen. We must remember, however, that the speeches (and indeed aspects of actions) are as much constructions of the author as the narratorial elements revealing the discrepancy, and so to speak of what the character "wants" here is a fallacy.

⁴⁹ Stadter (2009, 457) argues that Xenophon was particularly aware of how a person's character could affect politics. He says that Xenophon represented many different character traits and linked these to specific actions and repercussions. This suggests that Xenophon will also be interested in how leaders portray their own characters in speech, and what arises from this.

⁵⁰ As recommended in Anaximenes' *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, 29.6-26, 1436b.17-1437b.33 and 36.3-15, 1441b.37-1442b.28.

the speaker is unknown to the audience, he will need to construct his character entirely through what he says in his speech. A speaker can establish his *ethos* by directly describing his own character, by referring to his previous behaviour, or through his selection of arguments.⁵¹ Of course, the particular cause a speaker is arguing for will also incline his audience to view him in a particular way. For example, an audience will take a different view of a speaker who advocates helping a friend in need, despite the harm it will bring to himself, and a speaker who advocates abandoning friends because it is expedient. Whether the audience believes that the first speaker is morally right or foolish will depend on the specific addressees and circumstances.

The emotions the speaker tries to evoke or combat: the choice of which emotions to manipulate indicates what the speaker believes to be the mind-set of his audience, both in terms of what the audience values most and in response to the current situation.

The audience's response: when the narrator indicates a response, it usually takes the form of a narratorial comment indicating how the speech was received, the description of an action that explicitly or implicitly results from the speech, or the presentation of another speech. These indicate whether the audience has been persuaded or not.⁵²

Why the speech is successful or unsuccessful: this is sometimes explicitly indicated by the narrator, often by revealing the emotions the audience feels about the speech or by providing the audience's thought-processes in analysing it. Success indicates that the speaker anticipated the character of his audience correctly and hence selected the right arguments, *ethos* and appeals to emotions. An unsuccessful speech can

⁵¹ As Kelly (1977, 90) argues, in the *Anabasis*, speakers cannot be differentiated by their style or way of speaking. Instead, they all speak in Xenophon's own mode. For more on Xenophon's own style, see Chiron (2014) and Gray (2014). Colvin (1999) argues that the conventions of historiography mean that dialects in particular are not usually represented in such works, although he says that Xenophon occasionally includes elements of the Laconian dialect. My own investigations have confirmed that there is no stylistic differentiation between the ways people from different cities speak. See further Roy (1972) for Xenophon's use of ethnics in the *Anabasis*.

⁵² Leidl (2010) examines responses to speeches in historiography and concludes that they have two main roles. Firstly, they indicate the effect that the speeches had on the internal audience and relate to the continuation of the narrative. Secondly, they engage the reader with the author's aims for the work by allowing the reader to compare his own intellectual and emotional reactions, in order to interpret the speech and the action that is caused by the speech correctly. Leidl further argues that unsuccessful speeches have their effect on the reader rather than the internal audience.

usually be explained by the speaker's failure to understand his audience.⁵³ A speaker's prior reputation may also influence an audience's decision, as might speeches delivered by others, both in support of the speaker's argumentation and in opposition to it.⁵⁴

Allusions to other speeches: these can be speeches within the same work, within Xenophon's *oeuvre*, or within earlier literature. Within the same work, the narrator may indirectly invite a comparison between the ways in which different speakers responded to a similar situation, evoked the same emotion, used the same arguments, or appealed to the same motivation, for example. The narrator may also implicitly invite the reader to compare the different characters of the speakers and audiences in various episodes, as well as the reactions by different audiences to similar circumstances. Allusions to speeches in different works by the same author may shed further light on how the author wanted the reader to interpret the speech. For example, the allusion might confirm that a particular rhetorical method is effective or ineffective, that a particular type of person uses it, or that it is morally unsound. Links to speeches outside of Xenophon's work invite comparisons with famous speakers, audiences, persuasion attempts and outcomes. Such external allusions will not be a central preoccupation of my thesis, but I shall discuss them as and when they aid interpretation of the speeches in question.

The short-term and long-term outcomes for the speaker and the audience of successful or unsuccessful persuasion attempts: when the narrator reveals whether the speech was ultimately beneficial or harmful to the speaker and the audience, this invites the reader to judge one or both parties. For example, if the speech is successful but leads to disaster, this brings the speaker's motivation, aims and judgement into question, as well as the audience's decision to accept the speaker's arguments. If a speaker fails to persuade and this leads to harm, the reader may judge the speaker equally culpable. Here, the reader should assess the speaker's choice of how to persuade.

⁵³ See Debnar (1996). She examines a speech in Thucydides by the Thebans (3.61-7) and shows why it is an example of "inept rhetoric" in contrast to scholars who have tried to save the speech from reflecting badly on the Thebans' abilities.

⁵⁴ When there are multiple speakers making similar arguments but all contributing a different *ethos*, the narrator sometimes indicates that the character of a particular speaker persuaded his audience, but it is often difficult to distinguish whose character had the successful impact.

Further relevant information in the subsequent narrative: this includes information relating to how the speaker's leadership ends in the work and whether a leader is able to live up to his promises.

Previous Approaches to the *Hellenica*

I shall now give a brief overview of the major scholarly works on the speeches in the *Hellenica*, and demonstrate how my focus is different. The scholar who has examined these speeches in the most depth is Vivienne Gray. In *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, she uses close reading to analyse the majority of the speeches in the work in their contexts. In each case, she highlights the moral and ethical message conveyed in the episode in which the speech appears. In particular, she examines the moral qualities of speakers, leaders, cities and audiences that emerge from the speeches. Overall, Gray argues that the *Hellenica* has a moral and philosophical aim, and that it portrays examples of moral achievement and virtue. In contrast to Gray, I do not focus on classing speakers and audiences according to whether they show virtue or vice, although my analysis may reveal characters to be moral or corrupt. Instead, I concentrate on the speeches as persuasion attempts where the speaker either succeeds or fails, and I use the preceding and subsequent narrative to interpret the attempt further. While this includes an assessment of the characters of the speakers and their audiences, I focus on investigating the speaker's motives and understanding how accurately the speaker judged the character of his audience.⁵⁵

In her earlier article, 'Dialogue in Xenophon's *Hellenica*', Gray examines the role of the dialogues in the work through a close reading of their contents and their surrounding narrative. She particularly examines how the narrator presents the main speaker as persuading others and what this reveals about the speaker's character. She argues that the narrator presents dialogue to reveal the main speaker's clever manipulative talents and persuasive methods in a form that allows the reader to detect these skills for himself, and that the dialogues highlight themes that Xenophon wants to portray as part of his characterisation of particular leaders. In *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, however, Gray includes these same dialogues as examples

⁵⁵ Kane (1990) does not examine the speeches in the *Hellenica* specifically, but he also suggests a moral interpretation of the work, whereby the narrator indicates that justice and piety lead to positive outcomes and poor behaviour leads to negative outcomes. This is similar to my method of examining the outcomes of speeches to reveal how Xenophon may have wanted the reader to interpret the speeches.

revealing moral virtue. The approach she adopts in her article is close to the method I use in examining what a persuasion attempt can reveal about a character, but I primarily focus on set speeches presented directly and indirectly and only occasionally examine dialogue. Further, when analysing the *Anabasis* speeches, I examine them thematically and investigate additional elements of characterisation.⁵⁶

Buckler analyses the speeches in *Hellenica* 6.3.1- 7.5.27 in his article 'Xenophon's Speeches and the Theban Hegemony'. Firstly, he examines the role of the speeches in relation to the aim of this specific section of the work, and secondly, he examines the speeches to see whether they accurately reflect what the speakers said at the time. Buckler concludes that the function of the speeches is to allow characters to present their views and policies. While I also examine what arguments the characters present, I discuss the reasons for a speaker's selection of particular arguments and why he may have believed that these would be persuasive. Buckler compares the speeches in the work with other accounts of the same episodes to ascertain their authenticity. A similar approach is adopted in Usher's article 'Xenophon, Critias and Theramenes'. Here, Usher attempts to establish whether the speeches of Critias and Theramenes in *Hellenica* book 2 are based on actual transcripts of the speeches. The question of the authenticity of individual speeches is outside the scope of my work.⁵⁷

Tamiolaki examines the influence of Thucydides on Xenophon's speeches in her article 'A l'ombre de Thucydide? Les Discours des Helléniques et leur Influence Thucydidéenne'. Her method is to compare the representation and function of

⁵⁶ See also Hau (2014, 253-6) who argues that the dialogues in the *Hellenica* are partly included to explain what caused subsequent events. In contrast, I examine subsequent events for their impact on the interpretation of the speeches.

⁵⁷ The problem in relation to the *Anabasis* stands thus. Although Xenophon was present on the expedition and purportedly gave many of the speeches in the work, the events happened long before he composed the *Anabasis*, and he includes some speeches that he was not present for (7.6.4-6, for example). As Woodman (1988, 11-15) argues with a focus on Thucydides, it is unlikely that readers would actually expect a verbatim quotation and would instead expect a historian to make edits to the speech, although providing the essence. See further Marincola (2011, 120-7) who concludes that speeches in historiography are ultimately interpretations of speakers, characters and aims by the historian, rather than accurate representations. While the *Anabasis* can only partially be described as historiography, these conclusions most likely apply to this work too. Sacks (1981, 5-6) highlights that accurate representations of speeches are only relevant to internal audiences, while free inventions can only educate the external audience and do not fit the context. Speeches that are part accurate and part invention, he argues, are aimed at both the internal and external audiences, and progress the narrative as well as passing a message to the reader. Thus, if Xenophon is providing any lessons for his readers, it is likely that his speeches are not direct quotations.

speeches in Thucydides' and Xenophon's works. By way of introduction, she briefly compares several factors in the presentation of the speeches in both works. Firstly, she mentions some similarities and differences in the number of speeches, as well as the genres and structures of the speeches. Further, she examines some aspects of who speaks, how much, and when in the two works. She also comments on some similar and different factors in the presentation of audience reactions and the way the speakers' motivations are described. Finally, she touches on how moral qualities are described by each author. In the main body of her article, she examines specific echoes and adaptations of Thucydides by Xenophon, and common themes and motifs. She does not apply a rhetorical analysis to the speeches themselves in order to assess the representation of their persuasiveness or lack of it, but is concerned with the extent of Xenophon's innovativeness and whether he deliberately echoes Thucydides. As I mentioned above, I do not make allusions to other works a main focus.

In her article, 'Charakter mów Ksenofonta w "Hellenika"', Turska compares the content, form, type and function of the speeches in the *Hellenica* with those in Herodotus and Thucydides, and focuses especially on how each author presents the characters of the speakers. She concludes that the *Hellenica* narrator allows the reader to form his own opinion of a speaker based on what he says and does rather than providing explicit opinions. In my work, I examine what some of these readers' opinions might be by relating the speeches to the narrative and comparing the characterisations that emerge. I do not compare Xenophon's use of speeches to the employment of speeches by other authors.

Other scholars also touch on the speeches while investigating the *Hellenica*. Pownall (2004) argues that Xenophon has a moral agenda and aims to provide moral *exempla* for the benefit of aristocrats engaging in politics. She argues that speeches are one way in which Xenophon chooses to convey his moral teachings, and includes analysis of select speeches as examples of speakers displaying their moral qualities and thus providing good and bad moral paradigms. In my own work, Xenophon's overall ethical message is not the main focus, although it will be a factor in the interpretation of the speeches, for example, in understanding whether the narrator approves of speakers deceiving their audiences.

Marincola (2010) briefly examines a few instances of the employment of historical examples by speakers in the *Hellenica* in terms of why their use succeeds or fails. Similarly, Rood (2012c) examines speakers' use of the 'plupast' in the *Hellenica* and how such examples from the past reflect on contemporary issues of political relations, have power as models, and indicate speakers' exploitation of events for different audiences. While my own work will touch on historical examples used by characters as part of their persuasion attempts, this is again not my sole focus. Tuplin (1993) analyses the *Hellenica* as a critique of the struggle for dominance between the main Greek states and, as part of this, he discusses various aspects of the speeches, including the arguments presented in them and their outcomes. My work differs again in depth but also focuses less on how the speeches are political commentaries and more on what can be learnt from them as persuasion attempts.

Various scholars have also analysed specific speeches in the work, such as Schepens (2001), who examines the speeches of the three Athenian ambassadors at 6.3. Although he touches on elements such as characterisation and choice of arguments, he primarily focuses on what the speeches reveal about Xenophon's political vision. In examining an element of the relationship between leader and follower, as well as considering Xenophon's possible representation of the army as a *polis* on the march, I am clearly touching on Xenophon's political message in the *Anabasis*. Nevertheless, this is not my main concern and I am not letting Xenophon's political ideology guide my interpretation.

Examples

In order to illustrate how my focus on the content of the speeches and their relation to the information provided in the narrative may contribute insight into the interpretation of the speeches, I shall apply my method to three speeches in the *Hellenica*. They are all the subject of scholarly debate and I will set this out in the course of the discussion.

Polydamas' Speech to the Spartans (6.1.4-16)

Investigating this speech particularly reveals the importance of carefully reading the narrative after a speech, understanding a speaker's real motive in relation to his

claimed one, and linking a speech to the way a speaker's story ends in the work. These will all be important for investigating the speeches in the *Anabasis*. In this episode, Polydamas has come to Sparta to ask for Spartan aid against Jason, who wants to bring Polydamas' Pharsalus under his control. In the scholarship on this speech, Polydamas is often judged positively, while the Spartans are judged negatively, but I shall be arguing for the opposite.

This is Polydamas' first appearance in the work, and the narrator introduces him with an unusually extensive comment on the high repute he is held in throughout Thessaly and how his own people regard him as virtuous (καλός...κάγαθός, 6.1.2-3). The narrator recalls how Polydamas' people put their Acropolis in Polydamas' hands and how Polydamas managed incoming and outgoing funds fairly, even adding subsidies from his own purse. Finally, the narrator describes Polydamas as hospitable (φιλόξενός) and magnificent (μεγαλοπρεπής). This appears to be a ringing endorsement of Polydamas' character and his devotion to his city, but, notably, the narrator does not comment on Polydamas' persuasive skills, which the reader is implicitly invited to judge for himself in the subsequent speech. The narrator does not comment on what Polydamas will argue, what his motives are, or how he will speak, and so this must emerge from Polydamas' own words. This, of course, raises questions about whether the reader can trust Polydamas to speak truthfully about his motivations, and the reader should consider this when interpreting the speech.

While the narrator does not indicate the Spartan audience's state of mind before this particular speech, he does provide information pertaining to the circumstances in which the audience finds itself. This allows the reader to understand whether the Spartans should follow Polydamas' advice or not. Polydamas gives his speech at a time when the Athenians and the Thebans are pressing the Spartans hard, a few years before Leuctra; Nicolochus the Spartan recently led fifty-five ships to oppose an Athenian and Theban force travelling around the Peloponnese, but suffered losses (5.4.62-6). The narrator also reveals that the Thebans have just made an expedition into Phocis, and that the Spartans have sent four regiments, led by King Cleombrotus, in response to a Phocian request for help. The narrator provides a summary of the speech by which the Phocians persuaded the Spartans to help them against the Thebans (6.1.1). Unless the Spartans send aid, the

Phocians say, they will have to yield to the Thebans. Thus, the Spartans are already committed on several fronts.

Within his own speech, Polydamas embeds a speech purportedly given by Jason to Polydamas himself.⁵⁸ ‘Speech within a speech’ is frequently found in fourth century oratory, in both public and private cases.⁵⁹ Bers (1997, 223-4) argues that vividness is not the aim of including speech within speech, as is often suggested. Rather, he argues, in lawcourt speeches it is probably a characterisation technique that will be recognised by the listener as a rhetorical device rather than as an accurate representation of an actual speech. Thus, we should pay attention to how the speech characterises both Polydamas and Jason. That Polydamas’ speech merges features of forensic oratory with symbouleutic oratory suggests that Xenophon has an interest in how speakers attempt persuasion in practice, even if it transcends the theory he may have found in the handbooks of three distinct genres of oratory, each with their own special features. There are further examples of speeches within speeches in addition to those in lawcourt orations.⁶⁰ Polydamas’ speech presents striking parallels to Herodotus’ representation of Alexander, son of Amyntas, quoting to the Athenians a speech that Mardonius asked him to report to them with the aim of bringing about an alliance between Persia and Athens (8.140). Within his representation of Mardonius’ speech, Alexander further represents Mardonius quoting a message from the Persian king. Alexander, like Polydamas, comments on the speech he is quoting himself. Also like Polydamas, Alexander fails to persuade his audience (8.143). We shall see further similarities between the speeches as we investigate Polydamas’ words. It may be that Xenophon is deliberately alluding to this speech and indicating that a speaker who represents another’s speech within his own speech is often unsuccessful.

As part of his argument, Polydamas presents his motives first. He says that he thinks it is right to come to the Spartans when he is in difficulty or if there is trouble for Sparta in Thessaly (6.1.4), although he does not specify whom the trouble concerns on this occasion. As his speech progresses, Polydamas directly connects

⁵⁸ We must take into account that while Polydamas portrays Jason in a particular way, the narrator is responsible for how he represents Polydamas doing this. Further, the narrator is a construction of the author who is ultimately controlling everything in the work.

⁵⁹ See Bers (1997) for examples and discussion.

⁶⁰ In *Odyssey* books 9-12, speeches are presented within Odysseus’ discourse to the Phaeacians. See also Herodotus 6.86-7, and *Anabasis* 1.6.5-10 and 5.6.20. There are no parallels in Thucydides.

Jason's attempts to win over Pharsalus with Spartan interests. He claims that Jason has said that he does not think that any other city could easily contend with him (6.1.5), and this presumably includes Sparta. At 6.1.8-10, 'Jason' says that Sparta's enemies are already his allies and that they want to become his followers as soon as he frees them from the Spartans. To convince the Spartans that Jason himself is a serious threat, Polydamas describes Jason's character and leadership qualities. He does this in terms that the Spartans themselves traditionally would understand the value of, such as Jason being a harsh disciplinarian (6.1.6) and the most self-controlled (ἐγκρατέστατός) in relation to bodily pleasures (6.1.16). Polydamas dwells on the extreme yet effective training that Jason gives his men, which may particularly interest an audience who is famed for the quality of its warriors and training. Polydamas even says that Jason casts out weaklings (6.1.6), which sounds similar to Spartan practices.⁶¹ Polydamas does not actually explain what he wants from the Spartans until close to the end of the speech. He reveals that Jason allowed him to come to ask the Spartans for help against Jason (6.1.13). Polydamas argues that the Spartans need to take Jason seriously, but also that he thinks the Spartans are likely to be successful, as long as they send a large enough force to convince the Thessalian cities under Jason's control to become allies with them (6.1.14-15).

Polydamas chooses to present himself as a simple reporter who allows Jason to speak through him. This method of presentation is designed to pre-empt any Spartan suspicion that Polydamas is exaggerating the severity of Jason's threat because it concerns his own city. In reality, Polydamas has edited, arranged and perhaps even made up Jason's words for maximum effect, possibly including the argument by 'Jason' that Polydamas would be blameless in befriending him if the Spartans fail to help (6.1.13).⁶²

Polydamas also presents himself as someone who has goodwill towards the Spartans, who values his relationship with them, and who wants to do what is right. Firstly, he reminds the Spartans that he is their *proxenos* and benefactor (εὐεργέτης),

⁶¹ Alexander and 'Mardonius' use similar methods to Polydamas and 'Jason' to try to persuade the Athenians to become allies with Persia, including mentioning what would be in the Athenians' interests, and describing how strong the king (and Mardonius himself) is.

⁶² After Alexander's speech to the Athenians in Herodotus, Spartan ambassadors speak against him and argue that Alexander has 'smoothed' (λείψας) Mardonius' words (Herodotus 8.142).

as all his ancestors have been (6.1.4).⁶³ Throughout the speech, Polydamas represents himself as loyal to the Spartans (e.g. 6.1.13) despite the offer by 'Jason' to make him the second greatest man in Greece (6.1.8). Polydamas also recalls the admiration of 'Jason' for Polydamas' adherence to his friendship with the Spartans and the exclamation by 'Jason' that he must hold on to the allegiance of Polydamas even more because he has such a good character (6.1.13). Polydamas' implication is that the Spartans should likewise strive to retain his allegiance. Polydamas also presents himself as having practical wisdom when he interrupts 'Jason' to comment knowledgeably on the situation and on Jason's talents (6.1.6 and 6.1.14-16).⁶⁴

By giving Jason the bulk of the speech, the negative emotions that Polydamas evokes are directed towards Jason rather than himself. For example, if Polydamas had told the Spartans that Jason would easily be able to undermine Spartan control, the Spartans may have felt anger towards Polydamas for this slight on their strength, and refused to help. Instead, Polydamas seems to be trying to evoke gratitude in the Spartans towards himself through the presentation of his loyalty and concern with their interests.

Polydamas appears to try to evoke fear by recounting several different aspects of Jason's threat. To some extent, these arguments may have originally been used by Jason to make Polydamas fear. He represents Jason as having a well-crafted plan and as being astute. For example, Jason recognises the weak areas in his existing troops (6.1.8-9) and anticipates that his actions will gain him peltasts, which the Thessalian army is presently lacking (Brownson, 2004, 120-1 n. 2). In addition, Polydamas describes Jason's detailed knowledge of his enemy and confidence concerning his own ability to act. For example, Polydamas has 'Jason' describe how he will turn down the Athenians' friendship because the Thessalians have better access to timber, will be able to build more ships, are better able to fill the ships with men and supply them with corn, and because they have more income. Because of

⁶³ C.f. the opening of Alcibiades' speech in the Sicilian debate (Thucydides, 6.16ff.). 'Mardonius' and Alexander also emphasise their goodwill towards the Athenians. Alexander chiefly does this by saying that his goodwill does not need to be mentioned.

⁶⁴ In commenting on the speech by 'Jason', Polydamas acts almost like the narrator does in an historiographical work. Thus, it is possible that Xenophon is playing with generic conventions in his representation of Polydamas' speech. The *Hellenica* is not straightforward as historiography, however. Scholars have detected shifts in Xenophon's conception of historiography (see Rahn, 1971), and even doubted that the work is historiography at all (see Grayson, 1975). See further Tuplin (1977).

these advantages over the Athenians, 'Jason' believes that he could easily rule by sea. This may be specifically aimed at the Spartans who have never achieved long-lasting success at sea and may feel threatened by the thought of a sea power even stronger than Athens. 'Jason' goes on to explain how he could subdue the King of Persia because of the Persians' traditional servitude and his own knowledge of previous expeditions against the Persians (6.1.10-12). Further, with himself as *Tagus*, 'Jason' believes that the Thessalians would not consent to be subject to anyone (6.1.8-9). Supporting this fearsome account, Polydamas represents Jason as being unlikely to fail in anything he tries (6.1.6 and 6.1.15-16).⁶⁵ Polydamas also presents Jason as having a good sense of diplomacy (6.1.7), which may suggest that he will easily win people to his side. Polydamas further makes it clear that Jason is already in a position where he might cause serious trouble for the Spartans. For example, he mentions how powerful and famous Jason is (6.1.4), recites the list of Jason's subjects (6.1.7), and claims that a force of freed helots and a private commander will not be sufficient to tackle Jason (6.1.14-15). Polydamas is presenting Jason as an imminent threat who is highly capable and desirous of causing great harm. Polydamas' words also indirectly warn the Spartans that they are currently overconfident and underestimate their rivals. The Spartans are typically slow to act, do not take risks, and are inclined to take time for deliberation (as they are characterised in Thucydides, e.g. 1.84), and so Polydamas' appeal is designed to make the Spartans fear not acting quickly. He is seemingly aware that appeals to greed and the desire for expansion would not persuade the Spartans, as they may do an Athenian audience.

If the Spartans do not fear Jason, these arguments may make them feel contemptuous towards Jason because his excessive ambition, confidence and presumption are not to be admired. They may also be angry at the slights Jason made towards themselves, which may make them want to teach him a lesson. The Spartans may particularly feel angry when Polydamas has 'Jason' explain why mercenaries, such as he has, are better than citizen soldiers. Few men in cities train their bodies, he says, while all his men are able to endure severe toils like himself (6.1.5). The implication is that Sparta's soldiers would not be a match for Jason's men. 'Jason' also argues that it is better to have willing allies rather than forcing people under his

⁶⁵ C.f. Demosthenes' similar presentation of Philip, for example at 9.49-50.

control (6.1.7). This may strike a chord with the Spartans who had numerous troubles in subduing the Messenians by force and keeping them subdued.

Polydamas may also be trying to make the Spartans feel ashamed that they have let Jason become so powerful, despite others recognising the threat and becoming Jason's allies. He might also be recalling his ties of friendship with the Spartans to shame them into reciprocating the work he has done in their interests. This lack of action and potential refusal to help a friend may cause dishonour in others' eyes.

In response, the Spartans are not angry at Polydamas' criticism of them. Instead, the narrator reports that the Spartans deferred their answer to Polydamas and over the next two days assessed how many regiments they currently had deployed. The narrator reports their eventual reply: they cannot send Polydamas an adequate force and so he should go home and arrange his affairs and those of Pharsalus as best he could (6.1.17). Polydamas commends the Spartan state's simplicity (*ἀπλότητα*), presumably in giving a clear answer, and leaves (6.1.18).

Immediately afterwards, Polydamas becomes allies with Jason, gives him his children as hostages, and helps Jason to win over Pharsalus and become Tagus (6.1.18). Jason is killed four years later because 'the Greeks' (*οἱ Ἕλληνες*) feared that he might become a tyrant, and his killers were honoured in most of the Greek cities they visited (6.4.29-32). In the intervening period, Jason has not caused the Spartans excessive trouble. Indeed, before he dies, Jason dissuades the Thebans from trying to crush Sparta (6.4.20-4). Soon after Jason's death, his brother kills Polydamas and eight others from Pharsalus (6.4.34). By being unpersuasive, Polydamas has benefitted Jason in the short-term, but the Spartans in the long-term. He has brought only harm to himself and the Pharsalians who are killed.

Interpretation

This speech involves the reader in understanding why the Spartans were not persuaded. Polydamas' appeal has similarities to the Phocians' appeal presented immediately before it, in response to which the Spartans sent aid. Similarly, Polydamas' speech is often linked to Cleigenes' successful persuasion of the Spartans and their allies to deal with the growing threat presented by the Olynthians

(5.2.12-19) because they use similar arguments (see Gray, 1989a, 185-6 and Tuplin, 1993, 130). Cleigenes says that the Olynthians are a potential danger, that they have threatened the Acanthians and Apollonians to join them willingly or be forced, that there needs to be a strong force sent against the Olynthians, that the Olynthians themselves already have a strong force and position, that the Olynthians may make an alliance with stronger powers (including Boeotia and Athens), that the Olynthians are proud, and that cities who share citizenship with the Olynthians but who dislike them will desert if a strong force goes against the Olynthians before their cities become closely connected. Thus, Cleigenes' speech shows that the Spartans *can* be persuaded by similar arguments to those used by Polydamas. A key difference, however, is that Cleigenes has emphasised that the Olynthians are not currently hard to deal with, despite their advantages (5.2.18), whereas Polydamas has emphasised the difficulty of fighting Jason. This may alert the reader to the fact that this difference will be important in interpreting Polydamas' failure.

The Spartans do indeed seem to want to help Polydamas. Thus, Polydamas' assumption that the Spartans can be persuaded by considerations pertaining to their own interests, that they are more likely to be convinced if he puts the points he raises in terms that they can identify with, that they will want to help a loyal friend, and that they are driven to action by strong emotions seems to be right.⁶⁶ However, Polydamas may be a victim of his own success in ensuring that Jason comes across as a pressing threat. Rather than making the Spartans want to crush Jason immediately, Jason comes across as so great an opponent that the Spartans do not believe that they have the forces at hand to combat him and would need to recall troops in order to send aid. By saying that a private individual with emancipated helots will not be sufficient (6.1.14), Polydamas is effectively saying that the Spartans will have to turn back from campaigning against the Thebans in Phocis, because this is where King Cleombrotus is fighting, while Agesilaus is injured (5.4.58 and 6.4.18). Thus, the success of the speech actually depends on whether Polydamas has managed to persuade the Spartans that it is more important for them to use their troops against Jason than against their other enemies, which he fails to do.

⁶⁶ See Sanders (forthcoming) who argues that the Spartans in Thucydides can be incited to war through anger and fear. Thus, Polydamas' appeal to these emotions may have been apt.

Some existing interpretations judge the Spartans negatively for their response to Polydamas. Gray (1989a, 122), for example, argues that the Spartans put their own safety above their friendship with Polydamas and should have spared him one regiment. Their poor character, she argues, stands in contrast to Polydamas'. Pownall (2004, 100) also believes that Xenophon wants the reader to judge the Spartans as uncharitable. She contrasts this with Jason, who generously allowed Polydamas to go to the Spartans. However, the narrator indicates that, rather than deserting Polydamas in his time of need, the Spartans sensibly weigh up their options and actually follow Polydamas' advice of not sending any troops if they cannot send a large enough force. Indeed, Tuplin (1993, 130-1) rightly argues that the Spartan decline that Xenophon is presenting is not in moral terms, but in terms of their dire lack of resources. Polydamas even praises the Spartans' clear response, suggesting that he did not think that they had acted wrongly.

A close reading of the subsequent narrative actually reveals that the narrator represents Polydamas' recommendation to attack Jason as a poor one. This is not apparent until the narrator reveals additional information about Jason. Before this time, the reader may simply believe that Polydamas was caught in the difficult situation of trying to protect his people and aid his friends against a dangerous enemy. The reader may even feel suspense about what will happen to the Spartans and Polydamas. Later events demonstrate that Jason did not pose a significant threat to Sparta. In fact, Jason helped the Spartans more than he hindered them by preventing Thebes from crushing them. This vindicates the Spartans' decision not to send a force against him. Xenophon's original readers may even have known this when they were reading Polydamas' speech.⁶⁷ Tuplin (1993, 119-20) similarly notes that the narrator does not indicate that Jason has made much progress in his aims between Polydamas' speech and Jason's death, but he concludes that such development is not the narrator's concern. Rather, Tuplin argues, Xenophon is interested in demonstrating Jason's fulfilment of the warning that he has Jason

⁶⁷ Polydamas is a real historical person, but Xenophon may be playing with the audience's knowledge of Polydamas in the *Iliad*, who acts as an advisor to Hector. The Iliadic Polydamas usually fails to convince because of his conservative stance. In the *Hellenica*, Polydamas fails because he argues for the necessity of such a big force. Homer gives Polydamas the epithet 'wise' (πειπλυμένος) at *Il.* 18.249, when ignoring his advice leads to the death of Patroclus and the subsequent events. Again, in the *Hellenica*, the reverse is the case and failing to follow Polydamas' recommendation to attack Jason is the right course. Perhaps Xenophon's readers would expect the Pharsalian Polydamas to be a wise advisor who should be listened to, but, if so, Xenophon overturns their expectations.

himself articulate: god can make the small great and the great small (6.4.23). Thus, Tuplin argues that Polydamas' speech demonstrates Jason's greatness before his fall. The main difficulty in this interpretation is that it does not adequately explain Polydamas' role in presenting Jason's 'greatness' and his reason for doing so.

The narrator does not allow the reader to know whether Polydamas was genuinely concerned for the Spartans or not. The reader may believe that Polydamas makes a poor recommendation because he honestly repeats and believes what Jason has said. In this case, Polydamas would be the author of his own downfall for transmitting Jason's scare-tactics. Because Polydamas' own interests are so clearly at stake, and because he must have feared for his people, the reader is more likely to be suspicious that Polydamas has reworked Jason's speech for a new audience. Presumably, he deliberately exaggerates Jason's threat.⁶⁸ As we saw, certain arguments seem designed to speak directly to the Spartans, and so presumably come from Polydamas himself. This interpretation is *pace* Gray (1989a, 185-6), who argues that the similarities to passages representing ideal commanders in Xenophon's other works suggest that the speech "is almost entirely from Xenophon

⁶⁸ There may be an allusion here to Nicias' speech at Thucydides 6.20-3. Nicias tries to prevent the Athenians from launching an expedition against Sicily by exaggerating the resources that they would need to commit. He achieves the opposite outcome, however, and his speech only makes the Athenians more determined, confident and desirous to attack. It may be that Xenophon is playing with the reader's expectations here. The reader, being familiar with Nicias' speech, will perhaps expect Polydamas to be successful and for the Spartans to overcommit troops, to their own detriment. Instead, Polydamas achieves the outcome that Nicias hoped for in putting off the Spartans. Nicias' argument that against such opponents the Athenians cannot just send a light naval force but need also to send a large infantry force is similar to Polydamas' recommendation not to send emancipated Helots and a private commander. Also, both argue that the enemy is powerful and has a large number of land forces. Nicias further argues that the enemy have abundant ships, men and money and are better able to get corn than the Athenians. As we saw above, 'Jason' used similar arguments when he discussed his advantages over the Athenians. There are differences in the emotional appeals made by the two speakers. For example, Polydamas tries to persuade the Spartans to act by playing on their fears while Nicias tries to use fear to deter his audience from acting. However, the Athenians are motivated by greed and desire, as well as overconfidence, and in trying to make them reassess the situation by making them fear, Nicias is fighting against the Athenians' typical characteristics. Tamiolaki (2014, 132 and 135) also sees intertextuality with Thucydides in Polydamas' speech. She argues that both the arguments used by 'Jason', and the Spartans' reply rework Thucydides' motif of voluntary submission from the Melian dialogue (5.85-113), while Polydamas' character introduction recalls the structure of Pericles' characterisation at Thucydides 2.65. She argues that Xenophon is deliberately recalling Thucydidean ideas in these allusions, at the same time as demonstrating his innovativeness. The main difficulty with this interpretation is ascertaining Xenophon the author's aims in making such allusions. For example, if Xenophon consciously recalled the character of Pericles, does he want to imply to the reader that Polydamas is like Pericles in character, or does he create this expectation only to undercut it in the subsequent speech? Tamiolaki does not elaborate.

and not Polydamas". Assuming that Xenophon is using Polydamas as a mouthpiece ignores the interesting form in which the narrator presents this speech and the questions it raises about the methods of persuasion that the narrator represents Polydamas as adopting.

Perhaps Polydamas did not know how many forces the Spartans had already committed elsewhere. If so, he would be guilty of having not researched the situation and of thus misjudging his argument. Indeed, Polydamas has possibly misunderstood the circumstances further. A later remark in a speech by Jason demonstrates that the Spartans forged diplomatic links at an unspecified time with Jason. Jason tells the Spartans that he desires to save them because of his father's friendship with them and because he is their *proxenos* (6.4.24). Given that he is speaking to the Spartans, he is presumably representing his relationship with them accurately. If Jason had been made their *proxenos* before Polydamas spoke to them, Polydamas completely misjudged Jason and the Spartans' relationship; indeed, the Spartans may have felt that they already had Jason under control. In this case, the Spartans may have suspected Polydamas of exaggerating Jason's threat to them in order to save his own people and of being insincere in his claim that Jason posed a direct threat to the Spartans as well. Given the Spartans' willingness to investigate whether they could spare troops, it seems more likely that the Spartans heeded some of Polydamas' warning and tried to tame Jason afterwards in the only way available since Polydamas had persuaded them that their available force was not big enough. This friendship suggests further exaggeration in Polydamas' speech, although it is unclear whether it is from Jason or Polydamas. If Jason truly believed that he could take on any citizen army, bring the Athenians and the Persian king under his control, and had Sparta's enemies on side, it seems unlikely that Jason would be content to settle for a diplomatic alliance with Sparta, even if he thought he could use it to his advantage eventually (6.4.25).

In any case, if Polydamas had persuaded the Spartans to withdraw troops from elsewhere when they did not need to, they might have suffered losses and defeats against one of their other enemies, most probably Thebes. Polydamas is therefore not as positive as he may initially seem, and is not a foil to the heartless Spartans. This interpretation differs from Gray's (1989a, 121-3). She argues that the function of this speech is to contrast the morality of Polydamas, the man from a

small town, with the morality of those from a big city. She argues that the speech demonstrates Polydamas' good character, as described by the narrator before the speech, particularly his loyalty in the face of danger, and his honesty. However, this does not take into account that we cannot simply accept Polydamas' representation of himself, and that the threat of Jason does not materialise. Admittedly, Polydamas' character introduction seems glowing. Indeed, Pownall (2004, 100) believes that the narrator represents the character of Polydamas as credible through his introduction, and Dillery (1995, 164 and 171-6) argues that Polydamas' character introduction is included to notify the readers that Polydamas will speak truthfully. However, basing judgement of Polydamas primarily on the introduction does not take into account the information about his character and his particular motivations that arise from his speech and the subsequent narrative. In fact, Polydamas' introduction serves only to demonstrate that Polydamas primarily looks after the interests of the Pharsalians, despite the way he characterises himself to the Spartans. Interestingly, the introduction does not reveal what the Spartans thought of Polydamas, but only what the Thessalians thought. Perhaps the Spartans were not so convinced of Polydamas' character. In the end, Polydamas emerges from the *Hellenica* as being devoted to his people, but also as being misguided in his approach to his persuasion attempt and as being untrustworthy and a poor friend to the Spartans.

The speech does occur in a digression which the narrator specifically says is about Jason (6.1.19), and the narrator does clearly admire Jason (see 6.4.28). It is likely, therefore, that the speech is partly about Jason's character and achievements, as well as Polydamas and the Spartans. Pownall (2004, 99-105) argues that Polydamas' speech centres on Jason and that the speech reveals how dangerous Jason is, as well as demonstrating his positive characteristics, such as his decency in allowing Polydamas to go to the Spartans. The function of this, she suggests, is to create a contrast with Jason's later corruption and loss of virtue, in which he provides a parallel to Sparta. Both fell because of the arrogance engendered by their good fortune.⁶⁹ Tuplin (1993, 117-18) also discusses Jason's good persuasive abilities, in particular his use of reason, as well as the positive character and leadership skills that are revealed in Polydamas' speech. However, these positive interpretations of Jason do not take into account Polydamas' role in presenting

⁶⁹ Dillery (1995, 164 and 171-6) similarly makes the link between Jason's and Sparta's decline.

Jason's threat, character and skills, which leave open to question how much of the picture he presents is accurate.

Tuplin (1993, 120) argues that the death of Polydamas demonstrates how different Jason's brothers are to Jason, rather than relating it to Polydamas' speech, while Pownall (2004, 100) argues that the killing of such an honourable man as Polydamas shows the wickedness of Jason's family. However, I would argue that Polydamas' death is a result of his inability to persuade the Spartans to crush Jason. The death of some of his people also indicates that he failed to save those who relied on him. This speech and the related narrative provide a lesson about the repercussions of being a poor speaker rather than representing a morally corrupt audience and a virtuous speaker. Polydamas' comeuppance demonstrates to the reader the vital importance of leaders being able to persuade others by offering genuinely good advice. The reader also sees the importance of not exaggerating, of being thought trustworthy, of fully understanding the situation, and of being able to anticipate an audience correctly. The reader may also recognise the importance of rational assessment, which here saves the Spartans from overcommitting themselves. A related lesson may be that, as an audience, it is important to anticipate what really motivates a speaker and whether he exaggerates his claims. Subsequent history could have been different if Polydamas had persuaded the Spartans; perhaps Xenophon the author wants the reader to recognise how important persuasive speech is to the course of history.

Procles' speech to the Athenian Assembly (6.5.38-48)

The importance of examining fully the narrative before and after a speech, of recognising the difference between a speaker's real and claimed motivations, and of appreciating what happens to a character as a result of his speech can be seen even more clearly in Procles' two speeches in the work, and so I shall analyse them both. Regarding Procles' first speech, scholars generally argue that Procles is an honourable character who provides a contrast to the character of his Athenian audience, but it is actually possible to reach the opposite conclusion about Procles' character by examining the speech and narrative in tandem.

The Athenians, having heard about the Spartans' troubles in their fight against the Thebans, have called an Assembly. The narrator indicates that the

Athenians are unsure as to whether they should aid Sparta (6.5.33). The narrator summarises five speeches given by the Spartan ambassadors in support of aiding the Spartans, and then comments on which arguments most affected the Athenians (6.5.33-6). The Spartan ambassadors mention past occasions when the Spartans and Athenians stood by one another through crises, the successes they had when working together, and that they now have the opportunity to conquer and tithe the Thebans (6.5.33-5). The narrator says that the Athenians were not very willing to accept this and a murmur passed around that the Spartans were saying this now, but that when the Spartans were thriving, they pressed upon (ἐπέκειντο) the Athenians (6.5.35). This indicates what arguments do *not* persuade the audience. Clearly, they remember events which the Spartans carefully avoided mentioning and/or remember differently the events the Spartans did mention. The narrator tells the reader that the Spartan argument which the Athenians found most weighty was that the Spartans acted well in preventing the destruction of Athens previously, when the Thebans had recommended it.⁷⁰ The narrator says that emphasis was also placed on the Athenians' oath, which bound them to help the Spartans, although the audience is divided about this (6.5.36). While the Athenians are trying to decide, Cleiteles the Corinthian gives a speech that evokes pity at his own state's unwarranted destruction by the Thebans and develops the argument that the Athenians' oaths oblige them to help. The Athenians shout approval that Cleiteles had spoken rightly and justly (6.5.37). This further indicates to Procles the Phliasian, and the reader, what arguments may persuade the Athenians. Following this, the narrator gives Procles' speech recommending helping the Spartans.

Earlier in the narrative, in an entirely different context, the narrator reveals that Procles and his partisans (οἱ ἀμφὶ Προκλέα τὸν Ἴππονίκου) are friends of Agesilaus (5.3.13). The background to this reference concerns the Phliasiens refusing rights to their former exiles. In their search for impartial judges, these exiles go to Sparta. When the Phliasiens fine those who went to Sparta, the former exiles encourage the Spartans to take action against Phlius. The ephors call out the ban against Phlius and the narrator says that Agesilaus was pleased because Podanemus' followers had been friends of his father and because of his own links with Procles' followers. It is not clear exactly how Procles is involved, but it seems that Procles is

⁷⁰ See Steinbock (2013, 280-341) for the effect this episode had on the Athenians generally.

in favour of the attack on Phlius and is thus a traitor to his own city. He and his followers are not specifically mentioned as former exiles, whereas Podanemus' followers are, which may make Procles' motives even less creditable. The narrator praises the Phliasians' self-restraint (ἐγκράτεια) and courage (τόλμα) when they are besieged by the Spartans, but in the end, they run out of food and surrender. The Spartans leave a temporary garrison and order a group of former exiles and a group of defending citizens to decide who should be punished and what constitution to establish (5.3.14-25). The narrator's phrasing in 5.3.13 suggests that the reader already knows who Procles is. Thus, Xenophon probably assumed that the reader would recall Procles' character and actions when reading his later speeches. The narrator does not state what Procles' aim or motives are when he speaks at 6.5.38-48 but simply that he stood up and spoke after Cleiteles.

Procles uses two main strands of argument. Firstly, he represents the benefits the Athenians will gain if they follow his advice. He redefines the issue under discussion from being about giving the Spartans aid to being about the Athenians giving themselves aid (6.5.39). He represents it as being an opportunity sent by god to secure a friendship with the Spartans that the Spartans will be unable to renege on due to the numerous witnesses (6.5.41). It may seem unlikely that Procles will successfully convince the Athenians that the Spartans will be trustworthy and never try to go back on their friendship because of the suspicions the narrator indicated the Athenians as harbouring against the Spartans. Indeed, Procles seems to recognise this pre-existing view of the Spartan character, because he claims that the Athenians will benefit whether they trust the Spartans or not. The Spartans will either be honourable or will lose followers, both to the advantage of the Athenians (6.5.42).⁷¹

Procles and the reader also know from the narratorial comments after the Spartans' speeches that the Athenians did not respond positively to arguments about the times Sparta and Athens had worked together and the benefits that resulted. Perhaps with this in mind, Procles tries a slightly different tactic from the Spartan speakers. He describes how previous incidents illustrated the Spartans' good character and how useful the Spartans may be for the future. Procles argues that the

⁷¹ Compare the later advice in *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* about how to combat prejudices arising from the subject of a speech (29.23-4, 1437b.17-28). Anaximenes recommends that the speaker should employ anticipation and claim that his advice stems from necessity, luck, circumstance or, as we see in Procles' speech, advantage.

Spartans are more likely to be honourable than go back on their friendship because they strive for praise, abstain from shameful deeds and were brave at Thermopylae. They would also be desirable to have around if any further trouble with barbarians occurs (6.5.42-3). The Athenians previously responded positively to mention of the Thebans failing to persuade the Spartans to reduce the Athenians to slavery and, perhaps to cement his argument about the character of the Spartans, Procles mentions this again (6.5.46). However, he uses the argument slightly differently, and points out that the Thebans are arguing that the Athenians should let the Spartans, their saviours, be destroyed. The Athenians should not be worse than the Spartans who were not persuaded by the Thebans. Thus, it may be detrimental to the Athenians' reputation not to help the Spartans. Another benefit that Procles touches on is that the Spartans' allies will recompense the Athenians for their aid in the future (6.5.44).

The second strand of Procles' argument is to appeal to certain ways in which he judges that the Athenians liked to think of themselves and wanted others to think of them. For example, he refers to their reputation for helping people who are wronged (τοὺς ἀδικουμένους) and afraid (τοὺς φοβουμένους). This reputation is at risk, he implies, since the Spartans and their friends are here asking for aid and may not get it (6.5.45). He has already described how the world, including the gods, will witness the Athenians aiding the Spartans (6.5.41). The Athenians have the chance to increase their reputation, he says, particularly for nobleness and generosity because they could live up to the deeds of their ancestors and even exceed them (6.5.46-7). Procles uses particular representations of the Athenians that recur in their extant funeral orations, as well as in numerous forensic speeches, to try to persuade them that helping the Spartans would reflect well on them. Living up to ancestors, for example, is commonly appealed to (e.g. Plato, *Menexenus* 247a-b).⁷² Most notably, Procles mentions the Athenians aiding the Heraclidae and arranging for the burial of

⁷² See Loraux (2006, 34-8, 281 and 308) for the *topoi* of funeral speeches. She also discusses how these *topoi* later come to be used as rhetorical tools in others genres of speech, as we see in Procles' speech, and lose some of their original meaning. Other themes which occur both in Procles' speech and funeral orations include the Athenians acting on behalf of the rest of Greece (6.5.48; c.f. Lysias 2.20-44 and 58-60); being people who do right (6.5.43; c.f. Demosthenes *Epitaphius* 7), being noble and high-born (6.5.46-8; Plato, *Menexenus* 245c); being moved by pity for others (6.5.45; Plato, *Menexenus* 244e), being pious people (6.5.41; the tradition of the funerary oration itself embodies this perception of themselves), outdoing others (6.5.46-8 c.f. Thucydides, 2.40) and having a strong force (6.5.40; c.f. Lysias 2.42-4).

those who died at the Cadmea. As Loraux (2006, 106) highlights, all the extant funeral speeches cover these two events in some sense. The mention of the Heraclidae is, of course, particularly apt to this speech because the story involves the Athenians helping the Spartans' ancestors.⁷³ Procles' speech is an example of a non-Athenian cleverly using the typically Athenian *topoi* that he had either himself heard Athenians use or heard reports of, and which were more often used to contrast Athens and Sparta, than bring them together.⁷⁴

Procles appeals to a range of emotions. In conjunction with demonstrating the benefits that aiding the Spartans would have, in the first part of the speech, he raises fear in the Athenians of what might happen if they do not give aid, and mixes this with hope. The other speakers did not try this particular tactic. He says, for example, that it is clear to all that the Thebans would march against Athens as soon as they have beaten the Spartans, in their attempt to rule all the Greeks (6.5.38). Procles is here presenting the Thebans as an imminent threat who have the desire and ability to harm the Athenians. As well as directly confronting the Athenians with their fears about losing power to Theban domination, he gives them the hope that helping the Spartans will mean that the Thebans will have someone else to focus on before the Athenians. This presents the fearsome prospect as more distant, gives the impression of potential safety, and suggests that the Athenians can gain themselves

⁷³ A speech in Herodotus demonstrates that he believes that the Athenians use this particular deed to praise themselves outside of solely funerary contexts (9.26-7). Interestingly, the Tegeans, who also speak in this passage, argue that *their* finest exploit is that they *stopped* the Heraclidae when they attempted to return to the Peloponnese.

⁷⁴ For similar tactics of persuasion to Procles', see Rubinstein (2013) who discusses the recurring combination of the deliberative and epideictic genres in envoy speeches, including the regular mention of past favours rendered and received, and emulation of ancestors' generosity. We also perhaps see something similar to Procles' appropriation of Athenian *topoi* at *Anabasis* 1.7.3. Here, Cyrus is encouraging the Greek leaders for the forthcoming battle. He tells them to be worthy of their freedom, which he congratulates them on, and which he says he would choose himself if he could. Cyrus is appealing to something that he knows the Greeks are proud of, even if he does not specifically know that Athenians typically refer to their freedom in their funerary speeches (e.g. Plato, *Menexenus* 240e). This is all the more apparent as a motivational tactic because it seems out of place in the mouth of a Persian. Like Procles, Cyrus presents himself as an admirer of his audience.

allies. Procles either takes concrete fears that he knows the Athenians have or creates new ones that they may not hitherto have considered.⁷⁵

Procles may also be appealing to feelings of gratitude towards the Spartans for their behaviour at the battle of Thermopylae and for sparing the Athenians in 405/4. This latter favour was done at a time of great need, increasing its value. Procles may also hope that the Athenians feel gratitude and friendly feelings towards him for considering what would benefit them. In regards to his argument that the Athenians risk losing their existing reputation if they do not help the Spartans, he evokes shame at the potential dishonour or disgrace this could bring them. In saying that they could increase their reputation if they do help the Spartans, he attempts to inspire pride in their reputation, a desire to be viewed positively and feelings of emulation towards their ancestors.

It is unclear whether the internal audience is aware of Procles' link to Agesilaus and the Spartans, other than that he comes from an allied state, or that he is a traitor to his own city. The narrator does not represent Procles as feeling the need to combat any suspicions about his character or previous behaviour at the opening of his speech though. Procles is clearly a real person, but one of the Heraclidae is also called Procles and is the grandfather of the founder of the Eurypontid dynasty. Thus, Procles' name itself may seem to link his cause with the Spartans', if the Athenians make the connection, and may make him seem more concerned with the Spartans' benefit than the Athenians'. However, it may also remind the Athenians that their ancestors aided a Procles previously.

Procles never directly characterises himself but does so indirectly in several ways. Primarily, he demonstrates his astuteness in understanding what the Athenians stand to lose or gain by aiding the Spartans. This shows goodwill towards the Athenians, as does his concern with their reputation, and empathy with their fears.

⁷⁵ Further mixed fears and hopes: having the Thebans as rulers of Greece would be worse for the Athenians than having enemies far away, suggesting that the Athenians have the option to maintain their enemies at a distance (6.5.39). If the Athenians do not act now, there may not be others to fight with them later and they might have to face the Thebans alone, suggesting that now there are people who will act with them (6.5.39). Some may fear that if the Spartans survive now, they will cause the Athenians trouble in the future, but it is only people whom one injures who should be feared, giving the Athenians hope that their actions now could prevent further conflict with the Spartans (6.5.40). It is useful to build up favours while strong (raising hope) for times when one is powerless (evoking fears, 6.5.40).

By voicing his belief that the Spartans would not act badly in the future because everyone would have witnessed the Athenians' aid and because the Spartans formerly behaved well, Procles is characterising himself as someone who understands the restraints of shame and appreciates good behaviour in others. In presenting Sparta's allies as noble and fearless (6.5.44 and 6.5.48), Procles is including himself in this characterisation. He also presents the allies, and thus himself, as needing help, and as being grateful to Athens. He represents himself as someone who has previously admired the good behaviour of the Athenians, and as someone who is now present to see, rather than just hear, whether the Athenians live up to their reputation or not. Thus, his expectations are clear and he is in a position to judge the Athenians. By describing some of his audience's praiseworthy characteristics, Procles presents himself as sharing some of the Athenians' most important values, as he perceives them, and as being admirable himself. A contemporary reader may recognise in this a stark contrast to the man who earlier committed treason and believe that Procles is deliberately presenting a false *ethos*.

The narrator reveals that Procles is successful in his attempt to persuade. The Athenians deliberate, he says, and then refuse to listen to those who spoke in opposition (καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀντιλεγόντων οὐκ ἠνείχοντο ἀκούοντες, 6.5.49). They vote to aid the Spartans with full force and choose Iphicrates as general. The campaign that follows is a failure and the Athenians achieve nothing and do not aid Sparta (6.5.49-51). By the time the Athenians arrive in Arcadia, the enemies have either already left Sparta or were just about to depart. The Athenians return to Corinth shortly after the Thebans retire. To conclude the account, the narrator dwells on the poor leadership that Iphicrates demonstrated on the campaign, branding his actions either in vain (μάτην) or inexpedient (ἀσυμφόρως), particularly in allowing the Thebans to return home as they pleased (6.5.51-2). Procles has not benefitted himself, the Athenians or the Spartans with his speech.

Interpretation

While elements of the speeches before Procles' were persuasive, the narrator presents Procles' speech as the one that finally persuades the Athenians to aid the Spartans. Thus, Procles' assumptions that the Athenians are pragmatic, that they can be made to overlook their distrust and fear when a situation can be shown to be to

their advantage, that they seize opportunities and that they are proud of their reputation and the identity which they have crafted for themselves are shown to be correct.⁷⁶ Procles is clever in representing himself as being concerned with what is best for everyone, when his chief concern is really to get aid for his allies. While attention to Procles' particular choice of arguments, *ethos* and appeals to emotions is important, without taking into account his real character, this only provides half the story.⁷⁷

When scholars do discuss Procles' character, it is usually to describe him as the virtuous representative of virtuous Phlius. Baragwanath (2012, 322 and 333), for example, argues that Procles is a wise speaker and that his small-town origins demonstrate Xenophon's interest in revealing value where a person may initially seem insignificant. Pownall (2004, 74-5) argues that Xenophon must be interested in Procles because he gives him two long speeches and must agree with his words because he is connected to Agesilaus and is a Phliasian. Gray (1989a, 114-18) contrasts the Athenians' doubt and ultimate inability to help Sparta with Procles' magnanimity, which, she argues, either equals or surpasses the famed magnanimity of the Athenians. She further claims that the praise the narrator gives to the Phliasians for their loyalty to the Spartans (7.2.1-7.3.1) also applies to Procles. Gray maintains that Procles' speech is an example of the narrator's comment that the achievements of small Phlius were more worthy of record than one achievement of a

⁷⁶ See Sanders (forthcoming) who argues that hope and desire are two typical emotions used by speakers in Thucydides to incite the Athenians to war. Thus, Procles' choice to appeal to these emotions, among others, may be particularly apt.

⁷⁷ Several scholars examine why Procles is effective without assessing his real character. For example, Marincola (2010, 273-9) concludes that Procles' use of the example of Thermopylae, combined with an appeal to advantage, led to his success. Procles' references to deeds that the Athenians themselves show pride in also convinces the Athenians, Marincola argues, and pointedly contrasts the Spartans' appeals to Spartan deeds. Rood (2012c, 90-1) similarly argues that Procles' use of the Athenians' own traditional rhetoric lay behind his success. Tamiolaki (2014, 134) links particular phrases at 6.5.40-1 and 6.5.45 to Pericles' speeches at Thucydides 1.144.3, 2.37.1, 2.41.4 and 2.64.6. This presumably again highlights the importance of Procles' use of the Athenians' own perception of themselves, although she does not argue for this. Dillery (1995, 247-9) argues that Procles' success arises from his ability to relieve Athenian fears that the Spartans would soon become their enemies again. Although Steinbock is not attempting to explain the success of the whole speech, he (2013, 54-5, 155-210, 304, and 329-30) examines why Procles' mention of the Thebans failing to persuade the Spartans to enslave the Athenians, and the Athenians' actions regarding the Heraclidae and the dead at the Cadmea are fitting to the occasion. The first of these, he argues, aptly demonstrates the requirement to reciprocate, and Procles carefully does not mention the other states who were involved in wanting to destroy Athens. Regarding the latter two episodes, Steinbock argues that they both highlight Athens as the just and altruistic protectors of the Greeks, particularly those who come as suppliants, against arrogant barbarian and Greek powers.

bigger city, thereby revealing Procles' virtue. However, these positive interpretations do not take into account that the narrator has earlier connected Procles with the betrayal of his own city, and that before Procles' speeches, the reader has only read praise for the Phliasians in terms of their resistance to the Spartans. The praise for the Phliasians' loyalty comes later in the *Hellenica*. The narrator has clearly positioned himself on the opposite side to Procles, and even thrown into question Agesilaus' role in using the exiles for an attack on the city.⁷⁸ The reader's knowledge of Procles' previous actions creates tension and suspicion for him about Procles' motives and the soundness of his advice. This suspicion is confirmed in the narrative that follows the speech. While the narrator does not seem to indicate that the decision to aid Sparta was itself a bad one, the subsequent failed mission demonstrates that the Athenians made a poor decision in how they carried it out.⁷⁹

Some scholars interpret the speech and mission as reflecting badly on the Athenian character, but they do not mention that Procles must take some blame for the outcome of their mission. Gray (1989a, 115-16) argues that the narrator rewrites the Athenians as failing to live up to their own ideal. Pownall (2004, 74) maintains that the subsequent narrative serves to "undermine Athenian patriotic claims". Baragwanath (2012, 329) argues that the idealism of Procles' speech stands out all the more because of the subsequent ineffective mission. However, because Procles spoke at such length about how helping the Spartans could reflect well on the Athenians' reputation, they set out immediately and seem to be more concerned with how the mission will benefit themselves rather than how they can best help Sparta. The narrator says that the Athenians thought that Iphicrates could lead them to do a noble deed (καλόν...ἔργον) and that they were eager, and critical of delay (6.5.49). Iphicrates is certainly an adequate leader for the job, despite his failure here, and the narrator has previously praised him (6.2.32 and 6.2.39). Consequently, the problem seems to lie in the enthusiasm that Procles created, and which ultimately resulted in poor planning. As scholars note, the Athenians do not emerge from this episode with much credit, but this, I argue, is chiefly because they have allowed themselves to be

⁷⁸ Once more, we see that Xenophon is not a Laconophile. This is *pace* Buckler's (2008, 141 and 153-5) conclusion that Xenophon invented Procles' speech so as not to embarrass the Spartans by describing them petitioning the Athenians for help.

⁷⁹ Dillery (1995, 247-9) maintains that Xenophon is using the speech to advocate a new type of Greek leadership based on nobility and goodwill, as Procles argues for, rather than greed and oppression, but this does not take into account the description of the mission that followed.

taken in by someone whom they should not trust. This teaches the reader to be wary when listening to speeches himself. The reader learns the importance of recognising the real motives of a speaker and the danger of bad advice.

Procles to the Council of Athenians, Spartans and Spartan Allies (7.1.2-11)

In the episode that follows straight on from the criticism of Iphicrates, Procles speaks again. The reader must base his interpretation of this second speech, as well as the response to it and the outcome, on what he has understood from Procles' previous speech, the previous audience response, and the narrative episode that followed. The narrator indicates that ambassadors from Sparta and her allies have come to Athens to discuss the terms of the Athenian-Spartan alliance. The narrator says that many *xenoi* and Athenians argued that the alliance must be based on equality and sameness (ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις), although he does not provide these speeches (7.1.1). This indicates to those who go on to speak, as well as the reader, what terms the internal audience are likely to find persuasive. The narrator does not reveal Procles' motive or any further information about him before he speaks.

Procles makes it clear that the Council only have the issue of how to divide the leadership left to discuss. He says that he agrees with the proposal by the Athenian council to give leadership of the sea to the Athenians and leadership of the land to the Spartans. He directs his speech solely to the Athenians. This might be for several reasons, although neither he nor the narrator specifies. It may be because the Athenians are hosting the meeting, because he is echoing their proposal, because they are hesitating over the decision, or because he is an ally of the Spartans and so is presumably already saying what they want him to say. Despite the narrator having indicated what the audience wants from the terms, Procles does not discuss what would be an equal arrangement, but considers what will make the friendship last the longest (7.1.2). He bases his argument on what is most advantageous, what has been ordained by a higher power than man, and on an enumeration of the practical reasons why each side should lead one particular force.

Procles argues near the start of his speech that what will make the alliance likely to endure is to base it on terms that will most benefit (μάλιστα συνοίσει) both sides (7.1.2). He reiterates this in his conclusion, when he claims that he believes that the course he has recommended is the most profitable (συμφορώτατα) for both

Athens and Sparta (7.1.11). Procles also argues that the division of leadership proposed by the council is arranged by god and determined by fate (7.1.2), that the gods are behind both states' respective successes, including the Spartan victory over the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war (7.1.5-6 and 7.1.9), and that the Athenians' reliance on the sea for their safety is determined by nature (7.1.7).⁸⁰ This thread of argument encourages Procles' audience to believe that the decision over the leadership has effectively been made for them by higher forces, and that the division he is recommending would be supported by the gods.

Furthering his claim that his recommendation will be best for all, Procles outlines in turn why the Athenians are best qualified to lead at sea and why the Spartans are best qualified to lead on land. He uses roughly the same criteria and order of discussion in both sections (7.1.3-11). Firstly, both states have the best physical location for their respective leaderships. They are also both the best prepared for warfare in their respective spheres because they have the most relevant resources, skills and experience, and because their lives centre on trading by sea or on training for land-based warfare respectively. He further argues that the allies would be most likely to join and have confidence in the state that is supreme in each sphere. As mentioned above, he claims that the gods have granted the Athenians and Spartans great success by sea and land respectively. He also argues that in the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans did not finally defeat the Athenians until they had won at sea, and the Athenians did not crush the Spartans until they had won on the land, when the Spartan children, women and state were in danger. This phrasing (*περὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ὅλης τῆς πόλεως*) recalls Procles' words in his section enumerating the Athenian advantages. He says that the Athenians should not be happy to let the Spartans lead at sea, because the Spartans are less experienced and because the Spartans only risk those men whom they put on the triremes, whereas the Athenians endanger children, wives and the state itself. There is further correspondence with this argument when Procles says that for the Spartans it would be a terrible thing to allow others to lead by land, especially because the Spartans themselves are the best at the management of matters on land. Procles' parallel

⁸⁰ He also refers to the attention the Athenians pay to the sea as being necessary and proper (*ἀναγκαῖα καὶ προσήκουσα*, 7.1.6), and the Spartans' attention to the land as being necessary (*ἀναγκαῖα*, 7.1.10), furthering his argument that Athenian rule by sea and Spartan rule by land is natural and ordained.

discussions suggest that logically, it would be most advantageous if each side played to its own strengths in the leadership.

Some of the arguments Procles uses here are similar to those he used in his first speech. In both, he presents his recommendations as being beneficial for the Athenians and suggests that the gods are overseeing events and aiding the Athenians. He also mentions in both whom the allies will support in the future and why. Further, he recalls recent history between Athens and Sparta in each speech, although in the second he recalls a time when they were enemies. In both speeches, Procles slightly adjusts the topic under discussion.

Procles does not directly characterise himself in this second speech but his argument does this indirectly. He appears as someone who is motivated simply to give advice on how to make the alliance endure, and as someone merely developing the arguments for a proposal that the Athenians have already made themselves (7.1.2). In this, he presents his goodwill towards the arrangement, and in dwelling on trying to ensure terms that will be most beneficial to both sides, he shows his goodwill towards both Athens and Sparta. He even ends by wishing the Athenians good fortune in deciding on what is best for them all (7.1.11). This reiterates his friendliness and acknowledges the Athenians' power over the decision.

In suggesting that higher powers have already arranged and endorsed Athenian rule by sea and Spartan rule by land, Procles presents himself as piously deferring to the wisdom and designs of these forces. His list of why each side is best placed to lead in their respective areas of dominance demonstrates his practical wisdom. He represents himself as knowing about both states' past successes and failures, their current situation, their strengths and weaknesses in resources, training and character, and the supreme importance of children, wives and state to them.

Procles uses language indicating that he admires both sides. For example, he says that the Athenians greatly surpass (πολὸν προέχετε) others in their naval experience (7.1.4), and that the Spartans are the best (ἄριστα) at managing land affairs (7.1.11). By using the same criteria and a similar order to discuss why each state is best suited to lead the two forces, Procles is demonstrating that he has a fair approach and does not think that one state is superior to the other. His references to both sides' defeats in the Peloponnesian war may also make Procles appear realistic

in his praise of each side, because he shows himself aware that each side can be defeated in their own sphere of domination, albeit by each other. His arguments that the allies would be likely to want to follow the Athenians on sea and the Spartans on land (7.1.5 and 7.1.9) ring true because he is himself one of the allies. In characterising the allies in general as being supportive of both sides and as having confidence in them, he is characterising himself as such too.

He highlights that he is not making radical arguments when he says, for example, that it is quite clear (εὐδηλον) that the Athenians' safety rests on the sea (7.1.6). He also shows that he is making logical deductions, for example, by saying that his audience can judge his argument from what has happened (ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἔξεστι γινώσκειν, 7.1.10). In this, he presents himself as arguing for what the audience already knows. Again, there are similarities with his first speech. In both, he appears to admire the two states and have goodwill towards them. He also demonstrates in both his astuteness in understanding what will benefit and harm the Athenians.

Procles' claim that he agrees with the proposal of the Athenian Council may be designed to win goodwill towards himself. In making it clear that he is concerned about making the alliance last and about ensuring that both sides benefit, he may be trying to evoke the Athenians' gratitude. His comments about the gods ordaining the division of leadership and supporting both sides in the victories they have had previously could be designed to give the Athenians confidence in their decision, as could the arguments that the allies will likely follow the Athenians at sea and the Spartans by land. Similarly, the list of Spartan achievements and skills may evoke Athenian confidence in the Spartans, as well as respect for them. Procles' list of the reasons why the Athenians are best suited to lead by sea may evoke the Athenians' pride in their achievements and skills. The mention of Sparta and Athens defeating each other in the Peloponnesian war may evoke a momentary hatred, but this may be replaced with relief that the Spartans are now allies and instil further confidence in the power Sparta brings to the alliance. Finally, Procles evokes fear about what could happen to the Athenians' children, women and whole state if they let the Spartans rule by sea. There is again overlap with Procles' first speech because in both he arouses fear of what will happen if the Athenians do not do what he recommends and

confidence in doing what he does recommend, while evoking positive feelings towards himself.

The narrator indicates that the Athenians and Spartans strongly approved (ἐπήνεσαν...ἰσχυρῶς) of Procles' speech (7.1.12). However, Cephisodotus immediately directs a speech to the Athenians (7.1.12-14). He opens by claiming that Procles is deceiving (ἐξαπατῶμενοι) them and that he will prove this. He argues that if the Athenians lead at sea, the Spartans will send captains and marines who are citizens, but will send Helot or mercenary sailors. By contrast, the Athenians who fight under the Spartans on land will all be citizens. He explains that this would mean that the Spartans are leading Athenian citizens while the Athenians lead only Spartan slaves and the others least valued by them. Cephisodotus then questions the Spartan Timocrates about a speech that he made during this debate but which the narrator did not provide for the reader. Cephisodotus asks whether Timocrates had said that he had come to make terms based on equality and sameness. After Timocrates agrees, Cephisodotus proposes that equality would actually be if each side leads the fleet and the army in turn, with both sides sharing any advantage that comes from leading in each domain. The narrator indicates that the Athenians changed their minds and voted that each party should alternate leadership every five days.

The narrator goes on to describe the Spartans guarding a particular point at Oneum (7.1.15-17). Here, the Thebans attack the Spartans while they are unprepared, and cause casualties. The narrator says that the Spartan commander could have called for backup and held his position, but instead, while the Thebans were perplexed as to what to do next, the Spartan commander concluded a truce with them. The narrator says that most people thought that this was more to the Thebans' advantage than the Spartans'.

Interpretation

Despite using similar arguments, presenting a similar *ethos* and trying to evoke similar emotions in both speeches, Procles' second speech ultimately fails. As we ascertained from Procles' first speech, he clearly understands what is likely to persuade his audience. Procles assumes rightly that the Athenians will listen to a speaker who appears trustworthy and seems to have everyone's interests at heart, and

that they are susceptible to fear but can be made to feel confident. He also anticipates that the Athenians are driven by thoughts of their own advantage, respect higher forces, and can be persuaded by logical arguments. Procles is clearly a very proficient speaker, because he evokes a strong reaction on both occasions.

Some scholars explain Procles' eventual failure on his choice of arguments. Marincola (2010, 275-9), for instance, argues that the examples of past successes that Procles uses have no relevance to Athens and Sparta's future co-operation. Tuplin (1993, 113-14) also maintains that Procles' speech rests on out-dated ideas, such as Sparta still being dominant on land, when they have just been defeated in this field. The difficulty with these interpretations is that they do not take into consideration the characterisation of Procles as a bad advisor from his first speech. The Athenians have clearly forgotten that taking Procles' advice previously was not to their advantage, contrary to his claims, and was instead potentially dangerous for them, or they did not make this link in the first place. Even if the Athenians do not tie Procles' first speech to their subsequent disastrous campaign, the reader surely will. Thus, when reading the second speech, the reader may feel concern at what following Procles' recommendation may lead to this time. Indeed, after the final decision has been made about the division of command, the narrator plays out an example of Spartan leadership on land. The Spartan commander is a poor leader and the Spartans are clearly not as strong on land as Procles described in his speech. Thus, the risk to Athenian citizens is considerable, as Cephisodotus argues. Procles has obscured the fact that Athenian citizens will be in danger if the Spartans lead by land, and instead mentions the danger to their people only if the Spartans are allowed to lead at sea. Alternating the leadership at least mitigates some of this danger. Thus, the narrative sequel seems to demonstrate that the Athenians are right, on this occasion at least, to vote in favour of Cephisodotus' proposal. Because the Athenians rejected Procles' advice, the better solution has been reached and the Athenian forces are less at risk than they would have been if they had followed Procles' advice for a second time.

Tuplin (1993, 114) argues that the Athenians' suspicions here demonstrate that Sparta and Athens would never be able to co-operate. This is *pace* scholars who argue that this episode demonstrates Xenophon's positive visions for the Athenian-Spartan alliance. For example, Schepens (2001, 96) argues that Procles' speech

continues Xenophon's theme of the desirability of dual hegemony between Athens and Sparta. Daverio Rocchi (2014) argues that through Procles' speech in particular, Xenophon is putting forward his own ideas about hegemony, and that this vision has its parallels in contemporary rhetoric on the subject. The difficulty with these latter two arguments is that they do not take into account that the narrative supports Cephisodotus' advice against Procles'. Xenophon does seem to be raising questions about how each side conducts itself in the arrangement of the Athenian-Spartan alliance, although I argue that the real focus of suspicion falls on Procles' motives.

It is Cephisodotus, not Procles, who emerges as the wise advisor and as being concerned for Athens' interests. This is contrary to the interpretation by scholars who praise Procles and criticise Cephisodotus in this episode. Gray (1989a, 118-19) argues that this episode shows Procles' good character, the Athenians' self-interest, and Cephisodotus as making a "morally inferior proposal". Pownall (2004, 75) argues that the Athenians are led by the "demagogic" Cephisodotus into making a poor decision that demonstrates their "incompetence", "folly" and shows "the illusory nature of the standard Athenian patriotic claim". The difficulty with these arguments is that they do not take into account the narrative that has gone between Procles' two speeches, which has revealed that his advice has previously caused the Athenians to act impulsively and unsuccessfully, and the narrative after Cephisodotus' speech. Unlike Procles, who has been revealed as a traitor to his country and a giver of bad advice before this speech, Cephisodotus has previously been entrusted with the roles of general (2.1.16) and ambassador (6.3.2).⁸¹ Cephisodotus is perhaps the character that the reader has been hoping will come forward to prevent the Athenians taking Procles' advice again. Indeed, because of him, Procles receives his comeuppance for giving bad advice when the Athenians ultimately reject his recommendation. Procles is presumably speaking with the Spartans' benefit in mind, and it may be meaningful that the narrator indicates that the Spartans responded positively to Procles' speech (7.1.12) but does not indicate a response by them to Cephisodotus' speech.

⁸¹ By the time the *Hellenica* was published, the Athenian readers would possibly still remember their anger at the arrangement Cephisodotus made with Charidemus, for which they recalled Cephisodotus and tried to have him put to death (Demosthenes 23.167-9). This occurred after the events told in the *Hellenica* but it is important for his characterisation in the work that the narrator does not refer to it. Not mentioning less savoury incidents in a leader's career is also important in the *Anabasis* regarding Cyrus and Clearchus, as we shall see.

Thanks to Cephisodotus, the Athenians finally learn that they should not follow Procles' advice. Thus, a lesson arising from Procles' second speech is that an audience should remember past interactions with a speaker, and what these led to. The episode also demonstrates the need for actual wise-advisors. The importance of full deliberation is also demonstrated by Procles' speeches, and here, the Athenians' responses to Procles' speeches can be compared to the Spartans' response to Polydamas' speech. Whereas the Spartans stopped for further deliberation and decided not to aid Polydamas, the Athenians rushed into their decision after Procles' first speech, to their own detriment. They nearly do the same after his second speech, until further deliberation prevents this. Procles and Polydamas actually use some similar arguments and present a similar *ethos*, and both seem to be concerned with their own interests, but there is a difference in the presentation of their characters by the narrator. Whereas the narrator praises Polydamas in the narrative before his speech, he reveals negative information about Procles. This information helps the reader to understand their respective motivations.⁸²

Conclusion

I have demonstrated that the method I propose to use for analysing speeches in the *Anabasis* is both viable and can yield new interpretations for certain speeches in the *Hellenica*.⁸³ These readings are only apparent with a narratological and rhetorical approach. We have begun to see the importance of Xenophon's interest in rhetorical theory and leadership, and the way the speeches involve the reader, reflect on the speakers and audiences, and contain important lessons for the reader. In the next chapter, I apply the same method to emotional appeals in the *Anabasis* and attempt to ascertain whether such factors are still important in these speeches in order to understand the roles and effects of the speeches in this work.

⁸² For the difficulty of interpreting certain Xenophonic characters, see Moles (1994), who demonstrates that scholars cannot agree whether Callicratidas is presented positively or negatively.

⁸³ Analysis of a fourth example can be found in Appendix 2.

Emotional Appeals in the *Anabasis*

Evoking and calming emotions is of such fundamental importance to speechmaking that it is defined as one of the three means of persuasion alongside character projections (*ethos*) and rational argumentation (*logos*). Thus, it may be fruitful to begin the investigation of Xenophon's employment of speeches in the *Anabasis* by examining verbal emotional appeals.

Successful emotional persuasion causes an audience to act, not to act or to change its judgement without offering any tangible gain, such as profit, for doing so. Scholars such as Nussbaum (1996) and Konstan (2006, 20ff.) argue for the rational and cognitive aspect of emotional appeals, through which a speaker manipulates his audience's emotions by using reasoned argument to alter the way the audience perceives something, for example, the danger of a particular situation. It is clear from Aristotle that this way of understanding emotional persuasion was already being recognised in ancient rhetorical theory (see *Rhetorica* 2.1, 1378a.19-20). In order to manipulate emotions in this way, a speaker should understand what his audience believes in and values most. In addition, Aristotle argues that orators who want to evoke an emotion must know the state of mind of someone who feels that emotion, the people or objects towards which the emotion is usually felt, and the circumstances that give rise to the emotion (*Rhetorica* 2.1, 1378a.22-26).

Xenophon's Narratorial and Authorial Interest in Emotions and Leadership

Elsewhere (see Appendix 3), I have demonstrated that there is remarkable overlap between the emotions Xenophon mentions that a leader should evoke, allay and manipulate in the *Hipparchicus* and those discussed in the slightly later rhetorical treatises by Aristotle and Anaximenes. This, I argued, indicates Xenophon the author's interest in emotions and contemporary rhetorical theory.⁸⁴ I also suggested that because the *Hipparchicus* is a *techne*, we might expect this work to include examples to accompany the instructions Xenophon offers, as we find in Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorcetica*, Aristotle's *Rhetorica* and Anaximenes' *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, and even (in the form of case studies) in *Epidemiae I* and *III* of the Hippocratic *corpus*. I then demonstrated that there is a convergence between the

⁸⁴ I further suggested in this article that Xenophon's interest in rhetorical theory can be seen in his use of the rhetorical term 'enthymeme'.

instructions in the *Hipparchicus* regarding how to manipulate emotions and certain speeches in the *Anabasis*. Thus, I tentatively explained the absence of examples in the *Hipparchicus* by suggesting that Xenophon may have considered that he had already supplied the examples in the *Anabasis* and possibly other works, and that he would expect the reader to be able to recognise this.⁸⁵ I concluded that the speeches evoking emotions in the *Anabasis* act as *exempla* of successful and unsuccessful persuasion attempts for leaders to emulate or avoid.⁸⁶ In this chapter, I shall develop this last argument further.

Xenophon's interest in emotions may confirm Aristotle's criticism of those who wrote rhetorical treatises before him. Aristotle complains that these writers concentrated on evoking the emotions of the *dicast*, which he censures (*Rhetorica* 1.1, 1354a.11ff.). If, as I believe, Xenophon was drawing on contemporary rhetorical theory when he composed his speeches, we should not be surprised that Xenophon shows a particular interest in this area of rhetoric. However, Aristotle argues that arousing emotion is more important in forensic oratory whereas character projection is more important than the emotions evoked in symbouleutic oratory (*Rhetorica* 2.1, 1377b.28-31). The majority of the speeches in the *Anabasis* are symbouleutic, and indeed, Xenophon is also particularly interested in the characters his speakers present. Here, both Xenophon and Aristotle may reflect recognition by contemporary rhetorical theorists that a speaker's *ethos* is extremely important when delivering advice on future courses of action. Xenophon's interest in emotional appeals can perhaps be explained by Xenophon's symbouleutic speeches also containing elements of pre-battle speeches.

Because Aristotle's *Rhetorica* was written after Xenophon, rather than making use of Aristotle's work to explain the rhetorical features found in

⁸⁵ This raises the question of whether Xenophon's use of a pseudonym for the *Anabasis* debars the reader from making connections between this work and the rest of his *oeuvre*. See Appendix 4 for the debate regarding whether the *Anabasis* was published pseudonymously and how Xenophon's contemporary readers would have reacted to such a pseudonym. In my opinion, Xenophon's readers would have seen through the pseudonym with ease because of Xenophon's style and the consistency of his interests across his works.

⁸⁶ See further Tuplin (2014, 69-79) and Pernot (2014), who discuss the ancient responses to Xenophon's speeches, including Dio Chrysostom's claim that Xenophon is the only writer a public man needs, and that the *Anabasis* covers all the speeches such a man will need to make (*Discourses* 18.14-19). While Tuplin argues that Dio's praise does not wholly match with the *Anabasis* speeches, Pernot agrees that the *Anabasis* does offer the best model for all kinds of speech.

Xenophon's speeches, it is interesting to see that what Aristotle was treating was already being used by Xenophon. We shall see this particularly in terms of Aristotle's recommendations for how to evoke emotions. In this sense, Xenophon throws light on Aristotle's work, rather than the reverse. The direction of influence between rhetorical treatises and historiography has been investigated by Hornblower. He (1987, 46-50, 1996, 83-4, and 1995, 47ff.) suggests that the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and other fourth-century treatises may have drawn their examples from Thucydides. In turn, he argues that Thucydides may have been influenced by "rudimentary" fifth century rhetorical treatises, as well as actual speeches. While the idea of Thucydides influencing the theoretical discussion is interesting, more emphasis should perhaps be put on the likelihood that Thucydides' speeches and the examples in handbooks both reflect real speeches, as Heath (1990, 396 n.21) argues.⁸⁷

Xenophon's interest in leadership across his *oeuvre* is well known. Because of Xenophon's interest in both rhetoric and leadership, in this chapter, I examine various occasions on which leaders attempt to evoke or allay emotions in their audiences, concentrating on the reasons for their success and failure. The ability to evoke emotions in an audience is an important skill to master within a city context, particularly in relation to giving speeches in law courts or assemblies, but the *Anabasis* provides examples of emotional appeals made by leaders in an army setting. Here, the leader and his audience are not surrounded by the defences of a city, and persuasion attempts are more critical. Persuasive speeches are vital for unifying an army, especially in times of danger, because disunity can quickly lead to defeat. The inability to persuade an army to make a beneficial decision can be fatal. Thus, it is extremely important that leaders of armies can effectively appeal to the emotions to persuade their audience to act in a certain way, and can use their real or projected character to reinforce their appeal. However, ill-advised decisions resulting from successful persuasion attempts can also be harmful. Thus, effective persuasion must be coupled with tactical vision and unselfish aims. This chapter investigates how such difficulties are represented in the speeches in the *Anabasis*. While the

⁸⁷ Indeed, Pelling (2012, 284-8) argues that the comparison of Thucydidean and Herodotean speeches to rhetorical treatises is most fruitful when the *differences* are highlighted, rather than the similarities. Like Heath, he argues that the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the speeches in Thucydides and Herodotus are based on existing rhetorical conventions, as demonstrated by these differences.

Hipparchicus contains explicit instructions for evoking, allaying and manipulating emotions, there is no explicit comment in the *Anabasis* about how to evoke emotions verbally in an audience. Occasionally, Xenophon the narrator comments directly on the emotions evoked by leaders in the *Anabasis*. However, he focuses mainly on the emotions the leaders invoke towards themselves rather than those evoked as a response to the subject of their speeches, such as the enemy or a particular situation (see, for example, Clearchus' evocation of the fear of punishment by him, 2.6.8-14).

Emotional Appeals in the Anabasis

In a mercenary army, the leader faces different challenges than the leader of a citizen army. Mercenary soldiers are free to leave a commander's employment when they no longer consider that he is providing them with what they desire (primarily profit and safety), when they no longer want to be part of the current campaign, or if they simply do not like him. Thus, the emotions an audience feels towards a mercenary leader are particularly important. Secondly, a mercenary army is bonded only by its desire for profit and safety, rather than by common citizenship, and so the chances of disintegration are higher. Emotional appeals are thus even more important in a mercenary army for overcoming discord. Mercenary armies are also assembled from people of different ethnicities. Sanders (forthcoming) has demonstrated that in Thucydides, when speakers incite audiences to war or when battle exhortations are made, different emotions persuade different ethnicities. Such ethnic stereotypes may be part of the historiographer's agenda and so may not be accurate, but the representation of different peoples typically being moved by different feelings must reflect a reality. A mercenary leader must thus be aware that emotions have different effects on different people according to their background. The leader himself may also have a particular set of emotions that he believes to be persuasive because of his own background and civic identity.

The Cyreans' situation and mind-set changes repeatedly in the *Anabasis*. The army works for two different paymasters, faces numerous enemies, interacts with different peoples, alters its aims and motivations, responds differently depending on the location, and reacts differently to the same leaders under different circumstances. As well as making emotional appeals to the army, leaders must also appeal to certain external audiences. Thus, in the *Anabasis*, we may expect to see represented how the

ability to judge the appropriate emotion to evoke at the right time in the right audience is a necessary skill. Even when addressing the army, where the speaker may understand his audience relatively well, there is a difference between a leader evoking fear of punishment from himself if his audience does not fight an enemy, evoking feelings of shame at not facing the enemy, and evoking confidence that the audience can overcome the enemy. Indeed, at *Memorabilia* 3.5.5, Xenophon represents his Socrates as saying that confidence can lead to negligence, indifference and disobedience, while fear causes people to be more attentive, obedient and orderly. Concerning those outside of the army, the leader may not have any kind of understanding of what emotions these audiences are susceptible to or even what they value most. He also cannot use his established *ethos* to back up his emotional appeals. By contrast, when speaking to the army, a leader's *ethos* can enhance his emotional appeal. If his audience already recognises him as an expert tactician, for example, he may more easily instil confidence in his plan than a leader recommending the same plan without such a reputation.

Approach to the Anabasis and Method

I begin by examining particularly notable emotional appeals by six different leaders in the work. These are not examined chronologically but as responses to similar situations, which allows some comparisons to be made. Firstly, I examine emotional appeals made by Cleanor, Clearchus and Xenophon to other leaders who are afraid or despondent about the situation the army is facing. Secondly, I discuss emotional appeals by Cheirisophus and Clearchus responding to the soldiers being afraid and despondent. Thirdly, I investigate appeals made by Cyrus and Proxenus in response to the Greek army causing a dangerous situation for itself. Fourthly, I examine emotional appeals by Cyrus and Cheirisophus that respond to their audiences' mixed feelings about them as leaders. Finally, I look at emotional appeals by Cleanor and Xenophon that respond to speeches from outsiders. At the end of the chapter, I investigate how the interpretation of the speeches is affected if we take into account the motives of the speaker and the outcomes of the speeches.

In order to analyse the speeches as persuasion attempts, I first investigate what emotions the speaker may be trying to evoke and exactly how he tries to do this, such as by using direct or indirect appeal, by using specific vocabulary or by

detailing the consequences of potential actions. Following this, I examine several elements of the surrounding narrative, starting with the information given about the mood of the audience when the speaker began his appeal, and what measures the speaker took either to build on the existing mood or to counteract it. I also discuss whether the speech succeeds in winning the audience over and why the emotional appeal was successful or unsuccessful. Finally, I consider whether the choice of emotional appeal depends on the character of the speaker, either as already recognised by the audience or as projected in the speech itself, and whether the speaker is constrained by his existing reputation and the general demands and opportunities of the situation.

Further investigation of the wider narrative connected to these appeals indicates that there is more to the speeches than just success or failure. I argue that the emotional appeals produce several dramatic effects and may particularly involve the reader in the story. If the reader engages with the speeches, he may be more inclined to consider why the emotional appeals were and were not successful, and so may learn lessons from these examples about what produces success. However, the reader should not simply emulate successful emotional appeals and shun the example of failed ones. The positive and negative repercussions from successful and unsuccessful emotional appeals indicate whose example should really be emulated. Linking the appeals to the characterisation of the speaker further reveals how a leader should appeal to emotions. It becomes clear that leaders should have positive and selfless motivations. Only Xenophon the character emerges as a speaker able to reconcile successful emotional persuasion, benefit to the army and selfless motivations, and is thus the only leader who should be emulated.

In this exploration of verbal persuasion, Xenophon may share some of the concerns that Plato had about rhetoric. In the *Gorgias*, Plato represents Socrates as criticising the sophists for telling their audiences what they wanted to hear rather than telling them the truth. This seduction of the audience and distortion of the substance of the speech does not instil virtue, and is not backed by justice or knowledge. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato has Phaedrus admit that orators only need to know what *seems* to be just, good or noble to the audience rather than really knowing what is just, good and noble. Plato has Socrates argue that for rhetoric to be acceptable, the orator must know both the truth and the nature of man (259e.1ff.).

Thus, both Plato and Xenophon believe that rhetoric can be harmful unless it is practiced in a virtuous way. Further, in indicating that the ability to persuade through words is important but that it can be dangerous in the hands of the wrong person, Xenophon seems to anticipate Aristotle's belief that rhetoric is a tool, and that the harm or benefit it causes depends on the intent and morality of the speaker (*Rhetorica* 1.1, 1355b.2-7). Sophists, Aristotle says, are distinguished not by their ability but by their aims (προαίρεσει, *Rhetorica* 1.1, 1355b.17-18).

Marincola (2003, 288-9) discusses the difficulty for the modern historian of writing about emotions represented by ancient writers. He includes such problems as defining what an emotion is, both in comparison with what ancient writers thought and also in relation to contemporary research on emotions in scientific and psychological fields, whether there are differences between cultures in the way emotions are experienced, and whether everyone experiences emotions in the same way. Further, it is impossible to confirm whether the emotions that a modern reader believes a speaker in a text is trying to evoke would have been the ones felt by the internal audience, unless it is explicitly stated. Likewise, we cannot categorically state what emotions Xenophon's contemporary readers would have believed the speeches evoked. I attempt to minimise these issues by paying close attention to the narrative in relation to the speeches. As well as explicit narratorial comments, I take into account such factors as the requirements of the situation and the likelihood that a speaker will appeal to a specific emotion.

Examples

Emotional Appeals Responding to Leaders Fearing the Situation

Clearchus' Appeal to Fear and Confidence (2.2.3-4)

Clearchus is one of the main Greek leaders working for Cyrus on his mission. After Cyrus' death, the Persian Ariaeus has offered to return home with the Greeks (2.1.3), and Clearchus has sent a reply, offering to put Ariaeus on the throne if Ariaeus comes to the Greek army (2.1.4). In the meantime, Phalinus has brought a message from the king demanding that the Greeks hand over their arms, which Clearchus returns a non-committal answer to (2.1.7-23). The Greek messengers return from Ariaeus and bring word that certain Persians would not allow Ariaeus to be king and

that the Greeks should go to him before he sets out in the morning (2.2.1). Clearchus gives another non-committal reply and then calls a meeting of the generals and captains (2.2.2-3). The narrator does not indicate what Clearchus' aims are for the speech he proceeds to give, or what motivates him.

Clearchus begins his speech by indirectly evoking fear over the army's situation. He then indirectly evokes confidence in the army's future actions, and confidence in himself as a leader. Clearchus opens by disclosing what the sacrifices revealed to him that the army should not do, which is pursue the king. Perhaps this was what the other leaders were most inclined to do because Clearchus dwells on this option the most. Having first raised fear at the thought that the Greeks would be going against the gods if they followed this course, Clearchus then explains a further reason why they should not go after the king. He says that he now understands that the Tigris River stands between the army and the king and that the army cannot cross this without boats. He follows this by emphatically stating that the Greeks have no boats, although the other leaders presumably know this. Clearchus is perhaps evoking fear that the king can reach the Greeks, while the Greeks are unable to reach the king.

Clearchus next discusses another option for the army, which is remaining where it is. He does not seem to have asked the gods about this option and he quickly dismisses it by saying that the army cannot remain where it is because there are no provisions. This does not seem to have been a seriously considered option, but Clearchus raises the fear about the army not being able to provide for itself. Following this, Clearchus changes his tone and tries to evoke confidence. He simply says that the omens are exceedingly (*πάνυ*) favourable for joining Cyrus' friends. This would seem to suggest that the leaders should have absolute confidence that the gods strongly back this option and that no more needs to be said. This anticipates Aristotle's recommendation that a speaker can evoke confidence by mentioning signs that all is well in an audience's relations with the gods (*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1383b.4-6).

Finally, Clearchus tells the leaders what to do next. He tells them to eat, and then what to do at each signal in preparation for their departure. He even tells them how to proceed, with the beasts of burden advancing alongside the river and the

hoplites on the outside. By being authoritative and giving the leaders orders, he is trying to give the other leaders the confidence that he knows what they must do and that he will lead them in this. Clearchus, in indicating that he has carried out the sacrifices, examined the surrounding area and contemplated each option, is also trying to give the other leaders confidence that he is concerned for the army and is actively trying to ascertain what is best for its members.

The narrator does not indicate the mood of the audience before the speech, but the reader might be able to gauge it. The leaders have recently spoken to Phalinus, and while some seem defiant in resisting the king, others offer to be the king's friend. The narrator also says that Clearchus wanted to make the Greeks more hopeful (εὐέλπιδες μᾶλλον) about not giving up their arms to the king when he spoke to Phalinus (2.1.18), although Phalinus does not oblige him. Thus, the leaders seem to have mixed feelings and to be insecure about their situation and what to do next. Clearchus initially seems to build on negative feelings in his audience by talking through two options and saying why the army cannot choose these. He then counteracts the mood by not leaving room for discussion about what the army is going to do.

The narrator says that the generals and captains departed and followed Clearchus' orders (2.2.5). This does not specify what emotions were evoked by the speech, but the narrator immediately says that, after this, Clearchus commanded and the army obeyed (ἐπαίθοντο), not because the soldiers had elected him but because they recognised that he alone was wise (ἐφρόνει), as a leader should be, while the others were inexperienced (ἄπειροι, 2.2.6). The army simply follows (εἶποντο) him (2.2.8). This suggests that the army did feel confident in Clearchus and his leadership and in his actions and the decisions he made. Clearchus is successful in this speech because he is taking charge and reassuring the leaders that what they are going to do is the right choice, while backing this up with evidence from sacrifices and observations. Amid the confusion and indecision after Cyrus' death, this is exactly what the army needs. Clearchus plays on the leaders' concern for their lives and gives them hope that they will be safe and successful if they follow this option and his orders.

Clearchus is authoritative enough to be convincing in his portrayal of himself. His choice of emotions to evoke partly depends on his character as already recognised by his audience. Although his power over the army really started with his resolution of the mutiny at Tarsus, after Cyrus' death, Clearchus begins to take charge of the army's affairs and the army does not question this. He responds to the announcement of Cyrus' death seemingly independently, in a confident and decisive manner, whereas the soldiers and leaders have taken the news gravely (βαρέως, 2.1.4). Clearchus also takes charge when Phalinus visits the army, answering first, and telling the generals to give Phalinus the best and most noble replies when he is called away (2.1.9). Here, he leaves to sacrifice on behalf of the army, something that no other leader appears to have considered. Phalinus also seems to regard Clearchus' answer as the most definitive (2.1.15).

Although Clearchus' authoritative stance has been directed at outsiders until now, the leaders surely recognise this as part of his character when he directs it towards them. Clearchus talks in terms of 'us', 'we' and 'our' when discussing the army's options, perhaps to indicate that, despite his recent rise in authority, he shares the army's plight. When he issues orders, however, he uses the second person plural, separating himself from the leaders and reminding them that he is the one giving them direction. Evoking confidence is a natural choice to complement his commanding and self-assured existing character. In Clearchus' obituary, the narrator reveals that in dangerous situations, the troops were exceedingly (σφόδρα) willing to listen to Clearchus and would choose no one else as commander, because his gloomy and severe character seemed bright and resolute when facing an enemy, which promised safety (2.6.11) and gave them confidence (θαρραλέως, 2.6.14). If Clearchus had established this character with the army before his speech, then he was again furthering the presentation of a specific *ethos* through his appeal to confidence. Evoking fear also matches his existing character because it complements the projection of himself as understanding the dangers of the situation.

Clearchus has a reputation as someone who is fearless and he may also be limited by this in which emotions he can appeal to. He cannot dwell too much on the frightening aspects of the situation and has to give the leaders reasons why

ultimately they should not be afraid.⁸⁸ Clearchus is also constrained by the prevailing mood when he starts speaking. In his audience's relatively immobile and insecure state, trying to make the leaders act by creating more fear than he does in this speech might have caused panic, and so ending by evoking confidence is a better option. The situation demands that the army chooses a path and begin moving on it as soon as possible, further affecting Clearchus' choice of emotional appeal. The narrator says that the sun was already setting (2.2.3) and, because following Ariaeus means that the army would have to travel during the night, Clearchus has to find the quickest emotional appeal to get the leaders moving, which suggests ultimately evoking confidence.

Xenophon's Appeal to Fear, Confidence, Shame, Pride, Emulation and Desire (3.1.15-25)

Xenophon has only briefly appeared in the *Anabasis* before this speech, and it is with this oration that he comes to the fore. After Tissaphernes has betrayed the Greeks and tricked the majority of the army's leaders to their deaths, Xenophon has a dream, which he believes comes from Zeus (3.1.11-13). Following the account of this dream, the reader hears the internal thoughts by which Xenophon persuades himself to get up and take action when everyone else is despairing (3.1.13-14). After rising, Xenophon speaks to Proxenus' captains. From his internal thoughts, it is clear that Xenophon's aim is to begin making plans for the army's survival, and that his motive is fear for his own and the army's safety.

Xenophon appeals indirectly to fear, shame, pride, emulation, and desire for honour, and both indirectly and directly to confidence. He opens by trying to make the captains fear. Xenophon says that the Persians are fully prepared but that on the Greek side no one is making preparations to ensure that they fight the enemy as best they can. This threatens the captains with the thought that the Persians hold all the advantages over the Greeks while the Greeks are passively going to allow the

⁸⁸ Interestingly, Clearchus' reputation for fearlessness does not prevent Clearchus from trying to evoke pity in his troops at the sight of him crying, after his men have tried to stone him for trying to force them to continue with Cyrus (1.3.2). The speeches that follow Clearchus' weeping will be discussed in the next chapter, but it is important to note here that Clearchus does not seem to consider his reputation when he attempts to evoke pity. Perhaps he assumes that the men will believe that if such a fearless leader cries, the situation must be dire. The troops watch him, are amazed (ἐθαύμαζον), and stay silent.

Persians to attack them. Xenophon has made it clear that the Persians are more than able to harm the Greeks. He next asks rhetorically what he and the captains think (οἰόμεθα) the Greeks will suffer if ‘we’ submit (ὕφησόμεθα) and fall into the king’s hands, trying to get them to visualise the potential consequences. Throughout the speech, when Xenophon talks about the army’s situation, he uses the first person plural. He is clearly trying to reassure the captains that he feels as they feel and that he is trying to understand their predicament along with them.

Xenophon next vividly reminds the captains of what the king is capable of, in order to make them fear what the king might do to them. He describes how the king did not just kill his own brother born from the same mother (ὁμομητρίου ἀδελφοῦ) but, afterwards, he cut off Cyrus’ head and hand and impaled them. This provides the captains with evidence of the king’s viciousness, rendering Xenophon’s suggestion about the king’s probable cruel treatment of the Greeks extremely likely. If the implication from this is not obvious, Xenophon questions the safety of the Greeks’ position. Since they have no protector (κηδεμῶν) and since they advanced against the king to make him a slave and to kill him if they could, what do the Greeks think they will suffer? Again, Xenophon is provoking the captains’ minds to draw terrifying pictures of what might happen. Xenophon describes his own assumption next, in the form of another rhetorical question. He asks the captains if the king is not likely torture them so extremely (ἔσχατα αἰκισάμενος) that all men would be afraid (φόβον) to attack him again? Here, Xenophon is making clear the desire in the Persians to harm the Greeks. In his later recommendations on how to evoke fear, Aristotle says that fear is felt when others intend to and are able to cause harm (*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1382a.33-5). Xenophon’s appeal clearly pre-empts Aristotle’s recommendation. Again, the captains are being pressed to imagine their worst nightmares. By saying that others will be afraid by what has happened to the Greeks, Xenophon is further indicating that the captains should be afraid too. Xenophon concludes this part of his speech by saying what the captains are surely now thinking, that the army must do everything not to fall into the king’s power.

Having demonstrated that he knows that the situation is to be feared, Xenophon follows this up by indirectly giving the captains the confidence that they can defeat the enemy. Xenophon describes how at times he feared (ἐφοβούμην) the truce more than he now fears war, because the terms of the truce were so detrimental

to the Greeks. This suggests that Xenophon feels that the army's current situation may actually be an improvement, which may encourage the audience to feel hope along with him. He goes on to say that since the enemy ended the truce, they have also ended their own outrageous acts (ὑβρις) and the Greeks' ill-feeling (ὑποψία). This again suggests that the Greeks might have reason to feel optimistic. Xenophon next explains the positive elements of their present scenario. He says that the good things (ἀγαθὰ) which the Persians have now stand as prizes for whichever side is the braver (ἀμείνονες), and that the gods will judge this battle and are likely (εἰκός) to be on the Greeks' side. Here, Xenophon is relying on the likelihood that the captains will believe that Greeks are braver than Persians. He is also presenting the situation as being almost out of the Greeks' hands and in the control of the gods. The gods will back them, he says, because the Persians have sworn falsely by the gods (ἐπιωρκήκασιν) while the Greeks have firmly (στερρῶς) kept away from the temptations they saw before them on account of their oaths to the gods. That the Persians broke their oaths suggests that they should fear punishment from the gods. In contrast, the Greeks can have confidence in the gods' retribution on the Persians and perhaps even pride in their own behaviour. Xenophon is presenting the forthcoming confrontation as a contest that the Greeks can win in order to evoke the captains' confidence.

Xenophon next overtly appeals to the feelings he wants to evoke. He says that the Greeks can go into the battle with much greater spirits (πολὺ...φρονήματι μείζονι) than the enemy. Xenophon also offers further reasons for confidence. He says that the Greeks have more sufficient (ικανώτερα) bodies than the Persians for dealing with cold and hot temperatures and for working. He says that they also have better (ἀμείνονας) souls, thanks to the gods. Xenophon further says that the Persians are more vulnerable (τρωτοὶ) and more liable to death (θνητοὶ) than them, if the gods give the Greeks the victory, as they have done before. Here Xenophon is appealing to stereotypes, and perhaps pride in the Greek constitution and character. He is trying to make the Greeks even more confident that they will be victorious if they face the Persians. In saying that the gods have provided the Greeks with their good souls, he is reminding the captains that the gods back the Greeks. This section prefigures Aristotle's recommendations for evoking confidence. Aristotle says that confidence can be produced by assuring someone that he has advantages such as a stronger body

(*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1383b.1) and that his relations with the gods are good (*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1383b.4-6). In reminding the captains that the Greeks have already defeated the Persians, he is giving them evidence that the gods back them and that the Greeks can defeat the enemy. Xenophon almost presents the outcome of the battle as inevitable; it does not matter what the king's intentions and abilities are if he has angered the gods. Xenophon's evocation of confidence anticipates Aristotle's recommendation that when appealing to this emotion, the speaker should indicate that the audience's safety and success is imminent while what the audience fears is now non-existent (*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1383a.17-19).

In the final section of this speech, Xenophon seems to appeal to the captains' shame. He says that others in the army may have thought these same things and so the captains should not wait for these people to come and rouse them to the finest deeds (κάλλιστα ἔργα) but should be the ones rousing others to excellence (ἀρετήν). The thought that others may have to encourage the captains to perform valiant deeds, rather than the captains acting valiantly of their own volition, may make the captains feel ashamed. Xenophon is discussing their task in terms of honour, nobleness and excellence, and appealing to their desire to act well and be recognised for it. He says that the captains should demonstrate that they are the best of the captains, appealing to their pride. Next, he seemingly appeals to emulation by saying that the captains should show that they are more worthy to be generals than the generals themselves (τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀξιοστρατηγότεροι). This concept of competition and recognition works on the captains' pride in how they appear to others and gives them an immediate incentive for carrying out Xenophon's recommendations, in that they will be recognised as acting well.

The narrator has indicated the mood of the army before the speech and the reader must assume that the captains share this. The army members are perplexed (ἀπορία), dispirited (ἀθύμως), feeling grief (λύπη), and yearning (πόθου) for home and family (3.1.2-3). Despite the Greeks winning their own battle at Cunaxa, they are clearly not confident about facing the king due to Tissaphernes' treachery and the loss of the majority of their leaders. Xenophon begins by building on these feelings and increasing the captains' fear at their situation. First, he identifies with his audience's fear. He opens the speech by saying that he cannot sleep, just as he thinks they cannot. Here, he not only characterises the captains as afraid, but also himself.

On other occasions, a leader admitting his own fears might find it harder to command confidence and trust. However, when an audience is truly afraid, its members may not believe a speaker who does not appear to recognise the gravity of the situation. Xenophon's admission of his fear makes the captains believe that he knows the seriousness of the situation and also perhaps counteracts the suspicion that he may wish to make them feel ashamed for feeling fear or ashamed at their lack of action. Xenophon's words here establish a feeling of unity and rapport between speaker and audience, which he carries throughout the speech. Xenophon allows the captains to give in to their feelings of fear by making them fully visualise what may happen. The situation perhaps just needed someone to articulate an unspoken fear to make the danger seem real. The narrator has indicated particular elements about the army's situation that concern its members already, such as the insurmountable terrain and the lack of guides (3.1.2), but Xenophon is focusing on the fear of extreme personal harm, and relying on the natural urge to self-preservation. He dwells on the impending threat of evil, rather than issues that do not immediately face the army, such as having no guides. He then counteracts the fear that the captains are feeling by explaining why they do not need to fear any of this happening, arguing from likelihood. Further counteracting their negative mood, he ends the speech by giving the captains more reasons to act and sets up the actions he is recommending as something worthy of doing.

At the end of his speech, Xenophon has said that he will obey the captains or, if they choose him to lead, that he is in his prime to protect himself. The captains all respond to Xenophon's speech by indicating that they would like him to lead them, except Apollonides. Apollonides argues that the Greeks will only be safe if they persuade the king to let them go (3.1.26). Xenophon interrupts Apollonides and criticises him for suggesting that they could trust the Persians after they have already shown that they do not abide by truces and are now torturing the leaders they took captive. Xenophon says that Apollonides should not be allowed to associate with the leaders, should have his captaincy taken away, and should be treated like a pack animal (3.1.27-30). Agasias claims that Apollonides is a Lydian, and Apollonides is driven away (3.1.31-2). This extended response does not explicitly indicate what emotions the captains are feeling, although all except Apollonides presumably feel confidence in Xenophon himself. Given their response to Apollonides, the captains

also seem to be persuaded by the interpretation Xenophon makes of how the king would treat them, and of their chances of success. Apollonides' criticism allows Xenophon to use his response to demonstrate further that he is right in his interpretation of the situation. Following this, Proxenus' captains talk to the remaining generals, lieutenant-generals and captains of other divisions and invite them to a meeting (3.1.32), as Xenophon suggested. The speech has been successful, although Apollonides was not convinced, and Xenophon has counteracted his audience's negative emotions. Xenophon is successful because he has been able to evoke the right emotions to rekindle the captains' desire to act and to believe in themselves. He does this by successfully anticipating what his audience knows about the situation, what his audience believes and desires, and by getting his audience to trust him.

Xenophon's choice of emotional appeal does not depend on his character as already recognised by his audience, at least as far as the narrator presents it, because Xenophon is not represented as having had any prior contact with Proxenus' captains, although he was with the army as Proxenus' friend. Xenophon's presentation of himself as someone who feels the same as his audience could have been ineffective because the captains do not know him, but it was perhaps effective in this situation because of the immense danger the army is in. Xenophon presents himself as understanding how the king will act and as understanding the dangers in the Greeks' current position. He further represents himself as making careful observations, and this is reflected in the language he uses. He ponders (*ἐνθυμοίμην*), examines (*διαθεώμενος*) and reasons (*λογιζόμενος*). Once he has established that he knows what he is talking about by discussing what is fearsome about the situation, Xenophon presents himself as being even more perceptive than others and as being the only one who is able to see that the army might actually be successful. Thus, he appropriately switches to evoking confidence in the captains to accompany this presentation of himself. Xenophon also presents himself as pious and as believing in right behaviour and its reward, along with the inevitable punishment of immoral behaviour. This compliments his message that the Greeks' actions mean that they have good reason for confidence. He further presents himself as admiring brave and noble behaviour. In this, it is fitting that Xenophon appeals to the feelings of shame, pride, desire and emulation to make the captains want to act well and achieve

rewards for their actions. The particular characteristics that Xenophon presents himself as having anticipate Aristotle's recommendation that in symbouleutic oratory, for a speaker to be convincing, he must project the characteristics of good sense (φρόνησις), virtue (ἀρετή) and goodwill (εὐνοία).⁸⁹

As well as being constrained in his choice of emotional appeal by his audience's fragile state of mind before the speech, Xenophon is also restricted by the situation, which demands that Xenophon persuades his audience to act immediately. He must select the emotional appeal that he thinks will work most quickly and most effectively.

We can now briefly compare Clearchus' and Xenophon's appeals. There are certain similarities. Both men use their appeals to take charge when no one else will, after the death of key leaders. Both open their speeches by evoking fear, and earn trust in their understanding of the situation from this. They then both evoke confidence in the army's situation and what they recommend proceeding to do. They are both successful and persuade the leaders to undertake certain actions. Both also succeed in evoking confidence in themselves as leaders, and both increase their standing with the army. This is despite Xenophon having no formal position in the army when he began speaking. Although there seems little to separate the success of Clearchus and Xenophon here, we shall later see that considering the connected narrative paints a different picture.

Cleanor's Appeal to Fear (4.6.9) and Xenophon's Appeal to Fear, Hope and Confidence (4.6.10-15)

Cleanor is one of the eldest generals in the army. When the Greeks encounter a force of Chalybians, Taochians and Phasians, the generals and captains call a meeting to discuss tactics. Cheirisophus outlines the issue and says that they should decide whether it is best to try to cross the mountain today or on the next day (4.6.6-8). Cleanor is the first to give his opinion. The narrator does not reveal Cleanor's aims or motives.

⁸⁹ See Fortenbaugh (1992) for a discussion of this combination of qualities, as well as the complications arising from Aristotle's account of persuasion through *ethos*. See also De Temmerman (2010) for the value of applying rhetorical treatises to analysing character in narrative literature.

Cleanor tries to evoke fear indirectly by focussing on the leaders' thoughts of their own advantage, safety, and ease. He consistently uses first person plural verbs, demonstrating his shared concerns with the other leaders. He recommends that the army has breakfast as soon as possible (τάχιστα) and then attacks the enemy as quickly as possible (ὡς τάχιστα). In mentioning haste twice, Cleanor implies that the decision needs to be made rapidly because the audience is in danger. Cleanor goes on to describe what will happen if the army does not do as he proposes. He says that the army would waste (διατρίψομεν) the day, suggesting that they should fear missing an opportunity. He also twice mentions that not attacking immediately would lead to the enemy becoming bolder (θαρραλεώτεροι... θαρρούντων). A more confident enemy will be harder to face and the possibility of this happening would inspire fear. Cleanor also claims that not only would the Greeks have to face the enemy who are currently looking at them (ἡμᾶς ὀρῶντες), but more (πλείους) hostile people will also join this enemy if they delay. A larger enemy is also something to be feared, and Cleanor may be adding further pressure in his representation of the enemy as observing the Greeks. This prefigures part of Aristotle's description of how to evoke fear. Aristotle describes fear as a feeling of pain or worry at the idea that an imminent and nearby threat will cause pain or destruction (*Rhetorica* 2.5, 1382a.21-6 and 1382b.29-30). As we saw above, Aristotle also advises discussing the intent and ability of an opponent to cause the audience harm.

The narrator does not specify the mood of the audience when Cleanor begins his speech. The leaders are presumably alarmed at the situation because they have called a meeting to discuss how best to overcome the enemy. Cleanor is attempting to exacerbate the leaders' concerns and direct these anxieties towards the necessity of accepting his recommendation. He does not succeed in persuading the leaders to follow his proposal, however, because of Xenophon's subsequent speech, which we can also examine.

Xenophon indirectly redirects the fear that Cleanor has created about the enemy, while mixing it with indirectly evoked hope and confidence. He does this in order to persuade his audience to follow his plan instead of Cleanor's. Like Cleanor, Xenophon uses the first person plural to connect with his audience. Xenophon opens by saying that he thinks that if it is necessary to fight the enemy in front of them, the army should make preparations in order that it can fight as strongly as possible. This

implies that it might *not* be necessary to fight the enemy. Given that Cleanor has played on fears about the enemy, this may give the leaders hope that there is a way to avoid confrontation. Suggesting that the army would need to fight as strongly as possible also plays on the fear that Cleanor has evoked about the strength of the opposition. Xenophon next hints at an easier and safer alternative to facing the enemy head on. If they want to pass over the mountain as easily as possible (ὡς ῥᾶστα), he thinks they must examine how they can take as few wounds as possible, and lose as few lives as possible. Xenophon is implying that following Cleanor's plan, the Cyreans are likely to sustain many wounds and lose many lives.

Xenophon then sets out the situation as he sees it. The part of the mountain visible to them is more than sixty stadia, but the only men guarding it are those that Cleanor recommended fighting. Xenophon says that it is far better (πολὺ...κρεῖττον) to concentrate on the empty part of the mountain and try to both steal the position by escaping the enemy's notice and seize it by outstripping them, if possible, rather than fighting against strongholds (ισχυρὰ χωρία) and prepared men (ἀνθρώπους παρεσκευασμένους). This is logical, and again Xenophon is playing on the fear that Cleanor has already exacerbated about the strength of the enemy, by suggesting that it is advisable to avoid facing this. Xenophon goes on to explain why it is easier to take the unguarded route, even though it is presumably obvious. He says that it is much easier (πολὺ...ῥᾶον) to go uphill without resistance than to go over even ground with enemies all around (ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν). It is also easier to see by night without resistance than by day when fighting, and the rough road is more agreeable (εὐμενεστέρα) to walk on without resistance than the level ground is when objects are being thrown at the soldiers' heads. This may put images into the heads of the leaders about what they will have to face if they follow Cleanor's recommendations. This makes it clear that although Xenophon's suggested route may be challenging, it is at least preferable to Cleanor's proposal.

Xenophon next evokes confidence in his recommendations. He says that stealing a position is not impossible (οὐκ ἀδύνατόν) in his opinion, because the Greeks can go during the night and be unseen, and get far enough away that they cannot be heard. Again, this seems easier and safer than fighting the enemy head on, and also requires little effort. Further, it may evoke hope in the leaders. Xenophon next suggests that if the army appears to attack the enemy, the rest of the mountain

will become more deserted (ἐρημοτέρω) because the enemy would rather stay together. Xenophon is recommending a feint that will make the army's passage even easier, which perhaps gives the leaders further confidence in his recommendations and further desire to carry it out. Finally, Xenophon addresses Cheirisophus and suggests that, as a Spartan who practiced stealing as a child, Cheirisophus should use his skills to form the plan for how to steal the mountain.

It is not explicitly stated that Cleanor has been successful in building on the concerns of the audience and evoking further fear of the enemy. Xenophon represents himself as fearing the enemy, enough to want to avoid a confrontation, but it is unclear how much he already felt this emotion before Cleanor tried to exacerbate it. Cleanor presumably had at least some success in increasing the fear his audience felt, especially because Xenophon proceeds to build on this emotion too. Xenophon does this chiefly by further representing the enemy as a major obstacle and threat. When he evokes hope and confidence, he is not counteracting the leaders' fear of the enemy, because he gives them hope and confidence that they can avoid what is fearful, i.e. facing the enemy. Here, Xenophon has decided that it will be better for the army if he keeps the leaders scared for the purposes of engendering a useful outcome rather than relieving them of their fears.

Xenophon's speech succeeds. The leaders do not take a vote, but Cheirisophus responds to Xenophon's words by saying that Athenians are also good at stealing and so Xenophon can use his training too in carrying out his own recommendations. Xenophon proceeds to offer to lead the process of putting his plan into action, but Cheirisophus asks why Xenophon should leave his current posting with the rear-guard. Cheirisophus suggests that others should be sent if no one volunteers. Others do volunteer and a plan of action is formed. As it is presented, Xenophon's recommendation is so clearly preferable to Cleanor's plan that no discussion on whether to adopt it or not is needed. Xenophon thus seems to have convinced the leaders, but it is again not directly indicated whether he has evoked any emotions in them. That the leaders want to proceed with the proposal suggests that Xenophon has succeeded in evoking confidence in them in response to his plan, however, and part of the attraction of the plan is that the audience can avoid facing the enemy. This suggests that Xenophon's appeal to fear worked too, although we cannot say how much Xenophon has increased the fear already felt by the leaders

and the fear enhanced by Cleanor. Xenophon is successful because he uses what the audience is already feeling to back up his own argument.

Xenophon presents himself as being tactically astute, observant, aware of the terrain and opportunities of the situation, interested in the army's safety, and as able to understand what makes a situation difficult or easy. He also represents himself as knowing when to defer to others. Xenophon the character earlier presented this same *ethos* for himself in his speeches to the leaders and soldiers after Tissaphernes had betrayed the Greeks (3.1.35-45 and 3.2.7-32). Given that the leaders and soldiers responded positively to Xenophon on these occasions, the army presumably believes in Xenophon's character portrayal when he speaks at 4.6.10-15. Because he represents himself as understanding situations, he must appeal to fear because facing this enemy is clearly a fearsome prospect. He must also appeal to fear because otherwise he may inadvertently give the men confidence that they can overcome the enemy by facing them head on. In this sense, the prevailing mood of the audience limits Xenophon's choice of emotional appeal because he does not want the army to act rashly. Indeed, it may also have been particularly difficult to counteract the audience's fears, depending on how strong they were. Xenophon's choice to evoke confidence in his plan depends on his presentation of himself as tactically astute, because such a man would be confident in his own plans and would want others to believe in them along with him. The reputation he has built with the army thus also constrains Xenophon in his choice to appeal to fear and confidence. Finally, he is limited in his selection of emotions by the demands of the situation. In needing to save the men from unnecessary danger, he has to play up this danger, as well as the hope that they may not have to face it. In all of the four speeches we have examined so far, the speakers are constrained by the fact that they are attempting to persuade an audience who is as knowledgeable about the situation as they are, rather than an audience composed of soldiers whose understanding could be manipulated.

To return to Cleanor's speech, it is possible that without Xenophon's words, Cleanor would have been entirely successful and his evocation of fear would have backed up his argument. Xenophon, however, is better able to use the audience's fear in support of his plan. There are other reasons for Cleanor's failure. Cleanor portrays himself in the speech as understanding which tactics would give the army the best chance in the battle and as someone who works in the best interests of the army. He

also presents himself as being able to understand how the enemy will react to the Cyreans' actions. However, as the narrator presents it, the audience does not yet know Cleanor as a leader who recommends tactics and evokes fear of the enemy. He is made a general at 3.1.47, which suggests he does have good leadership skills, but on his other appearances in the work so far, he has spoken of bravery and correct behaviour rather than offering any concrete plans, and the only fear he evokes is that of being shamed. His choice to appeal to fear is dependent on his projected *ethos*, because it demonstrates that he understands what the army most needs to be concerned with and to prevent from happening. However, Cleanor is presenting a freshly constructed *ethos* here, and the army may not be in such a dire situation that they disregard that they do not know whether they can rely on him or not. Cleanor clearly does not feel limited in his choice of emotion to appeal to by his previous lack of reputation as a tactical expert, but he seemingly should. Like Xenophon, he is constrained in his choice of emotional appeal by the prevailing mood in the audience. Like Xenophon, he can either channel his audience's existing concerns, or try to make the leaders feel another emotion, such as confidence that they can easily defeat the enemy. Again, it may be more challenging to attempt to replace concern with confidence, especially because the situation does not seem to give grounds for confidence. Cleanor is thus also constrained by the situation in his choice of emotional appeal.

Emotional Appeals Responding to Soldiers Feeling Disheartened about their Situation

Clearchus' Appeal to Fear and Hope (2.4.5-7)

The Greeks have joined forces with Ariaeus and have been waiting more than twenty days for Tissaphernes to join them. During this time Ariaeus' relatives visit him, Persians come to talk to Ariaeus' followers with messages from the king, and Ariaeus and his followers pay less attention to the Greeks (2.4.1-2). The soldiers are unhappy and tell Clearchus and the other generals their fears (2.4.3-4). Only Clearchus is mentioned as responding. Neither the narrator nor Clearchus specify why and to what end Clearchus speaks.

Clearchus tries to indirectly evoke fear throughout most of this speech, and then closes by attempting to evoke hope indirectly. Whereas the soldiers raised fears

about staying, Clearchus raises fears about leaving. Clearchus uses the first person plural when discussing their situation. He also opens his speech by explicitly stating that he shares their thoughts. This bridges the gap between himself as a leader and his audience as soldiers, and identifies his own concerns with theirs. This may give the army confidence that he is taking the situation seriously. He then explains what the men would need to fear if they chose to leave. Instantly, it would appear to the Persians that the Greeks were acting with hostility and violating the truce, and Clearchus proceeds to elucidate the ramifications of this appearance. Firstly, no one will provide a market to the soldiers or anywhere to obtain provisions from. This is presumably intended to make the men fear starvation and their own deaths. Secondly, no one will guide them because their current guides will immediately (εὐθὺς) desert them. They would also have no allies because their existing friends will become their enemies. These statements appeal to fear in the men about being alone and being unable to obtain help from anyone. The motivations Clearchus assigns to the guides, the people they will encounter, and their former friends realistically suggest that these people would desire to harm the Cyreans.

Clearchus then discusses the rivers. He says that there may be other rivers that he does not know about, but the soldiers know at least that they cannot cross the Euphrates while facing an enemy. This confronts the soldiers with the fearsome possibility that they will be trapped and potentially slain. Also, Clearchus says, the army has no cavalry, should it have to fight, while the enemy has a large and most efficient (πλείστοι καὶ πλείστου ἄξιοι) cavalry unit. Thus, he asks rhetorically, even if the Greeks defeat the enemy, who could they kill? Alternatively, he says, if they lose, they would all be killed. This confronts the soldiers with the fearsome reality that the enemy is far more powerful than they are and is far more likely to defeat them. As Clearchus presents it, there are no advantages to leaving, and the soldiers can only get themselves killed or in terrible trouble by doing so.

After confronting his audience with the realities of the situation, Clearchus ends by offering the soldiers the hope and reassurance that their fears about staying might be unfounded. He claims to think that with so many allies (σύμμαχα), if the king was really eager (προθυμεῖται) to destroy (ἀπολέσαι) the Greeks, it would be unnecessary for the king to make an oath, give pledges and swear falsely by the gods and thereby appear untrustworthy before Greeks and barbarians.

The narrator indicates that before this speech the soldiers were displeased (οὐκ ἤρεσκον) with the Persians (2.4.2). From their speech to Clearchus, it is clear that they are afraid that the king wants to destroy them to make an example out of them, and that he is biding his time until he is in a position to attack them or has made the way home impossible for them. Clearchus begins by building on the fear his audience feels. After agreeing that the soldiers' fears are valid, he demonstrates that there is even more to fear by leaving. He thus redirects the soldiers' fear towards ensuring they remain, because the army's safety and return home depend on it. Finally, he counteracts the original fears through a logical evaluation of the Persians' motives and methods.

The narrator indicates that Clearchus said these things many times (τοιαῦτα πολλά ἔλεγεν). This suggests either that many different groups of soldiers come up to him or that the men do not believe his argumentation and he has to reiterate it more than once (2.4.7). Potential reasons for this could be that Clearchus' evocation of fear may have been more convincing than his assumption of how the Persians think, and the soldiers may feel even more trapped. They may also believe that Clearchus is basing his evaluation of the Persians' likely actions on the Persian reputation for trustworthiness, and that relying on this when the army is at the mercy of the Persians may be dangerous. However, the army does not leave, which demonstrates that Clearchus has succeeded in the aim of his speech.

As mentioned above, the narrator indicates that soldiers feel confidence in the face of the enemy under Clearchus. Thus, Clearchus' appeal to confidence may be dependent on a character that is already recognised by his audience.⁹⁰ The Greeks also now believe that Clearchus is a wise leader, and evoking fear and confidence about their situation demonstrates that he understands their predicament and has

⁹⁰ Indeed, the reader has recently seen that Clearchus is skilled at increasing the army's confidence, although he deceived the army to achieve this. When the soldiers feel fear (φόβος) and there is uproar (θύρυβος) and din (δοῦπος) amongst the army during the night while they are camping close by the enemy, Clearchus recovers the situation by evoking confidence in the army through a message he gives the herald to announce (2.2.20). The message states that the commanders give notice that whoever gives information about the person who set free the ass among the arms will receive a talent of silver. With this message, the noise and confusion is explained and assigned to one man's actions rather than the enemy. Clearchus tries to show that there is nothing to fear about their situation, which Aristotle recommends as a way of evoking confidence, as we saw. Thus, the men can stop panicking because they are safe. Clearchus' message is reassuring and maybe even distracts the men with desire for the talent of silver. The narrator says that the soldiers came to know that their fears were empty (κενός) and the commanders were safe (2.2.21).

taken thought for them. His reputation for fearlessness may also make his appeal to fear more convincing, rather than restricting his persuasiveness. If Clearchus himself fears the repercussions he discusses, the men must surely take them seriously.

Clearchus is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by the prevailing mood in the army when he begins his speech, and the situation. In choosing the emotions to evoke, he needs to ensure that he does not cause the army to act rashly and endanger itself. The men need reassurance and so he must give them this by trying to give them reasons to stay. As we saw above, it is risky for a leader to admit his fear to others, but the situation is so serious that only a fool would not feel fear.

Cheirisophus' Appeal to Fear and Pride (3.2.2-3)

Cheirisophus is the leader of a contingent of Spartans that is aiding Cyrus on his mission. After Tissaphernes has tricked most of the Greek leaders to their deaths, Xenophon brings the army out of its despondency and persuades the remaining commanders to choose new leaders to fill the place of those who had died (3.1.11-47). The army gathers and Cheirisophus addresses it. Cheirisophus' speech and the two that follow appear to put into action Xenophon's recommendation to the leaders of the army that they should encourage (παραθαρρύνητε) the soldiers, make them more cheerful (πολὸν εὐθυμότεροι) and motivate goodness (ἀγαθοὺς) in them, in order to make them more confident and successful (3.1.39-44).

Despite this aim, Cheirisophus indirectly appeals to a mixture of fear and pride. He begins by describing the army's situation as difficult/painful (χαλεπὰ), which the audience is presumably already aware of. He then elaborates on why the situation is so bad. Except for one occasion at the end of the speech, he uses the first person plural throughout to indicate that he shares the situation with his audience and will share in the actions they must take. Firstly, he reminds the audience that the army has lost such good quality (τοιοῦτων) generals, captains and soldiers. In listing each rank, Cheirisophus is drawing out the extent of the army's predicament. On top of this, their former allies have betrayed (προδεδώκασιν) them. This again does not provide new information but reaffirms exactly why the army is in a terrible situation. He does not try to hide how dire the situation is or make it seem any less fearsome. He then changes his tone by saying that nevertheless (ὅμως), it is necessary that 'we' become (τελέθειν) brave men (ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς) in this situation and do not

surrender, but try (πειρᾶσθαι), if ‘we’ can (ἤν μὲν δυνώμεθα), to save ‘ourselves’ through glorious victory (καλῶς νικῶντες). It is not just *recommended* that they act bravely, it is *necessary* for their very survival. Cheirisophus is suggesting that the Greeks cannot allow their fears to hold them back, despite how perilous the situation is. He does not offer his audience reasons for confidence that the army can defeat the Persians, but appeals to the men’s pride at the thought of a glorious victory. He may expect that the idea of obtaining this, as well as the subsequent honour the Cyreans would receive for it, would be stronger than feelings of fear. If the Greeks cannot achieve a glorious victory, he says, they should at least die gloriously (καλῶς), and not come under the power of the enemy alive. If they do, he thinks that they will suffer (παθεῖν) what he hopes the gods bring upon their enemies. This last section mixes pride and fear. While the men may fear to die, the idea of a glorious death may again be designed to appeal to their pride in how they are remembered. Cheirisophus tries to make the men fear not achieving a glorious victory or dying well by evoking fear at their potential suffering at the hands of the Persians. Here he is vague as to what would happen to them, possibly allowing the Greeks to fill the gap with their own worst imaginings. Cheirisophus is intimating looming pain and destruction, while representing the enemy as having the means and the intention to cause this. As we saw, Aristotle later discusses these elements as part of his recommendations for evoking fear.

The narrator states before this speech that the army is perplexed (ἀπορία), dispirited (ἀθύμως), feeling grief (λύπη), and yearning (πόθος) for home and family (3.1.2-3). Rather than trying to counteract these feelings, Cheirisophus seems to try to exacerbate them through his description of the Greeks’ situation, the possibility of their mistreatment by the enemy, their possible deaths, and by not mentioning anything that could give them real hope that they might succeed.

The speech receives no response, and two further speeches follow. After these speeches, the narrator reveals that the soldiers are encouraged to begin preparations to face the enemy. The exact effect of Cheirisophus’ emotional appeal on this outcome is unclear. Some scholars argue that it would have been unpersuasive for the particular audience it is addressed to. Buzzetti (2014, 130-1), for example, argues that this speech needed to be “addressed more reassuringly” rather than dwelling on the noble, and that Cheirisophus failed to understand what

would move his audience.⁹¹ Humble (1997, 83-4) likewise argues that “altogether this is a very unsatisfactory speech: it is negative, dwells too much on death and uses the wrong *topos* at the wrong time and with the wrong audience”. She maintains that the noble death *topos* might have been effective if Cheirisophus had been addressing Spartans or a citizen force, but that he had failed to take into account his current audience. She also argues that when Cheirisophus says that the soldiers should try to get a glorious victory, *if they can*, he does not sound like he believes that this is possible, and that this would affect his chances of persuading his audience. This is perhaps going too far. Cheirisophus is most likely just expressing caution and ensuring that the army does not become overconfident. Perhaps another element that may affect his success is his mention of the good leaders the army has lost. This may reduce the army’s confidence in its new leaders. Also, if the army is already unable to act because it feels a range of disheartening emotions, it may be counterproductive to increase or reinforce these. Buzzetti (2014, 133 and n. 59) further notes that Xenophon the character does not comment on Cheirisophus’ speech, as he does after the speech that follows Cheirisophus’. He also argues that Xenophon the character’s claims that the army should not be concerned that its former allies have deserted them (3.2.17) are an implicit criticism of Cheirisophus’ argument. Both suggest, Buzzetti maintains, that Xenophon did not believe that Cheirisophus had spoken persuasively.

Without an explicit narratorial comment, these interpretations remain unconfirmed. What we can say is that further speeches were needed afterwards to convince the audience to act. Perhaps Cheirisophus’ speech was only meant to appeal to a section of the army. Hirsch (1985, 31) argues that the three speeches may have been coordinated beforehand and perhaps reflect the speaker’s outlook. Thus, Cheirisophus’ may have been perfectly apt and meant to appeal to like-minded people. As Buzzetti and Humble argue, the speech seems geared towards a Spartan audience. Perhaps we should conclude that the speech works on some in the audience but not on others.

Cheirisophus’ choice of emotional appeal is perhaps dependent on the character his audience already recognises in him. His internal audience only seems to

⁹¹ He further argues that Xenophon mentions noble death in his speech to the leaders (3.1.43-4) but that this was appropriate to his audience.

know him as a Spartan, and his ethnicity is important to his authority. Indeed, Xenophon later suggests that Cheirisophus should head the front of the army because he is a Spartan (3.2.37). Thus, the internal audience perhaps expects Cheirisophus to be a hard-headed leader like Clearchus, who does not smooth over the obvious difficulties of the situation, and expects him to appeal to typical Spartan pride and the desire to fight well, whatever the odds. Cheirisophus' speech certainly lives up to this stereotype. An attempt to evoke confidence and reassure the army instead of evoking fear and pride would fit less with his character and perhaps have even less chance of success. Cheirisophus is thus also limited in his choice of emotional appeal by the prevailing mood. If he cannot convincingly counteract the mood, his best choice is to exacerbate the existing fear and try to put this to positive use. He is also constrained by the situation, because he is following a particular recommendation by Xenophon to rouse the spirits of the men.

We can now briefly compare Clearchus' and Cheirisophus' emotional appeals to the soldiers. Although Clearchus is trying to prevent the soldiers from acting and Cheirisophus is trying to make them act, both mostly exacerbate the negative mood of their audience and dwell on the predicament the army is in. Both identify with the audience and offer a way to overcome the negative emotions. Clearchus offers logic to suggest that the audience is safe to remain, and Cheirisophus offers the thought of achieving something honourable to encourage the men to fight well. The appeal to both of these may seem weak for some in the audience. Cheirisophus is at least suggesting that the army has its fate in its own hands, whereas Clearchus suggests relying on the Persians.

Emotional Appeals Responding to the Audience Causing Danger

Proxenus' Appeal to Calmness (1.5.14) and Cyrus' Appeal to Fear (1.5.16)

Proxenus is one of the original leaders of the Greek army who comes on the mission to aid Cyrus. Before this speech, one of Menon's soldiers argues with Clearchus, and Clearchus flogs him (1.5.11). The rest of Menon's soldiers become angry with Clearchus, and when Clearchus rides through their camp, Menon's men begin to throw axes and stones at Clearchus (1.5.11-12). Clearchus assembles his troops and begins to advance on Menon's soldiers, who get their arms (1.5.13-14). Proxenus arrives, later than the others, the narrator explains, and situates himself in between

the two sets of troops with his own soldiers (1.5.14). The narrator presents Proxenus' speech in *oratio obliqua* and merely says that Proxenus begged (ἔδεῖτο) Clearchus not to do what he was intending. The narrator states that, as a result, Clearchus was angry (ἐχάλεπαινεν) because Proxenus spoke lightly (πράως) of Clearchus' suffering, when he had nearly been stoned to death. Seemingly, Proxenus' persuasion attempt failed because he does not present himself as appreciating the reason for Clearchus' anger. This may be a reflection of an idea current in rhetorical theory because Aristotle later mentions in his discussion of calmness that to deny an evident slight which has led to anger is impudence, and that impudence is contempt (ὀλιγωρία) and disdain (καταφρόνησις), which is not conducive to evoking calmness (*Rhetorica* 2.3, 1380a.19-21). Thus, Proxenus presumably intended to evoke calmness in Clearchus but has instead made him even angrier.

The verb ἔδεῖτο indicates the desperation of Proxenus' plea, and Clearchus' response to Proxenus humbling himself actually highlights Clearchus as acting unreasonably as much as Proxenus' inability to evoke calmness. It is hard to see how else Proxenus could have tried to evoke calmness, especially because acknowledging Clearchus' slight might have antagonised Menon's men instead. It is thus Proxenus' role as peacemaker that is problematic here. Proxenus does not have the authority to make Clearchus stop, and Clearchus orders Proxenus to move aside.

Proxenus is a foil for Cyrus in this scene, and his failure makes Cyrus' subsequent successful appeal seem all the more remarkable. Cyrus rides up, learns what is happening, picks up his spears, and proceeds into the space between the two sets of troops with his counsellors. It is not yet clear whether Cyrus wants to talk to the Greeks or threaten them with his spears. In fact, Cyrus indirectly evokes fear. Cyrus addresses his speech to Clearchus, Proxenus and the others Greeks present and says that they do not know what they are doing. By using the second person plural here, he is blaming the Greeks for their actions. Cyrus then outlines what the consequences would be if the Greeks were to continue fighting amongst themselves. He says that they must know (νομίζετε) that he will be cut down (κατακεκόψεσθαι) on that day (ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ), and that they will be killed not long (οὐ πολὺ) after. Cyrus thus presents the Greeks' safety and success as being in their own hands. The certainty with which Cyrus presents the consequences is fearsome, and the future perfect tense of κατακόπτω indicates his clear vision of his death occurring. This

choice of verb itself adds to the vivid nature of the description. The speed of the anticipated outcome is also frightening. Not only are the Greeks threatened with the loss of their paymaster, but also the loss of their own lives. Their safety, and, while they are alive, Cyrus' ability to pay and reward them are the two things that motivate the army most. Cyrus ends by saying that if they allow matters to go badly (κακῶς), the barbarians in his army will be more hostile (πολεμιώτεροι) to 'us' than the barbarians who work for the king. Here Cyrus is aligning himself with the Greeks in his army, perhaps with the intention of making them feel valued and also confident that he has their best interests at heart. The thought that the Greeks' current allies will turn on them is fearsome, and perhaps plays on existing tension between Cyrus' Greek troops and barbarian troops, while reinforcing the idea that the barbarian troops are waiting for an opportunity to act. The choice to say 'more hostile' rather than 'stronger' also makes the threat more vivid. The Greeks presumably appreciate the hostility of those who fight for the king against them, and so ought to fear the possibility that Cyrus' barbarians could become even more hostile than their enemy. Cyrus is evoking fear about an imminent deadly suffering at the hands of people who have the desire to harm the audience. As we saw, Aristotle later recommends mentioning the nearness and the potential lethality of a situation in his discussion of evoking fear, as well as outlining the intent of the enemy. Once more, this suggests that both Xenophon and Aristotle are drawing on existing rhetorical theory.

There are different moods within the audience before Cyrus begins speaking. Clearchus is angry (ἐχάλεπαινεν) with Proxenus (1.5.14) and Menon's troops. Clearchus' troops are also presumably angry with Menon's men, and Proxenus is concerned about the situation. Menon's men are initially angry with Clearchus but, when Clearchus advances with his troops against them, the narrator says that Menon and his men are panic-stricken (ἐκπεπλήχθαι), although some remain unconcerned by the matter (1.5.13). Cyrus seems to chiefly target Clearchus and Proxenus as the ones who are responsible. He presumably thinks that he primarily needs to counteract anger, and perhaps does not even recognise the emotions of Menon and his men or Proxenus. Buzzetti (2014, 50) argues that in addressing Proxenus, Cyrus demonstrates that he did not completely understand the facts of the situation, marring his success. However, Cyrus had to appraise the situation and the emotions of the audience on the instant. Cyrus attempts to

counteract anger by explaining the repercussions of the army's actions and ensuring that those present know that their own lives are at stake.

The narrator says that, after the speech, Clearchus came to his senses (ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐγένετο), and both sides stopped and went to their quarters (1.5.17). Thus, Cyrus was correct in targeting his appeal to Clearchus' emotions and correct in anticipating how to do this. The narrator does not specifically say that Cyrus evoked fear, but this is presumably what now restrains his audience. Cyrus is successful because he selected the appropriate emotion to evoke that made the audience understand what was at stake. Cyrus also presents himself as feeling fear for both himself and the Greeks, and so he is inviting the army to share his emotions. If he is concerned, the Greeks may believe that they should be too.

Cyrus could have become angry and ordered the Greeks to stop fighting. He could even have threatened to withhold their pay, because the Greeks are driven primarily by money in their relationship with Cyrus. However, these options may have instilled fear of Cyrus or hostile feelings towards him in the Greeks. Whereas Cyrus presents himself as being angry towards his Persians (for example, at 1.5.7-8), Cyrus' authority with the Greeks rests on positive feelings felt towards him, and so he evokes fear of others rather than fear of punishment from himself. He displays a favourable disposition towards the Greeks, especially when enjoying seeing them scare his barbarians (1.2.18). Thus, the character of Cyrus that the audience already recognises governs the emotional appeal that Cyrus selects. The Greeks know that he values them, does not get angry with them, and is concerned with his own mission. Cyrus also has an existing reputation with the Greeks for being generous with his money (see 1.9.17 and 6.4.8, for example) and magnanimous (we shall see this in the next example), and this also constrains him. He is unlikely to want to undermine his reputation by withholding payment or punishing the Greeks for their indiscipline. Further, he perhaps cannot risk making the Greeks feel negativity towards him because his relationship with them may still be slightly fraught after their recent mutiny against continuing with him at Tarsus (1.3.1ff.), and because he has recently told the Greeks that he deceived them over the aim of the mission (1.4.11-13).

The prevailing mood in the audience further constrains his choice of emotion to evoke because the anger is strong and can only be combatted with equally strong

emotions. The situation also limits his choice because he needs those present to stop what they are doing immediately and to restore discipline, and so needs to appeal to an impactful emotion that will make the army act well and be obedient. Cyrus perhaps perceives that if he makes a strong appeal here, the effect on obedience could be long lasting. Indeed, there is no more infighting.

Emotional Appeals Responding to Mixed Feelings about Leaders

Cyrus' Appeal to Anger, Fear, Confidence and Goodwill/Friendly Feelings (1.4.8)

The generals Xenias and Pasion have deserted the army because a number of their soldiers went over to Clearchus when he claimed that he would follow his soldiers back to Greece during their mutiny against Cyrus. Cyrus let the soldiers stay with Clearchus, causing Xenias and Pasion to feel ambitious rivalry (φιλοτιμηθέντες). After Xenias and Pasion left, the narrator reveals that there were rumours that Cyrus had sent triremes after them. Cyrus calls the remaining generals together to address them (1.4.7). Neither the narrator nor Cyrus himself reveals Cyrus' aims and motivations.

In this speech, Cyrus indirectly appeals to anger, fear, confidence and friendly feelings. He opens by stating that Xenias and Pasion have deserted (ἀπολελοίπασιν) 'us' (ἡμᾶς). Not only does this clearly describe what the crime is, perhaps in case anyone in the audience thought that the pair were justified in their actions, but it also highlights that this is a crime against all the leaders, rather than just against Cyrus. This may create a feeling of unity between the audience and Cyrus, and may also make the audience feel both wronged and angry at Xenias and Pasion. Using an imperative, Cyrus says to let Xenias and Pasion know that they have not escaped, because he knows where they are and could attack their ship with his triremes. This may indirectly evoke some fear in the internal audience of Cyrus and his power to get revenge, by making the generals think of what might happen if they tried to desert Cyrus. However, Cyrus swears by the gods not to pursue Xenias and Pasion, and says that no one will say that he uses (χρῶμαι) a person when that person is present, but that when the person wants to leave him, he seizes (συλλαβῶν) him, treats him badly (κακῶς ποιῶ) and strips (ἀποσυλῶ) him of his possessions. Here Cyrus is presenting himself as generous, and perhaps is trying to evoke friendly feelings towards himself, while at the same time playing on fears of what some

leaders are known do. The generals can be confident that they would be treated in the same way as Xenias and Pasion, and that their own good service to Cyrus will stand them in good stead for the future. Cyrus tells the audience to let Xenias and Pasion go, knowing that they behaved worse (κακίους) towards ‘us’ than Cyrus and the generals did to Xenias and Pasion. Again, Cyrus is associating himself with the Greek generals. Here, he is asking the audience to take the moral high ground, and is perhaps trying to unite the different feelings that the generals have towards Xenias and Pasion, which I shall discuss below, so that the generals are firmly against them.

Cyrus says that he has Xenias and Pasion’s wives and children still, but that he will return these because of Xenias and Pasion’s excellence (ἀρετῆς) towards him. Here, Cyrus is demonstrating his familiarity with and respect for Greek values. Without needing to say it explicitly, he is subtly representing himself as valuing ἀρετή and understanding what it means to the Greeks. He knows that this will be important to the Greeks’ character assessment of him, and that they will be inclined to think that he is a man of virtue because he recognises and appreciates this quality in others. Cyrus seems to understand what Anaximenes later advises; a speaker is judged on the language he uses, for example, if he uses shameful language about shameful deeds (*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 35.18, 1441b.20-2). Cyrus indicates his desire to reciprocate the good others have done for him without reciprocating the bad. Again, this may make the audience feel positively towards Cyrus.

The narrator indicates before the speech that some of the army hoped that Xenias and Pasion would be caught because they were cowards, but others pitied (ἔκτιρον) them for what would happen if they were to be captured (1.4.7). It is clear that the generals expect Cyrus to go after Xenias and Pasion to obtain revenge for their desertion. While some think this is what they deserve, those feeling pity are perhaps questioning the rightness of the decision. The generals presumably feel pity because they believe that they may suffer the same punishment from Cyrus as Xenias and Pasion. This prefigures Aristotle’s discussion whereby he argues that pity for others is felt by those who believe that they may experience the same pitiful circumstances (*Rhetorica* 2.8, 1385b.13-19). Thus, they perhaps fear Cyrus. Cyrus attempts to redirect the negative emotions towards Xenias and Pasion and the positive emotions towards himself by making it clear that he *could* punish Xenias

and Pasion for their poor behaviour towards them all but that he has chosen not to, and by explaining his reason for not pursuing them.

The narrator says that even those Greeks who had little heart (ἀθυμότερος) for the *anabasis* proceeded more gladly (ἥδιον) and eagerly (προθυμότερον) when they heard of Cyrus' excellence (ἀρετὴν, 1.4.9). This suggests that report of his words spread throughout the army. While it does not reveal exactly what emotions the Greeks were feeling, it indicates that Cyrus succeeded in presenting himself well and making the men feel positively towards him, which made them in turn feel positively towards the march. It also indicates the extent of the unrest caused by the situation itself. Cyrus succeeds because he has recognised that the incident has caused some doubt about his leadership and character. He understands what kind of paymaster the men desire and, through his presentation of himself, he is able to evoke positive emotions.

As we saw regarding the previous example, Cyrus constantly tries to have the Greeks think positively of him and so the choice of emotions to appeal to here fits with his other attempts at building an *ethos*. Previously, Cyrus has concentrated on convincing the Greeks of his financial generosity, and his magnanimity is a relatively new trait within his speeches. However, the Greeks are aware of this aspect of his character. The narrator says that some soldiers wanted to join Cyrus' mission because they had heard about Cyrus' excellence (ἀρετὴν, 6.4.8), and so he clearly cultivates this aspect of his reputation. Such respect for his reputed goodness and the fact that he has not displayed it particularly before now may explain why the leaders react with such positive feelings after this speech. They perhaps also still have in their minds Clearchus' warning that Cyrus is a good friend but a dangerous enemy (1.3.12). Cyrus' speech perhaps reassures the Greeks that he does not classify others simply as friend or enemy, but takes into account past behaviour. He appears to value good service over the need for revenge, to know when it is appropriate simply to be the bigger man and to be generous and kind rather than prone to anger and revenge, although he has the power to punish if he wishes. Cyrus clearly carefully manages his reputation and is concerned with what others think about him because, in this speech, he mentions what other people will say about his treatment of those who have worked for him. In Cyrus' obituary, the narrator dwells on some of the aspects the Greeks may have heard about Cyrus' reputation. He discusses

Cyrus' good treatment of friends (e.g. 1.9.10 and 1.9.24-8), and claims that Cyrus does not let good service go unrewarded (1.9.18). The narrator further indicates that Cyrus treats well those who were faithful (πιστοὺς), kindly (εὖνους) and steadfast (βεβαίους, 1.9.30), as Xenias and Pasion formerly were. Cyrus is thus limited in his choice of emotional appeal by his carefully constructed existing reputation. Cyrus has to play on the positive feelings that such a reputation induces. A stronger appeal to fear might have left the generals in constant terror of Cyrus, which would alienate them. Cyrus is also constrained in his choice of emotions to appeal to by the situation, because he needs to unify and encourage the leaders, and the prevailing mood in the audience, because he needs to eradicate doubt about him.

Cheirisophus' Appeal to Goodwill/Friendly Feelings and Confidence (6.1.32-3)

The soldiers want Xenophon to take the role of sole commander, but, after consulting the gods, Xenophon turns down the request (6.1.25-9). He tells the army that it is not advisable to elect him when a Spartan is present who could take the role. If the army elects him, he says, the Spartans external to the army would no longer aid the Cyreans and would persecute him. Also, he says that within the army, someone, presumably Cheirisophus, would be angry with the soldiers and with him. After this speech, more people want Xenophon to be the commander, and Agasias says that it is absurd (γελοῖον) if the case is as Xenophon says it is. Agasias facetiously asks if the Spartans will also be angry if at dinner parties a Spartan is not chosen to preside over affairs. He also says that this must mean that the Arcadians cannot be captains because of their ethnicity. The soldiers shout that Agasias is right (6.1.30), and Xenophon tells the army that the gods advised him not to take the role (6.1.31). Thus (οὕτω), the army choose Cheirisophus for the role (6.1.32). In acceptance, Cheirisophus gives a speech to the army. Neither the narrator nor Cheirisophus specifies why Cheirisophus speaks.

Cheirisophus indirectly appeals to goodwill/friendly feelings and confidence. He begins with a statement about his own character in relation to what would have happened if he had not been chosen. He is emphatic in his words, telling the army to 'know this' (τοῦτο...ἴστε), that he would not have caused discord (οὐδ'...ἔγωγε ἐστασιάζον) if the army had chosen someone else. In this, he is attempting to refute Xenophon's suggestion that he would be angry with the men. He is trying to evoke

confidence that he would not have caused trouble over something the army deemed best, and confidence that he does not prioritise Spartan politics over the army. From this, he may hope that the army will feel goodwill towards him, or friendly feelings.

Cheirisophus next goes on to explain why not choosing Xenophon as sole commander benefitted (ὠνήσατε) Xenophon. He says that Dexippus, a Laconian, has been slandering Xenophon to Anaxibius by claiming that Xenophon preferred to lead the army with a Dardanian rather than with him. The detail of Dexippus' slander reinforces Xenophon's words about Spartans taking issue with non-Spartans having control of the Cyreans and blaming Xenophon for preventing Spartan leadership. This comment seems intended to give the army confidence that it has made the right decision over the leadership for its own and for Xenophon's chances of safety and success. Cheirisophus' words here may also evoke good feelings towards himself because he is not like other Spartans and, according to his account, has taken a stance against the criticism of Xenophon by trying hard (μάλα) to silence Dexippus.⁹² Cheirisophus may earn his audience's goodwill for representing himself as backing the soldiers' favourite leader and for hindering a man who previously deserted from the army.

Finally, Cheirisophus says that since the army has chosen him, he will try to do whatever good (ἀγαθὸν) he can. He then gives the men orders for sailing to Heracleia and says that they will take counsel when they arrive about the remainder of their journey. It is only here that Cheirisophus talks of himself as part of the audience. In the rest of the speech, he uses the first person singular and second personal plural. While this may make the speech seem adversarial, Cheirisophus is also asserting what he will do for the army, and so this is perhaps necessary. He must hope that the army feels goodwill towards him for his claim that he wants to benefit the soldiers, although he only says that he will try to aid them, rather than confidently saying that he *will* do this. Despite this, he may hope that his assertion makes the army feel confident that it has chosen the right leader. In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon directly links benefitting soldiers and working in their interests with producing friendly feelings (6.1-6). This is presumably part of the

⁹² Cheirisophus does refer to the army as Clearchus' (6.1.32), which may betray a tendency to assume that Spartans were the key leaders of the army and indicate that he is concealing his real feelings here. However, he may just be repeating what Dexippus said.

contemporary discussions about these two emotions. Aristotle seems to draw on the same idea when he says that men like those who they think want to do them good (*Rhetorica* 2.3, 1381a.13). Cheirisophus backs this up by assertively issuing commands, which may be designed to make the men feel confident that they have chosen an authoritative leader, as they desired.

Cheirisophus has to attempt to win the army's support and trust by evoking friendly feelings and confidence because his audience's mood is hostile towards him at the beginning of his speech due to Xenophon's and Agasias' speeches. Assuming the army believed Xenophon and Agasias, its members presumably think that Cheirisophus is an obstacle to them having Xenophon as their leader and believe that he would take out his anger on them. Cheirisophus is also a representative of the people who would deliberately hinder the army's journey because of their own dissatisfaction with the troops' choice of commander, and who believe they have a right to leadership without earning it. Xenophon's speech revealing that the gods did not approve of him taking the role may have convinced the army that it should not choose Xenophon as leader, but there is no indication that it softened the mood towards Cheirisophus. Cheirisophus thus tries to counteract the existing mood by positively representing the situation, his own character, and his intentions, and by projecting himself as the leader that they desire.

No response is indicated, but the army do make the journey to Heracleia. Thus, Cheirisophus' audience has been persuaded enough not to argue with him immediately. His success is only partial and short-term, however, because in the longer-term, the mood of the army becomes apparent. Soon after the army arrives in Heracleia, Lycon criticises the generals for not providing the army with money or provisions (6.2.4). This suggests that Lycon at least is already upset with what Cheirisophus is providing for them, and that he does not feel confident that Cheirisophus will benefit them. Lycon proposes demanding money from the locals and the army nominates ambassadors to do this (6.2.4-6). Cheirisophus and Xenophon both object to the plan on moral grounds but are ignored (6.2.6-7). This indicates that the mood in the army is fractious and that the soldiers are unwilling to obey their sole commander or even the man they first wanted as sole commander. They clearly neither feel goodwill towards Cheirisophus, nor confidence in him. When Lycon's mission backfires, Lycon and Callimachus try to persuade the

Arcadians and Achaeans to break off into their own division so that they can make profit to take home themselves (6.2.7-12). Lycon and Callimachus clearly believe that Xenophon is the real leader of the army, because they say that it is shameful for Peloponnesians and Spartans to be under an Athenian who brought no troops (6.2.10). These speakers have now disregarded Cheirisophus. They clearly have no confidence in his command and do not feel enough goodwill towards him even to pretend that they recognise his authority. The subsequent division of the army suggests that these feelings towards Cheirisophus extend beyond these two men and that the troops have no loyalty towards him either. The narrator comments that Cheirisophus' sole command dissolved after six or seven days (6.2.12). Cheirisophus' speech, although it successfully brought the men to Heracleia, clearly did not succeed in engendering lasting goodwill towards himself or confidence in his command.

Cheirisophus fails in evoking friendly feelings and confidence towards himself in the long-term because he cannot replace the army's negative opinion of him with a positive opinion. There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, he cannot live up to his claims that he will benefit the army because his speech after obtaining sole command indicates that he is already not going to give the soldiers what they want from a leader. The men have expressly elected a sole commander because they want to return home with profit and believe that one leader would be able to make decisions faster and better than if he had to consult with other generals (6.1.18). The troops may be frustrated that Cheirisophus is not simply making decisions for them but wishes to take counsel about the remainder of the journey when they reach Heracleia.⁹³ Secondly, the Greeks have recently discovered to their cost what happens when they trust Cheirisophus and put their hopes in him after being persuaded by him. We can briefly examine this episode for its impact on his speech regarding the sole command.

Cheirisophus' Appeal to Hope (5.1.4)

Having reached Trapezus, the soldiers have made it clear that they want to return home by ship (5.1.2-3). Cheirisophus speaks in response and says that he has a friend (φίλος) who happens to be the admiral of the Spartan fleet and, if the army sends him

⁹³ See also Humble (1997, 84-5) for this interpretation of Cheirisophus' suggestion to call a meeting.

to his friend, he thinks (οἴομαι) that he can bring back triremes and merchant ships to take the army home. He says that if indeed the soldiers want to go by sea, they should await his return, and that he will return quickly (ταχέως). In explaining his personal relationship with such a high-ranking individual, Cheirisophus is giving the soldiers hope that he will be able to fulfil their wishes to return home, in ease and comfort, without them needing to act. His audience may even begin to dream of home. Cheirisophus himself seems confident in his ability to obtain ships, which may be designed to make the men feel confident in turn. In saying that he will return quickly, Cheirisophus gives confidence about the ease of his mission and arouses hope that the army will be home soon. Again, Cheirisophus speaks of 'I' and 'you' except when he mentions ships that will carry 'us'. Thus, in both speeches, he mainly discusses what he can do for the army and only once links himself with its other members.

Before this speech, the army felt jaded, but Cheirisophus counteracted this mood through his own confidence in his friendship. In response, the narrator says that the soldiers are delighted (ἤσθησάν) and vote for Cheirisophus to set sail as quickly as possible. The soldiers are clearly confident that Cheirisophus can deliver on his claims. This is perhaps mainly because he is telling them what they want to hear and presents his friend as being likely to want to help. Xenophon, however, offers suggestions for what the army should do while waiting for Cheirisophus, including obtaining ships, because, he says, the army cannot be certain (ἄδηλον) that Cheirisophus will return with enough ships. (5.1.10-11). If he does, they will have more to return home on, but if he does not, they can use what they have procured. Thus, Xenophon has not been completely convinced by Cheirisophus' words, and has to remind the army to be realistic. The army agrees with Xenophon's proposal (5.1.11). This may mean that the men are now doubting Cheirisophus too or simply that they can see the benefit of having more ships at their disposal.

Cheirisophus does not return until 6.1.16. In this passage, the narrator says that the soldiers expected (προσεδόκων) that Cheirisophus would come back with something for them, suggesting that they still had hope in Cheirisophus upon his return. However, he only brings one trireme and a vague promise of future pay from Anaxibius. The narrator does not indicate how the soldiers reacted to this, yet his

statement that Cheirisophus brought nothing (ὁ δ' ἤγε μὲν οὐδέν) to meet the men's expectations with seems critical.

Cheirisophus represents himself here as someone who has friends in high places, as being at the service of the army, as recognising that he has to gain the men's consent to be sent on a mission by them rather than choosing to go himself, and as being confident in his success. The army has little reason to doubt this. Before this speech, he led troops adequately (3.5.4, 4.2.8, 4.3.17 and 4.3.20-7), worked well with Xenophon (4.2.25-6 and 4.5.34), and acted beneficially for the army (4.5.9-10, 4.5.22 and 4.6.23). Although Xenophon is superior tactically (3.4.38-42 and 4.7.2-8) and Cheirisophus rarely took the lead in making decisions, the only thing that Cheirisophus had done that was detrimental to the army was to strike, but not bind, a guide, leading to the guide's escape (4.6.2-3).⁹⁴ His choice to evoke hope is therefore partly dependent on his previous reputation with the army and partly the character he projects in his speech.

To return to Cheirisophus' speech after being given sole command, the soldiers may still bear Cheirisophus ill will from the incident where he failed to deliver on the hope he had evoked. Thus, Cheirisophus' choice of emotions to appeal to does not take into account his prior negative reputation in the eyes of the men of not living up to his words. In his speech regarding the sole command, Cheirisophus again represents himself as wanting what is best for the army. He also presents himself as being content to allow another leader to rule, as being concerned for Xenophon's well-being, and as having the authority to issue commands. However, for this positive presentation of his character and his evocation of positive emotions to be persuasive, his audience also has to believe that he is trustworthy, which they do not.

Although he is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by needing to dismiss the current hostile mood against him, and limited by the situation which demanded giving the soldiers a reason to want to follow him, he did not necessarily have to try to evoke positive emotions towards himself. Cheirisophus might have been more successful playing on the fear of his anger than Xenophon the character

⁹⁴ See further Nussbaum (1967, 116-17 and 131) for Cheirisophus' "administrative" rather than "directive" leadership of the army, combined with his "spirit of disinterested public service".

had evoked about him when he rejected sole command, backed by the threat of other Spartans hindering the army's return. Perhaps Xenophon the character recognised that this was the only way that Cheirisophus could persuade the men to follow him after his last attempt to raise hope.

We can briefly compare Cyrus' and Cheirisophus' emotional appeals responding to doubt about themselves. While they both try to evoke friendly feelings, and both even try to use the behaviour of others (Xenias and Pasion, and Dexippus) to do this, Cyrus' appeal is a master class of successful emotional persuasion whereas Cheirisophus' is not. This stems from the very different ways in which the two speakers take into account their previous reputations and established characters, and perhaps Cyrus' identification with the leaders compared to Cheirisophus' distance from his audience. However, we shall see at the end of this chapter that this does not mean that Cyrus is a positive example to emulate and that Cheirisophus is entirely negative.

Emotional Appeals Responding to Speeches by Outsiders

Cleanor's Appeal to Shame and Fear (2.5.39)

After the Persians have tricked the Greek commanders to their deaths, Ariaeus, Artaozus, Mithridates, Tissaphernes' brother and three hundred Persians come to give a message to the remaining Greek leaders. Cleanor, Sophaenetus and Xenophon go to hear the message and are told that the king demands the Greeks' arms and that Clearchus has received the punishment he deserved. Cleanor responds on the Greeks' behalf but the narrator does not reveal Cleanor's aims or motivations.

Cleanor directly appeals to shame. He asks Ariaeus and the other former friends of Cyrus if they are not ashamed (οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε) before gods and men of what they have done. Cleanor here implies that the Persians' deeds have been witnessed by all and that they will be judged for them. Cleanor continues by using indirect appeals to shame during his description of his audience's actions. He passes negative judgement on Ariaeus' behaviour by calling him the worst of men (κάκιστε ἀνθρώπων). Cleanor similarly criticises his audience's choice of ally, Tissaphernes, whom he calls the most godless (ἄθεωτάτῳ) and wicked (πανουργοτάτῳ) man. Through this, he attempts to evoke shame in his audience because of its members'

association with Tissaphernes. Cleanor refers to Ariaeus, Artabazus and Mithridates as being former friends of Cyrus. This reminds the trio of how they have turned their backs on this friendship. Cleanor twice mentions the betrayal that the Persians have carried out on the Greeks (προδόντες... προδεδωκότες). This confronts the Persians with their immoral behaviour. He also twice mentions oaths that the Persians have broken (ὀμόσαντες... ὄμνυτε). Breaking oaths is an offence against the divine, and this repetition may be designed to indirectly evoke fear in the Persians that the gods will punish them. The gods have the power to act, even if the Greeks do not. As Aristotle later discusses, this is the threat of impending destruction by those who want and are able to harm the audience.

Cleanor reminds his audience of how it would have been proper to act. The Persians and the Greeks should have had the same friends and enemies, but the Persians did not adhere to this convention. Instead, the audience destroyed (ἀπολωλέκατε) the Greek generals and brought enemies (πολεμίοις) against the remainder of the Greeks. This again confronts the Persians with their corrupt actions, which, Cleanor implies, they should regret. Cleanor's appeal anticipates Aristotle who argues that shame is a feeling of pain, or a psychological disturbance due to immoral actions that bring ill-repute (ἀδοξίαν, *Rhetorica* 2.6, 1383b12-14).

The narrator does not indicate Ariaeus' or his associates' mood at either the beginning or end of Cleanor's speech. However, when delivering the message from the king, Ariaeus seems confident in the rightness of the Persians' actions and the message he is delivering. Cleanor thus tries to counteract Ariaeus' mood by taking away the basis for Ariaeus' confidence. His methods are to recount what it is about the Persians' actions that render them shameful and what they have to fear because of their actions. After the speech, Ariaeus replies that it is clear that Clearchus had been plotting against Tissaphernes, Orontas and their followers for a long time (2.5.40). By further justifying the Persians' actions, Ariaeus appears confident still that the Persians acted rightly. Clearly, Ariaeus feels no shame, regret or fear and Cleanor's appeal has failed.

Cleanor positions himself and the Greeks in general as critics of the Persians, and implies that the gods will also look unfavourably upon the Persians' actions. However, part of the reason for Cleanor's failure is that the Persians do not respect

Cleanor or believe that he is right. The again pre-empts Aristotle, who says that people feel shame in front of those they esteem (*Rhetorica* 2.6. 1384a.23-5). Cleanor takes it for granted that the Persians will be god fearing and will feel shame at what they have done. However, it is clear from Ariaeus' words before and after Cleanor's speech that the Persians blame Clearchus for breaking the truce and reneging on his oath, even if this is pretence. Therefore, the Persians present themselves as believing that there is no longer a truce and so no oaths preventing them from harming the Greeks. They thus do not fear divine retribution because they do not believe that they have done anything worthy of punishment. Cleanor fails to comprehend the Persian standpoint and that the Persians are trying to make the *Greeks* feel guilty for breaking *their* oaths.

Cleanor has previously spoken with several ambassadors from the Persians, led by Phalinus. He is represented as saying in *oratio obliqua* that the Greeks would prefer to die than hand over their arms (2.1.10). The ambassadors do not reply and Cleanor's statement, although brave, is ineffective. It is perhaps unlikely that the impression of Cleanor obtained from this meeting was relayed to the Persian ambassadors present for the speech under discussion. Thus, Cleanor is not constrained in his choice of emotions to evoke by his character as already known by his audience. He projects his character through the speech itself and presents himself as a morally upright man who knows the correct way to behave concerning friends and oaths, and who judges others on their actions. In this respect, shame and fear of punishment from the gods are appropriate emotional responses to try to evoke in relation to his projected character. However, it is clear that Cleanor's emotional appeal is not made more effective by his *ethos*. Rather than being constrained by his own reputation, Cleanor is limited in his choice of emotions to appeal to by Ariaeus' confidence and the situation itself. In the latter case, both the Persians and Greeks are aware that the Persians currently hold all the advantages.

Xenophon's Appeal to Shame and Fear (5.5.13-23)

Hecatonymus, the spokesman for a group of Sinopean ambassadors, confronts the Greek army in the Greek camp about its behaviour towards certain communities that are Sinopean *apoikoi* and pay tribute to Sinope (5.5.8-12). After opening his speech with an attempt to gain goodwill, typical of a *prooimion*, Hecatonymus claims that,

as fellow Greeks and because they have done the Cyreans no harm, the Sinopeans deserve good treatment from the Cyreans. He then gets to the issue at hand and says that any harm done to the Cotyrorites equates to harming the Sinopeans too. Hecatonymus then tries to evoke shame in the Greeks. He describes what he has heard about the Cyreans' behaviour towards the Cotyrorites, particularly about them using force (βίβα) and not obtaining consent for their actions (οὐ πείθοντα). Hecatonymus presents the Cyreans as thieves who go where they are unwelcome. He says that the Sinopeans do not think this is fitting behaviour (οὐκ ἄξιοῦμεν). Hecatonymus is judging the Cyreans as breaking cardinal codes of behaviour in harming friendly fellow Greeks. Thus, he presents the Sinopeans as judging the Cyreans' actions as being poor by Greek standards. Implicit in this criticism is the idea that the Cyreans' actions could affect the way the other Greeks who may hear about them will think of the Cyreans, and that their reputation may be affected. Hecatonymus ends his speech with a threat. He describes the consequences of continuing such shameful behaviour. If the Cyreans continue their actions, the Sinopeans will be forced to make friends with the ruler of Paphlagonia, the Paphlagonians and anyone else they can. Hecatonymus does not actually say that the Sinopeans and their allies would attack the Cyreans, but this is implied.⁹⁵ Hecatonymus is linking the Cyreans' safety to their own choice of how to behave. The intended effect is surely that the Cyreans should fear a potentially dangerous situation and enemy.

The mood of the Greek army before the speech is not specified, but there is no indication that it is feeling anything other than content with its actions. Hecatonymus is thus presumably trying to counteract this existing mood by trying to evoke emotions that will make the Greek army stop the actions that are disadvantageous to the Sinopeans. Xenophon responds for the soldiers, indirectly appealing to the same emotions in return. Xenophon is here speaking as one of the assembly rather than as someone who has been specifically addressed or as a nominated spokesperson. It is unclear how others in the army responded to Hecatonymus' attempts to evoke shame and fear, but, as Xenophon the character presents it, he evoked neither in Xenophon.

⁹⁵ In a second speech at 5.6.3, Hecatonymus backtracks and claims that he did not actually threaten war against the Greeks in his first speech but said that the Sinopeans would befriend the Greeks rather than the barbarians.

In the first part of the speech, Xenophon refutes the criticisms Hecatonymus implied. This may begin to make the Sinopeans feel uneasy. The Cyreans are happy just to be alive, Xenophon says, and they have not had the opportunity to gain plunder because they were too busy saving themselves. This challenges Hecatonymus' presentation of the army as thieves. Next, Xenophon describes how the army has acted since reaching Greek cities. The Trapezuntians, he says, provided a market and so the Cyreans bought provisions from them. Because the Trapezuntians gave the Cyreans honours and gifts, the Cyreans honoured them in return by not harming the Trapezuntians' barbarian friends, and by harming the Trapezuntians' enemies. Xenophon's tone is reasonable here but the Sinopeans can presumably guess at how Xenophon's argument will continue. Indeed, he seems to be attempting to make the Sinopeans feel shame at accusing the Cyreans of acting immorally.

Xenophon tells the Sinopeans to ask the Trapezuntians what kind of people the Cyreans are, and this is possible because the Trapezuntians sent guides along with the Cyreans out of friendship. Xenophon is here offering proof that the army previously acted well, and again he may hope that the Sinopeans feel shame at the thought that they have accused good people. Xenophon next describes what happens when the Cyreans face barbarians or Greeks who do not provide a market: they take provisions because they need to, not through *hubris*. He lists the Carducians, Taochians and Chaldaeans who were not subject to the king and who were extremely fearsome (μάλα φοβεροὺς), but whom the Cyreans became enemies with because they needed provisions and because these people would not provide a market. The Macronians, he says, provided a market and so, even though they were barbarians, the Cyreans did not take anything from them by force. In describing the army's moral choices, Xenophon may be attempting to make the Sinopeans regret their judgements. In describing how the Cyreans overcame fearsome people who refused to help them, Xenophon may also be trying to evoke fear of what could happen if the Cyreans turn on the Cotyrorites and Sinopeans. He may also be trying to shame the Sinopeans because they based their criticism of the Cyreans on the belief that Greeks should behave well to other Greeks, whereas the Cyreans base their behaviour on others' actions towards them, irrespective of whether they are Greek or not. Harming

enemies and helping friends is a particularly common refrain in Greek literature, and so the attitude Xenophon represents may be the more commendable one.⁹⁶

Xenophon next turns to the current situation. If the Cyreans have taken from the Cotyrorites, he says, the Cotyrorites are responsible (αἴτιοί) because they were not friendly to the Cyreans. Instead, they shut the Cyreans out of their city, refused to admit the Cyreans and would not send out a market. Indeed, he says, the Cotyrorites claimed that the *harmost* sent by the Sinopeans was to blame (αἴτιον) for them carrying out these actions. This undermines the moral high ground that Hecatonymus claimed for the Sinopeans, and particularly his claim that Greeks should treat other Greeks well. Thus, Xenophon may be trying to evoke feelings of shame in the Sinopeans because they did not act in the way they claim others should. Xenophon is perhaps implying that such behaviour might bring dishonour to the Sinopeans, and we have seen that Aristotle links feeling shame with anticipating dishonour. Xenophon is positioning himself as judging the Sinopeans and presenting the Cyreans as being innocent of crimes that the Sinopeans are guilty of. This perhaps anticipates Aristotle's argument that people are ashamed in front of those who cannot be accused of the same poor deeds (*Rhetorica* 2.6, 1384b.1-2).

Xenophon next directly challenges Hecatonymus' claim that the Cyreans entered the city by force. He says that the Cyreans asked the Cotyrorites to take in their sick men, but that the Cotyrorites did not open their gates. Instead, the Cyreans found their own way into the city. They did this without using force, he says, except for the fact that the sick are living in the Cotyrorites' houses and paying expenses and that the Cyreans are guarding the gates so that the sick will not be subject to the Sinopeans' *harmost* and can be taken back when the Cyreans want. Again, Xenophon is indicating that the Sinopeans should be ashamed of their accusations. He continues by saying that the rest of the soldiers, as the Sinopeans can see, are encamped outside of the Cotyrorites' houses, in formation, prepared, if anyone treats them well (εὖ), to treat these people well (εὖ) in return, and if anyone treats them badly (κακῶς), to repay that too. In saying that the Sinopeans can see where most of the army is, Xenophon may be attempting to make the Sinopeans feel ashamed that

⁹⁶ Dover (1974, 180-4) lists the most important passages portraying this attitude from Xenophon and his contemporaries.

they have deliberately ignored evidence about the Cyreans' actions that was before their eyes.

Finally, Xenophon tries to evoke fear in the Sinopeans. He refers to Hecatonymus' threat (ἠπειλήσας) to become allies with Corylas, the ruler of Paphlagonia, and the Paphlagonians, and says that the Cyreans are ready to take on the Sinopeans and the Paphlagonians together, because they have already fought far bigger enemies. Xenophon also says that the Cyreans might decide instead to become friends with Corylas, who, the Greeks have heard, desires (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the Sinopeans' city and coastal strongholds. He claims that the Cyreans will be good friends to Corylas by helping him take what he wants. Here, Xenophon is making a counter-threat and confronting the Sinopeans with the possibility that they may imminently face a strong enemy that has the power and intent to ruin them. Again, this anticipates what Aristotle later says about evoking fear. Xenophon represents himself as being unconcerned by the threat posed by the Sinopeans and their allies. Thus, the Sinopeans may lose confidence in the power of their own threat. They may also recognise that the Cyreans have a better chance of becoming allies with the Paphlagonian than they do.⁹⁷

The narrator says before Hecatonymus' speech that the Sinopeans are afraid (φοβούμενοι) for the city of the Cotyrorites, which they own and get tribute from, and for the territory around it, because they have heard that the Cyreans are ravaging it (5.5.7). However, they present themselves as confident, righteous and indignant. Xenophon appears to see through this false bravado and understand that the Sinopeans are bluffing. Thus, in his speech, he may be attempting to build on the Sinopeans' fear by undermining the reasons they presented for having confidence, namely that the Cyreans are in the wrong and that they could drive the Cyreans away.

⁹⁷ Buzzetti (2014, 17-18, 206 n.76, and 207 n.78) argues that in this speech, Xenophon puts a particularly positive spin on the Cyreans' dealings with the tribes he mentions, and even represents one tribe as fearsome when they were actually shown in the narrative to be weak. Thus, there is an element of deceit in Xenophon's portrayal. Further, Hutchinson (2000, 59) highlights passage 5.5.2-3, where the generals initially do not accept the Tibarenians' friendly gifts because they wanted to attack the Tibarenian fortresses. The leaders consult the gods, who warn them not to attack. Hutchinson points to this as an episode demonstrating that the army's "honour had slipped". While this does suggest that the army were not always as devoted to the principles that Xenophon outlined, at least they consulted the gods about it before acting. Xenophon also does not use this as an example in his speech, and so does not lie.

Immediately after Xenophon's speech, the narrator states that Hecatonymus' fellow ambassadors made it clear that they were angry (*χαλεπαίνοντες*) with Hecatonymus.⁹⁸ One ambassador gives a speech and claims that the Sinopeans did not go to the Cyreans' camp to make war but to demonstrate that they were friends. This speaker promises the Cyreans gifts of hospitality and that the Sinopeans will tell the Cotyrorites to aid the Cyreans (5.5.24). The Sinopeans fulfil their promises and the two sides are friendly to each other (5.5.25). It is not specified whether Xenophon actually evoked shame and fear in his audience. However, in dissociating themselves from Hecatonymus' criticism of the Cyreans and his threat to them, and claiming that they wanted friendship with the Cyreans, the ambassadors perhaps give away that they recognise, and indeed recognised before Hecatonymus' speech, that the Cyreans are not in the wrong and have the power to harm them. Thus, they may feel shame at having been called out on their false accusations. Also, if the Sinopeans feared for their territory beforehand, presumably they fear for their city more after Xenophon's speech.

Xenophon is speaking in front of the rest of the army too. Their reaction is not given, but they do not interject to criticise his words or to stop him speaking. Xenophon has been successful in defending the army's actions and counteracting the Sinopeans' threat because he demonstrated that he believed that the Cyreans had no reason to be ashamed, whereas the Sinopeans did, and because he was able to present the army's threat as more fearsome than the Sinopeans'.⁹⁹

Xenophon is unknown to the Sinopeans and so his choice of emotional appeal does not depend on what his audience already know about him. His *ethos* is

⁹⁸ It is possible that the other Sinopean ambassadors are only dissociating themselves from Hecatonymus' words because his appeal failed to shame or scare the Cyreans. Indeed, Hecatonymus gives a second speech to the Cyreans (5.6.3-10), which may suggest that the Sinopeans trusted him to speak on their behalf a second time, and therefore that he spoke as intended in his first speech. Rubinstein (forthcoming), however, notes that in Hecatonymus' second speech, he speaks in the first person singular, on his own behalf.

⁹⁹ By contrast, Hecatonymus' failure comes down to the *ethos* he has presented. Hecatonymus seems to believe that he and the Sinopeans in general are unknown to the Cyreans and that he does not have to take into account any prior reputation. Within his speech, Hecatonymus therefore creates his own version of the Sinopeans' character. Xenophon appears to know enough about the Sinopeans and their situation, including their relationship with the Paphlagonians, to recognise that Hecatonymus is not representing the Sinopeans accurately. Although Hecatonymus is introduced as someone who was thought of as being a clever orator (*προηγόρει δὲ Ἐκατόνυμος δεινὸς νομιζόμενος εἶναι λέγειν*, 5.5.7), his provocation of Xenophon, if not the rest of the army, indicates that he is far from this.

created through the speech itself. While he is not constrained by his reputation in his choice of emotional appeal, he is limited by the existing mood in his audience. He needs to choose emotions that will undercut Hecatonymus' projected confidence and exacerbate the Sinopeans' real feelings. The general demands of the situation also constrain Xenophon. Despite his claim that the army is willing to fight, he presumably does not want to make relations worse between the two sides and so has to attempt to evoke emotions that will persuade the Sinopeans to drop their opposition to the Cyreans without conflict.

We can briefly compare Cleanor's and Xenophon's appeals to shame and fear. Both have no reputation with their audience, but whereas Cleanor cannot convince his audience of the rightness of his claims, Xenophon can. This is because Cleanor did not understand his audience's standpoint and so could not convince the Persians about the rightness of feeling shame and fear. By contrast, Xenophon recognises the Sinopeans' standpoint, sees through it, and is able to undermine it. He appeals to beliefs and knowledge that he knows his audience has, and is able to prove that he is right. The Sinopeans are forced to respect Xenophon's words and feel what he wants them to feel.

Function of Emotional Appeals

It is clear that Xenophon's readers can learn what makes a successful emotional appeal and what does not from the examples that Xenophon includes throughout the *Anabasis*. As well as particular methods of evoking an emotion, such as describing the consequences of an action to instil fear, we saw that a leader needs to judge the prevailing mood of his audience to see whether he would be most likely to succeed by building on the prevailing emotion or attempting to counteract it. A leader also needs some understanding of how emotional appeals have their effect and on what kinds of people. Further, if a leader has already established a character with his audience, he needs to make use of this to reinforce his emotional appeal, while also taking into account any prior reputation. The demands and opportunities of the situation must also govern the emotions that the speaker appeals to. By comparing and contrasting certain attempts at emotional persuasion, we were able to see even more clearly why certain appeals failed or were successful. This was especially the case with speeches that followed each other, such as Proxenus' and Cyrus' attempt to

stop the fighting within the army. Speeches that are further apart can also be compared in this way, such as Cleanor's and Xenophon's response to outsiders, and Cyrus' and Cheirisophus' attempts to engender positive feelings towards themselves.

However, there is more to the presentation of emotional appeals than simply representing success and failure. For example, Cleanor's and Xenophon's arguments about whether to face or avoid a particular enemy were both successful in evoking fear, but it is clear that one is superior to the other. Clearchus' and Xenophon's methods and degrees of success are similar when they confront leaders about their fears, as are Clearchus' and Cheirisophus' when they speak to soldiers who are afraid. However, these leaders have different levels of success in their generalships overall, and so their persuasion attempts should perhaps be judged differently too. To explore these subtleties, the reader needs to take into account the narrative connected to the speech, which changes the interpretation that emerges from the speeches we have examined significantly. Thus, the speeches cannot be taken out of their context.

Firstly, we can examine the short and long-term harm or benefit that the emotional appeal causes. When Clearchus evokes fear and confidence in the leaders by explaining their options, he immediately benefits himself and the leaders by giving them a plan of action and an authoritative figure to rally behind. The gods have recommended this option to Clearchus, although we only have Clearchus' word for this, and so it seems to be the correct option to take. However, in the longer term, joining with the friends of Cyrus proves fatal. This is because Clearchus leads the Greeks to their destruction when he trusts Tissaphernes enough to bring the leaders and soldiers into his trap. By contrast, Xenophon's speech to Proxenus' captains benefits himself, the captains and the whole army in both the short and long term. He has immediately given the captains purpose and made them act usefully, and over the longer course, has set the army on its way to escaping the king. Cleanor's speech trying to persuade the Greek leaders to attack the enemy immediately could have caused harm to the army if Xenophon had not stepped in to redirect the fear that he had most likely evoked. Xenophon's speech here benefits himself and his audience in the short term by stopping the army following Cleanor's plan, and in the long term by enabling the Greeks to overcome the enemy.

Clearchus' successful persuasion of the soldiers to stay with Ariaeus and Tissaphernes benefits the army and himself in the short term, in that they have not rashly departed and caused further problems for themselves. However, in the long term, the Persians do prove to be treacherous. Clearchus was not only wrong in his logic but himself facilitates this treachery. The consequences of this speech are ambiguous because staying might have been the most sensible option at the time, even if it was later to cause harm. Despite the ambiguity over Clearchus' actions here, he is elsewhere capable of unequivocally benefitting the army in the short and long term. I briefly mentioned him evoking confidence in the soldiers when they were panicking by giving the herald an announcement to make (n. 90), which keeps them from acting foolishly in the short term and prepares them for the forthcoming confrontation with the king's troops in the longer term.

Because it is unclear whether Cheirisophus' appeal to a noble victory or a noble death has been persuasive, it is difficult to say whether he benefitted or harmed the army. He presumably did evoke confidence to face the enemy in certain members of his audience, in which case he brought benefit to them. However, the focus on death and the horrors that the king may inflict on the army perhaps actively harmed the mood of some of the audience.

Proxenus nearly makes the situation worse by failing to calm Clearchus. Thus, a speaker's failure to evoke an emotion can also be dangerous. Cyrus' speech evoking fear in the Greeks that he and they will be killed benefits himself and the Greeks immediately by breaking up the quarrel and keeping both himself and the Greeks alive. This benefit continues into the long term because there are no further quarrels between the divisions.

Cyrus' evocation of anger, fear, confidence and friendly feelings in the wake of Xenias and Pasion's desertion brings benefits to both Cyrus and the leaders in the short term, because the leaders are more eager to continue with the journey. In the long-term, both parties suffer when Cyrus is killed at Cunaxa, and the Greeks are left to fend for themselves. Cheirisophus' speech following his election to the sole command benefits himself and the army in the short term, because the army proceed to Heracleia. In the longer term however, the army's lingering doubts about Cheirisophus cause harm to the army and may even cause the army to divide into the

three groups that go their separate ways. Cheirisophus' successful evocation of hope regarding his ability to obtain ships benefits the Greeks in the short term by lifting their spirits. However, in the longer term, Cheirisophus has perhaps harmed the morale of the army and delayed it, and also affected his standing with the army. This appeal indicates that a leader must be able to back up his claims with actions and not raise false hopes.¹⁰⁰

Cleanor's unsuccessful attempt at evoking shame and fear in Ariaeus brings no benefit or harm to the army because it fails. By contrast, Xenophon's appeal to the Sinopeans brought himself, the army, and the Sinopeans benefit in the short term by stopping Hecatonymus carrying through his threat. In the longer term, Xenophon also benefitted himself, the army, and the Sinopeans by causing the Cyreans and the Sinopeans to become friends.

By examining the outcomes, we have seen that it becomes easier to differentiate between whether an emotional appeal should be emulated or not. We see two key issues here. Effective emotional appeals can be lethal if the connected advice is bad. There is also a danger of failing to connect with an audience and consequently of failing to persuade it to accept good advice. Thus, it seems that Xenophon is offering a more complex message about how one should and should not persuade. I propose, therefore, that the presentation of such a didactic message may be one role for the speeches in the *Anabasis*. Such a message may be made even clearer by examining how the speakers' leaderships end in the work, and I shall explore these in more detail in the next two chapters. Cyrus, Clearchus and Proxenus are killed by the Persians, Cheirisophus dies of an illness after his sole command collapses, Cleanor continues in an uneventful command, and Xenophon is rewarded for his leadership by the army. These endings suggest that there is a difference in the way the reader should interpret these leaders' periods of command, including the emotional appeals they make. In the examples we have examined, only Xenophon unequivocally brings benefit through his emotional appeals and ends well in the work.

The reader must also take into account the speaker's motives for making an emotional appeal. For example, despite Cleanor nearly causing harm to the army

¹⁰⁰ See *Cyropaedia* 1.6.19 for the dangers of raising false hope.

when trying to evoke fear, there is no evidence that he had anything other than a concern to benefit the army when he spoke. Similarly, although he is ineffective when trying to evoke shame in Ariaeus, he again seems to be motivated positively in attempting this. Cleanor is capable of evoking emotions, but can be characterised by his lack judgement in both of the appeals we examined. Proxenus likewise seems to have good intentions when trying to calm Clearchus, but, unlike Cyrus, he is unable to resolve the situation through an emotional appeal. This is a precursor of the narrator's later characterisation of Proxenus' ineptitude at evoking emotions. The narrator indicates in Proxenus' obituary that Proxenus is unable to inspire respect (αἰδῶ) or fear (φόβον) in his soldiers, and says that Proxenus feared making his soldiers hate (ἀπεχθάνεσθαι) him more than they feared the consequences of disobeying him (2.6.19-20).¹⁰¹ Because of this fear, Proxenus is himself a mild leader, who does not get angry with his men when they act wrongly but simply withholds praise. Consequently, the bad amongst his men plotted against Proxenus (2.6.20). This is despite the fact that he trained under Gorgias (2.6.16) and so should have been an accomplished speaker, able to evoke emotions in his soldiers. This mention of Gorgias locates the *Anabasis* within a certain intellectual tradition by assuming that the reader will understand what training under Gorgias should mean for Proxenus' abilities.

Again, there is no evidence to suggest that Cheirisophus was motivated by anything other than thoughts of the army's benefit in the three speeches we examined, although he may also have been concerned for his own power and reputation in his speech about his sole command. Like Cleanor, he can be successful in evoking emotions, particularly hope regarding obtaining ships, but in his speech appealing to noble death his success may only be partial, and his speech concerning his sole command does not achieve complete success in the longer term. This picture complements the characterisation of Cheirisophus elsewhere. He is often ineffectual and relies on Xenophon to provide direction for the army.¹⁰²

Cleanor, Proxenus and Cheirisophus can thus be characterised as meaning well but as being inconsistent in their abilities to persuade. If this was not dangerous

¹⁰¹ Benardete (1963, 11) links Proxenus to Hector in the *Iliad* because of their shared inability to lead bad men and to evoke respect or fear.

¹⁰² See Humble (1997, 81-91) for Cheirisophus' unsuitability for leadership more generally.

enough, in some cases their persuasion attempts cause or nearly cause harm to the army. They are not positive *exempla* to emulate in terms of success or outcome, although they are not entirely negative *exempla*, because their motivations are positive.

Ascertaining Cyrus' and Clearchus' motives is more complicated. The reader may be suspicious of Cyrus' motives for making a speech about Xenias and Pasion because all of his generous actions towards the Greeks, such as giving the soldiers more money and bonuses, can be linked directly to his aim of defeating his brother. His treatment of Xenias and Pasion, and his announcement about it, are thus likely to be motivated primarily by ensuring his own success rather than stemming from a genuine desire to be magnanimous. Indeed, by getting the leaders to feel positively towards him, Cyrus may deliberately be paving the way for telling the army the real aim of the mission, which follows shortly after and which is accepted with relatively little trouble, despite the Greeks learning that Cyrus has deceived them (1.4.11-13). When reading Cyrus' appeal, the reader may also think back to an incident in the earlier narrative, where Cyrus has two Persian officials who were accused (αἰτιασάμενος) of plotting against him killed without trial (1.2.20). This clearly demonstrates that Cyrus can be ruthless and is prone to anger and revenge, the opposite of the picture he is trying to present of himself. When discussing Cyrus' later trial of Orontas, Gray (2011b, 223-4) refers to Herodotus who states that Persians do not condemn a person the first time they commit a crime (1.137). While this can be seen in the case of Orontas, who Cyrus makes it clear he has been willing to forgive in the past and is now only reluctantly having killed (1.6.6-11), there is no indication that Cyrus gave the Persian officials a second chance. This may indicate that Cyrus' magnanimity in the Orontas trial was partly for show and that Cyrus was aware that Clearchus would report details of the trial back to the Greeks.¹⁰³ Thus, with his words about Xenias and Pasion, Cyrus may be deliberately trying to project an *ethos* that would appeal to the Greeks in order to ensure their good behaviour and loyalty for his own benefit.

The reader may also suspect that Cyrus' motives are selfish when he evokes fear in Clearchus and the other Greeks about his and their deaths. The reader knows

¹⁰³ Keaveney (2012, 32) concludes that Cyrus was acting on both "instinct and calculation" with Orontas.

that Cyrus is primarily concerned with the success of his own mission here because, by deceiving the Greeks as to the real purpose of his mission, Cyrus has deliberately brought them on a far more dangerous mission than they realised. As a result, Cyrus' concern for the Greeks here rings hollow, and he is thus characterised as a selfish leader. Combined with the long-term harm that comes from being persuaded by Cyrus, the reader may question how right Cyrus was to persuade his audiences by playing on their emotions, even though he does so successfully.

The reader may also have some suspicions about Clearchus' motives for his emotional persuasion. Regarding Clearchus' speech giving directions to the army, Buzzetti (2014, 87-8) argues that it is odd that Clearchus did not consult the gods about remaining where they are. He further argues that the evidence from the narrative suggests that there actually are provisions that could have sustained the army if it had remained, and that the information Clearchus provides about the Tigris is incorrect. Indeed, he demonstrates that Xenophon the character later recommends that the army remains where it is (3.2.24), indicating that it would be possible. Buzzetti links Clearchus' speech to Ariaeus' refusal to try for the Persian throne, and believes that Clearchus now just wants to return to Greece. If this interpretation is correct, Clearchus has misrepresented the situation to accord with his own desires.¹⁰⁴

Clearchus' appeal to confidence in order to persuade the army to remain with the friends of Ariaeus might also be selfishly motivated in part. When talking to Tissaphernes later, Clearchus offers him the Greek army (2.5.12-14), although the army currently believes that it is returning home. Clearchus has been exiled by Sparta (1.1.9), and the reader may believe that Clearchus has a need to keep the army at work, and that this was also his motivation when he appealed to the emotions of the leaders and the soldiers. Despite this, his evocation of calm when the soldiers were panicking seems to be motivated purely by what was best for the army at the time. Thus, Clearchus can be characterised as ambiguous in his use of emotional appeals. He can bring both benefit and harm and can be motivated selfishly and unselfishly. He is not always completely successful, but when he is, it can be dangerous for his audience.

¹⁰⁴ I also briefly mentioned Clearchus' attempt to evoke pity (n. 88). In the speeches that follow his weeping, Clearchus deceives the soldiers for his own ends. Thus, there is supporting evidence for interpretations regarding Clearchus' self-serving deception of others such as Buzzetti makes.

Although Cyrus and Clearchus are mostly successful in their emotional persuasion, the ambiguity of their motives clearly detracts from their success and prevents them from being positive *exempla*. In contrast, the narrator gives the reader no reason to doubt that Xenophon's motives for making emotional appeals are anything but positive in the speeches we examined. Xenophon is successful, brings benefits to his audience by his appeals and is motivated by the army's interests, although this naturally includes thoughts for his own safety. He thus seems to be a positive *exemplum*. Because the motives behind a speech can affect how the reader perceives the speaker, I propose that characterisation is another role for the speeches in the *Anabasis*. We shall see in the subsequent chapters that the audience of a speech can be characterised by whether or not they are persuaded too.

The nuances of the emotional appeals would not be possible if these speeches did not engage the reader with the speakers, their persuasion attempts and the outcomes. Often the emotional appeal is in response to a dangerous situation, which in itself involves the reader. The internal audience's emotions are usually heightened because of the current circumstances, and the reader's engagement might cause him to also be moved by a similar mood. For example, along with the soldiers, the reader may be suspicious of Ariaeus and Tissaphernes. If the reader identifies with the prevailing mood, he may be able to understand how effective the emotional appeals the speaker uses are, and why the speaker is successful or unsuccessful. Because the reader appreciates the situation and the mood of the audience, he may also recognise the need for the emotional appeal to be not only successful but also prudent, and anticipate the consequences if the prevailing emotions are not handled adequately. For example, the reader may fear what will happen to the soldiers if they act on the concerns they raise to Clearchus about the intentions of the Persians. The reader is thus likely to be concerned with understanding the outcomes of the speeches he has engaged with. The reader may himself also feel some of the emotions the speaker evokes. For example, when Cheirisophus raises hope about obtaining ships, the reader may feel positively towards him, like the internal audience, and later feel the blow when Cheirisophus lets them down. Through the appeals, the reader further engages with the speaker by understanding the emotions he typically tries to evoke, and why he makes the appeal. The reader also engages with the internal audiences by understanding what emotions do and do not move

them and whether the audiences can assess the quality of the advice given so that the decision they make will not be harmful for themselves.

Some of the speeches we examined above have other dramatic effects and ways of involving the reader. For example, after Xenophon has redirected the fear that Cleonor evoked about attacking the enemy, the reader may briefly consider what would have happened if Cleonor had successfully convinced Xenophon and the leaders to follow his plan because of the fear he evoked. Such consecutive emotional appeals can also be particularly effective in making the reader tense. This is especially the case when Proxenus' emotional appeal to Clearchus fails and Cyrus has to rescue the situation. Cyrus' appeal to fear in this speech may also cause the reader some surprise. Cyrus claims that his barbarian troops would be a threat to the Greeks but the narrator has not previously presented any animosity between the two groups in the narrative, although they were clearly competing against each other. This may make the reader question whether Cyrus was presenting the situation accurately. Some speeches also have particularly vivid descriptions as part of the evocation of emotions, such as Xenophon's speech to Proxenus' captains, which includes the details of what Cyrus' brother did to Cyrus' dead body. There is suspense created by this speech too because we wonder whether Xenophon will be able to influence the mood of his audience despite not being a leader and perhaps not even being well known to them personally. In light of all this, I propose that reader involvement is an effect of the speeches in the *Anabasis*.

In the following chapters, I shall analyse other speeches as successful and unsuccessful persuasion attempts, but also examine the didactic message, characterisation and reader involvement that stems from them to see further what Xenophon is attempting to achieve through the inclusion of his speeches. I next move to a different theme of persuasion: deception. It is clear that if a leader is skilled at verbal manipulation, he could use his skills for his own advantage. For example, he could mask that a decision could be harmful, or present his own character and motivations falsely. Indeed, we have seen that Clearchus, Cyrus and Xenophon all use elements of deception as part of at least one of the emotional

appeals we have examined.¹⁰⁵ However, even from the examples in this chapter, we have seen that the issue is not as straightforward as the use of deception rendering a speaker a negative *exemplum* and always causing harm.

¹⁰⁵ Clearchus deceives in his attempts to calm the panicking army and possibly in the speech where he gives orders to the leaders. Cyrus seems to deceive in his presentation of himself over the Xenias and Pasion affair and possibly regarding the danger the Greeks face from the barbarians in his army. Xenophon deceives in his presentation of how the army acted when talking to Hecatonymus.

Deceitful Speeches in the *Anabasis*¹⁰⁶

Before trying to persuade an audience, a speaker chooses whether to speak honestly or to deceive. Verbal deception can be particularly problematic in leadership contexts. In Athens, although the *demos* had the power to choose whether to follow proposals made by political leaders or not, such leaders could still successfully distort or misrepresent a proposal and what they foresaw as its outcome. This potential appears to have been so troubling, that a law was established ruling that anyone who deceives in his promises to the Assembly, Councils or law-courts should be punished by death (Demosthenes 20.100 and 20.135).¹⁰⁷

In an army context, private, conscripted soldiers are expected to obey the officers formally appointed by their city's Assembly or other decision making body while on campaign. However, these soldiers do have some control over the leaders. Hamel (1998, esp. introduction and 158-60) demonstrates that the Athenian *demos* could control their generals on military expeditions through their decision-making capabilities both in Athens and on the campaign, and through their ability to ruin the reputation of generals who opposed or neglected them after their term had ended. Despite this, the opportunity for leaders to deceive their soldiers still existed. As historiography represents it, during meetings convened by leaders to decide upon specific strategies and tactical moves, it is often the speeches that are decisive in the decision making process. On occasion, these are directed at private soldiers, who are asked for their opinion. While officers may feel constrained from deceiving other officers because of the specialised knowledge this type of audience possessed, deception can be extremely destructive when practiced on an assembly of soldiers who do not have the necessary knowledge to recognise it.

¹⁰⁶ This chapter will only consider the deception of friends or those on a speaker's own side. For the deception of enemies, see *Hipparchicus* 4.12, 5.2-3, 5.8-12, 5.15 and 7.13, *Agésilas*, 1.17, and *Memorabilia* 4.2.15. In these passages, Xenophon the author seems to use his characters and narrators to indicate that deceiving enemies is justified and that leaders should practice it. Danzig (2007) has investigated the deception of enemies in the *Anabasis* and demonstrates that the issue is not quite so straightforward in this work, however, because the narrator negatively portrays Tissaphernes, even though he skilfully deceives his enemies. Danzig concludes that it is the type of deceit used by Tissaphernes against enemies that Xenophon the author disapproves of, namely perjury, which is especially problematic because it has the potential to weaken a leader's command. For further investigations of deceitful stratagems against enemies in warfare, see Wheeler (1988), Roisman (1993) and Krentz (2000).

¹⁰⁷ Hesk (2000, 51-5) highlights further references to this law: Demosthenes 49.67, Aristotle *Athenaion Politeia* 43.5, Xenophon *Hellenica* 1.7.35, and possibly Herodotus 6.104-36.

A leader of mercenary soldiers does not face the same threat of being held accountable upon his return to his home city, but the obedience of the soldiers under him is less secure. Because his soldiers can desert him at any time, he has to represent himself as someone that they can trust, as someone who has their desires and interests at heart, and as someone who is recommending what is best for them. Because of this, a mercenary leader may be more inclined to deceive than an officer in command of troops conscripted from his own city. This may particularly be the case because, as a mercenary himself, the leader may have his own desires and aims that diverge from those of his soldiers. To exacerbate this, there may be no clear hierarchy among the mercenary leaders, which may encourage jockeying for position through support of the soldiers or a paymaster. Such paymasters may also be inclined to misrepresent the nature of the employment opportunity that they are offering in order to ensure that troops will undertake the mission.

Xenophon's Narratorial Opinion on Deceit

This potential for deceit clearly hangs over the speeches in the *Anabasis*, and, indeed, the narrator provides numerous examples. Thus, by investigating how the author confronts the issue of the verbal deception of friends, we may be able to understand his aims further. The issue is complicated though. The narrator openly condemns the deception of friends in his obituary for Menon by denouncing Menon's continuous and systematic deception of his associates (2.6.22-6). The narrator also represents Xenophon the character as saying that it is shameful to deceive friends (7.6.21). This comes in a speech where Xenophon is justifying why he is not ashamed to be deceived by Seuthes, however, and so it aids his defence to express these sentiments. Despite these two negative comments, the narrator represents Xenophon the character, as well as Cyrus, Clearchus and Timasion, verbally deceiving audiences who are on their side. We have seen that there is some ambiguity in the representation of Cyrus and Clearchus, but Timasion is a generally positive character and, so far, we have seen that Xenophon the character seems commendable in his verbal appeals. Thus, there appears to be a contradiction here between what the narrator indicates it is right for a leader to do and what even positive leaders do. We must ask whether there is a way to determine the author's actual standpoint on the deception of friends by leaders.

Looking for a consistent approach to the deception of friends elsewhere in Xenophon's *oeuvre* does not shed light on the issue. At *Agesilaus* 11.4, the narrator claims that Agesilaus classed the deception of those who trust the deceiver as unholy (ἀνόσιον). Because this comment occurs in an encomium, the reader can take for granted the narrator's endorsement of this view. Yet, in the *Hellenica*, the narrator explicitly approves of Agesilaus deceiving his troops because it stops them deserting and allows them to win a particular battle (4.3.12-14).¹⁰⁸ Between these two comments there seems to be a contradiction similar to the one we find in the *Anabasis*.¹⁰⁹

Because there is no definitive narratorial comment on deceiving friends, and because the leaders that deceive in the *Anabasis* are all either explicitly or implicitly characterised well at some point in the work, we must examine each occasion of verbal deceit in order to ascertain what Xenophon the author's view on the topic is. Cyrus deceives his brother (1.1.8), subordinates, friends (including, indirectly, the soldiers working under them, 1.1.6 and 1.1.11), and the Greek army (1.3.20), while Clearchus deceives the soldiers (1.3.5-6, 1.3.9-13 and 1.3.15) and Cyrus (1.8.13). Timasion, who becomes a general after the death of the original commanders, deceives friendly Heracleot and Sinopean merchants (5.6.19-20), while Xenophon deceives the Greek army (3.2.18-19, 3.4.46, 4.8.14, 6.1.25-9 and 7.1.22) and the Greek army, two Spartan ambassadors, a Thracian leader and his aide (7.6.41). Again, we must examine the speeches as persuasion attempts and link the speech to the narrative, in order to examine how the narrator guides the reader's interpretation

¹⁰⁸ For further deception in the *Hellenica*, see 1.6.36, 4.1.2-15, 5.4.13, and 6.4.22-5. See also Gray (1981) who argues that Xenophon displays an interest in the manipulation of others within the dialogues of the *Hellenica*.

¹⁰⁹ This inconsistency is also reflected generally in Greek literature. On the one hand, deceit is often condemned. For example, see Achilles' denunciation of Odysseus' deceit (*Iliad*, 9.312-13). Particularly in Greek oratory, we find warnings for the audience to be on guard against the deception and insincerity of the speaker's opponents, as well as outright accusations of deception (for instance, Aeschines 3.168). See further Kremmydas (2013) for 'the discourse of deception' in fourth century Athenian oratory, as well as Hesk (2000, 220-91). Nevertheless, there are also depictions of speakers who deceive friends but who are not outright villains. Odysseus, for example, deceives his friends and family but receives praise as well as condemnation in ancient and modern times. See further Pratt (1993, 58 and 85-94) for the moral concern Odysseus' deceit of others occasions, as well as Stanford (1950 and 1968, 22), who defends Odysseus' lies against friends. Similarly, we find references to special circumstances under which it is acceptable to deceive friends. Plato's Socrates advocates the 'noble lie' by which leaders in the city can deceive the populace in order to make them care for the state and each other more (*Respublica* 414b.8ff.). See Hesk (2000, 163-99) for further passages relating to the noble lie.

of the deception. We must also compare and contrast how the different leaders deceive their friends.

How does the Narrator Present Deceptive Speeches and How is the Reader Made to Detect Deception?

Narratologists routinely discuss the unreliability of the narrator, but, in the case of deceptive speeches, it is the characters that are unreliable. Chatman (1990, 149-53) devised the term “fallible filtration” to describe incidents when the thoughts or speeches that characters are made to present are at odds with what the narrator tells the reader elsewhere. These thoughts or speeches can be “inaccurate, misled, or self-serving”. On some occasions, writes Chatman, the narrator draws attention to the filter character’s ‘fallibility’; on others, the narrator does not guide the reader explicitly, but the reader is still able to recognise that a thought or speech is fallible. Chatman believes that the intended effect on the reader is that the narrator is inviting him to share in the irony that they both know that a certain character is fallible. Chatman is primarily discussing moments when characters are mistaken, but in the *Anabasis*, deliberately deceptive speeches are presented similarly.¹¹⁰

Xenophon the narrator sometimes directly draws attention to the deceit and, on other occasions, simply provides enough information so that the reader understands that a character is being deceitful without being told this explicitly. In both cases, but above all in the second case, the reader must actively compare the

¹¹⁰ Chatman does not take his concept further, and the idea has been largely undeveloped since. Nünning (2008, 66) commented that the question was not with the existence of fallible filtration (also called ‘unreliable focalization’ or ‘fallible focalization’) but with what benefit recognising a fallible character brings to the reader. He refers to two articles which discussed Chatman’s idea (Jahn 1998 and Schubert 2005) but which failed to advance a theory for this concept. Indeed, Jahn is concerned with making slight refinements to the model and with placing it in relation to prior scholarship, rather than explaining how and why it is used. Schubert applies the concept to analysing fictional texts in which a focalizer is restricted from fully perceiving his environment due to hindrances such as bad lighting. He concludes that this device is used for atmospheric and entertainment purposes, including retardation and suspense. Both Schubert (2005, 207) and Olson (2003, 101-5) work from the premise that fallible focalizers fail to perceive correctly due to external restrictions rather than “intellectual” or “ethical” reasons. Olson categorises such deliberate misperception as untrustworthy narration. Chatman (1990, 150), however, states that fallible filters are not aware that they are acting as narrators and so cannot be classed as such. Further, Chatman perceives the narrator to be a separate entity that can directly comment on or imply the fallibility of the character in question. In the case of the *Anabasis*, then, the closest term to apply may be ‘fallible filtration’ rather than ‘unreliable narration’. This chapter will extend the discussions surrounding this concept by focusing on deliberate rather than mistaken focalizations in non-fiction, and by suggesting what the reader can learn from them.

speeches with the earlier and later narrative. For some deceitful speeches, the narrator indicates that a speech will be deceitful before the speaker gives it, which allows the reader to see the deceit unfold. On other occasions, the narrator confirms or reveals the deceit after the speech. By exposing the deceit, the narrator places the reader in a privileged position compared to that of the internal audience. In some cases, the reader has to recognise the deceit without any explicit help from the narrator, and he remains on the level of the internal audience. The reader may assume that a speech is deceitful, based on contradictions between what he believes the speaker knows and what he says, and between what he believes the speaker's motives are and what he claims. If the reader has judged correctly, this is confirmed later in the narrative.

Methodological Approach

The selection of deceptive speeches directed at friends in this chapter is based on the definition that a speech is deceptive when a speaker deliberately uses words to make his audience believe something that he knows is false. The speaker must intend to deceive when he speaks. Consequently, this chapter does not discuss situations where characters are forced to go back on an agreement originally made with honest intentions because circumstances have changed.¹¹¹

After examining the speeches as successful and unsuccessful attempts at deception, I examine the speeches according to the three roles and effects proposed in the previous chapter. It is clear that the variety of different ways to present the deceptive speeches to the reader creates reader involvement and encourages him to examine the speeches, speakers and outcomes further. Again, the speaker is characterised by exploring his motives for deceiving his friends and the type of deception he uses. Sometimes the narrator will reveal a speaker's motivations before a speech, and these can then be compared to the motives the speaker claims. When the narrator does not reveal a speaker's motives, the reader has to attempt to reconstruct them based on prior characterisation. The reader may form a judgement about the leader's trustworthiness based on how his motives and words match. An evaluation as to the advisability of the deception attempt may also be made when the

¹¹¹ See Bolmarcich (2007) who discusses the inbuilt flexibility of treaty-oaths to cover unforeseen future conditions that may make agreements impossible to adhere to.

reader understands the outcome of the deception and whether it brought benefit or harm. Further, the way the speaker's leadership terminates in the work can be linked to his deceptive speeches and again this elicits judgement about how justified the leader's deception of others was. In these key areas, the leaders who deceive can be compared and contrasted. This again prompts an evaluation on who acted rightly and who acted wrongly, and the author's own standpoint on the deception of friends is revealed. In the final analysis, only Xenophon emerges as a positive leader in respect to his deception of others.

Examples

Cyrus' Deception of Friends and Subordinates (1.1.6 and 1.1.11)

Cyrus deceives Greek commanders who are his friends when he faces the problem of how to get troops to work for him, and he also deceives garrison commanders within the cities that he has under his command. After the death of Cyrus' father, Cyrus' brother Artaxerxes becomes king (1.1.3). Tissaphernes soon accuses Cyrus of plotting against his brother, yet Cyrus' mother saves Cyrus and supports him over Artaxerxes (1.1.3-4).¹¹² The narrator says that Cyrus returns from danger and dishonour (κινδυνεύσας καὶ ἀτιμασθείς) and aims never to be controlled by his brother again, and to replace him as king (1.1.4). The narrator states that Cyrus goes on to collect a Greek force with as much secrecy as possible so that he might take the king as unprepared as he could (ἀπαρασκευότατον, 1.1.6).

The narrator places the reader in a privileged position compared to the internal audience because he makes the reader aware of Cyrus' real aims from the start. Thus, when the narrator presents Cyrus telling his garrison commanders to enlist men because *Tissaphernes* was plotting against their cities (1.1.6), the reader is immediately aware that Cyrus' aims and words do not match and that he has chosen to deceive others as to the real purpose of his mission. At 1.1.11, the narrator reveals

¹¹² Danzig (2007, 31) argues that the narrator's use of διαβάλλει in relation to Tissaphernes' report means 'hostile' rather than 'false'. This suggests that the narrator is remaining neutral in his judgement on Cyrus' guilt. Other accounts, such as Plutarch's *Artaxerxes*, suggest that rumours existed during Cyrus' lifetime that Cyrus attempted fratricide without any cause in a sacrilegious plot (3.1-5). Xenophon's readers may be aware of these rumours but the narrator does not mention the past negative behaviour of Cyrus or Clearchus. These characters start with a relatively clean slate in the *Anabasis*. See Braun (2004) for details of Cyrus' and Clearchus' behaviour before the events of the *Anabasis*.

that Cyrus ordered Proxenus to bring men to fight against the *Pisidians*, while he directed Sophaenetus and Socrates to bring men for a war on *Tissaphernes*. The narrator also says that when Cyrus wanted to begin his march, he claimed a desire to drive the *Pisidians* from his land, although the narrator does not specify whom the audience of this particular assertion is (1.2.1). Cyrus also uses the cover of restoring the Milesian exiles to Miletus for gathering troops (1.1.7).¹¹³

Cyrus' speeches are presented in *oratio obliqua*, so there is little chance to see how Cyrus presents his *ethos* and appeals to his audience's emotions. Cyrus must feel, however, that he has enough authority to tell the garrison commanders what to do and strong enough relations with his friends that they trust him and would want to work for him, or at least would feel obliged to do so. Thus, his existing *ethos* and reputation back up his deception. Cyrus clearly believes that the reasons he offers for undertaking a mission with him are appealing, or at least not deterring, particularly because he tailors them for different audiences.

Because Cyrus' aims and words do not match, the reader may expect Cyrus' actions not to match his words either. Indeed, confirmation that the various aims he gives for the mission are deceptive is provided by following the progress of the army. The army neither proceeds against Tissaphernes nor the Pisidians. Thus, the type of deception Cyrus uses is to invent untrue pretexts (*προφάσεις*).¹¹⁴ No response is indicated from the garrison commanders or Cyrus' friends but they appear to do as Cyrus requested (1.1.11 and 1.2.1). This does not confirm that they believed Cyrus' deceit, but that they complied without question seemingly because the request is attractive to them in some way.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Cyrus similarly deceives his brother by focusing on the conflict between himself and Tissaphernes when he sends Artaxerxes a message at 1.1.8. The narrator's subsequent comment clearly defines Cyrus' message as deceitful; he says that because of this message the king did not perceive the plot (*ἐπιβουλήν*) against him.

¹¹⁴ So called by the narrator at 1.1.8 and 1.2.1, and by Clearchus at 2.3.21.

¹¹⁵ There are parallels here with Seuthes, whom the army later works for. Like Cyrus, Seuthes may also deceive the Greeks about his true aim. Dillery (2001, 566) provides a reference to Archibald's (1994, 458) argument that Seuthes "was trying in fact to establish an independent kingdom" rather than recover his ancestral land, as he claims. Unfortunately, neither Archibald nor Dillery explain how they arrive at this from Xenophon's text at 7.2.31-4. It is possible that the original reader saw Seuthes' claim as being self-evidently deceptive, but I shall not examine this speech.

Cyrus' Deception of the Greek Soldiers (1.3.20)

At Tarsus, the soldiers refuse to go on when they guess the real aim of Cyrus' mission (1.3.1), but Clearchus rescues the situation for Cyrus, who is perplexed (ἀπορῶν) and distressed (λυπούμενος) by the mutiny (1.3.3-20), as we shall see in the next example. Clearchus finally makes the soldiers back down when he and his associates persuade them to send ambassadors to question Cyrus about his intentions. The narrator indicates no motive for Cyrus' subsequent deception of the soldiers. Cyrus must still have the motive of secrecy, but his choice to deceive may also be affected by the strong feelings of the men against continuing with a mission that they were not hired for.

The narrator presents Cyrus telling the ambassadors in indirect speech to report to the soldiers that they are going against Abrocomas, his enemy, who is close by. In direct speech, the narrator then presents Cyrus as saying that if Abrocomas has already departed, he and the army will deliberate about the matter (1.3.20-1). Cyrus must believe that his claim will pacify the soldiers and that they will be willing to undertake such a mission. Cyrus' assertion that he will deliberate with the army if Abrocomas has fled seems to represent him as wanting to give some decision-making power to the soldiers, which may be designed to appease them further and to demonstrate that he values their opinions.

The narrator does not explicitly signal to the reader that Cyrus' words are untrue, but the reader knows that Cyrus' main mission is against the king. Thus, Cyrus' aims and words do not match. In fact, the army does go against Abrocomas, but only in the process of going against the king (1.4.1ff.). Thus, the type of deception that Cyrus uses here is to be economical with the truth by omitting to reveal the long-term aims of the mission. The narrator says that, while the soldiers suspected Cyrus' real aim, they still decided to follow him (τοῖς δὲ ὑποψία μὲν ἦν ὅτι ἄγει πρὸς βασιλέα, ὅμως δὲ ἐδόκει ἔπεσθαι., 1.3.21; c.f. 3.1.10 where the narrator confirms this). Thus, they do not believe the *ethos* he presents. The soldiers request more pay, which Cyrus gives them (1.3.21). This perhaps indicates that they were persuaded to continue the mission because they know from Cyrus' prior reputation

that they are likely to be able to gain further financial reward from Cyrus. By continuing with Cyrus, the soldiers react as if his deception had worked.¹¹⁶

Clearchus' Deception of the Greek Troops (1.3.5-6, 1.3.9-13 and 1.3.15)

As mentioned above, Clearchus deceives the troops when the army has refused to proceed at Tarsus. This takes place over the course of three speeches, and the first speech is addressed only to Clearchus' own troops. Before Clearchus' speech, he tried to force his troops to continue with Cyrus, but they became angry and tried to stone him, and he only just escaped with his life (1.3.1-2). At this point, the narrator reveals Clearchus' inner thoughts; when he realised that he could not succeed with force (ἐπεὶ ἔγνω ὅτι οὐ δυνήσεται βιάσασθαι), he called a meeting of his troops (1.3.2). There is no indication that Clearchus has altered his aim of getting the men to continue with Cyrus, and so the reader must assume that Clearchus is simply trying a new approach- persuasion- rather than reconsidering his position, as he goes on to claim. This aim also drives his subsequent two deceitful speeches.

Clearchus' deception of his troops is revealed when his words do not match his motivation to continue the march. Thus, the reader comes to understand as he is reading the speech that Clearchus is being deceptive. Before the speech, Clearchus weeps, which throws the soldiers off-guard and makes them wonder (ἐθαύμαζον) and be silent (ἔσιώπων, 1.3.2). This is because the soldiers know Clearchus as someone more likely to punish others than make them pity him. Clearchus is perhaps trying to stun the soldiers out of their anger. He may also be attempting to lessen any suspicion about the complete change of mind he goes on to present. Because the reader knows that Clearchus is simply changing tactics, he might be sceptical about the sincerity of Clearchus' tears and assume that he is trying to manipulate his audience's emotions. Tuplin (2003a, 126) and van Wees (1998, 16) observe that Clearchus' weeping is reminiscent of Agamemnon's tears at *Iliad* 9.13-15, when Agamemnon has given up hope and wants the army to go home. The reminder of Agamemnon at his most honest and vulnerable, if the soldiers make this connection,

¹¹⁶ Buzzetti (2014, 63) argues that Cyrus also deceives the army at 1.8.15 when he tells Xenophon to announce that the sacrifices and omens were favourable, because there was no time for him to actually have conducted the sacrifices. There is no evidence to confirm this, however.

may be designed to add an air of earnestness to Clearchus' portrayal of himself even before he begins to speak.¹¹⁷

During his speech (1.3.3-6), Clearchus talks about how he became friends with Cyrus and what he and his soldiers did before joining with Cyrus. Everything Clearchus says seems geared towards appeasing the men and winning back their trust, friendly feelings and gratitude. He presents himself as someone who has previously provided for them when he could have frittered away the money given to him by Cyrus, and also as someone loyal to the Greeks rather than barbarians, because he involved his men in a war on behalf of Greece (ὕπερ τῆς Ἑλλάδος). He depicts himself as distressed and as being caught between loyalties to two different parties, perhaps attempting to make the men feel pity for the predicament he faces.

Clearchus specifies that he has the choice between deserting his men and retaining Cyrus' friendship or playing false (ψευσάμενον) with Cyrus if he follows his men. He claims that he wants to repay Cyrus for the benefits (εὖ ἔπαθον) Cyrus gave to him, which depicts him as a good man trying to do what is right by everyone. He says, however, that he chooses to follow his men, even though he does not know if this is right (δίκαια), and that he will suffer for it if necessary. Thus, he presents his loyalty to his soldiers as overcoming both moral issues and fear. He also declares that never will anyone say that he abandoned (προδοῦς) the Greeks and chose barbarian friendship instead, reiterating his devotion to Greece.

Clearchus next reconfirms that he will follow the men, because they are fatherland, friends and allies to him. This emphasises the depth of his feeling for his soldiers and may be designed to evoke friendly feelings for him. Clearchus goes on to say that he will be honoured if he remains with the men, while without them he would be unable to help a friend or harm an enemy. In this, he depicts himself as someone who recognises the power that the soldiers give him and treats others as they deserve. Finally, he reiterates that he will go wherever his men lead. Overall, Clearchus tells the men exactly what they want to hear. So far in the work, the reader

¹¹⁷ See further Föllinger (2009), Suter (2009) and Lateiner (2009), who discuss weeping in Homer, tragedy and historiography. Xenophon's portrayal of characters crying is probably influenced by the representation of weeping in all of these genres. Other cases of crying in Xenophon's works may well indicate the heroic nature of the weeper's choices, as Lateiner believes, but he does not consider Clearchus' tears, which are more sinister.

has next to no information to go on regarding Clearchus' relationship with his men. Thus, it is difficult to know whether they would believe his character projection here. Presumably, Clearchus based his *ethos* in this speech on the same character that he had presented to them when they fought under him.

Shortly after the speech, the narrator confirms that Clearchus' actions do not match his words and that he deceived his men (1.3.8).¹¹⁸ He describes Clearchus communicating with the perplexed and distressed Cyrus, unknown to the soldiers (λάθρα δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν). Clearchus reassures Cyrus that he will bring about what is necessary (ἔλεγε θαρρεῖν ὡς καταστησομένων τούτων εἰς τὸ δέον). Clearchus also advises Cyrus to keep sending for him but says that he will refuse to go. The reader can now pick out the deceit in Clearchus' speech. Clearchus has not chosen his men over Cyrus but is trying to retain the friendship of both. His statement that no one will accuse him of abandoning the Greeks in favour of barbarians is proven to be false too, because, by highlighting that Clearchus is still furthering Cyrus' plans, this is what the narrator is claiming. The word the narrator represents Clearchus using to mean abandon, προδοῦς, describes a capital crime. For Clearchus' internal audience, this choice of word indicates the force of his conviction and makes it sound as if Clearchus could never contemplate doing such a shocking thing. However, because the reader comes to know that Clearchus is deceiving here, in hindsight this word actually condemns Clearchus and his choice to put Cyrus' interests and his own aim first, without the narrator explicitly having to do so. The narrator's comments may also confirm to the reader that Clearchus' tears were false. Further, Clearchus' words about his soldiers being fatherland, friends and allies to him may take on a new meaning. Tsagalis (2002, 103 and 126) argues that these words, and the whole framing of the speech, should remind the reader of Hector and Andromache's exchange at *Iliad* 6.392-502.¹¹⁹ Tsagalis contends that by evoking Andromache and Hector, Xenophon is making a tragic allusion to Clearchus' death. However, because Clearchus is deceiving, there may be a more sinister interpretation. Discussing this

¹¹⁸ It seems impossible to take the view of Pearson (1962, 153) that Clearchus was being genuine in this speech.

¹¹⁹ This is despite the fact, Tsagalis argues, that in antiquity Pseudo-Dionysius linked Clearchus' speech to Phoinix's attempts to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting at *Iliad* 9.433-605 (*Ars Rhetorica*, 302-3). Tsagalis argues that Pseudo-Dionysius only links the two speeches because both Clearchus and Phoinix say one thing while having another aim in mind. Thus, this allusion would have no effect on the soldiers who do not realise that Clearchus is deceiving them.

allusion, Tuplin (2003a, 126) argues that “exploit[ing] a classically affecting scene as a strategy for manipulation is surely shocking”. If Xenophon the author did intend for this link to the *Iliad* scene to be made, and if the reader is meant to believe that the soldiers also made the connection, it might indicate to the reader Clearchus’ cynical manipulation of his audience’s emotions.

The narrator states that when the soldiers from Clearchus’ own contingent, along with soldiers from other contingents, hear that Clearchus will not go on, they commend (ἐπῆνεσαν) him and more than two thousand troops commanded by other leaders come over to him (1.3.7). This reaction shows the strength of the soldiers’ desire not to go on and is a complete volte-face from the men wanting to stone him before the speech. The reader, having recognised Clearchus’ deception of the men, may not have such positive feelings towards him.

Because Clearchus arranged that Cyrus will call for him, but that he will not go, the reader is aware that Clearchus plans to make it appear to his soldiers that he is adhering to his choice to follow them. Thus, the reader will suspect that Clearchus is going to continue his deceit. Indeed, soon after, Clearchus makes a second speech to his soldiers and the others that had joined him or wanted to be present (1.3.9-12). Contrasting his first speech, the reader understands that Clearchus’ audience now feels positively towards him. Clearchus claims that Cyrus feels wronged (ἀδικεῖσθαι) by the Greeks and that he personally declines Cyrus’ requests to go to him primarily because he is ashamed (αἰσχυνόμενος) at being proved false (ἔψευσμένος) to Cyrus and also because he is afraid (δεδιώς). Clearchus’ message to Cyrus has indicated that shame and fear are not the reason Clearchus refuses to go to Cyrus and that Cyrus is feeling bewildered rather than wronged. Thus, the reader knows that Clearchus’ representations of himself and Cyrus are both false in the immediate situation. Clearchus here continues his pretence that he is concerned by thoughts of what is right and wrong.

Clearchus next recommends that the soldiers consider what they should do to remain safe because, although Cyrus is a good friend, he is also a fearsome enemy (χαλεπώτατος δ’ ἐχθρὸς ᾧ ἂν πολέμιος ᾖ). Again, the narrator’s previous description of Cyrus’ confusion confirms Clearchus’ deception of the troops. The narrator does say in Cyrus’ obituary that Cyrus is ferocious in punishing wrongdoers (1.9.13), and

we saw that some leaders feel pity for Xenias and Pasion should they be caught by Cyrus (1.4.7), and so it may be that Clearchus anticipates that the soldiers do think of Cyrus as fearsome. However, Clearchus is aware that his description of Cyrus is not an accurate reflection of Cyrus at the particular time that he presents it. Regarding his own character, even though Clearchus is not described as fearless to the reader until his obituary (2.6.7), the internal audience knows this about Clearchus. Thus, if Clearchus is afraid of Cyrus, this suggests that the soldiers should be too. Clearchus falsely presents himself as a voice of warning and as someone who has the soldiers' safety in mind. He concludes by saying that others should propose plans for what to do next. Here he falsely presents himself as someone who is willing to listen to others and be led by them, and as someone who has relinquished control to the men, but in reality, it facilitates his next deception.

Following straight on from this speech, people whom Clearchus has prepped (ἐγκέλευστοι) control the subsequent debate and demonstrate the difficulties of leaving without Cyrus' consent (1.3.13-19). The reader must assume that Clearchus arranged this intervention before his second speech, and this demonstrates further that Clearchus is carefully stage-managing his deception of the soldiers. Having seemingly unconnected people back up his argument helps to persuade the audience by illustrating that Clearchus is not the only one to have such fears. One of these men, who is pretending (προσποτούμενος) to be in a hurry to return home, says that other generals should be chosen if Clearchus does not want to lead them (1.3.14). In response, Clearchus modestly declines to lead the men because he sees many reasons why he should not do so and claims that he will obey (παίσομαι) whomever they choose (1.3.15). Here Clearchus is presenting himself as someone who has the best interests of the men at heart and who wants the person who is most fitting to lead them. This furthers the presentation of himself as bowing to the men's decisions. The reader may suspect deception here because the man who made the suggestion has been set up to speak by Clearchus, and because Clearchus has thus far retained his control over the men by deceiving them, despite him apparently relinquishing his power to the soldiers in his first speech. Kelly (1977, 29-30) argues that by not leading the retreat, Clearchus is deliberately trying to make the situation seem harder for the soldiers, because they will be disillusioned by him not commanding them. Thus, they may be more inclined to continue with Cyrus.

It is not until later in the narrative that the narrator confirms Clearchus' words here to be false. He reveals that Clearchus desired to have the army for himself (2.5.29) and that Clearchus does not like to be led by others (2.6.15). Indeed, it may be noticed by the reader that in his speech Clearchus only says that he will obey whomever the army chooses *as best he can* (ὡς δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἂν ἔλησθε πείσομαι ἢ δυνατὸν μάλιστα). Perhaps he will not try very hard. Another speaker follows Clearchus and argues that the army cannot trust Cyrus and that ambassadors should ask Cyrus what he wants the army to do for him (1.3.16-19). The narrator does not confirm whether this man's speech was arranged by Clearchus or not, but because it accords with Clearchus' aims, the reader may suspect that it was.

With these speeches, Clearchus has carefully stage-managed his deception of others. After Clearchus' series of deceptions is complete, the men agree to go to Cyrus to ask what he wants from them (1.3.20), and the army eventually follows Cyrus again, as Clearchus wanted. The types of deception that Clearchus uses are active falsehoods, misrepresentations of himself and Cyrus, aspects of performance to back up his words, such as weeping, and getting others to speak for him. The soldiers are persuaded because they have no reason to doubt the words of Clearchus and his associates and believe that they are concerned for the army's well-being.

Clearchus' Deception of Cyrus (1.8.13)

Clearchus deceives Cyrus before the battle of Cunaxa over Cyrus' orders to lead the Greeks against the centre of the king's army (1.8.12). The narrator states before Clearchus' reply that Clearchus did not want to follow Cyrus' instructions because he was afraid that the troops would be encircled (1.8.13).¹²⁰

In response to Cyrus' orders, the narrator presents Clearchus telling Cyrus in *oratio obliqua* that he is taking care that all goes well (αὐτῷ μέλει ὅπως καλῶς ἔχοι). Here, Clearchus presents himself as being concerned to work in Cyrus' interests, perhaps attempting to evoke trust and friendly feelings. Indeed, Cyrus already appears to trust Clearchus, perhaps because Clearchus resolved the mutiny at Tarsus for him. After the mutiny, Cyrus invites Clearchus to be present at Orontas'

¹²⁰ There is debate over how individual words in this passage should be translated. See Knapp (1916), Bridgham (1917), Scoggin (1917) and Mather (1917).

trial and asks for his opinion first (1.6.5-10), and also give Clearchus a position of power, leading the right wing of the army (1.7.1).

Because the reader knows that Clearchus does not intend to follow Cyrus' orders, the deception is revealed. Clearchus does not actually lie, but words his answer so that he gives the impression that he will act in a way that he will not. Cyrus does not respond to Clearchus, but Clearchus presumably convinces Cyrus that he is going to follow Cyrus' instructions. The trust Cyrus feels for Clearchus explains why Cyrus believed Clearchus' vague response.

Timasion's Deception of the Heracleot and Sinopean Merchants (5.6.19-20)¹²¹

During the return journey, Timasion deceives the Heracleot and Sinopean merchants after Silanus the soothsayer tells the army that Xenophon wants to make the army settle down where it is to win himself a name and power. The narrator says that some of these merchants are present at the time when the soldiers learn about Xenophon's inquiries regarding settling the men where they are. This suggests that these people are friendly with the Cyreans and able to pass freely amongst them. While some soldiers think that the army should settle down, most think that they should not (5.6.19). The narrator provides no motives or aims for Timasion's deceitful speech.

Timasion and Thorax tell the merchants that if they do not pay the Cyreans enough to provision themselves for the journey, they may stay where they are. The actual deception occurs when Timasion and Thorax claim to quote what Xenophon has told them to say to the soldiers when the ships arrive: the army has no means of getting provisions for the journey or of taking anything back for those at home, and so the soldiers should choose a place around the Euxine to land the ships and make an attack. Afterwards, the soldiers have the choice to return home or remain there. Timasion and Thorax present themselves as being concerned for the local people. They play on the locals' fear that the Cyreans will either ravage the area or permanently settle there, and they rely on the locals' desire to get the Cyreans to leave. Timasion and Thorax tell an active falsehood and the audience has no opportunity to check the accuracy of their statement or confirm the character they

¹²¹ The narrator indicates that Thorax jointly makes the speech with Timasion, but it is unclear whether he is a leader or not. He is unknown to the reader before this episode and does not appear again after.

present. The reader has more knowledge than the internal audience does, however. This is not because the narrator has provided access to the thoughts of Timasion and Thorax. Rather, it is because the narrator has not reported Xenophon telling anyone to say to the soldiers what Timasion and Thorax claim he did. Indeed, it would seem unlikely to have happened because the reader knows that Xenophon has only enquired of the gods as to whether he should broach the subject of settlement with the men at this stage (5.6.19-20). The merchants take the message to the cities and Timasion sends Eurymachus and Thorax with them to make the same report. The Sinopeans and Heracleots urge (κελεύουσι) Timasion to arrange for the army to leave and give him money (5.6.21). They perhaps believe him because their fear overrides any scepticism.

Xenophon's Deception of the Army (3.2.18-19, 3.4.46 and 4.8.14)

Xenophon's first three deceptions can be discussed together because they are of a similar type. He first deceives the soldiers when he is trying to persuade them to act after the Persians have killed the majority of the leaders. We saw in the last chapter that the soldiers are completely dejected at this point. Xenophon the character seems to have articulated the aims and motives for his first deception at 3.1.39-44. Here, Xenophon recommends to the new leaders that they should gather the soldiers together to encourage them (παραθαρρύνητε), make them more cheerful (πολὸν εὐθυμότεροι), and inspire goodness (ἀγαθοὺς) in them. He recommends doing this so that the men will be more confident going into battle and will be more likely to succeed.

During Xenophon's speech to the assembly, he says that the army does not need to fear the enemy horsemen (3.2.18-19). He says that horsemen are really just men because no-one has ever been killed by horses biting or kicking them. The horsemen, he says, are afraid both of the Cyreans and of falling off their horses, while the Greeks are on safer ground. Because of this, the Greeks will be able to strike more strongly and are more likely to hit their targets. He concludes this topic by saying that the only advantage the horsemen have over the foot soldiers is that it is safer for them to flee. The reader may suspect at the time of reading the speech that this is a deception because the narrator has previously revealed that part of the army's despair is caused by the lack of horsemen (3.1.2). Soon afterwards, the deceit

is confirmed when the enemy horsemen cause the army trouble (3.3.9-10). Indeed, Buzzetti (2014, 138) notes that it is only a day later that Xenophon puts together a company of horsemen (3.3.16-20). Xenophon is not simply mistaken here or being hopeful, but deliberately deceiving the men through false assurances. The readers would know Xenophon as an experienced cavalryman who would recognise the dangers of the enemy cavalry. Perhaps the internal audience would also know of Xenophon's background in the cavalry, although we cannot assume this. If they do know this about him, Xenophon would be using his reputation to present a persuasive *ethos*. As the narrator presents it, Xenophon and the soldiers have not interacted thus far and so he cannot build on any pre-established character that they would recognise. Xenophon presents himself as knowledgeable about cavalry battles and the advantages various types of troops have over each other, and as being confident that the Cyreans do not need to be concerned. He also characterises the horsemen as fearful, perhaps evoking some contempt of them. They are the opposite of the Cyreans, whose confidence he tries to evoke.

Xenophon performs his second deception when the Greeks are fighting Tissaphernes' army and both sides are racing to be first to the top of a mountain. The narrator describes the Greek soldiers urging each other on (3.4.45), and so they appear eager. Again, it is clear that Xenophon speaks in order to get the men to act in a certain way, because the narrator says that Xenophon exhorted (*παρεκελεύετο*) the men. Xenophon tells the men to strive for Greece, children and wives, and that they only need to put in a small amount of effort in order to be able to complete the remainder of the journey without further resistance (3.4.46). He seems to be trying to evoke confidence and relief that the army is nearly safe. Xenophon presents himself as someone who values his country and family and as someone who is confident that the army's plight is nearly at an end. This does not appear to draw on any particular presentation of his character thus far, except his repeated demonstrations that he is keen to lead the army home. He may simply be identifying his desires with the army's, while encouraging the soldiers to remember these desires too. The reader may be suspicious about how true Xenophon's statement is when reading this speech because he knows the extent of the trouble the Cyreans faced. Indeed, Xenophon's assurance is shown to be false when the army faces further enemies.

Xenophon's third deception comes when the Greeks encounter a fully formed up Colchian army. Neither Xenophon the character nor Xenophon the narrator reveals the aims or motivations for this speech, yet it closely resembles his second deception and so the reader might assume that Xenophon intended to exhort the men again. The soldiers are not directly characterised, although they have formed up ready for battle (4.8.14). Xenophon again says that only the current enemy is blocking the soldiers' way to the place that they have long been trying to get, and that they should eat the enemy raw if possible (4.8.14). He is seemingly trying to evoke desire for home, confidence that the army will be there soon, and hatred of the enemy. Xenophon again presents himself as knowledgeable about the situation, as understanding that the men have long been desiring to go home, as desiring this himself, and as believing that the enemy is an obstacle that needs to be destroyed. Between his last deceptive speech and this speech, Xenophon has established himself as acting well for the army, as giving good advice, and as demonstrating excellent judgement.¹²² Thus, in this speech, the *ethos* that he has drawn from these actions may reinforce his recommendation. Again, the reader may be suspicious that this will not actually be the end of the army's troubles, and he may also be reminded that the last time Xenophon made this assurance, he was wrong. Again, the narrative demonstrates that there are further enemies for the army to face.

There are no specific responses that indicate whether Xenophon has successfully deceived the men or not on these three occasions, or even whether he has successfully encouraged them. The soldiers later believe that Xenophon is deceiving them on several occasions, but these accusations stem from different incidents, and there is no indication that the soldiers have noticed Xenophon's earlier deceptions. The soldiers are certainly not afraid to express their suspicions of Xenophon later, and already one man has criticised him at 3.4.47. Thus, perhaps we would have expected the soldiers to accuse Xenophon over these three deceptions, if they had suspected him of trying to deceive them, especially because he is a new leader. For all three of these deceptions, the reader remains on the level of the internal audience. He may be taken in by Xenophon's false assurances, or may be suspicious about Xenophon's ability to predict the future and whether Xenophon reveals the full extent of his knowledge about the cavalry. The narrator does not

¹²² See 4.3.10-13, 4.3.20ff., 4.4.11-13, 4.5.7-9, 4.5.15-19, 4.7.3-7 and 4.8.10-13.

suggest that the reader is particularly meant to recall Xenophon's deceptions when the Cyreans do have trouble with the enemy cavalry and when they meet further enemies whom they have to fight. Thus, the reader may question whether the narrator wants him to judge these speeches as deceitful at all, or whether the assertions are simply motivational rhetoric that is not really meant to convince anyone.

Xenophon's Deception of the Army (6.1.25-9)

Xenophon also deceives when the soldiers offer him the role of sole commander. The narrator reveals that all the speakers in the assembly want a sole commander and that they nominate Xenophon (6.1.25). Xenophon has learnt in advance that he will be offered the role, and the narrator has provided Xenophon's inner thoughts about whether to accept the role or not. Xenophon wants to accept the role because it would increase his honour amongst his friends, because his name would be greater when it reached his city, and because he could use his position to do good things for the army. Conversely, he is worried that he will lose the good reputation that he has already won because of the role (6.1.20-2). Because Xenophon is unable to decide, he consults the god who says that Xenophon should neither ask for the role nor take it if he is offered it (6.1.22-4). Thus, Xenophon's aim in his speech to the army is to refuse the sole command, although the narrator does not reveal why Xenophon chose to deceive the army in the process.

When the soldiers nominate Xenophon, he does not reveal that the gods told him not to take the role. Instead, he says that it would not be beneficial (συμφέρον) to either himself or the army for him to be elected as sole commander when a Spartan is present. If he were in charge, the army would be less likely to receive favours from the Spartans, and it would not be safe (ἀσφαλές) for him because the Spartans are likely to punish him personally for nullifying their authority. He claims that he will not be at variance with the leader they choose but that, if they choose him, someone will be vexed (ἀχθόμενον) with them and him (6.1.26-9).

Xenophon presents himself as happy and grateful to the army for honouring him, and prays that he will be able to return the benefit in the future. He therefore appears to value the army and what it offers him, and to recognise that the soldiers

have the power to give him honour and a leadership position. He also comes across as someone who wants to benefit the army and as someone who is concerned with what it is right and advisable for the army to do. Further, he represents himself as not planning to act factiously if the army chooses another commander and as being concerned that whoever is elected is best for the army. Thus, he seems to have the army's interests and safety at heart, and to understand what the army will need from the Spartans. By this point in the narrative, Xenophon has further established himself as someone who prioritises the army's interests and so his *ethos* would ring true.¹²³ The army seems to recognise this part of his character because they want him to be the sole commander in order to further their own interests. Xenophon also presents himself as being concerned with his own safety, which perhaps makes his concerns seem more realistic. He gives a historical example as to why it is likely that the Spartans will not accept an Athenian as the leader of the army and thus presents himself as being politically aware and as knowing what effect the army's actions will have on the political landscape. By providing evidence to back-up his argument, Xenophon's audience may be more inclined to believe his words and his *ethos*.

Xenophon may be trying to evoke the friendly feelings and gratitude of the soldiers for trying to act in their interests. He also perhaps tries to evoke fear of what the Spartans will do to the army in the future, as well as fear of their wrath from inside and outside of the army. Xenophon may further be trying to evoke confidence in the soldiers that they can employ someone else in the role without Xenophon causing trouble.

In this speech, Xenophon is suppressing the truth by omitting to reveal what really motivated his decision. The reader is raised above the knowledge of the internal audience here, because the narrator has presented Xenophon's inner thoughts and the god's reply, and has not mentioned the Spartans as influencing Xenophon's decision. Thus, the deception is revealed. Xenophon fails to persuade the soldiers that they should elect Cheirisophus, and the narrator says that more people want Xenophon as leader. Agasias says how unfair the situation is if Spartans automatically expect leadership roles, and others back him up (6.1.30). Xenophon

¹²³ See 5.1.5-14, 5.2.16-19, 5.2.24-7 and 5.4.16-21 for the good Xenophon has recently done for the army, although Xenophon has also had to deal with criticism and distrust from the army (5.6.17-19, 5.7.1-4 and 5.8.1-11).

has aroused anger at the Spartans rather than fear.¹²⁴ Xenophon speaks again and reveals that the gods advised him not to take the role, which persuades the army not to elect him (6.1.31). If anyone in the audience recognises that Xenophon initially tried to suppress his real reasoning, no one comments on it. After this, the men follow Xenophon's recommendations and choose Cheirisophus (6.1.32). Thus, Xenophon achieves the same result as if he had persuaded the army with his deceptive speech.

Xenophon's Deception of the Army (7.1.22)

Xenophon also deceives the army over his intentions. Anaxibius, the Spartan admiral, has told the Cyreans that he will not pay them and that they must leave Byzantium, but that he will send them home and make a record of them. The soldiers are angry because they have no funds with which to buy provisions (7.1.7). When the army has left Byzantium, the gates are barred and Anaxibius tells the Greek leaders to get their provisions locally and then to go to the Chersonese, where Cyniscus will employ them (7.1.12-13). When word reaches the army, the soldiers attempt to get back inside the gates, but these are shut before the soldiers reach them. The soldiers hammer on the gates, claiming that they have been treated unjustly in being thrown out to the enemy, and threaten to break them down. Some of the soldiers scale the walls and those who happen to be inside the walls still open the gates to allow the rest of the army in (7.1.14-18). When the men see Xenophon, they say that he has the opportunity to be a man. They remind him that he has a city, triremes, money and many soldiers. They claim that he could help them and that they would make him great (7.1.21). Before Xenophon deceives in response to this, the narrator has revealed that Xenophon has gone into Byzantium with the men after the gates have been opened because he was afraid (*δείσας*) that the army would turn to plunder (*ἄρπαγήν*) and cause damage to the city, himself and the soldiers (7.1.18). This suggests that when Xenophon replies to the soldiers, he is motivated to try to stop the army attacking the city somehow, but it does not explain why he chooses to deceive his audience.

¹²⁴ Strauss (1975, 141) writes "whether and to what extent the anti-Spartan reaction was intended by Xenophon perhaps as a warning to the irascible Spartan candidate against misuse of his power in case of his election, it is impossible to say". There is no evidence, however, that Xenophon intended to do anything other than convince the army to elect Cheirisophus.

In reply to the men's request and offer of greatness, Xenophon gives the impression that he will lead the soldiers to sack Byzantium by telling them that he will do the things they said (ποιήσω ταῦτα) and by telling them to form up ready for battle (7.1.22). Xenophon presents himself as someone who values the opportunity the soldiers give him, and as the kind of leader who follows what his men tell him to do. Xenophon has continually demonstrated that he works in the interests of the soldiers,¹²⁵ and so his audience may believe this *ethos*. Particularly, Xenophon's renunciation of his thoughts about settling the army when the soldiers objected to it (5.6.31) may have demonstrated this to them. He is perhaps trying to evoke the emotions of gratitude and friendly feelings towards himself. Indeed, the men are angry and so cannot immediately be reasoned with. Xenophon is not actually lying here because he only agrees to help the soldiers rather than agreeing to lead them.¹²⁶ In fact, he does go on to help them by stopping them sack Byzantium. He is suppressing the truth of what he plans to do by carefully choosing his words.

Because the narrator earlier revealed Xenophon's inner thoughts, the reader recognises that Xenophon's words do not match his motivations and aims. Again, the reader has more knowledge than the internal audience. The narrator also reveals that Xenophon wanted to calm the men down (βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς κατηρεμίσαι). Some editors of the *Anabasis* place this clause before Xenophon's deceitful response to the men, and some place it after.¹²⁷ The positioning of this clause has different effects on the reader in terms of understanding the speech as deceitful. If placed after Xenophon's response to the men's request for help, the reader might wonder as he is reading the speech whether Xenophon the character has changed his mind since 7.1.18 about the advisability of storming Byzantium. The narrator would then be confirming Xenophon's deceit, as well as his intentions. Placed before this speech, the clause makes Xenophon's motives clearer, although it is perhaps unnecessary

¹²⁵ See 6.2.6, 6.3.10-24, 6.4.12-26, 6.5.9-10, 6.5.14-21, 6.5.23-4 and 6.6.5-35 for recent examples.

¹²⁶ See also Higgins (1977, 88), who argues that Xenophon plays down dangers but does not lie.

¹²⁷ The Loeb edition locates the clause before Xenophon's words, but a note by Dillery reveals that, in the manuscripts, this clause appears after Xenophon's response. Dillery writes that the move was proposed by Schenkl and followed by Gemoll and Peters. Schenkl (1868, 628) suggested moving this clause to a location before the speech because he believed that its connection to the surrounding text was loose if located after the speech. He argues that it fits better grammatically following ἀπεκρίνατο and allows καὶ αὐτός to follow ὡς τάχιστα more appropriately. This clause has evidently caused editors much trouble because Cobet (1898) even goes as far as to delete it.

because of the inner thoughts provided at 7.1.18.¹²⁸ In any case, the men appear to believe that Xenophon will lead them against Byzantium because they start to follow his orders to prepare for battle (7.1.23). He is successful because he tells the men what they want to hear and because they have no reason to doubt him.

Xenophon's Deception of the Army, Charminus, Polynicus, Heracleides and Seuthes (7.6.41)

When the Cyreans agree to undertake an offer of employment from the Spartans, an Arcadian blames Xenophon for leading them to the region and for arranging for them to fight under Seuthes, while also accusing Xenophon of being enriched by Seuthes and defrauding the men of their pay. The Arcadian wants Xenophon stoned to death for this, and others back this speaker up (7.6.8-10). After Xenophon defends himself (7.6.11-38), the Spartan ambassador Charminus says that the soldiers are being unjust about Xenophon (7.6.39), and Eurylochus says that the Spartans should lead the army in trying to obtain the money that Seuthes owes (7.6.40). After Eurylochus' speech, Polycrates, whom the narrator reveals is incited (ἐνετὸς) by Xenophon, speaks. He blames Heracleides for stealing the proceeds from the sale of the booty that the Cyreans had won and says that the army should take hold of Heracleides because he is a Greek wronging other Greeks (7.6.41). The whole deception is revealed in the word ἐνετὸς.¹²⁹ Thus, the narrator again gives the reader more knowledge than the internal audience. The type of deceit that Xenophon uses here is to pass off his words as someone else's. Immediately after the speech, Heracleides reacts as if he is guilty by telling Seuthes that they need to ride away (7.6.42). This suggests that Polycrates, on behalf of Xenophon, was speaking truthfully, and indeed, the accusation accords with the narrator's previous presentation of Heracleides' scheming character. There is no response in word or deed from the army, and so it is unclear whether they were persuaded to blame Heracleides.

¹²⁸ Because the manuscripts place the clause after Xenophon's speech, I am inclined to follow this.

¹²⁹ The term is not necessarily negative. At *Cyropaedia* 1.6.19, Cyrus' father uses this term when recommending that Cyrus should have others speak for him when he is unsure of the truth of a statement, so as not to lose the trust of his men. This is again a form of deceit, but it is part of Cambyses' recommendations for good leadership. I am not suggesting, however, that Xenophon is presenting a false message through Polycrates.

Similarities between the Deceptions of Friends

In these deceptions, there are many similarities in context, character projected by the deceiver, character perceived by the deceiver's audience, and the methods used. Xenophon's and Clearchus' deceptions are particularly comparable. For example, both deceive by carefully choosing their words. Xenophon does this when he allows the soldiers to think that he is going to do as they have asked of him at Byzantium, and Clearchus does this when he deceives Cyrus and at times during his deception of the soldiers. Both project themselves as being at the service of the soldiers and the soldiers believe them. Both leaders also misrepresent the enemy, although they do this in opposite ways. Clearchus makes the men fear Cyrus and represents opposition against the soldiers increasing, while Xenophon tries to alleviate the fear of the enemy cavalry and play down the number of enemies the army will encounter in the future. Both project themselves as being knowledgeable, confident and as understanding how others think. They also similarly arrange for people to speak on their behalf to the army. Further, they both refuse sole command, and in the process of this, project themselves as being concerned with what is best for the army.

Cyrus' and Xenophon's deceptions of friends can also be compared. Both use deception to make the mission seem easier, Cyrus by misrepresenting who the opponents are and Xenophon by making the cavalry seem less fearsome and the enemies seem fewer. Also, both omit information or present half-truths, Cyrus to the soldiers about the mission and Xenophon as to why he is refusing sole command. Both ultimately have to reveal the truth.

Clearchus and Cyrus deceive the soldiers to make them continue into Persia when they have stopped. Xenophon also uses deceit to persuade the army to move on, but this is when they are in immediate danger. Timasion also tries to get the entire army to move, but in the direction of home. Although Timasion deceives people outside of the army, his deception resembles Clearchus' deception about Cyrus' character and feelings towards the Greeks. Both leaders misrepresent what another thinks because they want their audiences to think that a particular course of action would be best for them. Both Timasion and Clearchus project themselves as accurately representing others for the audience's benefit, and their audiences believe

them. Timasion's deceit is also like Cyrus' because both use deception in order to encourage the army to follow them as leaders.

Function of the Deceitful Speeches

Given that there are various similarities between the deceitful speeches, we should examine the surrounding narrative in more detail to establish where the real differences lie. To do this, I shall examine the deceitful speeches under the three heads identified in the last chapter.

Reader Involvement

The dramatic effects arising from the deceitful speeches do not differentiate between the leaders' use of deception, but once the reader has been drawn to noticing the deceit, he begins to form an opinion about the character of the deceiver and what lesson he can learn from the persuasion attempt. When the reader is made aware that a speaker will be deceitful in advance of a speech, the reader engages with the text in paying attention to how the speaker deceives and how the internal audience reacts. If the reader only suspects that a speaker may be deceiving, the reader again pays close attention to uncovering the deceit. When the reader discovers after a speech that a speaker was being deceitful and that he was taken in along with the internal audience, the reader may feel personally affected by the speaker's use of deceit and react emotionally to it. Thus, the method the narrator uses to reveal the deceit to the reader engages the reader through different effects. Once a speaker has deceived an audience, the reader is suspicious of further deceit and thus closely involved in interpreting the subsequent speeches.¹³⁰

Other dramatic effects stem from the deceitful speeches, including suspense at what might happen if the internal audiences discover that they are being deceived. This question particularly hangs over Cyrus' deceitful speeches because he is deceiving the army about the aim of the entire mission and because there are several occasions on which the soldiers suspect Cyrus' real aims and will not go on. The reader presumably knows that ultimately the soldiers will continue with Cyrus but engage with finding out how he persuades them to do so. Regarding Clearchus'

¹³⁰ See Wencis (1977) who highlights how the characters' suspicions also serve to involve and create tension for the reader. See further Kingsbury (1956) who briefly examines the dramatic nature of the *Anabasis*, including the drama created by speeches.

deception of the army, the reader is kept in suspense over what would happen if the soldiers realise that Clearchus is deceiving them into continuing with Cyrus, given that they were prepared to stone him earlier for trying to make them proceed. Similarly, before Xenophon's deception of the soldiers at Byzantium, the men are angry and therefore may take their emotions out on someone who attempts to deceive them. Again, if the men thought that Xenophon was trying to clear his own name by having Polycrates speak for him, they might have attempted to stone him, as the Arcadian who speaks to accuse Xenophon wants to do. The narrator has shown that the soldiers are repeatedly suspicious of Xenophon and believe that he is deceiving them, although they believe this at times when he is not actually deceiving them. If they actually caught Xenophon in deception, their anger might lead them to rash actions.¹³¹

The narrator creates surprise for the reader through the deceitful speeches. For example, the reader recognises that the soldiers end up doing what Clearchus wanted in the first place and are perhaps surprised that the men fail to spot Clearchus' deception, even though they are already aware that he is trying to get them to proceed. The reader may also have expected Xenophon to say that the gods told him not to take sole command immediately and be surprised when he talks about the Spartans objecting to his appointment.¹³² Further, when the soldiers recognise that Cyrus is actually leading them against the king but follow him despite his deceit, the reader might be surprised that the soldiers did not react angrily. There is also some surprise in Timasion' deceit of the merchants, because there has been no indication that he would tell such a blatant lie.

¹³¹ See, for example, 5.7.2. The men suspect that Xenophon is deceiving them into leading them back to the Phasis and the narrator says that it was to be feared that the men might do what they had done to the Colchian heralds and market-clerks, i.e. stone them to death.

¹³² The narrator may also further play with the readers' expectations in Xenophon's deception over the sole command. Here, the reader may recall Nicias' attempt to exaggerate the cost of the expedition to Sicily (Thucydides 6.20-3). Like Nicias, Xenophon's attempt to prevent his audience from doing as they wanted backfires and their respective audiences are more eager to attack Sicily and have Xenophon as leader. In Thucydides, Nicias is ultimately forced to take command of the expedition. Similarly, at 4.27-8, Cleon attempts to distract from awkward questions by taunting his opponent. He says that if he were in command he would undertake a mission against Sphacteria. This again gets an unintended response. His opponent resigns his command and the audience urges Cleon to take on the leadership and carry out the mission. Again, Cleon is forced to accept the command. Xenophon's readers who are familiar with Thucydides may suspect that, like Nicias and Cleon, Xenophon will also have to take the command, but he is able to escape from it.

As well as being surprised, the reader may also be shocked that Clearchus is risking confusing Cyrus in the middle of battle by disobeying Cyrus' orders. Alternatively, the reader may not be surprised because he has already seen Clearchus' extensive deception of others. The reader may still feel suspense after this deception, because he knows that Cyrus is expecting Clearchus to act in a certain way but that he will not do so. The reader has to anticipate how this will affect the battle. The narrator emphasises Cyrus' ability to make others loyal to him, and so it makes it all the more surprising that Clearchus was ultimately disloyal to Cyrus.

Xenophon's deceptive speeches are less clearly deceitful than Cyrus' and Clearchus'. The ambiguity concerning whether some of them should even be regarded as deceptions may actually engage the reader further into the narrative. Purves (2010, 159-95) interprets the narrative after the Greek leaders are killed as reflecting the disorientation, sense of being lost, lack of end-point, and hopelessness of the soldiers. Xenophon's deceptions occur during this stage and so may similarly reflect the increased difficulty of separating truth from lies that the men might be feeling at this stage of the march, especially because the men have to rely even more heavily than usual upon their leaders while they are in danger. The lack of clarity over Xenophon's deceptive speeches may encourage the reader to think even more about the relation of the speech to narrative.

Characterisation

Cyrus, Clearchus, Timasion and Xenophon all use verbal deception in their first or one of their first speeches in the work. Thus, their deception of others reflects on their entire characterisation. Rather than the use of deception itself or even the form the deceit takes simply condemning the leaders, it is the motives behind the deception of others that really allow the reader to form a true picture of the leaders' character from their deceptive speeches.¹³³

¹³³ Kremmydas' (2013) argument that accusations of deception in Attic oratory are partly used to characterise the accuser positively reminds us that, by drawing attention to deception, Xenophon the narrator may be projecting his own *ethos* as someone who is honest, reliable, has integrity and is the only one who can reveal the truth about the characters to the reader.

Cyrus

Cyrus takes a risk that the Greeks would turn back from his mission if they discovered his deceit, but his far-sightedness, calculation and stage-management ensure that this does not happen. While Cyrus' success at deceiving his audience indicates his skill at persuasion and a good understanding of his audience, his motives for using deceit are problematic. The narrator indicates that Cyrus deceived when gathering his army because he wanted to keep the mission a secret. Secrecy is often a necessary and acceptable reason for deceiving friends and constitutes an aspect of good leadership, but not the way Cyrus uses it.¹³⁴ Ultimately, Cyrus' secrecy is self-serving, rather than being for the good of the men who work for him, and is geared towards getting others to do as he needs. Cyrus is fixated with killing his brother and taking the throne because he has been maltreated, rather than because it is just and right. His selfish aims drive him to deceive others and make promises that he cannot keep. His deception of others makes the mission safer for him but more dangerous for them.

The soldiers' reaction when they find out the real aim of the mission indicates that they would have been unwilling to join Cyrus without the pretexts he offered. The narrator says that the men were fearful (φοβούμενοι) of the journey and unwilling (ἄκοντες) to go on, although the majority continued out of shame (αἰσχύνην) before each other and Cyrus (3.1.10).¹³⁵ As mercenaries, the soldiers need to know that they are likely to survive the mission and that they are not taking excessive risks. We have seen that Cyrus understands what drives people. Thus, Cyrus might have anticipated that deception was the only way to persuade the men to undertake a mission voluntarily against the king and his allies. Indeed, in Diodorus' account, which draws on Ephorus, this is made explicit; Cyrus' reason for not telling the troops the real aims of his mission stems from a fear that the troops may abandon his mission if they knew its magnitude (*Bibliotheca Historica* 14.19.9).

When the soldiers do find out the truth in the *Anabasis*, they ask for more money to continue (1.4.12). Again, Cyrus may have anticipated that if the mercenaries had agreed to fight the king at the beginning of the mission, they would

¹³⁴ Cyrus the Great uses secrecy to good effect at *Cyropaedia* 2.4.17ff.

¹³⁵ Clearchus also claims that shame motivated the army to continue (2.3.22).

have requested more wages from the start. Cyrus' inability to pay an increased wage may be another reason why he chose to use deceit. By 1.2.11, Cyrus already owes the soldiers more than three months' pay, but if his lack of funds had become known sooner because he was paying them a higher wage, the soldiers may have been able to abandon Cyrus successfully.¹³⁶ This inability to pay the men until aided by the Cilician queen throws into doubt Cyrus' ability to back up his later promises of pay and his reputation for generosity.

When the soldiers hear the real aim of the mission, they assume that the generals all knew the truth from the beginning and deliberately kept it from them (1.4.11-12). Indeed, in Diodorus' account, all the commanders *were* aware of the real aim from the beginning. In the *Anabasis*, however, only Clearchus knows the real aim (3.1.10), even though the commanders were mostly handpicked friends.¹³⁷ Thus, Cyrus must believe that the leaders, as well as the soldiers, have reasons not to want to attack the king. Examining why Cyrus only informed Clearchus of his aim further demonstrates why the Greeks might not have wanted to attempt a mission against the king and that Cyrus is being more than just cautious for the good of his army.

By the time the narrator reveals that Clearchus knew Cyrus' aim, the reader has heard that Clearchus is fearless, has been given money by Cyrus, and is an exile. Thus, Clearchus would not object to the mission because he was afraid, or because he has not been paid enough, as we have seen that the others might have done. He is also in constant need of employment and would not fear political repercussions in Sparta caused by fighting against the king. This suggests that the other leaders, and perhaps also the soldiers, might have less of a pressing need to fight and might have political reasons for not wanting to attack the king. Indeed, Socrates warns Xenophon of the possible implications of befriending Cyrus (3.1.5), and Xenophon

¹³⁶ Higgins (1977, 84) argues that Cyrus shrewdly prolongs his deceit until the men had come too far to return alone and had no choice but to continue with him. See also Brennan (2005, 37-8), who argues that Cyrus may have decided that the longer he could spin out the deception, the more chance he would have of talking the Greeks into continuing. There is no evidence in the narrative to confirm either argument, but both are possible.

¹³⁷ Some scholars argue that Xenophon is deliberately misrepresenting events here. Bassett (2001, 12), for example, says that Cheirisophus at least would also have known because he was sent officially by Cyrus' Spartan allies. See Herman (1987, 100), however, who notes that the text only states that Cheirisophus was responding to Cyrus' call (μετάπεμπτος ὑπὸ Κύρου, 1.4.3). This may not have been the summons made officially to Sparta but a private call.

may even have been exiled for his part in Cyrus' expedition.¹³⁸ The current political situation was complicated. The Spartans had previously surrendered the Ionian cities to the Persians in return for Persian support against the Athenians. Cyrus had been sent by his father to oversee the Ionian coast and to help the Spartans against the Athenians, and he formed a close bond with the Spartan leader Lysander and gave the Spartans his own money for the war effort. Because of the treatment by Tissaphernes of the Ionian cities, all but Miletus successfully revolted and went over to Cyrus. Cyrus treated them well and looked after the Milesian exiles, yet Artaxerxes did not back the Spartans or approve of Cyrus' relations with the Ionians. When Cyrus asked for help for an expedition, the Peloponnesians may have been inclined to aid him because the best chance for the Ionian cities to regain their freedom was to place Cyrus on the throne. The Peloponnesians may also have felt obliged to help Cyrus after his personal involvement in their affairs. However, they would also fear fighting against the king and evoking his wrath.¹³⁹ Cyrus' real aims would be high risk for the Greek cities to be involved in, and even mercenary leaders and soldiers may have appreciated this.¹⁴⁰ Cyrus is thus professing lower risk aims to gain support.¹⁴¹

It is questionable whether anyone in the Greek cities would believe that the soldiers and leaders had been duped by Cyrus into going on the mission. Thus, while Cyrus benefits by gaining himself an army, he leaves the Greeks to face condemnation at home later. Cyrus also does not appear concerned about the impact of the deceit on the relationship between the soldiers and the leaders when he asks the commanders to reveal the truth to the men. By revealing the truth in this way, he allows the soldiers to blame the generals, and his own reputation does not seem affected.

Despite Cyrus' selfish motives, no character blames Cyrus for his deceptions of others. Likewise, the narrator does not explicitly condemn him. Προφάσις can be

¹³⁸ See Tuplin (1987) and Badian (2004, 40-2).

¹³⁹ For fuller treatment of these events see Lewis (1977, 119-23 and 130-9), Dillery (2001, 22-4) and Stronk (1990-1). See also *Hellenica* 1.4.3-7, 1.5.2-3 and 3.1.1-3.

¹⁴⁰ See Brennan (2005, 37-8), who also argues that Cyrus' secondary reason for deceiving the army was that the Greeks would not have undertaken the mission. He argues that this is primarily because they still recalled Xerxes' destruction of Athens, though.

¹⁴¹ English (2012, 55) even argues that Cyrus tailored the pretexts he offers to where the mercenaries were recruited from or first stationed.

translated with a variety of words such as ‘explanation’, ‘pretext’, ‘cause’, or ‘excuse’,¹⁴² but, as Hirsch (1985, 23) comments, the term is neutral in tone and does not constitute a judgement by the narrator. The narrator does make it clear that Cyrus, through Proxenus, deceived Xenophon the character (3.1.10). This may suggest that the narrator wants to distance Xenophon as far as possible from perpetrating this deception, because it is negative in some way.

Clearchus

Clearchus’ deception of others characterises him as willing and able to use a variety of techniques to persuade others. Like Cyrus, his deception is not a spontaneous response to a desperate situation, but is carefully pre-planned. The complexity and stage-management of his deception demonstrates how skilled he is in forethought and anticipation of what will persuade others. He knows what *ethos* will best make his audience trust him and which emotions to manipulate. Testament to this is the strong reaction he receives to his first deception. Clearchus’ deceptions of others reveal him as wanting to be in control, and wanting to have others follow and rely on him. Using deception, Clearchus gets others to do what he desires, makes others trust him, and strengthens his leader position.

Xenophon the author, via the narrator, has rendered Clearchus’ deception of others a central part of Clearchus’ characterisation and leadership. Indeed, it is unclear how Xenophon himself knew about certain aspects of Clearchus’ deception, such as Clearchus’ secret message to Cyrus or that Clearchus had prepped men before the debate at Tarsus. Kelly (1977, 166, n. 201) even notes that *Cyrus* settles the mutiny at Tarsus in Diodorus’ account (14.20.4-5), again demonstrating that Xenophon the author has the narrator foreground Clearchus’ deception of others. It may be that Xenophon is playing on the fifth and fourth century Athenian stereotype of Spartans who say one thing and think another.¹⁴³ Indeed, Millender (2012, 388)

¹⁴² See in particular Hornblower (1991, 64-5), Heubeck (1980), Rawlings III (1975), Pearson (1972 and 1952), and Gomme (1945, 153) who investigate its meaning.

¹⁴³ This challenges the categorisation of Xenophon as a Laconophile. Much work has been done recently to combat this perception of Xenophon. See Millender (2012, esp. 417), Gish (2009, esp. 339 and 342), Kroeker (2009, esp. 216), Humble (1997) and Tuplin (1994, 163 and 1993, 41).

makes this connection between Clearchus and duplicitousness, as well as seeing other Spartan typecasts in the portrayal of Clearchus.¹⁴⁴

Clearchus' deceptive speeches may actually be unnecessary, perhaps characterising him as someone who relishes deceiving. To persuade the men to continue at Tarsus, Clearchus could have bargained with the distressed Cyrus to get him to pay the men more money, because the soldiers request more money from Cyrus when they discover the real aim anyway (1.4.12). Clearchus could also have appealed to the benefits the army could get from Cyrus, and his good nature. Even the unscrupulous Menon persuades his men to continue by saying that they will get rewards from Cyrus (1.4.13-16). Likewise, Clearchus could have appealed to the shame the Greeks would incur at abandoning their friend, because both Clearchus and the narrator claim this as a motive for the army continuing, as we saw. Regarding Clearchus' deception of Cyrus, Clearchus could have raised his concerns with Cyrus, given that they were on good terms, and that Cyrus had previously requested input from the Greek leaders (1.7.2).

To complicate the picture, on other occasions, Clearchus' deception of others is straightforwardly positive. We saw in the last chapter that at 2.2.19-21, Clearchus stops the army panicking by deceiving them. At 2.3.9, Clearchus explains to the other generals that he is going to delay reporting to the king's messengers that the army has decided on a truce, in order to make the messengers fearful. He says that he supposes that the Greek soldiers will also be afraid. While this confirms that Clearchus has no qualms about deceiving friends as well as enemies, the deception Clearchus practices is primarily to give the Greeks a psychological advantage.

Neither the narrator nor Clearchus himself reveal Clearchus' motives for deceiving the soldiers, and so the reader is left to speculate over what makes Clearchus choose Cyrus over the men. The reader may assume that, because

¹⁴⁴ These she identifies as being 'severe', being concerned with warfare and discipline, being violent towards other Greeks, and abandoning the Spartan upbringing in favour of wealth, power and foreign rule. She also argues (2012, 401-93) that the portrayal of the Spartan Anaxibius is similar because he prefers helping Pharnabazus over Cheirisophus, although he does aid the Greeks later. Tuplin (1994, 133 and endnote 9) sees some more positive Spartan stereotypes in the *Anabasis*, but stereotypes none the less. See also Hesk (2000, 21-39 and 64ff.) and Bradford (1994) for Spartans who think one thing and say another, although neither scholar connects Clearchus to this. See Powell (1994 and 1989) for the Spartan state's official use of deceit, particularly in their visual images, and their use of lies and secrecy. Powell argues that this aided Spartan success, particularly by projecting a controlled image. Deception, it seems, was part of Spartan political rule.

Clearchus is an exile, he is desperate to maintain employment. For Clearchus to do this, he must continue being useful to Cyrus by maintaining control over the men and keeping them happy, as Dillery (1995, 66) argues. Clearchus may also be concerned that his troops will leave him if he begins to lead them home, and so he needs to keep them employed. Alternatively, perhaps Clearchus really did feel that he had a duty to Cyrus and needed to reciprocate the money and honour that Cyrus had given him. This last interpretation is quickly rendered unlikely, however, by Clearchus' lack of care for Cyrus' interests when he does not explain to Cyrus how he is going to get the men to continue at Tarsus, even though Cyrus is distressed, and in his deception of Cyrus.

The narrator explains that concern for the troops motivated Clearchus' disobedience of Cyrus' orders, and there has been much discussion over whether Clearchus was right to disobey Cyrus here.¹⁴⁵ Irrespective of whether it was better for the Greeks to disobey the order, he could have questioned Cyrus over it, as we saw, for the benefit of all concerned. The reader will perhaps conclude that Clearchus did not care enough for Cyrus' concerns. The reader has earlier seen that Clearchus believes that he has the power to make decisions over other leaders, when he thinks he has the power to punish Menon's men (1.5.11).

Clearchus' concern for the Greeks' safety here, may suggest that when he deceived the soldiers he was genuinely concerned for the army and really did believe that it would be safer for the soldiers to stay with Cyrus because Cyrus really would punish them if they defected.¹⁴⁶ The narrator's representation of Cyrus' confusion at Tarsus perhaps renders this unlikely, despite Cyrus' reputation for harming

¹⁴⁵ Plutarch says that Clearchus was mistaken in not wanting to lead the Greeks against the king because he put Greek safety over the interests of his employer. He argues that Clearchus abandoned the plans and the aim of the march because of fear, and that the Persians would not have faced the Greeks if the original plan had been followed. Plutarch holds Clearchus' caution (εὐλάβειαν) to blame for the destruction of Cyrus and the entire aim of the mission (*Artaxerxes* 8.3-7). See, however, Rood (2005, xxiii), who comments that many ancients believed that Clearchus acted rightly. Mather (1917, 594) also believes that Clearchus was actually following the Greek practice of not exposing the right side. Anderson (1974, 104-5) argues that Clearchus had no choice but to act as he did because of the position of the other contingents in the battle and the logistics of how the two armies were set up. He blames Cyrus instead.

¹⁴⁶ Braun (2004, 101), for example, appears to believe that Clearchus' deception of the men was for their own good, when he compares it to "Odysseus' white lies, which the goddess Athena commended with amusement, even admiration". Likewise, Roisman (1985-8, 36) argues that while it was in Clearchus' best interests to continue the march, he also did the best for the men in their difficult situation.

wrongdoers. It is also perhaps unlikely that Cyrus would turn on the whole Greek army, which he knows is capable of scaring his barbarian troops (1.2.18). Indeed, as the narrative progresses, it becomes more apparent that Clearchus may be more concerned with his own leadership than with Cyrus', and his own interests rather than the troops'.

At 2.5.11, Clearchus says to Tissaphernes that he wanted to be friends with Cyrus because Cyrus was the most capable person at the time of benefitting whomever he wanted. This suggests that Clearchus' desire to repay Cyrus stems from thoughts of his own interests, rather than Cyrus', although Clearchus may be misrepresenting himself to Tissaphernes in order to appear as a typical mercenary and as no threat to Tissaphernes. Indeed, Clearchus benefitted by gaining a position of trust with Cyrus after Tarsus. Clearchus' general self-interest is highlighted elsewhere by the narrator who reveals that Clearchus insists on taking the leaders to Tissaphernes because he thought that Tissaphernes was going to accuse Menon of slandering the Greeks. Clearchus wanted no one to stand between himself and having the entire army under his control, the narrator says, and saw this as a way to remove Menon, who was trying to win support for his own leadership (2.5.27-9).¹⁴⁷ As Dillery (2001, 199) notes, Xenophon the author has here rejected Ctesias' account that Clearchus was unwilling to go to Tissaphernes (*F. Gr. Hist.* 688, F27) and instead emphasised Clearchus' selfish aims. As Danzig (2007, 35) points out, even some of the soldiers realised what Tissaphernes was planning, which suggests that Clearchus was naïve or blinded here. Partly because of the power his deception of others has gained him, Clearchus has the authority to get an agreement from the army that a certain number will go to Tissaphernes (2.5.29-30). Such self-interest suggests that Clearchus' own leadership powers were firmly in his mind when he persuaded the soldiers to continue with Cyrus.

In Clearchus' obituary, the narrator mentions that Clearchus loves war (φιλοπόλεμος) and constantly seeks it (2.6.2-6). Thus, the reader might think that

¹⁴⁷ Buzzetti's (2008, 16) claim that Clearchus trusted Tissaphernes because of his "rash hopefulness" and his trust in both "virtue and Tissaphernes' belief in the divine" seems to contradict the motive provided by the narrator.

this is why he wants to stay with Cyrus.¹⁴⁸ The narrator also says that soldiers usually abandoned Clearchus when they were no longer in danger or fighting an enemy (2.6.11-14), suggesting that Clearchus may have been concerned about whether the soldiers would stay with him if he led them home.

That Clearchus thought it acceptable for Cyrus and himself to deceive the soldiers and lead them on an extremely dangerous mission which they would otherwise not have agreed to go on suggests that Clearchus is an excessive risk taker and that the safety of others was not his primary motivation when deceiving the men at Tarsus or even when he deceived Cyrus. When the narrator reveals that Clearchus knew Cyrus' true aim, this indicates further verbal deception by Clearchus. Kelly (1977, 11) and Laforse (2000, 82 n. 18) observe that the reader may think back to Clearchus' speech to the Persian messengers and Tissaphernes at 2.3.21-3. Here, Clearchus says that the army did not form to go against the king and was not intentionally marching against him, but that Cyrus kept presenting pretexts that encouraged the mercenaries to continue. The first part, of course, is not true in Clearchus' own case. While Clearchus' motives for deceiving the soldiers remain uncertain, the narrative points to self-interest ultimately driving him.¹⁴⁹ Clearchus' deception of others and lack of explicitly explained motives render him an

¹⁴⁸ Particularly because the narrator presents Clearchus as loving war, Tritle (2004) believes that Xenophon understood that Clearchus had been affected by the long years of fighting and that in modern terms he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. However, Clearchus' status as an exile seems just as likely a reason for him seeking war constantly.

¹⁴⁹ Several scholars comment that Clearchus is self-interested, and some specifically link this to his deception of others. Millender (2012, esp. 382-95) argues that Clearchus used the soldiers and Cyrus against each other and came out of the situation as the only one to benefit, and that he was concerned for himself when disobeying Cyrus. Seelinger (1997, 27) argues that the presentation of Clearchus' deception of the soldiers may make the reader think that Clearchus had his own interests at heart. Rood (2005, xxiv) argues that Clearchus only pretends to be concerned for the interests of the men and in reality has his own interests, as well as Cyrus', in mind. Humble (1997, 76-9) argues that Clearchus puts himself and his desires first and only works in the interests of the army when their interests overlap, particularly in remaining working for Cyrus. Nussbaum (1967, 59, 127 and 139) writes that if Clearchus did help the army in any way it was because it fitted in with his own plans and that he would stop at nothing to see these fulfilled. Hirsch (1985, 28) says that Xenophon criticises Clearchus' "self-serving ambition and poor judgement".

ambiguous character.¹⁵⁰ Despite this, neither the internal characters nor the narrator overtly criticise Clearchus for deceiving the troops or Cyrus.

Timasion

Timasion's deception of the merchants characterises him as recognising which emotions to arouse to persuade his audience and what *ethos* to present to be convincing. He is also characterised as being proactive in trying to get the army to sail away. However, neither the narrator nor Timasion make it clear whether Timasion is motivated to act because sailing away is what the army wants, or because it is what he wants. Indeed, some of the army wants to remain, so the reader may suspect that Timasion's own desires carry more weight here, particularly because Timasion would also gain more authority as the primary leader of the army.¹⁵¹ Much later in the work, the narrator reveals that, although other leaders want to take the army elsewhere, Timasion wants to lead the men back to Greece, because he desires to go home himself (7.2.2). The narrator reveals that Timasion's desire to go home coincides with what the soldiers wanted on this occasion, as it did when he deceived the merchants. Thus, while it seems that Timasion is driven primarily by his own interest, what he is trying to achieve with his deception is at least desirable to most of the army, unlike what Cyrus' and Clearchus' deceptions aim at.

From the characterisation of Timasion before and after this incident, lying seems out of character for him. Before his speech, he has been elected to replace Clearchus as general (3.1.47) and so must be highly regarded despite being one of the younger leaders. Thus, the reader may believe that Timasion acted with poor judgement when he lied, and may lose some trust in him. However, Timasion may

¹⁵⁰ There are similar mixed interpretations of the character of Cyrus the Great and the deceit he uses in the *Cyropaedia*. See Whidden (2007) for the opinion that Cyrus is practicing deceit at every turn, and Field (2012, 729-30) for a dark interpretation of Cyrus' leadership. By contrast, see Gray (2011b, 28-30 and 246-63) for a more balanced picture, Gera (1993, 286-99) for interpretations explaining certain elements of Cyrus' deceit in positive terms, and Danzig (2012), who argues that Xenophon shows that deception can be used for self-interested motives in certain cases.

¹⁵¹ Dillery (1995, 88), for example, believes that Timasion wants gain for himself and is greedy. Nussbaum (1967, 175 and 178) argues that Timasion wanted the chief leader role and to end his exile, while pretending that he was benefitting the army. Buzzetti (2014, 211) believes that Timasion wanted to use the army to become tyrant of his city. However, the narrator does not specify this, and indeed Timasion says that his city will receive him readily (ἐκόντες), even though he admits to being an exile (5.6.23).

regain this trust by his actions after this episode, because he acts in the interests of the army and supports Xenophon. For example, he demands provisions for the army from Coeratadas, who wants to lead the Cyreans (7.1.40), and when Heracleides tries to get the generals to leave Xenophon's leadership in return for pay, Timasion replies that he would not undertake a campaign without Xenophon even for five months' pay (7.5.9-10).¹⁵² Considering all the information about Timasion, the reader may believe that Timasion's deception of the merchants is partly selfish but also that he wants to do something positive for the army, although he goes about it in the wrong way.¹⁵³ Like Cyrus and Clearchus, Timasion is not blamed by any character or by the narrator.

Xenophon

Xenophon's deception of the army reveals that he is perceptive about situations, particularly understanding fears and potential repercussions, that he can improvise, and that he can check volatile situations. He appears to understand the army's concerns, and he is successful on all but one occasion. We saw that Xenophon's motives for deceiving others are sometimes clear and sometimes unclear.

Straightforwardly, we saw Xenophon deceive the men on three occasions in order to encourage them to fight on, and we also saw him calm a potentially catastrophic situation at Byzantium because he was concerned for all parties involved. Of course, Xenophon is anxious for his own safety as well as the army's safety on these occasions, but we can see the differences here with the other leaders' deceptions. Xenophon gives the army confidence about the enemy for their own benefit, while Clearchus, in misrepresenting Cyrus as someone who will oppose them, takes away the confidence of the army for his own benefit. When Cyrus makes the mission seem easier, it is primarily for his own interests, in contrast to Xenophon. All the deceivers try to get the army to move on when they have stopped, but only Xenophon does this for the soldiers' own good. When Xenophon allows the soldiers to think he will do

¹⁵² Stronk (1995, 243) sees further selfishness in this, however, and argues that Timasion might have doubted Heracleides' ability to pay and was concerned that he and the other leaders would face blame for this.

¹⁵³ See also Nussbaum (1967, 133-4) who refers to this incident as a "lapse" due to Timasion's desire to return home. He says that Timasion is "rash and perhaps headstrong", had "moderate ability" and was "willing and generous enough". Nussbaum also argues that Timasion's good behaviour after this incident suggests that Timasion is a generally good character who may even be seeking to make amends for his actions. Nussbaum similarly questions whether Timasion later wants to return to Greece because the men do, or whether it was his own desires that drove him.

as they wish at Byzantium for everyone's interests, he contrasts Clearchus who allows the soldiers to think he is doing as they desire at Tarsus for his own interests.

Xenophon's motives for rejecting the sole command by warning the army of the troubles it will face with the Spartans need further investigation. Because Cheirisophus backs up Xenophon's warnings about the Spartans in his acceptance speech (6.1.32), the reader might think that Xenophon has taken the opportunity to try to teach the army about how its actions will be perceived by others and will affect their safety. This is a valuable lesson both for now and for the future. Xenophon misjudges how the army would receive such advice, however. Either the soldiers think that Xenophon is exaggerating, or they want Xenophon as sole commander so strongly that they are willing to suffer Spartan anger in order to have him lead them. Dangerously, they seem to believe that they can choose a leader without any repercussions. The army's disregard of Xenophon's good advice demonstrates how valuable it is that the army has a leader who understands the wider political landscape and attempts to keep the army well regarded.

In this example, Xenophon does not conceal the fact that he is concerned for his own well-being, as well as that of the army. Indeed, his inner thoughts about taking the sole command demonstrate that he is particularly concerned with his own reputation. However, in trying to turn the situation into a lesson for the army, he is working in the army's interests. The offer of the role itself suggests that the soldiers believe that Xenophon would achieve for them what they desire and that he has their interests at heart. Strauss (1975, 141) argues that the gods did not indicate who should be sole commander instead of Xenophon and so Xenophon had to assess the situation for himself. This may be when he realised the political implications of the soldiers' choice and may explain why Xenophon did not consider the political implications as part of his musings on whether to accept or reject the sole command. Again, the differences between the leaders can be seen when compared to Clearchus' deceptive claims that he should not lead his troops home, and also with Cyrus' deception of the soldiers. Clearchus rejects the command in the process of deceptively increasing his authority over the soldiers, whereas Xenophon declines more power honestly. Both Xenophon and Cyrus present half-truths and omit information but Cyrus does it to gain and retain his leadership over the army, in contrast to Xenophon.

The reason that Xenophon deceives by having Polycrates speak for him can only be hypothesised based on how Xenophon has been motivated before. By this late stage, the narrator has shown that Xenophon consistently acts and also deceives with the interests of the army in mind, and so it is unlikely that he would undercut this picture now. Xenophon presumably uses Polycrates because the soldiers were not as suspicious of Polycrates as they were of Xenophon, whom they recently believed was receiving money from Seuthes and defrauding them of their pay. The alternative interpretation is that Xenophon is selfishly trying to clear his own name, and is using Polycrates because he is aware that his audience will believe that he is trying to pass the blame onto another. However, the reader knows that Xenophon is not to blame and also that what he has Polycrates say is correct. Thus, the reader may judge that Xenophon was positively motivated here and that this was the only way to correct the audience's misconceptions during a tense situation. The narrator may also be making a deliberate contrast with Clearchus who primed others to speak, but for his own interests.

Of the four leaders, only Xenophon's motivations for deceiving stand up to scrutiny. Xenophon's deceptions of the army reveal his repeated consideration of the army's morale, interests, safety and understanding. Xenophon does not use deceit to increase his power or to gain control over others, unlike Cyrus, Clearchus and, to an extent, Timasion. He does not deceive about the fundamental aim of the mission, but attempts to ensure that the army can proceed with their mission as safely as possible. He is concerned with his own safety and reputation, but these thoughts never compromise the interests of the men.¹⁵⁴ As with the other deceivers, the narrator and characters do not blame Xenophon for any of his deceptions of others, although the soldiers suspect him of deception on other occasions.

Audiences

The audiences of the deceptive speeches are also characterised. Cyrus' friends are too trusting of him, and the soldiers allow themselves to be deceived because of shame, fear and the desire for more money. They must take some responsibility for their own predicament after Cyrus dies. Again, both the soldiers and Cyrus are too

¹⁵⁴ Humble (1997, 46-62) also argues that Xenophon is shown as having the best interests of the army at heart.

trusting of Clearchus and too eager to believe that he is doing as they want. The merchants can be characterised by their willingness to believe strangers, when Timasion deceives them, because of fear. Through Xenophon's deceptions, the soldiers can be characterised as being prone to strong emotions such as despair and anger, as well as making rash decisions, and believing that they are right and able to act as they please. However, they can be encouraged, calmed and made to see sense.

Didactic Function

As we saw in the last chapter, the speeches present the reader with an indication of how to persuade others successfully, here by using deception. For example, as part of his deception of others, Cyrus recognises what he needs to say and do to make himself seem attractive to work for and seem able to fulfil his promises. Testament to the strength of the affiliations he is able to make, the narrator concludes that Cyrus had the largest (πλεῖστοι) following of anyone (1.9.12) and that no one was loved (πεφιλησθαι) by more people (πλειόνων, 1.9.28). Cyrus has a carefully engineered method of attracting and retaining followers that allows him to deceive people. He is clearly a master at representing his own *ethos* and manipulating the feelings of others, and he has evidently worked hard to establish a positive reputation. The narrator presents the desirability of working for Cyrus as being well known to the Greeks and even Cyrus' enemies.¹⁵⁵ Because of his good repute, he makes friends whom he can manipulate later. When he needs Greek troops, he already has a network of friends to call on.¹⁵⁶ Cyrus makes friends with leaders by giving them money (1.1.9) and political support (1.1.10). Cyrus also treats his brother's courtiers well, with the intention of making them more friendly (μᾶλλον φίλους) to himself than to the king. He also makes sure that those in his own province feel goodwill (εὐνοϊκῶς) towards him (1.1.5). The basis of Cyrus' leadership over the Greeks is

¹⁵⁵ See 1.4.3, 1.4.15, 1.7.2, 1.9.17, and 6.4.8.

¹⁵⁶ See further Azoulay (2004a, 300), Mitchell (1997, 119-20) and Herman (1987, 99) for Cyrus' *xenos*-relationships with the Greek leaders. See also Millender (2012, 390-2) who discusses how Xenophon the author does not refer to Clearchus as a *xenos* of Cyrus. She argues that Clearchus later claims that they have this relationship but also a unique relationship of *philia*.

what he can offer them and how he makes them feel.¹⁵⁷ Having attracted the Greeks by his reputed generosity and virtue, once on the march, Cyrus promises that he will give out more pay (1.3.21) and special bonuses (1.4.12) to the men, and offers the leaders satrapies and gold crowns (1.7.7). This keeps the Greeks motivated. We do not see these promises fulfilled, but they clearly satisfy the Greeks at the time. Cyrus also further presents himself as having a virtuous character, as we saw in the last chapter. Because the Greeks feel so positively towards him, he is able to deceive them, and even persuade them when they recognise that he is deceiving them.

Despite the fact that almost all the verbal deception is successfully carried out, the harm and benefit that the deceptions bring serves to demonstrate to the reader whether the deceit was warranted or not. The way the leader ends in the work further confirms how the speakers and their deceit should be judged. In the short term, Cyrus' deceptions against others benefit himself by both gaining him an army and ensuring it continues to work for him, and benefit the army by keeping it in employment. In the longer term, however, the army go on to fight against the king. The Greeks lose no one in the battle but they suffer greatly in their attempts to return home afterwards, and their original leaders are executed. As for the deceiver, Cyrus is killed in the battle, having himself been deceived by Clearchus over tactics.

Regarding Clearchus' deception of his troops and the wider army, in the short term, both speaker and audience seem to benefit from the decision to continue with Cyrus. Firstly, Clearchus appears to gain standing with Cyrus and the army. Indeed, some scholars argue that Cyrus did not initially regard Clearchus as the foremost Greek leader, because Cyrus did not give as much money to Clearchus as to Aristippus and because Menon led the right wing, and that Clearchus won his position of honour with Cyrus through his actions at Tarsus.¹⁵⁸ The soldiers benefit from continued employment and more money, and Cyrus benefits by having an army to continue his mission with. In the longer term, continuing on the mission proves

¹⁵⁷ Cyrus has a similar basis to his leadership with others. He can draw on his previous good treatment of the Milesian exiles to encourage them to enlist with him (1.2.2), and many Persians have a strong personal attachment to Cyrus which was gained and maintained by rich rewards (1.8.27-9 and 1.9.30-1). His leadership over the garrison commanders is different. Because the Ionian cities have voluntarily aligned with him, he can order the garrison commanders there to act (1.1.6).

¹⁵⁸ See Bassett (2001, 10), Laforse (2000, 80), Rood (2010a, 126) and Roisman (1985-8, 33).

disastrous for the Greeks and Cyrus because of the dangers the army faces at the battle of Cunaxa.

Regarding Clearchus' deception of Cyrus, the short-term effect is Cyrus' death. Cyrus attacks the king when he fears that the king is going to get behind the Greek troops and kill them (1.8.24). The king is able to attack because there is no one giving battle to him, although Cyrus asked Clearchus to do this. Cyrus soon becomes isolated with only a few attendants and, when he sees the king, he loses control and rushes at him. Cyrus is killed after wounding the king (1.8.25-6).¹⁵⁹ Clearchus is not entirely to blame, because Cyrus did act rashly. However, Clearchus created the situation in which Cyrus acted impulsively. Clearchus' deception of Cyrus benefits Clearchus in the short-term because after Cyrus' death, he takes control and the army voluntarily look to him, as we saw in the last chapter. In the longer-term, Cyrus' death leaves the army alone and vulnerable to Persian attack and treachery, which is particularly suffered by Clearchus. Clearchus' leadership ends in the work when he allows himself to be deceived by Tissaphernes (2.5.24-32). This causes his own death, as well as the death of others, and throws the army into chaos.¹⁶⁰ Hirsch (1985, 28-9) suggests that Xenophon the author may partly have used Clearchus as a scapegoat because he was ashamed that the Greeks fell into the trap set by Tissaphernes so easily. He admits, however, that this conflicts with the *Cyropaedia* narrator's claim that relying on the Persians' trustworthiness got the generals killed by Tissaphernes and the king (8.8.2-3). Clearchus knows that Cyrus deceives, however, suggesting that he at least is aware that one cannot blindly trust the Persians. In this case, he must accept responsibility for trusting Tissaphernes.

Thus, both Clearchus and Cyrus ultimately bring death, harm and suffering to the army, and leave it at a loss, rendering them both blameworthy. Both are

¹⁵⁹ In Ctesias' account, Cyrus dies in the battle because he did not take the advice given by Clearchus (ἀπειθοῦντος Κλεάρχῳ, *F. Gr. Hist.* 688, F16). Certain ancient and modern critics believe that Ctesias received some of his information from Clearchus himself (see Plutarch, *Artaxerxes*, 18.1-4, Photius *F. Gr. Hist.* 688, F27, Bassett, 2002, 454 and Bigwood, 1983, 345). This might explain why Clearchus' deceptions of others are concealed in Ctesias' account. See Bassett (1999) for the other accounts of Cyrus' death.

¹⁶⁰ See Rood (2010a, 132-3) who links the situation and feeling amongst the army after the death of the generals to the situation that Clearchus and those he had prepped to speak envisioned if they were to desert Cyrus. Rood bases this on certain similar words and themes. Rood argues that the link demonstrates that what the soldiers most feared happening to them at Tarsus if they abandoned Cyrus has actually happened, although under different circumstances. This illustrates the horrors that Clearchus' deception caused.

themselves led to their death by deception practiced on them by another.¹⁶¹ Combined with their selfish motives, the presentation of Clearchus' and Cyrus' deceitful speeches renders them negative paradigms and leaders who should not be emulated, especially in their persuasion attempts. Clearchus is sometimes viewed as a positive leader,¹⁶² and indeed the narrator presents some positive elements to his leadership.¹⁶³ However, the many negative elements, including his deception of friends, clearly detract from these. He is clearly untrustworthy, and, because of this, the reader may even suspect Clearchus of deceit where he may be innocent. In Clearchus' obituary, Clearchus *persuaded* (πείσας) his state that the Thracians were injuring the Greeks and needed to be stopped (2.6.2), perhaps suggesting some degree of manipulation. He has also been exiled because he was disobedient towards the Ephors (2.6.3). Although this passage does not indicate that he deceived the Ephors or pretended to go along with their orders, Clearchus' disobedience of Cyrus parallels the disobedience that got Clearchus exiled, as Humble (1997, 65) notes. This, she argues, demonstrates that Clearchus is a "liability". Even the narrator's reference to the arguments Clearchus used to persuade Cyrus to employ him, which the narrator erroneously claims have been recorded elsewhere, suggest an element of deceit (2.6.4), especially when compared to Clearchus' own account of Cyrus voluntarily giving him money.

More seriously, when Ariaeus tells the Greeks that Clearchus was perjuring himself and breaking his oath with them (2.5.38), the reader might wonder if this is true, rather than understanding it to be a false accusation to justify killing the Greek

¹⁶¹ Danzig (2007, 41) argues that the narrator does not link the deceit practiced by Clearchus and Cyrus to their deaths, but this view is surprising considering that it is deception by another that leads to their deaths.

¹⁶² See Kelly (1977, 35) who argues that Clearchus' deception of the soldiers is a "a masterpiece of persuasion" and illustrates Clearchus' excellent ability to handle such a volatile situation, as well as his resourcefulness and ability to reverse the situation so that it is to his advantage. Kelly argues that Xenophon is providing a "personal tribute" to Clearchus' leadership abilities. Kelly (1977, 95) also argues that Xenophon offered Clearchus (and Menon) to the reader as characters to learn from because of their success, even though their methods of achieving success may have been "deceptive, untrue, or morally reprehensible". Lendle (1996, 151-2) argues that Clearchus and Cyrus are mirrors of princes to Menon and Proxenus' failed leaderships. See also Roisman (1985-8, 35) who argues that Clearchus' speeches to the men at Tarsus reveal him "as a shrewd and skilled demagogue". Roisman further argues (1985-8, 50) that Clearchus' leadership is "based on compromise and responsible leadership more than self-regard, coercion or intimidation". Humble (1997, 67 n. 84) criticises Roisman's argument.

¹⁶³ At 2.3.10-13, he sets the example of hard work when bridges need to be built, and in his obituary, the narrator says that Clearchus displays presence of mind in terrible situations, is fit for command, is skilled in getting provisions and is competent in stressing that he must be obeyed (2.6.1-15).

leaders. The narrator does not help to clarify Clearchus' innocence. Xenophon the character says that if Clearchus was guilty, he has been duly punished (2.5.41), which sounds non-committal about whether he believes Clearchus' guilt. However, Xenophon is concentrating on getting Proxenus and Menon, who are apparently still alive, returned to the Greeks. Proxenus' involvement in accusing Clearchus throws further doubt on the situation, because he is a relatively positive, if ineffective character, and Xenophon's friend. It may be that the Persians are lying about what Proxenus said, because it becomes clear that they are lying about him still being alive. In sum, although the characters and the narrator repeatedly blame the Persians for betraying the Cyreans, some doubt may remain as to Clearchus' guilt.¹⁶⁴ Presumably, when Ariaeus accuses Clearchus, he believes that the Greeks would be persuaded that Clearchus was guilty. In this case, it can be assumed that Clearchus did not have a reputation for trustworthiness, even amongst the Greeks.

Cyrus is also often regarded as an ideal leader,¹⁶⁵ and in certain other aspects, he is extremely positive, as evidenced by his obituary. However, even here, not all the praise is straightforward. The narrator praises Cyrus in terms of his trustworthiness, for example, which seems to contradict the picture of Cyrus as deceitful. The narrator says that cities, individuals and former enemies all trusted Cyrus (ἐπιτρεπόμεναι, ἐπίστευον...ἐπίστευε, 1.9.7-10), and that Cyrus firmly believed it of the greatest importance not to deceive (μηδὲν ψεύδεσθαι) when making treaties, agreements or promises. Indeed, as well as being *thought* to be trustworthy, the narrator claims that Cyrus demonstrated this trustworthiness (ἐπέδειξεν...ἐπεδείκνυτο). The trustworthiness that Cyrus has cultivated explains partly why the Greeks initially believed in Cyrus' good character and that he would reward them, as well as the pretexts he offered. As Hirsch (1985, 24, n. 40) and Rood (2005, xxiv) argue, it may be that the narrator has made Cyrus' trustworthiness more prominent in order to exculpate Xenophon and the Greeks from some blame

¹⁶⁴ There is some scholarly suggestion that the Greeks broke the truce by taking from the land and that Clearchus was responsible for this, as well as that Clearchus offended Tissaphernes by offering the Greek troops to Tissaphernes to use to become king (see Bassett, 2002, 460-1, Waterfield, 2006, 120 and Jansen, 2014, 122-7). However, there is little evidence to implicate Clearchus directly in breaking the truce and no sign that he offended Tissaphernes. These arguments also do not explain why Ariaeus accuses Clearchus of having plotted for a long time (2.5.40). Nevertheless, these particular interpretations demonstrate that certain modern readers have trouble accepting Clearchus' innocence.

¹⁶⁵ See Dillery (2001, 11) and Sears (2007, 15-16), for example. However, see Braun (2004), Flower (2012, 189-94) and Higgins (1977, 83) who argue that Cyrus is not an ideal leader.

for following him. In any case, Cyrus' deception of the army demonstrates that Cyrus' trustworthiness is a façade.

Indeed, the wording of the passage about Cyrus' trustworthiness in his obituary does not actually say that Cyrus would not deceive friends and soldiers into undertaking a mission that they did not enlist for. This demonstrates that there is not a conflict between the obituary and the details that the narrator has previously presented. Rood (2005, xxiv) suggests that Xenophon points out Cyrus' lack of truthfulness in the obituary and that this reflects on Cyrus' earlier deception of others. Rood argues that the narrator only praises Cyrus for his attainment in two of the three key aspects of Persian education that Herodotus discusses (1.136) - riding and shooting- but does not link Cyrus with the third, telling the truth.¹⁶⁶ Truthfulness was central to Persian culture (see Hirsch, 1985, 18), and we saw that the *Cyropaedia* narrator argued that relying on Persian trustworthiness got the Greek leaders killed. The *Anabasis* suggests an extension to this; relying on Cyrus' trustworthiness put the Greeks in serious danger.

In the short term, Timasion's deception of the merchants seems to benefit the army, because he gains money for the soldiers. When he returns to the army, Timasion speaks to the soldiers in the assembly and offers them pay, a return home, and plunder once they get there, while Thorax in turn offers the men pay and a return home (5.6.22-6). The army does not respond to these offers, even though most of the soldiers want to return home, but the assembly continues and further criticism is made of Xenophon, who defends himself (5.6.27-33). During Xenophon's speech, he recommends that the army follows the leaders who are offering pay and a return home. However, when the Sinopeans and Heracleots hear that Xenophon, who supposedly wanted the army to stay, has recommended that the army departs, they fail to give the money they had promised (5.6.35). Thus, Timasion's lie catches up with him. To hide that they now cannot pay the army or obtain provisions, Timasion

¹⁶⁶ Tuplin (1994, 158) also highlights that the narrator does not mention that Cyrus told the truth in his obituary, but also that truth-telling is not specifically mentioned in the discussion of Persian education in the *Cyropaedia* or elsewhere in the work. See further Hirsch (1985, 22-4, endnote 40, and 158-9), who questions whether it is "in part ironic" that no one in the work states openly that Cyrus has acted badly in any respect, and whether Xenophon really wanted his readers to understand that Cyrus did deceive and endanger the Greeks. He struggles with this idea, however, because words from *pistis* are regularly associated with Cyrus and form part of his characterisation. He also argues that the pretexts Cyrus uses may have contained an element of truth and so may not have been seen as reprehensible.

and Thorax try to persuade the other generals to go back to the Phasis (5.6.36-7).¹⁶⁷ When Neon blames Xenophon for trying to trick the army into going to the Phasis, the soldiers become angry and nearly riot (5.7.1-2).¹⁶⁸ Thus, in the longer term, Timasion and Thorax' deception has brought unrest to the army, which Xenophon goes on to recover.

As Hirsch (1985, 33) highlights, the narrator describes the Heracleots and Sinopeans as deceiving (*ἐψευσμένοι*) when they realise they had been lied to. Thus, as we saw with Cyrus and Clearchus, Timasion also receives his comeuppance through being deceived, although this does not lead to his death. The failure of the Sinopeans and Heracleots to pay is Timasion's punishment for deceiving. He does not get to lead or return home, and becomes panicked and afraid of the army (5.6.36). Timasion should not be emulated because his deception backfires, but he is not entirely a negative paradigm because of his later positive behaviour. Timasion is perhaps not as skilled at deception as the other leaders, and thus represents the dangers and difficulties of deceiving.

After Xenophon's first three deceptions, the soldiers go on to succeed in the three actions that they are undertaking. Although there is no specific response indicated, the reader might assume that Xenophon has had a positive effect on the army's state of mind. Thus, Xenophon's audience appears to have benefitted from these deceptions in both the short and long term. Regarding his deception of the army over the sole command, in the short term, soon after Cheirisophus' appointment, the army splits into three groups, as we saw in the last chapter, which seems to be harmful. We saw, however, that in his speech to the army after his appointment, Cheirisophus confirms that Dexippus has been slandering Xenophon.¹⁶⁹ We also saw that some sections of the army believe that Xenophon

¹⁶⁷ Farrell (2012, 259) argues that this is an attempt to undermine the decision-making power of the soldiers, and that Xenophon the character has advised Timasion and Thorax to discuss the matter with the soldiers. Farrell notes that, instead, Timasion tries to get the other generals to persuade their captains. Nussbaum (1967, 179-80) also comments that Timasion uses "private persuasion" here, which is what the men were critical of Xenophon for.

¹⁶⁸ Nussbaum (1967, 179-80) argues that the outrage directed at Xenophon for supposedly intending to lead the army back to the Phasis was actually caused by the private ambition of Timasion, Thorax and Neon to take control of the army rather than benefit of the army.

¹⁶⁹ Dexippus is a *perioecus* (5.1.15), technically not a citizen of Sparta. Whereas Xenophon has suggested that full-citizen Spartans, and presumably only ones in positions of power, such as Anaxibius, might be unhappy, this report shows that everyone connected with Sparta is liable to feel aggrieved.

actually leads the army and that it is shameful to be under his rule. This indicates that it is not just the Spartans who do not want Xenophon as sole commander. Given the trouble that just the suspicion of Xenophon's ultimate control of the army caused, it is perhaps a benefit to the army that Xenophon was not elected as sole commander. Perhaps Xenophon's refusal of the position served to head-off some of these rumours, externally at least. In the long-term, the narrator indicates that the Spartans do have the potential to cause the Cyreans serious trouble, especially if they believe that Xenophon is the army's sole commander. When the Spartan Cleander becomes involved in the affairs of the army, Xenophon the character says that even one Spartan could make life extremely difficult for the army (6.6.12-14). Indeed, the army has to stop Cleander from ordering cities not to receive the Cyreans. At 6.6.34, Cleander says that he has heard that Xenophon has been trying to make the army disloyal to the Spartans, but sees that this is not the case. Later, when the men attempt to return to Byzantium once they have been ejected, Xenophon outlines the dangers of starting a war with the Spartans and advises obedience (7.1.25-30). The army is even deceived and sold as slaves by the Spartans Anaxibius and Aristarchus (7.1.7ff. and 7.2.5ff.). The Asinaean Neon also has ambitions to be the leader of the entire army and thinks he will be given this role if the army falls in with Spartans (7.2.2), even though he is not a full Spartan citizen. This indicates that he believes that the Spartans would want Spartans or those connected with Sparta to control the army. Thus, Xenophon's rejection of the role may ultimately have prevented more trouble than the army received.

In terms of his deception of the army at Byzantium, once the men have formed up as a result of his deception, Xenophon is able to talk them out of storming the city and no harm is done (7.1.25-31). The narrator does not give the thoughts of the men after it becomes apparent that Xenophon deceived them. Nevertheless, they do agree with Xenophon's recommendations to send a message to Anaxibius (7.1.32), suggesting that they are not angry with Xenophon and see the sense in his suggestions. This tells the reader that Xenophon was successful in calming the soldiers down. In his speech after the soldiers have formed up, he describes what could happen to the army if they proceeded to destroy Byzantium. He warns that if they take and pillage an innocent Greek city, they would be made enemies of the Spartans, who have recently defeated the strong Athenians and now have them as

allies, as well as retaining their original allies. As well as this, the barbarians on the coast are hostile to the army, along with the king in the interior. With all these groups against the Cyreans, there would be no chance of them winning, and they would die shamefully as enemies of their homeland, friends and families. This list of potentially disastrous consequences encourages the reader to think that Xenophon acted in a way that was beneficial to the army in the longer term by ensuring that the army avoided these repercussions. The narrator does nothing to suggest that Xenophon's account of the potential dangers is untrue. Finally, in revealing the truth of who was to blame for the soldiers not receiving their wages from Seuthes, Xenophon and Polycrates seem to end the hostility amongst the Cyreans in the short term and the army begins to prepare to journey to the coast (7.7.1). In the long term, the men seem to accept Xenophon again and he benefits them by obtaining the money that Seuthes owed them (7.7.55).

As well as ultimately benefitting the army with his deceptions, Xenophon receives a particularly positive ending in the work. After Xenophon leads the army on a final mission, the Spartans, captains, other generals and soldiers arrange for Xenophon to have the pick of the booty (7.8.23).¹⁷⁰ Thus, Xenophon the character receives a reward for his leadership, which includes manipulation of the army. Despite this, the army has an erratic relationship with Xenophon. The soldiers can be supportive of Xenophon (see 3.4.48-9, 4.5.30 and 7.6.38) but can also believe that Xenophon is deceiving them or not working in their best interests on occasions when this is incorrect. At 5.6.17ff., Silanus causes the men to believe that Xenophon is planning for the soldiers to settle down without consulting them. At 5.7.1ff, Neon accuses Xenophon of trying to deceive the soldiers into going back to the Phasis and having persuaded the generals to follow this plan. At 6.4.14-15, some members of the army say that Xenophon wanted to found a city at Calpe Harbour and that he bribed the soothsayer to say that the sacrifices did not prove favourable for leaving. At 7.6.9-10, an Arcadian accuses Xenophon of talking the army into working for Seuthes, of being enriched by Seuthes and of defrauding the soldiers of their pay.

¹⁷⁰ This last mission is sometimes criticised for being a plundering raid (see Hutchinson, 2000, 92, for example). However, Bradley (2011, 304) argues that it is acceptable because it constitutes Xenophon's return for propitiating Zeus Meilichos. Delebecque (1957, 294-5) also argues that this episode demonstrates that Xenophon gains honourably and that this fits with the emphasis in the *Anabasis* on Xenophon not enriching himself dishonourably.

The reader knows that all these accusations are untrue, and Xenophon the character successfully clears himself of them all. Because Xenophon joined the army without a position of command (3.1.4), he has to build his reputation for trustworthiness from scratch through what he says and does. His leadership is not based on any existing role, previous experience, age, ethnicity or ability to pay the men or find them employment. Instead, it is based on his good suggestions, his ability to persuade and motivate, and because he had the strength of character to act when everyone else was despairing. His relationship with the army is made all the more difficult because the men have already been deceived by Cyrus, and may have been made wary of other leaders, especially unknown ones. Xenophon does not entirely succeed in winning the men's trust, but the reader sees that it is part of the integrity of Xenophon's leadership that when he does deceive the army, he does it for good reasons, and not with his own benefit in mind, as the men mostly accuse him of. Through Xenophon's deceitful speeches, the reader sees that Xenophon proves to be trustworthy and puts the army first.

Because Xenophon deceives his friends but is still a positive character, the *Anabasis* seems to demonstrate that it is a reality that during war, deceit of those on one's own side becomes almost inevitable and that all leaders will have to deceive their friends, sometimes just to survive. Xenophon's ends justify his means and he is a positive *exemplum* in the work in terms of how he deceives. The reader should clearly emulate him. Perhaps the very lack of attention drawn to Xenophon's deceptions suggests that they are not as problematic as Cyrus' and Clearchus'.¹⁷¹ Examining the speeches has demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish when it is acceptable and even praiseworthy to deceive friends and when it is not. The elements

¹⁷¹ Buzzetti (2014, 16-19) highlights other possible deceptions by Xenophon. For example, he says that at some points in the narrative Xenophon claims that luck or chance is responsible for certain events, but that in speeches discussing the same events, Xenophon assigns responsibility to the gods. Buzzetti argues that this "repetition" is a technique by Xenophon the author to demonstrate how Xenophon the character modified his own opinions to fit with the beliefs of the soldiers, "oftentimes, to lift their spirits". Buzzetti argues that Xenophon is "helping his reader to explore whether truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule". Thus, we reach similar conclusions. Buzzetti gives several other less convincing examples where Xenophon twists facts. For example, he argues (2014, 18) that when talking to Proxenus' captains, Xenophon mentions that Artaxerxes would certainly harm the Greeks because the Greeks wanted to make him a slave and kill him, even though the narrator claims that the army followed Cyrus because of shame when his real intentions were revealed. I would argue, however, that Xenophon is presenting this argument from the point of view of the king, rather than recounting the Cyreans' intentions.

of deception that we saw in the speeches in the last chapter fit with the same interpretation of character and message that we have seen in this chapter.

Thus, the *Anabasis* presents a wider lesson about deceit and trustworthiness. Sometimes, deceiving friends is the necessary, most expedient, safest, kindest and most practical thing to do.¹⁷² A passage from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* backs up this conclusion (4.2.14-17). Here, Socrates claims that it is acceptable to deceive others when it is for their own good, for example, when a general uses deceit to contain discouragement in his soldiers.¹⁷³ Particularly in wartime or when in a crisis, the general Greek distaste for deceiving friends clearly has to be adapted.¹⁷⁴ However, a leader still needs to follow a moral code in recognising when it is acceptable to deceive. Xenophon's deceptions occur when the men are in danger, with the exception of his words about the sole command and his use of Polycrates to speak for him. However, these two deceptions *prevent* danger for the army. By contrast, Cyrus' deception of his friends occurs in peacetime and his deception of the soldiers occurs when they are in no danger, although he is in danger of losing his army. Clearchus' deception of the soldiers also occurs when the army is not in danger. His

¹⁷² Other scholars make general comment along the same lines. Humble (1997, 52) argues that "Xenophon approves of the use of deception of one's own troops if it is in their own best interests; for example, his comments about the superiority of hoplites over cavalry are clearly only meant to encourage, as the need for cavalry is demonstrated almost immediately after the army sets out". Wood (1964, 65) argues that Xenophon believes that a person may deceive friends with good reason but not excessively.

¹⁷³ See also Cambyses' words to Cyrus the Great in the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.27-34). Cambyses tells Cyrus that the teacher of a previous generation tried to teach the distinction between deceiving friends and enemies but that children took advantage of this knowledge and harmed friends. This teacher also taught that one could distinguish times when it was right to deceive friends as long as it was for good ends. Cyrus goes on to deceive his friends, suggesting that he may have learnt this lesson. See Hesk (2000, 122-42) for the difficulties of this passage, and his argument that Xenophon highlights the problems with systems of deceit whereby it is acceptable to deceive friends, and that correct education about the subject is vital. Hesk argues that Cambyses does not recommend deceiving friends to Cyrus and in fact implies that it is dangerous, but that he still gives the information for Cyrus to digest and use as he will.

¹⁷⁴ Hesk (2000, 21-49 and 85-142) argues that "boundaries" are often "renegotiated" to allow deceit, especially in wartime. Regarding deceit in the *Hellenica*, Higgins (1977, 105-7) comments that "it may be wondered...whether Xenophon thinks men always recognise when deceit is permissible and when it is not. He may, in fact, suggest that the very atmosphere of war is conducive to the blurring of necessary distinctions". A concern with how warfare affects the way deceit is used and perceived also appears in Thucydides' analysis of *stasis* (3.82-4). Here Thucydides describes how under the conditions of warfare people are driven by different necessities and that morals degenerate. Included in his account are comments about how plotting becomes a means of self-defence and a necessary requirement for party members, how treachery becomes admired and how there develops a lack of respect for oaths. Whereas Thucydides pauses to describe and comment on this, in the *Anabasis*, analysis is integrated into a combination of the deceptive speeches and the way the narrator feeds information about motivations and outcomes to the reader.

deception of Cyrus occurs when the army faced danger in the battle at Cunaxa, but Clearchus serves to exacerbate this. Timasion's deceit occurs when the army is not in danger, although there is internal dissention.

The reader also learns about the importance of trustworthiness. Cyrus had a reputation for trustworthiness, but abused this. His death proves how dangerous it was to trust him, particularly for the commanders who are killed by Cyrus' former friends. It is also particularly pointed that Cyrus himself has a habit of trusting people who do not deserve trust, namely Orontas, Ariaeus, Tissaphernes and Clearchus. Trusting Clearchus also proves disastrous for the other leaders and soldiers, and he similarly abuses the faith put in him. As the narrator presents it, the reader and internal audience have no particular reason to trust Timasion, but the episode where he lies may negatively affect his trustworthiness. Xenophon is not trusted by the army, although he does everything he can to earn their trust, yet the narrator demonstrates that Xenophon can be trusted to work in the interests of the men. It is clearly important for a leader to cultivate a reputation for trustworthiness but he has to use this for the good of others. A leader must *be* rather than *seem* trustworthy.¹⁷⁵ Hirsch (1985, 36) draws attention to the speech in which Xenophon the character tells Seuthes that a leader should show himself to be trustworthy (7.7.23-6). Here, Xenophon the character is echoing the message that the narrator is teaching.

One final lesson is that, although Clearchus and Cyrus act reprehensibly in deceiving the army, their internal audience must also take some responsibility for trusting these leaders without adequately testing that they will choose to benefit the army and work in the army's interests. In the case of Cyrus, the soldiers can particularly be blamed for not following up on their doubts about Cyrus' aims, and later for recognising his deceit but choosing to pretend that they had been deceived. Of course, it is harder to detect deceit in the form of outright lies than in the form of omission and suppression because alternative sources of information need to be found, and this may affect the culpability of the deceivers. While the soldiers need to be able to rely on their leaders, as mercenaries they have the power to mutiny against

¹⁷⁵ Cyrus the Great learns the importance of leaders being rather than seeming at *Cyropaedia* 1.6.22. See also *Memorabilia* 2.6.39. See further Agesilaus' trustworthiness, particularly at *Agesilaus* 1.12 and 3.2-5, and the importance Cyrus the Great assigns to projecting a belief that truth is important to him (*Cyropaedia* 3.1.9, 3.1.31, 4.2.8 and 5.2.9-11).

incompetent or corrupt leaders. Yet they allow themselves to be persuaded to go on each time they pause. There was less opportunity to put Xenophon to the test, because the army was in an extremely precarious situation when he took over. However, the men perhaps begin to learn that they should test their leaders because, when they are out of immediate danger, they repeatedly question Xenophon's actions. Perhaps even more than the soldiers, other leaders should have been responsible for testing Cyrus and Clearchus rather than trusting them implicitly. Because they are in a position where they are responsible for the welfare of soldiers, they should have been more vigilant and questioned them both on any information they may have omitted or suppressed. Again, this is something that the other leaders also do with Xenophon during his period of leadership, suggesting that they also learnt from the army's dealings with Cyrus and Clearchus.

Conclusion

The *Anabasis* narrator has not contradicted himself by condemning the deceit of friends and then showing otherwise positive leaders deceiving those on their side. Instead, he has used deceitful speeches as well as the accompanying narrative to involve the reader in a complicated issue, to characterise the leaders positively or negatively, and to make a subtle distinction in how the verbal deceit of friends can be practiced acceptably and unacceptably. For the most part, the lessons on how to be a good leader presented in the *Anabasis* are for the reader to discover rather than being explicitly described.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, there are perhaps too many shades of grey regarding the deception of friends to make it possible for the narrator to pass a simple judgement on it.¹⁷⁷ One aspect that deserves further comment is the soldiers' request for more money when they continue with Cyrus despite knowing that he is deceiving them. It seems that the thought of financial gain has helped to override their repugnance at being deceived. Thus, it may be instructive to examine how leaders make use of appeals to financial gain, as well as to another important desire, honour, and also how the leaders represent their own attitudes towards these concepts.

¹⁷⁶ See Grethlein (2013, 64-9), who notes that the speeches in the work allow the narrator to hide his presence and the reader to judge the characters without the need for explicit comment.

¹⁷⁷ See Pownall (1998, esp. 272) who argues that Xenophon the author uses negative paradigms rather than direct comment to indicate that impiety is reprehensible in the *Hellenica*. This is similar to my argument that Xenophon uses *exempla* to indicate where deceit is acceptable and unacceptable.

Κέρδος and Τιμή as Persuasive Concepts in the *Anabasis*

Any speaker needs to understand his audience's desires, motivations, attitudes and expectations and be able to link these to what he wants to persuade his audience to do or think. Typically, soldiers and leaders desire κέρδος (profit) and τιμή (honour). For soldiers and leaders in armies drafted from citizens, earning τιμή for their actions is a primary motivation, although they also want to return home with a personal profit. In a mercenary army, the reverse is true, and the soldiers primarily desire profit. According to Trundle (2004, 43, 63-6, 99 and 101), mercenaries want financial gain in order to bring something back for their relatives at home, but also to supplement their meagre pay (especially if a paymaster reneged on his agreement), to obtain food, to save enough to leave service, and to have something for the future. While many ancient writers disparaged mercenaries for preferring profit to honour and state,¹⁷⁸ a mercenary's desire for gain gave him a reason to fight in battles that often did not affect him personally, and to conduct himself well. The desire for financial gain or profit is not intrinsically reprehensible but it becomes problematic when it turns to unregulated greed, is motivated by *hubris*, and overrides the constraints of acting acceptably. Indeed, the Greeks regarded a love of money, φιλοχρηματία, as particularly dishonourable, and drew attention to base covetousness, αίσχροκέρδεια, when they saw it.¹⁷⁹

Mercenaries did desire τιμή too, although not as strongly as they desired profit, or as strongly as citizen armies desired τιμή. The term itself has connotations of esteem and a person or object having a value or worth.¹⁸⁰ It could be obtained from leaders within the army, from paymasters, from people the army encountered or from those in Greece. Τιμή may come in such forms as positions within the army or in Greek communities, preferential treatment, and a greater cut of the rewards. Unfortunately, the desire for τιμή can cause tensions between members of the same army if they jockey for favour and put their interests before those of the group. Φιλοτιμία is literally the love of τιμή, and the word is sometimes translated as ambition. It also encompasses the notions of self-interest, rivalry, competition and

¹⁷⁸ See Trundle (2004, 2, 29 and 42), Roy (2004, 276), von Reden (1998, 271) and Perlman (1976-7, 251) for references and discussion.

¹⁷⁹ See further Dover (1974, 109-11 and 171-2) and von Reden (1995, 99).

¹⁸⁰ See Chantraine (1980, 1119-20), Liddell and Scott (1996, 1793-4) and Cairns (2011, 29).

jealousy.¹⁸¹ Thus, it is clear that the desire for honour can be as problematic as the desire for profit.

The potential for these concepts to prove problematic within a community can clearly be seen in the Athenian *polis*. Scholars argue that by the fourth century, elite φιλοτιμία was so problematic to the ideals of the democratic *polis* in Athens that the *demos* acted by appropriating φιλοτιμία. They made it useful to themselves by controlling who could be honoured and what actions merited honour.¹⁸² Similarly, Waterfield (2006, 192-4) comments that greed was a problem in Greece after the Peloponnesian war, where wealth and increase were highly sought. A love of gain was particularly associated with the elite, and Engen (2010, 39-40 and 49) describes how the Athenian *demos* again attempted to make this more useful to the city. The *demos* established an ideology where money's value as wealth was replaced by its value as honour, status and reputation, and where the elite were encouraged to use their wealth to benefit the community. The Greek army in the *Anabasis* is often likened to a democratic *polis* on the march,¹⁸³ suggesting that both a *polis* and the army may face similar issues with profit and honour. However, it also suggests that, like in Athens, the problems these concepts cause can be mitigated.

Appealing to these desires is common within a mercenary army setting. Aristotle includes desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) as an emotion in his *Rhetorica* (2.12, 1388b.33), and there is nothing morally wrong about tapping into an audience's desires.¹⁸⁴ However, there are particular difficulties associated with doing this. A leader must find the right balance between appealing to the desire for profit and honour in order to persuade the soldiers to undertake beneficial and honourable behaviour, without allowing the desires for these concepts to encourage disreputable behaviour that could jeopardise the army's safety or bring it disgrace. Here an

¹⁸¹ See Liddell and Scott (1996, 1941) and Whitehead (1983, 55).

¹⁸² See further Whitehead (1983, 59-68 and 1986, 242-3), von Reden (1995, 83-4), Johnstone (1994, 223-5), Ober (1989, 219-20, 230, 246-7 and 291-2) and Engen (2010, 41-9). Such a progression would not have been as seamless and complete as it is often presented, however, and must also have occurred at different times in different democratic *poleis*.

¹⁸³ See Farrell (2012, 209-25), Trundle (2004, 2), Hornblower (2004, 243-9 and 262), Dillery (1995, 92-3), Stronk (1995, 34-5), Dalby (1992, 17-23 and 30), Perlman (1976-7, 284), Nussbaum (1967, esp. 2-10 and 30-93) and Bonner (1912, 354-60). See also Lee (2007, 9-10), Hutchinson (2000, 62) and Higgins (1977, 90-1) for objections to the *polis* model.

¹⁸⁴ Desire does not have its own section in the *Rhetorica*, unlike the other emotions. See Cooper (1996), Striker (1996, 289), and Leighton (1996, 222-8) who attempt to explain why this is the case.

army's short-term goals, such as making a profit, may come into conflict with its long-term goals, such as being received well upon their return home. Κέρδος and τιμή are often considered to be in tension with each other (see Dover, 1974, 172 and 231, for example), with τιμή being the nobler motivation of the two. In Plato's tripartite division of the soul, the spirited part desires honour, while the appetitive part desires money. Socrates argues that the rational part of the soul should work in tandem with the spirited part to rule the appetitive part, or else it will lead to vice (*Respublica* 435a.5ff.).¹⁸⁵ On some occasions, however, appealing directly to others' desire for profit is what is best for the army, because it encourages the soldiers to overcome a dangerous situation, for example. Thus, a leader needs to be able to judge when an appeal is appropriate and when it is not. A mercenary leader's role is made harder by the fact that in coalition warfare, different leaders and soldiers in the same army will be motivated to different levels by the same desires or even have completely different motivations, as well as different beliefs as to where κέρδος and τιμή should be obtained from. A leader may also need to interact with outsiders to the army who have their own attitudes and desires concerning κέρδος and τιμή.

Fulfilling the soldiers' desire for profit and honour is particularly important for a mercenary leader, because if the soldiers think that a leader is not satisfying their desires, they can follow others to obtain these. Indeed, soldiers will not follow a leader who lectures them that they should not pursue financial gain, even if this is for their own advantage, while they are more likely to follow someone who appears to be fulfilling their desires. This puts the leader in a difficult position. If he wants to educate an audience about how to behave, he needs to set a good example of how to control his desires. Soldiers will imitate their leaders' actions rather than their words and will not stay with leaders who do not live up to their words. Leaders can also make examples of others' poor behaviour concerning these two concepts.

Behind a leader's appeals to the desire for κέρδος and τιμή in others lie his own values, sometimes articulated honestly and sometimes deceptively. He may have an ulterior motive that influences whether he harnesses appeals to κέρδος and τιμή for the benefit of others or causes harm in the process of benefitting himself. Mercenary leaders particularly require honour from the soldiers in order to ensure

¹⁸⁵ See Plato *Phaedrus* 253d.1ff. and Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea* 1098a.3ff. for more about these desires being located in different parts of the soul.

that they remain in command, although they can also get honour from others external to the army too, sometimes causing a conflict in their duty. For example, in the *Anabasis*, we see examples of paymasters appealing to the desire for κέρδος and τιμή in the leaders, as well as the soldiers.

The Anabasis Circumstances and Xenophon's Narratorial Opinion

In the *Anabasis*, the army's motivations alter over time and so its leaders need to re-evaluate constantly what the army wants. For example, the narrator reveals the soldiers' and leaders' initial motivations. The soldiers were motivated to join Cyrus' mission either because of Cyrus' noble character or because they had heard that people had been enriched by him previously (6.4.8). The leaders joined Cyrus to make money but learnt that loyalty could obtain them more than just pay (1.9.17).¹⁸⁶ Once Cyrus has died, the aims of the mission evolve constantly, as do the army's desires. While the army is trying to escape its immediate danger, safety is the foremost motivation and it is to the army's benefit to obey the commander without considering what gain can be made from doing so.¹⁸⁷ When on safer ground, the army is driven more by thoughts of κέρδος and τιμή.¹⁸⁸ Here, the soldiers are in no desperate need to follow their leaders in order to obtain safety, and can begin to question their leadership. Thus, carefully judging what to appeal to, and also presenting an attitude towards κέρδος and τιμή that the soldiers find acceptable are important for a leader's success.

The amount of mentions of κέρδος and τιμή by leaders in the *Anabasis* demonstrates that the author is deliberately representing leaders as making use of these concepts in their persuasion attempts. However, the narrator offers no explicit advice for how a leader should tread the fine line between referring to κέρδος and τιμή as encouragement for others to act positively, and such references bringing harm to the army. There is no such instruction elsewhere in Xenophon's *oeuvre*

¹⁸⁶ See Roy (1967, 317), who argues that this comment might only refer to the motives of Proxenus' division.

¹⁸⁷ Tuplin (2014, 81-2 and 114) demonstrates that the lowest amount of speech occurs in book 4 (11.72%) because the army is in desperate danger and so does not need persuading to follow its leaders.

¹⁸⁸ Scholars such as Nussbaum (1967, 147-52) and Dillery (1995, 61-90) divide the *Anabasis* into different sections relating to the army's employment, aims and safety. Although they do not always divide the work in the same places, they all argue that there is a period where the men's desire for gain increases and discipline consequently breaks down.

either. In these other works, characters and narrators refer to an extreme love of profit negatively,¹⁸⁹ and present φιλοτιμία as being both constructive and destructive.¹⁹⁰ Thus, there is some point of reference for Xenophon the author's probable opinion on appeals to these two concepts. Nevertheless, the mentions of profit and honour by leaders in the speeches in the *Anabasis* must be analysed individually in order to determine how a leader should make use of these concepts.¹⁹¹ I shall investigate speeches by Cyrus, Seuthes, Xenophon, Clearchus, Menon, Ariaeus, Cleanor, Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus.

Methodological Approach

References by leaders to κέρδος and τιμή as part of their persuasion attempts, as well as the opposite concepts, loss of profit and disgrace, can be divided into categories based on who is mentioned as providing and gaining honour and profit, and who is representing their attitude about these concepts to whom. These can then be examined in a logical order.¹⁹² Firstly, I briefly examine instances of paymasters offering κέρδος and τιμή to the Greek leaders, because this will influence the Greek leaders' appeals to the army. Secondly, I touch on the references by two Greek leaders to the κέρδος and τιμή they can make from both paymasters and the army. This demonstrates where certain leaders' loyalties lie and again how the appeals they make may be affected. Thirdly, I briefly analyse how certain leaders discuss κέρδος and τιμή with those outside the army. These appeals and representations of particular attitudes give an indication of what is acceptable in relation to κέρδος and τιμή,

¹⁸⁹ See *Hellenica* 1.4.13, *Memorabilia* 1.5.6, 2.1.25, 2.6.4 and 3.5.16, *Symposium* 4.34-44, *Oeconomicus* 14.5-10, *Agésilas* 8.8 and 11.3, *Cynegeticus* 13.10-16 and *Cyropaedia* 1.6.45-6 and 8.8.18. See also the example of the Thirty Tyrants (*Hellenica* 2.3.21-2, 2.3.43, 2.4.21 and 2.4.40).

¹⁹⁰ Constructive: *Agésilas*, 10.4, *Cyropaedia* 1.2.1 and *Hellenica* 7.5.18-19. Destructive: *Memorabilia* 1.2.12-25 and *Oeconomicus* 1.21-3.

¹⁹¹ Some scholars have already discussed Xenophon's interest in these concepts. For example, Higgins (1977, 126) argues that Xenophon and Thucydides recognised that the πλεονεξία (greed, although not necessarily for financial gain) and φιλοτιμία of those involved in politics is "the primary cause of political evil, especially in war", but he does not carry out a sustained investigation of this. Sandridge (2012) has investigated φιλοτιμία in the *Cyropaedia*, and Figueira (2012) has investigated Xenophon's concern with economic matters generally. However, these scholars do not examine the role of these concepts in leaders' persuasion attempts. Azoulay (2004b) argues that lavish spending and giving distinctive honours are particular benefits that a charismatic leader must give in order to receive *charis*. However, because the particular circumstances in the *Anabasis* mean that the Greek leaders have little power in personally bestowing money and honour on their subordinates, there is little overlap in our investigations.

¹⁹² While I only examine uses of the word τιμή, I analyse further terms for profit/gain than just κέρδος.

which will also aid in the investigation of appeals made by Greek leaders to the army. In the subsequent sections, I examine in detail examples of commanders and paymasters offering κέρδος and τιμή to the army, commanders appealing to the idea of outsiders offering κέρδος and τιμή to the army, and leaders recalling how the army and others previously acted in relation to κέρδος and τιμή, in order to provide lessons for their audiences.

As in the last chapter, I analyse the speeches as persuasion attempts in the first instance, and then examine them in terms of the three proposed roles and effects of the speeches in the work. In this chapter, it will be particularly important to pay attention to whether the speaker's promises link up with his actions and whether a leader's self-representation matches his actions. From a speaker's ability and intent to fulfil his promises, as well as the honesty of his self-representation, the reader can particularly learn whether the leader is trustworthy or not, and whether he has his own desires chiefly in his mind when he mentions honour and profit. Comparing similar passages in Xenophon's other works, as well as in Greek literature generally, helps to distinguish what is acceptable and unacceptable regarding appeals to κέρδος and τιμή. Again, we shall see that only Xenophon masters appealing to the desire for κέρδος and τιμή in a way that does not compromise the army's interests, and is the only one to have a praiseworthy attitude towards these concepts.

Examples

Paymasters Offering Κέρδος and Τιμή to Greek Leaders

When Cyrus believes that the Persian king is about to attack his army, he calls a meeting of the Greek leaders (1.7.2). He encourages them by claiming that if his mission goes well, he will make those who want to return home objects of emulation (ζηλωτὸν) to those already there, although he says that he is confident that many will prefer to stay with him (1.7.4). When questioned by Gaulites, who is 'faithful' (πιστὸς) to Cyrus (1.7.5), Cyrus reassures the leaders that he will be willing and able to fulfil his promises, and says that he will give each Greek leader a wreath of gold (1.7.6-7). The narrator states that when the Greek leaders heard this, they were far more eager (πολὺ προθυμότεροι) and reported this back to the other Greeks (1.7.8). Some Greeks ask Cyrus what they will personally receive if he is victorious and the narrator states that Cyrus satisfies them all with his response (1.7.8). Perhaps before

this speech there were some doubts about Cyrus' intentions, which he successfully overcomes.

Seuthes, who later becomes the second paymaster of the Greek army, tries to get the army to work for him by attempting to persuade Xenophon to bring the army over to him. Twice while the army is in Asia and trying to decide on its next move, Seuthes sends Medosades to Xenophon to make vague promises about what Xenophon would receive in return for bringing the army to him (7.1.5-6 and 7.2.10), which Xenophon declines to do on both occasions. The narrator also indirectly refers to an unspecified occasion on which Seuthes offered other Greek leaders benefits to bring the army over to him (7.2.2). This is revealed when the army is trying to decide what to do next, and the narrator mentions that the generals all wanted to lead the army to different places. He says that Cleanor and Phryniscus wanted to take the army to Seuthes because he had appealed to them to do this and given one a horse and one a woman. Unlike Xenophon, these leaders have accepted gifts from Seuthes and want the army to go to Seuthes without consulting the soldiers.¹⁹³

When Xenophon and certain other leaders later go to consult Seuthes about what use he would make of the army if the Greeks were to go over to him, Seuthes offers the army pay, and the generals land, oxen and forts (7.2.35-8). Seuthes promises that even if the army is prevented from helping him by the Spartans, he will accept the army into his community, and he offers Xenophon a coastal residence, his daughter to marry, and offers to marry Xenophon's daughter (7.2.38). The narrator indicates that Seuthes and the leaders present gave pledges (7.3.1), and so the leaders presumably accept these offers of τιμή and κέρδος should the army go on to work for Seuthes. The Greek leaders report back to the rest of the generals and Xenophon advises the soldiers to listen to what Seuthes has to offer them (7.3.3-6). Much later, after Xenophon has arranged for the pay owed by Seuthes to be given to the army, Seuthes tries to persuade Xenophon to stay with him by reoffering Xenophon the fortresses and the other gains that he promised (7.7.50). Again, Xenophon refuses (7.7.51).

¹⁹³ See Farrell (2012, 273) who argues that these leaders are undermining the soldiers' decision-making role.

These speeches engage the reader. He already knows that Cyrus has had difficulty paying the army and so, like the leaders, may need further reassurance to allay his suspicions about how Cyrus intends to reciprocate the army's aid. Given Gaulites' relationship with Cyrus, the reader may suspect that it has been arranged that Cyrus will elaborate on exactly how he will pay, and that the army is being carefully manipulated. Concerning Seuthes' appeals to τιμή and κέρδος, the reader may wonder whether Xenophon will be tempted by Seuthes' offers, whether this would be beneficial for the army, and what the army would do if Xenophon did make an arrangement without consulting them. The reader might feel some unease at the thought of the army working for another paymaster, and some suspicion at Seuthes' generosity. The reader may also be shocked that Cleanor and Phryniscus took what Seuthes offered.

Both paymasters ultimately have a selfish motive for wanting to make use of the Greek army- Cyrus to get revenge on his brother, and Seuthes to regain his ancestral territory- and they offer the leaders τιμή and κέρδος for their own benefit rather than the benefit of the recipients. We saw that Cyrus' inability to pay the army threw doubt on his ability to fulfil his other generous promises. However, his intentions may be honourable in this case. The narrator dwells on Cyrus' rewarding of friends and good behaviour in his obituary (1.9.16-28), and it seems likely that, if he had the resources, Cyrus would match his words with his actions. Cyrus dies before he gets the chance to fulfil his promises, and so his trustworthiness in terms of these particular promises is left unconfirmed by the narrator. By contrast, Seuthes' failure to pay the army their wages even though he has money, suggests that he would be unlikely to have fulfilled his promises of τιμή and κέρδος to Xenophon and the army, although he has given relatively low-costing gifts to Cleanor and Phryniscus.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, because Xenophon repeatedly requests the outstanding wages for the Greeks, Seuthes no longer offers Xenophon the coastal forts that he previously promised (7.5.7-8).¹⁹⁵ Thus, the narrator undercuts Seuthes' presentation

¹⁹⁴ Azoulay (2004b) argues that Seuthes' claim that he did not mean to cheat anyone shows that his failure to pay the soldiers was due to Heracleides' influence. Scholars such as Flower (2012, 113), however, disagree and believe that Seuthes deliberately did not pay the Cyreans and routinely lied.

¹⁹⁵ See Azoulay (2004a, 294 and 2004b, 162) for the difference between acceptable *xenia*-gifts from Seuthes, such as these forts, and the offer of corrupt gifts, which the men incorrectly criticise Xenophon for receiving.

of himself as generous and willing to reward others for aiding him, and characterises him as untrustworthy.

These appeals demonstrate that most of the Greek leaders are highly motivated by thoughts of their own honour and profit, and that Xenophon is an exception. In a later defence speech, Xenophon claims that instead of accepting Seuthes' offers, he led the army to where it could quickly cross to Asia, because he thought that this was the best course for the Greeks and because he knew that this was what they wanted (7.6.12). Thus, Xenophon claims to have had the best interests of the army in mind when he declined Seuthes, although he might be saying this simply to save himself. He and the other leaders only go to Seuthes when the gods have indicated that they would allow Xenophon to lead the army to Seuthes after Aristarchus has demonstrated his untrustworthiness (7.2.15ff.), and again, Xenophon appears to be doing what is best for the army.

These speeches indicate that appealing to the desire for profit and honour in leaders is usually successful, but not always. Examining the outcomes of these appeals further indicates that it is not always right to do so. We have seen that in the long term, following Cyrus into battle is catastrophic for the army and Cyrus, despite the short-term morale boost Cyrus' speech brings that benefits both the leaders and himself. Seuthes' failed attempts at persuasion do not bring harm or benefit to the army, but he brings both harm and benefit when he does persuade the leaders to want to work for him. Although the army comes under his protection, by reneging on his promises, he causes the army to turn on Xenophon and to remain in limbo waiting for its pay. Seuthes does not suffer physically for his actions, but is roundly criticised by Xenophon the character, especially for his attitude to profit and honour (7.6.20-2 and 7.7.21-47). Thus, the reader may judge Seuthes to be a poor leader and should understand not to follow his example in terms of appeals to τιμή and κέρδος. Cyrus also, because he ultimately causes the army harm by motivating his leaders to continue an inadvisable mission and is himself killed in the process, should not be emulated in the way he appeals to τιμή and κέρδος. The reader also sees the possible destabilising effect that offering specific rewards to leaders can cause to the army, and how it can influence a leader's actions and appeals. Even though Cleanor and Phryniscus ultimately do not lead the army to Seuthes, this could have driven their actions rather than their duty to the army. Further, when the army suspected

Xenophon of being enriched by Seuthes, much discontent is caused (7.5.7 and 7.6.9-10), demonstrating what could have happened if Xenophon had accepted Seuthes' proposals and held conflicting interests.

Commanders Gaining Κέρδος and Τιμή from Paymasters and the Army

This image of Xenophon as prioritising the army's interests over his own is reinforced by briefly examining how he and Clearchus refer to the τιμή and κέρδος that they gained or could have gained from paymasters. It is not inherently wrong to receive τιμή and κέρδος from a paymaster, and problems only occur when accepting honour or profit comes into conflict with the leaders' duty to the army. We saw in the last chapter that Clearchus claims to his troops that he is distressed because he has been honoured (ἐτίμησε) by Cyrus and may not be able to reciprocate this (1.3.3). Clearchus says that, with the soldiers, he thinks he will be valued or held in honour (τίμιος) wherever he may be, whereas without them he would be unable to help friends or harm enemies (1.3.6). Because (as Clearchus presents it) the τιμή he owes to Cyrus and the soldiers cannot both be repaid, he claims to value the τιμή from the men over that from a foreign friend. However, we have seen that actually he retains both, to his own advantage.

The dramatic effect of Clearchus' speech stems from the reader knowing that Clearchus is being deceptive, and we also saw how this deception impacts on his characterisation. Clearchus presents himself as someone who takes his relationships seriously, who desires to reciprocate the τιμή given to him, and who is ultimately loyal to his men. Yet we saw in the last chapter that the narrator undercuts this presentation. Clearchus accepts the soldiers' τιμή without properly reciprocating it, and only pretends to follow their wishes while actually maximising his own τιμή.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ See *Cyropaedia* 1.2.7, 5.4.32 and 8.3.49 and *Memorabilia* 2.1.28, 3.6.3, and 3.12.4 for the importance of repaying others and the necessity of actually earning τιμή. Elsewhere, see Aristotle's *Ethica Nicomachea* (1162b.31-4) for the importance of repaying a friend. Underpinning the giving and receiving of τιμή and κέρδος is the concept of reciprocity. See particularly Seaford (1998, 1-3) and von Reden (1998, 258-60). Reciprocity is often regarded as creating long-lasting ties that are mutually beneficial and encourage positive social relations (see von Reden, 1998, 255 and Mitchell 1997, 9). However, reciprocity also has a problematic role in Athenian politics (see von Reden 1995, 89, 94-6 and 219, Engen 2010, 33-5, 47, 101-2, 132 and 135, Seaford 1998, 6-11 and Missiou 1998, 191 and 196). See further Gauthier (1985) who demonstrates that we must be careful when making sweeping judgements about reciprocity based on what constitution a community has and where it is located.

The moral attitude he presented was only a façade to persuade the men to act in the way he wants, and he is failing to do his duty to the soldiers. He used the men's expectation that a good leader would prioritise their τιμή to his own advantage.

Like Clearchus, Xenophon presents himself as desiring honour from the army and as wanting to repay what the soldiers have given him. When Xenophon refuses sole command, he claims that he is happy (ἡδομαι) and grateful (χάρην) to be honoured (τιμώμενος) by the soldiers because he is human, and he prays that the gods allow him to benefit (ἀγαθοῦ) the army (6.1.26). He attempts to make the men feel that he values their honour, and to give them confidence that he conforms to their expectations of how a leader should act in desiring to repay them. The army's response does not specifically indicate that his mention of the men giving him honour has influenced its reaction. However, because more men want Xenophon as leader, this suggests that they believe that he will carry out his wish to benefit them in return. Thus, Xenophon has used a representation of his attitude towards honour to influence his audience. Unlike with Clearchus, the narrator shows that Xenophon matches his words with his actions because he benefits the army repeatedly, including immediately by rejecting the sole command, and hence avoiding the wrath of the Spartans, and later by gaining the men their pay from Seuthes.

When Xenophon is sent by the Spartan leaders to Seuthes to obtain the soldiers their outstanding pay, Xenophon explains the choice he makes between accepting τιμή and κέρδος from Seuthes or working in the interests of the army. At 7.7.40, Xenophon reminds Seuthes that he has not received anything from him, and says that it would have been disgraceful (αἰσχρὸν) to look to his own affairs and leave his soldiers' in a bad state, especially because he had been honoured (τιμώμενον) by the men. Xenophon presents himself as thinking highly of reciprocal relationships, and as wanting to pay back the men as his priority. The narrator has already demonstrated that Xenophon can be characterised in this way, as we have seen. Indeed, Xenophon chooses to put aside his plans to make a settlement where he would get honour as its founder in favour of keeping the soldiers safe and preserving their τιμή (5.6.31-3). Thus, Xenophon's words match his actions and he is motivated positively. Xenophon is willing to work in the interests of the men even though they are ungrateful and suspicious towards him and want to stone him to death. Xenophon

does not let his love of honour overcome his duty, even though honour is something that men in general desire greatly (see *Hiero* 7.1).

Xenophon the character here offers his own example to Seuthes, suggesting that Seuthes should likewise reciprocate the soldiers' τιμή by paying them. Xenophon the character's comments here can also partly be read as a comment on Clearchus' failure to reciprocate acceptably. Indeed, Xenophon's extrication of himself and the army from their relationship with Seuthes, as I shall discuss below, demonstrates that Clearchus could possibly have engineered a friendly departure for the Greeks from Cyrus if he had really wanted to.

Which leader acts correctly can be seen by how Clearchus' and Xenophon's leaderships end in the work. Tissaphernes' recognition that Clearchus prioritises his own τιμή facilitates Tissaphernes' treachery of the army and leads to Clearchus' death. The narrator says that Clearchus wanted to lead the entire army and desired to remove rivals for this leadership, specifically Menon, who he believes Tissaphernes will implicate when he takes the Greek leaders to him (2.5.29). Thus, Clearchus is punished for prioritising the τιμή he wants from the army over the soldiers' interests and concerns. This can be contrasted with the rewards Xenophon receives at the end of the *Anabasis*.

Xenophon the character presents his attitude about leaders being rivals for τιμή in a speech at 5.7.10, which may comment further on Clearchus' actions. Xenophon is responding to accusations that he is deceiving the soldiers into returning to the Phasis, and he claims that such stories are invented by foolish people who are envious (φθονούντων) of him because he is honoured (τιμῶμαι) by the men.¹⁹⁷ This is unjust (οὐ δικάίως), Xenophon says, because he does not stop anyone from saying or doing beneficial things for the army or from being commanders, as long as they benefit the army.¹⁹⁸ While other leaders are concerned with their own

¹⁹⁷ Aristotle later argues that envy is felt by base people (*Rhetorica* 2.11, 1388a.35-8). Sanders (2008, 272-3) argues that the main issue with envy is that it is an unjustified feeling of pain at someone's good fortune rather than a justified feeling of pain at someone's good fortune (indignation), which makes envy morally wrong.

¹⁹⁸ See Xenias and Pasion who desert the army because of jealous ambition (φιλοτιμηθέντες, 1.4.7). Even Thorax is always fighting with Xenophon over the leadership of the army (5.6.25).

standing, Xenophon claims that he is concerned with what is best for the army.¹⁹⁹ There is no specific response from the men to this particular argument, although the speech as a whole is successful. The narrator has already shown that Xenophon is not jealous of other people who are honoured or have positions of command. For example, Xenophon has said that it would be better for the army to follow Timasion and Thorax as leaders because they could offer the army pay and a trip home, rather than the army splitting up over his idea to settle (5.6.31). Thus, Xenophon matches his words and actions.

The negative repercussions resulting from Clearchus' speech for both himself and the army occur early in the work and demonstrate that such a selfish attitude to τιμή should not be emulated.²⁰⁰ The narrator is presenting a real danger. A leader may be able to speak so convincingly about attitudes towards honour and profit which he only pretends to have that his audiences will not be able to stop him from acting in ways that will harm them, and they will carry out the actions that he wants the army to do to fulfil his own desires. Only Clearchus allows his *xenia-*

¹⁹⁹ The idea of leaders working together rather than against each other also occurs in the *Memorabilia* and *Agesilaus*. At *Memorabilia* 2.6.24-5, Socrates says that leaders who have good motivations for commanding should be able to share public honours (πολιτικῶν τιμῶν) for the benefit of each other. Agesilaus even honours (ἔτιμα) political opponents when they do something positive because, the narrator claims, Agesilaus thought so highly of Sparta's citizens (*Agesilaus*, 7.3). Whether this motive is accurately represented or not, the narrator is presenting it as the ideal.

²⁰⁰ In the *Cyropaedia* (5.5.5-36), Cyaxares is likewise concerned with his own honour over the interests of his men. He does not present himself deceitfully but is quite open to Cyrus about his feelings towards honour. Cyaxares believes that Cyrus' actions in aiding his army have robbed him of his reputation (ἀξιώματος) and honour (τιμῆς) by making Cyrus look better than him. Cyaxares even says that he would have preferred it if Cyrus had harmed the soldiers instead of benefitting them. Scholars disagree over how Cyaxares should be interpreted, but I agree with scholars such as Gray (2011b, 268 and 271-5) and Danzig (2012, 514-38) who interpret Cyaxares as weak, ineffective and selfish, and as wrong to be more concerned with his own honour than the interests of his men or the advancement of the campaign. That the narrator allows Cyaxares to be seen like this and to have his arguments undone by Cyrus suggests the didactic message that a leader should prioritise the interests of the soldiers over his own. See further *Hellenica* 4.1.34ff. and 6.1.17, and *Agesilaus* 5.4-7 for positive representations of speakers prioritising their own community over foreign friends. Of course, the mercenaries themselves have chosen to work for a foreign friend over their own communities, but we have seen Socrates' warning about this, and the possibility that Xenophon was exiled because of this.

relationship to affect his loyalty to his men, even though the narrator also says that Proxenus valued Cyrus more than his own state (3.1.4).²⁰¹

The soldiers are punished for trusting that Clearchus prioritises their τιμή. Cyrus is also punished for thinking that Clearchus prioritises his τιμή. When Clearchus deceives Cyrus over the orders at the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus is looking after the interests of himself and the Greeks, and Cyrus dies partly because of this. It is clear that a leader's appeals to his own attitudes to honour are useful persuasive tools, but they must accurately reflect the speaker, and the leader should have a selfless attitude and put his duty to the soldiers first.

Leaders Discussing Κέρδος and Τιμή with Outsiders

During the same speech to Seuthes in which Xenophon explains that he values honour from the army, Xenophon teaches Seuthes several further lessons about how to behave concerning honour and profit, as part of his demonstration as to why Seuthes should pay the men. These lessons indicate that a leader may have to address behaviour concerning these concepts to outsiders, as well as to those within the army. Xenophon says that it is important that Seuthes is thought of as being trustworthy because the words that untrustworthy men say go wandering (πλανωμένους) without achieving anything, without power and without honour (ἀτίμους, 7.7.22-4). Thus, Xenophon is suggesting that Seuthes should prove trustworthy to the Greeks and pay them or risk being unable to form relationships or receive τιμή in the future. Xenophon also accuses Seuthes of selling the Greeks' trust in him for the thirty talents he owes them. Thus, he is now relating the desire for κέρδος to issues of trust, again to suggest that Seuthes should pay the men. Xenophon argues that because Seuthes has received much more profit because of the Greeks than the thirty talents he owes them, it would have been a small sum to pay to ensure that the Greeks thought well of him (7.7.25-6).²⁰² Later in the speech,

²⁰¹ See Humble (1997, 186) who comments regarding the Spartans in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* that "a common desire for personal glory at the expense of what is best for the state and a fiercely competitive attitude towards one another...undermine their success". Humble (1999, 339) disagrees with scholars who argue that Xenophon portrays *sophrosyne* as a typical trait of the Spartans, and my interpretation backs this up. See also Seelinger (1997, 25-30) who argues that Xenophon was concerned with the interests of all while Clearchus was driven by his personal friendships rather than benefitting the soldiers.

²⁰² C.f. *Cyropaedia* 4.2.42-5, where Cyrus argues to the army that enhancing its reputation is more important than making a short-lived profit.

Xenophon explains how friendship is more desirable than riches (7.7.41-2).²⁰³

Xenophon is here reminding Seuthes that his friendship with the Greek army and the benefits this will bring are more important than the amount he could save by not paying the army. Finally, Xenophon says that after all he has done for Seuthes, Seuthes has the effrontery to overlook the fact that the soldiers are holding Xenophon in dishonour (ἄτιμον) because they think that Xenophon has received gifts from him (7.7.46). By contrast, Xenophon emphasises that he has continued to treat Seuthes as a friend (7.7.43-5). This argument suggests that Seuthes should help Xenophon and repay his friendship by paying the men.

Xenophon appeals to the benefits that being honoured, being well thought of, and having friends can bring, in contrast to selfishly desiring money. Xenophon is also playing upon the fear of what will happen if Seuthes does not mend his relationship with the Greeks, and also shame at how he has treated the Greeks. Xenophon perhaps also tries to evoke pity for himself by describing how his reputation with the soldiers has suffered, and tries to evoke feelings of gratitude and goodwill towards himself and the army for what they have done for Seuthes. Xenophon presents himself as someone who knows what constitutes right and wrong behaviour for a leader regarding honour and profit. He also appears to recognise the value of a positive reputation and does not value selfish gain highly. He presents himself as a loyal friend who wants to relay his wisdom for the benefit of his audience and as someone who is disappointed that his friend did not support him. The narrator backs up this self-presentation by Xenophon. He is elsewhere seen to be concerned with the reputation a leader's actions can accrue, for example, in his thoughts about whether he should take sole command (6.1.20-1). Xenophon is also shown not to be motivated by gain.²⁰⁴ Xenophon is unable to give Seuthes gifts (7.3.20ff., unlike Timasion who offers expensive gifts), and later chooses not to take payment when there is not enough to split between all the generals (7.5.2-4). Indeed, near the end of the work, Eucleides the seer confirms that Xenophon has not

²⁰³ C.f. *Memorabilia* 1.2.7, 2.4.1 and 4.2.9 where Socrates argues that friendship and wisdom are more important than money and profit, and *Symposium* 4.34-44 where Antisthenes says that wealth is based on what is in one's heart rather than possessions. Socrates seems to endorse this view (4.61-4). Further, c.f. Plato (*Republica* 336e.2-9) and Isocrates (1.19, 1.21 and 3.50) who place wisdom, justice and reputation above riches.

²⁰⁴ Pace Buzzetti (2014, 57-8, 63 and 114) who argues that the narrator presents Xenophon as desiring gain from the mission.

enriched himself (7.8.2-3). Xenophon only receives his financial rewards when he sacrifices to Zeus the Merciful. He has his horse redeemed (7.8.4-6) and is informed of a way that he can win plunder (7.8.8-9).²⁰⁵ He thus earns his rewards in an acceptable way.²⁰⁶ Also, confirming his presentation as a good friend, we see that Xenophon is a loyal friend to Proxenus, going forward to learn his fate when the Persians have seized the generals (2.5.37), and setting up a plaque to him at Scillus (5.3.5). Xenophon also offers wise advice elsewhere (7.3.37, for example). Thus, Xenophon presents his attitude honestly, and his advice matches his own actions.

After this speech, Seuthes curses the man responsible for the soldiers not being paid, and claims that he did not mean to defraud the Greeks of their wages and that he will pay them (7.7.48). Seuthes is persuaded to do as Xenophon recommends. However, what follows indicates either that Seuthes is not persuaded by Xenophon's words about the rightness of prioritising τιμή from the soldiers, or that he does not believe Xenophon's presentation of himself as prioritising the soldiers' τιμή and wants to test Xenophon's resolve with an offer of τιμή and κέρδος from himself. After Xenophon requests that payment is made through him to restore some of his standing with the army, Seuthes says that Xenophon will not be more dishonoured (ἀτιμότερος) among the soldiers if he and a thousand Greek hoplites remain with him. As we saw above, Seuthes also promises to give Xenophon all the gifts and honours that he offered before, but Xenophon refuses. When Seuthes tells Xenophon that it would be safer to stay with him, Xenophon again says that it is not possible, but that wherever he is more highly honoured (ἐντιμότερος) it will be good for Seuthes too (7.7.52). This suggests that Xenophon believes that he will get greater honour elsewhere, perhaps from the men, but that the army will still reciprocate

²⁰⁵ C.f. Agesilaus' and Cyrus the Great's attitudes and actions concerning financial gain (*Agesilaus* 1.36, 4.1-6, 8.8, 11.5 and 11.8-9; *Cyropaedia* 1.6.8, 3.3.2-6, 5.1.28, 5.2.7-11 and 8.1.26). Both speak and act similarly to Xenophon.

²⁰⁶ Azoulay (2004a, 289-92, 295-6, 299-300 and 303, and 2004b, 192ff.) argues that Xenophon the author's agenda in presenting this careful portrait of Xenophon the character is to distance him from accusations of being a mercenary who is motivated by pay and mercenary exchange. Trundle (2004, 19, 60-1 and 68) and Perlman (1976-7, 255-6) also argue that Xenophon the author deliberately intended to distance the army from the negative associations that mercenary service brought. See further Flower (2012, 45), who draws attention to the motif of the return home as possibly encouraging the reader to forget that the mercenaries desire plunder. I argue that while Xenophon may indeed have wanted to represent himself as being above the mercenary way of life, his actions in regard to gain also form part of his moral teaching for potential leaders, in offering an example for others inside and outside the army.

Seuthes properly by spreading a good word about Seuthes because he finally kept his promise to them.

Seuthes is characterised by Xenophon's speech and his own response. The reader can judge exactly where Seuthes' leadership and moral attitude lack, and recognise that Seuthes is unable or unwilling to understand Xenophon's morally correct lesson. Indeed, Seuthes' inability to learn a lesson has already been demonstrated. For example, Xenophon previously suggested a way that Seuthes could prevent the army from being drawn apart at night (7.3.36-9) but Seuthes forgets this by 7.3.47. Seuthes clearly has much to learn, and the narrator also presents Xenophon giving advice about the kind of people Seuthes should take captive (7.4.24). Seuthes' lack of regard for Xenophon's choice to reciprocate honour from his men also fits with Seuthes' criticism that Xenophon is too friendly with the soldiers (7.6.4). Even if Seuthes does not learn Xenophon's lessons about how a leader should act, the reader surely does. Instead of presenting an attitude to honour and profit that will ensure himself more rewards from Seuthes, Xenophon uses his real attitude to confront Seuthes about his actions and to teach Seuthes how a good leader should act.

The reader engages with this speech by anticipating the effect a critique of Seuthes' actions will have on a man who is already hostile to Xenophon. The reader may also momentarily wonder if Xenophon will be tempted to stay with Seuthes when Seuthes requests this, and may anticipate that Seuthes will make the same mistakes as he does with the Greeks in his future relationships. Xenophon is motivated to act positively for the army and Seuthes here, but may also want to clear his name amongst the army. Thus, he acts both selflessly and selfishly. However, Xenophon benefits the army and Seuthes, as well as himself, with this speech, even if he only benefits Seuthes for a short time. He obtains the soldiers their pay and ensures that they parted from Seuthes on good terms and are ready to join their new employer. Xenophon benefits himself by restoring the army's faith in him (7.7.55) and departing from Seuthes on good terms. Finally, Xenophon benefits Seuthes by restoring his friendship with the Greeks, saving him on this occasion at least from the repercussions that he envisioned that Seuthes' failure to pay could have incurred, and by promising that the army will speak well of him. In the longer term, because Seuthes does not take on board Xenophon's message about whose honour to

prioritise, the reader may assume that Seuthes will continue to act poorly in his leadership.²⁰⁷ Xenophon is rendered a positive paradigm for his attitude and his attempt to instil good behaviour in others

Earlier, Xenophon has attempted to manipulate Seuthes' desire for profit and honour for his own and the army's benefit, further demonstrating the importance of a leader being able to judge what drives outsiders. Heracleides recommends to Xenophon that he needs to honour Seuthes as magnificently as possible at Seuthes' dinner party. However, Xenophon has no gifts to give and so must improvise. Gnesippus, the guest before Xenophon, also has no gifts to give. Gnesippus says that Seuthes should give gifts to those who have nothing to give first so that these people can give gifts and honour (τιμᾶν) back to Seuthes (7.3.28). Gnesippus may be trying to create a fictional relationship of reciprocity in a way that a Greek would understand and where he would not feel so inferior to Seuthes.²⁰⁸ Gnesippus' appeal receives no reply, however, and presumably does not please Seuthes. Xenophon, having drunk a little, stands up confidently (θαρραλέως, 7.3.29). He offers Seuthes himself and the soldiers as faithful and willing friends who will bring Seuthes territory, horses and people as gifts of honour (δῶρα) while in his service, rather than Seuthes having to take them as plunder (λήζεσθαι) himself (7.3.30-1). Xenophon here amalgamates the Greek and Thracian systems of honour and gift giving and attempts to create a more equal relationship that will benefit both parties.²⁰⁹ Xenophon has highlighted the ease with which Seuthes will be able to make gains, and the long-term advantage of having Xenophon and the army provide him with gifts in this fashion, while also working for him. Seuthes drains the drinking horn and sprinkles the last drops with Xenophon, seemingly accepting his gifts (7.3.32). The army does indeed win captives and cattle for Seuthes while regaining him his

²⁰⁷ See further Seelinger (1997, 25-30), who argues that Seuthes may not have understood the message that Xenophon presented or did not believe that he should live by it, and that Xenophon admits that he could not make Seuthes an ideal leader. See also Nussbaum (1967, 127 and 142) who argues that Xenophon acted in the opposite way to Clearchus by putting the army before his friendship with Seuthes and the rewards offered to him.

²⁰⁸ Mitchell (1997, 113 and 135-7) describes how Thracian kings were perceived to like to receive gifts in an "essentially supplicatory" fashion and how they subsequently controlled if and when to return gifts. She argues that the Thracian system created "social inequalities", compared to the "rough equality" of Greek reciprocal exchange.

²⁰⁹ Pace Buzzetti (2014, 272-3) who argues that Xenophon's companions were not his to offer to Seuthes and that Xenophon is actually concerned with saving himself from Aristarchus and trying to earn himself rewards from Seuthes. Xenophon's failure to provide gifts to Seuthes would surely have affected Seuthes' relationship with the army, however.

father's realm, and the Greeks prove to be good friends to him (7.3.48, 7.6.22 and 7.7.25). Xenophon has immediately benefitted himself by being able to offer something to Seuthes, and he has benefitted the army by cementing the soldiers' good relationship with Seuthes, who provides them with protection and food. In the longer term, the army's friendship brings benefits to Seuthes because the army fights for him and brings him plunder. Because Seuthes does not fulfil his promise of pay, the army and Xenophon suffer for a while, until Xenophon persuades Seuthes to do so, although, as we saw, working for Seuthes benefits the army in non-financial ways. Xenophon has overcome a potentially troublesome situation through his appeal to profit and honour.

There are also examples where a leader portrays to outsiders the attitude to honour and profit of those he is representing. We saw in chapter 2 that, when talking to the Sinopeans, Xenophon presents the Cyreans as not having focused on taking property (*χρήματα*) but on saving themselves (5.5.13). He also talks in terms of *τιμή* when he describes how the army reciprocated friendly and hostile behaviour (5.5.14).²¹⁰ Later, Xenophon represents the army as having a positive attitude to reciprocating benefits given in the form of wealth when Medosades warns the Greeks that they are acting unjustly by plundering his villages and tells them to leave. Xenophon argues that it is actually Medosades and his people that are acting badly, because the army enriched (*πλουτοῦντα*) Medosades by winning him the land, yet now Medosades and his people will not even allow the army to bivouac on the land before they leave (7.7.4-10). The Odrysian whom Medosades has brought with him to hear Xenophon's response says that he is ashamed (*αἰσχύνης*) at what he has heard about Medosades' behaviour and that the king would never endorse driving his benefactors (*εὐεργέτας*) away (7.7.11). Both the Sinopeans and the Odrysian believe Xenophon's representation of the army's attitudes, and believe that the army has acted rightly. Xenophon is thus able to prevent trouble for the army, benefitting them. The narrator confirms Xenophon's claims in the narrative (4.1.5ff., 4.3.4, 4.7.1ff., 4.8.1ff., 4.8.23-4, and 7.7.1), and Xenophon is characterised as being able to diffuse dangerous and tense situations in order to ensure the army's good relations with others and to secure the army's well-being.

²¹⁰ While Perlman (1976-7, 264) considers that the attitude which Xenophon presents here has nothing to do with morals but simply survival, I argue that the focus on reciprocity makes this a moral issue.

Ariaeus tries to represent the Persians as having a good moral approach to τιμή, reciprocity and friendship when talking to the Greeks. After Tissaphernes' treachery, he tells Cleanor, Sophaenetes and Xenophon that because Proxenus and Menon have benefitted the Persians by giving information on Clearchus' perjury and the violation of his agreement with the Persians, they are being held in high honour (μεγάλη τιμή) by them (2.5.38). Ariaeus is presumably attempting to make the remaining Greeks trust that the Persians acted morally in rewarding Menon and Proxenus, and persuade them that the Persians will also treat them well if they cooperate. Any concern that the reader may have about the Greeks believing Ariaeus is quickly ended. Cleanor, who responds to Ariaeus, does not appear to believe him. He does not refer to Proxenus or Menon but criticises Ariaeus instead. The Greeks are perhaps largely influenced by what happened when they trusted Ariaeus' fellow Persian, Tissaphernes. When Xenophon speaks, he asks the Persians to return Proxenus and Menon to the Greeks, but the Persians give no answer and depart (2.5.41-2). This seems to confirm that the Persians are lying about the pair being held in honour. Ariaeus' *ethos* is shown to be false, and he is characterised as untrustworthy. Ariaeus fails to benefit anyone, and the reader's final impression of him is the criticism directed at him by Cleanor (3.2.5). Clearly, communicating a positive *ethos* on behalf of those a leader represents is an important role for a leader, and it is important not only that the audience believes his words but also that the audience believes that the leader can enforce the good moral behaviour he is describing in those he represents.

Commanders and Paymasters Providing Τιμή and Κέρδος for the Greek Army

In this section, I firstly compare appeals by Xenophon, Timasion, and a joint speech by Lycon and Callimachus in which the speakers suggest how the army can obtain profit (3.2.39, 5.6.22-4 and 6.2.10-11). These speakers all make their appeals when they are trying to persuade the army to follow their leadership or have only just begun their leadership role. Secondly, I compare speeches by Xenophon and Lycon when they are both trying to provide financial gain for the army but from two different types of source (5.1.8, 5.2.18 and 6.2.4-5). Finally, I examine two appeals by Xenophon where he is trying to persuade his audience to follow him after he has been accused of acting poorly and where he mentions honour and profit (5.6.30-1

and 5.8.25). To the second of these speeches, I compare Seuthes offering honour directly to the Greek army (7.3.10-11).

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (3.2.39)

We have seen that Cheirisophus, Cleanor and Xenophon take it in turns to speak to the army after new leaders have been elected to replace those killed by Tissaphernes, and that Xenophon deceives the soldiers over the cavalry in his speech. At the end of this speech, Xenophon appeals to different groups who have specific motivations, including those who desire material gain (χρημάτων). He says that these people should try to defeat the enemy because then they can keep their own possessions and gain the enemy's too.²¹¹ Xenophon is trying to overcome the men's despondency about the situation, and he must hope that the soldiers' desire for material goods will be stronger than their fears and disinclination to act. He is linking his advice for what to do next to one of the soldiers' motivations for coming on the mission, and therefore knows he is appealing to strong desires. Not only is Xenophon arguing that the soldiers stand to gain, and presumably here he is conjuring up images of Persian finery, but he is also appealing to the soldiers' fear that they will lose their own possessions. As Xenophon presents the situation, it is to the men's own advantage to prepare to go against the Persians. Xenophon presents himself as someone who knows what motivates different groups of people and how their desires can be fulfilled. We have seen that he is successful in motivating the soldiers to follow his instructions, although they do not respond to any of his arguments specifically.

Timasion's Appeal to Κέρδος (5.6.22-4)

In the last chapter, we saw how Timasion persuaded the Heracleot and Sinopean merchants to give him money to ensure that the army left the area. After Timasion has secured this promise, he speaks to the army, some of whom want to remain and some of whom do not. Timasion says to the soldiers that they should return to Greece, that he will pay them a wage and that, once returned, he will lead them to places where they can get much money (πολλά χρήματα). Timasion begins by linking his recommendation about leaving to the long-term aim of the mission, to

²¹¹ Elsewhere in Xenophon's work, appeals to taking the possessions of the enemy are made without condemnation (see *Cyropaedia* 1.5.13, 3.3.45, 4.2.26 and 7.5.73, and *Hellenica* 3.1.26 and 5.1.17).

return home having been paid, but he then alters this by suggesting that, once home, their aim becomes about making further gains. He is not trying to persuade the men to do anything that the majority are unwilling to do in setting out for home, but he is explaining why it would be advantageous to follow him by appealing to a desire that mercenaries typically have. He is presumably using this to try to evoke the soldiers' goodwill and confidence towards his potential leadership. Timasion presents himself as someone who values home and Greece, and as someone who knows what the soldiers desire and who will be able to fulfil this personally.

After Timasion, Thorax stands up and offers to pay the soldiers and lead them to the Euxine. Unlike Timasion, he does not appeal to the gains they could make. The narrator does not indicate a response from the army to Timasion's or Thorax's appeal, and Philesius and Lycon go on to criticise Xenophon instead (5.6.27). The soldiers agree to the recommendation Xenophon makes in his subsequent speech to return home with the leaders who are offering pay (5.6.33), but Xenophon has not mentioned anything about making further profit once they have returned. It is unclear whether the army does not get a chance to respond, does not want further campaigning or does not believe that Timasion can fulfil his promises, but it seems relevant that no one else refers to the gain that could be made.

Lycon and Callimachus' Appeal to Κέρδος (6.2.10-11)

After Cheirisophus has been elected sole commander, the army proceeds to Heracleia and discusses the rest of the journey (6.2.1-4). Here, Lycon recommends that the army demands money from the Heracleots, as we shall see in a later section. Cheirisophus and Xenophon refuse to play any role in the mission and, when the mission fails, those who had recommended going to the Heracleots accuse the generals of ruining the mission. The Arcadians and Achaeans band together under Callimachus and Lycon (6.2.6), and the narrator presents the speech that Lycon and Callimachus give to the Arcadians and Achaeans in *oratio obliqua*. Because they blame the generals for the previous mission failing, it is clear that these men aim to turn the army against the current leaders, and shift the blame from themselves. Lycon is perhaps motivated by shame and also anger that the generals did not aid him in his suggestion. Lycon has previously criticised the generals' running of the army (6.2.4), suggesting that he thinks he can do a better job than the current leaders.

No motives are indicated for Callimachus, and the reader may simply assume that he also wants power.

These men say that it is shameful (αἰσχρὸν) for Peloponnesians and Lacedaemonians to be commanded by an Athenian who brought no troops. They say that while the Arcadians and Achaeans do the hard work (πόνους) in the army, the profits (κέρδη) go to others, even though the Arcadians and Achaeans achieved the army's deliverance (σωτηρίαν). They say that the rest of the army amounts to nothing, and the narrator breaks in to confirm that the Arcadians and Achaeans formed more than half the army. The speakers recommend that the Arcadians and Achaeans split away from the others, choose new leaders, and try to get some benefits (ἀγαθόν τι) for themselves. In asking the Arcadians and Achaeans to separate themselves from the rest of the army, Lycon and Callimachus are trying to persuade the group to do something they already seem inclined to do, and so they are appealing to the men's emotions and desires to fully convince them to act. The speakers try to evoke shame at the audience's contentedness to follow Xenophon, and try to arouse contempt for Xenophon's contribution to the army, as well as the rest of the army's ability to save itself without them. They then try to evoke anger and jealousy over the division of the profits and the unfairness of their situation. The speakers also appeal to confidence by recalling how big the group of Arcadians and Achaeans is, and then give the soldiers a solution whereby they no longer need to feel shame or anger. They further appeal to the desire for benefits that they themselves have won and that they themselves can keep.

This solution is clearly advantageous to the audience, but the speakers also seem to suggest that it is a matter of fairness that the Arcadians and Achaeans separate from the rest of the army and get the rewards they deserve. The speakers clearly expect the soldiers to believe that they deserve to have received the gains they have been responsible for earning. They anticipate that returning home with profit is one of the soldiers' main aims. Lycon and Callimachus present themselves as being sensitive to feelings of shame and as being outraged that the Arcadians and Achaeans are not getting their just rewards. They also present themselves as knowing what it is best for the group to do and as being able to lead them to make gains.

The division of the army is arranged (6.2.12). Thus, the speakers seem to have successfully anticipated what would motivate their audience. Because the soldiers have recently made it clear that they want to return home with something (6.1.17), appealing to the profits they are not getting and the profits they can get is effective. The soldiers seem to believe in both the speakers and their own ability to make gains.

Reader Involvement

These speeches produce tension for the reader by making him consider whether directly appealing to profit will prove best for the army and whether the army should trust that the speakers are speaking truthfully. The reader may also be surprised to hear some of the claims in Lycon and Callimachus' speech regarding the division of the spoils and how the Arcadians and Achaeans delivered the army. The narrator at no point indicates that there has been an unfair division of the spoils or singles out those responsible for saving the army.

Characterisation

We saw in the last chapter, that in these speeches, Xenophon is motivated by wanting to encourage the soldiers, and that Timasion is motivated by his own interests, which happen to coincide with what the majority of the army wants. Lycon and Callimachus are also selfish in their motivations and manipulation of the men's desires and emotions.²¹² This immediately differentiates the leaders, but we can also examine how well they live up to their promises of obtaining profit or their suggestions for how the army might make gain. In Xenophon's case, the narrator demonstrates that by defeating the enemy, the Greeks do in fact gain the enemy's possessions, as Xenophon said they would, because the narrator later describes a surprise attack on the Greeks when they are scattered about getting booty (ἀρπαγὴν, 3.5.2). The enemy also do not take the Greeks' possessions, as he claimed they would not do. Thus, Xenophon's suggestion proves accurate and the army gains

²¹² Nussbaum (1967, 188) argues that there is no logical connection between what proceeded Lycon and Callimachus' speech, i.e. the attempt to obtain money from the Heracleots for the entire army, and Lycon and Callimachus being outraged that the Arcadian and Achaean division get no share of profits. He argues that it is also inconsistent that the army has just decided to operate under a sole commander but the speakers now want to run the new division under multiple generals. Nussbaum argues that these factors demonstrate that the speakers' claims are a "brazen fabrication" for their own benefit.

profit. We saw in the last chapter that Timasion proves unable to fulfil his promise of pay and tries to get out of his promise to lead the men home. If he had led the army home, it is unclear whether Timasion would have taken the soldiers out on expedition again, especially because his desire for home seems strong. Timasion claims that his city will receive the army willingly, but he is an exile, and so it is unclear whether this is true. Having proved to be unable to give the soldiers the pay he promised, the reader may suspect that Timasion should not be trusted about what else he claims he can offer the army. In any case, Timasion does not seem to have understood what the men want at this time. Lycon and Callimachus are also unable to fulfil their words because the Arcadians and Achaeans do not make any gains on their own.

Didactic Function

Xenophon and Lycon and Callimachus illustrate successful ways of appealing to profit. However, we must also examine the benefits and harm caused, and the way the speakers' leaderships end in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon benefits the army in the short and long term by encouraging them to face and defeat the enemy, and ends well in the work. Timasion's appeal causes no direct harm or benefit, because he does not get to lead the army home. However, by trying to get out of leading the army after the Heracleots and Sinopeans fail to pay him, he causes dissension in the army, and so causes harm. As we saw in the last chapter, though, he may redeem himself after this incident. Lycon and Callimachus directly harm their audience and themselves. The Arcadians and Achaeans set out to obtain booty from the Bithynians (6.2.17) but the division fares badly and suffer losses against the Thracians until Xenophon's men come to their rescue (6.3.2ff.). The harm is not just short-term. Nussbaum (1967, 189) argues that the loss of cavalry and light infantry, as well as the significant number of other deaths, came just as the army was about to embark into an area where the locals were well-known for their bad feeling towards the Greeks, as well as their strength in cavalry and archers, and where the Greeks had no friends nearby. Nussbaum also argues that the split of the army is an ethnic division, whereas previously the army had been bound together by their common Greekness. This, he suggests, is a dangerous new precedent. Xenophon the character attributes the Arcadian and Achaeans' troubles to the gods punishing them for their boasting (6.3.18), which included their overconfidence that they can get gains themselves.

Thus, these speakers receive their comeuppance, and their audience receives punishment for trusting them. At this point, the reader may think back to Xenophon the character's earlier warning that the army will be safer if everyone sticks together (5.6.32-3).

The situations for these appeals are slightly different. Xenophon has been elected as a leader and is addressing the soldiers for the first time. By contrast, Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus are trying to increase their leadership status with their appeals. These speeches indicate that it is inadvisable to try to win increased power by using an appeal to profit. Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus take the easy approach of appealing to what typically motivates a mercenary army in order to get an immediate following. By contrast, Xenophon is a positive paradigm of how to use an appeal to profit early in a leadership reign to persuade soldiers to follow good advice for their own benefit rather than the leader's benefit. Appealing to profit may not be ideal because of the stigma attached to the desire for money, but Xenophon appeals to it to good effect by using it to help motivate the men out of their despondency. Unlike the situations where Timasion, Lycon and Callimachus speak, Xenophon's appeal is made when the army is facing a real external danger and when he needs to use whatever means necessary to persuade the men to act. It is clear that direct appeals to financial gain should only be made when the speaker's motives are unselfish, when it is absolutely necessary, and that if a speaker claims he knows a way to make gain, he can fulfil this, to the benefit of his audience.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (and Τιμή) (5.1.8)

Further speeches by Xenophon and Lycon can be compared in the way both speakers appeal to getting financial gain for the army. Lycon is technically suggesting getting money for provisions, but we shall see that this may not be his real aim. When Cheirisophus has left the army to get ships, Xenophon makes proposals for what the army should do while they are waiting. Xenophon claims that he will speak about the things that it seems fitting (καίρως) that they should do (5.1.5). Thus, he seems to aim at ensuring that the army acts rightly and does all it should. The men have agreed with Xenophon's first proposal regarding how they should obtain provisions (5.1.7).

Xenophon next proposes that when the army plunders, the soldiers should take measures to ensure that they do it safely by informing the others of where they are going. Then, the others can help with preparations and advice, and can go to the soldiers' aid if necessary (5.1.8). In order to get the men to accept his proposals, Xenophon is outlining why it would be advantageous for them to follow his plans. Xenophon appeals to the soldiers' desire for plunder, which is part of their overall aims for the mission. The ability to make a profit for those at home is also linked to a soldier's τιμή.²¹³ Therefore, Xenophon is presenting himself as being concerned with the army obtaining both κέρδος and τιμή.²¹⁴ The men believe that they are about to return home on the ships Cheirisophus is bringing, and so this will be their last chance to make any gains. They are thus likely to attempt to gain plunder anyway, but Xenophon's suggestion appeals to a desire for safety, good chances of success, and backup if needed. Xenophon is perhaps also attempting to raise the soldiers' confidence in their attempts if they adopt his proposals. Xenophon presents himself as being concerned with the safety and success of the men's attempts at profit, and as being approachable for advice and aid. The men accept Xenophon's proposals (5.1.8) and so it seems that he has anticipated both their desire for plunder and their desire to be as safe and successful as possible doing it.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (5.2.18)

When the army is trying to capture a stronghold, the peltasts and light armoured troops rush in and try to take plunder, although Xenophon tries to keep them out because there are further enemies approaching (5.2.16). Soon the plunderers start trying to flee from the stronghold because there is a citadel inside and they were being attacked (5.2.17). At this point, Xenophon tells the herald to say that whoever wanted to plunder (τι λαμβάνειν) should enter the stronghold (5.2.18). The narrator does not indicate why Xenophon says this, but reveals that many proceeded to enter the stronghold. Xenophon is here appealing directly to the men's desire for gain.

²¹³ See Cairns (1992, 70), for example. Also, c.f. *Odyssey* 11.355-61. Odysseus wants to return home from the Phaeacians with more gifts because he will be received with a greater welcome and will be better regarded.

²¹⁴ Xenophon is offering the men ways of getting honour from profit, which is the opposite to Menon's method of obtaining honour to gain profit (2.6.21).

Lycon's Appeal to Κέρδος (6.2.4-5)

We saw above that after the army arrives in Heracleia and receives hospitality from the Heracleots, the soldiers discuss whether they should complete their journey by land or sea, and that Lycon speaks at this meeting (6.2.2-4). Neither the narrator nor Lycon specifies Lycon's aims and motives, but from what Lycon says, he aims to obtain the army money and provisions and is motivated by the generals' lack of care for the army. The reader may suspect Lycon's motives because the narrator has given no indication that the generals have not been doing all they can to supply the army.

Lycon says that he is amazed that the generals are not trying to get the army money for provisions because what has been given by the Heracleots will not last three days, and the army will not have the opportunity to get anything more before departure. He proposes that the army demands three thousand Cyzicenes from the Heracleots, and another speaker suggests ten thousand. Lycon says that they should choose ambassadors to go on the mission there and then. Lycon is attempting to persuade the soldiers to do something that they might find objectionable, given that that Heracleots are friendly to them. Thus, Lycon makes it seem necessary and possible. He plays on the soldiers' fears that they will have no money to buy provisions to sustain them, and evokes either contempt of the leaders or anger towards them for not providing for the army. Lycon presents himself as being concerned that the army is being inadequately led and that the men's interests are not being looked after. He appears as someone who has foresight and recognises the problems the army will face, while also offering a solution.

The narrator states that the army proceeded to nominate ambassadors (6.2.6). Xenophon and Cheirisophus are chosen but they both decline strongly because, the narrator says, they both thought that they should not compel a friendly Greek city to give what it did not want (6.2.6). This argument is ignored, and the mission goes ahead. Lycon has clearly correctly anticipated that the men want money to obtain provisions, and this desire is so strong that it overrides what the soldiers are told is morally right by Xenophon and Cheirisophus. It also outweighs any obedience the soldiers feel is due to these leaders, presumably because of the contempt Lycon raised about them. After the demands are made to the Heracleots,

and Lycon threatens them, the Heracleots move their market inside the wall and set up arms (6.2.7-8).

Reader Involvement

Xenophon's speech upon Cheirisophus' departure reminds the reader of how dangerous plundering can be for an army.²¹⁵ Thus, the reader may feel concern for the army, but also relief that Xenophon is making arrangements to combat this. His later indirect message telling the soldiers to go into the stronghold for plunder may make the reader question Xenophon's intentions, because he wanted to keep the soldiers out just before. Lycon's speech evokes tension for the reader, because the reader may suspect that it is inadvisable to make demands of a friendly Greek people, especially given that Cheirisophus and Xenophon are against the plan.

Characterisation

The narrator does nothing to suggest that Xenophon wants anything other than to benefit the army when he makes his speech about safe plundering, and that he is speaking selflessly in this example. Likewise, the reader may assume that Xenophon's motives for telling the men to go after plunder are positive because he has just shown concern for the army regarding the approaching enemy. By contrast, the narrator has created a question mark over Lycon's motives. The Heracleots have already given three thousand *medimni* of barley, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle and a hundred sheep (6.2.3). One Cyzicene is also the equivalent of a month's pay for the soldiers, therefore requesting three thousand or ten thousand Cyzicenes seems to be more than simply about provisioning the army. The reader may think that Lycon is trying to gain a following for himself and that there is an element of greed to his suggestion, rather than that he is motivated by concern for the army.²¹⁶

After Xenophon's speech regarding safely plundering, the narrator reveals that the army does go out in search of booty (*λείαν*) and that some people were obtaining it while some were not. On one particular occasion, the commander and

²¹⁵ Soldiers coming under attack while plundering or scavenging is so commonly portrayed that Hau (2014, 242-3) argues that this is a *topos* in Greek historiography.

²¹⁶ See further Nussbaum (1967, 186-7). He argues that Lycon's real aim was to take over leadership of the army and that Lycon was using the situation as a pretext, because the gifts from the Heracleots amounted to more than the gifts sent by the Sinopeans at 6.1.15, and these had been deemed sufficient then.

many men were killed (5.1.17). This suggests that Xenophon's recommendation did allow some to gain plunder safely, although it did not work in other cases. This may raise some questions over Xenophon's trustworthiness. In the second example, where Xenophon has the herald tell those who want plunder to enter the stronghold, Xenophon gains the men profit, because the narrator says that the Greeks seized everything outside the citadel (5.2.19). Here, Xenophon backs up his recommendation for how to get profit. By contrast, Lycon cannot back up his words with his actions because, instead of the Heracleots providing money for the army, they move their market inside their walls, close their gates and set up arms (6.2.8). Thus, Lycon is revealed to be wrong in his estimation. Lycon must have been aware that he was taking a risk by attempting to obtain money in this way and so can be characterised as a risk-taker, as well as someone who does not understand the right way to reciprocate allies and treat fellow Greeks.

Didactic Function

Both leaders demonstrate how to successfully appeal to κέρδος, and both have recognised it as something that the army wants or needs and provide a plan for getting it. However, they can be separated by examining the benefit and harm that occurred from their speeches. That some men were killed after Xenophon's recommendation for how to plunder safely suggests the difficulty and danger of such plundering missions, and that Xenophon was right to attempt to make the soldiers plunder as safely as possible. While Xenophon did not benefit all the plunderers, his plan may at least have benefitted some by helping them to safely make gains that they can spend or save. Perhaps the reader is meant to think that the soldiers and leaders that were unsuccessful and were harmed did not follow Xenophon's recommendations. Xenophon himself accrues no particular benefit from his appeal, and it seems to be to Xenophon's credit that he tries to alleviate some of the dangers involved in plundering. He is a positive *exemplum* in this respect. Xenophon could not have forbidden the men to go out plundering, and so he has to try to ensure that they are as safe and successful as possible when doing it.²¹⁷ Xenophon also gets the

²¹⁷ Cyrus the Great has similar concerns at *Cyropaedia* 7.2.11. After Cyrus' army has taken Sardis, Cyrus reveals to Croesus that he knows that if his men do not receive some gains soon, their obedience will decrease, they may destroy the city and the worst people would get the largest share. Cyrus therefore secures wealth from Sardis without the men needing to pillage. Both Xenophon and Cyrus provide for their men's desires but in a safe and beneficial way.

army to work as a group rather than as individuals in the pursuit of gain. After Xenophon tells the men to go into the stronghold for plunder, the narrator says that the people entering the stronghold forced back those Greeks trying to retreat, which in turn forced the enemy back into their citadel (5.2.18). Thus, Xenophon has benefitted the army in the short term by preventing the enemy from harming them and gaining them plunder. In the longer term, Xenophon also engineers a way for the army to retreat from this point, and so benefits them further.

Xenophon allows the soldiers to make profit from an acceptable source, enemies, whereas Lycon wants the Greeks to profit from friends.²¹⁸ While Xenophon tries to prevent future danger, Lycon is a danger to the army himself. Lycon's proposal harms himself and the army by losing them the friendship of the Heracleots, by showing the army as unwilling to repay the Heracleots' hospitality, by losing the army the opportunity to buy from the Heracleots' markets, and by having obtained them nothing in the process. As we saw above, Lycon then makes the situation even worse by trying to blame the generals for this episode and causing the army to divide. Lycon receives his comeuppance, and it is clear that he would not be a better leader than the current generals and has made a poor recommendation. By contrast, Xenophon and Cheirisophus are proved to have acted rightly in refusing to participate. Lycon's example should not be emulated.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (and Τιμή) (5.6.30-1)

Xenophon gives two defence speeches in which he appeals to his own actions regarding providing honour and profit for the army. In the first example, Xenophon has to defend himself before the men who have assembled to listen to Timasion and Thorax speak, most of whom do not want to settle down (5.6.19). Philesius and Lycon have accused Xenophon of acting poorly in regards to his idea for settling the army, and the narrator says that Xenophon was compelled (ἠναγκάσθη) to speak (5.6.27). The narrator does not specify that Xenophon wants to defend himself, but Xenophon presumably aims to set the record straight, because Philesius and Lycon's accusation is inaccurate.

²¹⁸ See *Hellenica* 3.1.8 and 4.8.30 for the unacceptability of taking money from friendly cities who do not wish to give it.

Amongst other arguments, Xenophon says that he would have tried to get the men possession of a city if he saw that they were without resources (ἀποροῦντας). This, he says, would have allowed those who wanted to return home immediately to do so while others would have been able to procure enough (κτῆσαιτο ἱκανὰ) to benefit those at home and then to return home themselves. He says that the army does not need this now, however, because there are men offering them a return and pay. Again, making gains for those at home affects a soldier's τιμή, and so Xenophon is appealing to the desire for both honour and profit. He represents himself as someone who assesses situations and who can be trusted to both understand what the men most need at any given time and to seek to provide it. Xenophon needs to alter the men's perception that he is someone who does what is best for himself and is primarily concerned with his own reputation, and convince them that he puts the army first. Whilst representing his own intentions, Xenophon is also appealing to the soldiers' desire for home, as well their pride in returning home with enough to provide for their family. In arguing that he attempted to fulfil these desires, Xenophon may also be attempting to evoke goodwill and gratitude towards himself.

The men agree with Xenophon's suggestions to keep the army together and depart for Greece, and that anyone attempting to desert should be put on trial (5.6.33). There is no indication that the soldiers believe Xenophon's claim that he would have tried to provide profit and honour for them, but it seems that he rightly anticipated that the men ultimately want to go home. Shortly after, the narrator says that the soldiers decide to elect a sole commander to enable them to get gains to take home. This suggests that Xenophon is anticipating a real motivation by appealing to profit and honour (6.1.17).

Xenophon's Appeal to Τιμή (5.8.25)

When the army puts their generals on trial, Xenophon has to defend himself against an accusation of hitting men out of *hubris*. After Xenophon has successfully defended himself against one particular case and the other accusers remain silent, he continues with another speech on the subject. Xenophon has already won over his audience, because, after his account of why he hit a particular man, the narrator says that the soldiers shouted that the man had not received enough strikes (5.8.12).

Because Xenophon is on trial, the reader must assume that Xenophon's aim is to clear his name. He has already cleared himself of the specific charges and so the reader may assume that his second speech has the motive behind it of defending his leadership more generally.

At the end of this speech, Xenophon gives a list of the positive things he has done to aid the army, including saying that he honoured (ἐτίμησα) men who were brave as best he could. Xenophon is not trying to get his audience to change their opinion of him, but is reminding them that he meets their expectations about how a good leader should reward his soldiers. He is trying to evoke goodwill and gratitude for his past actions. He is also appealing to the army's desire to have good behaviour rewarded and to earn honour, which plays on feelings of their own pride. Xenophon presents himself as someone who recognises and rewards good behaviour, and understands that this is something that the men appreciate. He suggests that he has acted justly in reciprocating the men's good behaviour.

The narrator says that the soldiers stand up and recall examples of the positive things Xenophon has done for them, although he provides no specific detail (5.8.26). It seems that Xenophon has correctly anticipated that the men do appreciate the positive things he does for them, but that they have temporarily forgotten about them.

Seuthes' Appeal to Τιμή (7.3.10-11)

Seuthes also offers the army honour. Xenophon has arranged for the army to listen to what Seuthes has to offer in terms of employment. The reader knows that Seuthes has made extravagant claims in front of Xenophon and some of the others leaders in the army about what he will give the leaders and soldiers, even if the army is prevented from helping him. Seuthes is aiming to persuade the army to work for him because he wants to regain his realm.

Seuthes claims that he will provide pay for the army, as well as food and drink, and will honour (τιμήσω) those who deserve it. In describing his intentions, Seuthes wants his audience to be persuaded that he understands what the soldiers will want from him and that he is someone who will fulfil his promises. Seuthes appeals to the key needs and desires of the army to show that it will be advantageous

for the army to work for him. The Greeks deliberate amongst themselves, and the speakers argue that working for Seuthes means safety for them, and that being paid as well is a bonus. Xenophon offers anyone who has an opposing view the chance to speak, and then puts the matter to vote. The army agrees to work for Seuthes (7.3.13-14). Thus, although Seuthes' promise of *τιμὴ* is not the chief reason that the army decides to work for Seuthes, referring to it might have given the soldiers an impression of the type of leadership they can expect from Seuthes in general.

Reader Involvement

The tension arising from Xenophon's speeches stems from the danger that Xenophon is in and seeing whether he can convince the army that he acted rightly. The reader may also feel tension over whether Seuthes can be trusted to fulfil his promises.

Characterisation

Xenophon is of course trying to save himself from harm in these two speeches, but the narrator does not undercut Xenophon by suggesting that he is not representing himself accurately. Although the hypothetical nature of Xenophon's first claim does not allow the reader to see whether Xenophon would have fulfilled his words with his actions, the prior and later narrative suggests that Xenophon would have done so. As we saw, Xenophon has already demonstrated a concern to make the men gain to return home with when he discusses how the army should best undertake plundering missions. When the men later choose Xenophon as sole commander, the reader further sees that the men believe that Xenophon would be the best to help them make gains. This suggests that the soldiers would have believed his claim in his defence speech. Regarding the second example, the soldiers' response demonstrates that Xenophon matches his words and actions. Xenophon emerges as a trustworthy leader both in describing his own leadership and in providing the men with honour and profit, even when the soldiers momentarily believe that he is acting against their interests.

In contrast, the narrator undercuts Seuthes' presentation of himself by not describing any times when Seuthes honoured the men. Seuthes' failure to pay the men and failure to honour Xenophon further suggest that it is unlikely that he honoured the soldiers. Seuthes may not have intended to renege on his promise of

honour at the time, but, by not fulfilling his words with his actions, he can be characterised as untrustworthy and as being selfish in not reciprocating the benefits the soldiers gave to him. Whether or not providing τιμή has any bearing on the soldiers' decision to work for him, once Seuthes has said that he will honour those who deserve it, he should adhere to his words. Seuthes may have taken advantage of the fact that the army was in a desperate situation.

Didactic Function

Again, both speakers are successful in using the concepts of τιμή and κέρδος in their appeals. While Xenophon's speeches primarily benefit himself by countering criticism against him and encouraging the army to follow him again, they also benefit the army in calming the immediate situation. In the first example, Xenophon recovers the situation in the short-term to the benefit of the soldiers, because the whole army follows one plan again and does not split up. The army even turns on Silanus when he says that anyone should be able to leave the army (5.6.34). After the second speech that we examined, the narrator ends the scene by saying that consequently all was well (5.8.26). This suggests that Xenophon has benefitted both the army and himself in the short term by regaining the men's goodwill. Xenophon's speech also ensures that the army continues to follow a leader who is concerned with its interests and believes in honouring those who deserve it. However, the longer-term effects of these two speeches for Xenophon and his audience are negligible. The army later doubts Xenophon again and does eventually split up, when Lycon and Callimachus encourage them to do so.

Xenophon's speeches teach the reader that even conscientious leaders will be criticised for their actions. It is thus extremely important for a leader to be able to draw on his past behaviour, here regarding his provision of τιμή and κέρδος to the army, in order to restore an army's faith in him, even if it is fleeting. In an army where the men can easily desert a commander, the leader should not make empty claims. Once again, Xenophon is rendered a positive *exemplum* in how he appeals to τιμή and κέρδος.

Seuthes benefits the army in the short term by keeping the Greeks safer than they would have been on their own, although they do not receive any honour. In the longer term, although his failure to live up to his promise of honouring the soldiers

does not cause problems, his choice not to fulfil his promise of pay causes a breakdown of relations within the Greek army and an impasse while the army waits for its money. Seuthes himself benefits from his false promises by gaining the use of the army in the short term, and is able to offload the army before it causes him too much harm in the long term. Xenophon's words at 7.7.28-34 recounting the problems that the Greeks could cause Seuthes remind Seuthes and the reader that soldiers can make life difficult for leaders who do not fulfil their promises, and suggest what could have happened to Seuthes.

The difference between Xenophon being rewarded for his treatment of the army at the end of the *Anabasis*, and the criticism of Seuthes' leadership by Xenophon the character that closes Seuthes' involvement in the work, indicates to the reader which of the two should be emulated, especially because Xenophon's speech includes censure for Seuthes' failure to fulfil his promises. However, while a leader is ultimately responsible for fulfilling his promises, soldiers should also be wary of trusting leaders until it is clear that their words and actions match. Both Xenophon's words at 5.8.25 and Seuthes' speech indicate how important giving honour in return for good behaviour is because Xenophon lists it with fundamental duties such as providing for the men when they are sick, and Seuthes lists it alongside essential requirements for survival.

Outsiders Providing Τιμή and Κέρδος for the Greek Army

In order to persuade their audiences to undertake a particular course, Menon (1.4.14-15), Clearchus (2.1.16-17) and Xenophon (3.1.37, 3.2.25-6, 5.6.30-1, 6.3.18 and 6.6.16) all refer to the honour or profit that their audiences can obtain from outsiders through particular behaviour.

Menon's Appeal to Τιμή (1.4.14-15)

After the mutiny at Tarsus, Cyrus offers the men a bonus and pay for the journey home. The narrator says that most of the Greeks were persuaded (1.4.12-13), but before it is apparent whether the army would follow Cyrus, Menon speaks to his own troops. The narrator does not reveal why Menon speaks but, as Menon presents it in his speech, his aim is to obtain his men benefits from Cyrus and his motivation is to provide for his troops.

Menon says that, if his men obey him, without suffering any danger or having to do any work, Cyrus will prefer them in honour (προτιμήσεσθε) to the other troops. He explains that his men should proceed while the other troops are still deciding. If the other troops follow them, Menon's troops will get the credit for going on first and Cyrus will be grateful and will repay them. If the other troops do not follow, all the Greeks will go back together but Cyrus will reward Menon's troops because they were the only obedient ones, and will employ them as garrison commanders and captains. Menon also says that his men will get whatever else they may want (ἄλλου οὐτινος ἂν δέησθε) because of their friendship.

It is unclear to what extent the soldiers are already inclined towards following Cyrus but Menon seems to need to overcome some hesitation. He appeals to the men's desire to gain and to do so without putting in effort, without needing to fear and without risking anything. He may also be trying to evoke feelings of rivalry with the other troops. Menon specifies particular honours the men will receive but is also vague about the extent of what Cyrus could offer, which may encourage the men to let their imaginations run wild. Menon presents himself as someone who has spotted an opportunity for his men to gain without risk, and as someone who puts his men's interests first. He projects himself as knowing what the men want, and as knowing how Cyrus will react. The narrator says that the soldiers are persuaded by Menon's speech and follow his plan (1.4.16). Thus, Menon has anticipated their desires and motivations correctly. Cyrus is delighted (ἦσθη), as Menon anticipated. He commends the soldiers and promises them recompense in the future, while he rewards Menon with magnificent gifts immediately (1.4.16-17).

Clearchus' Appeal to Τιμή (2.1.16-17)

After the death of the generals, heralds from the king and Tissaphernes have come to tell the Greek generals that they should give up their arms and go to the king.

Leading this group is the Greek Phalinus who is now working for Tissaphernes. He says that the king believes himself victorious in the battle and so orders the Greeks to hand over their arms, go to his court and find whatever favour they can. The Greeks become angry and Clearchus says that victors do not hand over their arms. He tells the other generals to give the best and most honourable answer while he is away examining the vitals from a sacrifice. Cleanor, Proxenus and Theopompus/

Xenophon (depending on the manuscript tradition) all tell Phalinus that they will not do as the king is asking, but the narrator reveals that some other generals offer their services to the king. When Clearchus returns, Phalinus says that the generals have given different answers, and he asks for Clearchus' opinion (2.1.7-23). The narrator reveals Clearchus' aims and motives after the speech. Clearchus wanted to give Phalinus a lead (ὑπήγετο) so that he would tell the Greeks not to surrender to the king, which would make the Greeks more hopeful (εὐέλπιδες μᾶλλον, 2.1.18).

Clearchus argues that, as a fellow-Greek, Phalinus should advise the Cyreans on what they should do. He reminds Phalinus, with an appeal to the gods as witnesses, that the advice he offers will be reported in Greece and has the capacity to bring Phalinus honour (τιμὴν) in the future when people talk about it. Clearchus is trying to persuade Phalinus to neglect his employer's orders, benefit his employer's enemies and perhaps even lie about his opinion. As incentives, Clearchus appeals to a desire for a positive reputation in Greece, and the fear of shame at being spoken badly of. He also tries to evoke feelings of kinship. Clearchus presents himself as being loyal to his compatriots over the Persians, as believing that one should do right in the eyes of gods and men, and as being concerned with Phalinus' reputation in Greece. He also presents himself as being grateful for the advice that Phalinus will give.

The narrator reveals that Phalinus' response went against Clearchus' expectation (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν) and that Phalinus eluded (ὑποστρέψας) Clearchus (2.1.18). Phalinus' response is carefully worded to present himself as being willing to advise the Greeks according to their interests but still informing them that they should surrender, as per the instructions from his employer (2.1.19). Clearchus has failed to read what Phalinus is likely to be driven by, despite the fact that they have both chosen to work in the interests of a Persian over Greeks.

Xenophon's Appeal to Τιμή (3.1.37)

After Proxenus' captains have gathered the remaining generals, lieutenant-generals and captains, Xenophon speaks to them. As we have seen, they are most likely perplexed (ἀπορίᾳ), dispirited (ἀθύμως), feeling grief (λύπης), and yearning (πόθου) for home and family, along with the rest of the army (3.1.2-3). One of Proxenus' captains introduces Xenophon's speech by saying that the meeting has been called so

that the leaders can take counsel as to whether they can do anything positive, and he asks Xenophon to repeat what he said to Proxenus' captains (3.1.34). Xenophon's aim is to encourage the leaders to take action, and he is motivated by the fear that they will all surely suffer if the army does not form a plan.

One of Xenophon's arguments in this speech is to explain why the leaders should plan and work hard on the soldiers' behalf; it is proper (δίκαιόν) that they should surpass the soldiers in wartime because in peacetime they received more pay and honour (τιμαῖς) than the soldiers did (3.1.37). The leaders have received honours in advance with the expectation that they will reciprocate these by benefitting (ὠφελῆσαι) those they are responsible for whenever needed.²¹⁹ Xenophon then proceeds to explain what actions he thinks the army should take. Xenophon needs to overcome the leaders' feelings of fear and depression, and provide them with a good reason to act. He thus evokes the leaders' shame that they are not acting as their societies demand. Xenophon appeals to the leaders' own attitude towards honour rather than their desire to achieve it. They have a duty, which Xenophon has to remind them of, and he is appealing to the justness of reciprocating honours. Xenophon presents himself as knowing what a leader's duty is, what constitutes right behaviour and how reciprocity should work. The leaders do not reply and so we cannot tell whether they were persuaded by Xenophon's words about honour. Cheirisophus, who appears to be presiding over this meeting, praises Xenophon and says that he would be glad to have others like him (3.1.45), although he also does not specifically mention Xenophon's words about honour.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (3.2.25-6)

Shortly after, the leaders address the assembly, and we have already seen that in his speech, Xenophon deceives about the cavalry and recommends that those who want profit should face the enemy. He also says that if the Greeks remain in Persia, he fears that they will learn to live in idleness and luxury and consort with the women there, forgetting that they want to return home, like Lotus-Eaters.²²⁰ Xenophon says that he thinks that it is fitting (εἰκὸς) and right (δίκαιον) that the men should prioritise returning to their families in Greece. He suggests that when they do return

²¹⁹ Scholars often link Xenophon's sentiments here with Sarpedon's arguments for why he and Glaucus should lead their men in battle at *Iliad* 12.310-21 (see, for example, Dillery, 2001, 230).

²²⁰ The reference is to *Odyssey* 9.82-104.

home, they should tell the Greeks that it is their choice to be poor because they could bring those who have a harsh life in Greece to Persia and they would enjoy riches (πλουσίους) there. Xenophon is not suggesting that the soldiers are actually planning to remain in Persia or should relocate their families there, but affirming the army's attitude and aims.²²¹ Xenophon seems to anticipate that the soldiers may begin to want riches in preference to home, rather than riches to take home, and attempts to combat this. This is thus an appeal to κέρδος the army should not try to obtain.

Xenophon recalls the Greek approach to life and the army's desire for this life; a poor life in Greece, accompanied by hard work but also freedom and family, is preferable to the possessions the Greeks could gain by living idle in Persia under a king. Xenophon reaffirms that the army was not aiming for such long-term riches. Xenophon appeals to the men's desire for home and family, as well as pride in the Greek way of life, and evokes contempt of the Persians for their luxurious life-style. Xenophon may also be trying to evoke shame in the men at the thought that they may choose not to act rightly, since he presents returning home as the just and noble course. In relating the soldiers to the men on Odysseus' mission, Xenophon may also be evoking feelings of pride at taking part in a comparable mission. He may also evoke pride by presenting the soldiers as messengers who can report in Greece that they overcame the temptation to live idly.

Xenophon presents himself as being able to anticipate how the army will respond when faced with the temptations of Persia, and afraid of what will happen because of it. He also represents himself as being wise in recognising that it would not be beneficial or right for the army to chase long-term riches. He appears as someone who values Greece, home, and the Greek way of life, over ease, luxury and the fulfilment of desires. He may also be presenting himself as an Odysseus figure, who recognises the danger facing the soldiers. The army votes in agreement with the measures Xenophon recommends in the rest of his speech (3.2.33), although there is no indication that his reference to the Lotus-Eaters had any particular effect.

²²¹ Ruderman (1992, 139-40) seems to misinterpret Xenophon's aims here and believes that Xenophon is recommending bringing Greeks to Persia. Ruderman thus interprets Xenophon as being "willing to give a place to love of gain in his political regime".

Xenophon's Appeal to Τιμή (5.6.30-1)

During the speech in which Xenophon defends himself over his sacrifices regarding settling the army down, where he says he would have tried to get the soldiers a city if it had seemed that they needed to obtain profit to take home, Xenophon also directly appeals to τιμή. Xenophon says that he renounces his plan to found a settlement partly because he thinks that if the army remains together, it will be held in honour (ἔντιμοι) and will be able to get provisions, whereas if the army splits up, it will not be able to find food and will likely be harmed.²²² The army is divided over the issue of whether to settle, and Xenophon needs to restore faith in himself and unite the army's aims. He appeals to the soldiers' goodwill when he presents himself as putting their interests first and as being concerned with their τιμή and obtaining provisions for them. He further attempts to arouse the army's desire to be well regarded, as well as the fear that they may not be. He also appeals to the men's fear that they will be unable to obtain food and will suffer harm if they split up. As he presents the situation, it would be disadvantageous to their safety, well-being and success to separate. Xenophon represents himself as knowing what is best for the army and as being able to foresee the issues they will have with others and with obtaining provisions. He presents himself as putting his own τιμή aside for the army's collective τιμή. As we saw, the army vote in favour of his proposals.

Xenophon's Appeal to Τιμή (6.3.18)

When the men are proceeding in three separate groups and Xenophon hears about the Arcadian and Achaean division being in trouble, he calls a meeting of his troops (6.3.10-11). There is no indication of the troops' frame of mind and the narrator does not reveal before Xenophon's speech why Xenophon called the meeting or what his aim is. Xenophon's own words make the reader think that Xenophon's motive is concern for his own troops. Xenophon claims to believe that the enemy have become more confident and so his men need the help of the Arcadians and Achaeans in facing this threat. He thus seems to aim to get his men to want to save the Arcadians and Achaeans.

²²² See also 5.6.13 for Xenophon discussing the necessity of the army having larger numbers than opponents.

As part of his argument, Xenophon claims that the gods might be punishing the Achaeans and Arcadians because they boasted and might be about to put Xenophon's men in a place of higher honour (έντιμοτέρους) because his men always begin (άρχομένων) with the gods. As he presents it, their own positive actions have provided them with the desirable reward of honour from the gods. This is less an appeal to gaining honour and more the use of honour that they have already gained to motivate them. Xenophon needs to overcome the fact that the soldiers may be disinclined to put themselves in danger on behalf of the Arcadians and Achaeans because this group deliberately split from them. Xenophon appeals to the men's confidence that they have acted rightly and consequently will be able to save their comrades, and that this will be advantageous to them. Xenophon might also be appealing to the men's goodwill because he has ensured that they are earning honour from the gods by acting in the right way. Xenophon is presenting himself as understanding how the gods view both his troops and the Arcadian and Achaean division, and as understanding what constitutes behaviour that the gods would find acceptable and unacceptable. No verbal response is indicated but the men follow Xenophon's commands.

Xenophon's Appeal to Τιμή (6.6.16)

Xenophon speaks at a meeting to discuss what to do about Cleander's demand that the army hands over to him certain people who were involved in a particular incident. Cleander is angry with the army after becoming frightened of the army's violent actions, and he threatens to make a proclamation prohibiting any city from receiving the Cyreans (6.6.5-9). The narrator has said that the Greeks thought the matter grievous (πονηρόν) and that they begged Cleander not to do as he threatened (6.6.10). The commanders are at a loss (άπορία) and call a meeting of the army. The narrator reveals that some people think that Cleander is of little account, but that the situation did not seem slight (φαῦλον) to Xenophon (6.6.11). It becomes clear from Xenophon's speech that he aims to get the army to do as Cleander wishes because this will provide the best chance of getting back to Greece.

Xenophon describes the negative repercussions of what may happen if Cleander carries out his threat, and thus indicates why it will be advantageous to the army to comply with Cleander's request. He ends his speech by saying that the army

would take it hard if instead of receiving praise (ἐπαίνου) and honour (τιμῆς) in Greece, the army was not even equal with other Greeks and not allowed into their cities. Xenophon is trying to change the men's opinion about Cleander and make them take the situation seriously. Thus, he links the situation to their long-term aims, appealing to the men's fear at losing their homecoming and not receiving the expected reception.²²³ He also appeals to the fear of shame at not being praised and honoured but being treated as enemies by their compatriots. Xenophon presents himself as having foresight and as understanding the repercussions that their actions would have. He also represents himself as knowing the men's ultimate goal, as well as what they hope for. There is no confirmation that the men were motivated by Xenophon's appeal to the τιμή they might not obtain, but overall the appeal is successful. Agasias swears that no one influenced his actions and that he will put himself in Cleander's hands (6.6.17-18).

Reader Involvement

These speeches have several different ways of engaging the reader. In the case of Menon's and Clearchus' speeches, the reader may suspect the wisdom of what both speakers are trying to achieve. In Menon's case, the reader may wonder how the other troops will react to Menon's troops separating themselves off so clearly. In Clearchus' case, the reader may question whether it is best for the army to fight against the king, as Clearchus wants. Further suspense may arise over what Phalinus will advise. In Xenophon's speeches at 3.1.37 and 3.2.25-6, the involvement of the reader comes from making the connection with two passages from Homer, and judging Xenophon's words in light of these. In the case of the Lotus-Eaters appeal, the reader may be suspicious as to whether the mercenaries would actually prefer a poor life in Greece full of hard work to luxury and ease. The reader may also remember the fate of Odysseus' men and be concerned that Xenophon's soldiers may similarly all be lost on their return home. Regarding Xenophon's speech at 5.6.30-1, tension comes from whether Xenophon will be able to defend himself and whether the reader should trust what Xenophon says when he is trying to defend himself. Xenophon's speeches at 6.3.18 and 6.6.16, come while the army is facing a

²²³ The Cyreans may hope to gain τιμή in the form of more important roles in their communities, more support for any attempt at obtaining such roles, preferential treatment, or even more formal commemorations.

dangerous situation, and there is tension in seeing whether Xenophon can use his appeals to overcome these.

Characterisation

Menon presents himself as having selfless motives, but the picture that the narrator subsequently paints of Menon indicates that this is a façade. In Menon's obituary, the narrator indicates that Menon is primarily concerned for his own interests and that he benefits his men because this will further his desires. The narrator says that Menon wants honour in order to fulfil his eagerness for enormous wealth (*ἐπιθυμῶν... πλουτεῖν ἰσχυρῶς*, 2.6.21), and that he helped his men in their wrongdoing in order to get them to honour him (2.6.27).²²⁴ In retrospect, it thus seems likely that through his speech, Menon was attempting to gain more honour from his soldiers as well as winning himself a better position with Cyrus, perhaps because Clearchus has just acted well for Cyrus by ending the mutiny.²²⁵ The narrator also suggests that Menon was conspiring with the Persians (see 2.2.1, for example), and perhaps he began this when Cyrus began to favour Clearchus. As Roy (2004, 278-9) highlights, it is only Menon who actually receives any rewards from Cyrus in this episode. Perhaps Menon recognised that this would be the case and was only concerned with thoughts of his own gain. The reader may judge that Menon's loyalty is primarily to himself, in which case he has a selfish motive for appealing to his men's desire for honour and for feigning loyalty to Cyrus.²²⁶

Menon feeds rather than controls his men's desires, for his own gain. We saw that Clearchus and the narrator claim that it was shame at betraying someone to whom loyalty is owed that made the troops continue with Cyrus, but Menon's speech demonstrates that his men are motivated by thoughts of the honours they

²²⁴ Compare Proxenus, who also wanted honour and profit, but only if he could gain them justly (2.6.18). At *Cyropaedia* 2.2.25, Cyrus says that those who are shameless for advantage are particularly bad people to have in an army because they lead others to wicked behaviour by demonstrating that bad behaviour can lead to gain.

²²⁵ Buzzetti (2014, 49) directly links Menon's actions here to Clearchus' at Tarsus, because, similar to Clearchus, Menon chooses Cyrus over the Greek army, although, as Menon presents it, not over his own men. Buzzetti argues that Menon's decision to do this was worse, because it caused discord within the troops.

²²⁶ See also Kelly (1977, 44-5) who argues that Menon works for his own interests, and that he "sacrifices the common good" for this. Buzzetti (2008, 10) argues that Menon has his and his men's interests above "the common safety" and that he "jeopardizes not only these soldiers' well-being but even his own".

could win. Thus, they are characterised as being motivated more selfishly than the other troops. Because of Cyrus' death, Menon's troops do not get to find out whether Cyrus would actually have given them the honour Menon said Cyrus would. Menon himself is only making an assumption rather than knowing that Cyrus would reward them. In comparing Menon's self-presentation and the reality of his actions, the reader knows that the loyalty seemingly demonstrated towards Cyrus in Menon's actions is false because the reader has heard Menon's words.²²⁷

Even though the narrator says that Clearchus wanted to give the Greeks heart to go on, which seems positive, the reader may question whether Clearchus only wants the men to continue because he wants to remain on the march and leading an army. Thus, again, Clearchus may appear selfish. It is unclear whether Phalinus would indeed have been honoured in Greece, particularly because he has chosen to work for the Persians, and so we cannot tell whether Clearchus' words are accurate. However, the narrator demonstrates that Clearchus' self-presentation does not match reality. Clearchus faced the same dilemma as Phalinus of whether to prefer Greek or Persian honour. Clearchus advises Phalinus to prioritise the Greek honour, but the reader knows that Clearchus chose to hedge his bets between the two, while only pretending to prefer honour from the Greeks, just as Phalinus ends up doing. Thus, this speech reminds the reader of Clearchus' poor attitude towards reciprocating τιμή.

The narrator does not indicate that Xenophon is speaking for any reason other than the army's interests, although he may also be concerned about his own reputation when defending himself over his desire to settle the army. The leaders that Xenophon addresses presumably recognise that Xenophon is truthfully representing their relationship with their troops. Thus, Xenophon's words match reality. When he talks about the gains that the Greeks could make in Persia, this is hypothetical, and Xenophon is not promising his audience anything. His words suggesting that if the troops stick together, they will be held in honour do not specifically come true, because we do not see any particular honour given to the army. However, they are able to find provisions, and the negative repercussions Xenophon envisages do not come true. When Xenophon says that the gods honour his troops and may do so

²²⁷ Menon has been sent by Aristippus to command his troops, rather than being directly employed by Cyrus and so Menon does not necessarily have much direct loyalty to Cyrus.

again, this is proved correct when they are able to save the Arcadians and Achaeans. Xenophon's claim that the soldiers will not receive honour and praise in Greece is not put to the test. However, Cleander's threat does make this seem a likely repercussion.

In contrast to Menon and Clearchus, the narrator does not undercut Xenophon's representation of himself and instead demonstrates that Xenophon's words and actions match. Regarding his speech about leaders repaying the honour shown to them, Xenophon himself is scrupulous in repaying the honour that others show him, particularly when he persuades Seuthes to pay the soldiers. His repeated putting of the army first demonstrates that he knows what a leader's duty is. In terms of Xenophon's speech referencing the Lotus-Eaters, Xenophon himself is the person who prioritises returning to Greece the most and endeavours to get the men back there, and so he matches his self-presentation with his actions and provides an example to the rest of the army. Xenophon again matches his words about how the army should stay together in order that they receive honour by elsewhere acting on a concern with the army's well-being. For example, when sacrifices do not permit the army advancing, Xenophon refuses to lead the army out. This proves to be the right decision because Neon leads the men out and his group is attacked (6.4.13-6.5.2). When the army does split into three later, the Arcadians and Achaeans are harmed (6.3.2ff.). Thus, Xenophon's words about strength in numbers appear to be true, and demonstrate that Xenophon is able to foresee issues that may arise. Again, regarding Xenophon's mention of the *τιμή* that the army have earned from the gods through their good behaviour, Xenophon matches his words and actions because the reader sees him repeatedly consulting and thanking the gods.²²⁸ The men also do not disagree with Xenophon's claim that he ensures that they begin with the gods, suggesting the truth of his statement that he ensured they acted rightly. Xenophon matches his words about the possibility that the army may not receive *τιμή* at home to his actions by repeatedly showing concern as to how the army's actions will affect relations with the Spartans, especially when he turns down the sole command. From these examples, it is clear that Xenophon is trustworthy and versatile in his appeals, and that he consistently works in the army's interests.

²²⁸ See 3.2.9, 4.3.13, 5.6.16, 6.1.22, 6.4.9ff., 7.8.10 and 7.8.20.

Didactic Function

Menon and Xenophon represent successful persuasion attempts using appeals to τιμή and κέρδος, but again, only Xenophon should be emulated. After Menon's men act, Cyrus advances and the rest of the army follows (1.4.17). In the short term, Menon has benefitted Cyrus by ensuring that his expedition can continue, has benefitted his men by winning them promises of future gain, and has benefitted himself by obtaining gifts. In the long term, continuing the mission brings trouble to them all. Even though Menon is successful in his persuasion attempt, he does not achieve anything for the soldiers other than a promise that is never fulfilled, and the trials that they experience after Cyrus' death. In fact, Roisman (1985-8, 33 and 38-9) argues that Menon's actions "isolated" his contingent from the others and that Clearchus was more favoured as a result. Buzzetti (2014, 49) even argues that the episode where Clearchus clashes with Menon's men stems from Menon separating his troops from the rest of the army.

Menon is one of the generals killed by the Persians, but instead of being killed immediately like the others, the narrator reveals in Menon's obituary that he was tortured for a year, the death of a rogue (πονηρός, 2.6.29). The narrator mentions Menon's comeuppance after the extensive criticism of Menon's behaviour and attitude, including his approach to τιμή and κέρδος. Clearly, Menon's attitude to honour and profit was particularly corrupt and he is a negative paradigm generally as well as in how to use these concepts as part of an appeal.²²⁹ The account of Menon demonstrates that it is imperative that a good leader combines a positive moral attitude with the ability to persuade others.

Clearchus' failed appeal is striking, because he is unable to anticipate how someone who, like him, faced a choice between Persians and Greeks will respond. The reader may question whether Clearchus' appeal to honour was ever likely to succeed, because Phalinus appears to have no use for honour from Greece. Clearchus' judgement as to how best to persuade is questionable here. After the exchange, Clearchus tells Phalinus to take back the message that if the Cyreans become friends with the king, they would be better friends if they kept their arms,

²²⁹ C.f. *Memorabilia* 2.6.24-5. Socrates says that bad leaders want positions in order to embezzle and hurt others and to live in luxury.

and if they went to war with him, they would also do better if they kept their arms (2.1.20). Phalinus questions Clearchus further on the army's intentions, and Clearchus gives non-committal answers (2.1.21-3). Because he did not succeed in his persuasion attempt, Clearchus has not harmed himself or the Cyreans with his words, and it is perhaps actually a benefit that Phalinus did not recommend fighting the king directly. However, Clearchus has not extricated the army from their dangerous situation. We have already seen that Clearchus' selfish attitude to honour leads to his comeuppance, and this speech is another example of Clearchus using references to honour to try to manipulate others for his own benefit.

That a leader should not appeal to the desire for honour and profit in others for selfish reasons but should only appeal to these concepts when it is good for those he is responsible for, can be seen by comparing the benefits Xenophon's speeches bring and the way he ends in the work. The outcomes from Xenophon's speeches are variously beneficial. After he speaks to the leaders following Tissaphernes' treachery, new leaders are chosen (3.1.45-7) and an assembly is called (3.2.1). Xenophon has initiated the formation of a plan and so he clearly brings benefit to the army and himself with his appeal in both the short and long term. After his speech to the army encouraging them to prioritise home over gains, Xenophon speaks further on what he believes the army should do (3.2.34-9) and they follow his recommendations. No specific benefit occurs because of this particular appeal, but the speech sets in motion the plan that the army begins to implement. After his speech in which he renounces his idea to settle the army, the whole army follows one plan again and does not split up. Again, this is a benefit in the short term, although his message is forgotten by the time the army splits into three and so may not have a long-term effect. After his speech regarding helping the Arcadians and Achaeans, Xenophon's division scare away the enemy and they are reunited with their comrades (6.3.15-26). Through his appeal, Xenophon brings benefit to the Arcadians and Achaeans by saving them, aids his men and himself by ensuring that they do not have to face the enemy alone, and benefits the whole army and himself longer-term by reuniting these two groups. After Xenophon's speech regarding Cleander, the army cooperates with Cleander and allows him to investigate the matter until the army becomes friends with him (6.6.19-37). Xenophon benefits himself and the

army in the short and long term by heading off the possibility that they will offend Cleander and not be able to enter the Greek cities.

Some of Xenophon's particular appeals have parallel elsewhere, which may suggest to the reader the righteousness of Xenophon's methods. Both the internal audience and the reader may be meant to recognise the correspondence of attitudes between Xenophon's and Sarpedon's appeals to the leaders of the army about their duty.²³⁰ Homer's authority may confirm that Xenophon's attitude and use of this appeal are apt.²³¹ It is necessary at this point in time that Xenophon the character appeals to an attitude which has external verification because he has no experience or rank to use as a basis for persuasion yet. The sentiments on the negative effects of idleness and luxury that Xenophon expresses in his speech referring to the Lotus-Eaters are reflected more widely in Greek literature.²³² Xenophon the character's appeal may thus be drawing on a particular warning that would be familiar to his internal audience and readers, and which they would understand as being right.²³³ Xenophon's insistence that consulting the gods and praying to them is a vital part of a leader's role is also found in the *Hipparchicus* (1.1-2, 3.1, 5.14, and 9.7-9), indicating how such an attitude should be held by an ideal leader. His argument that boasters are punished by the gods finds parallel in Odysseus' punishment from the gods for boasting to Polyphemus (*Odyssey* 9.500-35). Regarding Xenophon's concerns that the army will lose honour if they split up, at *Cyropaedia* 8.7.9-24, Cyrus anticipates that his sons will fight over his throne, and he makes arguments concerning potentially losing τιμή if they act in this way. Clearly, good leaders will try to use arguments about losing honour to persuade others to act in ways beneficial to themselves.

²³⁰ C.f. also a similar attitude presented by Socrates at *Memorabilia* 2.7.14. For the importance of reciprocating honour from others as a leader, see *Cyropaedia* 5.1.29 and *Hellenica* 3.4.9.

²³¹ Some scholars, such as Domingo Gyax (2009, 173-4 and 184), see reciprocal relationships as obtaining closure when each party gives once, because the second gift cancels out the first. Other scholars, such as Rubinstein (2013), emphasize the continuous and complex nature of reciprocal relationships. Xenophon's work appears to corroborate the second interpretation, particularly in terms of leaders continuously doing their duty to the soldiers.

²³² See Isocrates 2.2 and Herodotus 9.122. Waterfield (2006, 231) also makes the connection between these passages on "environmental determinism", and further connects Aristotle *Politica* 1327b, Aeschylus *Supplices* 497-8 and Pseudo-Hippocrates *De Aëre Aquis et Locis* 16. Gray (2011b) also connects *Cyropaedia* 7.5.75.

²³³ C.f. *Agésilas* 2.16, where Agésilas chooses to return home and be ruled rather than to have supreme power in Asia.

It is evident that Xenophon's references to honour and profit are commendable and instructive. Using the concepts of honour and profit as part of his arguments, Xenophon encourages his audiences to save themselves, desire the right things, act well and be safe. When Xenophon makes his appeals, the army is involved in dangerous situations, which he helps to deliver it from.

Recalling How the Army and Others Acted in Relation to Τιμή and Κέρδος

Cleanor (3.2.4-6) and Xenophon (5.4.19-21, 5.7.13-33 and 5.8.13-26) use how others acted in relation to honour and profit as negative examples.

Cleanor's Appeal to Τιμή (3.2.4-6)

At the assembly of the army after the Greek generals have been killed, Cleanor speaks after Cheirisophus and before Xenophon. Cleanor is speaking as part of Xenophon's recommendation that the leaders should encourage the soldiers, make them more cheerful and motivate their goodness, in order to make them more confident and successful (3.1.39-44). Cleanor dwells on the perjury, impiety and faithlessness of the Persian leaders, and the punishment they will receive because of this. He claims to be particularly appalled that Ariaeus feels no shame at joining Cyrus' enemies after Cyrus' death, and is trying to harm Cyrus' friends, even though Cyrus honoured him most highly (τιμώμενος μάλιστα) when he was alive. Cleanor's objection here is with Ariaeus not continuing to provide honour or respect (αἰδεσθεῖς) in return for the honours given by Cyrus, even though Cyrus has died. As Cleanor represents it, reciprocating τιμή goes beyond death.

Cleanor is using this representation of Ariaeus' poor attitude to make the soldiers confident that the Persians have acted so unjustly that they will be punished by the gods, while the Greeks, who maintained their friendships and oaths will easily be successful. Cleanor may be trying to evoke contempt or hatred of the Persians in general for their actions. He may further be warning the Cyreans to ensure that they continue to act well in their friendships and in respect to τιμή. Cleanor represents himself as being appalled at the behaviour of others in not reciprocating friendship or honours and as having faith in the gods that they will avenge such behaviour. Thus, he presents himself as having the right attitude to these moral concepts. No response from the men is indicated but Xenophon the character says that he trusts that

Cleanor's message is understood by all (3.2.8), seemingly endorsing Cleanor's point. The narrator does not indicate how the men respond to this endorsement either.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (5.4.19-21)

With three different speeches, Xenophon restores three situations by referring to others' attitudes and actions towards making selfish profit. In the first example, certain Greek soldiers have followed their Mossynoecian allies to attack an enemy citadel without orders from the Greek generals, because they seek plunder (ἀρπαγῆς ἕνεκεν). Some are killed and others flee. The narrator states that the other Greeks are very angry (μάλα ἤχθοντο) because the Cyreans had not fled at any point before and because the enemy had been made bolder (5.4.16-18). The narrator indicates that Xenophon called the Greeks together and spoke to them. It is not stated, but the reader might presume that Xenophon aims to calm the men and encourage them again, for their safety.

Xenophon describes what good has come from the situation and tells the Greeks not to lose heart (μηδὲν ἀθυμήσητε). They can be confident that their allies are indeed enemies of the people in the citadel and that the plunderers will not leave their lines so easily next time. He urges the Greeks to prove to their allies that they are better men (κρείττους) than the plunderers and to show the enemy that they are not as disordered (ἀτάκτοις) as those that went after plunder. Xenophon has both made an example of the plunderers by condemning them and tried to use their actions to evoke calmness in the men by making them think about the advantages of the situation. He attempts to evoke confidence in the allies and the future behaviour of the plunderers, as well as a spirit of competition in trying to outdo the plunderers, and contempt of the plunderers in describing how disordered they were. Xenophon presents himself as understanding why the men are angry but as wisely being able to look beyond this to see how the army can benefit from the situation. He presents himself as having faith that the Greeks who did not seek plunder can better their colleagues. The Greeks do not respond at the time.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (5.7.13-33)

Xenophon gives a speech defending himself to the army against Neon's accusation that Xenophon was trying to deceive the men into going to the Phasis in the wake of

Timasion's and Thorax's attempts to lead the army back home (5.7.1-12). At the end of this speech, Xenophon says that the men should listen to his description of what he sees growing in the army. If it progresses as it is doing, he says, they need to take counsel on their own behalf so that they do not seem most wicked and shameful. The narrator says that the men wonder (ἐθαύμασάν) what this could be and ask Xenophon to continue (5.7.13). The narrator does not reveal Xenophon's aim or motive here, but Xenophon the character presents his aim as being to prevent the army destroying its reputation and ability to return home. Yet the reader may wonder if Xenophon is simply trying to distract the men further from accusing him.

Xenophon describes how Clearetus the captain arranged with his messmates to plunder (πορθήσων) a stronghold friendly to the Cerasuntians and escape from the army with their gains. When the plan backfires, according to Xenophon, those plunderers who survive cause havoc in the army. They attack ambassadors who are preparing to report the incident, and encourage others in this until the ambassadors are killed. When the Cerasuntians report the incident to the generals, the soldiers suddenly rush in and seem to be about to throw stones, although many, Xenophon claims, do not even know why they are doing this. One who does claim to know says that the market-clerk had treated them very badly. The market-clerk is attacked, and several Cerasuntians and Greeks drown.

Xenophon dwells on the repercussions of Clearetus' selfish desire for money. Firstly, the army is perceived badly by outsiders and there are catastrophic effects on the relations of the army with others. He also says that if the market-clerk was guilty, then he has escaped punishment, while if he was innocent, he has departed in fear of the army. Because of their actions, the army cannot safely go to Cerasus, and the Greeks are unable to bury their own dead. If the soldiers approve of such deeds, they will not be able to offer sacrifices to the gods because of their sacrilegious (ἀσεβῆ) actions. The army will also be unable to fight its enemies because the men will be too busy killing each other, and friendly cities will not receive the army or provide a market. Finally, the soldiers would not receive the praise they wanted from those in Greece. Xenophon says that the soldiers themselves would judge other people who acted like this to be rogues (πονηροῦς). Xenophon also dwells on the dangers of the men following corrupt leaders like Clearetus who are only concerned for their own gain. He says that, under such leaders, ambassadors

will not be allowed to speak to the men, the commanders will be unworthy and the general will be able to make those willing to obey him kill anyone without a trial.

Xenophon makes an example out of those who acted selfishly by dwelling on the injustice, negative repercussions, and ignoble behaviour that can stem from a desire for gain, and how this can affect the whole army's aims and survival. Xenophon appeals to anger at the men who began this affair, shame in those who took part in the events, and fear at what the outcomes could be both short and long term. Xenophon presents himself as being concerned for the reputation and interests of the men. He also represents himself as finding selfish greed reprehensible, and the inciting of the army and the killing of innocents inexcusable. Xenophon also presents himself as having the foresight to see what problems these actions could cause and as being the opposite of the selfish leaders he describes.

This speech evokes a strong reaction. The audience proposes that those who began the affair should be punished and that no one should be allowed to instigate lawlessness in the future. If they do so, they must face trial. The army also decides that anyone who has committed an offense since Cyrus' death must undergo trial, with the captains as jury, and the army is purified (5.7.34-5). The response focuses on future and past lawlessness and so the reader might assume that a desire to appear to act rightly in their own and in others' eyes, as well as their fear of appearing negatively, chiefly persuade the soldiers. Thus, Xenophon seems to have successfully demonstrated the dangers that can stem from selfish financial gain. The men clearly believe Xenophon's account of events.

Xenophon's Appeal to Κέρδος (5.8.13-26)

We have seen that once Xenophon has defended himself against striking certain men, he gives a second speech. Xenophon is presumably trying to clear his name, although he has already successfully done this in his first speech on the subject.

Xenophon admits that he hits, among others, those soldiers who wanted to enjoy plunder over the rest of the men (ἀρπάζειν ἤθελον καὶ ὑμῶν πλεονεκτεῖν). He explains that this is because it is detrimental to discipline and, if everyone had tried to get such an advantage, it would have destroyed (ἀπωλόμεθα) the whole army. Xenophon claims that the army neither helped him punish these men nor stopped

him from punishing them, and that this allowed the selfish plunderers to act as they pleased. Xenophon singles out Boïscus as an example of someone who fought to avoid carrying a shield due to tiredness but stripped (ἀποδέδουκεν) the dead when he had the opportunity. Xenophon says that the army should tie Boïscus up at night and let him loose by day.

Xenophon is trying to change the army's perception of his actions and thus links them to a direct concern for the army's safety and success, explaining how they are just, advantageous and necessary. Xenophon appeals to the men's fears that the army could potentially have been ruined, and their gratitude towards him for acting to prevent this. He also appeals to the shame of those in the army who did not help him one way or the other, as well as evoking anger at Boïscus, whom Xenophon makes an example of. Xenophon presents himself as defending the discipline and well-being of the whole army by punishing those who threaten this, and thus as knowing what is beneficial for the army. He represents himself as being alone in his endeavours to punish those who have the potential to cause the army harm and as being aware of how individual soldiers act. In response, the soldiers recall the good things that Xenophon has done for them, but this does not confirm that they were persuaded that people who go after selfish gain should be punished. Xenophon is not charged for hitting such men, however, and so he seems to have anticipated that the army would judge that he had acted rightly concerning such people.

Reader Involvement

The reader engages with Cleanor's speech because of the tension arising from whether his arguments will motivate the soldiers enough to persuade them to try to extricate themselves from their dangerous situation. Xenophon's speech trying to calm the soldiers after some of their number go plundering causes tension for the reader in contemplating what the army will do in their anger, and how Xenophon will recover a potentially dangerous situation. Xenophon's speech recounting Clearetus' actions may cause the reader surprise because the narrator did not describe the incident at the time it occurred in the narrative. The description is also particularly dramatic and forewarns of danger. Regarding Xenophon's speech shaming Boïscus, the reader may feel tension over whether the army will believe Xenophon's claims or think that he is passing the blame onto Boïscus.

Characterisation

Cleanor seems to want to be beneficial to the army. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the narrator undercuts Cleanor's presentation of himself. He is generally pious, honest, dedicated, and leads his men well,²³⁴ although he gives bad advice when trying to evoke fear in the other leaders. We also saw, however, that Cleanor accepted gifts from Seuthes (7.2.2). Cleanor does not repay these gifts because he does not lead the army to Seuthes, as Seuthes wanted. This is a striking lapse from Cleanor's attitude in the speech we examined, where even death should not stop a person from returning honour. This characterises Cleanor as not living up to his words and as being untrustworthy in representing his attitude.

Xenophon also seems to be motivated to ensure that the army acts well in the future, although this may be combined with thoughts of clearing his own name. Again, Xenophon's representation of himself matches his actions elsewhere. Firstly, he himself sets a good example of not striving for individual gain, as we have seen. The narrator also confirms that Xenophon understands the men's feelings, as he represents himself as doing when calming the soldiers after their fellows have sought plunder. For example, Xenophon dismounts from his horse because he recognises that the soldiers will follow more eagerly if he leads them on foot (7.3.45). Regarding the same speech, the narrator also confirms that Xenophon is wise in understanding how the men can benefit from a situation and as having foresight when, for example, he arranges for local roads to be repaired even though the men do not want to travel by land (5.1.14). The narrator also represents Xenophon as echoing the same concerns in this speech elsewhere. For example, Xenophon the character praises discipline and order and acts on a desire to maintain it (3.1.38, 3.2.29 and 5.8.1-11).²³⁵ As we have seen before, Xenophon is concerned for the army's interests and reputation (see also 6.5.24). Regarding the speeches at 5.7.13-33 and 5.8.13-26, the reader might think that Xenophon is trying to shift the blame onto others. However, the narrator has confirmed that the Clearetus incident took place (5.7.2) and, because he says that some feared that the men would act in the same way as this again, Xenophon has a valid reason for mentioning it in the subsequent

²³⁴ See 2.1.10, 4.8.18, 6.4.22, 7.1.40 and 7.5.10.

²³⁵ See *Oeconomicus* 8.4 for the importance of an ordered army and *De Re Equestri* 3.6 for the problems of a disobedient army.

speech. Also, no one denies that Boïscus acts in the way Xenophon describes. Xenophon further claims that people have seen him punishing wrongdoers and done nothing, which no one objects to, and so this seems to confirm that Xenophon acts as he says. Indeed, the reader has already seen that Xenophon is concerned with the whole army punishing wrongdoers when he recommends that everyone in the army needs to be like Clearchus in punishing disobedience (3.2.31). Seemingly, only Xenophon has attempted to act on this. Through Xenophon's self-characterisation and the narrator's confirmation of this, Xenophon appears as a wise, selfless and concerned leader who speaks for the army's benefit and is the opposite of the selfish people he describes.

Didactic Function

From the comparison between Cleanor's and Xenophon's use of *exempla*, the reader learns that if a leader is going to criticise others, he must be able to act rightly in this respect himself. What Cleanor advocates is morally right,²³⁶ and he has a positive effect at the time. The men go on to prepare to face the Persians after Xenophon's subsequent speech. Simply by including Cleanor's speech before this, the narrator suggests that Cleanor has a positive impact on the morale of the men, and thus, that he benefitted the army and himself. By still being loyal to Cyrus' cause, the Greeks have acted well, and are perhaps encouraged to continue to honour any relationships they have or make. This may be why Cleanor does not appear to be punished for failing to live up to his words, and why the internal characters do not appear to discover that Cleanor fails to act according to his words. The reader, however, learns that Cleanor cannot be entirely trusted to work for the men's interests, and that there is a danger in trusting a leader who has not been fully tested in such a situation. We saw that Xenophon twice refused Seuthes' gifts to him personally, and that these two occasions fell either side of the narrator revealing that Cleanor had accepted them. Clearly, Cleanor should not be emulated in his actions here.

By contrast, Xenophon himself should be emulated in how he attempts to use the concepts of honour and profit to teach lessons. On the day after his speech

²³⁶ Similar opinions can be seen elsewhere. C.f. Isocrates 1.1: base men only honour their friends while they are present, whereas the friendships of good men are not erased by time. See also Thucydides 3.39: Cleon argues that the Mytileneans had been held in the highest regard by the Athenians and so they should be punished firmly for their revolt. See also Aristotle *Rhetorica* 2.4, 1381b.25-6. He claims that men like those who are fond of friends who have died.

regarding those who followed the Mossynoecians for their own gain, the army maintains order and discipline, are victorious, and are able to plunder the strongholds (5.4.22-6). By presenting Xenophon's speech just before the success, it appears that the speech has played a role in encouraging the men in their undertaking. Because Xenophon has both stopped the Greeks potentially acting on their anger and encouraged them on to victory, Xenophon has benefitted the army and himself. Xenophon's speech regarding Clearetus' actions benefits the army in the short term. The wrongdoers are punished, new laws are created, the generals undergo trial, and the army is purified. Xenophon is also able to clear his name, benefitting himself in the short term too, although he is further suspected later. The soldiers seem intent upon changing their way of acting for the future, which should benefit them long-term, but they fail to act admirably in some later situations. After Xenophon's speech regarding hitting the men, no particular benefits are specified, although Xenophon clears his name. Given what he does for the soldiers, it may be to their benefit that they trust Xenophon again, although they do not feel positively towards him long-term.

In his creation of lessons for the army, Xenophon the character mirrors the narrator's creation of leadership *exempla*. Xenophon the character instructs the internal as well as external audience, teaching about the dangers of a desire for financial profit, the importance of order, discipline, safety, obedience, relations with outsiders, reputation, marshalling the army in the future and the army's own moral character.²³⁷ Given the repetition of incidences involving men going after their own private gain, it is clear that the desire cannot be overcome, although it can be controlled for the most part. Flower (2012, 200-1) argues that Xenophon the character never cures the army of its indiscipline and that the author presents us with

²³⁷ C.f. similar lessons by other leaders. At *Cyropaedia* 7.2.5-8, Cyrus teaches his men that obedience, teamwork and the protection of a community are more important than the quick profit they can make, and he ensures that people profit fairly through this lesson. At *Cyropaedia* 2.2.23-8, Cyrus recommends weeding out of the army those that are excessive (σφοδροῖ) and shameless (ἀναίσχυντοι) in trying to gain an advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν). Ischomachus also releases those who are incurably greedy (ἀνηκέστους πλεονέκτας, *Oeconomicus* 14.8). At *Hellenica* 6.3.11, an Athenian ambassador argues that the repercussions from Spartan deeds such as the seizure of the Cadmea have taught everyone that trying to gain advantage (πλεονεκτεῖν) over others is unprofitable (ἀκερδές). Even the Spartans agree with this (6.3.18). In this work as a whole, Xenophon seems to imply that the Spartans are punished for such actions (see Dillery, 1995, 192ff.). See also criticism of the selfish gain of the Sophists (*Cynegeticus* 13.1-9). Elsewhere, for a strong condemnation of those who selfishly plunder despite friendships, alliances and justice, see Polybius *Historiae* 4.6.

no hope that such an army can overcome its greed for gain. The reader might judge that it is to Xenophon's credit, however, that he repeatedly tries to persuade the men to act in a disciplined way and does not allow them to give into their desires as leaders such as Menon did.²³⁸

Conclusion

We have seen that the narrator *does* present a clear message about how a leader should use the concepts of κέρδος and τιμή as part of his persuasion attempt. Despite the success that most of the speakers we have examined achieve with their speeches, the leaders can be separated by their selfless and selfish motivations, by their accurate or inaccurate representations of their attitudes, by their ability and intent to make good their promises, by whether they bring benefit or harm to their audiences and themselves, and how their leadership ends in the work. References to κέρδος and τιμή can be directly compared to each other, and clear messages emerge.

Particularly, it is clear that Xenophon is a positive *exemplum* in his use of the concepts of κέρδος and τιμή in his persuasion attempts, even though he occasionally has his own defence partly in mind, and even if the benefits his speech brings do not always have lasting effect. The range of dangerous situations in which Xenophon uses references to κέρδος and τιμή to aid the army indicates the usefulness of being able to appeal to these concepts, but also the necessity to do this rightly, without damaging the army's moral outlook. The other leaders who use the concepts do so in various unacceptable ways. Those speakers whom the reader eventually recognises as negative paradigms or ambiguous characters often fail to reciprocate adequately while trying to get something for nothing, and cause problems to the community of men as a result. The reader learns specific lessons from the comparisons. In a leader himself, the desire for κέρδος and τιμή from a paymaster must not conflict with his duty to the army and bring harm to it, and τιμή from the soldiers should motivate a leader positively and cause him to do his duty.²³⁹ When a leader himself appeals to the κέρδος and τιμή the army can gain, it should be to motivate his audience to extract itself from a dangerous situation, not cause danger, or to encourage the

²³⁸ See *Hellenica* 3.2.6-7, for the influence a leader has over the army's actions.

²³⁹ Nussbaum (1967, 143) similarly argues that Xenophon appreciated material gains but did not let these conflict with his duty to the men. See also Johnstone (1994), who argues that in his works Xenophon was advocating a lifestyle for the elites in the *polis* that was built on self-control over the desires that the elite competed over. This argument also appears to hold true for elites in the army.

audience to positive actions, not to manipulate them into acting a certain way. A leader must also reflect his own attitude to the concepts accurately in order to inspire the army to trust him because he lives up to his words. Being able to draw on past behaviour and set a personal example in relation to these concepts is vital. A leader must not use the audience's desires for his own benefit, such as to gain power or control.

A mercenary army will inevitably try to plunder and gain profit, and a leader will have to provide for this by trying to ensure that this is done acceptably and safely. Ideally, a leader would appeal to τιμή over profit, but this is not always practical.²⁴⁰ When direct appeals are made to gaining κέρδος, this must be because it is absolutely necessary for the army's safety. It must also be gained from acceptable sources. An admirable leader must also be able to represent well to outsiders the army's attitude to κέρδος and τιμή. A good leader should be able to make an example of others but be able to back this up with his own actions. Finally, audiences should not trust a leader until he has been tested and proves that he will match his actions to his words and aims to do what is beneficial for the army.

²⁴⁰ Ferrario (2012, 371) argues that the soldiers think of their reputation in terms of the booty they can return with, whereas Xenophon the character focuses on ensuring that the army acted nobly. Dover (1974, 172) similarly argues that Xenophon the author recommends using φιλοτιμία to overcome the desire for gain (see particularly *Oeconomicus* 14.10). We have seen that it is more nuanced than this in the *Anabasis*.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to investigate the roles and effects of the speeches in relation to Xenophon's aims and agenda for the *Anabasis* through an examination of the speeches as persuasion attempts by leaders of an internal audience that should be read in conjunction with the prior and subsequent narrative. I began by establishing that such a narratological and rhetorical analysis of Xenophon's speeches can produce new interpretations of certain speeches in the *Hellenica*, and that this may also prove true for speeches in the *Anabasis*. To begin my study of the speeches in the *Anabasis*, I investigated examples of speakers attempting to evoke emotions in their audience. By looking at how the speakers achieved or did not achieve persuasion, my analysis established two things. Firstly, Xenophon had an interest in contemporary rhetorical theory and pre-empts some of Aristotle's later recommendations for how to evoke certain emotions. Secondly, based on this first point and also on Xenophon the author's clear interest in leaders elsewhere in his *oeuvre*, the speeches act as examples of how a leader can successfully evoke emotions and what elements can lead to failure. My analysis could have stopped here. The majority of the speeches in the work are successful, and so their function could be to indicate to the reader how to compose his own speeches. However, the prior and subsequent narrative indicates that Xenophon is interested in far more than success when he presents the speeches. I demonstrated that when the motives of the speakers for making these appeals are examined, as well as the harm or benefit the success or failure of the appeal causes in the short and long term, the picture of the leader and the correctness of the persuasion attempt that emerges becomes more complicated. The speeches themselves also produce a number of dramatic effects on the reader, which seems to suggest that Xenophon wanted the reader to engage with the speeches, the speaker and the internal audience, in order to understand these nuances. Thus, I suggested that dramatic effect, characterisation of the speaker and audience, and presentation of a didactic message are the three key roles and effects for the speeches in the *Anabasis*, when examined in context with the narrative.

In the subsequent chapters, I established that an examination of the speeches in terms of these three roles and effects enabled the reader to judge which characters and persuasion attempts he should emulate and which he should shun the example of. Ultimately, the reader may learn that successful techniques of persuasion need to

be combined with a moral approach to persuasion. Although I examined the speeches through three different themes, the conclusions emerging from each chapter were the same. This presentation simply facilitated comparisons and contrasts between leaders' responses to situations and the methods they used. I established that the speeches engage the reader in numerous ways. Particularly, the reader may share the mood of the internal audience when the army is in a dangerous situation and may feel the emotions the speaker subsequently evokes. The reader also becomes involved in the leader's deceit of others, both in terms of being deceived himself and in recognising the deceit before or during a leader's speech. The reader also engages with whether a leader will match his words with his actions when he appeals to the desire for honour and profit in others, and whether his representation of his attitude towards these concepts matches reality. The reader is further involved with understanding whether or not successful appeals to these concepts will prove to be for the benefit of the army, and whether the audience is right to trust the leader's self-representation in this area.

I also demonstrated that the reader could distinguish between leaders who are motivated selflessly and leaders who are motivated selfishly through their attempts to evoke emotions, deceive others and make use of references to honour and profit to present their own attitude and to motivate their audience. Between Xenophon, Clearchus and Cyrus, these three leaders control the army for the majority of the *Anabasis*. They are also all usually successful in their persuasion attempts. Yet, it is clear that Xenophon the character is consistently driven by the needs and interests of the army when persuading, while Clearchus and Cyrus are driven by their own needs and interests. Thus, there is a way to distinguish between their characters, for better and for worse. Other supporting leaders have positive and negative motivations for their persuasion attempts, although they are not always so successful at persuading their audiences, and can also be characterised as selfish or selfless accordingly. Whether a speaker matches his motives, words and actions also characterises him in terms of his trustworthiness. Leaders who make promises that they cannot or will not fulfil, or who make untrue claims about their attitudes are, for the most part, not working in the best interests of the army. Again, only Xenophon emerges as being trustworthy. The combination of narrative and speech exposes the real character of the leader, which is often different from the *ethos* he presents. The reader also sees

what the audiences of these speeches are susceptible to in terms of emotional appeals and appeals to their desires and motivations, as well as what deception they will believe, and who they put their trust in.

We can also distinguish between successful persuasion that benefits the speaker and the audience, and successes that cause harm in the short or long term. Xenophon's speeches consistently benefit the army in the short term, and nearly always in the long term, while other leaders often produce longer-term harm with their speeches, most notably Cyrus and Clearchus. Some leaders also produce immediate harm. It should be clear to the reader from this that the repercussions of a persuasion attempt must be taken into account when assessing which persuasion attempts should be emulated and which should not. Failure to persuade an audience can also produce negative outcomes.

The way a speaker's leadership ends in the work ties characterisation and the harm or benefit produced together. We saw that Xenophon is rewarded at the end of the work, which suggests that he should be emulated in how he has led, including the persuasion attempts he has made. Other leaders suffer death, or criticism from internal characters, which can often be related to their persuasion attempts, and which indicates that their example should be shunned. Thus, the reader learns that not all successful persuasion is praiseworthy. The reader also learns that the internal audiences must not trust a leader to work in their benefit without testing him first. These elements of the narrative also indicate to the reader important lessons about when it is appropriate to deceive friends and appeal to the desires in others. A leader must understand this in order to carry out his duties acceptably.

Combining all these elements, the reader sees that only Xenophon is represented as an ideal leader in terms of the persuasion attempts he makes. The other leaders become negative *exempla* to varying degrees, or at least are not fully positive *exempla*. Xenophon consistently does his duty to those he is responsible for and offers his own example to them in terms of his own attitudes and corresponding actions. He is skilled at persuasion, but he does not use this for his own benefit and does not harm the army with it. He receives his reward from those he has benefitted. The army is actually in danger from the other leaders either because of the leaders' inability to persuade successfully even though they have good advice, or because the

leader can successfully persuade but does not put the interests of the army first, and so gives bad advice.

What I have established is significant because it locates the speeches as integral elements in the work as a whole. They are closely linked to the narrative, the reader's involvement, the understanding of the characters and the lessons that can be learnt from the work. Learning these lessons through the speeches and the corresponding narrative is more engaging than simply being provided with direct instructions on how to persuade or lead others in an acceptable way, such as are found in the *Hipparchicus*. In allowing the leaders to speak for themselves and the reader to experience the leaders' speeches, the reader is drawn in. In indicating motives and outcomes, more subtle characterisation can be achieved than if the narrator simply praised or blamed the leaders, although Xenophon does this as well through the obituaries. Indeed, it is significant that what the narrator reveals in the obituaries is different in some aspects to what emerges from the speeches. Through the speeches, the fine lines between ultimate success and failure can be better illustrated. Thus, we may be closer to establishing that the aim of the *Anabasis* as a whole is didactic. The roles and effects of the speeches also suggest Xenophon's intended readership for the work. I argue that Xenophon has in mind prospective or even established leaders as his readers.²⁴¹

This thesis has challenged some of the previous interpretations of certain speeches from the *Hellenica* by allowing the speeches and the corresponding narrative to speak for themselves. In terms of the *Anabasis*, this thesis has built on previous work rather than challenged it.²⁴² For example, my thesis has furthered general statements made by some scholars about the speeches in the work characterising speakers, illustrating the importance of leaders being good speakers, illustrating leadership qualities, and being examples for composing speeches. All of these are true, but I have demonstrated *how* they are true. I have also extended the work of Kelly, who only examined the speeches in the first book of the *Anabasis*.

²⁴¹ See Appendix 4 for previous scholarly suggestions.

²⁴² However, it does continue the trend of refuting the idea that Xenophon did not truly understand what he was writing. For example, my conclusion opposes scholars such as Westlake (1966, 255, 257 and 269), who argues in relation to the *Hellenica* that Xenophon the author cannot understand what makes truly great leaders because of his own inadequate experience as a leader. He "admires the wrong leaders or admires the right leaders for the wrong reasons".

We reach similar conclusions, but some of his conclusions were hypotheses based on what he assumed he would find in the rest of the *Anabasis*. I have shown that the majority of his conclusions were correct, although we disagree on whether Cyrus' and Clearchus' speeches should be emulated. Likewise, I have extended investigations such as those by Morales Harley and Varias, who each analysed one speech as a piece of rhetoric. I widened this out to examine what roles and effects persuasion attempts had in the whole work. Other theories specifically about the speeches that we encountered are extended by this thesis. For example, Grethlein's argument that the speeches make the past seem present for the reader; Farrell's argument that Xenophon achieves success and authority through his speeches and that they ensure order and instil virtue; Pontier's argument about tackling disorder and lack of courage; and Rood's suggestion that there might be a didactic element to the speeches. I have simply investigated the speeches on a wider scale and in more depth, than these scholars did. We further saw that there have been previous investigations of the whole *Anabasis* in terms of narratological elements, Xenophon's interest in leadership, his use of didactic *exempla*, and his presentation of Xenophon the character as an ideal leader. This thesis combines these areas of investigation and demonstrates what the speeches and their corresponding narrative reveal concerning these topics, sometimes producing new conclusions and sometimes reaffirming existing interpretations.

This thesis has contributed a new narratological and rhetorical approach to the work, and a methodology that is proven to obtain new and interesting interpretations of the speeches in Xenophon's works. It has also contributed a possible way of understanding Xenophon's aim for the *Anabasis*, the text as it stands, the characters, lessons emerging from the work, and the role of the speeches. Individually, the three themes of persuasion that I investigated have had little research carried out on them so far, and so this thesis contributes to research on Xenophon's interest in these particular areas. I have also added to the research on Xenophon's interest in contemporary rhetoric generally. This investigation may further our understanding of Xenophon and the *Anabasis*, and the approach and method could be used elsewhere.

The most important limitation of this research is that it is one particular reader's interpretation of the function of the speeches in the *Anabasis* and cannot be

taken to have ‘proven’ anything. It is nowhere indicated that Xenophon had a specific overarching agenda behind his inclusion of any of the speeches, and he may not have specifically intended for the reader to make the connections and comparisons between the speeches and leaders that this thesis highlights. Indeed, the hunt for such a design is a product of modern approaches to literary analysis. We also cannot assume that we understand exactly how Xenophon’s contemporary audience would have interpreted the speeches. The nuances of the characterisation and didactic message that I suggest would perhaps take several readings of the work to become apparent. A reader simply may not recall which speech has led to which outcome on first reading, or recall that Xenophon and Clearchus both have to choose between honour and profit from a paymaster and their soldiers, and that both react differently to this. It would also depend on the reader’s particular interests and agenda behind reading the work.

To combat being led in my interpretation by my own interests or forcing a particular agenda on the speeches, I have tried to be guided by the speeches themselves and their relation to the narrative, and let the roles and effects emerge organically. In illustrating what I argue are the three main roles and effects, I also base my argument on three themes associated with persuasion that an ancient audience might have been particularly interested in: emotions, deception, and honour and profit. Because of this interest, a reader may have been more inclined to make comparisons between leaders in these areas and remember what a leader had previously said relating to these. However, in analysing the work thematically, I have deconstructed the text by taking speeches out of sequence and arranging them in my own order, to examine them as speeches given in similar scenarios or on similar topics. Nevertheless, the characterisation and didactic message that emerges from each theme is similar, and so a reader would only need to engage with one to understand the messages Xenophon may have been trying to convey. Because the messages are similar, the reader also does not need to engage with any particular theme and may grasp the lessons of the speeches by reading them as a whole. It is also not improbable that a reader would consult the work more than once. Indeed, in the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon directly recommends reading his instructions several times in order to understand them (9.1).

The number of occasions where the links I argue for can be found, and such comparisons can be made does seem to suggest that Xenophon did have a design for the speeches that involved the reader in understanding the leaders' characters and how a leader should act when trying to persuade others. This interpretation may seem to require that the reader has an interest in rhetoric or leading an army. However, because these interests can be demonstrated as belonging to Xenophon the author from his other works, they may lie behind his aim, even if his not all his readers engage with it.

There are further limitations in my work that could be eliminated by further research. My thesis does not cover all the speeches in the work, sometimes covers only specific sections of a longer speech, mainly focuses on set speeches and direct speeches, and does not interpret the few speeches given by non-leaders. The themes I chose also did not capture the speeches of all the different leaders. Agasias, for example, is a particularly interesting leader, but none of his speeches are analysed in this thesis. Thus, an examination of more speeches, more types of speeches and different themes would make my interpretation more complete. Using my methodology on further speeches in the *Hellenica* may also shed light on the roles and effects of the speeches in this work. Similarly, applying it to the *Cyropaedia* may help to indicate whether Xenophon had an ironic aim in this work or not. My approach could also be applied to the works of other authors that contain speeches. It would be particularly interesting to see whether my methodology adds confirmation to the possibility that Caesar used Xenophon's *Anabasis* as a model when writing his *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* and *Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Like the *Anabasis*, the speeches in this work have also been neglected.

Appendix 1: Direct Speech in the *Anabasis*²⁴³

Total number of direct speeches: 269

Speakers:

Total number of different speakers: 63

Total number of speakers given personal names: 40

Total number of speeches assigned to more than one named speaker: 7

<i>Speaker</i>	<i>References</i>				
Procles and Cheirisophus	2.2.1-2				
Thorax and Timasion	5.6.19-20				
‘The Lacedaemonians’/ ‘Laconians’ (previously indicated as referring to Charminus and Polynicus)	7.6.4	7.6.5	7.6.6	7.6.7	7.7.17

Total number of named speakers who give one speech only: 17

<i>Speaker</i>	<i>References</i>
Menon	1.4.14-16
Gaulites	1.7.5
Theopompus (possibly Xenophon)	2.1.12
Socrates	3.1.7-8
Hieronymus	3.1.34
Mithradates	3.3.2
Soteridas	3.4.47
Callimachus	4.1.27
Leon	5.1.2
Thorax	5.6.26

²⁴³ Where a speech moves from indirect to direct, or vice versa, I have included reference to the direct part. See Tuplin’s (2014) analysis for further statistics. He lists both direct and indirect speeches in his appendices.

Lycon	6.2.4-5
Anaxibius	7.1.13
Aristarchus	7.2.13
Arystas	7.3.25
Gnesippus	7.3.28
Eurylocus	7.6.40
Polycrates	7.6.41

*Total number of named speakers who give more than one speech: 20 (219 speeches)*²⁴⁴

Xenophon (93 speeches)						
1.8.16 (or Clearchus)	2.5.41	3.1.15-25	4.1.19	5.1.5-8	6.1.26-9	7.1.6
		3.1.27-30	4.1.22	5.1.8-9	6.1.31	7.1.9-10
		3.1.35-44	4.6.10-15	5.1.9-11	6.3.12-14	7.1.10
		3.2.8	4.6.17-18	5.1.12	6.4.12	7.1.22
		3.2.9	4.7.5-6	5.1.13	6.4.17	7.1.25-31
		3.2.10-32	4.7.7	5.4.5-7	6.4.21	7.2.24
		3.2.34-8	4.8.5	5.4.9	6.5.9	7.2.25
		3.2.38	4.8.5	5.4.19-21	6.5.10-11	7.2.26
		3.2.39	4.8.10-13	5.5.13-23	6.5.14-21	7.2.28
		3.3.12-20	4.8.14	5.6.12-13	6.5.23-4	7.2.29-30
		3.4.39		5.6.28-33	6.6.12-16	7.2.35
		3.4.41		5.6.37	6.6.31-3	7.2.37
		3.4.46		5.7.5-13		7.3.3-6
		3.5.5-6		5.7.13-33		7.3.6
				5.8.3-5		7.3.8

²⁴⁴ In the *Hellenica*, 20 different speakers also give more than one speech, but they mostly give low numbers of speeches: two (7 speakers), three (6), four (2), five (1), and six (2). The other two speakers are Agesilaus with 31 speeches, and Dercylidas with 15. This can be compared to the *Anabasis*, where eight speakers give 7 or more speeches. In Herodotus, 28 characters give more than 2 speeches. In Thucydides, 14 speakers give only 1 speech. 7 speakers give more than 1 speech. For the function of Herodotus' speeches, as well as themes and characterisation within the speeches, and his use of direct and indirect speech, see Pelling (2006), Marincola (2003), Harrison (2000), Gould (1989), Lateiner (1989), Walters (1985), Lang (1984), Hohti (1976), Guzie (1955), Solmsen (1944 and 1943), and Lattimore (1939). For the method, function and type of Thucydides' speeches, as well as themes and characterisation within the speeches, see De Romilly (2012), Lang (2011), Zoido (2007), Frolov (2006), Morrison (2006), Gribble (2006), Luginbill (1999), Rood (1998) Heath (1990), Hornblower (1987), Cogan (1981), Harding (1973), Immerwahr (1973), Stahl (1973), Kennedy (1973), Soulis (1972), Tompkins (1972), Westlake (1971 and 1968), Wallace (1964), and Jebb (1880).

				5.8.6		7.3.9
				5.8.7-9		7.3.12
				5.8.9-11		7.3.14
				5.8.11		7.3.30-2
				5.8.13-26		7.3.37-8
						7.3.45
						7.3.48
						7.4.24
						7.5.3
						7.5.5
						7.6.11-38
						7.7.4-10
						7.7.14
						7.7.18
						7.7.20-47
						7.7.49
						7.7.51
						7.7.52
						7.7.54
						7.7.56

Clearchus (22)	
1.3.3-6	2.1.4
1.3.9-13	2.1.9
1.3.15	2.1.16-17
1.6.6-10 ²⁴⁵	2.1.20
1.7.9	2.1.22
	2.1.22
	2.1.23
	2.2.2
	2.2.3-4
	2.2.10
	2.3.5
	2.3.9

²⁴⁵ Clearchus' report of Orontas' trial could be categorised as speeches given by Cyrus and Orontas, as Tuplin does, but the narrator makes it clear that Clearchus is describing proceedings to his friends. Thus, he may have altered the wording or misremembered it.

	2.3.21-3
	2.4.5-7
	2.5.3-15
	2.5.24
	2.5.26

Seuthes (18)
7.2.32-4
7.2.38
7.3.9
7.3.10-11
7.3.12
7.3.35
7.3.36-7
7.3.39
7.3.41
7.3.43
7.3.44
7.3.45
7.3.47
7.4.9
7.7.48
7.7.50
7.7.51
7.7.53

Cheirisophus (17)			
3.1.45-6	4.1.20-1	5.1.4	6.1.32-3
3.2.2-3	4.6.7-8		
3.2.33	4.6.16		
3.3.3	4.6.19		
3.4.39-40	4.7.3		
3.4.40	4.7.4		
3.4.42	4.7.7		
3.5.6			

Cyrus (13)
1.3.20
1.4.8
1.4.16
1.5.16-17
1.7.3-4
1.7.6-7
1.7.9
1.7.18
1.8.12-13
1.8.17
1.8.26
1.9.25-6
1.9.26-7

Heracleides (8)
7.3.17
7.3.18
7.3.19-20
7.6.2
7.6.4
7.6.5
7.6.6
7.6.42

Phalinos (7)
2.1.11
2.1.13
2.1.15
2.1.19
2.1.21
2.1.22
2.1.23

Cleander (7)	
6.6.25-6	7.1.8
6.6.28	7.1.10
6.6.34	7.1.39
6.6.36	

Tissaphernes (6)
2.3.18-20
2.3.24
2.3.26-7
2.3.29
2.5.16-23
2.5.25

Agasias (4)	
3.1.31	6.1.30
	6.6.17-18
	6.6.21-4

Medosades (4)
7.2.27
7.2.28
7.7.3
7.7.16

Ariaeus (3)
2.2.11-12
2.5.38
2.5.40

Cleanor (3)		
2.5.39	3.2.4-6	4.6.9

Charminus (2)
7.6.39
7.7.15

Euclides (2)
7.8.3
7.8.4

Episthenes (2)
7.4.9
7.4.10

Hecatonymus (2)
5.5.8-12
5.6.4-10

Timasion (2)	
5.6.22-4	7.5.10

Proxenus (2)
2.1.10
2.4.16

Dracontius (2)
4.8.26
4.8.26

Total number of speakers not described with a personal name: 23 (26 speeches)²⁴⁶

<i>Speaker</i>	<i>Reference</i>		
‘One man’	1.3.14		
‘Another person’	1.3.16-19		
‘Messengers from the King’	2.3.7		
‘The greater part of the Greeks’	2.4.3-4		
‘The man’	2.4.16-17		
‘A young man’	2.4.19-20		
‘A Rhodian man’	3.5.8	3.5.9-12	
‘A peltast who had been a slave at Athens’	4.8.4		
‘The Macronians’	4.8.6		
‘The Generals’	4.8.6		
‘They’ (Greeks)	4.8.26		
‘Mossynoecian chiefs’	5.4.10		
‘One of Hecatonymus’ fellow ambassadors’	5.5.24		
‘The first man who spoke’	5.8.2-3	5.8.6	5.8.11
‘Arcadians’	6.3.25-6		
‘Someone’	6.4.18		
‘The Generals’ (who have gone with Agasias to Cleander)	6.6.20		
‘The one who had been rescued’	6.6.27-8		
‘The Soldiers’	7.1.21		
‘A Thracian’	7.3.26-7		
‘The Greeks’	7.3.34-5		
‘An Arcadian’	7.6.9-10		
‘The Odrysian’	7.7.11		

²⁴⁶ A lack of name for the speaker does not mean that the speech has no importance. Tuplin (2014, 88) suggests that Xenophon may simply have forgotten the names of these speakers and either chooses not to invent them for the sake of it or because the lack of name makes the account seem more reliable. In the *Hellenica*, 25 speakers, who give 28 speeches between them, are not identified by a personal name.

Audiences by Speaker:

Total number of the 20 named speakers who give more than one speech but which are all in the same episode: 3

Phalinus
Eucleides
Episthenes

Total number of the 20 named speakers who give more than one speech over more than one episode: 17

Clearchus	Cheirisophus
Cyrus	Medosades
Xenophon	Seuthes
Proxenus	Heracleides
Ariaeus	Charminus
Tissaphernes	Hecatonymus
Cleanor	Timasion
Agasias	Cleander
Dracontius	

Of these 17, more often than not they speak to more than one type of audience.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ I have categorised these based on whom the speech is addressed to primarily, although there are often other people present, as I have indicated in the audience section below. In the *Hellenica*, only 10 of the speakers who speak more than once speak in more than one episode.

Xenophon						
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Named Individual and Unnamed Individual</i>	<i>Greek Leaders</i>	<i>Ambassadors</i>	<i>Greek Troops</i>	<i>The Greek Army or Mixture of Troops and Leaders</i>	<i>Specific Member of the Troops</i>
1.8.16	7.7.4-10	3.1.15-25	5.4.5-7	3.4.46	3.2.8	4.8.5 (peltast)
2.5.41		3.1.35-44	5.4.9	3.5.5-6	3.2.9	4.8.5 (peltast)
3.1.27-30		3.3.12-20	5.5.13-23	4.8.14	3.2.10-32	5.8.3-5 (accuser)
3.4.39		4.6.10-15	5.6.12-13	5.4.19-21	3.2.34-8	5.8.6 (accuser)
3.4.41		4.6.17-18		5.6.28-33	3.2.38	5.8.7-9 (accuser)
4.1.19		4.8.10-13		5.7.5-13	3.2.39	5.8.9-11 (accuser)
4.1.22		5.6.37		5.7.13-33	5.1.5-8	5.8.11 (accuser)
4.7.5-6		6.5.9		6.3.12-14	5.1.8-9	
4.7.7		6.5.10-11		6.4.21	5.1.9-11	
6.6.31-3		6.5.14-21		6.5.23-4	5.1.12	
7.1.6				7.1.22	5.1.13	
7.1.9-10				7.1.25-31	5.8.13-26	
7.1.10					6.1.26-9	
7.2.24					6.1.31	
7.2.25					6.4.12	
7.2.26					6.4.17	
7.2.28					6.6.12-16	
7.2.29-30					7.3.3-6	
7.2.35					7.3.6	
7.2.37					7.3.14	

7.3.8					7.6.11-38	
7.3.9						
7.3.12						
7.3.30-2						
7.3.37-8						
7.3.45						
7.3.48						
7.4.24						
7.5.3						
7.5.5						
7.7.14						
7.7.18						
7.7.20-47						
7.7.49						
7.7.51						
7.7.52						
7.7.54						
7.7.56						

Clearchus				
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Greek Troops</i>	<i>Greek Leaders</i>	<i>Ambassadors</i>	<i>Specific Members of Army</i>
1.7.9	1.3.3-6	2.1.9	2.3.5	1.6.6-10 (his friends)
2.1.4	1.3.9-	2.2.3-4		
2.1.16-17	1.3.15	2.3.9		
2.1.20	2.4.5-7			
2.1.22				
2.1.22				
2.1.23				
2.2.2				
2.2.10				
2.3.21-3				
2.5.3-15				
2.5.24				
2.5.26				

Seuthes			
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Greek Army</i>	<i>Greek Generals</i>	<i>Specific Greek Troops</i>
7.2.32-4	7.3.10-11	7.3.35	7.3.41 (those at front of army)
7.2.38	7.3.43	7.3.36-7	7.3.44 (hoplites)
7.3.9			
7.3.12			
7.3.39			
7.3.45			
7.3.47			
7.4.9			
7.7.48			
7.7.50			
7.7.51			
7.7.53			

Cheirisophus			
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Mixture of Troops and Leaders</i>	<i>Named Individuals and Leaders</i>	<i>Greek Leaders</i>
3.3.3	3.2.2-3	3.1.45-6	4.6.7-8
3.4.39-40	3.2.33		
3.4.40	5.1.4		
3.4.42	6.1.32-3		
3.5.6			
4.1.20-1			
4.6.16			
4.6.19			
4.7.3			
4.7.4			
4.7.7			

Cyrus					
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Greek Leaders</i>	<i>Leaders and Troops</i>	<i>Specific Greek Troops</i>	<i>Specific Members of the Army</i>	<i>No Audience Specified</i>
1.7.9	1.3.20	1.5.16-17	1.4.16 (Menon's)	1.9.25-6 (his friends)	1.8.26
1.7.18	1.4.8			1.9.26-7 (his friends)	
1.8.12-13	1.7.3-4				
1.8.17	1.7.6-7				

Heracleides	
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>People Referred to by their Ethnicity</i>
7.3.18	7.3.17
7.3.19-20	
7.6.2	
7.6.4	
7.6.5	
7.6.6	
7.6.42	

Cleander		
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Greek Generals</i>	<i>Specific Member of the Army</i>
6.6.25-6	6.6.36	6.6.28 (rescued man)
6.6.34		
7.1.8		
7.1.10		
7.1.39		

Tissaphernes		
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Greek Generals</i>	<i>The Greeks as a Whole</i>
2.3.24	2.3.18-20	2.3.26-7
2.5.16-23		2.3.29
2.5.25		

Agasias		
<i>Named Individual</i>	<i>The Army in General</i>	<i>Named Individual and Leaders</i>
6.6.21-4	6.1.30	3.1.31
	6.6.17-18	

Medosades	
<i>Named Individuals</i>	<i>Xenophon, Charminus and Polynicus, and all the Important Men of the Army</i>
7.2.27	7.7.16
7.2.28	
7.7.3	

Ariaeus
<i>Named Individuals</i>
2.2.11-12
2.5.38
2.5.40

Cleanor		
<i>Named Individual</i>	<i>Mixture of Troops and Leaders</i>	<i>Named Individual and Leaders</i>
2.5.39	3.2.4-6	4.6.9

Charminus	
<i>Greek Army</i>	<i>Named Individual</i>
7.6.39	7.7.15

Hecatonymus
<i>Greek Army</i>
5.5.8-12
5.6.4-10

Timasion	
<i>Greek Troops</i>	<i>Named Individuals</i>
5.6.22-4	7.5.10

Proxenus	
<i>Named Individual</i>	<i>Unnamed Character</i>
2.1.10	2.4.16

Audiences:²⁴⁸

*Total number of speeches directed at named individuals: 140*²⁴⁹

Xenophon (39)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.1.7-8	
3.4.39-40	
3.4.40	
3.4.42	
3.4.47	His troops and some of Cheirisophus' troops
3.5.6	Greeks in a rescuing party
4.1.20-1	
4.6.16	
4.6.19	Greek generals and captains
4.7.3	Peltasts and hoplites from the rearguard
4.7.4	

²⁴⁸ The following lists detail the main recipient of the speech, with the other people indicated as being present listed in a separate column. There are *presumably* other people present during certain speeches, such as attendants, but where they are not indicated in the text, I have not mentioned them. Sometimes translators are specifically mentioned but I have not listed these as the person giving the speech. Where translators are not indicated as being present, I have not listed them, even in cases where it is likely that they were there. The following shows clearly what type of interactions are important in the work as a whole, and especially that interaction between leaders is just as important as interaction between leaders and troops. The audiences in the *Hellenica* are as follows: named individuals (80 speeches), Athenian or Spartan official bodies within the cities (34), people who are referred to by their ethnicity or both their ethnicity and role (20), troops of some kind (13), and audiences who do not fall into a clear category (15).

²⁴⁹ Characters who give the most speeches in the *Hellenica* also have the most speeches directed at them: Agesilaus 27 and Dercylidas 8.

4.7.7	
4.8.4	
5.4.10	Timesitheus and other Greek generals
5.8.2-3	Greek troops and jury of captains
5.8.6	
5.8.11	
6.6.34	Greek generals, captains, Dracontius the Spartan and others as seemed fitted for the mission
7.1.8	
7.1.10	
7.1.21	
7.1.39	
7.2.13	The Greek army
7.2.28	Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates
7.2.32-4	Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a man from each general (except Neon) who they had confidence in
7.2.38	Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a man from each general (except Neon) who they had confidence in
7.3.9	The Greek army
7.3.12	The Greek army
7.3.19-20	
7.3.39	Greek generals
7.3.45	Greek hoplites
7.3.47	30 horsemen, and the most active men up to 30 years old
7.7.3	An Odrysian, 30 horsemen, certain of Xenophon's captains and men who were fit for the purpose
7.7.48	The men who were deemed fittest to go with him
7.7.50	The men who were deemed fittest to go with him
7.7.51	The men who were deemed fittest to go with him
7.7.53	The men who were deemed fittest to go with him

7.8.3	
7.8.4	

Seuthes (26)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.2.24	Medosades, Phryniscus and Polycrates
7.2.25	Medosades, Phryniscus and Polycrates
7.2.27	Xenophon, Phryniscus and Polycrates
7.2.35	Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a man from each general (except Neon) who they had confidence in
7.2.37	Medosades, Phryniscus, Polycrates and a man from each general (except Neon) who they had confidence in
7.3.8	The Greek army
7.3.9	The Greek army
7.3.12	The Greek army
7.3.26-7	The noblest of the Thracians, the generals and captains of the Greeks, and embassies from other states
7.3.28	The noblest of the Thracians, the generals and captains of the Greeks, and embassies from other states
7.3.30-2	The noblest of the Thracians, the generals and captains of the Greeks, and embassies from other states
7.3.34-5	
7.3.37-8	Greek generals
7.3.45	Greek hoplites
7.3.48	Seuthes' 30 horsemen and the most active men up to 30 years who were with Xenophon
7.4.9	Xenophon
7.4.10	Xenophon
7.4.24	
7.5.3	
7.6.2	

7.6.42	
7.7.20-47	The men who seemed fittest to go with Xenophon
7.7.49	The men who seemed fittest to go with Xenophon
7.7.51	The men who seemed fittest to go with Xenophon
7.7.52	The men who seemed fittest to go with Xenophon
7.7.54	The men who seemed fittest to go with Xenophon

Clearchus (12)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.7.9	Some of the Greek commanders
1.8.12-13	Pigres, an interpreter and 3 or 4 unspecified 'others'
2.1.15	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.19	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.21	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.22	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.23	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.2.11-12	The highest rank of Ariaeus' followers and Greek generals and captains
2.3.7	Other generals and their troops
2.3.24	Greek generals, the brother of the King's wife, 3 other Persians and many slaves
2.5.16-23	
2.5.25	

Medosades (7)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.1.6 (message for Seuthes)	
7.2.26	Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates
7.2.28	Seuthes, Phryniscus and Polycrates

7.7.11	Xenophon, 30 horsemen and certain of Xenophon's captains and men who were fit for the purpose
7.7.15	Polynicus, Xenophon and all the important men of the army
7.7.17	Xenophon and all the important men of the army
7.7.18	Polynicus, Charminus and all the important men of the army

Charminus and Polynicus (7)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.6.4	Seuthes
7.6.5	Seuthes
7.6.6	Seuthes
7.6.9-10	The Greek army, Seuthes, an interpreter and Heracleides
7.6.40	Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, interpreter, Heracleides, Greek army
7.7.14	Xenophon's best men
7.7.56	

Phalinus (7)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.1.10	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.12	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.16-17	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.20	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.22	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.22	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders
2.1.23	Barbarian heralds and Greek leaders

Cleander (6)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
6.6.20	The man Agasias had rescued and Agasias

6.6.21-4	The man Agasias had rescued and the generals who have gone with Agasias
6.6.27-8	Agasias and the Greek generals who have gone with him
6.6.31-3	Greek generals, captains, Dracontius and others as seemed fitted for the mission
7.1.9-10	
7.1.10	

Cheirisophus (6)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.4.39	
3.4.41	
4.1.19	
4.1.22	
4.7.5-6	
4.7.7	

Tissaphernes (4)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.3.21-3	The brother of the King's wife, three other Persians, many slaves and an interpreter
2.5.3-15	
2.5.24	
2.5.26	

Heracleides and Seuthes (4)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.5.10	The rest of the generals except Xenophon
7.6.4	
7.6.5	
7.6.6	

Ariaeus (3)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.2.10	The highest rank of his followers, and Greek generals and captains
2.5.39	Sophaenetus and Xenophon
2.5.41	Sophaenetus and Cleanor

Cyrus (3)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.7.5	Greek generals and captains
1.7.9	Some of the Greek commanders
1.8.16	

Cleanor, Sophaenetus and Xenophon (2)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.5.38	
2.5.40	

Procles and Glus (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.1.4	Greek generals

Silanus (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.7.18	

Xenophon/Clearchus (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.8.17	

Theopompus/Xenophon (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.1.13	

Procles and Cheirisophus (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.2.2	Other Greek leaders

Agasias (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
6.6.25-6	The Greek generals who have accompanied him and the man whom he rescued

Seuthes and Polycrates (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.2.29-30	Medosades and Phryniscus

Clearchus, Proxenus and Xenophon (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.4.19-20	Messenger from Ariaeus and Artaozus

Apollonides (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.1.27-30	Proxenus' generals

Mithradates (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.3.3	The Greek generals and Mithradates' 30 horsemen

Dracontius (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
4.8.26	

Timasion (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.3.18	

Episthenes (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.4.9	Xenophon

Heracleides (1)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.5.5	

Total number of speeches given to people who are referred to by their ethnicity or both their ethnicity and role: 6

<i>Speaker</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
The Greeks (possibly leaders, but unclear)	2.3.26-7	
	2.3.29	
Mossynoecian chiefs	5.4.5-7	Other Greek generals
	5.4.9	
Heracleot and Sinopean merchants	5.6.19-20	
People from Parium	7.3.17	

Total number of speeches directed at troops of some kind: 27

Greek Troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.3.3-6	
1.3.9-13	
1.3.14	Clearchus
1.3.15	Previously unnamed speaker
1.3.16-19	Clearchus and unnamed speaker

2.4.5-7	
4.8.14	
5.4.19-21	
5.6.22-4	Xenophon
5.6.26	Xenophon
5.6.28-33	Timasion and Thorax
5.7.5-13	
5.7.13-33	
6.2.4-5	
6.3.12-14	
6.4.21	Other Greek generals
6.5.23-4	
7.1.22	
7.1.25-31	

Menon's Troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.4.14-16	
1.4.16	

Xenophon's Troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
6.3.25-6	

The Greeks at the Front of the Army	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.3.41	

Greek Hoplites	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
7.3.44	

Xenophon's Troops and Some of Cheirisophus' Troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.4.46	

Greek Troops in the Rescuing Party	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.5.5-6	Cheirisophus

Guards	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.4.16-17	Proxenus and Xenophon

Total number of speeches directed at generals, captains or people in leadership/ambassadorial roles: 27

The Generals	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.4.8	
2.1.9	Barbarians heralds and Phalinus
2.3.9	
2.3.18-20	The brother of the King's wife, 3 other Persians and many slaves
3.3.2	Mithradates' 30 horsemen
4.8.10-13	
6.5.9	
6.5.10-11	
6.6.36	
7.3.35	
7.3.36-7	

Generals and Captains	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.7.3-4	

1.7.6-7	Gaulites
2.2.3-4	
3.5.8	
3.5.9-12	
4.6.7-8	
6.5.14-21	
7.1.13	

Generals, Lieutenant-Generals and Captains	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.1.34	
3.1.35-44	

Greek Leaders	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
2.1.11	Barbarian heralds
2.2.1-2	

Leaders Representing the Greek Army (including Clearchus)	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.3.20	

Proxenus' Captains	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.1.15-25	

All the Generals except Neon	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
5.6.37	

Generals and Captains of the Peltasts and Hoplites	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
4.1.27	

Total number of speeches directed at audiences made up of named individuals and people in leadership roles: 10

	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
Clearchus and other generals	2.4.3-4	
Xenophon and Proxenus' captains	3.1.31	Apollonides
Xenophon and generals, lieutenant-generals and captains	3.1.45-6	
Cheirisophus and the eldest generals	3.3.12-20	
Cheirisophus, generals and captains	4.6.9	
	4.6.17-18	
Cheirisophus, Cleanor, generals and captains	4.6.10-15	
Hecatonymus and Sinopean ambassadors	5.5.13-23	Greek army
	5.6.12-13	
Charminus, Polynicus, Xenophon and all the important men of the army	7.7.16	

Total number of speeches directed at audiences made up of troops and leaders: 41

Menon, Clearchus, Proxenus and all their troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
1.5.16-17	

Greek Army	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
4.8.26	
4.8.26	
5.1.2	
5.1.4	
5.1.5-8	
5.1.8-9	
5.1.9-11	
5.1.12	
5.1.13	
5.5.8-12	
5.5.24	Hecatonymus
5.6.4-10	Sinopean ambassadors
6.1.26-9	Xenophon
6.1.30	Xenophon
6.1.31	Xenophon
6.1.32-3	
6.4.12	
6.4.17	
6.4.18	Xenophon
6.6.17-18	
7.3.3-6 (except Neon's men)	
7.3.6 (except Neon's men)	
7.3.10-11	
7.3.14	Seuthes
7.3.43	
7.6.7	Seuthes and Heracleides
7.6.11-38	Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, interpreter and Heracleides
7.6.39	Seuthes, Polynicus, interpreter and Heracleides
7.6.41	Seuthes, Charminus, Polynicus, interpreter and Heracleides

Greek Generals and Troops	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
3.2.2-3	
3.2.4-6	
3.2.8	
3.2.9	
3.2.10-32	
3.2.33	
3.2.34-8	
3.2.38	
3.2.39	
6.6.12-16	

Greek Troops and Jury Made up of Captains	
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
5.8.13-26	Generals

Total number of speeches directed at audiences who do not fall into a clear category: 18

	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Others Present</i>
Clearchus' Friends	1.6.6-10	
None Specified	1.8.26	
Cyrus' Friends	1.9.25-6	
	1.9.26-7	
Messengers from the King	2.3.5	Greek generals and their best troops
A Certain Man	2.4.16	Xenophon
A Man who has Accused Xenophon of Beating him	5.8.3-5	Rest of the army
	5.8.6	
	5.8.7-9	
	5.8.9-11	
	5.8.11	

The Man who has been Rescued by Agasias	6.6.28	Agasias and the Greek generals who have gone with him
A Peltast who was Formerly a Slave at Athens	4.8.5	Macronians and Greek generals
	4.8.5	
	4.8.6	
	4.8.6	Greek Generals and Macronians
A Cupbearer	7.3.25	Noblest of the Thracians, the Greek generals and captains and embassies from other states
Medosades and the Odrysian	7.7.4-10	30 horsemen and certain of Xenophon's captains, and men who were fit for the purpose

Appendix 2: Euphron's Killer to the Theban Council (*Hellenica* 7.3.7-11)²⁵⁰

In this speech, we again see how difficult it is to interpret whether a speaker is trustworthy or not. This speech also further develops the dangers of being persuaded by arguments relating to the audience's advantage, as we saw with Procles' speeches. Again, we shall see that the narrative after the speech is vital to interpreting the speech. Scholarly interpretations tend to focus on what the speech reveals about Euphron rather than it being a persuasion attempt.

Euphron has visited the Thebans as part of his plan to regain control of Sicyon. While talking to the Theban officials and council on the Theban Acropolis, he is killed (7.3.5). The Theban officials arraign his killers on a capital charge but only one man admits killing Euphron (7.3.7). This man attempts to persuade the officials and council members that Euphron's killers were right in their actions. This is, in effect, a forensic speech, rather than a deliberative speech.

The speaker is unnamed, but before the speech, the narrator reveals that he is one of a group of former Sicyonian exiles. The story of his exile appears earlier (7.1.44-6). Euphron wanted to make an alliance with the Argives and Arcadians, and so he arranged that he would establish a democracy in Sicyon. To achieve this, he banished particular officials, and certain people for favouring the Spartans. At 7.3.1, the narrator reveals that Aeneas the Stymphalian has arranged for the exiles, who had been banished without a decree of the people, to return. The narrator states that the group of former exiles took the risk of killing Euphron on the Acropolis and in front of the Thebans because they feared that Euphron would achieve his aim of being the master of Sicyon by persuading the Thebans to banish the aristocrats and give the state over to him again (7.3.5). If Euphron regains power, they will clearly be in danger of exile or death again. Thus, when killing Euphron, they are thinking of their own interests and the safety of the Sicyonian aristocrats in general. Indeed, at this time, the people in Sicyon are backing Euphron (7.3.4). Knowing these motives, the reader is armed with more information than the internal audience, who does not appear to know the relation of the killers to Euphron. The reader has also heard a condemnation of the killers' deeds by the Theban officials (7.3.6) and so may at this

²⁵⁰ A slightly altered version of this appendix has been submitted for potential publication in *Auctor*, the Royal Holloway Classics journal.

point be inclined to believe that the killers are villains. That none of the other killers admit to killing Euphron further suggests that the others do not think that their actions can be justified to the Thebans. By contrast, this speaker must be confident in his own ability to persuade, if not in his righteousness.

In terms of the audience of this speech, from the preceding narrative (7.3.4), the reader knows that the Thebans have an interest in Sicyon because they have a governor there, and that Euphron believes that he will not be able to regain his control of the state with that governor in place. The narrator also reveals Euphron's belief that the Thebans can be bribed with money to banish the aristocrats and give Sicyon back to him. Euphron does not seem to have proceeded very far in his plan to bribe the Thebans because at 7.3.6, the Theban officials seem to say that Euphron has not yet had a chance to explain why he has come to Thebes. The Theban officials recommend to the Theban council that they arraign the killers on a capital charge (7.3.6). They believe that the killers have surpassed all men in hardihood and brutality because they took the killing of Euphron into their own hands and did it in front of the Theban leaders and the council, who are the only ones entitled to decide on who is killed and who is not. The officials are concerned that, if these men are not put to death, no one will dare to visit Thebes and the city will suffer for allowing it to happen. They argue that the killers are most unrighteous, unjust and lawless and have shown contempt for the city. The council members do not respond to this, but the reader may expect that they have similar concerns to the officials.

The speaker opens by confronting the Theban officials' impression of him and their accusation of contempt. He says that it is impossible for anyone to feel contempt for the council if he knows that the council has the power to punish him. He claims instead to have trusted that he was doing a just deed and that the Theban officials would decide rightly (7.3.7). This claim directly contrasts with the presentation by the Theban officials of the killers as most unjust men. He flatters the council's righteousness and shows that he was not attempting to usurp their power.

Throughout the rest of the speech, the speaker characterises himself by identifying the Theban officials' opinions about the kind of men who deserve punishment with his own. He presents himself as someone who, like them, is concerned to punish unrighteousness, injustice and lawlessness. Instead of the *killers*

being unrighteous, unjust and lawless, however, the speaker repeatedly argues that *Euphron* was a traitor, double-deserter and tyrant (7.3.7, 7.3.8 and 7.3.11), as well as greedy for money and property (7.3.8).

The speaker also presents himself as being concerned with the threat *Euphron* posed to the Thebans' moral reputation because he describes the damage and the shame that *Euphron*'s attempted bribe might have brought upon them (7.3.9). The Theban officials may be concerned with what others would think about Thebes because of *Euphron*'s death, but the speaker implies that people might have had an even worse impression of the Thebans if *Euphron* had succeeded in his mission. Thus, the speaker presents himself as being driven to save others from shame. He furthers his presentation of himself as righteous by saying that it would not have been right to kill *Euphron* in Thebes if *Euphron* had been an enemy to him but a friend to the Thebans (7.3.10). Hence, he presents himself as knowing what is right and wrong and as having no choice but to act because of the threat to the Thebans.

The speaker has three main strands of argument: the killers' deeds accord with Theban precedent, were beneficial, and the Thebans now have an opportunity to appear positively in their own and others' eyes. Firstly, he says that he based his perception that the Thebans would judge *Euphron* and the killers rightly on decisions the Thebans have made previously. He describes a group of people whom the Thebans have previously had killed and demonstrates that *Euphron* was just like them (7.3.7). He also explains how the killers' actions accord with a previous Theban vote about exiles and argues that, as an exile who returned without a resolution of the allies, *Euphron* should have been killed anyway (7.3.11). He further argues that the killers' actions benefitted the Thebans' interests because *Euphron* was intending to harm the Thebans more than he already had done when he betrayed them previously, by using money to corrupt them (7.3.9-10). He thus argues that deciding that the killers acted rightly would show the Thebans to have taken vengeance on *Euphron* on behalf of both themselves and the allies.

The speaker must be aware that his actions have provoked strong emotions and that he will need to calm the anger directed towards him. He will also need to convert the audience's general hatred of murderers and those who show contempt towards them into friendly feelings. He counteracts these negative emotions by

presenting what Euphron was planning to do as fearsome. He represents Euphron as having the intention and ability to harm the Thebans, and indicates how close it came to happening. As he mentions explicitly at 7.3.9, this fear is of the shame that the Thebans could have incurred from the misdeed of accepting a bribe, and the dishonour this would have brought them in the eyes of others. He states that the Thebans would have been grateful (χάρην...εἶχτε) to him if Euphron was bringing troops against them, and thus that they should be grateful to him for the favour he has done them of acting when Euphron was attempting to corrupt them (7.3.9). That the Thebans have the opportunity to do something on behalf of their allies might also appeal to their pride.

The reader is made aware that the speaker was successful in defending himself when the narrator states that the Thebans decide that what had happened to Euphron was just (δίκαια, 7.3.12). Euphron's killers and the Theban council are not specifically mentioned again. The narrator says that Euphron's citizens (οἱ...πολιταὶ αὐτοῦ) thought that Euphron was a good man (ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν) and so buried him and continue to pay him honours as the founder of their city. The narrator comments in his own voice that it seems that most people determine their benefactors to be good men (7.3.12). At 7.4.1, the narrator says that the citizens of Sicyon, along with the Arcadians, regained the Sicyonian port. This suggests that the aristocrats and pro-Spartan exiles did not regain power in Sicyon. The speaker has thus benefitted himself and the other killers, but only in the short-term. It is unclear whether he really benefitted the Thebans.

Interpretation

The narrator clearly states that he is making a digression on Euphron (7.3.4 and 7.4.1), but he reveals many of the same details about Euphron in both the narrative and the killer's speech. Most importantly, before the speech, the narrator has already told the reader that Euphron intended to bribe the Thebans because the presence of a Theban governor in Sicyon means that he will not be able to rule the state (ἔγνω οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενος...τῆς πόλεως κρατεῖν, 7.3.4).²⁵¹ The narrator also confirms some of the speaker's criticisms of Euphron (see 7.1.44-6, 7.2.11-15 and 7.3.1-4).

²⁵¹ There may be a parallel between Euphron and Procles here. Both sought external support against their home cities to fulfil their own interests. Even though Euphron is not asking the Thebans for a military intervention, his actions are still condemnable.

Particularly, after Euphron establishes democracy in Sicyon, the narrator says that Euphron was clearly a tyrant (σαφῶς τύραννος ἦν, 7.1.46). The narrator has also described how Euphron established democracy because of his personal ambitions to be first with the Spartans, Argives and Arcadians. Further, the narrator confirms that Euphron lies about his loyalties, uses public and sacred money to keep mercenaries on side and to pay supporters, makes his son the mercenary commander, banishes Spartan supporters and keeps their property without a decree of the people, and treacherously (δόλῳ) has certain fellow officers killed and others banished, until he has everything under his control. He persuaded his allies to allow him to act in this way by giving them money and by supporting them on expeditions. Indeed, the narrator makes it clear at 7.2.11 that there was a Theban governor and garrison at Sicyon and that, at this point, Euphron supported him by going on campaign with him. When Euphron fears the return of the exiles, he hands over the Sicyonian port to the Spartans, changing sides again, and claims that he had always been faithful to the Spartans, despite establishing a democracy and working with Sparta's enemies. He even claims that the Spartan supporters whom he exiled were traitors to Sparta. While Euphron is absent from Sicyon, the aristocrats and the *demos* are at variance, so Euphron brings mercenaries from Athens and uses the *demos* to rule the town (τοῦ... ἄστεως ἐκράτει). While these details confirm that the speaker's account of Euphron's deeds is mostly accurate, the reader may question the need to provide the information twice.²⁵² Thus, the key to understanding this digression might be in explaining the need for the speech.

The point of interest in this speech seems really to be in seeing what the speaker does with the facts in the process of taking the arguments made against him and completely turning them on their head in dramatic fashion. These accusation and defence speeches indicate Xenophon's interest in how a person can talk his way out of a seemingly damning position. Indeed, Gray (1989a, 135) mentions that Aristotle describes arguments made by an unnamed killer as a rhetorical *topos* (*Rhetorica* 2.23, 1397b.9-11), and that Aristotle actually seems to be referring to this speech

²⁵² There are some discrepancies between the two accounts. For example, the speaker's claim that Euphron took up arms against the Theban governor (7.3.9) finds no parallel in the narrative. Another episode not paralleled in the narrative is at 7.3.8. The passage is controversial in itself. Whitehead (1980, 175-8) highlights that the Greek either means that Euphron enslaved free men and citizens or that he freed and enfranchised slaves. Whitehead argues for the second option.

from the *Hellenica* as a good example of this *topos*. This suggests that Xenophon was particularly interested in the rhetorical aspect of this episode.²⁵³

Most interpretations do not dwell on the speech as a persuasion attempt. Pownall (2004, 103-5) argues that the whole account about Euphron, including this speech, serves as a moral example of how Euphron's poor character precipitated his deserved death, in contrast to the surrounding account of the loyal Phliasians. The difficulty with this is that it does not account for the detail about the honours Euphron received after his death. Tuplin (1993, 124) appreciates this difficulty and argues that Euphron's overall story demonstrates that regaining power in a corrupt and violent way will cause a man's downfall, even if such a person does seem to benefit some people. Indeed, Euphron's honours render him extremely ambiguous in comparison to what the narrator and speaker have revealed about him. His people clearly believe that he has treated them well, despite the narrator making it clear that Euphron was primarily concerned with his own power, that he took public funds and made decisions above their heads. His people do not seem to view him as a tyrant, but as a liberator. He must have been beneficent to his people (perhaps even 'kindly', as his name suggests), if only to further his own interests. In this way, the narrator invites the reader to question what he and the speaker have previously said about Euphron and understand that events and characters can be viewed from different perspectives, despite what the facts of the matter seem to suggest.²⁵⁴ The narrator is not claiming that Euphron's people are wrong, just that this is how they interpreted his actions.

²⁵³ Buckler (2008, 150-1) concludes that the reference in Aristotle's *Rhetorica* and the account at Diodorus 15.70.3 confirm the authenticity of the speech in Xenophon. Diodorus' account does not actually mention a trial, however. A further difficulty with Buckler's interpretation is that Diodorus may well have read Xenophon's account, as Gray argues Aristotle has. Indeed, other authors may also have been influenced by Xenophon. Bowen (1998, 19), for example, argues that Plato may have been influenced by Xenophon's *Symposium* when writing his own.

²⁵⁴ See Lewis (2004, 65, and 73-4) who locates Euphron's story within Xenophon's discussion of tyranny, and argues that Euphron illustrates the opposing ways that sides could label the ruling power. She explains this as the result of the *stasis* in Sicyon, which would split public opinion dependent on political views. In this, she argues, Xenophon is highlighting a contemporary problem of defining and understanding types of leadership. She argues that "almost any ruler or regime could be claimed as a tyranny" and that a reader must understand exactly what individuals or regimes provided for the community they led. While I agree with this interpretation, it does not take into account the relevance of the killers' speech, particularly because the reader can appreciate the contrasting viewpoints about Euphron from the narrative alone.

This contrast would have been apparent without the speech, however. Thus, I argue that the narrator's final comment, that people judge their benefactors to be good men, reflects not just on how the different parties whom Euphron dealt with saw him in relation to their own interests, but also on the methods Euphron's killer used in his speech. The Theban officials believe that the speaker is the worst kind of person until he persuades them that he was acting in their interests.²⁵⁵ Thus, like Euphron's people, the Thebans have judged their benefactors to be good men. Although, as Tuplin (1993, 123-4) highlights, the narrator states that the Thebans decide that Euphron had suffered rightly rather than stating that they thought the speaker did rightly, by not punishing the killers, the Thebans are proclaiming that the killers acted acceptably.

As Tuplin further argues, the narrator never confirms that the speaker was fair in his actions. Indeed, Tuplin concludes that it is questionable whether the killers were entirely justified in killing Euphron, even though Xenophon clearly believed that Euphron was corrupt. The reader may indeed feel this suspicion about the killers, especially because of the killers' motives. It is clear that by claiming a concern for the Thebans, the killer is using a persuasive tactic rather than revealing a real motivation, because the narrator has already revealed the killers' real, self-interested motives. Indeed, the speaker barely mentions the benefit he himself will get from Euphron's death, despite it being considerable.²⁵⁶ This parallels the persuasive methods of Euphron himself when he convinced the Argives and Arcadians, and later the Spartans to trust him. He succeeds in convincing them all that he is working in their interests (7.1.44 and 7.3.2), despite previously being on good terms with their enemies (like the Spartan-supporting killers) and trying to increase his own power (like the killers who want the aristocrats to regain power in Sicyon). Thus, in some ways, the killer is as much of a 'double-dealer' as he accuses Euphron of being. This interpretation is *pace* Gray (1989a, 136) who argues that the trial is "a memorial to the impeccable justice of the killer, revealing hidden virtue where at first there was only apparent vice", and that Xenophon is interested in showing justice being served. The chief difficulty with this interpretation is that it

²⁵⁵ Indeed, Lewis (2004, 67) questions why the council need such convincing if Euphron is clearly a tyrant.

²⁵⁶ See also Lewis (2004, 66), who argues that the reader cannot take this speech at face value because of the particular aims of the speaker.

does not adequately take into account the motivations of the speaker and the information that the narrator provides about Euphron's citizens honouring him after his death.

The narrator may not give the speaker a name for several reasons. Perhaps Xenophon did not know the name of this speaker, or he may have thought it irrelevant, or the speech may be fictitious. Given that the speaker is trying to identify himself as much as possible with the Thebans' interests, previous actions and beliefs, it might be appropriate that he is not named. The audience is not individualised either which perhaps indicates that this method of persuasion is common and that the speaker and audience could indeed be anyone. The speech indicates a straightforward way to alter an audience's mind, even in such an extreme case when the audience seems set against the speaker, and is perhaps a warning to those who listen to speeches to examine exactly how a speaker is trying to persuade and what his real motives are.

Euphron's killers are seemingly not famous tyrant-slayers, despite the usually commendable nature of tyrannicide, which perhaps again throws into question the righteousness of their deed and their good character. In the *Anabasis*, we likewise see the interplay between real and feigned motives, and the methods speakers use to get out of tight situations, as well as the importance of narratorial comments. We also see audiences not recognising that a speaker has his own interests at heart and consequently considering the speaker to be their benefactor.

Appendix 3: Xenophon and the Emotions

The reference for the following article is:

Winter, J. (forthcoming 2016) 'Instruction and Example: Emotions in Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* and *Anabasis*' in E. Sanders and M. Johncock (eds.) *Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Pp. 165-181.

INSTRUCTION AND EXAMPLE: EMOTIONS IN XENOPHON'S *HIPPARCHICUS* AND *ANABASIS*²⁵⁷

Jenny Winter

Xenophon's *Hipparchicus* is a didactic work, which contains directions relating to all aspects of commanding cavalry.²⁵⁸ Included amongst these instructions is Xenophon's advice on how to evoke, dispel and manipulate the emotions.²⁵⁹ I shall argue that in this area of interest we see links with Xenophon's *Anabasis*.²⁶⁰ This work offers the exempla, particularly in speeches, that illustrate the instructions regarding emotions from the *Hipparchicus*.²⁶¹ From this, I argue that the speeches in the *Anabasis* are also didactic and that, in both works, Xenophon is interested in the handling of the emotions as an important aspect of leadership.

That the *Hipparchicus* does not contain examples to illustrate its instructions is contrary to the expectations of its genre as a *technê*, as I shall demonstrate in the first section of this chapter. In the second part, I shall examine two ways in which Xenophon displays an interest in rhetorical matters. I conclude that Xenophon is clearly interested in certain issues that were being discussed in contemporary rhetorical treatises and that the speeches in the *Anabasis* provide didactic exempla. Having identified Xenophon's interests and established the need to look elsewhere for examples to accompany his instructions, I then discuss how the *Hipparchicus* and the *Anabasis* correspond in their discussion of emotional persuasion. For each emotion that Xenophon recommends verbally evoking, allaying and manipulating in the *Hipparchicus*, I shall discuss a passage from the *Anabasis* that illustrates this advice.²⁶²

The *Hipparchicus* is a largely neglected work, although there has been recent interest in it.²⁶³ The importance for leaders of being able to persuade others is often stated,²⁶⁴ but the instructions regarding emotions in this work have not been investigated, nor has the overlap in this area with the *Anabasis*. Whereas the

²⁵⁷ I would like to thank the editors for organizing a stimulating colloquium and for their comments on this chapter, as well as those who gave feedback at the event.

²⁵⁸ Since I use the Hellenized title *Hipparchicus* throughout this chapter, I abbreviate it *Hipp.* to avoid confusion (rather than *Eq. mag.*, as per the OCD abbreviations followed elsewhere in this volume).

²⁵⁹ The relevant guidance is spread across the work at 1.8, 1.11, 1.13-15, 1.21-3, 1.26, 2.5, 2.8-9, 4.11-12, 4.17-19, 5.3, 5.8, 6.1-6, 7.6-7, 8.19-20, 9.3, and 9.6-7. These little-known passages are a useful Classical-period foil to Aristotle's instructions at *Rh.* 2.2-11, 1378a30-88b30 and Anaximenes' in *Rh. Al.* 34, 1440a26-b5 and 36, 1443b15-22 /1444b36-45a27 (see also 7.5, 1428a39-b2). See further Sanders (this volume) pp. __.

²⁶⁰ The genre of the *Anabasis* is disputed, but it is often classed as historiography. See Sanders (this volume) pp. __ and Fragoulaki (this volume) for emotions in Thucydides' historiographical work. See also Hagen (this volume) pp. __ for emotions in Roman historiography.

²⁶¹ Other instructions from the *Hipparchicus* that are illustrated in the *Anabasis* are not my concern in this chapter.

²⁶² Xenophon also recommends evoking emotions through action and exploiting situations to evoke emotions, but I will only investigate verbal persuasion in this chapter. For these other passages, see *Hipp.* 4.11-12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6-7 and 8.19-20 (fear) and 4.17-19, 5.3 and 5.8 (confidence). These instructions are reflected in certain episodes in the *Anabasis*: see 1.7.14-20, 2.6.10, 5.2.28-31, and 7.3.35 (fear) and 4.3.27-32 and 5.4.16-17 (confidence).

²⁶³ See Althoff (2005), Stoll (2010) and (2012), Toalster (2011) and Blaineau (2014).

²⁶⁴ See e.g. Stevenson (2000), Stoll (2010) 54-8 and 70-3, and Wood (1964) 52-4.

speeches in the *Hellenica* have been examined by Gray in particular,²⁶⁵ the speeches in the *Anabasis* have received less attention and there has been little interest in the emotional appeals within them. Xenophon's interest in emotions is beginning to be investigated, however; Tamiolaki, for example, has examined how Xenophon innovates in his use of emotions in the *Hellenica*.²⁶⁶ She is interested mainly in emotions as facilitating historical explanation, however, whereas my approach is broader. It is my aim that the following investigation gives further insights into Xenophon's interest in rhetoric, emotions and leadership theory, and helps to suggest a didactic, as well as historiographic, purpose for the speeches in the *Anabasis*.

The *Hipparchicus* and other treatises

The *Hipparchicus* is frequently compared to Aeneas Tacticus' *Poliorcetica* because they both pioneer the genre of the military treatise and because they share some similarities in approach, content and language.²⁶⁷ The works are contemporary and Whitehead even suggests that the two authors discussed ideas about their works.²⁶⁸ Although we cannot prove this, if indeed the works did influence each other or if there was collaboration, we may have expected the two authors to use examples in a similar way. In fact, they differ completely.

For Aeneas, examples are integral to his work. He uses them repeatedly to accompany his advice, and they often detail events from recent history. Most frequently, Aeneas uses them to demonstrate the necessity for his advice by showing that what he is warning against has happened previously.²⁶⁹ On other occasions, they describe a person or group of people who did as Aeneas is recommending and who succeeded because of this,²⁷⁰ or demonstrate what happens when people do not do what Aeneas is recommending.²⁷¹ Finally, on four occasions, they are relevant to the general topic of the section but do not illustrate the particular instruction he is giving at the time.²⁷² Thus, Aeneas' examples encourage the reader to follow his instructions.²⁷³

Examples are also prevalent in the nearest extant rhetorical treatises to Xenophon's time: the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, now usually assigned to Anaximenes, and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. We shall see below that Xenophon appears highly interested in the content of such works. It would be strange, then, if he was not also influenced by their form when writing within the same technical genre.

Anaximenes' work provides practical instructions for the composition of speeches, and he uses examples regularly throughout. He once refers to a passage in another work, Euripides' *Philoctetes*, to exemplify a point (18.15, 1433b10-14), but on all other occasions, he invents his own examples, mostly of what one could say in

²⁶⁵ See Gray (1981) and (1989).

²⁶⁶ Tamiolaki (2013).

²⁶⁷ See Whitehead (2001) 35-6 and Burliga (2008) 96. See Vela Tajeda (2004) for the development of this genre.

²⁶⁸ Whitehead (2001) 35-7.

²⁶⁹ Aen. Tact. 4.1-5, 11.2, 11.3-6, 11.7-10, 11.10a-11, 11.12, 11.13, 12.3, 12.4-5, 17.2-4, 18.3-7, 18.8-11, 18.12, 18.13-19, 18.20-1, 18.22, 23.3-5, 23.7-11, 28.5, 29.3-10, 29.11, 31.2-5, 31.6, 31.7, 31.8, 31.9a, 31.10-23, 31.24, 31.25-7, 31.28-9, 31.30-1, 31.31 (two), 31.32, 31.33, 31.34 and 31.35.

²⁷⁰ Aen. Tact. 2.2, 2.3-6, 5.2, 10.21-2, 16.14, 17.5-6, 20.4-5, 22.20, 24.16, 24.18, 27.7-10, 27.11, 28.6, 37.6-7 and 40.2-3.

²⁷¹ Aen. Tact. 4.7-11, 15.8-10, 24.3-14 and 29.12.

²⁷² Aen. Tact. 25.2-4, 37.4, 39.6 and 40.4-5.

²⁷³ For more on Aeneas' examples, see Hunter & Handford (1927).

a speech that illustrates how to follow his instructions. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* demonstrates that rhetorical theory is an area that interested philosophers. Although it is more exposition than instruction, Aristotle again uses examples regularly. This can be illustrated by examining his section on emotions, which is representative of his method in the rest of the work. Like Aeneas, Aristotle also uses examples from historical events to explain his ideas.²⁷⁴ Aristotle also quotes Homer and his characters and refers to plot lines in Homer's works,²⁷⁵ as well as referencing the events in a play.²⁷⁶ Finally, Aristotle refers to proverbs in order to use his analysis to explain them.²⁷⁷ All these examples reinforce the correctness of his arguments by drawing on familiar cases.

Although the number of extant works within the genre of the treatise is small, the ones we have examined all use examples in some way.²⁷⁸ We can hypothesize, then, that providing extensive exempla is an accepted convention within the genre. In this case, it is surprising that Xenophon does not use them within the *Hipparchicus*.²⁷⁹ From the range of Xenophon's own corpus, it seems clear that he would have been familiar with technical works in various fields and with philosophical texts, including their frequent use of examples.²⁸⁰ If we accept that Xenophon would have felt it necessary to provide accompanying examples, we will need to look elsewhere in his corpus. The *Anabasis* was written before the *Hipparchicus* and yet contains corresponding illustrations, as I shall demonstrate. I argue that when writing the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon expected readers to be familiar with his earlier work and believed that he had already provided the relevant examples, particularly in the *Anabasis*.

Xenophon's interest in rhetorical theory

Showing that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory will give credence to my argument that Xenophon wanted to include examples of verbal emotional persuasion in the *Anabasis*. This interest can be demonstrated by examining Xenophon's use of technical vocabulary and the range of emotions that he discusses.

I begin with Xenophon's use of the term *enthymêma*. Aristotle and Anaximenes define enthymemes very differently. Aristotle describes them as rhetorical syllogisms (*Rh.* 1.1, 1355a2-8), while Anaximenes calls them contraries in word, action and all other ways (10.1-3, 1430a23-40). Because there seems to have been at least these two definitions slightly after Xenophon's time, we must assume that Xenophon could have known more still. Xenophon certainly recognises a

²⁷⁴ Arist. *Rh.* 2.3, 1380b8-13 (two); 2.6, 1384b15-16; 2.6, 1384b32-5; 2.6, 1385a10-13; 2.6, 1385a27-8; 2.8, 1386a14; and 2.8, 1386a20-2.

²⁷⁵ Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1378b4-10; 2.2, 1378b30-5 (two); 2.2, 1379a5-7 (two); 2.3, 1380b22-5; 2.3, 1380b27-30; and 2.9, 1387a31-3. See further Knudsen (2014) 147-50.

²⁷⁶ Arist. *Rh.* 2.2, 1379b14-17.

²⁷⁷ Arist. *Rh.* 2.4, 1381b15; 2.6, 1383b23-4; 2.6, 1384a34; and 2.10, 1388a16-17.

²⁷⁸ The case studies used in medical treatises may also have led to examples becoming fixed within technical writing – see e.g. Hippoc. *Epid.*

²⁷⁹ Xenophon does use brief comparisons: 1.26, 2.3, 2.7, 4.16-20, 5.9-10, 8.3, 8.5-6 and 8.8, and gives two very small examples 7.4 and 9.4.

²⁸⁰ Althoff (2005) 237, note 9 239, and 251 even sees similarities between the ways Xenophon, Aristotle and some of the Hippocratic texts move between sections and discusses the similarity of the pious opening of the *Hipparchicus* with some of the openings in the Hippocratic corpus.

meaning for ‘enthymeme’ not connected with rhetoric,²⁸¹ but on two occasions his usage indicates that he is aware that it is also a specialised term connected with persuasion and rhetorical theory. At *Anabasis* 6.1.21, the narrator uses the term to refer to arguments that make Xenophon want to take the role of sole commander.²⁸² These specifically ‘induce’/‘persuade’, and work by creating desire. Although Xenophon is here referring to internal thoughts and not part of a speech, the usage here seems to suggest his awareness that enthymemes are part of the world of arguments and persuasion.²⁸³ At *Cynegeticus* 13.9.3, Xenophon mentions that philosophers use *enthymêmata*. Xenophon does not say ‘rhetoricians’ here, but he may have considered that rhetorical theory primarily belonged in the domain of philosophy. He at least seems to appreciate that the term has a technical meaning associated with those who are concerned with argumentation.

These two uses do not prove that Xenophon had specialised knowledge. However, the majority of authors who use this term before or contemporary with Xenophon are orators, professional rhetoricians, and philosophers.²⁸⁴ These authors connect enthymemes to giving or writing speeches, and with the kinds of techniques and reasoning that speakers or philosophers use. Xenophon’s similar usages suggest that he is among a small group of writers who have sufficient knowledge of rhetoric and persuasion to employ the term in its technical capacity.

There is further evidence to suggest that Xenophon was familiar with the theory in rhetorical treatises: the emotions mentioned by Xenophon in the *Hipparchicus* overlap significantly with those listed by Anaximenes and Aristotle. Although Xenophon would be unaware of their particular discussions, all three writers seem to be reflecting on a pre-existing and on-going discussion of emotions, which presumably mostly occurred in rhetorical treatises. The emotions that Xenophon instructs the commander to evoke and exploit are given in table 1 in the appendix to this chapter. Anaximenes refers to five of the same emotions as Xenophon, as can be seen in table 2. The other emotions that Anaximenes mentions are given in table 3. There is an even clearer overlap with the list of emotions in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.²⁸⁵ Table 4 shows the eight emotions referred to by both. Table 5 indicates the other emotions that Aristotle mentions.

Even though the terms used by the three authors sometimes differ, I shall demonstrate below that what Xenophon refers to corresponds with Aristotle’s definitions of the various emotions. When assessing the convergence, we must remember that neither Anaximenes nor Xenophon were aiming to produce a

²⁸¹ *An.* 3.5.12, *Hell.* 5.4.51 and 4.5.4, *Oec.* 20.24.4 and *Cyn.* 13.13.4.

²⁸² In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon is both narrator and character. Because Xenophon the narrator speaks about Xenophon the character in the third person throughout, it is not immediately apparent that Xenophon is the narrator, however.

²⁸³ See Grimaldi (1972) 71 who also argues that this reference is different to the basic meaning found elsewhere.

²⁸⁴ Isoc. *Panathenaicus* 2.4, *Antidosis* 47.2, *In sophistas* 16.10, *Evagoras* 10.3 and 10.7; Aeschin. *On the False Embassy* 109.10; Alcidas *On the Sophists* 3-4, 18-20, 24-5 and 33; Demetrius of Phaleron *On Style* 30, 32-3 and 109; Nausiphanes fr. 2.48; [Hippoc.] *De decente habitu* 3. There are two anomalies. Athenaeus 5.65.19-24 quotes the comic poet Anaxandrides as using the term, although it is possible that he has not copied his exact words. Indeed, as his is a philosophical work, Athenaeus might be using philosophical words where they were not originally used. However, the meaning of the term assigned to Anaxandrides seems to accord more with Xenophon’s non-technical meaning of the term anyway, as a kind of scheme or craft, rather than with rhetoric or philosophy. Sophocles uses the form *tanthumêmata* at *OC* 292 and 1199.

²⁸⁵ Cf. Sanders (this volume) pp. ___ for more on this work.

comprehensive list of emotions like Aristotle,²⁸⁶ but were referring to them when they became relevant. Of the emotions mentioned by Anaximenes and Aristotle that Xenophon does not mention, it is perhaps difficult to envisage how or why he would recommend that a cavalry commander evoke or manipulate some of them in his daily role, such as envy, shamelessness and ingratitude.

Xenophon's interest in contemporary rhetorical theory and persuasion, and the seemingly intentional overlap with the instructions on good leadership in the *Hipparchicus* (see below), suggests that the *Anabasis* speeches could be didactic exempla from which aspiring leaders could draw lessons for their own speeches.

Instruction and example

I shall now discuss the passages in the *Hipparchicus* where Xenophon gives instructions regarding verbally fostering or allaying emotions as a way of influencing actions and morale, and the corresponding passages from the *Anabasis* that illustrate the same concept, taking the emotions he discusses one by one.

I begin with **fear**. At *Hipp.* 1.8, Xenophon writes that a commander should have speakers in the Council whose speeches may frighten the troops. Cavalrymen, he says, do better under the influence of fear (*phobos*). This passage indicates that fear does not always have to be engendered by the commander himself. He is said to *have* (*echein*) these speakers, however, which suggests that he has influence over what they say and that they work together as a team to get the best out of the troops. Xenophon may here be recommending that the speakers evoke fear about the Council punishing the soldiers. Having the troops fear punishment by the Council may indeed be preferable to having them fear punishment by the day-to-day commander. Fear of the commander may breed further emotions, such as anger, which may cause the soldiers to feel and act negatively towards him. Anger may grow into resentment and hatred and cause such problems as disobedience and disloyalty. Fear of a commander can, of course, also be effective. In the *Anabasis*, for example, Clearchus relies upon making his soldiers fear him. While he does get military success from this, it later fails him too. In Clearchus' obituary, the narrator tells us that in wartime, fear of Clearchus' punishments kept his soldiers disciplined. When they were no longer compelled to stay with him, however, they left because he was always harsh and rough (2.6.12-14). That the fear centres so much on Clearchus is not always positive, then. Arguably, if the fear is focused on a person or a body of people that the soldiers do not come into contact with and take orders from daily, negative feelings may have less effect on their obedience and loyalty.

A second – more likely – possibility is suggested by the *Anabasis*. Here, in contrast to Clearchus, when Xenophon the character creates fear, it is often about others; for example, in his first speech, he evokes fear of the Persian King (3.1.17-18). To some extent, Xenophon has to create fear about himself, but he makes it clear that he only uses punishment as a last resort, in extreme conditions, for the soldiers' own good, and against people who react only to such treatment (5.8.2-26). Xenophon the character's success makes it seem likely that in the *Hipparchicus* Xenophon is envisaging the Council evoking fear about an enemy.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶ Aristotle's comment at 2.11, 1388b29-30 that he has finished describing the emotions (*ta pathê*) that are related to *pisteis* suggests that he has discussed them all, although he then mentions desire three lines later. (He says that he has already discussed this, however – probably in a different work.)

²⁸⁷ Speakers frequently do the same in Thucydides. See Sanders (this volume) pp. __ *re* deliberative speeches, but the same also happens in speeches to armies.

The *Hipparchicus* passage has highlighted the strong impact fear can have and the importance of a leader having other people to raise it, and has hinted at the different effects it can have when fear is focused on different sources. We must now find a corresponding passage in the *Anabasis*. It must be admitted that there is no exact equivalent to the Council in this work. Nussbaum aligns the captains in the *Anabasis* with the Athenian *Boulê* because of their ‘intermediate’ position between soldiers and general.²⁸⁸ Several speakers act as intermediaries between the general and the soldiers at a meeting arranged by Clearchus (1.3.13-19), although the narrator does not indicate that they are captains. Clearchus has pre-arranged for these men to create fear in the soldiers who wish to desert Cyrus, their current paymaster. These speakers appear to the other audience members to be raising concerns on their behalf to the general and to each other, while they are actually working in tandem with Clearchus. The essence of teamwork between the commander and Council members that is hinted at in the *Hipparchicus* is explicitly played out in this passage.

To make the soldiers fear, one speaker argues that even if Cyrus seems to be helping them leave to go home, he will, in fact, be arranging to attack them. This is because they will have ruined his plans to fight the king. The speaker also highlights that there is no way for the Greeks to leave without Cyrus knowing. The speaker mentions what Cyrus is likely to do to them if they try to leave him, and the fear he creates complements and enhances the fear that Clearchus had been trying to arouse when he spoke about Cyrus being a fearsome enemy in his previous speech (1.3.12). The speaker also specifically mentions his own feelings of fear concerning Cyrus’ possible actions in order to encourage fear in the others. Once he has created fear about their chances of success, he recommends asking Cyrus what use he wants to make of them. He makes it clear that this is the only safe option.

This passage in fact plays out both the creation of fear about someone other than the day-to-day commander who has the power to punish the army, and also fear of an enemy punishing them, because Cyrus is envisaged as becoming their enemy. Aristotle’s discussion of fear suggests why the speech is successful; he describes fear as being a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain, in particular, a fatal misfortune (2.5, 1382a21-2, 1382b29-30). He also highlights that men particularly fear being injured by others, including those who think they have been wronged (2.5, 1382b9-12 and 1382a30-5). Indeed, Clearchus has previously deliberately represented Cyrus as feeling wronged by the Greeks (1.3.10), even though this is untrue.

The speech has the desired effect of making the soldiers agree with the suggestion to send representatives to ask what use Cyrus wants to make of them (1.3.20). Clearchus is able to exploit the fear created by someone else for his own aims. The importance of Xenophon’s instructions about using others to create fear can be seen in the fact that Clearchus has tried several other methods to persuade the soldiers himself but it has culminated in arranging for other speakers to evoke fear. The instruction in the *Hipparchicus* is brought to life by having it played out in the *Anabasis*. The fundamental message to draw from the passages examined in both works is the same, but the *Anabasis* provides a case study of when the instruction was used successfully and indicates why it was necessary. The *Anabasis* has far more room to develop the usefulness and pitfalls of evoking fear, yet we can see that

²⁸⁸ Nussbaum (1967) 38.

Xenophon has successfully condensed a key message from the *Anabasis* into a couple of lines in the *Hipparchicus*.²⁸⁹

We can now turn to **confidence**. At *Hipparchicus* 2.5, Xenophon advises that the leader in the rear of each file has the important task of evoking the confidence of the soldiers when they need to drive out the enemy. Aristotle's analysis of *tharsos* can help us to elaborate on why such an exhortation would be successful (*Rh.* 2.5, 1383a31-2): the soldiers become confident when they see that the enemy does not inspire fear in their commander. If the soldiers feel confidence in their leader after such a speech, it may also encourage them to feel friendly feelings (*philein*) towards him, because, if Aristotle's argument at 2.4, 1381b32-3 is correct, confidence (*tharrein*) and friendly feelings (*philein*) are linked. Speeches of this kind, then, may increase the bond between leader and soldiers.

On a larger scale than file leader, Xenophon the character is the commander of the rear-guard in the *Anabasis* and is represented as giving speeches urging on the confidence of the soldiers before they are about to face the enemy – for example, at 3.4.46. He firstly cheers the troops by telling them to believe that they are striving for Greece and their families. This gives the soldiers a reason to fight and also works on the emotion of desire (see below). Next, he alleges that they will only have to put in a little work to overcome this enemy and to achieve their return. This gives the soldiers confidence that there is no real danger or difficulty to this battle, perhaps also evoking contempt of the enemy. This could be dangerous and make the soldiers underestimate the enemy but it also encourages them to have confidence that they will be successful. Xenophon also makes the soldiers confident by saying that they will return home without further opposition after this battle. Xenophon has nothing on which to base this assurance, which reveals it as a tactic to encourage confidence in the soldiers rather than a statement of fact.

The speech is successful because Xenophon seems assured about the accuracy of his words, which gives them authority. As we saw, and as Aristotle recommends, Xenophon shows that *he* does not fear, evokes the benefits they will get from their efforts, and indicates that there will be nothing further to fear in the future. While the passage in the *Anabasis* does not develop further any points from the *Hipparchicus* passage, it does give an example of the tactics a leader could adopt to instil confidence in his soldiers.

Xenophon also writes about the emotion of **calmness** or **mildness** (using *katapraunô*) in the *Hipparchicus*. At 1.8, Xenophon mentions the importance of having speakers who can appease the Council if its members become unduly angry. Here he is suggesting that a good commander will sometimes need to manage those who are involved alongside him in the management of the cavalry, in order to stop rash decisions being made or punishments being given in anger. A leader who can successfully demonstrate that on previous occasions there was no need to get angry with him may reduce the likelihood of the same people becoming angry with him again in the future.

An example of this instruction occurs in the *Anabasis* when Xenophon the character has to appease Cheirisophus and the eldest generals, a group of men that the leaders have to answer to. At 3.3.11, they have found fault with Xenophon for leaving the main body of the army to pursue the enemy and for then being unable to

²⁸⁹ Xenophon also recommends threats that the Council can make to the soldiers to encourage them to act better in the future at *Hipp.* 1.13-15. A word for fear is not used in this passage but the threats seem to be related to the creation of fear we saw at 1.8. For a parallel, see *An.* 1.5.15-16. See Appendix table 1 for the terms used for fear in the *Hipparchicus*.

do the enemy any harm. Cheirisophus and the elders are not specifically described as being angry, but it is clear that they have to be pacified by Xenophon. In the speech following their rebuke of Xenophon (3.3.12-19), we see him using several techniques to calm them down. Xenophon begins evoking mildness in them by telling them that they are right, and repeats this assertion again later. Xenophon also admits that he was responsible for what happened. Aristotle also particularly posits humbling oneself and not contradicting one's audience in order to calm an audience. Xenophon then goes on to explain his actions, starting with the argument that he had no other choice. He also perhaps evokes sympathy when he argues that he was motivated by the thought that the Greeks were suffering badly. He also represents the events as being something that they should all be thankful for, because the army's shortcomings might have been revealed at a more catastrophic time. Xenophon then reveals his chief argument: his actions actually allowed him to discover that the army could be arranged better. He also confirms that little damage was actually done. He concludes by providing a solution to the problem that was revealed. There is no discussion after this speech, but the proposals Xenophon makes are adopted (3.3.20). From this, it can be assumed that Xenophon succeeded in calming down Cheirisophus and the elders, after they heard his point of view. This episode demonstrates the kind of issue that may anger a body to which the leaders must answer. It also shows an array of tactics that can be used to calm such a body down. It does not add further information to the *Hipparchicus* passage, but it shows a scenario where the advice given might be necessary and demonstrates how the instruction can be carried out.

A fourth emotion that interests Xenophon is **desire**. At *Hipparchicus* 1.10, Xenophon advises that the commander get soldiers to enrol in the cavalry either by court order or by persuasion. At 1.11, he gives details for how to persuade them. He recommends speaking about the brilliance of horsemanship to encourage young men to feel desire (*epithumia*) to be in the cavalry and to overcome the resistance of their guardians. Xenophon advises the commander to say that the young men will be made by someone to keep horses anyway, but under his leadership their extravagance will be ended and they will be made into good riders. This seems designed to appeal to the guardians' financial concerns and their desire for their charges to be successful, rather than being about horsemanship. The young men may be reluctant to join the cavalry due to fear for their safety or contempt for the cavalry, yet an appeal to desire may overcome these feelings.

How this could work is made clearer in the *Anabasis*. An exact parallel cannot be found, because the men have already enrolled in the army and mostly are not horsemen. However, we can see various attempts to encourage people to undertake something by appealing to the desirable things or benefits that they may get out of it. There is also no exact parallel of the appeal to the guardians, but the instruction can be illustrated by speeches that use arguments to overcome opposition to undertaking something, again by appealing to desirable benefits. We see both of these illustrated in a speech by Menon to his soldiers at 1.4.14-16. When the mercenaries refuse to go on, Cyrus promises them more money to continue. Before it is clear whether the other soldiers will agree to follow Cyrus or not, Menon calls his soldiers together and tries to persuade them to follow him, based on what they can get out of it.

Menon first appeals to the soldiers being honoured over and above the other troops by Cyrus, without danger or toil. This appeals to a pre-existing desire to obtain rewards from Cyrus; the narrator later states that many of the soldiers had

come on the mission because they were aware that Cyrus gave out benefits (6.4.8). Presumably, Menon's troops are such men. The ease and safety of the undertaking is also desirable, while the appeal to the soldiers being regarded more highly than the other troops may also be effective in terms of their rivalry with others. Menon says that Cyrus will be grateful to them even if the other contingents go on because they started the crossing, and, he says, Cyrus knows how to return a favour if any man does. This hint that Cyrus is extremely generous is again designed to work on the desire and perhaps even greed of Menon's soldiers. If the others do not go on, Cyrus will still think that only Menon's soldiers were obedient to him and will give them leadership roles and whatever else they may want. Here Menon is encouraging his soldiers to consider what else they might desire from Cyrus. The promise of promotions also appeals to their desire for honour. Following Menon's instructions will lead to a 'win-win' situation for his soldiers and they are persuaded. Menon's argument is solely based on thoughts of gain, and does not take into account whether it is right for them to follow Cyrus or how the other soldiers may react to them being the only ones to go on. All this suggests that desire is a powerful motivator.²⁹⁰ Although this speech differs slightly in context from the *Hipparchicus* recommendation, it still provides an example that demonstrates how the instruction works in practice, and why it works.

Xenophon evokes a strong emotion at *Hipparchicus* 9.7. He states that the most effective infantrymen are those who are 'most opposing' (superlative of *enantios*) towards the enemy (or 'very bitter' as Marchant translates). This clearly represents a strong feeling, which a commander can harness and deploy in a way useful to the army. This emotion seems most like Aristotle's definition of **enmity/hatred** (*echthra/misos*, 2.4, 1382a1-19). Hatred, Aristotle says, is directed indiscriminately at classes of people, without any personal injury necessarily causing it. The person who hates wants the destruction of the object of his hatred, and this can be directed in a way useful to the army. The *Hipparchicus* passage does not suggest whether a leader should continue to foster hatred once he has enlisted soldiers who hate the enemy. A passage in the *Anabasis* suggests that he should, however. As part of a pre-battle exhortation, we see Xenophon the character fostering strong opposition by urging the soldiers to eat the enemy raw (4.8.14). The likely emotion being encouraged here is hatred. The enemy are the Colchians, a class of people, rather than individuals. They have caused the army no personal outrage, but instead are simply an obstacle in the way of their reaching home, as Xenophon tells the soldiers. They need to be overcome with no pity or any consideration of individual Colchians. The metaphor of eating the Colchians raw does not aim at just hurting the Colchians but absolutely destroying them, until there is no trace of them

²⁹⁰ For other passages regarding desire, compare *Hipp.* 1.8 with *An.* 3.1.39-42. See also *Hipp.* 1.22-3, although I have been unable to find a convincing parallel to this one. At *Hipparchicus* 1.26, Xenophon recommends that if prizes are offered to the regiments for the things that the men are expected to do in the public cavalry spectacle, it will encourage the Athenians into *philonikia*. It is unclear whether this refers to the Athenians in the crowd, in which case we could translate this as emulation, along with Marchant, and see a further overlap with the emotions mentioned by Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.11 on *zēlos*). Because this comes in a section regarding how to make the soldiers and chief-officers perform well, it seems more likely that it refers to feelings the soldiers have, and therefore refers to rivalry or ambition. In this case, we can link this to the emotion of desire, because the men want victory, prizes and honour, as well as shame, because the men want to avoid performing poorly. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon promotes rivalry at 4.8.25-8 and 4.3.29, and encourages Proxenus's captains to emulate and surpass the generals at 3.1.24. See also *Hipp.* 9.3, 9.6 and 1.21 for *philotimia* which is linked to desire.

left, not even their flesh. Xenophon is not literally suggesting they eat the Colchians; instead, it is symbolic of the strong feeling that Xenophon is trying to evoke and the dehumanization of the opposition. The speech appeals to an irrational action and may be designed to whip the soldiers into a frenzy. This creation of hatred may be strong enough to overcome any fears the soldiers may have.

Finally, Xenophon discusses the emotions of **friendly** or **loving feelings** (*philikôs/eunoikôs echein*) and **contempt** (*kataphronein*), specifically directed at a leader, at *Hipp.* 6.1-6.²⁹¹ Xenophon advises that no one can get soldiers to do anything, unless they regard a leader with friendly feelings. This indicates the importance he assigned to arousing this emotion, and avoiding its opposite. The passage contains a list of things that a leader should do to evoke friendly feelings in his soldiers and to avoid contempt. These seem to be straightforward responsibilities that any leader should carry out simply for the survival of his army, and they perhaps first evoke feelings of confidence in the soldiers for the leader. Aristotle's analysis helps us to understand Xenophon here. He argues that we *like* people who do important service for us (2.4, 1381a11-13) and that we *like* those in whom we have confidence rather than those we fear (2.4, 1381b32-3).²⁹² We may think again of Clearchus who created so much fear of himself that, Xenophon says, no one followed him out of friendship or goodwill (2.6.13).

It is unclear whether Xenophon is recommending that friendly feelings be evoked by action or words. Examples of both can be seen in the *Anabasis*, but I shall provide references below to speeches as far as possible. Many of the examples that correspond to Xenophon's list of instructions in the *Hipparchicus* passage are straightforward, demonstrating no more than that Xenophon is concerned by the things that are recommended in the *Hipparchicus*. As they require little comment, I shall quote the *Hipparchicus* passage in full and indicate in footnotes where each recommendation can be illustrated in the *Anabasis*. After the passage, I shall discuss one example in more detail to demonstrate the convergence.

‘However, no man can mould anything to his mind unless the stuff in which he proposes to work lies ready to obey the artist's will. No more can you make anything of men, unless, by God's help, they are ready to regard their commander with friendly feelings (*philikôs echein*) and to think him wiser than themselves in the conduct of operations against the enemy. Now the feeling of friendliness (*eunoikôs echein*) will naturally be fostered when the commander is kind to his men,²⁹³ and obviously takes care that they have victuals,²⁹⁴ and that they are safe in retreat,²⁹⁵ and well protected when at rest.²⁹⁶ In the garrisons he must show an interest in fodder, tents, water,

²⁹¹ Xenophon also mentions **shame** at *Hipp.* 2.8-9, although he uses the noun *aischros*, which means something that causes shame, rather than the emotion of shame itself. He advises that soldiers know that certain actions are shameful and that this is useful to the army. I shall not discuss this passage because Xenophon is not explicitly recommending verbally evoking shame, although he may believe it needs reinforcing from time to time. See *An.* 6.5.23, for Xenophon verbally evoking shame in the soldiers.

²⁹² On character traits and actions that arouse *philia* and *eunoia* in forensic speeches, and the relationship between these two emotions, see Sanders (forthcoming).

²⁹³ This will be discussed below.

²⁹⁴ Cf. *An.* 5.1.6.

²⁹⁵ Cf. *An.* 4.7.7.

²⁹⁶ Cf. *An.* 5.1.9.

firewood, and all other supplies.²⁹⁷ he must show that he thinks ahead,²⁹⁸ and keeps his eyes open for the sake of his men.²⁹⁹ And when he is doing well the chief's best policy is to give them a share in his good things.³⁰⁰ To put it shortly, a commander is least likely to incur the contempt (*kataphronoien*) of his men if he shows himself more capable than they of doing whatever he requires of them.³⁰¹ He must therefore practise every detail of horsemanship – mounting and the rest, – that they may see their commander able to take a ditch without a spill, clear a wall, leap down from a bank and throw a javelin skilfully. For all these feats are so many stepping stones to their respect (*mé kataphroneisthai*).³⁰² If they know him also to be a master of tactics,³⁰³ and able to put them in the way of getting the better of the enemy;³⁰⁴ and if besides, they are certain that he will never lead them against an enemy recklessly,³⁰⁵ or without the gods' approval or in defiance of the sacrifices,³⁰⁶ all these conditions increase the men's readiness to obey their commander'.³⁰⁷

The first instruction, that a commander should be kind to his soldiers, can be illustrated at *An.7.4.7-9*. Here, Xenophon has been begged by one of the soldiers, who is a lover of boys, to rescue a handsome young man from being killed. Xenophon has no particular reason to fulfil this wish, except that, as he himself tells Seuthes, this man previously performed bravely. This passage indicates that Xenophon rewards good behaviour and takes the time to remember what people within the army have achieved. Both will evoke friendly feelings towards him.

None of the examples I provided explicitly show the soldiers *reacting* with friendly feelings. It is clear from other passages in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon has won the affection of the soldiers (see 3.4.47-9, 4.2.20-1, 7.6.4 and 7.6.38) but it is difficult to find them responding to a speech in this way. There is at least one example, though. During a speech at 5.8.12-26, Xenophon explains that he only beats soldiers when it is for their own good and the good of the army. He ends by saying that he is surprised that people remember such incidents but not the good things he has done for them. He lists helping soldiers in the cold, warding off the enemy, providing for the sick or needy, praising soldiers for good deeds and honouring the brave as examples. As a response, soldiers stand up and reminisce about particular positive incidents. This episode suggests that the soldiers were able to remember many occasions when Xenophon had done something for them, which presumably made them feel friendly towards him. Overall, the *Anabasis* is a

²⁹⁷ Cf. *An.* 5.6.30.

²⁹⁸ Cf. *An.* 6.5.9.

²⁹⁹ Cf. *An.* 7.6.36 if this means the leader suffers sleepless nights for the soldiers; *An.* 7.4.12 if it means he is watchful for them.

³⁰⁰ Cf. *An.* 7.5.3-4.

³⁰¹ Cf. *An.* 6.6.14-16.

³⁰² There is no equivalent passage showing a leader practicing the skills of horsemanship, but we see Xenophon performing actions demonstrating that he can do the task that he is asking of the soldiers, for example, *An.* 7.3.45-6.

³⁰³ Cf. *An.* 4.7.3-7.

³⁰⁴ Cf. *An.* 4.8.12-13.

³⁰⁵ Cf. *An.* 6.5.14.

³⁰⁶ Cf. *An.* 6.5.21.

³⁰⁷ *Xen. Hipp.* 6.1-6; tr. Marchant (1968), slightly amended.

masterclass from Xenophon in fulfilling the instructions regarding friendly feelings in the *Hipparchicus*, despite the criticism he sometimes faced.

Conclusion

We have seen that Xenophon was interested in contemporary rhetorical theory and, in particular, the discussion of emotions. He clearly thought that being able to persuade others, and make use of emotions to do so, was vital for any leader and could determine success or failure – which is why arousing emotions through words and actions, and making use of emotions created by situations, feature in both the *Hipparchicus* and *Anabasis*. By examining other technical works, we ascertained that Xenophon might have been expected to include examples to illustrate his instructions regarding evoking emotions in the *Hipparchicus*. It is my contention that when Xenophon was writing this work, he specifically considered that he had provided examples to illustrate and even develop his instructions elsewhere, particularly in the numerous speeches in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon's interest in rhetoric, his conviction in its importance for leaders, and the role he seems to have assigned to the speeches as didactic exempla, seem to offer an explanation as to why there are so many speeches in the *Anabasis*. Indeed, the *Anabasis* also includes speeches acting as negative exempla, demonstrating how *not* to manipulate the emotions. Thus, the narrator illustrates both competent and incompetent leaders from whom readers can learn.

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Appendix: Emotions referred to in Xenophon's *Hipparchicus*, the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

Table 1: Emotions referred to by Xenophon in the *Hipparchicus*

Emotion	Greek	References
fear (and Panic)	<i>phobos / phobeō / phoberos</i> (and <i>ekplēssō</i>)	1.8, 1.13-15, 4.11-12, 5.3, 5.8, 7.6-7 and 8.19-20
confidence	<i>tharsos / tharseō / rōmēn</i>	2.5, 4.17-19, 5.3 and 5.8
calmness/mildness	<i>katapraunō</i>	1.8
shame	<i>aischros</i>	2.8-9
desire	<i>epithumia / epithumeō</i> (see also <i>philonikia / philotimos /</i> <i>philotimeomai</i>)	1.8, 1.11 and 1.22-3 (1.21, 1.26, 9.3 and 9.6)
opposition (hatred/enmity)	<i>enantios</i>	9.7
love/friendship	<i>philikos / eunoikos</i>	6.1-4
contempt	<i>kataphroneō</i>	6.4-6

Table 2: Emotions referred to in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* corresponding to Xenophon's

Emotion	Greek	References
fear	<i>deidō</i>	7.5, 1428a40
desire	<i>epithumeō</i> (see also <i>philotimia</i> , here classed amongst <i>ta pathē</i>)	7.5, 1428b1-2 (7.14, 1429a19)
hatred/enmity	<i>misos / miseō / echthra</i>	34.12-13, 1440a26-32; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 36.49, 1445a13-19
friendship	<i>philia</i>	34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; and 36.29, 1443b15-22
contempt	<i>kataphroneō</i>	7.5, 1428a39

Table 3: Other emotions referred to in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

Emotion	Greek	References
anger	<i>orgē</i>	7.14, 1429a18; 34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.14, 1440a32-4; 34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 36.49, 1445a13-19
gratitude	<i>charis</i>	34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 36.47, 1444b36-1445a4
pity	<i>eleos</i>	34.16, 1440a39-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b15-22; and 36.47-8, 1444b36-1445a13
envy	<i>phthonos / phthoneō</i>	34.12, 1440a26-9; 34.15-16, 1440a34-1440b5; 36.29, 1443b16-22; and 36.49-50, 1445a13-27
feeling pleasure	<i>êdomai</i>	7.5, 1428b1
feeling pain	<i>lupeō</i>	7.5, 1428b1
sexual passion/desire	<i>erōs</i>	7.14, 1429a18

drunkenness	<i>methê</i>	7.14, 1429a18
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Table 4: Emotions referred to in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* corresponding to Xenophon's

Emotion	Greek	References
fear	<i>phobos / phobeô</i>	2.5, 1382a20-1383a12
confidence	<i>tharsos / tharseô / tharsaleos</i>	2.5, 1383a13-1383b10
calmness/mildness	<i>praotês / praos / praunô</i>	2.3, 1380a6-1380b34
shame	<i>aischunê / aischunô</i>	2.6, 1383b11-1385a15
enmity/hatred	<i>echthra / echthros / and misos / miseô</i>	2.4, 1382a1-19
friendly/loving feeling	<i>philia / phileô</i>	2.4, 1380b35-1381b37
contempt	<i>kataphronêsis / kataphroneô / kataphronêtikos</i>	2.11, 1388b22-8
desire	<i>epithumia</i>	2.12, 1388b33

Table 5: Other emotions referred to by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*

Emotion	Greek	References
anger	<i>orgê / orgizô</i>	2.2, 1378a30-1380a5
pity	<i>eleos / eleeô</i>	2.8, 1385b11-1386b7
indignation	<i>nemesis / nemesaô / nemesêtikos</i>	2.9, 1386b8-1387b19
emulation	<i>zêlos / zêloô / zêlôtikos</i>	2.11, 1388a31-1388b22
envy	<i>phthonos / phthoneros / phthoneô</i>	2.10, 1387b22-1388a30
shamelessness	<i>anaischuntia / anaischunteô</i>	2.6, 1383b11 and 2.6, 1385a14-15
gratitude	<i>charis / charizô</i>	2.7, 1385a16-29
ingratitude	<i>acharistos / acharisteô</i>	2.7, 1385a33-1385b10

Appendix 4: Views on the Authorship, Date and Audience of the *Anabasis*

Authorship of the Anabasis

In Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the narrator directs the reader to an account of the march of the Ten Thousand by 'Themistogenes of Syracuse' (3.1.2). Plutarch later claims that Xenophon wanted to make himself seem more trustworthy by putting the account of his own deeds under the name of another (*De Gloria Atheniensium*, 345e.1-6). This suggests that in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon is referring to his own *Anabasis*. An initial problem is that the passage in the *Hellenica* only seems to refer to part of the story contained in the *Anabasis*, although scholars have argued around this.³⁰⁸

It could be that Plutarch is wrong and that Xenophon had simply not written his *Anabasis* at the time of writing this part of the *Hellenica*, or that both Xenophon's and Themistogenes' accounts had been written at the time but that Xenophon preferred to refer to another's account. Buzzetti (2014, 302), however, believes that it is "implausible" that Xenophon would have directed his readers to another account of the march if he had written his own.

Flower (2012, 53-5) argues that Xenophon did not go so far as to publish the work under a pseudonym but that the passage in the *Hellenica* may simply be a "polite and rhetorically self-effacing reference to his earlier work", although this contradicts Plutarch. Indeed, as Flower argues, not referring to his own *Anabasis* in the *Hellenica* would fit with Xenophon not naming himself when he appears as a speaker in the *Hellenica* (3.2.7), and later not mentioning his son's death in battle (7.5.15-17).³⁰⁹ Xenophon is not averse to referring to his own work elsewhere (see

³⁰⁸ Maclaren Jr. (1934, 243-4) argues that it is unimportant that the reference in the *Hellenica* does not seem to cover the entire contents of the *Anabasis* as we have it, because Xenophon only needs to refer the reader to a particular section of the *Anabasis* events for his narrative in the *Hellenica*. Anderson (1974, 83-4) argues that Xenophon may have published two editions of the *Anabasis*, with the first one describing the period that Xenophon records Themistogenes' account as covering. Flower (2012, 53) even argues that the *Hellenica* passage could actually cover the events of the *Anabasis* if not taken literally.

³⁰⁹ See Maclaren Jr. (1934, 242-3) who argues that when Xenophon appears in the *Hellenica* it is only as a commentator and not as a historian who participated in events. See further Cuniberti (2011) who discusses how Xenophon does not reveal his own experience of events in the *Hellenica* so that his readers will appreciate it as unbiased, impersonal and historically accurate.

De Re Equestri 12.14 for a reference to his *Hipparchicus*), but these works do not involve his own deeds.

However, seemingly corroborating Plutarch and pointing to Xenophon's use of a pseudonym, there is no other ancient evidence that a Themistogenes of Syracuse existed, except for a reference in the *Suda*, which Dillery (2001, 7) and Maclaren Jr. (1934, 241) argue appears to have been based on this passage in the *Hellenica*. The name itself seems suspicious, and Gray (2004, 130 n. 7), argues that its meaning, 'born of Themis', suggests a truthful author, given Themis' links to justice. Thus, 'Themistogenes' may have been a particularly apt name to select if, as Plutarch argues, Xenophon wanted to appear more trustworthy.³¹⁰ Gray (2011b, 40, n. 40) argues that Xenophon did not use the pseudonym to deceive people into believing his account but that a seemingly unbiased account of his deeds, given in the third person, was a powerful narrative tool.³¹¹ Xenophon may indeed have faced an impossible decision. If he published the *Anabasis* under a pseudonym, he could indeed be open to accusations of deceiving his readers, but if he circulated the work under his own name, he could be accused of deceiving the reader about his role and influence.

Xenophon's need to use a pseudonym may also have been related to the expectations of the autobiographical genre. Most (1989, 124-31) argues that the form of autobiography that the *Anabasis* would take if published under Xenophon's name did not exist in Classical Greece. He describes how autobiographical accounts usually took the form of laments about current misfortunes or defences against current charges, which the author had to invent if they did not really exist, and how an audience would balk at an account in which the author was not in imminent danger and which was self-praising. Gray (2011c, 31) argues that in using a

³¹⁰ See also Buzzetti (2014, 307 and 311), who argues that "Xenophon is "Themistogenes" because he is "the offspring of Socrates," and because Socrates is himself law incarnate", and that Themistogenes means ""Xenophon the Socratic, author of a propaedeutic to philosophy designed to earn a measure of toleration for philosophy"". Buzzetti's reasoning behind this elaborate interpretation is complicated, but it demonstrates the tendency to believe that Xenophon selected a meaningful pseudonym. Another suggestion, made by Prentice (1947), is that 'Themistogenes' is the error of a copyist. He claims that Xenophon actually wrote that the relevant account ""has been written, rightfully and dutifully, by one of Cyrus' men"".

³¹¹ See further Marincola (1997, 128-216) for the various ways in which ancient historians tried to give credibility to their accounts and make themselves appear authoritative, as well as the different methods historians used to recount events in which they participated.

pseudonym despite his readers knowing that he really wrote the work, Xenophon was commenting on the difficulties of recounting one's own achievements.³¹²

Other scholars discuss at what point it became obvious to Xenophon's readers that he was the real author. Similar to Gray, Flower (2012, 53-5) argues for the likelihood that Xenophon's style would immediately be recognised by contemporary readers. Tuplin (2003a, 154) argues that Xenophon's readers must have accepted the pseudonym for some time at least, while Marincola (1997, 186) argues that some readers would never recognise that Themistogenes was a pseudonym. I am inclined to agree with Gray and Flower.

Date of the Anabasis

Scholars cannot agree on when Xenophon published the *Anabasis*. Dillery (2001, 8-9) goes as far as to say that "all that can be said with confidence is that the *Anabasis* was written late in Xenophon's life". Typically, dating the work relies on references within the *Anabasis* to Xenophon's exile and time at Scillus, the mention of the *Anabasis* in the *Hellenica*, and the possibility that either Xenophon drew on Isocrates' work or Isocrates drew on Xenophon's work.³¹³ More recently, several scholars have discussed unique methods for dating the *Anabasis*. Millender (2012), for example, tries to date it based roughly on the evidence contained in it regarding the Spartan policy on Persian friendships. As Rood (2005, xvii-iii) argues, different scholars often argue for dates that relate to what they perceive as Xenophon's aim in writing. He gives the example that a scholar who believes that Xenophon was advocating a Panhellenic expedition against Persia would be likely to date the work to the early 360s. However, Xenophon's aims are far from clear, and so dating based on this criterion is speculation only.

Scholars have used these various methods to suggest dates ranging between the 390s and the 350s, but there are difficulties associated with most pieces of 'evidence'. For example, basing whether Xenophon was still at Scillus when he

³¹² See further Buzzetti (2014, 303-11) who argues that the use of the pseudonym at its particular place in the *Hellenica* links to the oath that precedes it in the text, allows Xenophon to avoid having to mention his status as an exile, disguises Xenophon's association with Cyrus during a passage in which Xenophon is describing the suffering that Athens underwent due to Cyrus' aid of the Spartans, and implies that Xenophon was a Socratic and had philosophical interests. Again, this further illustrates the tendency for scholars to explain the reasoning behind using a pseudonym.

³¹³ See Maclaren Jr. (1934, 244-7) for early bibliography on these dating criteria.

wrote or had already left Scillus on the tense of the verbs and tone of the passage is “inconclusive”, according to Humble (1997, 29), and “highly speculative”, according to Dillery (2001, 9). Dating the work is further complicated by scholars who argue that the *Anabasis* was written in two or more periods. For example, Delebecque (1957, 83) believes that he can identify two different stages of composition, dated to 386BC and 377BC, although this is not a popular theory now. Perhaps more likely, Cawkwell (2004, 49-50) believes that Xenophon wrote certain parts in different periods, especially the obituaries.

Audience of the Anabasis

Certain other works by Xenophon are explicitly aimed at the Athenians (*Hipparchicus* and *Poroi*) but Xenophon does not identify his expected readership for the *Anabasis*. Focusing on Xenophon’s interest in leadership, Gray (2011b, 6) and Pownall (2004) argue that the *kaloï kagathoi* who took part in politics might be Xenophon’s envisioned audience for all his works. Buzzetti (2014, 293) similarly argues for “high-minded and talented youths with some political ambition”. Kelly (1996, 161-2) even envisages Xenophon wanting some of his works to be read by educated reading groups who could discuss his works after. Cuniberti (2007) proposes a mainly Spartan target audience for Xenophon’s works, along with other Greeks who are friends of the Spartans.

Scholars have proposed various audiences specifically for the *Anabasis*. Waterfield (2006, 190) argues that Xenophon wrote the *Anabasis* for the Athenians in order to demonstrate why his exile was undeserved. Alternatively, some scholars argue that Xenophon was defending himself against written or verbal accusations made by others. Delebecque (1957, 295-9), for example, argues that Xenophon was defending himself against criticism by his former comrades and the Spartans. However, Delebecque’s other proposals for the purpose of the *Anabasis* (n. 32) require both a Spartan audience and an audience of the other major Greek powers. More generally, Flower (2012, 34-8) posits the idea that the *Anabasis* was written for “participants and posterity” as a record of the Ten Thousand’s actions. I argue that Xenophon directed the *Anabasis* at men who aimed to become leaders, as well as existing leaders.

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Abbreviations Used

AHB = The Ancient History Bulletin

AJPh = American Journal of Philology

AncSoc = Ancient Society

BICS = Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies

C&M = Classica et Mediaevalia

CB = The Classical Bulletin

CJ = The Classical Journal

CPh = Classical Philology

CQ = Classical Quarterly

GRBS = Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies

JHS = The Journal of Hellenic Studies

PUPS = Presses de l'université Paris-Sorbonne

REA = Revue des Etudes Anciennes

TAPhA = Transactions of the American Philological Association