ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN’s role in East Asian regional order

PhD in International Relations
Department of Politics and International Relations
Royal Holloway, University of London

Candidate name: Robert Yates

Declaration of authorship

I, Robert Yates, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: _____

Date: _____

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the puzzle of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) prominence in regional order negotiation and management in East Asia during times of transition and crisis. It argues that ASEAN's prominence is not merely the result of structural dynamics of great power rivalry, but due to ASEAN creating a 'regional conductor' role in negotiation with great powers. The thesis contributes to the literature by developing an English School-inspired 'role negotiation' framework and uncovering the social foundations for ASEAN's role, rooted in cumulative and on-going role negotiation. The framework shows how actors come to perform social roles through a process of legitimation: they conceptualise and claim a role and seek endorsement from key audiences. This thesis applies the framework to the US in early Cold War Southeast Asia, China during the Cambodian Conflict and to ASEAN in post-Cold War East Asia. It finds that negotiations over the US' and China's roles during the Cold War established, and reinforced, a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the key 'great power' function of diplomatic leadership was subcontracted to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role in the uncertainty of the early post-Cold War years. ASEAN extended its diplomatic leadership into the wider East Asian region, convening the full regional 'orchestra' and providing a 'score': a framework of norms and institutions within which all regional players can operate. However, ASEAN's position in a post-Cold War division of labour is insecure because, unlike during the Cold War, there is no clear goal shared between all key players. ASEAN's legitimacy as 'regional conductor' is therefore based on its neutrality and competence to convene inclusive dialogue; its ability to address substantive issues between the great powers is limited. In order for the regional orchestra to play more beautiful music, the great powers themselves will need to reach agreement on a more sophisticated 'score'.

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Introduction

This thesis is concerned with how regional order has been negotiated and managed in Southeast and East Asia and by whom. In particular it addresses the puzzle of why a group of small to medium sized states, organised collectively as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)[1], have played such a prominent part in regional order negotiation and management at times of transition and crisis, when we would most expect the great powers exclusively to play the leading role. Before illustrating what ASEAN has done for regional order, it is first necessary to outline what is meant in this thesis by order, regional order and order management. This will provide a conceptual context for understanding why ASEAN's prominence constitutes such a puzzle.

This thesis follows the English School (ES) in conceiving of order as "a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among sovereign states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals"[2]. In his classic study, Hedley Bull described the goals of international society as the preservation of the society of states itself, maintaining the independence of states, the limitation of violence, maintaining the sanctity of agreements and upholding property rights through the mutual recognition of sovereignty[3]. The 'rules' that govern states interactions towards pursuing such goals take different forms. The most observable are explicit legal rules set out in international treaties. Such explicit legal rules may reflect broader and more implicit *norms* that determine what behaviour is considered appropriate and inappropriate[4]. These in turn will be related to the more fundamental 'deep rules' of international society, what are commonly known as *primary institutions*[5]. Primary institutions are "durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles"[6]. Primary institutions are constitutive of international society; they reflect the 'rules of the game' which provide a normative foundation for order that is constitutive of who actors are and regulative of their behaviour[7]. Within modern international society, the state is the principal actor, given its identity and rights through the primary institution of sovereignty. Sovereignty is therefore widely seen as the most important and fundamental primary institution with other primary institutions such as equality of peoples, the market, nationalism and

[1] ASEAN was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore. Members that joined later include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar and Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999).
[2] Alagappa (2003a: 39).
[3] Bull (1995: 16-19).
[4] Buzan (2004a: 163-164). See also Krasner (1983).
[5] Khong (2014) uses the term 'deep rules' to refer to primary institutions.
[6] Buzan (2004a: 181).
[7] Reus-Smit (2003), Phillips (2010).

environmental stewardship existing to various degrees within different interstate societies[8].

As order constitutes an arrangement, it does not come about purely fortuitously; rather, it is socially negotiated. States come to agreements over the explicit and implicit rules of the game, but also over the legitimate distribution of capabilities and how material capabilities will be used to serve order as a whole[9]. Ideally, international order would have widespread agreement on common interests, norms and values and a legitimate basis for the distribution of capabilities. However, a certain degree of contestation is always present, reflecting the diversity of actors, interests and values within international society. To sustain rule-governed interaction and address the challenges of capturing common interests, managing inequalities and mediating difference and value conflict, order needs continual renegotiation and management[10]. Part of order negotiation includes establishing certain order functions which need to be be performed to uphold the order. It is through the performance of these order functions that order is managed. As discussed below, order functions and the management of order are mostly associated with the primary institutions of diplomacy and great power management.

Within international society order may exist at the global level, but also at the regional level[11]. Put simply, regional order refers to contexts within which states have negotiated the material and normative foundations of order and how order will be managed within a socially-defined region. Regions are constructed based on geographical proximity, security and economic interdependence, and social recognition from those states within and outside of the region[12]. States' geographical proximity to one another generally means that their interactions and linkages are more intense, which can lead to increased interdependence[13]. Security interdependence at the regional level - what is known as a 'regional security complex'[14] - means that the security of any one state within a region cannot be considered separately from all the others within that region. Likewise, economic interdependence concerns whether economic linkages between states within a region are so extensive that each 'national' economy cannot be considered without reference to a broader 'regional' economy. On their own however, geographical proximity and security and economic interdependence do not make a region; rather, they provide material conditions for the social

[8] Buzan (2004a) includes a list of common primary institutions and discusses which ones may prevail within different types of interstate society, running on a spectrum from asocial to confederative.
[9] Clark (2001).
[10] Hurrell (2007: 287).
[11] See Hurrell (2007: 239-261).
[12] Alagappa (2003b).
[13] This 'bottom up' or 'undirected' process of regional interaction, which is mainly led by markets, private trade and investment and company decision-making, is known as 'regionalisation'. See Hurrell (1995).
[14] See Buzan (1991) and Buzan and Weaver (2003).

process of the 'imagining' of the region[15]. For a region to come into being, it is necessary that those actors 'external' and 'internal' to a region, recognise the region as distinctive and recognise their own positions as outside of and within the region[16]. Social recognition is therefore the most important factor in producing a region. It provides the 'regional awareness' necessary for the political process of regionalism, which itself is explicitly concerned with increasing regional stability and order through building regional interconnectedness and regional understandings of identity, norms, rules and institutions[17].

From an ES perspective, once the boundaries of a particular region have been determined, regional order can then be analysed, and differentiated from the global level, by determining what prevailing 'primary institutions' exist, how they operate and whether they manifest themselves in extant regional secondary institutions (regionalism). This thesis however is not concerned with what the primary institutions of Southeast or East Asian order are *per se*, but is interested in *how* regional order has been negotiated and managed and by whom[18]. It therefore limits its interest in primary institutions to the two institutions that are concerned explicitly with how order is negotiated and managed: diplomacy and great power management.

Diplomacy is fundamentally concerned with communication between members of international society. Indeed, it symbolises the existence of an international society, as the rules and procedures that govern diplomacy between members reflect how international society is organised and what rules it operates by. Diplomacy enables the negotiation of agreements, the gathering of information and intelligence, and the minimising of frictions[19]. Diplomacy is inclusive in the sense that it encompasses state and non-state actors and allows for order to be maintained through the day to day interaction between such actors. Buzan discusses bilateralism and multilateralism as derivatives of diplomacy, which can be considered the contexts within which key diplomatic functions can be performed for managing order[20]. These functions include, but are not limited to: conflict mediation – ensuring disputes are settled in a peaceful manner; agenda-setting – determining what key issues and problems deserve attention; and rule-making – drafting and amending the rules and norms that govern states' interactions[21]. These functions can be performed by state actors, but also by non-state actors such as technocrats associated with international

[15]In this way regions can be considered 'imagined communities' in the same way nations can. See Anderson (2006).
[16]Acharya (2012).
[17]See Fawcett and Hurrell (1995).
[18]Buzan and Zhang's (2014) edited volume discusses the primary institutions of East Asia. Narine (2006) and Quayle (2013) discuss the primary institutions of Southeast Asian order.
[19]Bull (1995: 163-166).
[20]Buzan (2004a: 187).
[21]See Barston (2014). Also Watson (1991).

organisations. Such non-state actors gain prominence especially in dealing with specific and complex issue areas such as global finance[22].

However, within the ES literature, great powers are considered to have special responsibilities with respect to order negotiation and management, especially during times of major crisis or transition in international society. For this reason, great power management is considered a primary institution in its own right. Great powers are considered to contribute to order in two distinct ways: managing their own relations to ensure that their disputes do not lead to conflict, and providing central direction to international society[23]. By managing relations amongst themselves, great powers perform the function of maintaining a general balance of power. Providing central direction refers to great power leadership within their own spheres of influence and also, more importantly, the notion that the great powers have exclusive responsibility for negotiating the foundations of order at times of transition, especially after major conflict[24]. In this sense, great powers perform the function of diplomatic leadership through their foundational rule-making and their creation of secondary institutions, otherwise known as international organisations. Secondary institutions 'lock in' and legitimise the great power agreement over the distribution of material capabilities and the regulative norms of order[25]. In this way, secondary institutions are a key site for the negotiation and management of order, and, as discussed above, become forums within which diplomacy is conducted and its associated functions can be performed[26].

It is within this context of the great powers' leading role – and other actors' subordinate role – in negotiating and managing order, especially at times of transition and crisis, that East Asia presents us with a puzzle. During times of transition and crisis in East Asia, the small states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have played an important part in negotiating the foundations of order and subsequently in managing that order. Three empirical examples illustrate ASEAN's activism.

At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the US tried to impose its vision for an anti-communist regional order in Southeast Asia. It sought to legitimise its unilateral and interventionist management of order through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The

[22]See Bukovansky et al (2012: 163-209).
[23]Bull (1995: 194-222). See also Watson (1991: 195-211).
[24]Clark (2001), Ikenberry (2001, 2011).
[25]The major example is the United Nations which has a legal Charter that provides a framework of rules to govern states' interactions. The rules reflect the deeper normative and material foundations which constitute that sovereign states are the actors that bear rights and have responsibilities towards one another. The Security Council provides a legitimising function with respect to a particular distribution of capabilities at the time of creation, although this has since been significantly contested by calls for reform to reflect new distributions of capabilities.
[26]See Goh (2013: 28-29).

US' efforts were resisted not only by communist groups but also nationalist constituencies that resented foreign involvement in regional affairs. Order in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia was unstable. War raged in Vietnam and Indonesia pursued its Confrontation against the newly formed Malaysia. When the anti-communist military took power in Indonesia, the weak non-communist Southeast Asian states came together to form ASEAN. ASEAN's formation was crucial for negotiating order in Southeast Asia. Through ASEAN these states developed a framework for managing their relations, avoiding conflict and disputes and cooperating together to promote economic development and 'regional resilience'. ASEAN lay down the norm of non-interference, establishing that relations within Southeast Asia would be norm-governed. In the context of US disengagement from Vietnam, ASEAN played a key part in legitimising the US' continued provision of security public goods from an offshore position by not challenging the US' bilateral security arrangements with regional states. ASEAN's front-line diplomatic activism complimented the US' offshore stationing of its capabilities and provision of aid and assistance. Both worked towards building a stable non-communist social order in the region. ASEAN's rule-making established that order would be based on rules of coexistence[27], and its regional institution-building provided a legitimate framework through which to manage order. In this respect, ASEAN succeeded where the US had failed through SEATO.

When Vietnam occupied Cambodia from 1978 to 1989, ASEAN was highly active diplomatically in opposing the occupation. ASEAN successfully thwarted a Vietnamese challenge to the credentials of the ousted Khmer Rouge, prevented the acceptance of the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) within the United Nations (UN) and regularly promoted resolutions in the UN condemning the occupation. ASEAN was able to contain the conflict, keep the issue on the international agenda and ensure the social estrangement of Vietnam because it successfully framed the issue as a violation of the norm of non-intervention and consequently a violation of the rule-governed interaction amongst states. ASEAN was unable to resolve this conflict alone. It aligned with China which provided the material capabilities to resist Vietnam. However, ASEAN contributed to the management of the conflict and thus to the management of order as interactions that are governed by rules rather than the arbitrary use of force. More than this however, by securing agreement from China for a neutral Cambodia after Vietnamese withdrawal, ASEAN asserted the salience of its norms and processes over Cambodia. This ensured that after the conflict ASEAN would take primary responsibility for making and managing order in Indochina as well as maritime Southeast Asia. This was seen most explicitly in ASEAN's subsequent enlargement to include the mainland states.

[27] Bull (1995: 64-68).

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, there was great strategic uncertainty within East Asia. The removal of the Soviet threat led to fears within the region of US retrenchment, a potentially resurgent Japan and a rising China. Such fears reflected uncertainty over the foundations of regional order. At this time of transition and uncertainty ASEAN took the initiative to provide a regional institution in the form of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brought together all the great powers and major players in the region. Other states such as the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan and Australia had tried to promote regional security dialogue but had failed. As mentioned above, multilateral institutions can provide sites for the negotiation and management of order because they act as forums for communication between states where states can develop common interests, address issues and develop new rules and norms. The ARF brought the great powers together with a commitment to engage with regional issues and to acknowledge that interactions within East Asia were rule-governed. ASEAN contributed to order by supplying a site for the negotiation and management of order at a time of major uncertainty. On top of this, ASEAN provided a normative framework which all major powers and players could agree to: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). First developed by ASEAN in 1976, the TAC contains a list of norms through which to regulate interactions between states. The ARF members agreed to it as a code of conduct governing regional relations. Since then ASEAN has built up a network of overlapping institutions with varying memberships such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). It has maintained its centrality within these institutions two decades after the initial establishment of the ARF, and in each the great powers have committed to ASEAN's leadership. All the great powers have now signed the TAC, one of the criteria for membership in the EAS, demonstrating a formal commitment to, or at least acknowledgement of, the norms it embodies. Again, this represents an acknowledgement that interactions within East Asia should be rule-governed – indeed, governed by ASEAN rules. In the context of continued uncertainty about the material and normative foundations of regional order, the promotion of TAC and the acknowledgement of its norms represents a working agreement on the regulatory norms states *can* agree on.

All three of these examples highlight how ASEAN has been highly active in negotiating the normative and institutional frameworks for sustaining rule-governed interaction in Southeast and East Asia at times of strategic transition or crisis. Considering IR's common understanding of this being the exclusive remit of the great powers, ASEAN's prominence raises two questions. Firstly, why have the great powers allowed ASEAN to do so much? Secondly, how has ASEAN been able to sustain its prominence for so long?

This thesis argues that ASEAN has been enabled to play an important part at key junctures because it has been given a legitimate social role, first as the 'primary manager' in Southeast Asia and then as the 'regional conductor' in post-Cold War East Asia. These roles are legitimate because they have been endorsed by the great powers. Indeed, ASEAN has embedded these roles within role bargains with the great powers, whereby both parties perform corresponding functions towards managing regional order. ASEAN has then been able to sustain its prominence in order negotiation and management because it has been able to redefine, reclaim and renegotiate its evolving roles and find continued endorsement and thus legitimacy from the great powers.

ASEAN first became the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order during the Cold War. By 'primary manager' I mean that ASEAN took on primary responsibility for diplomatic/normative order functions in Southeast Asia[28]. ASEAN intentionally eschewed performing security functions such as balance of power and security public goods, leaving these as the responsibility of the external great power role, exercised by the US. However, it took on diplomatic leadership, taking primary responsibility for managing intra-regional relations through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and for regional rule-making, establishing the normative framework governing relations based around the core norm of non-interference. ASEAN's aim was to build 'regional resilience' and unity, reducing any opportunities for external actors to interfere in the region and foment instability through subversion. On top of this, ASEAN's diplomatic leadership had an external aspect, principally providing a diplomatic front to legitimise shared US-ASEAN containment imperatives within Indochina. This was exercised most clearly during the Cambodian conflict.

These two aspects of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role accord with what Michael Leifer[29] saw as ASEAN's contributions to regional order: its limited success in managing intra-mural relations and its ability to present itself as a 'diplomatic community' when negotiating with external partners[30]. However, Leifer's yardstick for assessing whether ASEAN was a successful manager of regional order, was based on the Indonesian vision of regional order defined as the ASEAN states themselves playing the proprietary role to the exclusion of external powers. This led to Leifer's judgement that “the continuing limitation of ASEAN as an instrument for promoting regional order even on a modest scale and basis has been exposed by the external security relationships retained by all member governments, except Indonesia”[31]. In contrast, this thesis shows how ASEAN's 'primary

[28]See Chapter One for a discussion of 'order functions'.
[29]Leifer worked broadly within an English School tradition, emphasising concepts such as international society, regional order and balance of power. See the essays in Emmers and Liow (2006).
[30]Leifer (1989, 2005).
[31]Leifer (2005: 105).

manager' role was never intended to replace external powers outright, but rather was part of a role bargain *with* external great powers. External powers continued to provide the functions ASEAN was unable and unwilling to perform, such as security public goods, whilst ASEAN took responsibility for those diplomatic/normative functions that it could perform.

By taking on the 'primary manager' role, ASEAN established practical and social foundations from which it created a new role entirely in the post-Cold War period, enabling it to expand its responsibility for order negotiation and management into the wider East Asia/Asia-Pacific region. The social role ASEAN created in post-Cold War East Asia is a 'regional conductor' role. The 'regional conductor' role is based on an analogy that sees the region as an orchestra where the different great powers make up the different sections (brass, percussion etc). They are the ones that possess the instruments which represent the material capabilities (military hardware, economic and financial resources etc). It is they who essentially 'make the music'. The problem of great power rivalry however means that the different sections want the orchestra to play their own musical score (their own vision of regional order) and thus exist in a state of competition. ASEAN has been able to claim the role of 'regional conductor', analogous to a musical conductor who does not possess any instrument (lacks material capabilities), but has been able to provide a musical score for the orchestra to play: a framework of norms and institutions within which the region can operate.

Understanding ASEAN's role as a 'regional conductor' thus captures the two key functions ASEAN performs for East Asian regional order: 1) convening all major powers and players together through an 'inclusive engagement' function and 2) providing a 'score' that all players can agree to through its 'rule-making' function. This conception avoids the ambiguity of the commonly used 'ASEAN driver' role, which raises questions – and provokes mockery - regarding what the destination is that ASEAN is driving the region to. The analogy of the 'orchestra' is also useful because it helps us understand when ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is relevant: when the full orchestra is convened. This means that other smaller groupings are possible (such as US-led alliances or coalitions) that may play more sophisticated 'Chamber music' because the members share common visions of regional order and values. These are generally not seen as a threat within ASEAN to its 'regional conductor' role. However, when it comes to large-scale cooperative security that involves all the major powers, ASEAN takes the lead as the 'regional conductor', and jealously guards its role. The orchestral analogy is also useful because all players seek to join and perform with the orchestra as it is the medium through which the most impressive music can be played. This desire therefore means that they are willing to compromise on the quality of the 'score' for the time being to maintain harmony. This captures the fact that all the great powers seek to join and be a part

of ASEAN-led processes and agree to ASEAN's 'minimalist' normative framework[32].

This thesis' argument is rooted in the assertion that analysing the negotiation of social roles is crucial for understanding how order is negotiated and managed. Social roles are made up of three elements: identity, status and function. So that order can be maintained, states need to reach a working agreement on their respective legitimate identities, their places within the society - their statuses - and what functions are legitimate for each state to perform in relation to negotiating and managing order. As alluded to above, the prevailing arrangement on roles as IR understands it is within the primary institution of great power management, and to a lesser extent within the institution of diplomacy. However, as we will see, the agreement on the great power role within the institution of great power management is not a one-way process of others recognising and legitimising the great power role, but rather a role bargain between great and small powers. A role bargain is a reciprocal arrangement, whereby negotiating actors agree to a division of labour with respect to the performance of order functions. Each party agrees to perform particular order functions in return for the other performing complementary order functions. A reciprocal role bargain is a key aspect of a broader understanding on what order is (its material and normative bases) and how it should be managed (what order functions need to be performed and by whom). The implicit role bargain within great power management means there is not only a role for great powers but also a corresponding role for small powers. The legitimacy of each role is contingent on each power holding up its end of the bargain. Small powers recognise the special status and rights of great powers, but great powers need to recognise small power identities, their status as sovereign states and also the functions they may perform in upholding order.

As is discussed later in this introduction, the great power aspect of this role bargain has been explored extensively in IR. However, within great power management, the functions small powers perform has generally been neglected or understood as limited to legitimation, performed when small powers recognise great powers. This particular understanding of the great power-small power bargain is historically contingent in European international society; it is not necessarily universally applicable[33]. Different social arrangements are possible. ASEAN's activism in regional order negotiation and management should prompt us to look for whether different social arrangements on roles have been reached in East Asia. This thesis takes up this task. Before discussing the literature on great power and small power roles in IR, and how this thesis re-conceptualises the primary institutions concerned with order management, this introduction addresses the alternative explanations for the puzzle of ASEAN's prominence.

[32]Goh (2011).
[33]Bisley (2012).

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are three main approaches that provide alternative explanations for understanding ASEAN's negotiation and management of regional order: realist, neo-liberal institutionist and constructivist. Realists generally seek parsimonious explanations for international outcomes and in doing so posit power, defined in terms of material capabilities, as the most important variable in international politics[34]. As a consequence, realists argue that ASEAN and its processes are of secondary importance to questions of regional order; great power politics is of primary importance. Great powers have subcontracted questions regarding inclusive institution-building and norm provision to ASEAN because doing so involves little cost and does not have an impact on great power interests. This is because the great powers have not allowed such institutions to manage their key interests and the major flashpoints in the region such as the Korean nuclear issue, Taiwan or the East China Sea, are not addressed by ASEAN processes. ASEAN's informal institutions and norms can be abandoned in situations where the great powers consider their interests at stake[35]. ASEAN's ability to affect the balance of power is therefore limited. Indeed, a stable balance of power is a necessary condition for ASEAN's institutions to be effective[36]. ASEAN's unsuccessful efforts to address the South China Sea issue and constrain China within its normative framework, show how limited ASEAN's enterprise is without drawing on a conventional balance of power to back it up[37]. ASEAN's contribution to regional order is therefore limited to providing alternative forums within which traditional great power politics can take place, through practices such as 'institutional balancing'[38]. In the sense that this moves competition away from more traditional power balancing, ASEAN's contribution can be considered at the most to blunt the edges of great power politics.

Realists are right to emphasise the importance of great powers in the negotiation and management of regional order. However, by rooting its explanation of the puzzle in a material-structural account of great power rivalry, realism is deficient in two respects. The first is that it does not account for ASEAN's agency nor the ebb and flow of great power contestation and endorsement of ASEAN's leadership at different times. What part has ASEAN played in promoting and arguing the case for its leadership? Also, if the reasons for ASEAN's prominence are essentially fixed, why do the great powers at different times seek to challenge ASEAN's leadership (such as after the Asian Financial Crisis and when China sought to steer regionalism in an exclusive East Asian direction with shared leadership) and at other times actively endorse it? Related to this is the second reason,

[34]e.g. Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2001). See Legro and Moravcsik (1999).
[35]Tow (2012).
[36]Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003).
[37]Emmers (2003, 2010).
[38]He (2008).

which is that this approach is too pessimistic about the basis for ASEAN's prominence. There may be more in it for the great powers than merely passing the buck. Great power endorsement of ASEAN's position reflects this fact. For example, the Obama administration put a lot of emphasis on showing attention, and even deference, to ASEAN's leadership after 2009 as a means to reverse the US' perceived loss of influence during the Bush era. This suggests that US officials recognise that their country receives legitimacy benefits through endorsing ASEAN's leadership[39]. This more complex and fluid situation can better be captured through focusing on the negotiations between ASEAN and the great powers and to see what bargains they may have reached over reciprocal roles, and how these may serve common interests and goals.

One approach that seeks to capture bargains between states, expressed within formal institutions, is neoliberal institutionalism. It shares with realism a positivist epistemology, arguing that states are rational and utility-maximising. However, it differs in that it posits a more optimistic and functional theory of institutions, asserting that "[i]nstitutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity"[40]. States can successfully develop institutions because they are concerned with absolute gains, rather than relative gains, and therefore can work together to try and solve collective action problems. Neoliberal institutionalists have generally had less to say about ASEAN and its processes however, due to ASEAN's informal structure and lack of specific outcomes. For example, the Asian Financial Crisis revealed that ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, were clearly not set up to deal with the problems related to the crisis as states reverted to unilateral policies which appeared detrimental to regional cooperation.

Despite this, Kawasaki has applied a rational institutionalist argument to the ARF, which he sees as capturing a 'diffused reciprocity' between the major powers. He argues that the production of the informal 'ASEAN Way' and its voluntary, non-binding confidence-building mechanisms are not institutional deficiencies, but the logical result of the 'assurance game' that Asia-Pacific states found themselves in in the immediate post-Cold War period[41]. In an assurance game, the players do not fear being cheated as much as they do in a collaboration game such as the 'prisoner's dilemma'; therefore, cooperation is the optimum strategy. All the major powers preferred to maintain the status quo of US strategic engagement in the immediate post-Cold War years because the economic benefits of cooperation outweighed the potential geo-strategic benefits of defection. As there is less danger of defection or being cheated in an assurance game, the players do not need to set up formal

[39]Goh (2011) discusses the legitimising aspect of ASEAN's leadership for great powers.
[40]Keohane and Martin (1995: 42).
[41]Kawasaki (2006).

or binding institutions. They merely need to assure the others that they will not defect through a commitment to institutionalising their communication and through unilateral confidence-building measures. ASEAN's prominence in order management can therefore be explained by its ability to exploit the opportunity available within the assurance game to provide such an institutionalised dialogue in the ARF. The soft regionalism and flexible consensus of the ARF is therefore not a failure of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, but an appropriate instrument for optimising the mutually beneficial cooperative moves each player needed to make. The problem with this position however, is its reliance on the major powers remaining within an assurance game. As soon as one major power sees its geo-strategic interests as being served through defection, then ASEAN's processes no longer matter. In this way, it too posits a structural explanation of ASEAN's prominence, based on the assurance game rather than great power rivalry. Although more positive than realism about the stake the great powers have in ASEAN's leadership, it too does not account for ASEAN's agency after initially setting up the ARF, nor the ebb and flow of great power endorsement and contestation thereafter.

Constructivism offers the third alternative explanation to the puzzle which seeks to address the rationalist approaches' neglect of ASEAN's agency by emphasising social processes rather than fixed interests. The key scholars that have highlighted ASEAN's agency are Amitav Acharya and Alice Ba. Acharya has focused on how ASEAN agents have shaped regional norms and then promoted these norms amongst the major powers through the ARF and its other offshoots[42]. ASEAN, through its processes, has been able to shape the balance of power in the short term by providing norms of restraint and avenues for confidence-building, but may in the long term enable the major powers to transcend balance of power practices altogether[43]. This can be achieved by ASEAN socialising great powers into adopting its norms and practices and thereby shaping great power interests and even identities. Indeed, for Acharya and also Johnston, China's move from being a power sceptical of multilateralism to one whose officials were increasingly comfortable with multilateralism was due to ASEAN's socialisation[44]. Chinese officials changed their policy discourse from *real politik* pronouncements of the primacy of bilateral great power relations, to pronouncements advocating cooperation and 'mutual security'[45]. ASEAN's success in initially getting the great powers on board with its institutions and norms, was followed by ASEAN institutionalising its centrality in Asian regionalism through building further ASEAN Plus mechanisms. The status quo took on a path dependency[46]. Taken together with his work on 'norm

[42] Acharya (2014).
[43] Acharya (2014: 199).
[44] Acharya (1997, 2009), Johnston (2003).
[45] Johnston (2003, 2008).
[46] See also Capie (2012).

localisation' and 'norm subsidiarity', Acharya therefore attributes ASEAN's prominent management to its ability to shape the institutional and normative structure of the region[47].

Alice Ba provides a different angle, focusing on ASEAN's negotiation, and renegotiation, of more fundamental ideas about how the region(s) should be organised during times of transition and crisis[48]. For Ba, key ASEAN agents have been able to exploit opportunities provided by shifts in the material power structure (e.g. Nixon Doctrine, communist victory in Indochina, end of the Cold War) and make arguments for regional cooperation, initially within Southeast Asia but then in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia after the end of the Cold War. ASEAN came up with ideas for regionalism - and the norms that would underpin this regionalism - in place of failed attempts by other states. In this sense, Ba suggests ASEAN's prominence is due to its ability to shape the ideational environment surrounding questions of regional organisation.

Constructivists are right to highlight the importance of social processes related to ideas and norms for understanding ASEAN's prominence. However, they may rely too much on the explanatory power of norms. The burden of proof for whether norms have actually been internalised by key players and whether this has shaped their identities and interests towards regional cooperation rather than competition, is quite high, especially in a region where great power competition and rivalry is arguably escalating. Also, whereas constructivists such as Acharya start with ASEAN's agency, they end up rooting their explanation of ASEAN's prominence in the normative structure that ASEAN has created in the region, which in turn constrains ASEAN and the great powers through a logic of appropriateness. In this sense, much like realism and neoliberal institutionalism, this position does not adequately capture the fluidity of ASEAN-great power negotiations and mutual understandings because of its ultimate concern with structure[49]. Ba's work, however, is more nuanced in this respect. Ba focuses on interaction and negotiation and the ideas that she posits as a determining factor in explaining ASEAN's prominence are not fixed but need constant renegotiation. In this sense, her work is much closer to the approach adopted in this thesis of looking for mutual understandings and bargains. Ba's principle concern however, is internal ASEAN negotiations, treating the external as triggers for these periods of renegotiation. She does not explicitly look at the bargains that ASEAN may have reached with the great powers. In later work Ba has addressed the question of ASEAN's internal and external legitimacy[50]. This work focuses on ASEAN's responses to external challenges by pushing back or resisting (e.g. by

[47] Acharya (2009, 2011).
[48] Ba (2009).
[49] See Acharya (2014). For a critique of ASEAN's adherence to its norms see Jones (2012).
[50] Ba (2013).

admitting Myanmar in the face of Western pressure) and through internal reform, most notably to the norm of non-interference and the ASEAN Charter. She focuses however, on ASEAN's legitimacy as an institution rather than the wider issue of its contribution to regional order negotiation and management. She thus focuses on ASEAN's status but not on the functions ASEAN performs in regional order management and how these may be embedded within bargains with the great powers.

It is here that this thesis makes its contribution. By focusing on negotiation between ASEAN and the great powers and analysing the mutual understandings they reach over their respective roles, we can better capture why ASEAN has been able to do so much for so long. Role negotiation shifts our focus away from structures of material capabilities or norms to the relational dynamics of legitimacy: how actors negotiate their legitimate identity, status and functions within international society[51]. ASEAN has been able to negotiate a legitimate role for itself that has enabled it to perform important order functions. It can use this role because the role is considered legitimate by the great powers. The role continues to be considered legitimate because ASEAN has been able to redefine, reclaim and renegotiate this role and root it within role bargains with the great powers. On top of better capturing the complexity and fluidity of ASEAN-great power interactions, this approach also balances between the implicit pessimism and optimism with respect to the basis of ASEAN's prominence of realism and constructivism respectively. The role bargains that sustain ASEAN's role can be underpinned by both instrumental *and* normative factors.

This introductory chapter now goes on to look at how great power-small power roles are commonly understood within the primary institutions of great power management and diplomacy. It proposes that the general neglect of the small power role is unwarranted and shows how we can re-conceptualise the key institutions of 'great power management' and 'diplomacy' by merging them to form a broader primary institution of 'order management'. Doing so provides us with a more neutral conceptual starting point from which to analyse how a wide range of actors could engage in role negotiation towards reaching bargains over their respective contributions to order negotiation and management.

[51] Stubbs (2014) similarly argues that ASEAN's prominence is due to its entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership and the fact that it is perceived as non-threatening and neutral by the great powers. Stubbs therefore highlights ASEAN's legitimacy, as well as arguing that ASEAN's leadership is not all-encompassing, but limited to specific sectors, principally providing initiatives for consultation and cooperation (Stubbs 2014: 530). He thus suggests that there may have been a division of labour negotiated between ASEAN and the great powers, but does not go into an analysis of how this may have been negotiated over time.

THE GREAT POWER ROLE

The notion of a distinct role for great powers is widespread across different theoretical traditions. For neorealists, great power responsibilities to the international system are rooted in their interests in maintaining stability. Only great powers can maintain stability; as Waltz stated: “[g]reat tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability”[52]. Classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau also saw the great powers as having a role in the settlement of political issues and governance based on their superior capabilities[53]. Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), which has both neorealist and neoliberal roots, clearly recognises the interests a preponderant power has to upholding the international system that it dominates[54]. The material bases of these theories mean that they equate order with stability regarding the distribution of capabilities; great powers necessarily have an interest in maintaining such stability so that they can maintain the distribution of capabilities in their favour.

The ES institution of great power management therefore gives the clearest expression of the great power role being based on social recognition by other members of international society and consisting of responsibilities in the social negotiation and management of order[55]. Indeed, some scholars have dubbed them the 'Great Responsibles', reflecting the primacy of social recognition and great power responsibilities to order as the basis for distinguishing great powers from the rest[56]. The social, and even legal, recognition of a distinct great power role dates back to at least the Congress of Vienna in 1815[57] and has been characterised by one scholar as 'legalised hegemony'[58]. When we analyse Bull's understanding of what makes a great power, we can clearly identify the three aspects of a social role: identity, status and function. Bull states that great powers recognise themselves as great powers with rights and responsibilities (identity), that they are recognised by their own population and other members of international society as such (status) and that they perform the functions or responsibilities of the great power role[59].

The great power role includes the primary functions of diplomatic leadership, balance of power and the provision of security and economic public goods[60]. These functions are directly

[52] Waltz (1979: 109).
[53] See Carr (1939: 137), Morgenthau (1948: 356-368).
[54] Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1981).
[55] Bull (1995: 196).
[56] See Zimmern (1936) and Wight (1979). For a critique of the US and Soviet Union neglecting this responsibility and acting as 'irresponsibles' see Bull (1980).
[57] Clark (1989: 114).
[58] Simpson (2004).
[59] Bull (1995).
[60] These functions, among others, are discussed in detail in Chapter One.

related to the twin responsibilities of great powers mentioned above of managing relations amongst themselves and providing central direction to international society. Within the ES, the fundamental aspect of great powers' managing relations amongst themselves is creating and maintaining a stable balance of power as a condition for international society from which other institutions can operate[61]. For this reason, many scholars treat balance of power as a derivative institution of great power management rather than a primary institution in and of itself[62]. It is in this sense a function of order to be performed by the great powers. The second responsibility of providing central direction to international society could be considered a special diplomatic responsibility, performing the function of diplomatic leadership.

Diplomatic leadership can be distinguished from the day to day practices associated with the institution of diplomacy as it involves the great powers exercising their preponderance to negotiate the material and normative foundations of order, particularly at times of transition and crisis[63]. These moments of great power negotiation are most clearly seen in the great peace conferences over the last few centuries[64]. Major wars represent times of upheaval and transition, when the foundations of order – material and normative – are up for renegotiation. Ian Clark discusses these foundations in his study of distributive and regulative aspects of peace settlements[65]. Peace settlements include the distribution of the 'spoils of peace' and sanctify the new distribution of power that arises out of war. By legitimising the distribution of capabilities through negotiating the distributive settlement, great powers can then use these capabilities for the common benefit of order. The two primary functions of the great power role that encompass this aspect are the provision of security and economic public goods. The notion of public goods provision is mostly associated with HST which analyses how a single preponderant power provides stability and order within the international system by using its capabilities to provide goods such as security of sea lanes, acting as a lender of last resort and material aid and assistance[66]. However, we need not only consider these public goods as universal, in the sense of being provided globally, nor limited to being provided by a single hegemon. To the extent that public goods can be provided at regional level or to a particular constituency (as club goods) we can consider them functions of the great power role more generally[67]. As part of the regulative settlement, great powers use their diplomatic leadership to perform the derivative functions of rule-making and secondary institution-building to ensure the

[61] Bull (1995: 201-202). For an analysis of US-China management of a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific from an ES perspective see Odgaard (2007).
[62] Buzan (2004a).
[63] Watson (1991: 195-211).
[64] Major studies of these times of post-war order-building include: Holsti (1991), Osiander (1991), Knutsen (1999), Clark (2001, 2005), Ikenberry (2001, 2011).
[65] Clark (2001).
[66] Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1981).
[67] For discussion of a hegemon providing club goods, see Brawley (2003/04).

peace lasts for as long as possible[68]. As discussed at the start of this introduction, the rules and norms to regulate states interactions are essential for order. The secondary institutions that great powers establish as part of the regulative settlement act as mechanisms through which rule-governed interaction will be upheld. These 'lock in' and formalise the arrangement over the material and normative foundations of order.

San Francisco in 1945 represents the clearest example to date of great powers exercising their prerogative as primary negotiators and managers of order. The victorious powers of the Second World War established the United Nations, providing a clear legal framework which outlined rules to govern interaction amongst states revolving around sovereign equality, non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Security Council was tasked with managing issues and conflicts that arose within international society, ensuring that the rules of order were upheld and that there was a cost to violation through sanctions or the threat or use of force. The five victors had a permanent seat on the Council and veto powers, embedding their special responsibilities in managing order within the UN framework.

However, the role of great powers is “given to them ... and is in significant measure constituted in the giving”[69]. Recognition of great powers' identity, status and function is crucial for the performance of a great power role and the order that they negotiate needs to be accepted by other members of international society to have legitimacy[70]. In this sense, implicit within the institution of great power management is not just a role for great powers, but also a corresponding role for small powers. In this arrangement great powers provide diplomatic leadership, balance of power and security and economic public goods, but small powers perform functions with respect to recognising the great powers and their visions for order as legitimate. It is this mutual understanding that gives the respective roles meaning. The next section will look at the small power side of this arrangement to see what other functions in order management the IR literature has ascribed to small powers.

THE SMALL POWER ROLE

Generally, IR has ignored small powers, particularly when it comes to theory-building. For positivists, because of their disposition towards explanatory power and parsimony, small powers have been peripheral to the real story of great power politics. Waltz considered it **“**ridiculous to

[68] Clark (2001: 53).
[69] Donnelly (2006: 153), see also Simpson (2004: 68).
[70] Bull (1995: 195-196).

construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica" because "a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers"[71]. They were relevant only as objects of great power rivalry, especially so as newly independent states arose during the height of the Cold War. Their position was defined by the material inequality of the international system[72] and they were therefore highly vulnerable in the face of larger powers, particularly the closer to a great power's sphere of influence they were[73]. This meant a limited range of policy options were available, mostly bandwagoning or balancing. Any influence a small power could have was mostly exercised within an alliance with a great power partner[74].

More recent literature however has begun to consider small power agency within international institutions. Small powers' weight of numbers enables them to form voting coalitions and push certain agendas. The potential for this to change the nature of international society as states emerged from colonialism was noted by Bull in his idea of a 'revolt against the West'[75]. Small powers can also engage in more specific agenda-setting on policy issues and also act as norm entrepreneurs[76]. Certain small powers can also act as neutral mediators for peace talks. These responsibilities suggest the small power role in order negotiation and management is limited to the 'normal' politics of international society. In this sense, the small power role would come under the primary institution of diplomacy. Small powers contribute to the development of rules and norms within specific policy areas and provide support in managing specific conflicts, but there is little to indicate that they can play a more expansive part in order negotiation and management during times of transition and crisis. These are the times when the great power role is most clearly relevant as discussed in the section above. The case of ASEAN in East Asia stands out in this respect because ASEAN was not merely supporting great powers in their initiatives at key junctures but was actively providing initiatives itself.

The contribution small powers can make to the 'normal' politics of international society within the institution of diplomacy is not the only sense in which a small power role relates to order in IR literature. As mentioned above, implicit within great power management is not only a great power role but also a corresponding small power role. Great and small powers strike a bargain. Small powers recognise great powers as legitimate, and great powers agree to use their power

[71] Waltz (1979: 73).
[72] Vital (1967).
[73] Mathisen (1971).
[74] Keohane (1971).
[75] Bull (1984).
[76] Ingebritsen (2002), Petrova (2007), Bjorkdahl (2008), Cooper and Shaw (2009), Panke (2012).

within certain constitutional limits[77]. These limits usually mean upholding the norms and social structure that protect small states' identity and their status as sovereign states with certain degrees of autonomy[78]. Great powers should also recognise the legitimising function that small powers have. The recent revisionist approach to order of the Bush Administration shows the consequences of not acknowledging the legitimising function other states have for a great power or hegemon role[79].

This bargain has been made more explicit in recent writings on hierarchy in international relations. For David Lake this is mostly expressed in hierarchical dyads, where one state will develop legitimate authority over another by providing them with *inter alia* security, aid and access to markets. In return, the subordinate state complies with the dominant state's wishes[80]. Evelyn Goh has a wider focus of hierarchy, looking at how a hierarchical order can have layers of different actors[81]. This "layered hierarchy" is maintained through social processes of assurance and deference. Assurance includes providing public goods, demonstration of benignity, provision of normative leadership, and provision of a mechanism for maintaining order. Deference includes not challenging the dominant state's position, adopting policies to reinforce its dominant position, ideological affinity, accommodation of dominant state's security imperatives, and greater prioritisation of their relationship over the subordinate's relationship with other great powers[82]. David Kang adds a cultural aspect to hierarchical orders, seeing East Asia before its interaction with the West as unusually peaceful[83]. He argues that the legitimacy of the Confucian social order maintained the hierarchy, even if the state of China itself was not held in such esteem (notably by Japan)[84]. He asserts that the history of hierarchical relations within East Asia has given regional states an inclination towards deference, especially to China, which accounts for the fact that these states have not tried to balance China's rise[85].

Brantly Womack also notes the exceptional nature of East Asian history that defies western IR's theoretical assumptions. He rejects the idea that there will be any return to the type of hierarchy that used to exist in East Asia, but sees similarities in the current asymmetry in China's relations with its neighbours[86]. His concern is not necessarily with the more tangible forms of assurances and

77 Ikenberry (2001), Finnemore (2009).
78 Suzuki (2008).
79 Reus-Smit (2004).
80 Lake (2007), (2009a), (2009b).
81 Goh (2008).
82 Goh (2008: 359). For an extensive analysis of how this hierarchy has been negotiated in post-Cold War East Asia see Goh (2013).
83 Kang (2010a).
84 Kang (2010b).
85 Kang (2003, 2007).
86 Womack (2010: 3).

deference that Lake and Goh highlight, but with the fundamental relationship of respect between a larger and smaller power that serves to manage the inherent asymmetry in their relations. Instability comes from the tendency of the larger state to be inattentive to the smaller state's position, and for the smaller to be over-attentive towards the larger, creating tension and leading to crises. In order to manage this, the larger state assures the smaller that it will uphold their autonomy and identity and the smaller state reciprocates with deference. An example of this may be the larger state respecting the small state's right to make its own policies in certain areas free from interference, with the small state deferring to the larger's position perhaps in a dispute with a third party. This pattern can be peaceful because, as long as the reciprocal recognition continues, there will be a framework for dealing with problems that avoids the cycle of rise and fall that domination and resistance produce[87]. Womack claims this can be maintained through the rituals of diplomacy, especially high level visits of state.

Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the negotiated bargain between great powers and the rest in determining the terms of the great power's role is in the work of G. John Ikenberry[88]. He has explored how hierarchy can operate in international orders. He defines power in terms of material capabilities but argues that we need to look at how power is used. A leading state can use its power to enforce its dominance through coercion or can establish agreed upon rules and institutions which it operates through. This involves a bargain between the leading power and subordinate states by which they develop these rules and institutions to manage order. The dominant power will show strategic restraint by operating within these rules and institutions and in return receives support for its policies. The type of bargains that are struck will determine where the hierarchy operates on the continuum between imperial and liberal[89]. These bargains can be made through multilateral institutions which determine the rules through which states should operate – 'rule through rules' – or bilaterally through the provision of public goods in return for political support – 'rule through relationship'[90].

Ikenberry's work is problematic in that it tends to be ideological, equating US post-war hegemony with the ideal type of 'liberal hierarchy'. However, he makes an interesting point in that different bargains can be struck depending on the states involved, meaning that there can be differing degrees of hierarchy, as well as different meanings attached to the great power social role. The role of a great power can therefore mean different things in different political spaces depending

87 Womack (2010: 29-30).
88 Ikenberry (2001, 2011).
89 Ikenberry (2011: 75).
90 Ikenberry (2011: 81).

on the kind of bargain that has been struck between the great and small powers. This thesis agrees on this point. For this reason the next section makes the case for how we can conceptually move away from understanding roles within the separate primary institutions of great power management and diplomacy, to situating them within the more neutral institution of 'order management'. This allows us to be more flexible in analysing different manifestations of great power and small power roles in different social contexts.

FROM 'GREAT POWER MANAGEMENT' TO 'ORDER MANAGEMENT'

Implicit within all the work on the great power-small power bargains is a social arrangement on respective roles: a role bargain. Great and small powers reach a working agreement on their respective identities, statuses and functions, although the literature pays less attention to the small power side of the bargain. There is some recognition of the functions small powers can perform within international institutions in specific policy areas; however, there is little indication that small powers can perform key functions related to the negotiation and management of order at times of transition or crisis. As suggested above, the type of social arrangement made between great and small powers can vary depending on the social context and the different states involved. There is therefore a need to broaden our understanding of how order is negotiated and managed. For this reason, this thesis posits that we should conceptually merge the institutions of 'diplomacy' and 'great power management' to form a the more general institution of 'order management'. Order management can be made up of roles for various different actors, providing a more neutral territory from which to analyse different actors' responsibilities that does not assume that the key functions are always performed by the great powers. As Bisley[91] has pointed out, the very prominent role for great powers in order negotiation and management is a historically contingent social arrangement rooted in European international society. It is not universally applicable to all international societies. Likewise, great power ‘special responsibilities’ do not necessarily apply across the board, but can be issue-specific and different actors can have different responsibilities depending on the issue at hand[92]. Other social arrangements are therefore possible; other actors can have important roles in negotiating and managing order.

The rationale of merging diplomacy and great power management to form the institution of 'order management' becomes clearer when we consider how these institutions have been applied in the case of East Asia and the question of ASEAN's role. Yuen Foong Khong argues that ASEAN has contributed to regional order through acting as the main driver of multilateralism – which he

[91] Bisley (2012).
[92] Bukovansky et al (2012).

includes within the primary institution of diplomacy[93]. For Khong, this is separate from, but fundamentally linked to, the lack of a completely functioning institution of great power management in East Asia. China and Japan have been unable to perform the associated functions of great power management – managing relations with each other and providing central direction within regional society[94] - and therefore the US and ASEAN have stepped in to take over these functions. This is also the major conclusion of Evelyn Goh in her study of great power management in East Asia[95]. Rosemary Foot treats diplomacy as part of the primary institution of great power management because, as she argues, its "derivative institutions of bilateralism and multilateralism function in important ways as a means to deal predominantly with forms of power"[96]. This also allows her to deal with ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy as part of great power management, in a similar fashion to Khong and Goh. However, by treating ASEAN's managerial prominence as part of 'great power management', the conclusion reached, especially by Goh, is that there is a failure of great power management in East Asia as the regional great powers (China and Japan) have passed the buck up (to the US) and down (to ASEAN). Using the broader institution of 'order management' does not presuppose that great powers *exclusively* have primary responsibility for negotiating and managing order. It therefore does not presuppose that there is a deficiency where great power management does not operate as assumed. It also allows us to look more deeply at how actors may have negotiated variegated responsibilities in managing order in the region.

As indicated throughout the discussion in this introduction, when analysing social roles it is conceptually more fruitful to consider the functions that need to be performed in managing order, rather than ascertaining actors' responsibilities from the derivative institutions commonly associated with diplomacy and great power management. This thesis therefore posits that the primary institution of 'order management' does not have associated derivative institutions, but consists of 'order functions' that need to be performed. These order functions differ depending on the particular order under study and will be performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations over social roles. The next section shows that the key for understanding what order functions are relevant and which actors' will perform them as part of their roles, is legitimacy. Negotiating a legitimate social role involves establishing a working agreement on actors' respective identities, statuses and the order functions they will perform. This is achieved through the practice of legitimation.

[93] Khong (2014).
[94] Bull (1995: 200).
[95] Goh (2014a).
[96] Foot (2014: 191).

SOCIAL ROLES AND LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy in international society is an empirical question[97]. If the actor's identity, status and function are considered rightful then they have a legitimate role. In this way legitimacy should not be conflated with any particular norms. Legitimacy is not synonymous with legality, morality or constitutionality but is a composite of, and an accommodation between, a number of different norms[98]. It does not have its own standard by which identity, status and function can be measured. Instead actors must engage in the political practice of legitimation to gain acceptance that these elements are rightful[99]. States must make legitimacy claims with respect to their identity, status and function to claim a role. Norms are still very important because it is through the language of norms that legitimation takes place[100]. However, legitimacy depends on the responses of other actors: claims need to be endorsed. This practice of claims and endorsement will be expanded into an analytical framework for analysing role negotiation in the next chapter. The key for now is to acknowledge the importance of the legitimacy of an actor's identity, status and function for establishing the role it performs.

ARGUMENT IN BRIEF AND CHAPTER PREVIEWS

This thesis shows how role bargains have been negotiated between ASEAN and the US and ASEAN and China at different points from to Cold War to the present day. These bargains have been cumulative, laying social foundations for ongoing role negotiation, which accounts for why ASEAN has been so prominent in regional order negotiation and management. It is worth noting at this point that, unless otherwise stated, the terms used to describe each actors' roles throughout the thesis have been coined by the author himself based on the key identity, status and function elements identified as part of the thesis' analysis of role negotiation. The reason for this is that these roles were not necessarily explicitly identified by the key actors themselves, and therefore were not given names. The names for the roles posited by the thesis are intended to capture the key features of the implicit mutual understandings of the actors at the time and to provide analytical clarity in trying to understand complex processes of negotiation over time.

The first key role bargain, discussed in Chapter Two, was that which emerged in the late 1960s/early 1970s between the newly formed ASEAN and the US. The US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role was first legitimised within this bargain, and has since been upheld through further

[97] Clark (2005: 254).
[98] Clark (2005: 207).
[99] Clark (2005: 3), Reus-Smit (2007).
[100] Clark (2007: 4).

role negotiation. The term 'offshore great power guarantor' captures the fact that the US maintains its dominant military presence within the region through its naval bases and its series of bilateral security alliances and relationships with maritime states. Apart from in South Korea, since its withdrawal from Vietnam and Thailand in the 1970s, the US has not maintained bases on 'mainland' East Asia. The US' nature as a guarantor of security and order, comes from the perceived stability its predominance produces, through reassuring partners and deterring potential challengers, notably China. Robert Sutter in a recent study interviewed a number of Asia-Pacific government officials, who nearly all viewed the US as performing the "leading role as the Asia-Pacific region's security guarantor"[101]. Natasha Hamilton-Hart also notes the near uniform positive views of Southeast Asian practitioners regarding the US' security role[102]. Regional officials are therefore comfortable with the US' strategic dominance[103]. However, they are less comfortable with the US' occasional political interference in what they consider domestic or regional affairs. Hence the preference for the US' 'offshore' position refers not just to its strategic-military presence, but also its political presence, as an actor to be invited in rather than to wield overt political leadership[104]. I argue that the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role needs to be understood as situated within role bargains *vis a vis* ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia and 'regional conductor' role in the Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN-US role bargain during the Cold War redefined the great power role by decoupling the key function of diplomatic leadership and transferring it to ASEAN. It suited the US at this point to not interfere in regional or domestic affairs too overtly and allow ASEAN to perform diplomatic leadership. The US had achieved its goal of nurturing anti-communist regimes in the five founding ASEAN member states and did not want to disrupt the legitimacy of these regimes and ASEAN by appearing to be too involved in their politics. ASEAN did not challenge the US' interests but rather legitimised US imperatives regarding communist containment in the region through its diplomatic leadership by: managing intra-ASEAN relations and engaging in regional reconciliation; determining regional norms such as non-interference which would be directed at trying to limit Chinese and Soviet influence within the maritime subregion; and in providing diplomatic initiatives to support US actions in Indochina. This last aspect was demonstrated in the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia in 1970, which sought to legitimise US support for the anti-communist Lon Nol government.

This redefinition of the great power role was further consolidated during the Cambodian conflict, discussed in Chapter Three, as ASEAN negotiated a role bargain with China. Thailand, and

[101]Sutter (2009: 271).
[102]Hamilton-Hart (2012).
[103]See Goh (2008).
[104]Examples of such sentiment are numerous. For example, a recent backlash against 'US interference' came in the wake of US officials criticising the May 2014 coup in Thailand.

by extension ASEAN, needed to draw on a source of countervailing power to balance Vietnam's potential hegemony in Indochina after it invaded Cambodia. As the US was acting as the 'offshore guarantor' in the wake of the Vietnam conflict, China stepped in to take on the role of 'regional great power guarantor', through which it performed the function of holding the line against Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism. China therefore provided the needed balance of power within Indochina. China was the guarantor of ASEAN, and its established non-communist status quo, against any possible Soviet-Vietnamese backed insurgency or direct penetration. ASEAN as the 'primary manager' provided the diplomatic vanguard internationally for the anti-Vietnamese coalition which served to legitimise the opposition to Vietnam's actions, especially China's support for the ousted Khmer Rouge. Through this bargain, ASEAN was able to expand its diplomatic leadership over the full extent of Southeast Asia by having China, as well as other external partners, recognise that ASEAN norms and processes should take precedent over Cambodia in the event of Vietnam's withdrawal. When the Vietnamese did eventually withdraw, this removed the basis for China's 'regional great power guarantor' role, but China had become a key player in the region and therefore the need for China's regional role-taking continued. ASEAN emerged with its 'primary manager' role strengthened and expanded as it had gained substantial status recognition for its diplomatic activism during the conflict.

Within the post-Cold War context however, not only was the bargain with China destabilised but so was the bargain with the US. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the rationale for the US' strategic presence in the region. ASEAN therefore engaged both powers as a means to legitimise the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the new strategic context and begin a process of socialising China into taking on a 'responsible regional great power' role. However, ASEAN could not guarantee its relevance in a context where the major strategic issues, and great power attention, were no longer focused on Southeast Asia. As shown in Chapter Four, ASEAN captured the debate over the formation of a regional security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific and in the process created for itself the 'regional conductor' role. It enacted the role by establishing the ARF and putting its norms within the TAC forward as a regional code of conduct. ASEAN ensured its continued relevance by situating its 'regional conductor' role within a role bargain with the US by giving the US an invitation to engage the region, bolstering the Clinton administration's efforts to garner domestic support for its continued commitment to Asia through the 'offshore great power guarantor' role. ASEAN also situated its role within a bargain with China by offering China a forum within which it could begin to demonstrate its desire to take on a 'responsible regional great power' role, and therefore avoid containment and promote inward investment, but also a forum within which its interests - especially over Taiwan - would not be at stake. The subsequent years of the

post-Cold War period have seen ASEAN respond to challenges to these initial bargains by redefining and reclaiming its role, seeking to further embed its 'regional conductor' role in more consolidated bargains with the US and China. These negotiations have seen ASEAN expand its role by exercising its inclusive engagement of all major powers in more forums (ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit, and ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus) and by securing formal commitment to its norms as part of the criteria for membership of the EAS (through having to sign the TAC). At the same time, this has put pressure on ASEAN to reform its 'primary manager' role to demonstrate credibility in performing functions at the wider Asia-Pacific level. This effort at reform has revealed tensions between the imperative of maintaining the 'regional conductor' role as a means to shape the external environment ASEAN operates within, and the imperative of the 'primary manager' role to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference. This makes it difficult for ASEAN to maintain unity and a common understanding needed for boosting its 'regional conductor' role, which accompanied by increasing great power rivalry over the South China Sea dispute, threatens ASEAN's ability to keep performing the role.

Having presented the main flow of the thesis' argument, it is necessary to outline each chapter more systematically. Chapter One, outlines the framework through which to analyse role negotiation. It reviews how role theory has been used in IR and identifies the constituent elements of identity, status and function in the emphases of different approaches to roles in the literature. It shows that roles need to be negotiated through the practice of legitimation and identifies three role processes that will be applied in the empirical chapters: role redefinition, role taking and role creation. It then discusses the methodology used in this thesis and how the role negotiation analytical framework is operationalised.

Chapter Two is the first empirical chapter which analyses the process of role redefinition in Southeast Asia in the early Cold War decades. It focuses on negotiations that took place from the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 up to the end of the Vietnam War and shows how the US and regional states redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia. The function of diplomatic leadership was decoupled from the great power role and transferred to regional states. This came about through a struggle between the US and Indonesia to establish a grand strategic narrative for the region. The US' ‘containment’ narrative identified the boundaries of non-communist Southeast Asia that needed to be protected through containment of an expansionist communist threat. The US' ‘great power guardian’ role conception envisioned its own deep involvement in the region through military intervention, showing similarities to the colonial great power role in its concern for the stewardship of newly independent states. Indonesia's

‘autonomy’ grand strategic narrative recognised a more diffuse region of emerging post-colonial states that should have autonomy over their own affairs. Indonesia's ‘indigenous great power liberator’ role conception sought to exclude and replace any role for external powers. Indonesia tried to enact its role claim through confrontation first against the Dutch in West Papua and then Malaysia. In the late 1960s, political change in Indonesia brought to power a staunchly anti-communist regime and the US began to disengage from Vietnam. This allowed for the US to subcontract diplomatic leadership to regional states in order to satisfy the goals of containment of the communist threat and autonomy through the concept of national and regional resilience whereby regional states would take primary responsibility for security through combating insurgency and the US would provide security public goods. This redistribution of functions with respect to great and small power roles laid the groundwork for the further negotiation of roles in the two later periods.

Chapter Three analyses the process of role-taking during the Third Indochina War. It argues that the conflict acted as a catalyst for China taking on a ‘regional great power guarantor’ role. ASEAN and China negotiated a division of labour with respect to managing the conflict which brought China out of its previous social alienation to perform legitimate regional order functions. It also shows how ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership was expanded from its initial maritime sub-region to cover the full extent of Southeast Asia. Through this expanded diplomatic leadership, ASEAN was able to limit the extent of China's great power role-taking to the specific circumstances of the Third Indochina conflict by diluting the influence of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge and asserting the salience of their own rules and processes over Cambodia. The expansion of ASEAN’s remit built on the negotiations during the period covered in Chapter Two and provided foundations for creating ASEAN’s ‘regional conductor’ role in post-Cold War East Asia.

Chapter Four analyses this process of role creation in post-Cold War East Asia. It shows how ASEAN conceptualised the ‘regional conductor’ role as part of an effort to maintain its relevance in the emerging order, but also as part of an effort to legitimise and embed complimentary great power roles for the US and China within a regional role bargain. The great powers endorsed ASEAN's role, enabling ASEAN to perform important functions with respect to the negotiation and management of the emerging regional order. The chapter shows how ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role subsequently faced challenges from Western constituencies that contested ASEAN's competence to lead institutions, and also from China which contests ASEAN's rule-making in the South China Sea dispute. ASEAN has maintained its role by re-conceptualising and reclaiming the role at key junctures, brokering transitional role bargains that allow ASEAN to keep performing diplomatic leadership. However, this chapter also shows how ASEAN's impact on regional order

through its role is limited; it cannot address fundamental issues between the great powers. It also identifies the challenges for ASEAN's role in the future, principally the need to stay united in the face of emerging great power rivalry.

The thesis ends with a concluding chapter summarising the findings of the thesis and highlighting possible avenues of further research.

Chapter One - Role negotiation in international society

The introductory chapter to this thesis showed how, when it comes to the big questions of order negotiation and management, IR has generally focused on the role of great powers, neglecting the contribution small powers can make. However, the puzzle of ASEAN's important part in negotiating and managing order in Southeast and East Asia at times of transition and crisis, shows that we need to broaden our understanding of order negotiation and management beyond great powers. An analysis of social role negotiation can explain this puzzle because roles capture how power is constituted through relationships of legitimacy and thereby how small powers can be enabled to act in areas traditionally deemed the realm of great powers. ASEAN has successfully created a 'regional conductor' role which it has been able to sustain through redefining, reclaiming and renegotiating its legitimacy.

The previous chapter provided the conceptual framework for this thesis, rooting social roles in the primary institution of 'order management' – a merging of the ES institutions of great power management and diplomacy. Order management provides a more neutral category for understanding who performs what roles in relation to order negotiation and management. In theory, any actor can contribute as long as the actor's role has been given legitimacy through negotiation. It is the process of *role negotiation* therefore that is crucial for understanding actors' roles in order negotiation and management. Social roles have three elements: identity, status and function. Role negotiation in international society involves establishing the legitimacy of the these three elements. This chapter focuses on developing an analytical framework for capturing the process of role negotiation. In developing the analytical framework, this chapter has two parts.

The first part reviews the literature associated with role theory and how it has been applied in IR so far. This review shows how scholars have mainly focused on the identity and status elements of roles. Those emphasising identity focus their analysis on national role conceptions, looking at what roles state actors believe their state should perform. Their analysis is mainly focused on the domestic constructions of such role conceptions[1]. Scholars that account for status have mainly done so within a structural analysis of roles. For these scholars, roles exist independently from individual states within the social structure of international society. Status provides the link between an individual state and a social role. Once the state comes to perform the role, the role then prescribes what is appropriate behaviour for the state in that role[2]. The reason

[1]Holsti (1970), Walker (1987), Chefetz et al (1996), Le Prestre (1997).
[2]Wendt (1999), Doran (1991, 2000), Thies (2012).

these two branches of role theory overlook the question of functions is because they generally seek to explain individual states' foreign policy behaviour rather than exploring how roles can be negotiated between states to perform functions related to order negotiation and management. It is here that this thesis advances the state of the art, based on the conceptual framework provided by the English School. This thesis conceptualises roles as social objects that have a shared existence within international society based on their legitimacy. This contrasts with previous scholars' conception of roles as existing within the subjective 'mind' of states or within the social macro-structure of international society. Social roles are linked to order through the functions associated with the role. If an actor successfully negotiates for itself a legitimate social role, it can use the role to perform functions related to the negotiation and management of order. As legitimacy is an empirical question based on states' mutual understandings, we therefore need to develop an analytical framework that can capture the actual negotiations that take place within international society.

The second part of the chapter moves on to outline such a role negotiation framework. It identifies three role processes that illustrate how states come to perform legitimate social roles within international society and how new roles can be created: role redefinition, role-taking and role creation. It then discusses types of order functions that may need to be performed by actors in managing order. The chapter then outlines the framework of legitimation, which provides a basis for analysing how actors negotiate roles through a two-way process of role claiming and endorsement. This offers the most effective means for capturing the process of negotiation between actors on their way to reaching mutual understandings over their respective roles. The resulting mutual understandings are then captured through the analytical tool of the 'role bargain', which was discussed in the last chapter as being implicit within the existing literature of great power/small power roles. This chapter finishes by discussing the methodology and the data sources used in gathering evidence for the thesis' analysis of the role bargains reached between the ASEAN states and the great powers. This sets up the next three empirical chapters which trace the processes by which ASEAN came to perform its prominent role in regional order negotiation and management.

ROLE THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Role theory developed from sociological analysis. Sociological role theory has traditionally been split between structural role theory and symbolic interactionism. Structural role theory defines roles as a collection of normative expectations about appropriate behaviour for an individual in a

particular position within society[3]. In this view, roles are played according to a script of role expectations that are embedded within the social structure. The strength of structural role theory is its ability to account for the effects of social structure on interactions and on human behaviour. However, as with all structural theories, it struggles to account for individual agency. This is where symbolic interactionism is more useful. Symbolic interactionism developed principally from the work of George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer[4] who define roles not in terms of social structure, but in terms of interaction. When individuals engage in interaction, they take on roles by taking on the perspective of the Other. The Other, or "generalised other", rather than social position, becomes the principle source of role behaviour. This accounts for agency by showing how individuals create shared meanings between each other through gestures. However, symbolic interactionism has less to say about the effect of social structure on behaviour. Later scholars therefore sought to integrate the structural and interactionist approaches to develop a more holistic role theory that could account for structure and agency[5].

Both structural role theory and symbolic interactionism have been highly influential within IR. However, much of role theory in IR departs from these traditions that put an emphasis on status and instead emphasises role identity as the primary explanation for state behaviour. Indeed, the principal fault line in the debate over roles in IR is not whether we should look at social structure or interactions; rather, it is whether to locate roles within the subjective understanding of the state itself – its own role conception – or as an objective part of the social structure of international society. The first tradition has been popular within Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) whereas the second is associated with recent constructivist work. This chapter finds that both traditions have something to say for the negotiation of roles in international society because together they highlight two of the three elements of a role: identity and status. Their neglect of functions however, means they are limited in advancing our understanding of how roles are negotiated in international society. The next two sections explore these limits before discussing how a focus on functions provides the key for developing a more flexible framework that avoids the limitations of looking at identity and status in isolation.

Role conceptions and identity

The identity element of roles is most clearly associated with the literature on role conceptions. Kal

[3] Turner (1956: 316).
[4] Mead (1934), Blumer (1969).
[5] Stryker (1980), Stryker and Statham (1985), see also Handel (1979), Callero (1986).

Holsti[6] introduced role theory to IR and set the tone for this literature when he emphasised how a state's 'role conception' was the key to understanding its foreign policy behaviour. Holsti's framework was based on four key role concepts. The first is role performance, which is the actual foreign policy action that states take. Second, role conception, which is the self-defined, subjective understanding of a role a state feels it should play. Third, role prescriptions, which are the expectations about behaviour that are external to the individual state, coming from the structure of the international system, social norms and other actors. Finally there is the social position or status that the state occupies which consists of a system of role prescriptions[7]. Holsti wanted to explain a state's foreign policy decisions and actions (role performance) and posited that national role conceptions (subjective) and role prescriptions (expectations about behaviour coming from others and the structure of international society) as possible independent variables.

Holsti chose to analyse role conceptions and rejected role prescriptions as a useful variable for explaining role performance because he saw international society as too underdeveloped. As he states: “the expectations of other governments, legal norms expressed through custom, general usage, or treaties, and available sanctions to enforce these are ill-defined, flexible, or weak compared to those that exist in an integrated society and particularly within formal organisations”[8]. In this context, a state’s identity, embodied in its subjective role conception, took precedence over status and function. Others followed Holsti in neglecting role prescriptions and focusing on subjective role conceptions[9]. Most of this research used quantitative data, based on a collection of references to roles made in speeches and communiques by national leaders, building up a picture of how states viewed their own roles and how this affected foreign policy behaviour. This research programme went through various different states and analysed and compared how they viewed themselves.

More recent literature has drawn on the work of Sheldon Stryker who sought to integrate structural role theory and symbolic interactionism[10]. It has begun to explore the actual interactions of states in international politics and how roles may provide a bridge between agent and structure. These studies have begun to take account of role prescriptions and social position[11]. They provide a good update to Holsti's work, as they consider the effects of status. However, their analysis remains focused mostly on how role prescriptions affect states' own role conceptions. Flockhart recently

[6] Holsti (1970).
[7] Holsti (1970: 241).
[8] Holsti (1970: 243).
[9] Walker (1987), Chefetz et al (1996), Le Prestre (1997).
[10] Stryker (1980), Stryker and Statham (1985), see also Handel (1979), Callero (1986).
[11] Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011), see also January issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2012).

stated that “[r]ole theory is useful for explaining the interactive processes between agents and the structural conditions affecting the individual agent, but in the end the outcome of the influence exercised through structure and interactive processes is the agent's own role conception”[12]. The focus remains on individual states and trying to explain or understand their foreign policy behaviour through role conceptions. This has neglected the possibility that through interaction states may negotiate roles that exist in some way beyond any one individual state's role conception, having a shared and negotiated existence within the society of states.

This work on role conceptions is useful for establishing how states understand their own roles. This thesis incorporates role conceptions as a crucial part of the analytical framework developed later in the chapter. By itself however analysis of role conceptions is not enough for our purposes of understanding the negotiation of roles in international society. Role conceptions are the beginning of the role negotiation process, forming the basis for role claims, which need to be endorsed in order for the actor to legitimately perform the role. Status must be considered as a crucial element of roles and not just for its effect on how a state perceives itself. The next section will look at how analyses that emphasise role prescriptions have accounted for status, but have tended to do so from a structural perspective. As will be shown, this makes them less flexible in understanding how roles can be changed. This provides the rationale for the chapter to move on to discuss how functions need to be incorporated.

Role prescriptions and status

Those that emphasise the salience of role prescriptions for explaining state behaviour have situated roles outside of individual states' subjectivity as part of the social structure of international society. Alexander Wendt states that “[u]nlike foreign policy role theorists, who treat roles as qualities that states attribute to themselves, and thus as properties of agents ... I have focused on the role attributed to the Other, and thus on role as a *position* in or property of a social structure”[13]. Wendt considers a role conception as a subjective role-identity, but sees roles themselves as an objective social fact within the social structure of international politics. For Wendt, status is the link between an actor and the objective role. He identifies three principal roles: enemy, rival and friend. These roles accord with his three cultures of anarchy respectively: Hobbesian, Lockian and Kantian[14]. The problem with Wendt's roles are that they are very abstract collective representations within the macro-structure of his three cultures of anarchy. He does not provide any empirical analysis of

[12] Flockhart (2011: 99).
[13] Wendt (1999: 264) original emphasis.
[14] Wendt (1999: 246-312).

roles. However, he does suggest that roles could be a property of micro-structures – what he understands as the level of interaction between states - and elsewhere gives the example of Great Britain performing the role of 'balancer' in the Concert of Europe[15]. The notion that roles are developed through interaction is taken further by Charles Doran and Cameron Thies, who also hold a structural view of roles.

Doran sees roles as a product of structure, linked closely with material power. A state's 'international political role' consists of the responsibilities associated with its relative position in the international system i.e. provider of security or dependent on security, aid giver or aid recipient, lender or debtor[16]. Although these roles depend mostly on what a government does, a role cannot exist unless other states acknowledge that role. Roles consequently need to be legitimised through an informal process of strategy and bargaining[17]. Doran has integrated this understanding of role into his power-cycle theory emphasising how 'power-role' gaps can arise when states have power not commensurate with their international political role (or vice-versa)[18]. A major example would be the inter-war years where the US had the power to underwrite the international economic system but did not accept the role and thus did not try to legitimise it. Although this analysis relies heavily on material power, it also acknowledges the social aspect of how roles are negotiated or legitimised within international society through interaction. It is also useful when thinking about how states may have roles that do not necessarily accord with their material capabilities as is arguably the case now in East Asia.

The importance of negotiation or bargaining is also acknowledged by Cameron Thies[19]. He argues that his 'socialisation game' can help understand the way states interact in negotiating roles, and how those roles link with the material structure. Indeed he claims that socialisation itself is essentially a role bargaining process[20]. His game includes two players, A and B, who interact within 'nature' –i.e. the material and normative factors that make up the international system. Player A engages in a process of 'role location' where it locates a role within the social structure that it would like to play in the international system. Nature decides whether they are a 'type one' player (have the capabilities to perform the role) or a 'type two' player (lack the necessary capabilities). A can try to enact the role and B responds by either accepting A in the role or rejecting it. Depending on whether A is a 'type one' or 'two' player, and whether B accepts or rejects, will determine whether the

[15] Wendt (1999: 257, 259).
[16] Doran (1991: 30-31).
[17] Doran (2000: 338-339).
[18] Lahneman (2003).
[19] Thies (2012).
[20] Thies (2012: 29).

outcome accords with structural conditions. For example, if A is 'type one' and B accepts their enactment of the role then this accords with structural conditions and counts as B socialising A into the system. Similarly, if A is a 'type two' player and B rejects their role enactment then this accords with structure and also counts as socialising. B gives A an indication of A's incapability to perform the role. However, if A is 'type two' and B accepts the role enactment, then this does not accord with structure and the players may experience problems further down the line. If A is 'type one' and B does not accept the role enactment then this would also not accord with structure and perhaps A will try to enact the role regardless causing friction between the players. Thies considers there to be four 'master roles' of emerging state, small member state, large member state/regional power and great power. These master roles are considered to exist across all social systems but may include many auxiliary roles that states may locate to perform[21].

Thies' conception of roles is similar to Wendt's in that he considers them to be a part of the overarching social structure. He takes the analysis further however in introducing agency in the role claimant's initial 'role location', and interaction by showing the necessity for a response from another player. The framework remains rather restricted to socialisation and the role location process relies on prior existence of a social structure made up of roles from which a state can choose. However, is useful when considering how existing roles can be redefined and how these roles may link back to the material structure. For example, if the US' great power role was redefined as not including the function of diplomatic leadership, then this may not be in line with structure as the US is the one with the capabilities to effectively perform diplomatic leadership through strong and substantive institution-building and rule-making. The 'players' in the region may experience problems down the line in that institutions for seriously addressing the various conflicts and disputes in the region may not be in place, as many would argue is the case in East Asia. However, Thies' socialisation game does not deal with the creation of new roles, which is the primary case in this thesis. A more useful framework would include scope for novelty in A's initial move, by allowing it to conceptualise and claim a new role.

Identifying roles as part of the social structure helps us move beyond the analysis of individual states' role conceptions and overemphasis of identity. Wendt acknowledges how role identity and the role itself are separate. His roles are very abstract as he is more interested in making meta-theoretical claims about how macro-structures and actors are mutually constituted. The role bargaining frameworks discussed by Doran and Thies are more useful as they include clear bargaining over both identity and status. This thesis recognises that roles can already exist within

[21] Thies (2012: 33-34).

international society and that states can negotiate themselves into a pre-existing role or can be socialised into a role. Thies' socialisation game is useful for establishing how states can engage in the processes of role redefinition and role taking. These processes would start with role location and then involve the practice of legitimation – seeking to gain endorsement from others that the state's identity and status match the role and it can thus perform the legitimate functions of that role. This thesis also posits that roles can be created, which raises the question of how this can be done. However, although Thies' framework is helpful to a certain extent in understanding processes of role redefinition and role-taking, a structural approach to roles still lacks flexibility when it comes to understanding change. It therefore cannot fully account for the creation and redefinition of roles. The next section will explore how to conceptualise social roles in a way that allows for them to be an objective aspect of international society but also malleable in the sense that they can be redefined and even created by actors through negotiation. It argues that the key to this is to emphasise the overlooked element of functions.

Roles negotiation: roles as social objects and the importance of functions

The challenge for understanding how roles can be redefined and created involves showing how roles can be linked to structure and individuals. Hollis and Smith argue that social structure and elements of structure, such as roles, are external from actors individually, but are internal to them all collectively[22]. Hollis and Smith see roles as a part of structure that both constrains and enables an actor. They constrain because of the norms and expectations attached to them, but they also enable because these norms and expectations are “underdefined” which means that actors have to use their own judgement in order to perform the role[23]. Aggestram[24] also looks at how individuals use their own judgement. She uses structuration and the concept of the 'situated actor' to establish an ontology that takes account of the individual, interaction and structure. The situated actor is embedded in various institutional structures from which role expectations are generated. However, the actor does not operate mechanically but reflexively, interpreting the expectations and experimenting with different ways to adequately perform the role. This is considered to be a process of learning and can lead to the adoption of new roles. The degree to which roles can change

[22] Hollis (1994: 180). John Searle (2010) splits objectivity and subjectivity into two areas: ontological and epistemic. Ontological objectivity and subjectivity have to do with the existence of entities; empistemic objectivity and subjectivity have to do with the epistemic status of claims. He thus poses the problem as: “How can there be an epistemically objective set of statements about a reality which is ontologically subjective?” (Searle 2010: 18). An example being that Barack Obama is the President of the US – an epistemically objective statement (independent of anyone's feelings or attitudes) but ontologically subjective (the position of President and the US as a nation are categories dependent on the common intentionality of people).

[23] Hollis and Smith (1990: 157), Hollis (1994).

[24] Aggestram (2006).

depends on the extent to which the actor is role-playing or non-reflexively role-taking[25]. The idea that the actor is situated within certain interactions and institutional structures, as well as the introduction of novelty from an actor's own interpretation and experimentation with roles, is perceptive. Again this represents a negotiation over an actor's identity and status.

This 'shared existence', individually interpreted is best captured by positing roles as social objects[26]. Roles can be more than just subjective role conceptions but also need not solely be properties of macro-structures. They can be negotiated within the actual interactions that go on between states. Through negotiation, roles take on existence as social objects, that is, social constructions that have a shared meaning within a particular community and experienced as an objectively real aspect of the community. They prove themselves to be social objects because they need to be taken into account within interaction much like physical objects. Physical objects show their existence through 'contact experience' because they offer brute resistance – i.e. if you walk into a coffee table, you know about it! Social objects are validated through interaction – if the social role facilitates the completion of a social act then by definition it must be shared[27]. Roles can be used as a resource to facilitate social action[28]. This is due to the functions that are attached to them.

This ontology fits the English School conceptual framework set up in the introductory chapter. We can demonstrate this through applying the ontology to our earlier discussion of the great power role. The role of ‘great power’ exists as a social object in international society because it needs to be taken into account within interactions and can facilitate the completion of social acts. Indeed it has been a dominant feature of interactions since at least 1815. Large and small actors alike cannot ignore the great power role. It can also be used as a resource to facilitate significant social action because of the *functions* attached to it. Once a state is recognised as a great power, they become imbued with all the rights and responsibilities attached to the role – they can perform its functions. The remit of legitimate social action changes and the state can use the role to engage in social action it may not have been able to before. No doubt being accepted as a great power in the late 19th/early 20th Century greatly facilitated Japan's imperial actions in its near abroad at a time when imperialism and the civilising mission were key functions of the great power role. It is within this that we see how identity, status and function combine to form a social role.

However, roles change over time. David McCourt shows how this was the case with the

[25] Aggestram (2006: 25).
[26] Callero (1986), Callero et al (1987).
[27] Callero et al (1987: 248-249).
[28] Baker and Faulkner (1991), Callero (1994).

great power role. He analyses Britain's response to the Suez Crisis in 1956 using an interactionist role framework that draws on George Herbert Mead. He argues that states role-play but not solely from a script like in structuralist theory, but rather through engaging in the processes of role-taking, role-making and alter-casting. Interestingly, his 'role-making' process indicates how new roles can be created. The three processes of interaction work when "[p]olicy-makers and elites gain a sense of the appropriate and possible responses to a given situation through the process of 'taking the role of another' — viewing their state's Self or identity from the perspective of others — on the basis of which they try to 'make' a particular role and 'alter-cast' Others into complementary roles"[29]. Eden and Macmillan interpreted US and French views on Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal as an act that threatened Western interests and demanded action. An appropriate response from Britain would thus be to reclaim the Canal through force and they proceeded to make the role of 'residual great power' and alter-cast the US into a supportive ally. However, Britain misinterpreted the others' views at the role-taking phase as well as the norms and cultural content of the 'great power' role[30]. The US, which had itself made the role of 'leader of the West' a key function of which was restraining allies - opposed the action and alter-cast Britain and France as 'colonial powers'. In this analysis, the problem for Britain in trying to make the role of 'residual great power' was not necessarily its own identity and status, but rather that the 'cultural content' of the great power role in 1956 had changed from 50 years previously. We can understand this 'cultural content' as the *functions* that the 'great power' role performed in international society. The functions associated with the great power role had changed. McCourt does not go further to show how the functions of roles are changed through interaction and his example shows the failure of Britain trying to create a role rather than successful role creation. However, it highlights the importance of focusing on functions in understanding how roles can be created and redefined. A more general framework of role negotiation, which will be outlined in the next section, could trace these processes over time.

In this thesis then, social roles are not constitutive of a society - like they may be for a more theoretical study of macro-structure - but functionally specific. Roles involve the performance of particular functions in relation to order depending on social context. As was discussed in the introductory chapter, a crucial part of order negotiation is the development of mutual understandings about what order functions need to be performed. The negotiation of these order functions is inherently tied up with the negotiation of social roles because negotiating functions also involves negotiating who will perform the functions. Particular order functions and associated social roles are negotiated by members of international society at particular times to serve specific purposes. For this reason, order functions and social roles are an empirical question rather than a

[29] McCourt (2011: 2).
[30] McCourt (2011: 18).

theoretical question. They must be looked for within the actual interactions of members of international society. By looking at how actors negotiate the performance of order functions in their society, we can better capture how roles come to be created and redefined. The next section outlines the role negotiation framework used in this thesis which enables us to do this.

FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY: LEGITIMATION AND FUNCTIONS

This section presents the role negotiation framework used in this thesis and shows how it will be operationalised. It first looks at the basic framework of role negotiation and the three role processes used in this thesis before moving on to look at functions, developing broad categories of order functions that states may claim during role negotiation. It then looks at the practice of legitimation itself, showing how we can operationalise the two-way process of role claiming and endorsement, before developing a spectrum for judging how substantive claims and endorsement may be. It finishes by discussing the question of how substantive ASEAN's role is and the data and sources used in this thesis to provide the empirical evidence for role negotiation.

Role processes

The three role processes of role redefinition, role-taking and role creation, are specific processes that result from actors reaching a role bargain after a period of generic role negotiation. *Generic role negotiation* involves three stages: role conceptualisation, role claiming and role enactment. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the analysis of role conceptions is a well developed aspect of the role theory literature, and this thesis accepts that this is the best place to look for the initial development of a role during role negotiation[31]. An actor first needs to conceptualise a role (identity, status, function) that they want to perform, either by locating a pre-existing role or conceptualising a new role. To move this role beyond the mind of the actor and to seek to actually perform it within international society, however, the actor then needs to claim the role. If the actor receives endorsement for their role claims then they can legitimately enact the role by performing the functions associated with the role. This process of claiming and endorsement is captured by the practice of legitimation which is outlined further below. If others contest the actor's role claims then the actor can either give up or re-conceptualise the role and re-claim it. This basic framework is common to all three role processes.

However, role negotiation is rarely a simple process of claiming a role and having all aspects

[31]e.g. Holsti (1970), Flockhart (2011).

of the role claim endorsed. There will usually be contestation from key constituencies within the audience over all or aspects of the role claim, and often counter-role claims from certain key constituencies. This will most likely occur at times when order is in transition or unstable. In contrast, when order appears to be stable it may mean that the role claimant and the audience have reached an agreement on what part different actors will play in making and managing order. In this case we can look for whether a *role bargain* has been established. Specifically a role bargain refers to an implicit or explicit reciprocal arrangement on a division of labour according to functions: B endorses A's performance of function X in return for A endorsing B's performance of function Y. Actors usually reach some sort of role bargain at the end of a particular phase of role negotiation. Each of the empirical chapters in this thesis finds that the great powers and ASEAN came to perform particular roles at particular junctures as part of a role bargain. Each of the role processes - role redefinition, role-taking and role creation – came about as part of these role bargains reached between the great powers and ASEAN. Each new phase of role negotiation was then initiated after one party destabilised the previous role bargain by not holding up their end of the bargain. As the empirical chapters will show, it was usually the great power that reneged, or threatened to renege, on the previous ASEAN-great power bargain. This is why ASEAN has had to constantly re-conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate its role, so that it can nest its role within a role bargain acceptable to the great powers.

Role redefinition is generally understood within the social-psychology literature as a process individuals use to cope in situations where there is a conflict between two different roles that the individual may perform (i.e. one's role at work vs one's role as a parent)[32]. Role redefinition as this thesis understands it is different: it refers to situations where an actor has unsuccessfully tried to claim or enact a pre-existing role that they may perform in one social context, into a new social context. The claimant may have experienced significant contestation of all or aspects of its role claim from key constituencies. These constituencies may have tried to alter-cast the role claimant either into a different role or no role at all. The role is redefined when certain (contested) aspects of the original role claim are withdrawn in order to reach a role bargain with the key constituencies. This will usually involve withdrawing a claim to a contested function and sub-contracting this function to actors whose identity or status makes them a more acceptable performer of the function. If the function was previously a key aspect of the original role in another social context, then by detaching it from the role and transferring it to other actors in the new social context, the claimant and key constituencies have redefined the role.

[32]Perry and Wynne (1959), Hall (1972), Hage and Powers (1992).

Role-taking is most commonly identified with symbolic interactionism and refers to a process whereby actors take on the role of the Other when interacting with them[33]. However, this thesis instead uses the term to refer to a process similar to that outlined by Thies in his role socialisation framework[34]. Role-taking can be initiated by an actor trying to claim a pre-existing role or by others trying to socialise the actor into a role. The actor, or those wanting to socialise the actor, first locate an existing role within the social context. The next stage involves the actor claiming the role or others alter-casting the actor into the role. If both claiming and alter-casting occurs at the same time then legitimation can be achieved if the actor's role conception matches the others' role expectations. If they do not match then either the actor will need to re-conceptualise the role claim or the others will need to change their expectations. If there is an actor's role claiming without alter-casting, then the claim will need to be endorsed by others. If there is alter-casting without a role claim, then the actor themselves will need to accept the others' understanding of the actor's role. Once legitimation has occurred, the actor has successfully taken on the role and can legitimately perform the associated functions.

Role creation differs from the previous role processes because it involves creating a new role entirely. This process starts with an actor conceptualising a role that it would like to perform. The actor then makes a role claim, consisting of claims about the identity and status of the actor and what proposed functions the role would perform. If these claims are contested then the actor can either give up or re-conceptualise the role depending on what aspects of the claim were contested. If they are all endorsed then the actor has had its identity, status and the functions of the role recognised as legitimate. The role now exists as a social object within the society and can be used to facilitate social action by performing the functions of the role. Once the role exists and is enacted it faces two pathways depending on whether it continues to receive endorsement or faces contestation. If there is universal endorsement then the role will go down the path of consolidation as it gets further entrenched within the social structure of the society. If it faces increasing contestation however, it will deteriorate. The end point of deterioration is role death. If an actor faces contestation over its role once it is enacted, it can again re-conceptualise the contested aspects of the role and reclaim the role by making new legitimacy claims. An actor can thereby avoid the path of role deterioration by skilfully redefining, reclaiming and renegotiating the role so that it continues to receive endorsement. In situations where there are two or more constituencies of legitimation and one constituency contests the role, the role claimant can aim for endorsement from the other constituencies to avoid deterioration. However, this may leave the role in an uneasy balance between consolidation and deterioration.

[33]Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), McCourt (2011).
[34]Thies (2012).

Order functions

Having outlined the role processes, it is necessary to expand on the issue of functions which, as we have seen, is crucial to understanding role negotiation. As discussed in the last chapter, this thesis conceptually positions order functions within the primary institution of 'order management'. Order management is a merging of great power management and diplomacy and therefore it could encompass the recognised order functions – what Buzan calls 'derivative institutions' – of great power management and diplomacy[35]. However, rather than presuppose that any particular functions are necessary 'derivatives' of order management - which would apply across different types of societies or orders - this thesis instead posits that order functions are contingent on social context. That is, different functions will be relevant depending on the particular order under study, and these functions will be performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations that have taken place within that society. The key therefore for understanding which order functions are relevant, and which actors will perform such functions, is legitimacy and, more specifically, how legitimacy is negotiated between the relevant parties. Table 1 below therefore outlines broad categories of order functions that *might* be found across different types of order. These are split into security, economic and diplomatic/normative functions. The list of functions draws on a wide range of literature that moves beyond the ES to include realist, institutionalist, constructivist and critical insights. The criteria for choosing these functions therefore is not a commitment to a particular theoretical view but rather to try and capture a full range of functions that scholars have identified actors performing in relation to order broadly defined. To understand which functions may be relevant to a particular order depends on looking at the negotiations between the actors within that order. These negotiations can be captured through the framework of legitimation.

During role negotiation, the three elements of a role (identity, status and function) need to be legitimised through endorsement. This thesis focuses more specifically on the legitimation of functions because functions are the most important aspect for understanding social roles. On their own, functions tell us more about the role than identity or status; roles can be more clearly differentiated by the functions that are associated with them and it is the functions that contribute to the society. If we think of the role of 'medical doctor', it is most clearly differentiated from other roles by the specific functions a doctor performs.

Functions are also more encompassing than identity or status alone. The negotiation of identity and status are intrinsically involved in how an actor views itself and presents itself in

[35]Buzan (2004a).

seeking to perform a certain function and how others see that actor and determine their competence to perform that function. A trainee doctor will need to go through medical school and prove her competence to perform the necessary medical functions; however, in claiming her competence in performing these functions she is also negotiating her identity and status as a doctor. Once she has been recognised as competent in legitimately performing the functions, she will receive the identity and status recognition as the title of doctor is bestowed upon her. Functions are also most useful in the case of ASEAN because of their importance for actors that lack the kind of high status and identity that great powers may have. Whereas a great power may come to perform a role because it already has a distinct status, ASEAN is more likely to claim its competence to perform functions in claiming a role because it lacks the distinct identity and status to draw on.

Christian Reus-Smit has provided a useful outline of the practice of legitimation. It is worth quoting him at length. He states:

> "Ascribing legitimacy is ... inextricably linked to, and dependent upon, social communication. Actors establish their legitimacy, and the legitimacy of their actions, through the rhetorical construction of self-images and the public justification of priorities and practices, and other actors contest or endorse these representations through similar rhetorical processes. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is thus a discursive phenomenon, and the nature of this discursive phenomenon will depend heavily upon the prevailing architecture of social norms, upon the cultural mores that govern appropriate forms of rhetoric, argument, and justification, and upon available technologies of communication"[36].

This practice points to the three elements of a role. Actors seek to establish the legitimacy of their own self images (identity) and status. They also seek to legitimise their actions, suggesting the desire to present these not as isolated actions but related to the performance of broader order functions. With specific respect to roles this suggests not so much a 'prevailing architecture of norms'; rather, a prevailing architecture of functions within which legitimation may take place. There may be certain order functions that need to be performed for the maintenance of order as rule-governed interaction. Table 1 below shows a preliminary list of various order functions split into three categories of security, economic and diplomatic/normative. Primary functions designate the most important functions that include one or more derivative secondary functions.

[36] Reus-Smit (2007: 163).

Security		**Economic**		**Diplomatic/Normative**	
Primary	***Secondary***	***Primary***	***Secondary***	***Primary***	***Secondary***
Grand strategic narrative		Economic public goods provision	Lender of last resort Financial leadership Reducing poverty and development asymmetry Aid provision	Diplomatic leadership	Institution building Conflict mediation Brokerage Rule-making Agenda setting Advocacy
Security public goods	Security of sea lanes Military assistance/aid Rule-enforcement Holding the line				
Alliances	Alliance leadership Alliance confidence				
Balance of power	Deterrence				
Disaster management	Mitigation Emergency relief				
Strategic restraint	Institutional binding				

Table 1 – Order functions

The aim of this list is to provide some broad categories of order functions that could be found across different types of order, but as already stated, particular orders will have particular order functions, and some of these functions may be specific to that particular order or to a particular time period. The empirical chapters of this thesis show that some order functions come and go depending on circumstances and actors' negotiations. This has an impact on the relevance of particular roles. This section will now expand on each of these functions in table 1 to see how they could be related to the management of order.

Security functions

The function of grand strategic narrative is not split into the categories of primary or secondary because it acts as a key function on its own. This is because, to a significant extent, other security functions are contingent on the prevailing grand strategic narrative of a social order. If accepted, grand strategic narrative become part of public discourse and links apparently disparate and complex events and phenomena into a common narrative. Grand strategic narrative has three

aspects: presentation of an 'in-group', threat to the 'in-group' and necessary strategic response. The presentation of an 'in-group' can be linked to Foucault's[37] notion of productive power: discourses produce meanings, norms, customs and social identities which determine subjects and limit or enable action. Those that are 'in' are considered 'normal' and worthy of the benefits of inclusion. Those who are 'out' are considered 'abnormal' or a threat and need to be opposed or co-opted into the 'in-group'. An example is how Europeans determined as subjects those that were 'civilised' and 'uncivilised' in 19th Century international society. The civilised that were part of the 'in-group' were deserving of certain rights and responsibilities in international society. The uncivilised that were part of the 'out-group' and were subject to colonisation and 'civilising' practices. Grand strategic narrative also determines what constitutes a threat to the 'in-group' and what the necessary strategic response to the threat is. For this reason, other security functions are contingent on the acceptance of a particular grand strategic narrative. For example, the provision of alliances and a deterrent balance of power will be determined by the prevailing grand strategic narrative. The grand strategic narrative will determine who is 'in' and needs to be protected through alliances, and who or what the threat is that needs to be deterred. Grand strategic narrative was particularly important during the Cold War as the two superpowers sought to legitimise their global security strategies and mobilise allies against the other.

Apart from grand strategic narrative, security functions more generally are needed for fostering a stable environment so that states can pursue their private and collective goals. Security functions can be public, club or private goods[38]. The primary function of security public goods shown in table 1 includes public and club goods. In a region that is significantly maritime based, security of sea lanes is a key secondary function that needs to be performed and could be considered a public good in that, to a certain extent, it is non-excludable and non-rival[39]. The majority of trade passes through sea lanes and some, such as the Malacca Straits, are considered crucial 'choke points' that figure highly in regional states' strategic outlooks. Maintaining freedom of passage through these lanes is recognised to benefit the region as a whole.

Military assistance/aid can be considered a club good in that it will most likely be provided to those states considered to be within the 'in-group' of the dominant grand strategic narrative. It contributes to order by building the capacity of states and was used extensively by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Military assistance and capacity-building can thus form a significant part of a sub-contracting arrangement whereby a major power gives primary

[37] For a collection of Foucault's writings and lectures on power, see Foucault (2002).
[38] Krahman (2008).
[39] Kaul et al (1999).

responsibility to another smaller state for providing security in their immediate locale. This can occur within a formal alliance relationship or an informal security partnership. At its extreme, this sort of arrangement has been advocated as a possible grand strategy for the US in the post-Cold War period known as 'offshore balancing', whereby the US pulls back from its alliance commitments and leaves the heavy lifting in balancing challengers to regional states[40].

A club good that could be considered a secondary function of security public goods provision is ‘holding the line’. Holding the line is very much associated with the strategy of containment[41] whereby a line is drawn representing the boundary between a protected 'in-group' and the threatening 'out-group'. The power that commits to holding the line essentially commits to containing the threat the out-group poses at that line. In the context of the Cold War, containment was a key US strategy in Europe and Asia, and lines were drawn between Western and Eastern Europe, within Korea and in Vietnam.

Alliances can be considered a separate primary function as it more clearly entails club goods. Those that are part of an alliance system receive the majority of the benefits. Alliance leadership entails building alliances that offer protection and reassurance through deterrence of threats, as well as material benefits to junior partners such as training and capacity-building. They also serve to restrain allies by eliminating the need to engage in potentially destabilising self help measures[42]. Since the Second World War states in Western Europe and East Asia have faced a variety of internal and external threats and alliance formation has provided one way of seeking assurance against such threats. Alliances can deter those who may be seeking revision of order through military means and, in this sense, perform a wider function for order by ensuring actors continue to pursue their goals through rule-governed interaction. Ensuring alliance confidence by demonstrating commitment to maintaining the alliance, reassures junior alliance partners so that they do not need to seek other means to ensure their security. In particular John Ikenberry argues that alliance confidence is developed because alliances form a key political architecture through which officials from allied nations are linked and enabled to do business together. They also provide a means through which the more powerful partner can demonstrate strategic restraint by opening up its decision making processes to junior partners[43]. Operationally, confidence can be built through actions such as joint military exercises which contribute to the coordination of states' militaries. In coordinating military operations they also contribute to the management of regional problems including natural and humanitarian disasters. However, alliances can also have negative

[40]Layne (1997).
[41]Art (2003: 111-120).
[42]Thalakada (2012: 3-5).
[43]Ikenberry (2011, 2013).

consequences as they can be perceived by external actors as constituting a threat, potentially triggering a security dilemma. Beyond deterrence and reassurance however, alliances have also come to be seen in the post-Cold War period as a formal means through which the US as the sole superpower can share the burden of maintaining its preponderance and upholding its 'liberal international order'[44]. This can be seen through the use of NATO in undertaking military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the expansion of the remit of the US-Japan alliance in covering situations beyond Japan's immediate area.

Balance of power is a primary security function that has long held a central place in international relations. It could also encompass many of the other secondary security functions especially alliances as they have been a key means through which states have sought to balance power and perceived threats[45]. As Hedley Bull[46] pointed out, local balances of power serve to protect the independence of states by preventing the dominance of any one power as well as providing the conditions within which other functions can be carried out. This is important in a region where there is significant asymmetry with respect to material capabilities. Having a balance between major powers means that there are more strategic options available for small states seeking to maximise autonomy[47]. A military balance also deters threats and can be used explicitly for deterrence or containment purposes.

Despite all this, rules do get broken, so there need to be consequences such that rule-enforcement is a major secondary security function. Enforcing rules through punishing those that break them validates those rules, contributing to their salience and sanctity within actors' interactions. This can deter others from breaking rules through a logic of consequences but can also further enforce the social logic of the appropriateness of the rules. The primary means through which rules are enforced in international society is through sanctions, and in extreme cases, military intervention[48].

Disaster management is a primary function particularly in a region that is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones and tsunamis. Mitigating procedures in case of a disaster limit the damage and loss of life of such disasters. Emergency relief also serves to limit the devastating consequences of disasters[49].

[44] Thalakada (2012).
[45] Walt (1987).
[46] Bull (1977: 102).
[47] Ciorciari (2010).
[48] For a discussion of the debate surrounding the benefits of coercive enforcement see Thompson (2012).
[49] For a recent, and critical, overview of the international politics of disaster management see Hannigan (2012).

Strategic restraint can be considered another primary security function. States that have superior capabilities can consciously reassure neighbours by committing to show restraint in their foreign policy. The usual way to do so is through institutional binding: agreeing to be bound within cooperative frameworks and rules[50].

Economic functions

The primary function of economic public goods providion includes a number of secondary functions which derive mostly from Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), especially the work of Kindleberger[51]. Financial leadership and acting as a lender of last resort provides investment, liquidity and coordination of financial cooperation and macroeconomic policy. These are supposed to ensure the functioning of the market economy but also provide safety nets in the case of crises by ensuring access to emergency liquidity. This is especially salient in a region that experienced a significant financial crisis that had far reaching political effects in the late 1990s.

Reducing poverty and asymmetry comes from Dent's[52] work on regional leadership and, together with aid provision, reflect the collective goal of development. Economic development has long been associated with domestic stability and so has been advanced as a way to improve international security and also as a normative aspect improving the living conditions of the world's population. This is especially so in East Asia where the conception of 'comprehensive security' or 'resilience' has focused on economic development for internal security purposes.

Diplomatic/normative functions

Diplomatic leadership is a primary function that can be highly encompassing. It can refer to the coordination of states and other actors on a grand scale, such as at international peace conferences after major wars, or refer to the general coordination of diplomatic initiatives on a global or regional scale. It can also be issue specific, such as when a particular actor is given leadership over a particular issue. Institution-building is a key secondary function of diplomatic leadership, providing forums within which regional states interact. This again is related to the function of agenda-setting. An actor performing this function can determine what will be discussed and what constitute important issues.

[50] Ikenberry (2001, 2011), Goh (2013: 28-71).
[51] Kindleberger (1973).
[52] Dent (2008a).

Conflict mediation and brokerage are important secondary diplomatic functions because conflicts and differences are common in international society. Indeed, mediating value difference is a key function of any social order[53]. Conflicts need to be managed so that they do not escalate to the detriment of rule-governed interaction. Brokerage relates more specifically to the brokering of agreements between parties that may have conflicting interests and values. This is an important function because it can bring parties together to realise common interests whilst downplaying the areas of difference. This can contribute to rule-governed interaction by ensuring that differences and disagreements do not escalate and also facilitating the creation of new rules.

Rule-making is needed because, put simply, order needs rules and rules need to come from somewhere. This is related to the idea of norm entrepreneur[54] as new rules or norms can be introduced by actors into international society. Advocacy is also related as a new norm or rule can take time to be accepted by international society and so may need continued advocacy from an actor to keep it on the agenda. This can contribute to significant normative change, such as the abolition of the slave trade, or to more specific or technical rules such as within the WTO mechanisms.

Great and small power functions

Great powers are assumed to provide a grand strategic narrative for order by determining the 'in-group' of states, the threat to that group and the necessary response[55]. As great powers have superior capabilities they are also assumed to perform the function of balance of power, provide security public goods, economic public goods and perform the primary diplomatic/normative function of diplomatic leadership, especially through institution-building. This is apparent primarily at times of crisis and transition when great powers are expected to provide diplomatic leadership in negotiating order as well as building institutions to express and lock in the new arrangement for order.

The small power role is considered to include diplomatic/normative functions in the day to day politics of order, not at times of transition. These might include conflict mediation, advocacy and rule-making with respect to specific issues but not deeper questions of order. As we will see, the novelty of decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to the small power role in Southeast Asia, has led to ASEAN's unusual prominence in the negotiation and

[53] Hurrell (2007).
[54] Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
[55] This can be seen when we think of the US' mobilisation of coalitions of states particularly during the Cold War but also in the post-Cold War with respect to 'rouge states' and non-state terrorist organisations.

management of post-Cold War East Asia. In order to find out how this was done, we first need to look at how the framework of legitimation can be operationalised so that we can capture role negotiation during the three periods under study.

Legitimation – claims and endorsement

States negotiate a division of labour with respect to order functions through the process of legitimation. Actors make claims about their competence to perform particular functions that need endorsement from others. Some functions more clearly require substantial material capabilities such as those in the security and economic categories. Others do not necessarily require substantial material capabilities such as those in the diplomatic/normative category.

Reus-Smit[56] points to legitimation as occurring through discursive social communication. This serves his purpose of highlighting the way the US rhetorically justified its power during the Bush Administration. When considering the broader subject of the negotiation of social roles however, we need to go beyond discursive communication. In doing so we can understand communication in terms of how substantive claims and endorsements are. Figure 1 shows a spectrum of claims and endorsement moving from the least substantive, purely discursive claims/endorsement, to the most substantive claims/endorsement. In between there are two intermediate degrees of the symbolic and performative. Symbolic may move beyond the merely discursive by including gestures and actions that indicate the deeper meaning or intention. Performative bridges the symbolic and the substantive when the actor seeks to perform the function or aspects of the function as part its claim. Substantive would constitute fully implemented policy action which actually carries out the function.

Figure 1 – Spectrum of claims and endorsement

The spectrum essentially reflects the degree of cost to the actor in making its claim or giving endorsement. A purely discursive claim is the least costly as it involves merely rhetoric. A substantive claim is the most costly because implementing policy action may require significant mobilisation of resources and/or tackling domestic opposition. This section expands on these

[56] Reus-Smit (2007).

categories using the example of a state claiming the function of 'conflict mediation' to illustrate the differences between the types of claims and endorsement.

Claims

Discursive claims are things that are actually said by key actors. These will be included in policy papers, concept papers, speeches and things said in meetings. What do actors say about themselves and their ability to perform certain functions? For example, if two states were experiencing a crisis or conflict in their relations, a leader from another state may make a speech saying that her state will offer to mediate the conflict. On its own, this speech would constitute a discursive claim to perform the function of conflict mediation. It involves little cost and may have some benefits in making the leader look like a responsible statesperson.

Symbolic claims and endorsement may be more implicit in the words, gestures and actions of actors[57]. Symbolic interactionism has highlighted the importance of the presentation of gestures and a response to the meaning of those gestures for communication. As stated by Blumer, "[a] gesture is any part or aspect of an ongoing action that signifies the larger act of which it is a part"[58]. An actor's gestures convey an idea of their intention and plan for forthcoming action. The actor who responds organises their response on the basis of the meaning the gesture has for them. The gesture has meaning for both actors. This mirrors the two-way process of legitimation. If we think of the 'larger acts' as being the acts of 'claiming' and 'endorsement', then we will need to look at gestures as the 'part or aspect of' these larger ongoing acts. For example, in our case introduced above, a gesture that may constitute a symbolic claim to the function of conflict mediation may be that the claimant state actually prepares a venue for the two sides to meet for discussions. This is more costly than merely announcing such an intention in a speech as above, and gives a clearer indication of the claimant's intentions to actually perform the function should the intended constituency endorse its claims.

Performative claims involve policy action that goes some way towards performing a function or at least represents an attempt to perform the function. An example may include our claimant state travelling to visit the feuding states to try to persuade them to agree to a ceasefire and negotiations towards conflict resolution. Alternatively it could involve actually getting the parties around the table but on terms that fall short of what may be considered meaningful steps towards conflict resolution – i.e. for informal or exploratory dialogue with no formal commitments. These

[57] Charon (2000: 43-44).
[58] Blumer (1969: 9).

actions involve reasonable cost but may not go fully towards performing the function of conflict mediation.

Substantive claims involve fully implemented policy action that actually explicitly performs the function being claimed. This in a sense would be the provision of policy that meets the need required by the function. In our example this may involve the claimant state successfully getting the feuding parties around the negotiating table within a formal dialogue, with a commitment to discussing the key issues of their conflict and making meaningful steps towards conflict resolution such as implementing a ceasefire. This would constitute the claimant state actually enacting the function of conflict mediation, enactment being the most substantive claim to that function.

As these types fall within a spectrum there may often be overlap in practice. An actor may also pursue more than one type of claim at once. The fact that words can also constitute symbols means that the discursive and symbolic will often go hand in hand. This is an important point in international politics because conventions of diplomatic language may mean that something that is said (or not said) can have deeper symbolic meaning or indicate some intention that cannot be rhetorically expressed. The recent disagreements over the language contained in the final communiqué regarding the South China Sea at the ASEAN AMM in July 2012, which led to ASEAN not releasing a final communiqué for the first time in its history, shows the symbolic importance words can have.

Endorsement

When thinking about endorsement it is first necessary to think about who an actor needs endorsement from. Reus-Smit employs the concepts of the 'realm of political action' and the 'social constituency of legitimation' to show that if an actor intends to act in a particular political area/region, there will be a particular constituency from which the actor will need to receive endorsement. In order to gain legitimacy, the realm of political action and social constituency of legitimation need to correspond[59]. In this thesis the realm of political action is Southeast and East Asia and the constituencies of legitimation are geographically situated, or politically active in these regions. Within these regions there are three distinct constituencies of legitimation that ASEAN requires endorsement from: the great powers, ASEAN itself (individual member states) and the domestic populations within regional states. Claims will be directed at these constituencies and the fact that these constituencies may have different expectations regarding ASEAN's competence and

[59] Reus-Smit (2007: 164).

what ASEAN should do, may pull ASEAN in various, often conflicting directions.

Similarly, the great powers' constituencies of legitimation are regional states and the domestic constituencies within individual states. This is particularly important during the periods covered in Chapters Two and Three dealing with role redefinition and role-taking. The dominant domestic constituencies within regional states determined whether regional states would endorse or contest the US' and China's role claims. For example, the role bargain established at the end of Chapter Two was only feasible after the emergence of a staunchly anti-communist domestic constituency in power in Indonesia.

As with claims, endorsement also comes in degrees. Again the degree of endorsement reflects the cost to the actor endorsing. There may be little cost in rhetorically endorsing a claim. Indeed, an actor can discursively endorse whilst taking contradictory policy action. Substantive endorsement is costly because it involves policy implementation.

Discursive endorsement is found in speeches, official statements, published communiques and things said in meetings. Have key others vocalised support for the role claimant's specific claims? For example, a state may rhetorically support a policy initiative and help in advocating the initiative that constituted a claim to perform a function. In our example above, one of the feuding states or an interested third party may express support for the claimant state's policy for conflict mediation through a speech or by issuing a declaration or communiqué.

Symbolic endorsement includes gestures such as attendance at meetings and official visits. High level attendance and visits to claimant states, as well as timing and prioritising some meetings over others, indicate the importance the actor claiming a function may have to the one endorsing. How visits are framed and what activities are undertaken on visits – signing of agreements, policy speeches and where speeches are given (place can have deep symbolic meaning) – can all act as indicators of the degree of endorsement or contestation. For example, a state endorsing our claimant state's policy of conflict mediation, may make a visit to the claimant state's capital during negotiations as part of an effort to demonstrate its support.

Performative endorsement involves performing in a way that corresponds with the actor claiming the function. This could include taking part in a claimant's initiatives, following the lead of a claimant on an issue, or acquiescing to the claimant's actions by not pursuing alternative policies and allowing the actor to go through with a policy. This acquiescence can even come after

discursive contestation. Perhaps there was some rhetorical protest during a meeting but the protester acquiesced to the final outcomes/agreements of the meeting. For example, the feuding states or interested third parties may participate in the claimant state's proposed talks but on the condition that they are informal with no prior commitments. This would fall short of substantive endorsement as it would not involve the cost of fully implemented policy, but it would demonstrate performing in a way that indicated endorsement of the claimant's state's claims.

Substantive endorsement is concerned with policy – policy positions represent a major symbol of endorsement or contestation. Does an actor's policy position support the claimant's position? This is a costly form of endorsement as new policy may need to be introduced or policy position may need to shift. Substantive endorsement may be easier for smaller states who may see greater reward from shifting their policy and who may not incur such cost. The states of Western Europe after the Second World War gave substantive endorsement to the US' substantive claims to a hegemon role by adjusting their policy to align with the US'. Conversely, substantive endorsement will be more difficult for stronger states as it may involve costly policy change (in terms of domestic opposition) or opportunity costs. In our case, the feuding states might show substantive endorsement for our claimant state's claims by engaging in talks with formal commitments to a ceasefire and a genuine desire to seek some resolution to the conflict. This may be politically costly domestically as it would constitute a change of policy from seeking a military solution to a diplomatic solution based on the claimant's mediation.

Policy action can also often override contradictory discursive statements in the sense that a state may rhetorically express a certain position but its actions and policies suggest a different position. In such a case the policy position would provide stronger evidence of whether there is endorsement or not. For example, one of our feuding states may express a desire to engage in negotiations over resolving its conflict, but then not attend dialogue, not adhere to the preconditions for engaging in the dialogue or break an agreed ceasefire etc. These actions would override any discursive or symbolic endorsement of the claimant's claims to conflict mediation.

The purpose of role negotiation is to reach mutual understandings over what functions are needed within a particular order and who will perform them. The framework of legitimation outlined in this section shows how we can capture the negotiation process through claims and endorsement. As mentioned earlier in the chapter however, to go beyond generic role negotiation and identify the processes of role redefinition, role-taking and role creation, this thesis employs the

concept of a role bargain. A role bargain is characterised by the mutual understandings that states reach as part of their role negotiation, more specifically, the reciprocal arrangement that underpins who will perform what function and the basis upon which this arrangement is recognised as legitimate. This chapter finishes by expanding the discussion of the role bargain and shows how this thesis will go about studying role negotiation and identifying whether role bargains have been reached between ASEAN and the great powers. Before that however, the next section briefly discusses the issue of how the degree of claims and endorsement effect the efficacy and efficiency of ASEAN's role.

Efficacy and efficiency – how substantive?

The key question for ascertaining the efficacy and efficiency of a role is: was there clear policy action that came about as a result of the endorsement? Was ASEAN able to act and perform certain order functions as a result of the endorsement from others? That ASEAN has indeed been able to perform key order functions at times of transition shows that this process of role negotiation has indeed worked. This thesis argues that ASEAN has been able to use its role to perform these functions. Not only has ASEAN been able to use its role at particular junctures but, because role negotiation is cumulative, in each period ASEAN has been able to build on the foundations of the previous role negotiation to extend the order functions it is legitimately able to perform and thus extend the scope of its role. In this way the current situation of ASEAN's prominence in East Asia is not merely an accident of the region's present structural dynamics but is part of this historical process of cumulative role negotiation. Having said this, there is also a question of how much ASEAN can do with its role and for how long. This is related to the degree of substance to ASEAN's claims and the endorsement it receives. Have claims been primarily towards the discursive or substantive end of the spectrum? What about endorsement from the different constituencies of legitimation? This thesis shows that particularly with respect to its ‘regional conductor’ role, ASEAN’s claims, and the endorsement it has received from the different constituencies of legitimation, have been closer to the discursive end than the substantive end. This raises questions regarding the future of ASEAN’s role, which will be explored in Chapter Four.

Data and sources

This final section discusses the sources I used to find the evidence for role negotiation and discusses how I went about studying role negotiation and role bargains. As discussed, role negotiation is tied up in the process of order negotiation more generally, and they are linked together by the

negotiation of order functions – what order functions are considered necessary for order and who should perform which functions. As negotiation is considered to be more than merely discursive communication in this thesis, I looked at the actions and policies that key actors pursued throughout the period under study and considered whether these could constitute the types of role claims and/or role endorsement outlined above, and whether they constituted negotiation over order functions. To look at the events and actions themselves I consulted secondary scholarly studies and news sources from the time of the events, as well as scholarly historical accounts. These helped me determine how events and negotiations occurred and in what political context. On top of this, I looked at how state actors framed their actions within speeches and discussions with other states. For the historical chapters, primary sources from online archives (including the US Department of State Office of the Historian series *Foreign Relations of the United States,* National Security Archives and the National Australian Archives) were particularly useful in this respect. These included speeches, declassified official documents, minutes from meetings and oral history interviews. I also consulted personal biographies of key officials and diplomats. These sources gave me an insight into the internal policy discourse of states as well as what was said and agreed at key meetings and negotiations between leaders and top officials. This enabled me to build up a better picture of key actors' role conceptions from which I could determine whether the actual policy or action the state undertook was consistent with such a role conception. Determining the cost of the action allowed me to identify where it could be placed on the spectrum from discursive to substantive claims/endorsement.

In order to determine whether negotiating states had reached a role bargain, I looked at the junctures where order seemed to be relatively stable and looked at whether the states' behaviour during these times appeared complementary or even coordinated. This would give an indication that there may be mutual understandings between the states over pursuing a common aim/goal, and alongside this, understandings over respective responsibilities in pursing such an aim/goal – i.e. responsibilities to perform complementary order functions. I could then look at the minutes and accounts of key meetings that took place around the same time, and see whether explicit negotiations actually occurred between key actors, whether their action/policy was coordinated or whether they came to any agreements over how to pursue common aims/goals. If there was evidence of implicit or explicit agreement over what each party should do towards achieving their common aim/goal and that each party implemented such policy, then this pointed to the existence of a role bargain based on the performance of complementary order functions. I could then determine the basis upon which states built their role bargains by looking at the nature of any implicit or explicit agreements as well as the wider political and social context at the time of role negotiation. In this sense, I could look for the instrumental and normative factors that underpinned the states'

mutual understandings over their respective responsibilities to order and how the bargain fit within the political and normative context.

For the later Cold War and post-Cold War chapters, I also used semi-structured interviews with policy-makers, diplomats and region-based academics to provide data from those that have actually attended high-level meetings and have been directly involved in the negotiations on the issues covered in the thesis. In February and March 2014 I travelled to Bangkok, Singapore, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur where I arranged interviews with key actors from the four countries who were involved in various capacities in ASEAN activities during the Cambodian conflict and during post-Cold War ASEAN activities - from the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in the early 1990s up to the present day. I chose these four countries because they constitute four of the five founding ASEAN members and have consistently been the most active members in developing ASEAN initiatives. Before each interview I prepared questions about what different ASEAN members states' positions were on various issues to try to trace processes of deliberation within ASEAN towards reaching a common policy position. This gave me a sense of what different constituencies at the domestic and international level expected of ASEAN in its role, enabling me to build up a picture of ASEAN's collective role conception. I also enquired as to what the responses of external actors such as the US, China and Japan were to ASEAN initiatives to get an idea of whether external actors endorsed ASEAN's claims and for what reasons.

These sources necessarily raise issues of reliability. Secondary sources contain biases and authors' interpretations of events and evidence. Interviews also involve bias and memory lapses. This can lead to different interviewees presenting contrasting information. This problem was combated through triangulation as things said within interviews were cross-checked against other documentary evidence as well as the secondary literature. Where two sources may have clashed, they were checked against another source to determine which version of events is most reliable.

As this study relies on qualitative methods of social science there is also an issue of my own subjectivity and interpretation. This required thinking reflexively about how I use and interpret the data. Also, as it seeks to go in depth with respect to the case of ASEAN, there may be an issue of generalisability as far as the role negotiation framework is concerned. As the thesis specifically seeks to explain the empirical puzzle of ASEAN prominence in order negotiation and management in East Asia this should not matter too much at this stage. The generalisability of the framework could be determined through further research using other cases.

Chapter Two - Role redefinition: the US and Southeast Asia 1954-1975

"Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences[1]."

United States President Dwight Eisenhower, April 1954

"I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth[2]."

Indonesian President Sukarno, April 1955

This chapter covers a period of major transition, when the pressures of the Cold War and decolonisation engendered a fundamental contest over the type of order that would emerge in post-colonial Southeast Asia[3]. During the 1950s and early 1960s, one side of the contest saw the US try to establish an anti-communist order under US great power leadership, advocating the containment of communism. This push for containment included the establishment of a series of US-centred bilateral alliances and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), as well as the US-led intervention in Vietnam[4]. On the other side, Indonesia pursued an autonomous regional order dedicated to expelling external great power influence under its own indigenous great power leadership. The push for autonomy was reflected in the organisation of the Bandung Conference, MAPHILINDO (Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia) and Indonesia's Confrontation against the 'neo-colonial plot' of Malaysia[5]. Competing visions of order in Southeast Asia led to instability not only at the 'front-line' against communism on mainland Southeast Asia, but also in maritime Southeast Asia as regional states bitterly contested the legitimacy of each other's governments and territorial borders.

By the end of the 1960s however, a different picture emerged. Although SEATO had become obsolete, the US' bilateral security ties with regional states remained. These existed alongside ASEAN - an effort at indigenous regionalism involving the US-supporter states of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as the former challenger Indonesia. All the ASEAN states supported the US' military involvement in Vietnam as buying time for them to consolidate

[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower "The President's News Conference," April 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202> accessed 2/7/14.
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia (1955: 19-29).
[3] Volumes that assess the impact of these processes on the region include Frey, Pruessen and Yong (2003), Goscha and Ostermann (2009), Lau (2012), Murfett (2012). See also Berger (2004).
[4] Mcmahon (1999) provides a useful overview of US strategy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War.
[5] Leifer (1983) provides an excellent account of Indonesian foreign policy during this period.

their domestic regimes. Through ASEAN they developed a means for managing intra-regional relations, agreeing to support each other's regime consolidation through non-interference[6]. Practically this meant not supporting opposition groups challenging a regime's legitimacy, and avoiding the escalation of disputes such as those over territorial claims. At the bilateral level member states cooperated to combat communist insurgency. ASEAN states even provided the diplomatic vanguard for US imperatives. For example, the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia in 1970 sought to legitimise the US' military position in Indochina whilst demonstrating regional activism on the part of the Indonesian government.

How do we explain this move from a deeply contested pattern of order, to one that established a legitimate military presence for the US and a space for indigenous states to exercise autonomy through regional organisation and diplomatic initiatives? This chapter argues that it is best understood as the result of an explicit regional division of labour, developed between the US and regional states after two decades of negotiation and contestation. The division of labour was part of a US-ASEAN reciprocal role bargain, which entailed the redefinition of the great power role in Southeast Asia. The generic great power role includes the key functions of security public goods and diplomatic leadership. In the US-ASEAN role bargain, security public goods provision remained intrinsic to the regional great power role, but the function of diplomatic leadership was detached from the great power role and transferred to regional states.

Analysing events during this period through the lens of role redefinition helps us better understand why US-led bilateral security ties were acceptable in Southeast Asia, but not US-led multilateralism as seen in the failure of SEATO. Likewise, it also helps us understand why ASEAN emerged as a successful effort at regionalism whereas other efforts such as SEATO, Bandung and Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) failed. These were both part of a regional division of labour determining the US' and regional states' respective roles. Bilateral security ties were the means through which the US provided security public goods as part of its newly negotiated 'offshore great power guarantor' role. ASEAN took on its own 'primary manager' role, through which regional states managed their own affairs and collectively performed diplomatic leadership in support of the US' role. This gives us a more holistic picture of this period than approaches that focus solely either on great power initiatives or on indigenous state agency. It also helps us understand the foundations laid for regional order and how order would be managed; these foundations were subsequently built on through the processes of role-taking and role creation in subsequent decades. The analysis of role

[6]On ASEAN's formation as primarily an exercise in regional reconciliation see Leifer (1989). On ASEAN's development of regional norms and contribution to order over time see Haacke (2003) and Acharya (2014). For a critical perspective which questions the salience of ASEAN's norms and prioritises analysis of domestic social forces, see Jones (2012).

redefinition contributes to two key questions regarding US security ties and ASEAN's success.

Firstly, why did the US' military commitment to Asia take the form of a series of bilateral security ties rather than a multilateral security arrangement such as NATO? The US faced a similar communist threat, there was a similar mix of medium and small sized states to those in Europe and many US officials desired a multilateral arrangement in both regions. Previous studies have tried to explain this by either emphasising the US' choices or factors indigenous to the region. Both sides of the debate come up short however because they emphasise one side of what is a two-sided, interactive process. In doing so, they overlook or downplay significant empirical details that are better understood through the complex negotiation of instrumental and normative factors *between* the US and regional states.

For instance, emphasising US choices downplays the extent to which the US desired a multilateral security arrangement in both Europe and Asia. To take one example, the National Security Council agreed in December 1954 that one of the aims of US policy in Asia was to "encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defence arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS"[7]. Why was this never formed? The argument that the US faced a greater threat in Europe than Asia, and therefore took riskier policies and made firmer commitments, can help us account for the urgency with which the US saw the need for a collective security arrangement. However it still cannot fully account for why it never materialised[8]. If US officials were being more cautious, what were they waiting for and what other factors were involved? Likewise, the argument that the US and Europe shared a common identity which brought them closer together, whereas US officials had a racial bias against Asians, cannot fully account for why certain parts of the US foreign policy establishment still wanted a multilateral alliance to be formed[9]. If key officials thought Asian states could not contribute strategically, what purpose did they see such an arrangement serving?

As becomes clear through the discussion below, elements such as threat perception and identity are important, but they are factors that feed into the US' role conception. For example, the perception that there was not an immediate threat in Asia led US officials to wait for the initiative for regional cooperation to come from regional states themselves. They wanted regional states to legitimise the US' strategic imperatives and role through inviting the US to protect their region. It is

[7] "Note to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), 19th November 1954" *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1952-1954, Vol XII Part 1 Doc 394 (hereafter *FRUS).*
[8] He and Feng (2012).
[9] Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002).

this legitimising factor that explains why the US wanted such an initiative despite viewing Asian states as incapable of contributing practically. However, after Dien Bien Phu and the French withdrawal from Indochina, the US perceived a greater threat from communism and could no longer wait for the initiative to come from the region. It tried to develop a multilateral security arrangement itself through SEATO but received mixed responses in the region. The US' racial bias meant that it often acted and presented itself in a way that offended regional states sensitive to colonialism, complicating its search for legitimacy. However, we need to look to the region itself to see why regional states were for the most part unwilling to invite the US to establish a collective security organisation.

One argument posits that the strong regional norm of anti-colonialism precluded the development of a multilateral security arrangement because regional states were adverse to being dominated by former colonial powers. Instead, the norm of non-interference became rooted in the region, preventing any collective pooling of resources[10]. This highlights the importance of the normative appeal of autonomy in post-colonial states. However, how do we account for the fact that many states opted for bilateral security ties that have more potential for domination and interference than multilateralism? This suggests that the salience of anti-colonialism, or at least how it manifested itself in practice, was contested and uneven. A more promising avenue is to look within the newly emerging states at domestic power struggles. One in-depth study by Natasha Hamilton-Hart has shown how bilateral alignments in Southeast Asia resulted from these struggles. The groups that won were able to seize the opportunity of US anti-communism to secure access to resources, enabling them to consolidate their domestic power. Over time, various sociological factors within regional states contributed to a deeply entrenched belief of the US as a 'benign' security guarantor[11]. Although important for understanding how the US' role was eventually accepted, Hamilton-Hart's historical analysis remains limited to the origin and endurance of these beliefs. It mostly deals with the initial factors that led individual countries to align with the US; it does not cover the period before when the US' role was still contested, and an alternative indigenous great power role was promoted by Indonesia.

By applying the role negotiation framework, we can simultaneously capture both the US side and the regional side of the story by analysing US claims and regional responses. We can also capture how both instrumental and normative factors shaped these claims and responses. For example, how regional states required access to US material assistance and security guarantees to consolidate their domestic power (instrumental), but how the appeal of anti-colonialism and

[10] Acharya (2009).
[11] Hamilton-Hart (2012).

autonomy complicated their endorsement of the more overt US diplomatic leadership (normative). The bargain between the US and regional states, which transferred diplomatic leadership to regional states and kept security public goods provision at the bilateral level, solved this problem by offering a means to satisfy both instrumental and normative demands.

Secondly, why did ASEAN emerge as successful whereas other efforts at regionalism failed? At the time of ASEAN's creation in 1967, there was little reason to expect it to be successful considering the diversity of the region, recent experience of intra-regional conflict and continuing mutual mistrust and territorial disputes. Most studies explain ASEAN's success as lying in regional states' responses to changing structural dynamics, particularly domestic political change in Indonesia and the shifting balance of power as the great powers began to withdraw from the region. These studies have provided persuasive and extensive accounts of internal negotiations and shown how different factors such as the accommodation of Indonesia[12], the establishment of regional norms[13] or founding ideas[14] helped to promote cooperative behaviour between regional states. However, they tend to treat the US as external to this process, triggering regional negotiations but not really involved. This chapter instead views ASEAN as an expression of the division of labour between regional states *and the US* whereby regional states would manage their own relations and the US would provide security public goods from its offshore position. Through ASEAN, regional states were not just responding to external factors such as the changing balance of power, they were responding to Washington's expectations that ASEAN would play its part in facilitating and accommodating American withdrawal to an offshore position. Part of managing their own relations was negotiating Indonesia's regional role in the wake of its failed claims to replace external great powers and establish itself as an indigenous great power. This included the acceptance of Indonesia's ideas for regional autonomy through building regional resilience, offered in return for Indonesia's strategic restraint.

The negotiations that eventually led to the role bargain between the US and ASEAN involved two processes. Between 1954 and 1965, we can identify a more general role negotiation over the specific identity and functions of the great power role in Southeast Asia. The US and Indonesia sought to legitimise two different grand strategic narratives, with two different understandings of the great power role. The US sought to legitimise a 'containment' grand strategic narrative and associated 'great power guardian' role conception. As discussed below, the 'great power guardian' role conception mixed elements of the European great power role and the colonial

[12] Leifer (1989), Emmers (2003).
[13] Acharya (2014).
[14] Ba (2009).

great power role. It satisfied regional regimes' desire for access to material assistance and an external security guarantee, but the tendency for the US to treat Asian states as unequal and attempt to manipulate domestic politics to strengthen anti-communist elements, came up against the need for ruling regimes to demonstrate independence and autonomy. In this sense, the US' role claims were contested by nationalist constituencies. Indonesia sought to legitimise its 'autonomy' narrative and associated 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception, claiming to lead other regional states to true independence. This was rejected by most regional states as Indonesia did not have the material capabilities to replace external great powers and some states saw Indonesia as a threat. However, the 'autonomy' narrative had significant normative appeal for domestic constituencies within regional states which put pressure on ruling regimes to demonstrate their independence and autonomy. Before 1965, both Indonesia and the US were unsuccessful in fully legitimising their role claims because they were unable to gain endorsement from all relevant constituencies of legitimation. This prevented any role bargain being reached on what constituted the 'great power' role in the Southeast Asian context.

After 1965 however, the US and regional states moved from general role negotiation over the 'great power' role to the process of role redefinition. The US' desire to withdraw from Vietnam removed the more overt interventionist aspect of the US' role claims and domestic political upheaval in Indonesia brought to power an anti-communist regime. The key constituencies now accepted the imperatives of both 'containment' and 'autonomy' rather than just one or the other. To achieve both, regional states and the US sought to build the resilience of ruling regimes against communist insurgency. A division of labour towards pursuing these goals could now be reached. The US re-conceptualised its role as an 'offshore great power guarantor' and the new leadership in Indonesia abandoned Indonesia's claim to perform an 'indigenous great power' role and re-conceptualised a 'leading-from-behind' role. However, it was not enough for the US to merely assign a regional leadership role to Indonesia. Indonesia's role needed to be endorsed by regional neighbours still wary after Indonesia's Confrontation. This was achieved through ASEAN. Indonesia shared responsibility for diplomatic leadership with the other ASEAN states by agreeing to be bound within ASEAN's institutional framework and norms. ASEAN took on the 'primary manager' role through which regional states acted collectively to perform the function of diplomatic leadership. As discussed in Chapter One, a role bargain entails a reciprocal agreement on the respective functions each actor will perform as part of their roles towards a shared goal. The US supported regional regimes' consolidation through security public goods provision and in return ASEAN performed diplomatic leadership, promoting (non-communist) social stability in Southeast Asia through regional institution-building and rule-making, as well as providing diplomatic

initiatives that supported the US' position in Indochina. Through this bargain, the US and ASEAN redefined the great power role. The function of diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia was decoupled from the great power role and transferred to ASEAN as part of its 'primary manager' role.

The chapter divides role negotiation into three distinct phases. Firstly, role conceptualisation in 1954-1955, when the US and Indonesia both conceived of their strategic narratives and roles and made performative claims by organising SEATO and Bandung respectively. Secondly, role enactment between 1956 and 1965, when the competing grand strategic narratives and associated role conceptions were put into practice through US interventions in Indonesia and Vietnam, and Indonesia's confrontations against Dutch New Guinea and Malaysia. Lastly, the chapter will analyse role redefinition after 1966 when the US and regional states reached their reciprocal role bargain. Before moving onto the first phase of role conceptualisation, the next section provides the historical and contemporary context for the ensuing role negotiation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Colonial great power role

The task of negotiating the great power role in the post-colonial period was complicated by the fact that Southeast Asia had no historical experience with a 'European' model of the great power role, discussed in the introduction to this thesis, but rather its colonial manifestation. The colonial manifestation overlapped with the European great power role particularly in the function of security public goods as colonial powers policed threats to trade routes and defended their territories against external threats. The major difference however, was that instead of providing diplomatic leadership in a society of formally equal states, colonial great powers performed the self-appointed function of stewardship within a formally and substantively hierarchical system[15].

The stewardship function justified the establishment of European control over territory, trade routes and indigenous people in Southeast Asia as part of bringing 'civilization'. Europeans established colonies with defined political borders, sovereignty over which was held by the metropolitan governments in the capitals of Europe. European responsibility for the management of internal political and economic structures of the Southeast Asian polities was premised on the logic that indigenous rulers were uncivilised and therefore, in order to bring the the economic, political and judicial benefits of civilisation, sovereign prerogatives should be held by civilised Europeans[16].

[15] See Keene (2002: 76-96, 112-117).

[16] Gong (1984), Suzuki (2009).

Indigenous peoples were for the most part denied a legitimate voice in the organisation of their own states and the wider regional order. This contrasted with the previous regional society in Southeast Asia which operated under entirely different norms, rules and practices. Polities were mostly organised into relatively small kingdoms where the ruler enjoyed localised authority based on a system of rule emphasising kinship[17]. In what was known as the '*mandala* system', kingdoms vied with each other to extend their authority by establishing vassals and tributaries. Polities were defined by their centres rather than territorial boundaries and different centres' circles of authority would expand and contract over time and could have overlapping tributaries[18].

At decolonisation there was no going back to this previous regional society. Independent states inherited the externally imposed colonial borders and the centrally organised colonial state institutions. Central control was often weak, making ruling regimes fragile and control over the apparatuses of the state was often bitterly contested by rival groups. In this context, 'nationalism' as defined against the 'other' of colonialism was a keys means of legitimising ruling regimes and constructing new national identities that corresponded with the territories of the new states[19]. Thus the US' task of negotiating its legitimacy as a regional great power post-independence meant dealing with the normative baggage of the self-defined function of colonial stewardship and the resulting political need for newly independent ruling regimes to appear fully independent from former colonial powers. Southeast Asian states and their domestic constituencies were highly sensitive to action on the part of external powers which seemed to reflect colonial stewardship. This complicated negotiations over diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia because the US' claims to this function could easily be contested as constituting colonialism.

Transition into a Cold War context

The fact that newly independent states were emerging into the overarching struggle of the Cold War exacerbated the fragile nature of ruling regimes and internationalised struggles between rival factions over control of state apparatuses. The US and the West sought to ensure that newly independent states developed into strong, anti-communist states integrated into the capitalist economic system. The US and Britain in particular were deeply concerned with the internal politics of newly independent states and the decolonisation process itself was engineered towards achieving their strategic imperatives. Indicative of this was how Britain remained in Malaya to fight communist guerillas during the Malayan Emergency in order to ensure the survival of the pro-

[17] Andaya (1993).
[18] Wolters (1999).
[19] Anderson (1991, 1998), Reid (2009).

Western administration of Tunku Abdul Rhaman. To the extent that the internal structures of states were of concern to the great powers, there was not a significant departure from the previous colonial great power role. There was still a 'standard of civilisation'; civilisation now meant being anti-communist. This blurred the line between the functions of diplomatic leadership and stewardship in US great power role claim.

Previous US role

Prior to 1954, the US did not perform an extensive role throughout the whole of Southeast Asia. Its colonial influence was formally limited to the Philippines. The rest of Southeast Asia came under European colonial rule and Britain underwrote the region's maritime security. The US was more willing to withdraw its colonial control promising the Philippines independence in 1935 and granting it in 1946. Although the US was the main power behind the liberation of Southeast Asia from Japanese rule, Britain headed up Southeast Asia Command and took control of maritime Southeast Asia from the Japanese in 1945. Nationalist China was given responsibility for liberating much of mainland Southeast Asia. The US rhetorically supported independence and self-determination for regional states in the post-war period. However, the fall of China to communism and the onset of the Korean war meant the US could no longer offer a benign promotion of self-determination; independence movements could choose communism. The incoming Eisenhower administration in 1953 could not lose another another Asian state to communism after the domestic political fallout over 'who lost China'[20]. The US sought to establish its 'containment' grand strategic narrative for the region and perform security functions to insulate Southeast Asia from communist influence. These were new role claims for the US that needed to be legitimised through negotiation with the newly independent states. However, doing so meant competing with a newly independent Indonesia. Indonesia was crucial for shaping regional order in Southeast Asia due to its size, strategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and abundant natural resources. However, the group that assumed control of the apparatuses of the state at independence in Indonesia did so through active revolution and were therefore vehemently nationalist. Apart from the communists, Indonesia stood as the most significant challenger to US designs on post-colonial Southeast Asia.

1954-1955 – ROLE CONCEPTUALISATION: ESTABLISHING THE NARRATIVES

This section analyses the US' and Indonesia's competing visions for Southeast Asian order and their competing great power role conceptions. The US and Indonesia conceived and claimed their roles

[20] Kahin and Kahin (1997).

throughout 1954 and 1955 in response to the end of the First Indochina Conflict. In the wake of the failing French military effort there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in which the arguments for the 'containment' and 'autonomy' grand strategic narratives, and associated 'great power guardian' and 'indigenous great power liberator' role conceptions, were articulated. This section shows how the US and Indonesia conceptualised their respective roles and how they made performative claims to have their narratives accepted and their roles legitimised through alliances (convening the Manila and Bangkok conferences) and a broader movement of Afro-Asian solidarity (Bandung conference) respectively.

US' 'containment' narrative and 'great power guardian' role conception

The US' 'great power guardian' role conception derived from its grand strategic narrative and perception of Southeast Asia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of grand strategic narrative derives from Foucault's notion of 'productive power'[21]. It involves the presentation of an 'in-group', a threat to that 'in-group' and the necessary strategic response to counter the threat. Establishing an 'in-group' determines the subject positions of those who are 'in' and those who are 'out'. Those who are 'in' are considered deserving of the benefits of inclusion. Those who are 'out' either need to change their ways and be brought into the 'in-group', or actively opposed. Constructing an overarching threat to the 'in-group' helps to further define the boundaries between the subject positions of 'in' and 'out' and provides the basis upon which to mobilise peoples and resources towards countering the threat through the necessary strategic response.

The US' 'containment' narrative unfolded in response to the Soviet Union consolidating its influence over Eastern Europe. The 'in-group' were capitalist states of the 'free world' under threat from a monolithic and expansionist communist bloc. The necessary strategic response was containment under US leadership. The US' identity of 'leader of the free world' shown in table 2, was also linked to the US' understanding of itself as 'exceptional' due to its apparently unique origins and institutions[22]. It saw itself as a model for the rest of the world. Those that identified themselves as part of the free world and joined the US in countering the threat of communism were able to gain access to US military and economic assistance. Those that did not were for the most part excluded from these material benefits.

Containment became policy in Europe through the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and NSC 68 in 1950. The US provided substantial aid and assistance to European allies and coordinated collective

[21] Foucault (2002).
[22] See the essays in Edwards and Weiss (2011).

security through NATO. The US performed a European great power role through the provision of security and economic public goods, diplomatic leadership and institution-building. This came after debate within the US over whether it should establish itself as an offshore great power and build up European states' capabilities to manage their own defence. The European powers lobbied the US government to establish a firm commitment and military presence which acted as a significant pull factor, bolstering the arguments of Atlanticist constituencies in Washington[23]. European expectations therefore helped shift the US' understanding of its role towards a European great power role. The US' identity as 'exceptional' and 'the leader of the free world'[24] were not particularly problematic in the European context. Through European recognition, the US also gained its status as a established great power or even hegemon in Western Europe.

In Southeast Asia however, the US initially saw itself as performing an offshore great power role. US officials were aware of the anti-colonial sentiment in Asia which made for a less hospitable context. In particular, its identity as 'leader of the free world' and its status as an established great power/hegemon were problematic in a region where opponents alter-cast the US as having an 'external' identity and a status as a coloniser. For this reason, the US did not wish to claim overt diplomatic leadership or regional institution-building without first being invited as it had been in Europe. Such an invitation would off-set its external identity. For example, the National Security Council (NSC) in December 1949 stated that it would be counterproductive for the US to appear to be taking the lead on regional cooperation but that it should regard Asian initiatives in this direction sympathetically and “be prepared, if invited, to assist such associations to fulfil their purposes under conditions which would be in [their] interest”[25].

However, only strong US allies such as Philippine President Quirino, South Korean President Syngman Rhee and Republic of China's (ROC) president Chiang Kai-Shek, were willing to explicitly invite the US to establish a 'Pacific Pact' comparable to NATO. The US did not consider such a pact as credible. Firstly it was felt that the pact would not be 'mutual' but merely involve a one-way commitment from the US. Secondly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson deferred to Nehru's position that conflicts within Asia needed to be resolved before any Pacific pact could be feasible. India and Indonesia in particular were not interested in any arrangement that would compromise their non-aligned status. They also considered South Korea and the Philippines as 'satellites' of the US and did not want to deal with Chiang Kai-Shek. They recognised the People's

[23] Lundestad (1986), Ikenberry (1989).
[24] See Weldes (1996: 283).
[25] Colbert (1977: 140-142).

Republic of China (PRC) rather than the ROC as representing 'China'[26]. US officials encouraged the Philippines to distance itself from Chiang and reach out to Nehru by proposing regional cooperation on an economic and cultural, and not military, basis. By emphasising economic cooperation and development this could serve US imperatives by reducing the appeal of communism within the region. It could also be cast as anti-colonial because Asian states were acting under their own initiative. Once established, the US could invited to join. However, Philippine efforts at organising regional cooperation ended with the unsuccessful Baguio Conference in May 1950. India attended but opposed any moves to set up a Pacific association[27].

A Pacific pact linking Western powers with Japan and the Philippines, was again debated within the US in the lead-up to the Peace Treaty with Japan. For US officials, "[t]he type of pact which had the greatest appeal was an "offshore" Pacific pact which did not involve U.S. military commitments with respect to the Asian mainland"[28]. Australia and New Zealand opposed Japan's involvement in a multilateral pact and the British successfully argued that by just admitting the "US Satellite" of the Philippines, the pact would have even less appeal to other regional states[29]. Although the US did intervene on the mainland in Northeast Asia during the Korean war, in Southeast Asia it maintained its offshore great power role through defence pacts with the Philippines and with Australia and New Zealand in 1951. Its defence perimeter ended at the chain of islands linking its bases in Guam, the Philippines and Okinawa; that was as far as the US wanted to commit itself strategically[30]. It envisioned providing military and economic aid and assistance to emerging states through the Mutual Security Act 1951, as well as security of sea lanes from its bases in the Philippines. This was tenable as long as it could subcontract containment in Indochina to the French. The US increasingly underwrote the French military struggle in Indochina such that by 1954, the US was covering 66.7 per cent of French war expenditures[31].

US officials maintained their interest in "measures to promote the coordinated defence of Southeast Asia" but held that "the initiative in regional defence measures must come from the governments of the area"[32]. This position was abandoned when the French sought a diplomatic compromise at Geneva so as to withdraw from Indochina. US officials feared that the communists would win a diplomatic and military victory. The US expressed the 'containment' narrative and the

[26] For an analysis of the debate on a Pacific Pact 1949-1951 based on *FRUS* documents, see Mabon (1988).
[27] Mabon (1988).
[28] "Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Minister in France (Bohlen), March 31st 1950" *FRUS 1950* Vol VI pp. 1159.
[29] Mabon (1988: 171).
[30] Fifield (1963: 37).
[31] Cesari (2007: 178).
[32] Colbert (1977: 292-293).

urgency of the perceived threat to Southeast Asia through the 'Domino theory' first articulated by President Eisenhower in April 1954. Eisenhower argued that if Indochina fell to communism then the other states in the region would fall like a series of dominoes. Containment was necessary, insulating Southeast Asia from communist China. The 'containment' narrative gave regional actors a stark choice by defining the 'in-group' as those states aligned with the 'free world' of which the US was the leader. Those states that did not join the US containment strategy were presented as part of the 'out-group'. For the US neutralism was not an option, reflected in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reference to neutralism as 'immoral'[33].

Along with the US expression of the 'containment' narrative in Southeast Asia came its 'great power guardian' role conception, shown in table 2, that mixed elements of the European and colonial great power roles. Based on its identity as 'leader of the free world' and status as a great power/hegemon, the US saw itself performing the primary functions of diplomatic leadership and security public goods. Through trying to organise the region around containment and create collective defence under its leadership, the US claimed diplomatic leadership and the secondary function of regional institution-building. However, the US' claim to diplomatic leadership often merged into a claim to the stewardship function as it saw Southeast Asian states as weak and vulnerable in the face of communist insurgency, requiring the US, and also Britain, to nurture anti-communist regimes. The principal secondary function the US saw itself performing as a security public good was 'holding the line' against communist expansion in Vietnam. Between 1954 and 1965 the US saw itself 'holding the line' through deterrence, holding out the threat of military action against any communist advance. From 1965 the US sought to hold the line through direct intervention in Vietnam. The other secondary functions were security of sea lanes and military aid and assistance to build up regional anti-communist allies.

[33] "The Cost of Peace: Address by Secretary Dulles" *US Department of State Bulletin* Vol. 34 18/6/56 pp. 999-1000.

Identity	**Status**	**Function**	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Exceptional	Great power/hegemon	Diplomatic leadership (stewardship)	Regional institution-building
Leader of the free world		Security public goods provision	Holding the line (through deterrence, intervention) Security of sea lanes Military aid and assistance

Table 2 – US' 'great power guardian' role conception

Indonesian 'autonomy' narrative and 'indigenous great power liberator' role conceptualisation

In contrast to the 'containment' narrative, Indonesia's 'autonomy' grand strategic narrative argued that the newly emerging independent states of Africa and Asia were the 'in-group' and colonialism and neocolonialism were the primary threats to the independence of the emerging states - not communism. In the face of this threat, states needed to expel the last vestiges of colonialism from the region. The necessary strategic response was to maximise autonomy through the diplomacy of non-alignment and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which would promote security and peace in place of military-security ties[34]. The Five Principles were developed between the PRC and India in 1954 in the context of the Sino-Indian dispute over Tibet[35]. They were subsequently invoked by the Chinese as part of a conscious demonstration of a friendly and moderate foreign policy towards newly independent states. Adopting the Five Principles therefore represented an 'engagement' approach towards communist China, an alternative to the alienation and containment promoted by the US. The 'autonomy' grand strategic narrative left no room for an external great power role as external great powers were seen as the problem for regional security, rather than the solution. This sought to de-legitimise regional actors that maintained links with external partners, and legitimise groups seeking to sever such links.

[34] The Five Principles were 1) respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) non-aggression, 3) non-interference in internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit and 5) peaceful coexistence.
[35] Chen (2008: 134).

In place of external great power involvement was Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception. As shown in table 3, Indonesia's role conception included the identity of being an indigenous state and its status as 'independent', rooted in the fact that Indonesia achieved independence through revolution rather than being given it by the departing colonial power. For Indonesian leaders this meant Indonesia also upheld a 'non-aligned' status in international society. Indonesia was not subservient to, nor a product of, external powers' machinations. It also did not take either superpowers' side in the Cold War rivalry. Due to its indigenous identity and uniquely independent status within Southeast Asia, Indonesia saw itself as well placed to perform the primary function of diplomatic leadership, especially through the secondary function of rule-making. Indonesia would lead other emerging states towards autonomy and true freedom by establishing the rules appropriate for Southeast Asian order: the Five Principles of Coexistence. Table 3 also shows that the primary function of 'revolutionary regional leadership' and the secondary function of 'subversion' became intrinsic to Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception between 1963 and 1966. As we will see, these replaced the diplomatic leadership and rule-making as Sukarno sought to enact Indonesia's 'liberator' role through active revolution.

Identity	**Status**	**Function**	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Indigenous	Independent (won through revolution)	Diplomatic leadership	Rule-making (Five principles)
	Non-aligned	Revolutionary regional leadership (1963-65)	Subversion

Table 3 – Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception

Indonesia's role conceptualisation was rooted in its domestic politics. Unlike in US-supporter states like Thailand and the Philippines, domestic legitimacy for Indonesian governments did not depend on access to US material assistance. Indeed, close ties with the US had the opposite effect. In 1952 the Sukiman Cabinet was brought down by domestic pressure after it was revealed that Foreign Minister Subardjo had secretly signed an agreement in Washington through which Indonesia would receive economic and military assistance from the US under the terms of the

Mutual Security Act 1951[36]. Legitimation instead came from upholding the principles of anti-colonialism and *bebas actif* (independent and active). These principles were deeply held by the domestic population and were rooted in the struggle to win independence from the Dutch. There was little support from the West for Indonesia's independence struggle, making Indonesians see Western powers' interests as synonymous with colonial powers' interests and revealing US rhetoric of self-determination as untrustworthy[37].

Indonesia was in the process of building a modern state coterminous with the Dutch East Indies where none had existed prior to colonisation. This meant trying to unite a highly diverse archipelago around a common idea of the 'Indonesian nation'. Domestically, the state philosophy of *Pancasila* (five principles) was established in 1945 to counter proposals for the establishment of Islam as the state religion. *Pancasila* was designed in universal terms in order to appeal to all groups in the archipelago[38]. It did not prevent various groups competing to dominate domestic policy however. Broadly speaking, policy-makers were divided between 'administrators' - who saw the revolution as having ended with independence and wanted to focus on internal stability and development by fostering friendly relations with the west - and 'solidarity-makers' led by Sukarno and supported by nationalists (PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), who saw the revolution as ongoing[39]. The solidarity-makers were the dominant political force in the 1950s and were the ones to conceive of Indonesia as an 'indigenous great power liberator'. Although outside of the official political framework, the military was a major force in Indonesian politics that aligned more with the administrators and viewed itself as the guardian of *Pancasila*. This stemmed from its role in the revolution and in quashing rebellions such as the communist-led rebellion in Madiun in 1948, the *Darul Islam* rebellion and outer island rebellions. It saw itself as the only genuine national institution and the failure of parliamentary democracy to bring national unity in the 1950s further entrenched the army's view of its own legitimate political role[40].

In the context of divisions over domestic policy, foreign policy became highly important both for legitimising governments in power and for the broader project of Indonesian nation-building by uniting disparate peoples and constituencies around a common cause. Prime Minister Hatta set the tone for Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in September 1948 when he

[36] Anwar (2008: 184-185).
[37] Sukma (1995: 306).
[38] *Pancasila* consisted of belief in the one and only God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by consensus and consultation and social justice for all of the people of Indonesia. See Ramage (1995).
[39] Feith (1962), Anwar (2005: 142).
[40] Ramage (1995: 8).

spoke of Indonesia 'rowing between two coral reefs'; charting its own course and avoiding the dangers of the two superpower blocs[41]. Domestic legitimation was thus a major motivating factor behind Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet's role claim through hosting Bandung. By getting the people behind the ideal of Third World solidarity against colonialism and neocolonialism it was hoped that he would boost domestic support for his PNI-led government[42]. Indonesia's conception of itself as an 'indigenous great power liberator' that could provide diplomatic leadership in the region was thus to a large extent directed towards domestic constituencies. However, to be successful at home it would also need to also gain recognition in the region.

Claiming the 'great power guardian' role: SEATO

The US' initial efforts to legitimise its 'containment' narrative and 'great power guardian' role involved the call for 'united action' and subsequently establishing a collective security arrangement through the Manila Treaty. These represented claims to perform the functions of 'holding the line' against the communist advance in Indochina and diplomatic leadership through regional institution-building. These claims were directed at the key constituencies of legitimation, the Colombo Powers (an informal grouping which linked India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan), Thailand and the Philippines.

The US' call for united action was made by Secretary Dulles in March 1954. Dulles hoped that a collective stand by non-communist regional states would deter the communist advance at Dien Bien Phu. Thailand and the Philippines supported the idea but Britain and France were reluctant as they preferred to await the outcome of diplomatic negotiations over a resolution to the First Indochina Conflict at the Geneva Conference. United action failed to prevent communist victory at Dien Bien Phu and in May US attention turned towards establishing a collective defence treaty for Southeast Asia. Thailand and the Philippines were keen for a NATO-like organisation. Under the leadership of Phibun Songkram, Thailand entered into a firm alignment with the US and neutralist sentiment within the country was actively suppressed[43]. The Philippine government was however sensitive to internal neutralist sentiment and so President Magsaysay offered Philippine support with two qualifications: “First, that the right of Asian peoples to self-determination is respected; and second, that the Philippines be given a plain and unequivocal guarantee of US help in case of attack under our Mutual Defence Pact”[44]. These conditions reflect well the dilemma faced

[41] Sukma (1995: 308).
[42] Anwar (2008: 185).
[43] Fineman (1997).
[44] Fifield (1958: 102).

by the ruling regimes in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent Thailand, which were dependent on US material support for their domestic legitimacy but also had domestic constituencies sympathetic to the 'autonomy' narrative. For this reason, they wanted as firm a commitment from the US to their security as possible in order to justify their overtly pro-US foreign policy.

However, the US did not see a collective defence arrangement in Southeast Asia as taking the form of NATO. The US' security arrangements with Thailand and the Philippines were primarily bilateral, limiting the US' commitment and giving it more room for manoeuvre. For example, the Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines only required that the parties consider an attack on each as 'dangerous to the security of the other' and that they should meet the common danger through action in accordance of constitutional processes[45]. In the case of Thailand there was as yet no formal commitment. The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence was that the "US should not enter into combined military planning for the defence of the treaty area … nor should details of unilateral American plans for military action in the event of Communist aggression be disclosed to the other powers"[46]. Southeast Asian allies were not considered equal partners, rather their participation was only necessary as a means to legitimise US containment imperatives and its 'guardian' role in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the US initially pursued negotiations over collective defence without any Southeast Asian states. Dulles had initially invited representatives in Washington of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the Indochinese states to meet with him and establish a formal working group. However, Foreign Secretary Eden opposed this move, criticising Dulles' unilateralism over deciding who should be involved in negotiating a Southeast Asian collective defence treaty. Eden insisted that Burma and India needed to be consulted before any regional states were involved in the process. He proposed that Britain and the US start secret talks to get the ball rolling on the purpose, form and membership of collective defence[47]. "Five Power" military talks began in May between the US, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. The lack of Asian input was further reflected in the fact that substantive discussions over the form of the treaty were then carried out by an Anglo-American Study Group and a draft prepared in the State Department that became the basis of discussion at the Manila Conference in September. From this we see that US officials saw their country's performance of diplomatic leadership in terms of organising the region around the limited goal of containment, without accommodating any input from regional states or any particular desires they may have for their region. By excluding regional states from substantive discussions about the security and shape

[45] A copy of the treaty can be found online as part of the Yale Law School Avalon Project <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp> accessed 17/11/14.
[46] Colbert (1977: 300).
[47] Colbert (1977: 294).

of regional order, the US claim to diplomatic leadership leaned more towards the function of stewardship.

When news of the Five Power talks leaked, protests erupted from friendly Asian states over their exclusion. Thai diplomats described the talks as "another example of the archaic idea of the white man's burden"[48]. Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo warned that the Western powers were being accused in Manila of "'drawing a color line' in Asia"[49]. This showed the US that even apparently reliable allies in the region were extremely sensitive to anything that still appeared to be colonialism. The US responded by quickly offering membership to Thailand and the Philippines. President Eisenhower stated to the NSC in May 1954: "small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation"[50]. US officials began to recognise that the US needed these states to legitimise its 'containment' narrative and 'guardian' role, but they had to be given a voice.

To go beyond a "semblance of Asian participation" however, the collective defence arrangement needed the involvement of the Colombo Powers whose espoused neutralist policies would make the arrangement more credible. Eden appealed to them directly, but only Pakistan agreed to participate[51]. The states that eventually met in Manila in September 1954 were the US, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. They signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEADT) known as the Manila Treaty or Pact, and the Pacific Charter (1954). The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation was set up under Article V to "provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require". The first clause of Article IV was the heart of the Treaty and stated that "[e]ach Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes"[52]. This was a reduced form of collective defence that fell short of Philippine and Thai expectations of a NATO-like commitment where an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. A protocol to the Treaty stated that a threat to the newly independent states of Indochina (Laos,

[48] "Memorandum of conversation by the officer in charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs, 27th May 1954" *FRUS* 1952-1954 Vol XII Part 1 Doc 208.
[49] "Telegram: The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 4th June 1954" *ibid* Doc 215.
[50] "Memorandum of discussion at 195th meeting of the NSC, Washington, 6th May 1954" *ibid* Doc 170.
[51] Fifield (1973: 238).
[52] A copy of the treaty can be found online as part of the Yale Law School Avalon Project <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp> accessed 22/4/14.

South Vietnam, Cambodia) could be considered a threat to the alliance and therefore these 'protocol states' were covered by SEATO. This avoided needing to invite these states to join the alliance and thereby contravening the Geneva Accords[53]. The Pacific Charter was adopted on the initiative of the Philippines in order to show the commitment of SEATO members to the principle of self-determination. However, the promotion of self-determination and independence was limited to those countries "whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities". This qualification maintained an element of stewardship that was opposed to the Philippines' position that self-determination should be unconditional. In this sense, SEATO remained an easy target for those that wished to paint it as a modern day protectorate.

India and Indonesia were vocal in expressing their opposition to SEATO. India saw SEATO as subordinating Asian wishes to Western decisions and undermining Asian hopes for keeping the Cold War out of South and Southeast Asia. Krishna Menon, Indian Ambassador to the UN, described SEATO as a "modern version of a Protectorate … an organization of some imperial powers … to protect a territory which they say may be in danger. We are part of that territory and we say that we do not want to be protected by this organization"[54]. Indian officials saw SEATO as an example of how the Imperial powers continued to perform the function of stewardship. Indonesian officials asserted that SEATO would bring the world closer to war than peace and that it was not consistent with Indonesia's independent foreign policy[55]. Indian and Indonesian officials were keen to alter-cast the US as having no regional role, based on its external identity and its status as a coloniser.

Despite also being Colombo Powers, Ceylon and Burma did not share India and Indonesia's opposition. Ceylon[56] was sympathetic to the anti-communist cause but did not feel in a position to commit to SEATO despite Britain and the US even suggesting that the conference be held in Colombo instead of the Philippines[57]. Burma did not join but also did not share India and Indonesia's opposition. Burmese officials later stated privately that they were reassured by SEATO's existence and the protection it gave Southeast Asia[58].

India and Indonesia's efforts to associate SEATO with continued stewardship - and alter-

[53] Fenton (2012: 29).
[54] Colbert (1977: 296).
[55] "Indonesia to seek Nehru aid on Asia" *New York Times*, 5/9/1954.
[56] Ceylon became known as Sri Lanka after 1972.
[57] "Minutes of a meeting held at the Department of State: Washington, 5th August 1954" *FRUS* 1952-1954 Vol XII Part 1 Doc 285.
[58] Butwell (1963: 174).

casting of the US as having no regional role - concerned US officials, especially as Indonesia began preparations for the Bandung Conference. US officials were worried that the 'autonomy' narrative presented at Bandung could push Western powers out of Asian affairs. Recognising the US' 'external' identity within Southeast Asia, US officials thought it would be counter-productive to oppose the conference or prevent any delegation attending; doing so would only fuel Indian and Indonesian criticism. The Afro-Asian Working group, set up to advise Washington on the position the US should take to Bandung, advised that the US "should be chiefly concerned with impact on uncommitted elements in neutralist countries and in countries aligned with the West" and its objective should be: "(1) successful rebuttal of Communist charges, and (2) encouragement of an affirmative attitude by the Conference toward Free World and U.S. achievements and goals"[59]. To achieve these, the US was to avoid commenting on the Bandung Conference directly whilst taking public positions on issues that were likely to arise at the conference. More specifically, the US sought to counter the effect the 'autonomy' narrative may have on neutralist and pro-Western states, by subcontracting the legitimacy work for the 'containment' narrative and 'guardian' role at Bandung to friendly states. The US re-conceptualised the 'guardian' role by accepting its external identity and that to off-set its identity it needed regional states to advance diplomatic initiatives. As part of this subcontracting, the US encouraged these states "to propose courses of action which would embarrass Communist China and minimize the danger that the Conference might lead to the formation of an Asian-African bloc which could ultimately weaken relations between non-Communist Asia and the United States"[60]. This aimed directly at highlighting how China was a threat and therefore the 'containment' narrative was justified, and also at blocking any political organisation that could arise from Indonesia and India's promotion of the 'autonomy' narrative. The British also sought to influence their commonwealth contacts[61].

Carlos Romulo, head of the Philippine delegation at Bandung, said he was "eager to act as the principal protagonist of the Western position in the Conference". He explained that he would be making speeches in Manila and Bandung "which would be given a distinctly Asian cast and that . . . would embody some adverse criticism of the U.S.—this to associate himself sympathetically with the Asian community". He affirmed his intention to work closely with other pro-Western states at the conference and asked the Americans to supply him with "basic material" on issues that would arise at Bandung. William Lacy, head of the Afro-Asian Working Group, reportedly promised Romulo "counter resolutions" to resolutions on colonialism and the admission of the PRC to the

[59] "Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Reports and Operations Staff (Gilman) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 8th February 1955" *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXI Doc 11.
[60] "Minutes of meeting, Secretary's office, Department of State, Washington, 7th January 1955" *ibid* Doc 1.
[61] For Britain and Bandung see Tarling (1992).

UN[62]. Romulo was keen to emphasise "the imperative necessity of concealing his intimate relations with the U.S. in every possible way"[63]. In return for Asian allies promoting the 'containment' narrative at Bandung, the US accepted discursive criticism of some US policy. US and Philippine officials hoped this criticism would promote trust with neutralist states and give legitimacy to the Philippines as an actor with its own voice. Indeed, on the eve of the Bandung Conference the Philippine Senate adopted a resolution stating that a nation's right to self-determination included its right to decide exclusively by itself its ability to assume the responsibilities inherent in independent political status[64]. This formally rejected the qualifications set out in the Pacific Charter.

Before Bandung however, the SEATO Conference in Bangkok in February 1955 presented an opportunity to make a performative claim to the relevance of the 'containment' narrative and the US' 'guardian' role in Southeast Asia. It could also work to redress the US' tendency towards the stewardship function. By highlighting that the US was working together with Asian states as *equals* on Asian issues, the US hoped to show that its claim was to the function of diplomatic leadership and that the Asian states were endorsing that claim. Dulles stated that "it was of first importance that the Bangkok Conference should present a success to the world and thereby demonstrate that free Asian countries and Western countries could deal together with profit and harmony"[65]. Bangkok could anticipate the issues to arise at Bandung and produce statements, declarations, resolutions and a communiqué on these same issues. Manila Pact members could also reaffirm their commitment to self-determination embodied in the Pacific Charter and their concern to combat communist expansion, colonialism and promote economic development. For example, during the conference the Thai delegate Prince Wan "pointed to the realization of independence by Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and to forthcoming elections in Malaya as strengthening the principles of self-determination, self-government and independence embodied in [Manila] Treaty and Pacific Charter"[66]. This aimed to show that SEATO was not an organisation concerned with US neo-colonial imperatives, but an Asian institution addressing regional issues - the same issues as Bandung. Romulo agreed that "it would be useful indirectly to point to the Bangkok Conference as proof of the fact that there can be cooperation between Asian and Western nations, regardless of color, race, or creed". Romulo was "particularly concerned about the 'color' question in terms of the Bandung Conference"[67]**.** The Bangkok Conference could be construed as a hierarchical 'white man's

[62] "Memorandum for the Record by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Washington, 10th February 1955" *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXI Doc 13.
[63] Jones (2005: 857).
[64] Colbert (1977: 304-305).
[65] "Editorial Note" *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXI Doc 12.
[66] "Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State, Bangkok, 23rd February 1955" *ibid* Doc 19.
[67] "Memorandum for the Record by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Washington, 10th February 1955" *ibid* Doc 13.

club' as most of the delegations were from predominantly white nations whereas Bandung would be distinctly non-white. By highlighting that Asian and Western states were working equally together at Bangkok it was hoped that the racial charge could be countered[68].

The final communiqué of the Bangkok Conference sent a cordial greeting to Bandung which Dulles hoped would have "excellent propaganda value, and to some extent put that conference on the spot"[69]. Dulles wanted SEATO not only to show that Asian and Western states could work together but also as the pioneer of 'Asia for Asians' and anti-colonialism and that Bandung could follow in its footsteps[70]. By including issues such as national self-determination, and in particular pointing out how communist expansion represented a new form of colonialism, SEATO incorporated aspects of the 'autonomy' narrative. Dulles hoped that doing so would undermine the rationale for Indonesia's diplomatic leadership by showing that 'external' great powers were invited and working with Asian states on Asian issues. There would thus be no need for Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role. The SEATO Secretariat was established in Bangkok and primarily staffed by Asians in an attempt to demonstrate the Asian credentials of the organisation.

Claiming the 'indigenous great power liberator' role: Bandung

Indonesia's efforts to legitimise the 'autonomy' narrative and claim its 'liberator' role were pursued through platforms that emphasised its indigenous identity and status as independent and non-aligned. This began with the Colombo Power grouping first convened in April 1954 to influence the negotiations at Geneva. It brought together the Prime Ministers of India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma and Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo sought to instil in the grouping that colonialism and not communism was the principle issue in Asia. Reflecting this, they argued that the Colombo Powers should call on the great powers not to intervene in Indochina, by refraining from providing aid to combatants or intervening with troops or war material. This would leave the people of Indochina to work out their future themselves. However, the other three Prime Ministers did not agree that colonialism was more of an issue than communism. The Colombo Powers reached a compromise in their joint communiqué by merely encouraging the great powers to take "steps necessary to prevent the recurrence or resumption of hostilities"[71]. However the Colombo Powers did call for the PRC to be admitted to the UN, showing that they were not united with the West in seeking to contain China. Indonesia also responded

[68] Jones (2005), Parker (2006).
[69] "Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State, Rangoon, 26th February 1955" *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXI Doc 31.
[70] Jones (2005: 857).
[71] Acharya (2009: 37-38).

directly to Dulles' 'united action' by proposing that India, Burma, and Indonesia join a non-aggression pact with Communist China based on the Five Principles. This was its first claim to diplomatic leadership and offered an explicit alternative for managing regional relations with China to Dulles' collective defence. It was clear however that the differences between the Colombo Powers precluded a united stance on this issue.

Indonesia renewed its suggestion of a non-aggression pact with China after the Manila Conference was announced. Sastroamidjojo travelled to India where he sought support for the proposed pact, strongly denounced the Manila Treaty and discussed ways to counter the 'containment' narrative reflected in the Manila Treaty[72]. Although the non-aggression pact would not materialise, a means to counter the US' 'containment' narrative took the form of the proposal to convene a conference of independent Asian and African leaders at Bandung. It was hoped this would provide a forum to promote the 'autonomy' narrative and to demonstrate newly independent states' non-alignment in the Cold War rivalry. The Colombo Powers decided at their meeting in Bogor in December 1954 to send out invitations to 30 Asian and African nations for the Bandung Conference the following April. The fact that communist China was invited represented a major contestation of the 'containment' narrative. Sastroamidjojo stated that the most important aim of the conference was “[t]o view the position of the Afro-Asian countries and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation”. This revealed Indonesia's desire to make an impact on international order through its claim to diplomatic leadership[73].

The Bandung Conference was Indonesia's most explicit performative claim to diplomatic leadership. In preparation for the conference, the streets of Bandung were renamed, thoroughly cleaned and new conference venues were created. The main conference building was renamed “Freedom building” to reflect the 'autonomy' narrative[74]. The conference itself consisted of twenty nine nations from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Substantively, the discussions at Bandung were concerned with sovereignty and national independence. However, as was the case with the Colombo Power meetings, participants were divided over whether Western colonialism or communism constituted the principal threat to sovereignty. The different positions of conference attendees became clear when discussing the principles and norms that should guide relations between newly independent states and the appropriateness of military ties and alignment with major power blocs[75].

[72] Palmer (1955: 24).
[73] Fifield (1958: 113).
[74] Shimazu (2014).
[75] Acharya and Tan (2008).

President Sukarno set the tone for the discussion in his opening address. Presenting the 'autonomy' narrative he said: “I beg of you, do not think of colonialism only in the classic form … Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises”[76]. Sukarno equated the continuing presence of external powers, in various forms, with colonialism. The continued subjugation of Asian and African peoples under colonialism was only heightened by the bipolar Cold War conflict. The necessary strategic response was to seek autonomy through non-alignment, pursuing relations based on the Five Principles rather than security ties with external powers. Sukarno pointed to the recent Colombo Power meetings as an example, stating that the grouping played an important part in ending the fighting in Indochina by bringing a “fresh approach” that did not include ultimatums or military mobilisation but rather consultation, diplomacy and ideas. He stated that “[s]ome countries of free Asia spoke, and the world listened. They spoke on a subject of immediate concern to Asia, and in doing so made it quite clear that the affairs of Asia are the concern of the Asian peoples themselves. The days are now long past when the future of Asia can be settled by other and distant peoples”[77]. Sukarno thus emphasised the Colombo powers' concrete contribution as indigenous states to the settlement of the First Indochina Conflict through the diplomacy of Five Principles, a direct and better alternative to the military solutions of external powers.

Defenders of regional security pacts such as Romulo responded that voluntarily taking part in such pacts was an act of self-determination and a protection of sovereignty. They argued that the threat to sovereignty came not from Western colonialism/neo-colonialism – as Western states were giving up their colonies and working with Asian states as equal partners – but rather from communist subversion. Ceylon's Prime Minister John Kotelawala, despite not being a member of SEATO, argued that communism should be considered as a new form of colonialism and that the Conference should condemn Soviet domination in Eastern Europe as colonialism[78].

During the conference Nehru, Sukarno and Zhou En Lai personally met leaders from various nations and tried to persuade them of the value of the Five Principles as an alternative to collective defence. China's Premier Zhou En Lai stood out as the major talking point of the conference in this respect. That China was represented in the first place was a symbol of the 'autonomy' narrative that Bandung offered and the diplomacy of Zhou En Lai seemed to give weight to the appeal of non-

[76] MOFA Indonesia (1955: 19-29).
[77] MOFA Indonesia (1955: 19-29).
[78] Burke (2011: 45).

alignment and the Five Principles as an approach to security. At Bandung, Zhou impressed many with his apparent reasonable, conciliatory attitude and sincerity to establish China's peaceful inclinations[79]. This contradicted the US' narrative that presented China as a threat to other states which needed to be contained. Indicative of this challenge were the effects it had with respect to Thailand and Cambodia. It is worth looking briefly at these cases as they reflected US officials' concern regarding the impact the 'autonomy' narrative might have on pro-Western and neutralist opinion. Thailand was a key ally of the US on mainland Southeast Asia and Cambodia was considered by the US a 'front-line' state in the struggle against communism in Indochina.

Zhou went to great lengths to reach out to Prince Wan, the Thai representative at Bandung. He invited Wan to a private dinner and the Prince was apparently very impressed at Zhou being able to address Thailand's concerns regarding China. After the conference secret moves were made to establish diplomatic relations. Thailand sent a delegation for talks in Beijing in December 1955[80]. The Thai government relaxed its policy on Chinese minorities and made other indications of warming ties with Beijing. Press commentary became critical of the US and especially SEATO and many new leftist groups were formed merging as the Socialist Unity Front in February 1957. The new grouping called for a neutral foreign policy and the return of exiled former leader Pridi Panomyong, a figurehead for the Thai nationalist movement and those that opposed military rule[81]. This highlighted a growing Thai constituency that was opposed to the alienation of China encouraged by the US' 'containment' narrative and Thailand's close alignment with the US.

As a front line state in Indochina, Cambodia faced a more imminent communist threat than Thailand. It initially tried to cast its lot with the US requesting military assistance after the conclusion of the Geneva agreements. Negotiations were complicated by the Geneva Accords and by the French who wished to remain the principle trainers of the Cambodian military[82]. Cambodia's Prime Minister Prince Sihanouk then refused to join SEATO because it did not offer the firm protection he felt Cambodia required. It seemed clear that the US was reluctant to commit troops to Indochina[83]. Bandung came as an important turning point after which Sihanouk started vocalising Cambodia's commitment to neutralism and the Five Principles. In February 1956 Sihanouk made a visit to China where he discussed possible aid. Shortly before this he visited Manila and made a speech to the Philippine Congress explaining Cambodia's neutral policy[84]. He had apparently been

[79] Ang (2008: 32).
[80] Ang (2008: 33).
[81] Neuchterlein (1965: 126-128).
[82] Clymer (2004).
[83] Leifer (1962: 124).
[84] *ibid* (1962: 129).

pressed by the Philippine leader to join SEATO but responded by asserting that to join SEATO would be overly provocative and provide the communists with an excuse to intervene in Cambodia. The speech apparently went down well with congressmen and even led to calls by some for a reassessment of Philippine policy[85]. In private however, Sihanouk expressed more positive views of SEATO and its protection of Cambodia[86]. Cambodia's pursuit of neutralism was thus more out of necessity than the appeal of the 'autonomy' narrative itself. It did not represent an endorsement of Indonesia's claims to diplomatic leadership but rather was a strategic effort to coexist with China.

Despite the efforts of Indonesia and others and the fears of the US, the eventual outcome of Bandung was not the establishment of an Afro-Asian bloc committed to ousting Western powers from Asia. The divisions over the the threat posed by colonialism and communism respectively to national sovereignty were accounted for within the final communiqué. As a compromise, the communiqué promoted Ten principles; these included the Five Principles but also the principle of respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, as long as arrangements for collective defence were not used to serve any particular interests of the big powers. The use of the word 'particular' suggested a vague understanding that SEATO and other arrangements should be limited to defending the national security of participating states rather than serving to legitimise specific foreign policy aims or designs of external powers. By including these principles, the conference upheld the right of states to choose defence ties with external great powers. It therefore did not represent as substantive a challenge to the US as may have been feared; Dulles even stated that it was a document that the US could subscribe to[87].

Implications of SEATO and Bandung for the great power role

With respect to the US' 'great power guardian' role conception, the Manila and Bangkok conferences reflected the 'containment' narrative and represented the US' performative claim to the functions of 'holding the line' and diplomatic leadership. This was substantively endorsed by Thailand and the Philippines and at least acquiesced to by states such as Ceylon and Burma. Only India and Indonesia showed significant opposition. For the most part, regional states were willing to endorse the US' provision of security public goods and even the function of 'holding the line' against any communist advance. However, the function of diplomatic leadership was problematic. US officials saw their country's performance of diplomatic leadership in terms of organising the region around the limited goal of containment. Regional institution-building was considered to serve the

[85] *ibid* (1962: 129).
[86] Clymer (2004: 52).
[87] Ang (2008: 36).

purpose of legitimising US containment imperatives and its 'guardian' role, rather than the expressed needs of Asian states. US officials tended to treat regional states as unequal and therefore acted more in terms of stewardship, offending even strong US allies such as Thailand and the Philippines. Washington tried to redress this by emphasising cooperation between Asian and Western states as equals at the Bangkok conference and encouraging Thai and Philippine activism in promoting the 'containment' narrative and necessity of the US' 'great power guardian' role at the Bandung conference. However, the specific 'great power guardian' role conception and its tendency towards stewardship was problematic.

Despite the problems with the 'guardian' conception, Bandung failed to present a viable alternative for most emerging states. Indonesia and India failed to have the 'autonomy' narrative substantively endorsed. Those states that were part of SEATO and other collective defence arrangements successfully defended their right to enter into those arrangements as an act of autonomy. Many states still accepted that they faced a threat from communism and that the only means of meeting that threat was through external security guarantees. In this respect, the external great power role - in some form - was still endorsed as a necessity. The 'indigenous great power liberator' role that offered diplomatic leadership through non-alignment and the Five Principles was not seen as a credible alternative to the external great power role.

Bandung did however establish autonomy arguments that, in principle, states were willing to discursively endorse. The 'autonomy' narrative and its links to nationalism provided a powerful normative discourse for opposition groups within pro-Western states to use in challenging ruling regimes. The example of Thailand and how certain domestic constituencies were strengthened after Bandung to be far more critical of SEATO, and how Thailand even made moves to establish links with the PRC, demonstrated this. In the case of Thailand however this was short lived. Successive coups staged by Sarit Thanarat in 1957 and 1958 ensured Thailand's continued commitment to the US. The new leader made public his government's commitment to SEATO and ended the opening to China, quashing criticism of the US through a massive crackdown on the press and a ban on political parties[88].

In this way, the legacy of Bandung can be summarised as not “strategic and organisational, but educational and normative”[89]. Regional states did not move to renegotiate their ties with external powers, but the appeal of the 'autonomy' narrative in principle complicated the degree of

[88] Fineman (1997: 248-258).
[89] Acharya and Tan (2008: 14).

endorsement regional states could offer and thus the legitimacy of the US' 'great power guardian' role. We can conclude at this stage that there was only a partial bargain over the US' 'great power guardian' role; security public goods and 'holding the line' endorsed, but diplomatic leadership/stewardship contested due to the US' external identity. There was no agreement over the alternative of Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role however as this was not endorsed by any of the regional constituencies of legitimation. It was however endorsed by key Indonesian constituencies including the PKI which, as we will see in the next section, led President Sukarno to attempt to enact the role despite the lack of regional endorsement.

1956-1965 ROLE ENACTMENT: PRACTISING THE NARRATIVES

The decade following Bandung saw the US and Indonesia re-conceptualise their roles and make substantive claims through enacting their role conceptions. US officials were no longer concerned about performing diplomatic leadership, as it was clear that SEATO was waning as a mechanism to legitimise the US' role. Instead, Washington committed to more overt stewardship, intervening within states in order to prevent the spread of communism. This was clearly seen in the US' intervention in Indonesia. Its performance of 'holding the line' also moved from deterrence to intervention as seen in Vietnam.

With increased power, but a precarious domestic position balanced between the anti-communist military and PKI, President Sukarno pursued a more radical foreign policy, re-conceptualing the 'liberator' role from performing diplomatic leadership to revolutionary regional leadership. Sukarno enacted the 'indigenous great power liberator' role by taking radical steps to purge any external great power presence from the region. Indonesia seized foreign assets and pursued active confrontation against West Irian (still under Dutch influence) and Malaysia (considered a British plot to maintain its influence). Sukarno framed these confrontations as the continuation of Indonesia's revolution and tried to enlist support through a new grouping to rival the UN, the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS).

The audience for these role claims was an emerging Southeast Asian regional constituency of legitimation consisting of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. This emerging, if partial, regional constituency endorsed the US' 'containment' narrative, security public goods provision and 'holding the line' function. The three states also pursued regionalism in the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) to buttress the region from communist influence and compliment their external security ties. ASA was promoted as non-political, with leaders highlighting the 'autonomy' aspects of

cooperation as Asian solutions to Asian problems. It fell victim to the unfolding instability of Confrontation in 1963 but set a precedent for not only a conception of region and institutional form, but also the pattern of a division of labour with the US that would be realised through ASEAN.

Enacting the 'great power guardian' role: stewardship and 'holding the line' through intervention

Intervention in Indonesia

In the late 1950s regional military commanders in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi rebelled against Indonesia's central government by declaring regional autonomy. They were disaffected by Jakarta's leadership and concerned by the rising influence of the PKI. The US intervened in support for the rebel groups because of their anti-communist credentials. The US' intervention represented a clear claim to stewardship, showing its willingness to interfere in domestic politics to try to manipulate outcomes towards its containment imperatives. Washington saw an opportunity to bring Indonesia into alignment with itself and the rest of Southeast Asia by weakening the solidarity-makers and bringing anti-communists into power. Based on information from the CIA, and against that coming from the US Embassy in Jakarta, Washington officials believed Java was edging towards communism and Indonesia was likely to break up[90]. The rise of the PKI, and Sukarno's apparent willingness to allow this rise, compounded these fears. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles hoped that through support for outer island rebels, the US could leverage the central government to make moves against communists within Java. If Java did go communist, US officials hoped that communism could be contained within Java and not spread to the outer islands.

The consequences of Java becoming communist were considered twofold. In the short term were detrimental psychological and political effects for non-communist Southeast Asian states that would feel squeezed between communist China and North Vietnam and communist Java. In the long term the military consequences were reported to be “grave” as bases from Java could be used by communist bloc forces to threaten US regional allies. A communist Indonesia would “split off Australia and New Zealand from Southeast Asia ... sever sea lines of communication and hinder air communication between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Additionally, it would make very difficult the provision of U.S. military support to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaya”[91]. It was thus considered to severely impair the US' ability to provide security public goods to the region and

[90] See Kahin and Kahin (1997).
[91] “Report Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia for the National Security Council, Washington, 3rd September 1957” *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXII Doc 262.

directly threaten US allies and even its island defence perimeter. To counter this, Washington decided to maintain formal relations with the government of Indonesia but increase its support for anti-communist elements in the outer islands and Java. It sought to strengthen the anti-communists by encouraging coordination between non-communist parties, and at the same time weaken the PKI by undermining its nationalist credentials through identifying it with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

In December 1957 naval ships were readied for action around Indonesia to prepare for "any contingency including evacuation U.S. personnel and landing Marines to protect U.S. lives and property in Indonesia especially Java and Sumatra"[92]. Meanwhile, the CIA landed officers in Sumatra and distributed arms to rebels, leading rebel leaders in February 1958 to form the Revolutionary Government of the People of Indonesia (PRRI). The central government responded with force and civil conflict broke out. Secretary Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, considered ways for direct military intervention but struggled to find legal justification. Secretary Dulles also started making public statements that were highly critical of the central government in order to justify Washington's position with respect to the rebellions. Despite claiming that the US was not involved, the Indonesian press linked Dulles' critical statements with the rebel ultimatum and inferred that the US must be involved. Foreign Minister Sanbandrio protested that Dulles' statements constituted "unwarranted interference"[93].

The Dulles brothers hoped that rebel bombing raids over Java would act as leverage with the central government and decided to offer aid to anti-communist elements within the Indonesian army as long as it was not used against the rebels[94]. However, the Indonesian army discovered truck-loads of unpacked crates filled with new military equipment, ammunition, foodstuffs and money which had American markings. Prime Minister Juanda pleaded with US Ambassador Howard Jones to get his government to stop the bombing raids and support for the rebels, informing him that the revelation of foreign involvement in the bombing raids had played into the hands of the PKI and made things very difficult for pro-US elements in Jakarta. He requested that Secretary Dulles make a statement indicating US determination to do what it can to halt the raids[95].

The US continued to deny involvement whilst pushing for anti-communist figures such as Juanda and Army Chief of Staff General Nasution to make moves to eliminate communist influence within Java. Secretary Dulles proposed a plan that would begin with him proposing a cease fire,

[92] "Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump), Washington, 7th December 1957" *ibid* Doc 312.
[93] Gardner (1997: 149).
[94] "Editorial Note" *FRUS* 1958-1960 Vol XVII Doc 73.
[95] "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 6th May 1958" *ibid* Doc 80.

during which anti-communist elements in Jakarta could move against the communists and make changes to bring about an anti-communist cabinet. The US would then offer military and economic support starting with an initial gesture of $7 million dollars' worth of equipment. The new government and the rebels could then seek a resolution to the conflict[96]. However, Juanda and Nasution had no intention of negotiating with rebels that had been fighting with external assistance as this would compromise their standing with the Indonesian people[97]. The plan was aborted when a captured bomber pilot was identified as US Civil Air Transport (CAT) bomber Allen Pope. Dulles pulled the plug on the operation and made a statement that all conflicts in Indonesia were a matter for internal affairs and that there should be no foreign interference. However, on the same day as Dulles' press statement Indonesia was commemorating its declaration of independence and many speeches by Sukarno and others were scathing of foreign intervention, some directly mentioning the US. Even anti-communist commentators expressed outrage at the actions of the US and its allies in trying to "Balkanise" Indonesia[98].

Without external support the rebellions petered out by June 1958. The anticipated cabinet reshuffle did not bring about the changes that Washington hoped for. Indeed, the US' intervention had the adverse effect that the Indonesian public became increasingly anti-American. They believed the US had masterminded the PRRI rebellion from the start and were susceptible to accusations of US involvement in anti-Indonesian activities for a number of years to come, reinforcing the US' status as a coloniser. This strengthened the solidarity-makers and reduced the ability of administrators such as Juanda to influence Indonesian foreign policy.

The only constituency the US was able to maintain links with was the Indonesian army. US officials decided to provide the military aid first offered by Dulles in May as a way to counter Soviet support being provided to the Navy and Air force[99]. However, the West Irian dispute and President Sukarno's policies became obstacles; nearly all US assistance to the army was cut off with the onset of Confrontation and Sukarno's speech in 1964 that told the US to "go to hell with your aid". Despite this, a Civic Action Program (CAP) was initiated for Indonesia in 1962 and remained in place throughout Confrontation, providing direct links between the US and the Indonesian army that bypassed the central government. The CAP focused on the development of farming techniques and acted as a counterweight to PKI rural programmes. Indonesian officers increasingly went to study in the US: 0 in 1958, 41 in 1959, 201 in 1960, peaking at 1017 in 1962[100]. The US' courtship

[96] "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, Washington, 13th May 1958" *ibid* Doc 92.
[97] "Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 15th May 1958" *ibid* Doc 97.
[98] Gardner (1997: 158).
[99] Evans (1989: 31-32).
[100] See Evans (1989).

of the military paid off after the 1965 coup as the army became the dominant force in Indonesia's politics.

Intervention in Vietnam

The US' intervention in Indonesia was for the most part opportunistic and short-lived. In contrast, the intervention in Vietnam was seen as fundamental for proving US resolve in acting on the 'containment' narrative and making good its claim to the function of 'holding the line'. The US initially committed to building a strong anti-communist South Vietnam to resist communist pressure by providing aid, technical and military advisers and consumer products. Between 1956 and 1961 an average of 58 per cent of the South Vietnamese budget was provided by the US, making South Vietnam dependent on US aid. However, the US-backed Diem regime failed to gain popular support due to its authoritarianism and dependence on US aid[101]. Despite this, the commitment the US made to South Vietnam created a path dependency and, in the eyes of officials in Washington, became a crucial bellwether for US commitments across the globe. The US was therefore concerned with the impact not intervening may have on its own identity as 'leader of the free world' and status as a great power/hegemon.

In the context of this growing commitment to South Vietnam, SEATO became less useful as a mechanism for deterrence and for legitimising the US' 'containment' imperatives and 'guardian' role. British and French aversion to military involvement in Indochina meant any collective action was unlikely due to the need for consensus, as seen during the Laotian crisis in 1960-61. After coming under increasing pressure from communist and neutralist forces, Laos made a request for SEATO observers, prompting Secretary of State Dean Rusk to introduce plans for intervention in Laos at the SEATO conference in 1961. Rusk hoped that the threat of SEATO intervention would force the anti-government Pathet Lao into a ceasefire. Britain and France opposed such an ultimatum, with Britain approaching the Soviet Union to persuade the Pathet Lao to a ceasefire[102]. The US issued a unilateral warning by mobilising elements of the 3rd Marine Division and Seventh Fleet and dispatching advance elements of a Marine helicopter squadron to Udorn airbase in northeastern Thailand. This may have contributed to the Soviet acceptance of British diplomatic initiatives[103]. In the end the US and SEATO chose to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Laotian crisis with President Kennedy 'drawing the line' in Vietnam instead.

[101] McMahon (1999: 75-79).
[102] Buszynki (1982: 80-81)
[103] Fenton (2012: 204).

The US had already considered the usefulness of the Manila Treaty lying less in its basis in for collective action, than in its legal justification for US unilateral military action in Indochina. The NSC document titled “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East” was revised in August 1956 to say: “Should overt Communist aggression occur in the Southeast Asian treaty area, invoke the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both as applicable; and subject to local request for assistance take necessary military and any other action to assist any Mainland Southeast Asian state or dependent territory in the SEATO area willing to resist Communist resort to force”[104]. This willingness to act unilaterally under the cover of the Manila Treaty was expressed publicly in 1962 with the Rusk-Thanat Agreement. In the wake of the Laotian Crisis, Thailand was concerned that SEATO may not provide adequate defence and sought a commitment to Thai security from the US. The resulting agreement overrode the consensus principle of SEATO by stating that the US acting under the Manila Treaty “does not depend on prior agreement of all the parties to the treaty since this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective”[105]. On the US side, this represented a more substantive claim to 'holding the line' through deterrence. On the Thai side it showed the increased nature of the threat to the Thai regime which drove its endorsement of, and reliance on, the US' role.

This unilateral declaration was especially salient as the communist insurgency in South Vietnam picked up momentum. The National Liberation Front (NLF), with the support of North Vietnamese troops, was showing success against the better equipped South Vietnamese army. The NLF was also able to garner popular support from the rural population. After the battle of Ap Bac, when an outnumbered NLF force managed to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese army, it became clear that the Diem regime could not hold out. A brutal crackdown on Buddhist protesters in 1963 was the last straw, and Diem was brought down by a US-backed coup. This did nothing to help the military situation on the ground and the US moved towards direction military intervention. In August 1964 two US destroyers reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The facts of the incident are disputed[106] but it was used by the Johnson administration as a means to increase the President's freedom of action in Vietnam. The resulting Gulf of Tonkin Resolution allowed Johnson “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom” without a declaration of war from Congress[107]. This satisfied the 'according to constitutional processes' clause in Article IV of the Manila Treaty.

[104] “Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 29th August 1956” *FRUS* 1955-1957 Vol XXI Doc 118.
[105] Buszynski (1982: 86-87).
[106] See Moise (1996).
[107] “Joint Resolution: 7 August” *The Department of State Bulletin* (24/8/64), p. 268.

By removing the barriers of the need for consensus within SEATO and the need to satisfy constitutional processes, President Johnson was able to directly intervene in Indochina. This began with a systematic bombing campaign over North Vietnam in February 1965, followed a few months later by the introduction of ground troops. The US was making a substantive claim to perform the function of militarily 'holding the line' in Vietnam. To legitimise this, regional governments were enlisted to provide support under the “many flags” programme.

Responses from Southeast Asian states

Thailand considered the expansion of communism in Indochina as a direct threat to its security and therefore gave substantive endorsement. US intervention reassured Thailand of US resolve and provided an opportunity to extract greater military and economic assistance. Thailand offered land in the northeast for US-built and operated air bases. Over the course of the conflict 80 per cent of US bombing in Indochina was conducted from Thailand[108]. Thailand hosted 300,000 US servicemen and their presence led to the development of infrastructure and their use of Thai resorts for R&R dramatically boosted the tourist industry. In 1967 Thailand sent the Queen's Cobra division to Vietnam which included a force of 2,200 men to guard the highway between the US air base at Bien Hua and the port of Vung Tau. Thailand increased its contribution in 1968 through the Black Panther division[109]. Between 1968 and 1971 Thailand maintained a division size of 11,000 men, the third largest contingent of foreign troops after the US and South Korea[110]. This contribution was underwritten by the US. Thai forces were officially volunteers and there was widespread support within Thailand for their efforts. Thailand's major contribution to the US effort was its clandestine operation in Laos. Up to 23,000 Thai troops dressed in Royal Lao Army uniform and flew Lao aircraft in operations to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main route for transporting North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Vietnam[111].

The Philippines endorsed the US' 'holding the line' by sending an engineering task force called the Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG). Negotiations over PHILCAG originally revolved around funding of combat forces. The Philippines required that the US completely fund the forces and also offer additional concessions. This was unacceptable to the US at the time and it was settled that PHILCAG could consist of an engineering task force funded by the US. The PHILCAG bill experienced heated debate within the Philippines Congress but was passed in June

[108] Osornprasop (2012: 186).
[109] Ang (2010: 35).
[110] Ruth (2010: 1).
[111] Osornprasop (2012).

1966 subject to yearly review[112]. This contribution can be considered on the borderline between performative and substantive endorsement because, although rather insignificant strategically, it was costly due to domestic opposition.

The new states of Malaysia and Singapore also endorsed the US' claim. Malaysia's endorsement was more clearly performative than substantive. Malaysia did not send forces to fight in Vietnam but between 1961 and 1966 helped train a number of South Vietnamese officers in jungle warfare, anti-guerrilla operations and police administration. The Tunku thought Malaysia's policy on Vietnam would hurt its standing with Afro-Asians but was convinced that the US was taking the correct course as he believed from experience that communists would never negotiate until they were sure they could not take what they wanted through force. The US saw Malaysia as key for legitimising its efforts in Vietnam. Secretary Rusk told Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak that it would be good if Southeast Asian leaders found a way to tell non-aligned countries outside Southeast Asia not to speculate but to listen to what Asian countries close to the danger were saying and support their peace initiatives[113].

For Singapore, public endorsement of the 'containment' narrative and the US' 'holding the line' were difficult in 1965 as the country, newly departed from Malaysia, needed to be accepted by the Afro-Asian group prior to the September 1965 vote for its UN membership. The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) regime also needed to squash the left-wing opposition *Barisan Socialis'* efforts to exploit the base issue at home. Although *Barisan Socialis* had been weakened through PAP crackdowns, it still posed a potential challenge through its ability to link the British military presence to neo-colonialism. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew countered the *Barisan Socialis* effort by publicly criticising the US, making clear that the government was in full control of the bases and the US would not utilise them in their military effort against Vietnam[114]. Privately however, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence George Edwin Bogaars said that the Ministry of Defence would not interfere with existing British-US arrangements and the transportation of Vietnamese officers through Singapore for training in Johor[115].

The fear of a possible Malaysia-Indonesia condominium against Chinese populations after Confrontation contributed to the improvement in relations between Singapore and the US by 1966. In February 1966, Singapore allowed US troops to come to Singapore for R&R as long as they did

[112] Jagel (2013).
[113] Ang (2010: 30).
[114] Ang (2010: 27).
[115] Ang (2010: 28).

not appear on the streets in their uniforms. Lee began to endorse the 'containment' narrative and 'holding the line' by stating in June 1966 that people in Vietnam were dying to ensure that what was happening there was not repeated elsewhere in Southeast Asia. He hoped “the United States, despite domestic criticism ... would be able to hold the line through at least one more presidential election” emphasising that the Southeast Asian countries must make the most of the time which was being bought for them[116]. By not interfering in the transport of troops through Singapore to the Johor Jungle Warfare School and allowing US troops to undertake R&R in Singapore, Singapore also gave performative endorsement to the US' claims.

It is clear from the above that the non-communist states of Southeast Asia endorsed the 'containment' narrative and the functions of security public goods and militarily 'holding the line' in Vietnam. This endorsement varied in degree: the extent of each state's endorsement was largely determined by what they considered the primary threat to their own security and their sensitivity to their own domestic constituencies and the non-aligned group of states. As far as the non-communist regimes were concerned, the US' performance of 'holding the line' bought time to focus on economic development and political stability in order to ensure they met the challenge of communist subversion. US provision of security public goods guaranteed their external security and provided material assistance for their regime consolidation.

Crucially Indonesia was not part of this developing regional constituency that endorsed the US' role until 1966. The next section will look at how Indonesia made its substantive claims to its 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception through confrontation and how this was rejected by regional states.

Enacting the 'indigenous great power liberator' role: autonomy through revolution

Confrontation

Foreign involvement in the Sumatra and Sulawesi rebellions, the failure of parliamentary democracy to bring national unity and the lack of success obtaining West Irian through diplomacy provided the conditions for President Sukarno to take a leading role in Indonesian politics. He implemented his concept of 'Guided Democracy' in 1959, revoking the 1950 provisional constitution, re-establishing the 1945 constitution and banning parties opposed to the changes including Masjumi and the PSI. Guided Democracy was justified in terms of bringing a truly

[116] Ang (2010: 29), see also Ang (2009).

'Indonesian' political system to replace the inapplicable Western parliamentary model. Sukarno consolidated his power through mass mobilisation, carried out through the PKI and its allies. This put a check on the anti-communist military, the biggest challenger to Sukarno's position; the military was also given a stake in Sukarno's system through the imposition of martial law, which it used to seize major sectors of the economy from the Dutch. Sukarno subsequently maintained an uneasy balance between the army and the PKI which were bitterly opposed to one another. In this context domestic policy issues became even more divisive. This further encouraged Sukarno to focus on foreign policy in an attempt to unite Indonesians through evoking nationalist feeling. Making substantive claims to pursue the 'autonomy' narrative through performing a new function of revolutionary regional leadership was thus a key means of legitimising Sukarno's power[117].

The first major expression of this was the coercive diplomacy used to obtain West Irian from the Dutch. Sukarno first seized Dutch assets and expelled Dutch nationals, but this did not deter the Dutch from moving West Irian towards self government. Indonesia then sought heavy arms transfers from the Soviet Bloc, including sixty jet fighters, twenty bombers, two destroyers, two submarines and torpedo craft[118]. The Dutch responded by sending additional reserves to West Irian. By the end of 1961, Sukarno had created an atmosphere of crisis by threatening war through establishing a military command charged with the liberation of West Irian and infiltrating the territory by sea and parachute drops. The US moved from a position of neutrality to an active effort to mediate the dispute fearing that opposing Indonesia's claim would drive the country further towards communism[119]. A final accord was reached in August 1962 which allowed for temporary UN administration of the territory before being handed over to Indonesia in May 1963. This was on the provision that an 'act of free choice' be held in 1969 allowing the inhabitants of West Irian to choose whether they wanted to remain part of the Republic. The proposed act of free choice also gave the semblance of a compromise, although Indonesia never fulfilled its obligation.

The next, more substantive claim to revolutionary regional leadership, was Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. Indonesia opposed the formation of the Federation of Malaysia which sought to join the British colonies of North Borneo and Singapore with Malaya. The PKI were the first to publicly express their opposition describing the proposed Federation as a “new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of Indonesia”[120]. The Brunei rebellion in December 1962 allowed Sukarno and the PKI to mobilise mass domestic support for the rebels as

[117] Leifer (1972, 1983).
[118] Leifer (1983: 62-63).
[119] See Jones (2002: 31-60).
[120] Leifer (1983: 77).

an example of NEFOS in action. Sukarno announced in early 1963 that “Malaysia is a manifestation of neo-colonialism. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic … [w]e are determinedly opposed, without any reservation, against Malaysia”[121].

Not only was the Federation considered a neo-colonial project designed to perpetuate British interests in Southeast Asia, it was also a major affront to Indonesia's sense of entitlement as the 'indigenous great power liberator'. Sukarno resented that a colonial power could decide the territorial configuration of a part of Southeast Asia considered vital to Indonesia's security without its participation or approval[122]. Indonesia aimed to subvert the Malaysian government's authority over North Borneo by arousing popular unrest through armed infiltration. It also allowed the British embassy in Jakarta to be burnt down by rioters and seized British assets. In August and September 1964, Indonesia even landed infiltrators on Peninsula Malaya. Britain responded by sending troop and aircraft reinforcements to Singapore and sailing HMS *Victorious* through Indonesian waters in a show of military strength[123]. This deterred the Indonesian army from escalating the military aspect of Confrontation, so Sukarno tried more radical diplomacy within the UN and the Afro-Asian group to enlist support for the condemnation of Malaysia as a neo-colonial plot. He sought to link Confrontation with his wider espousal of the struggle of NEFOS but other states did not share Sukarno's view of Malaysia as a 'neo-colonial' creation and were concerned by Indonesia's military incursions into Malaysia which were seen as violating the UN framework. In December 1964 Malaysia was given a seat in the UN Security Council, compounding Sukarno's frustrations with the organisation and leading Indonesia to leave the UN.

Domestically the PKI became more dominant in politics, leading to a growing alignment between Indonesia and the PRC. Sukarno's radical foreign policy resonated with China which was disillusioned with Soviet 'coexistence' policy under Khrushchev. Indonesia and China aligned in establishing an 'international united front' to drive the UK and US out of Southeast Asia. China became the strongest supporter of Indonesia's confrontations and NEFOS[124]. The alignment reached its peak in 1965 after Indonesia withdrew from the UN and tried to set up the alternative Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFOS).

[121] Leifer (1983: 79).
[122] Leifer (1972: 124). For an analysis that looks at this period as an example of power transition in Southeast Asian regional order see Khong (2001).
[123] Jones (2002: 268-294).
[124] Sukma (1999: 31).

Responses from Southeast Asian states

Confrontation alienated many Western states and discredited Indonesia within the non-aligned movement, as it was seen as abandoning the principles of Bandung. Sukarno was therefore unsuccessful in undermining the legitimacy of Malaysia in international society and instead undermined Indonesia's own legitimacy, as well as its domestic economy[125]. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia's efforts to expel external powers from the region were viewed as an attempt to establish its own hegemony[126]. The opposition this engendered proved that there was no place in Southeast Asia for the function of revolutionary regional leadership and Indonesia's 'indigenous great power liberator' role.

Before Confrontation however, Indonesia had some limited success in enlisting the support of the Philippines in opposing Malaysia and committing Malaya to respect the self-determination of the people of Borneo. The Philippines opposed Malaysia because it had its own territorial claim to Sabah. The Philippines considered itself the successor state of the pre-colonial Sultanate of Sulu and thought it should inherit sovereignty over the Sultanate's territory, which included parts of North Borneo. However, the Philippine government did not agree with Indonesia that external powers should be expelled from the region. President Macapagal saw the Sabah claim as a means for the Philippines to present its Southeast Asian identity, and sought to legitimise the claim as part of indigenous Malay people finding their own solution for regional confederation rather than leaving it to the outgoing colonial powers[127]. Macapagal offered an alternative regional arrangement to the Malaysian Federation through a 'Confederation of Nations of Malay Origin' which became MAPHILINDO, an abbreviation of the names of the three member states. The Manila Accord signed by Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines in July 1963 committed Malaya to a declaration of adherence to the principle of self-determination for the people of Borneo under UN supervision. It also contained a clause stating that “the Ministers are of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their respective national identities”[128]. For Indonesia this represented a diplomatic success as two nations in formal alliance with external powers had given at least discursive endorsement to Indonesia's 'autonomy' narrative, excluding the external great power role. The three states also agreed to a joint statement that foreign bases in the region were temporary and would not be used to subvert the independence of any of the three countries. The fact that the Philippines agreed to this clause (which it opposed in the Bangkok

[125] Haacke (2003: 41).
[126] Emmers (2005).
[127] Leifer (1972: 140).
[128] Leifer (1983: 86).

Declaration in 1967) reflected its desire to enlist Indonesian support for its claim to Sabah. The states also agreed that the UN Secretary General would carry out an opinion survey in North Borneo regarding the proposed Malaysian Federation.

As the survey was taking place however, Malaya announced that it was going ahead with the formation of the Federation in September regardless of the results. The survey confirmed that the majority of North Borneo was in favour of the Federation, but Indonesia refused to recognise Malaysia and diplomatic relations were severed by Kuala Lumpur. Sukarno visited Manila in January 1964 to enlist the Philippines' further support in Confrontation but it had waned since the Manila meetings the previous July. The Philippines did not see Confrontation, especially its aim to expel external powers, as the best means to pursue its Sabah claim. Indeed, in March Manila and Kuala Lumpur agreed to exchange consular officials denting any hopes of Indonesian-Philippine solidarity on the matter. The Philippines subsequently joined Thailand as a mediator between Malaysia and Indonesia.

For Malaysia and Singapore, Confrontation represented a threat to their very existence. By utilising Britain as an external security guarantor, Malaysia and Singapore showed the most significant contestation of Indonesia's revolutionary regional leadership. Consequently, no Southeast Asian state made any moves to follow Indonesia in removing external powers from the region, nor join the NEFOS movement. Thailand and the Philippines' decision to recognise Malaysia showed the failure of Sukarno's attempts to oppose the Federation and a contestation of its claimed revolutionary regional leadership.

Thai and Philippine attempts to mediate were backed by the US, reflecting Washington's developing expectations that regional states manage their own affairs. Just before Sukarno visited Manila in January 1964, President Johnson made clear to Macapagal his support for Philippine efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to Confrontation[129]. US officials were also keen to stress to the British the importance of tripartite talks between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and that the Thai initiative in this respect should be encouraged[130]. By the mid-1960s this also involved a positive endorsement of the Association of Southeast Asia as a means of complimenting the US position in Vietnam. Regionalism could not be successful without the largest state of Indonesia on board, and so ASA remained only a partial fulfilment of US expectations.

[129] "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines, Washington, 6th June 1964" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 3.
[130] Jones (2002: 215-220).

Development of the partial regional constituency and moves towards regional cooperation

The Association of Southeast Asia resulted from a Malayan initiative for a Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), which envisioned a cultural and economic pact between the independent nations of Southeast Asia. SEAFET was undermined when the Philippine Foreign Secretary Serrano indicated that it could be the economic off-shoot of SEATO, making it unacceptable to Indonesia[131]. Negotiations continued however, and ASA developed as an informal association, reflecting the Thai position that this, rather than a treaty-based organisation, would increase the chances of broader membership[132]. Member states stressed that ASA had no connection to any 'bloc'. Tunku Abdul Rhaman said “this organization is in no way intended to be an anti-Western bloc or an anti-Eastern bloc, or for that matter, a political bloc of any kind. It is not connected in any way with any of the organizations which are in existence today; it is purely a Southeast Asian Economic and Cultural Cooperation Organization and has no backing whatsoever from any foreign source”[133]. The failure to enlist the support of other states however and the close connections the three member states had with Western powers, made ASA seem distinctly anti-communist despite the Tunku's claims. For example, Sihanouk declined the invitation for Cambodia to take part in negotiations saying that Cambodia could not join something that was a 'shadow' of SEATO[134].

ASA members still tried to fit ASA within the 'autonomy' narrative by claiming it represented a distinctly Southeast Asian initiative. Prior to the Second ASA Foreign Ministers' Meeting in April 1962, the Tunku issued a statement saying "it was the intention of the ASA countries - . . . to show the world that the peoples of Asia could think and plan for themselves"[135]. The member states viewed the pursuit of regional cooperation as a way to contribute to the strengthening of their own nations in the face of continued communist subversion and the increased threat from the PRC in backing subversive movements. Member states realised that short term security needs could not be met by local resources but also that external support was not a comfortable long term prospect because of domestic constituencies calling for greater autonomy rather than dependence on external powers[136]. ASA thus represented a first attempt to reconcile the conflicting pulls of security and autonomy. In this way, it lay the foundations for the pattern of reconciling the US' role with regional attempts at autonomy that would be expressed in the role

[131] Poulgrain (1998: 237).
[132] Jorgensen-Dahl (1982).
[133] Pollard (1970*:* 247).
[134] Leifer (1962: 131-132).
[135] Pollard (1970: 250).
[136] Gordon (1969: 75-84).

bargain after 1966. However, without the involvement of Indonesia, ASA, and Southeast Asia as a region, were incomplete.

Implications for the great power role

The deep polarisation between the US' and Indonesia's role conceptions, and the means through which they enacted them, prevented a bargain on the great power role. For the US, the 'great power guardian' role entitled it to intervene within regional states in order to protect its allies from a common menace and to influence domestic power struggles in its favour. This did little to distinguish it from the colonial great power role in the eyes of some in Southeast Asia. The regional constituency that began to appear through ASA, although still partial at this stage, was aligned with the US and endorsed the US' 'holding the line' function in Vietnam whilst beginning to seek ways of supplementing great power guarantees with regional cooperation. This gave the 'great power guardian' role partial legitimacy; however it could not be fully legitimised because of the significant contestation from Indonesia.

For Indonesia, the 'indigenous great power liberator' role meant leading regional states to autonomy through revolution. Sukarno's claim to revolutionary regional leadership alienated other states in Southeast Asia which considered Indonesia itself as a significant threat. There was no legitimacy for the 'indigenous great power liberator' role.

The fundamental obstacle to a role bargain at this stage was the fact that the legitimacy dynamics of the US' and Indonesia's role claims were completely out of alignment. The US needed sympathetic constituencies in power but its attempts to manipulate regional politics through stewardship led to deeper criticism from leftist and nationalist constituencies which were particularly strong in Indonesia. Sukarno drew his domestic legitimacy from these leftist and nationalist constituencies by more actively opposing the US and Britain's involvement in Southeast Asia. It would require the elimination of the solidarity-makers in Indonesia and a desire for the US to disengage from the region to provide the conditions necessary for a role bargain.

1966 – 1975 ROLE REDEFINITION: SYNTHESISING THE NARRATIVES

This section details how the US and regional states began to reach a nascent role bargain and in the process redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia. This was made possible by changing US and Indonesian role conceptions and expectations which opened the way for the 'containment' and

'autonomy' strategic narratives to be merged. Autonomy and containment were no longer competing goals but were linked by the common effort to build a resilient non-communist social order in Southeast Asia. The emergent reciprocal role bargain consisted of: the US providing security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor' in support of non-communist states' regime consolidation, in return for regional states collectively performing diplomatic leadership as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, not challenging the US' military presence in the region and providing diplomatic initiatives to legitimise its position in Indochina.

Domestic change in Indonesia saw the new Suharto regime give up the 'indigenous great power liberator' role and instead conceive the 'leading-from-behind' role, as a partner of the US and regional states. The US' growing desire to withdraw from Vietnam in the midst of domestic criticism led the US to propose instead the 'offshore great power guarantor' role. As discussed in the introduction, the 'offshore' aspect of the US' redefined role had a military-strategic aspect and a political aspect. The former involved the withdrawal of US forces from mainland Southeast Asia, and the latter saw the US leave regional states to manage their own relations with each other. Although the substance of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role conception was developed during the Nixon administration, its full enactment came only in 1975 when Thailand requested that the US withdraw from its Thai bases. The US' steady disengagement meant the withdrawal of any US claims to stewardship or diplomatic leadership. The US no longer explicitly sought to organise the region as it had before, but expected regional states to do this themselves. This left space for regional states to play a bigger part in shaping regional order. Negotiations around ASEAN therefore had important implications for the division of functions in Southeast Asia. Through negotiations to create ASEAN, regional states eschewed collective security functions but took responsibility for diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role was endorsed within ASEAN as the other ASEAN members accepted Indonesia's designs on the association in return for securing its strategic restraint.. ASEAN endorsed US provision of security public goods by accommodating external power military bases in the region.

ASEAN’s diplomatic leadership had two aspects. First, regional states began to manage their own relations through reconciliation, regional institution-building and rule-making in their subregion, as well as tackling communist insurgency on a bilateral level. This aspect was subcontracted to the ASEAN states in 1968/69 as the US deliberately kept its distance as the Corregidor affair nearly pulled ASEAN apart. Second, regional states provided a diplomatic front in support for communist containment in Indochina as shown through the Jakarta Conference 1970

where the US made clear its desire for regional states to spearhead a diplomatic initiative. These events reflected the emerging US-ASEAN division of labour as part of their role bargain. The generic great power role included the functions of security public goods provision and diplomatic leadership. Security public goods remained intrinsic to the external great power role, specifically the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role; Indonesia's neighbours and the great powers contested any Indonesian claims to provide security public goods in Southeast Asia. Only diplomatic leadership was subcontracted. By decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to regional states, ASEAN and the US redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia.

Indonesia's re-conceptualisation – 'leading-from-behind'

Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind'[137] role conception resulted from the elimination of the solidarity-makers from politics and the rejection of the 'indigenous great power liberator' role conception. The army, led by General Suharto, used an abortive coup by dissident army and air force officers and PKI members, as a pretext for seizing power in late 1965. The army instigated a systematic campaign of violence against the PKI and its sympathisers, resulting in over 500,000 deaths and the political elimination of the PKI. The army and Muslim leaders, supported by US and British propaganda, painted the PKI as an agent of China attempting to stab the Republic in the back[138]. President Sukarno's apparent association with the coup leaders and his failure to denounce their murder of six generals discredited him politically[139]. In March 1966, Sukarno was forced to transfer executive powers to General Suharto who immediately made the PKI an illegal organisation.

Suharto's "New Order" regime was concerned with internal stability and identified communist subversion as the primary threat. Suharto advocated building 'national resilience' through economic development and political stability to insulate Indonesia from external interference and subversion[140]. The new regime promoted itself as correcting the deviations from *Pancasila* and *bebas aktif* during the Sukarno era[141]. Suharto argued that Sukarno's alignment with China was a major infringement of *bebas aktif* and that China was involved in the abortive 'communist' coup. He appointed a group of US-trained technocratic economists to revive the economy, which had a negative growth rate, 600 per cent inflation and a national debt of over $2

[137] See Anwar (1994, 2006).
[138] Easter (2005), Simpson (2008).
[139] See Hunter (2007).
[140] Anwar (2005: 138-140).
[141] Ramage (1995: 9).

billion[142]. Suharto's domestic legitimacy rested on the promise to restore domestic stability, ensure the unity of the nation and pursue a programme of economic development and modernisation[143].

Suharto ended Confrontation in 1966 and phased out the radical rhetoric of Sukarno, withdrawing Indonesia's claims to revolutionary regional leadership. He endorsed the 'containment' narrative by seeking assistance from the West, expressing support for the US in Vietnam and breaking off relations with communist China. The new regime's conception of the *tut wuri handayani* 'leading-from-behind' role, was initially used by Suharto to describe the army's involvement in domestic politics, but came to be associated with Indonesia's commitment to Southeast Asian cooperation[144]. As table 4 shows, Indonesia still held its identity as an indigenous and independent state as well as the largest state in Southeast Asia. The principles of anti-colonialism and *bebas aktif* were still strong amongst the population. The Suharto regime's new role conception had to reflect and demonstrate Indonesia's independent and active credentials. Key figures such as General Nasaution and Lieutenant-General Djatikusumo also held a sense of Indonesia's entitlement within Southeast Asia, due to its size and revolutionary history, and cautioned against any alignment that would compromise *bebas aktif*[145]. Other prominent army figures also tried to push regional military cooperation under Indonesia's leadership to replace external power security guarantees[146]. To satisfy domestic opinion, Indonesia could not just be equal to the other states in the region, but needed to be recognised as the first amongst equals (*primus inter pares*). As discussed below, based on this 'sense of regional entitlement'[147] Indonesia claimed to perform diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia by offering a proposal for regional cooperation that showed its commitment to cooperative foreign policy, but also reflected aspects of the 'autonomy' narrative in its proposals regarding regional states' shared responsibilities *vis a vis* external powers. However, Indonesia's claim needed endorsement from neighbouring states suspicious of Indonesia in the wake of Confrontation. Suharto therefore also claimed the primary function of strategic restraint by ending Confrontation, agreeing to be bound within the cooperative framework of ASEAN and showing its willingness to compromise with respect to the status of external military bases. This acted as a key form of reassurance to its neighbours. As part of the agreement to end Confrontation, Indonesia dropped its demand for a referendum to be held in North Borneo on accession to the Federation of Malaysia[148]. We will see below how Indonesia and its neighbours negotiated Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role within ASEAN and collectively took

[142] Vatikiotis (1993: 33).
[143] Berger (1997).
[144] Anwar (2006: 66).
[145] Weinstein (2007: 335).
[146] Anwar (1994: 123-133).
[147] Leifer (1983).
[148] Weinstein (2009).

responsibility for diplomatic leadership through ASEAN. One specific secondary function Indonesia also saw itself performing was promoting conflict mediation initiatives for the Indochina conflict in support of US containment objectives. Indonesia's traditional non-aligned status could be used as leverage in legitimising containment objectives. We will see this demonstrated through the Jakarta Conference 1970.

Identity	**Status**	**Function**	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Indigenous	Primus inter pares	Diplomatic leadership (in partnership with ASEAN members)	Regional initiatives for Indochina (Conflict mediation)
Largest state	Non-aligned	Restraint	Institutional binding
Independent (won through revolution)			

Table 4 – Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role

The US' re-conceptualisation – US 'offshore great power guarantor' role

The US' re-conceptualisation evolved over the late 1960s as its efforts in Vietnam appeared to be failing. Its use of overwhelming force and conscription elicited domestic and international criticism, raising the financial and political costs of the intervention. The major shift in perception of the US' role came after the communist Tet Offensive in early 1968. Prior to this, US officials believed that they would be able to win the war by reaching a crossover point when communist casualty rates would exceed the number of new recruits, and over 1966 and 1967 US troop deployments were steadily increased. The Johnson administration sought to combat domestic criticism by playing up the success of the US effort and fostering general optimism the US would win. When the communist forces launched their large scale Tet offensives throughout South Vietnam in January 1968, it led to protracted and bitter fighting which contradicted the US government's optimistic propaganda. President Johnson's response was to halt the bombing campaign in North Vietnam and in March 1968 call for a negotiated settlement to the conflict[149]. From then on, US officials looked for a face-saving way to disengage from Vietnam whilst reassuring regional allies that the US would still provide some form of protection. This was manifested in the 'Nixon Doctrine' announced in 1969. The Nixon administration no longer saw the communist threat as monolithic (seen particularly in subsequent moves towards rapprochement with China); communism was less an external threat to the region than an internal problem for regional states through subversion perhaps

[149]On the Johnson adminstration and the Vietnam war see Van de Mark (1991), Khong (1992) and Dallek (1998).

with Chinese support. The 'Nixon Doctrine' lay down three principles to guide US policy. First, the US would keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, it would provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear power threatened an ally or a state whose survival the US considered in its interest. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, the US would support allies with military and economic assistance but would look to the nation directly threatened to provide the manpower for its defence[150]. The US would no longer commit troops; rather Asian armies would face threats on the ground through performing the function of communist counter-insurgency. The US would support this through continued Military Assistance Programs.

The Nixon Doctrine reflected the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role conception shown in Table 5. The 'great power guardian' identity elements of 'exceptionalism' and 'leader of the free world' were replaced by a realisation of the US' 'external' identity in Southeast Asia. US actions in Vietnam dealt a psychological blow to the US population; 'US exceptionalism' lost its legitimacy[151]. The Vietnam War also affected the US' status. Despite maintaining its status as a global great power, the US was now a weakened hegemon. Vietnam revealed the limits of US power both in terms of its inability to defeat a weaker enemy using superior capabilities, and in terms of its loss of legitimacy as 'leader of the free world' amongst its domestic population and international critics. By staying 'offshore', the US hoped to foster a more 'benign' status by not intervening directly in regional affairs. From its 'offshore' position it could still provide security public goods such as security of sea lanes and military aid and assistance but not directly intervene in conflicts with troops. This would encourage regional allies and partners to take more responsibility for their own security and, according the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, help build a capitalist world order that served US interests but one “in which the U.S. does not have to carry the entire burden”[152]. In justifying the need to provide such aid and assistance, President Nixon reported to Congress that “there is built into the decision to reduce our own presence the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring”[153].

Subsequent US negotiations with the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam to find a way out of Vietnam, served notice of the limited time for which the US would continue performing the secondary function of 'holding the line'. After withdrawal from Vietnam, 'holding the line' would be replaced by the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on offshore deterrence, especially the threat of a

[150] Gurtov (1974: 205).
[151] Bell (1975).
[152] “Memorandum of conversation. San Clemente, California, September 2, 1969” *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol I Doc 35.
[153] Richard Nixon. "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324> accessed 26/5/15.

possible nuclear strike[154]. By holding out deterrence from its bases in the Philippines, the US would perform the primary function of balance of power against any potential external threat to regional partners and allies. To iterate this commitment, Nixon repeatedly reassured regional allies that withdrawal from Vietnam did not mean complete withdrawal from the region; rather than US would remain in the region to ensure no strategic vacuum opened up[155].

Identity	**Status**	**Function**	
		Primary	*Secondary*
External	Great power (weakened hegemon)	Security public goods provision	Security of sea lanes Aid and assistance Holding the line
	Benign (non-interference)	Balance of power	Offshore deterrence

Table 5 – US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role

In order to facilitate a face-saving withdrawal from Vietnam, the US expected regional states to: 1) pursue regional cooperation amongst themselves to strengthen their own stand against communism; and 2) engage in regional initiatives for managing the Vietnam conflict. Whereas before the US had hoped for regional cooperation to be initiated by regional states, and for the US to then be invited, it now hoped regional states could cooperate on their own to strengthen their resolve[156].

In 1966, President Johnson toured the region and expressed his support for Asian regional cooperation. Likewise, Secretary Rusk iterated that "[w]e will see substantial advantage in the development among the Asian nations themselves of systematic machinery for consultation on political problems and security questions in which they are all involved"[157]. Rusk pointed to the Manila Conference in October 1966 as a promising start. Philippine President Marcos invited the US and other nations involved in the Vietnam effort to meet in Manila to discuss the situation in Vietnam and the prospects for negotiations with North Vietnam. US officials realised this would not

[154] Gurtov (1974: 208).
[155] For example "Memorandum of Conversation, Oval Office, Friday September 21st 1973" *Ford Library* <http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1552611.pdf> accessed 30/11/14.
[156] See Thompson (2011).
[157] Pollard (1970: 253).

produce any substantive outcomes, but saw the conference as another opportunity to show that the US was standing together with Asians[158]. John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, reported that the conference was a success in its "[d]isplay of not-US-aloneness, of resolve, of beginnings of an awakening responsible Asia, and of concern for the miseries of the Asian billions"[159].

US officials hoped that this 'awakening responsible Asia' would facilitate the US' shift to an 'offshore great power guarantor' role by easing US withdrawal from Vietnam. Rusk made this point to Tun Razak as early as October 1966[160]. He later reflected that his view since the early 1950s was that it was "far better to let the Southeast Asian countries evolve their own regional security arrangement without the United States being a direct party, and then we could stand in powerful … second line support to the region, if it ever got into trouble"[161]. Nixon also saw regional cooperation as the key counterforce to Chinese influence and so regional states' contribution to security would be to reduce the appeal of communism by promoting development through cooperation[162]. In a report to Congress on his administration's foreign policy, Nixon stated that: "[w]e look forward to an Asia in which the task of ensuring security, development, and political consolidation can be carried primarily by the governments and peoples of Asia. Similarly, we believe they have an indispensable role to play in creating effective mechanisms of regional collaboration and in shaping the broader structure of international relations in Asia"[163]. However, US officials were keen to ensure that US support for regionalism came from behind the scenes and that the Southeast Asian states themselves took the lead. Indeed, the US was pleased with the potential of ASEAN, but was sure to emphasise that US support should be "decidedly low key" so that it would not appear as a 'Western puppet'[164]

US re-conceptualisation primarily reflected its goal of withdrawing from Vietnam. In this sense, any concern for how regional states organised themselves in the wake of US withdrawal was of secondary importance. However, through its re-conceptualisation the US withdrew its claim to

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[158] "Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 15th October 1966" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol IV Doc 272.

[159] "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Manila, 26th October 1966" *ibid* Doc 284.

[160] Thompson (2011: 83).

[161] Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview III, 1/2/70, by Paige E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. Available at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/rusk/rusk03.pdf> accessed 18/5/15.

[162] Gordon (1969: 110).

[163] Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project* <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736> accessed 26/5/15.

[164] "Airgram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, February 21st 1968" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 253.

the functions of stewardship and diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia. The US no longer explicitly sought to organise the region, leaving space for regional states to play a bigger part in shaping regional order in Southeast Asia. Regional cooperation along the lines the US desired was possible now that leftist constituencies had been defeated in Indonesia. Indonesia had withdrawn its claim to the function of revolutionary regional leadership and no longer sought to replace external powers or drive them out of regional affairs. The new anti-communist regime in Indonesia still claimed the function of diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia and the US hoped it would enact its claim through regional cooperation.

Mutual endorsement between US and New Order

In August 1966, Secretary Rusk reported to President Johnson that US objectives of keeping Indonesia out of the hands of domestic communists and out of the orbit of communist China had been achieved. He stated "our objective now is to help this populous, potentially rich and strategically placed nation ... develop an effective government, and become a constructive force in the area"[165]. This indicated that the US had achieved the aims of its long-running intervention in Indonesian affairs, as its favoured constituency had now come to power and defeated the US' most formidable opponents within maritime Southeast Asia. In this way there was no need to interfere so readily in Indonesian affairs but maintain distance. This turn of events paved the way for the evolving bargain not just between the US and Indonesia, but also by extension ASEAN as we will see below. The US pursued its objective of helping Indonesia become a constructive regional force through military and economic assistance, but also by appearing to keep its distance so as not compromise the new regime's position domestically. The US re-started the MAP for Indonesia and training under International Military Education and Training (IMET). US officials also coordinated the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a long-term mechanism to provide assistance. Formed in February 1967, the IGGI included donor countries such as the US and Japan and multilateral lending agencies. It was chaired by the Netherlands so that it did not appear to commit Indonesia too closely to a US initiative. The donors agreed in 1970 to spread Indonesian debt repayment over thirty years and issued assistance totalling $200 million in 1967, $360 million in 1968 and $500 million in 1969[166]. This material assistance helped consolidate the new regime by enabling it to focus on domestic economic priorities.

Endorsement also flowed the other way. In September 1966, US Vice President Hubert

[165] "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, 1st August 1966" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 215.
[166] Leifer (1983: 116).

Humphrey reported that Foreign Minister Adam Malik “made clear ... his country's sympathetic understanding of the U.S. role in Asia and Vietnam”. Stating that Suharto's success in defeating the PKI was directly influenced by US determination in Vietnam, Malik warned that “U.S. withdrawal and a Communist victory in Vietnam would be a direct threat to his country”[167]. Indonesia now shared the view of other Southeast Asian states that the US was buying time by 'holding the line' in Vietnam so that regional states could focus on their own development and stability. Malik told President Johnson that his government had been discussing Vietnam with officials from Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and other Asian countries and that they all had a common stake in seeking peace in Vietnam. He said that any role Indonesia may play in promoting peace should be pursued quietly without public notice and that he hoped Indonesia could bring about a useful influence in resolving the conflict. For now however, Malik saw no other option than for the US to take a strong position in defending South Vietnam[168]. The Indonesian government's position, though it could not express it publicly, was that the US should remain in Vietnam and that the US should consider the need to maintain the general security of Southeast Asia in any assessment over drawing down. The Suharto regime was not opposed to the external great power presence as Sukarno had been. Indeed, Malik even stated that he had no objection to the continued presence of Commonwealth troops in Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal but hoped that no other foreign force would fill the gap left by the British[169].

Despite Indonesia and the other Southeast Asian states wishing the US to continue 'holding the line' in Vietnam, the US was set on drawing down its presence. This meant that regional states had to come to terms with each other, especially in the context of the recent Confrontation and extant territorial disputes; they could no longer simply rely on external security guarantees. This entailed accommodating Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in its early years, ASEAN was viewed in Washington primarily as a vehicle for promoting reconciliation between Indonesia and its neighbours, but that it could develop “a useful morale and authenticating function against future aggression directed at any of its members or countries in the area”[170]. US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green suggested the US encourage Indonesia to pursue regional cooperation but that “Indonesia's neighbors ... must be responsive ... we should encourage these nations to realize that a “New Order” has taken over in Indonesia and that ... the best and most pragmatic way to guard against the possibility of future Indonesian adventurism is to embrace Indonesia's new government

[167] “Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson, Washington, 25th September 1966” *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 222.
[168] “Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 27th September 1966” *ibid* Doc 224.
[169] “Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 29th July 1969” *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 271.
[170] “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, 13th October 1967” *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 284.

and interweave it inextricably in responsible regional activities"[171]. The US encouraged regional states to develop mechanisms for managing their relations with Indonesia, rather than relying on the US or other external partners to protect them. Through negotiations to create a framework for managing regional relations, regional states resolved the issue of Indonesia's leadership claim and its neighbours' wariness by endorsing Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role within the ASEAN framework. The next section shows how this was done and how these negotiations led to ASEAN taking on the first aspect of its diplomatic leadership through its emerging 'primary manager' role.

Diplomatic leadership: regional cooperation

Establishing ASEAN: the 'primary manager' role with Indonesia 'leading-from-behind'

ASEAN negotiations took place in the context of the space given to regional states in shaping regional order by external power disengagement and US expectations that they manage their own relations. ASEAN negotiations covered three themes: Indonesia's role within ASEAN; ASEAN states' collective responsibility through ASEAN; and the question of security public goods provision in relation to external power military bases. These negotiations directly related to the functions ASEAN members saw themselves performing in relation to external great powers. They produced ASEAN's claim to the 'primary manager' role (table 6) with Indonesia 'leading-from-behind', and the continued endorsement of US provision of security public goods.

In negotiating Indonesia's role there was a need to consider Indonesian constituencies that still demanded an independent and active foreign policy, but also Malaysia and Singapore's suspicion of Indonesia's regional intentions. To reassure its neighbours, Indonesia showed restraint by ending Confrontation and agreeing to be bound within a cooperative framework. ASA was restarted in 1966 but Suharto could not associate Indonesia with ASA without damaging his regime's independent and active credentials. Indonesia's population considered ASA an anti-communist, neo-colonial club. Creating a new grouping in the form of ASEAN allowed Indonesia to demonstrate its independent and active credentials by influencing the shape of regional cooperation. The Malaysians in particular were keen to tie Indonesia into a regional framework and were thus willing to disband ASA in favour of ASEAN and to acquiesce to Indonesian efforts to shape the new association if this served to strengthen the domestic position of the Suharto's government[172].

[171] "Airgram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, 21st February 1968" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 253.
[172]Inward Cablegram from Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 4th August 1967, National Archives of Australia: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.

On the question of membership, Indonesia pushed for ASEAN, at least in spirit, to be inclusive of all Southeast Asian states. ASEAN states did not invite North and South Vietnam as this was considered too provocative, but Malik visited Yangon and Phnom Penh to enlist support and Ceylon was also invited to join. These states declined as they thought membership in ASEAN would compromise their neutralist (for Burma also isolationist) foreign policies. However, the Suharto government used the gesture of seeking wider membership to show Indonesia's domestic population, and other non-Western countries, that regional cooperation was consistent with its independent and active foreign policy[173]. As shown in table 6 below, it also gave ASEAN, at least nominally, a non-aligned status and demonstrated ASEAN's 'indigenous' identity as a grouping limited to 'Southeast Asian' states[174]. No external powers or large regional powers such as India were invited to join.

Another gesture of Indonesia's independent and active credentials was the principled stand it took during negotiations over the paragraphs in the draft ASEAN declaration referring to member states' shared responsibilities and foreign military bases. As a demonstration of the importance this had for bolstering the domestic credentials of the Suharto regime, Foreign Minister Malik sent emissaries to Bangkok in advance of the foreign ministers' meeting to inform Thanat Khoman that Malik would not attend the meeting if reference to regional responsibility and military bases were not made in the ASEAN declaration[175]. Indonesia's original draft declaration adopted wording from the Manila declaration of 1963 to demonstrate its continuity with MAPHILINDO and the 'autonomy' narrative.

The Indonesian draft proposed sharing responsibility for economic and social stability and "for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the region from external interference". Singapore and the Philippines opposed this wording, rejecting the idea that ASEAN should have any security dimension. Explicitly stating shared responsibility for regional security came too close to the old 'autonomy' narrative of regional states *replacing* external great powers. Indeed, some in the Indonesian military wanted to establish a military alliance as part of ASEAN to replace external powers and balance the Chinese threat under Indonesian leadership[176]. Other member states objected as did elements within Indonesia that wanted to avoid military pacts. The wording of the paragraph was eventually split: shared responsibility was affirmed for economic and social stability, but by stating that member states were "determined to ensure their stability and security from

[173] Anwar (1994: 52).
[174] There was debate over whether Ceylon was 'Southeast Asian'. See Ba (2009: 59).
[175] Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Bangkok, 15th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.
[176] Anwar (1994 123-133).

external interference", security was kept as an individual responsibility[177]. Philippine Foreign Minister, Narcisco Ramos iterated that "[t]here is no obligation on the part of any Asian member state to go to the aid of another member state in cases of outside intervention; neither is there any intention or commitment for the Asian states to 'share' in the responsibility of resisting foreign intervention. Each state must look after its own security"[178]. ASEAN would perform no security functions.

The question of security public goods provision was the subject of the paragraph relating to foreign bases. Indonesia's draft also drew on the Manila and Bandung declarations saying that bases were "temporary in nature and should not be used directly or indirectly, to subvert the national independence of Asian countries, and … arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers"[179]. The Philippines and Singapore again opposed such wording, seeing it as inconsistent with maintaining strong defence relationships with external powers. Indeed, the Philippines initially opposed any reference to military bases. Thanat Khoman reportedly held threatened that Thailand was willing to form the new grouping without the Philippines if it did not compromise on including a reference to military bases[180]. The Indonesians also assured the Philippines that they were not asking for bases to be removed and that they recognised that the Western military presence would need to remain for some time but that they believed it was a matter of principle for the ASEAN states to declare their primary responsibility for regional security[181]. The Philippines relented and the member states agreed to a revised statement, redrafted by the Thai and Malaysian foreign ministers, that "all foreign bases are temporary" but that they "remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned"[182]. This compromise accommodated the 'autonomy' narrative by allowing member states to declare as a 'region' that foreign bases were on their way out. It also legitimised the status quo by making bases a 'bilateral' issue between individual states and external partners. That this did nothing to challenge the US' military position was reflected in the lack of any concern in Washington over this paragraph[183]. ASEAN's position on bases essentially endorsed US provision of security public goods and its balance of power function from its base in the Philippines, but relied on the Philippines to shoulder the responsibility for hosting the bases. As we will see in the next chapter, this became an issue when nationalist constituencies in the Philippines demanded an end to US bases.

[177] ASEAN (1967), Acharya (2014: 44-46).
[178] Acharya (2014: 59).
[179] Irvine, R (1982: 12).
[180] Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Bangkok, 15th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.
[181] Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 23rd August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.
[182] ASEAN (1967). Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Washington D.C., 17th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.
[183] *Ibid.*

In the end, ASEAN states established that their shared responsibility would be to build "regional resilience", an extension of Indonesia's notion of 'national resilience'. Member states would concentrate on economic development and nation-building and avoid conflict with each other and interference in each other's affairs. Through this they could cumulatively achieve unity and strength and avoid fragmentation and intervention by external powers. Regional resilience was the key part of ASEAN's strategic narrative, which allowed the 'autonomy' and 'containment' narratives to be reconciled. Southeast Asia was the 'in-group': regional fragmentation leading to external intervention was the threat; building regional resilience was the necessary response. Resilience could achieve autonomy as ruling regimes would grow stronger and insulate themselves and the region from external influence. Resilience through economic development and political stability would also help contain insurgency movements and regional discontent which might find support from outside the region.

Through these negotiations we can identify agreements reached on each of the three themes identified above. Firstly, by accommodating the 'autonomy' narrative and much of Indonesia's ideas within ASEAN, the other ASEAN states endorsed Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role in return for Indonesia's restraint[184]. This is clear from their decision to create a new grouping and disband ASA and their compromise on Indonesia's preferred wording within the declaration. ASEAN members also developed a practice of giving more weight to Indonesia's position on regional issues and consulted Jakarta first on matters that ASEAN was to deal with[185]. For example, Jakarta secured agreement from the other ASEAN states in 1971 that they would not rush into normalising relations with China but rather consult each other first[186].In return Indonesia showed restraint by not asserting its dominance. For example, Indonesia ultimately did not impose its view regarding the threat it saw China posing, but left the matter of normalisation to each individual ASEAN state. Indeed, this demonstrated the limits of other ASEAN states' endorsement of Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role; they were willing to show a certain amount of deference to Indonesia's position, but unwilling to let Jakarta determine their own foreign and security policy positions. Jakarta also demonstrated restraint in 1968 when Singapore hanged two Indonesian marines accused of bombing a bank during Confrontation, ignoring Suharto's calls for clemency. Suharto did not take punitive action despite domestic protests and calls from the military to act, showing his commitment to 'leading-from-behind'[187]. In 1973, Singapore showed deference to Indonesia's position when Lee Kuan Yew

[184] Emmers (2003).
[185] Chong (2011: 152).
[186] Telegram from American Embassy, Jakarta to US State Department, December 8th 1971, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 13.
[187] Emmers (2003: 63-64).

lay flowers at the marines' graves.

Secondly, by creating ASEAN and determining ASEAN's strategic narrative, regional states collectively began the process of claiming ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, which is outlined in Table 6 below. As has been pointed out by ASEAN scholars, the process of establishing ASEAN's legal rational and diplomatic-cultural norms (the 'ASEAN Way') took around a decade, coming to fruition around the first ASEAN summit in 1976 and expressed within the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)[188]. However, the founding of ASEAN represented the initial performative claims to the secondary functions of regional institution-building and rule-making, even if the functions would not be fully enacted straight away. ASEAN claimed regional institution-building by creating ASEAN as a regional framework open for accession by all Southeast Asian states. Regional states agreed to work together to ensure social stability – i.e. non-communist social stability – through regional cooperation. ASEAN claimed the function of rule-making in Southeast Asia by asserting non-interference as the central norm underpinning regional relations. Non-interference was applied internally and externally. Internally, ASEAN states agreed not to interfere in each other's affairs by supporting dissident or insurgent groups. Externally, non-interference was ostensibly directed at all external powers, but in light of the US' determination to take a back seat and have regional states manage their own affairs, was directed more specifically at China, to de-legitimise Chinese support for communist insurgency movements[189]. Regional-institution-building and rule-making constituted the first aspect of the primary function of diplomatic leadership subcontracted to ASEAN: regional states managing their own relations through regional reconciliation and cooperation. ASEAN cooperation was supplemented by bilateral practical cooperation between member states in combating insurgency, particularly in border areas. Regional states therefore also took on the function of counter-insurgency, with the backing of US aid and assistance.

Thirdly, ASEAN would not take on any security functions as part of its 'primary manager' role. Security public goods provision remained the responsibility of external great powers shown by the fact that ASEAN did not directly challenge the legitimacy of external security guarantees. In so doing, ASEAN states endorsed the US' security public goods provision from its bases in the Philippines.

[188]Haacke (2003: 32-51), Ba (2009: 66-100), Acharya (2014: 43-78).
[189] See Jones (2012).

Identity	Status	Function	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Indigenous	Non-aligned (nominally)	Diplomatic leadership	Regional institution-building Rule-Making Regional initiatives for Indochina (Conflict mediation)

Table 6 – ASEAN's 'primary manager' role

Enacting ASEAN's 'primary manager' role: Corregidor

ASEAN's 'primary manager' role was immediately tested by the Corregidor affair. In April 1968 the Philippine press reported that a secret Philippine force was being trained on Corregidor island in Manila Bay for the apparent infiltration of Sabah. This initiated a series of protests and mutual incriminations in Malaysia and the Philippines which led to severing of relations. The responses to this dispute demonstrated that a division of labour was emerging between the US and the ASEAN states, where the US expected the ASEAN states to manage regional relations themselves rather than calling on the US to act. The US purposefully remained at a distance despite a request from Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to put pressure on the Philippines. Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific William Bundy made clear that "advice or pressure from outside powers, however well-intended, would only weaken the sense of responsibility of ASEAN members for handling their own affairs ... [W]e can best encourage the development of ASEAN by standing aside and letting the member states decide for themselves how to deal with the potential threat posed by the Sabah dispute". More specifically, there was a danger that US pressure would "reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line"[190]. This position was reiterated when Marcos asked the US to put pressure on Malaysia. Bundy stated that US involvement "would be most unwise, but ... Asian friends of both parties might play [a] useful role particularly in the corridors at the forthcoming ASPAC and ASEAN meetings ... both Thai[land] and Indonesia were interested and objective nations"[191].

Thailand and Indonesia did indeed seek to mediate the dispute through informal discussions.

[190] "Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington, 20th May /1968" *FRUS* 1964-1968 Vol XXVI Doc 367.
[191] "Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, Manila, 25th July 1968" *ibid* Doc 369.

Malik hosted a meeting in August 1968 where Malaysia and the Philippines agreed to a 'cooling off period' for six months; neither side would take any action to escalate the dispute. However, Malaysia refused to convene ASEAN meetings in 1969 unless the Philippines withdrew its claim to Sabah. Many delegations from Indonesia and Thailand visited Malaysia and the Philippines hoping to get Malaysia to reconvene ASEAN meetings and for the Philippines to tone down its Sabah claim. Malaysia-Philippine relations were eventually re-established in December 1969 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM). According to a British diplomatic note, the value Malaysia and the Philippines put on ASEAN membership and the mediation of Indonesia in promoting mutual restraint, were key for the de-escalation of the dispute[192]. The Moro rebellion in the southern Philippines was also a major factor in Marcos agreeing to lay the Sabah claim to one side as he required Malaysian cooperation to combat the insurgency. ASEAN's management of the dispute without significant US involvement demonstrated ASEAN's emerging 'primary manager' role as regional states took responsibility for managing their own relations. Nixon highlighted the example of the resumption of Malaysia-Philippines relations under ASEAN auspices, as part of Asia's more "[a]ctive regionalism ... Its vigor [being] one of the guarantees of the influence of Asia's smaller states in the future political structure of the region"[193].

The ASEAN states' recognition of such responsibility was further underlined by Adam Malik's efforts at the 1969 AMM to initiate a dialogue between Thailand and Malaysia over the issue of the Muslim-majority southern Thai provinces. The Indonesians saw it as important for the two states to increase their cooperation over the provinces to combat communist insurgents in the area but also to manage separatist discontent. The two states needed to avoid falling out over the issue, which was a "real foreseeable danger to ASEAN"[194]. Although the issue was at that point not an immediate threat to relations, Malik's efforts to try to pre-empt any possible downturn over the issue, demonstrates the ASEAN states' recognition of the need to manage their own relations. Suggestive of the fact that the ASEAN states began to view this responsibility as linked with the US' provision of security public goods was that Malik told Nixon that enthusiasm for regional cooperation within ASEAN was also given a boost by President Nixon's speech to the American people in November 1969. Nixon had stated in the speech that the US would not pursue a precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam but seek a negotiated solution whilst trying to strengthen the South Vietnamese[195]. US officials also saw it as important that the ASEAN states were aware of the

[192] Acharya (2014: 48).
[193] Richard Nixon. "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324> accessed 26/5/15.
[194]Record of conversation between Abu Bakar Lubis, Chief of Staff to Indonesia's Foreign Minister, and F.R. Dalrymple, 9th January 1970, NAA: A4359, 221/5/22 PART 4.
[195]"Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 17th 1969" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 276.

US' view of mutual responsibilities within such a division of labour. Indicative of this was Kissinger advice to Nixon on his meeting with Suharto in 1970 to assure that "favourable developments in regional identification would not be taken by us as an excuse to get out, but as a basis for a new, broader partnership with Asian countries. So long as we can play a useful, stabilizing role, and are wanted, we will remain"[196]. The ASEAN states would continue to indicate that the US was wanted as part of their negotiations over the notion of Southeast Asian neutralisation.

Legitimising the US' 'great power guarantor' role: ZOPFAN

The Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) agreement was the culmination of a debate over ASEAN's collective expectations regarding external great powers, initiated by Malaysia's proposal for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. The proposal was made just after the January 1968 announcement of Britain's withdrawal east of Suez and became Malaysia's official policy when Tun Razak became Prime Minister in 1970. Malaysia's proposal was notable for covering the whole of Southeast Asia and also because it recognised communist China as a great power. Tun Razak was determined to move Malaysia away from its pro-Western position and also made efforts to open bilateral links with communist China. He hoped that in return for being recognised as a great power, China would recognise the legitimacy of Malaysia's ruling coalition and the norm of non-interference[197]. This would help manage domestic ethnic relations in the wake of Malaysia's race riots in 1969 by neutralising the threat from Chinese subversion. The neutralisation proposal called for a guarantee by external powers to respect Southeast Asia as neutral and to set up a supervisory mechanism for ensuring that guarantee. It represented a major shift in Malaysia's expectations of external great powers, seeing them as supervisors of Southeast Asian neutrality rather than directly involved through the provision of security public goods. In this sense, the proposal not only had implications for the great power role, but also how ASEAN's putative 'primary manager' role might fit in. Removing the great power presence within the region would theoretically give the Southeast Asian states more strategic space to manage their own relations, potentially taking on security functions as the great powers ended their alliances and military involvement in the region.

Regional states did not take much of an interest in Malaysia's proposal until the shock announcement in 1971 that President Nixon was to visit Beijing, sparking fears the US was seeking to withdraw from Vietnam by offering China a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. This challenged regional states' expectations regarding the speed of which the US was moving towards

[196]Memorandum for the President from Henry A Kissinger, "Your meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia", May 26th 1970" <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19700526_memo.pdf> accessed 22/5/15.
[197] Haacke (2003: 55).

the 'offshore great power guarantor' role. A precipitous US withdrawal would mean an end to US performance of the function of 'holding the line', considered vital in buying ASEAN states time to work on their resilience. The ASEAN states met in October and November to discuss a common position on these events. Malaysia's neutralisation proposal was on the table, but the other ASEAN states opposed its adoption. The Philippines was concerned with how it would affect its alliance with the US and the US' naval presence in the region. Thailand opposed a guaranteed neutrality as it was suspicious of China as a reliable guarantor and saw a direct threat from China and North Vietnam, especially considering its involvement in the Vietnam war. Thailand was in favour of strengthening ASEAN's political cooperation as a way to achieve armed neutrality rather than guaranteed neutrality[198]. Singapore was concerned by Malay dominance in the region should the external great power presence be removed, preferring the involvement of all great powers to provide an equilibrium in the region[199]. Indonesia also opposed the proposal arguing that a great power guarantee might create opportunities for intervention rather than prevent them. In Jakarta's view, ASEAN states should instead focus on regional resilience to avoid external intervention.

ASEAN agreed that “the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective” and that members were “determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers”[200]. The agreement reaffirmed that autonomy was desirable and needed to be worked towards through building regional resilience, but that the status quo of US military involvement and provision of security public goods should not be challenged. Indeed, there was an apparent back room deal that whatever the ZOPFAN declaration stated, it would not call into question members' ties with the US[201]. The contradiction between ASEAN's espoused desire for neutrality and its satisfaction with the status quo of the US military presence shows that ZOPFAN was targeted not at great powers in general but specifically at China and the Soviet Union. ZOPFAN was part of ASEAN's claim to rule-making in Southeast Asia, especially in its promotion of non-interference, to try to shape regional order in Southeast Asia so that China or the Soviet Union did not fill the vacuum US withdrawal from Vietnam would leave behind. The US welcomed the Kuala Lumpur meeting and ZOPFAN to the extent that they demonstrated ASEAN's desire to consult and cooperate on security matters. The State Department was relieved that the notion of formal great power guarantees was rejected in favour of a call for outside powers to 'respect' ASEAN's neutrality through non-interference[202]. This reflected the fact that ASEAN's rule-

[198] Haacke (2003: 56).
[199] Irvine, R (1982: 29).
[200] ASEAN (1971).
[201] Narine (2002: 15-19), Hamilton-Hart (2012: 176).
[202] Outward savingram from Department of Foreign Affairs, 20th December 1971, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 13.

making fit into the US-ASEAN division of labour by complimenting the US' desire to draw China into a rule-governed regional society. In the wake of Nixon's meetings in Beijing, Green told President Marcos that Nixon charged him to "convey to Asian friends and allies that [the] U.S. is not going to leave [the] western Pacific but rather find [the] right way to remain. He said we should be and act confident, that Peking might be hypocritical but we stand to gain to [the] extent Peking follows norms of international behavior"[203]. If China recognised non-interference then by extension it would recognise the legitimacy of the non-communist ruling regimes in ASEAN; if it recognised ASEAN regimes as legitimate it would not need to try to subvert them.

Diplomatic leadership: initiatives to manage Indochina conflicts

Aside from the question of regional states managing their own relations through regional cooperation, there was also the question of what to do about the conflicts in Indochina. The US and ASEAN shared the view that communism needed to be contained in Indochina. However, the US wanted to withdraw from Vietnam and expected ASEAN states to provide diplomatic initiatives to manage the conflict in support for its drawing down. This could be done by promoting initiatives that legitimised communist containment. Some within the state department considered ASEAN useful for making supporting statements regarding Vietnam as early as 1967[204]. However, this was not to materialise until Indonesia, with ASEAN members' support, provided a diplomatic initiative in response to the Cambodian coup in 1970.

Prime Minister Lon Nol's coup in Cambodia resulted in civil war when ousted Prince Sihanouk gave his support to the communist Khmer Rouge and the North Vietnamese intervened in support. The conflict took the same form as those in Laos and South Vietnam with a communist insurgency backed by North Vietnam and a non-communist government backed by the US and the 'free world'. The presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia posed a threat to Nixon's policy of withdrawal as bases in Cambodia provided a relatively secure place for North Vietnamese operations into South Vietnam. On the 29th April South Vietnamese and US troops entered Cambodia and attacked the major communist bases in an effort to eliminate this threat. However, much of the communist force had moved deeper into the countryside and US troops withdrew after one month.

Before the US launched its Cambodia campaign, it made clear that it expected regional

[203] "Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, 5th March 1972" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 247.
[204]Inward Cablegram from Australian Embassy, Washington D.C., 17th August 1967, NAA: A1838, 3004/13/21 PART 2.

states to take a stand on Cambodia, as a means to legitimise US military action. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Michael Green said that it "would be most useful if Asian countries were to register their concern over developments in Cambodia and their support for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity ... If this could be done by ASEAN countries speaking with common voice, this would be particularly impressive, but if ASEAN as an organization shrinks from being involved in this kind of an issue, then it would be second best if ASEAN member countries could speak up on their own. In any event, it is better for Asians to take the lead than it is for US or European countries"[205].

Indonesia responded positively, initially offering to act as a channel for US arms to the anti-communist forces in Cambodia. Despite the apparent desire of the White House to channel such aid, Washington rejected the offer because it would raise questions in Congress. Malik persuaded Suharto that a diplomatic response was the correct way forward rather than direct military support[206]. Indonesia prepared to host a conference on Cambodia. The US supported this but emphasised that it should be an Asian initiative and the US would give no public endorsement. Malik saw the conference as a means of promoting Indonesia's Southeast Asian leadership, of boosting his own government's prestige and forestalling pressures from abroad and from generals for more concrete aid to Cambodia. He intended the Jakarta Conference to legitimise the 'containment' narrative and US' 'holding the line' in Vietnam, telling US officials it aimed to counter communist propaganda and open the eyes of the world to the truth that communists had been subverting South Vietnam for a long time and that the US was supporting the South Vietnamese struggle[207]. This arrangement worked to reinforce the legitimacy interdependence between the US and Indonesia as it provided a key means for the Suharto regime to prove its independent and active credentials whilst legitimising the US' strategic imperatives in Indochina.

Indonesia invited 21 countries but almost all non-aligned invitees declined[208]. The fact that the US launched its military campaign the day after the invitations were sent out raised questions regarding the neutrality of the conference. Malik sought to distance the conference from US action by publicly expressing that US withdrawal of troops would be beneficial for the conference. Privately however, Malik was not disturbed by the US' action. Other Southeast Asian statesmen either publicly or privately expressed support for the US.

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[205] "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, Washington, 31st March 1970" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 284.
[206] Leifer (1983: 133).
[207] "Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 26th May 1970" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 296.
[208] For details on the conference see Ang (2012).

The ASEAN states for the most part also endorsed Jakarta's initiative for a conference on Cambodia. Malaysia was supportive but preferred a conference on general Southeast Asian security as a platform to promote its neutralisation proposal. Both Marcos and Romulo of the Philippines supported Malik's initiative, seeing it as similar to Marcos' failed proposal for an Asian Forum of Asian Nations to explore avenues that might lead to a unified Asian position on regional problems[209]. Only Singapore was unsure. Singapore's Ambassador to the US consulted Marshall Green to see what US views on the conference were. Green encouraged Singaporean participation but Singapore did not send Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam as it saw the conference as impotent[210]. The fact that Singapore felt the need to seek the US' position on an Asian conference reflected its continued wariness of Indonesian leadership and support for US military involvement in Southeast Asia. The US criticised Singapore's decision not to send S Rajaratnam however, calling it a “bad move”[211]; support for its strategic imperatives should be expressed precisely through participation in regional diplomatic initiatives such as the Jakarta Conference.

The conference took place in May and called on the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference to reconvene the International Control Commission on Cambodia (ICC) and for the hosting of an international conference. The foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and Japan were encouraged to consult with the co-chairman of Geneva and the Secretary General of the UN on how the above could be implemented. Subsequent efforts to convene an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality were unsuccessful. The civil war continued with the US supporting Lon Nol forces through a sustained bombing campaign. The conference was however a foreign policy triumph for Malik. Domestic commentary hailed the conference as an example of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy. It embodied both the 'containment' and 'autonomy' narratives; the support given to the Lon Nol regime and the call for the withdrawal of foreign forces aimed to contain the communist advance in Cambodia, but the fact that this was an Asian initiative seeking to resolve Asian problems reflected the 'autonomy' narrative. Though it was not explicitly an ASEAN initiative, ASEAN states tried to coordinate a common position on the conference and ASEAN delegates played an important part at the conference itself. It was an explicit example of the second aspect of diplomatic leadership subcontracted to ASEAN states and can be seen as the first step towards ASEAN extending its reach to mainland Southeast Asia. The US was pleased with the conference and Kissinger advised President Nixon to congratulate Suharto on its success, especially in light of the difficulties it potentially posed to Indonesia's non-aligned status. He wrote that the conference “helped greatly in solidifying the diplomatic position of the Lon Nol

[209] Ang (2012: 252).
[210] Ang (2012: 254).
[211] Ang (2012: 255).

government, and helped to preserve Cambodian neutrality and sovereignty. It will also strengthen the hand of those seeking a peaceful settlement of the fighting throughout Indochina"[212]. Such statements clearly reflected the US' view that the conference served its imperatives of legitimising the anti-communist government in Cambodia and its broader containment objectives in Indochina.

No subcontracting of security public goods

For some in Indonesia, the Cambodian coup provided an opportunity to gain access to US military assistance by claiming that Indonesia could perform more expansive military-security functions in the region. In May 1970 the opportunistic State Secretary H. Alamsjah indicated to US officials that Indonesia could take on more regional responsibility as part of a "special role" in Southeast Asia[213]. General Sumitro agreed, saying this "special role" would involve Indonesia becoming more active in the wake of great power disengagement to ensure that there was no strategic power vacuum in the region. Sumitro argued that military assistance from the US and Western Europe was needed to replace old Soviet equipment[214]. An Indonesian five year plan envisioned Indonesia taking on responsibility for training and advising regional militaries and developing mobile land and navy strike forces for deployment around the region[215]. No doubt the main instrumental reasons behind the acquisition of US aid related to domestic stability; however, claiming this 'special role' was seen by Alamsjah and Sumitro as a means to acquire such aid.

The response within the US to expanded Indonesian role claims was mixed. The White House was interested, although raised concerns regarding the US' ability to supply necessary equipment. The State Department however was concerned that these claims reflected opportunistic behaviour by certain Indonesian individuals with political ambitions, and did not reflect the policy consensus within Jakarta. More importantly, such claims would never be endorsed by other regional states. Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Theodore Eliot warned that the US "should discourage the Indonesians from thinking that we will underwrite a regional security role for them over the next five years" saying that "[e]ven should funds for such a program be available, *we cannot promote Indonesia into a role to which it must be elected by its neighbors*. Indeed, efforts to do so would probably be counterproductive as other nations would resent Indonesia's serving as a middleman for U.S. military assistance … [and] ... some of Indonesia's neighbors might well view an Indonesian external defense capability as a threat rather than a contribution to their own

[212]Memorandum for the President from Henry A Kissinger, "Your meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia", May 26th 1970" <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19700526_memo.pdf> accessed 22/5/15.
[213] "Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 27th May 1970" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol XX Doc 299.
[214] "Memorandum of Conversation, Los Angeles, 1st July 1970" *ibid* 308.
[215] "Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, 23rd December 1970" *ibid* Doc 318.

security”[216]. Malaysia and Singapore had only recently experienced Confrontation and the issue of Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role had been dealt with through ASEAN. ASEAN states rejected any overt military-security leadership from Indonesia and were happier to keep their links with external powers.

The question of regional responsibility for security public goods arose again in 1971 when Malaysia and Indonesia announced the Malacca Declaration. It declared that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were not international straits but came under the jurisdiction of the coastal states, which would provide safe passage for international shipping. It proposed preventing a vacuum opening up after British withdrawal, which a maritime power such as the Soviet Union could exploit. The Soviets had already sent naval ships through the straits into the Indian ocean in an apparent display of a more overt regional presence. Japan tried to set up a international board to oversee the safety of navigation through the Straits to which the coastal states would be accountable[217]. The coastal states however wished to assert their own jurisdiction over the Straits, keeping them off the agenda of the International Maritime Consultative Organisation. The Malacca Declaration represented Indonesia's concerns regarding its 'archipelago principle' which asserted that the gaps between the islands of Indonesia should be treated as bridges to bring the different islands and ethnic groups together. As pointed out by Leifer and Nelson, “[t]he assertion of joint control over the Straits by Indonesia and Malaysia is thus seen as a claim to restrict the strategic mobility of maritime powers which possess the capacity to pose a challenge to the security of Indonesia and to its own conception of regional order”[218]. In this sense, it represented a claim to perform the public good of security of sea lanes in these Straits and represented a more specific expression of the principle that security was the primary responsibility of regional states.

Both the Soviet Union and the US contested this declaration however and both sent naval squadrons through the Straits to perform competitive exercises in the Bay of Bengal in the closing stages of the Bangladesh war in December 1971[219]. Singapore also objected, fearing a pan-Malay primacy may be established in the region. The status of the Straits was taken up within the broader negotiations over the issue of jurisdiction in coastal seas and freedom of navigation covered by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III between 1973 and 1982. The US, Japan and the Soviet Union were in consensus that straits should be governed under a liberal regime of 'transit passage'[220]. Only China supported Indonesia and Malaysia's claim in the hope of constraining Soviet

[216] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.
[217] Leifer (1989: 60).
[218] Leifer and Nelson (1973: 192).
[219] Leifer (1983: 145).
[220] Leifer (1989: 61).

freedom of navigation. This episode highlighted that the great powers, the key audience for regional states' role claims, were not willing to subcontract security public goods provision in Southeast Asia to regional states when an issue considered vital to their interests, such as freedom of navigation, was at stake.

Great power role redefined

Negotiations after 1966 produced a nascent role bargain between the US and ASEAN which served the twin goals of 'containment' and 'autonomy'. The substantive endorsement given by all the ASEAN states to the US' 'holding the line' function in Vietnam and its security public goods provision, showed their commitment to communist containment and legitimised the US' newly negotiated 'offshore great power guarantor' role. The US' new role was not fully enacted until 1975 after its withdrawal from Vietnam and after the Thai request for withdrawal of US forces from Thailand. The US military presence had left the mainland, being concentrated on its bases in the Philippines. As is clear from US documents dating from immediately after the fall of Saigon in 1975, the sense within ASEAN states was that, although the communist victory was detrimental to regional security, it would at least help dampen opposition within the US Congress to increased US provision of military and economic assistance. Secretary of State Kissinger reported to President Ford that "[t]here is a uniform desire that the U.S. play a supporting—and deterrent—role in the region"[221]. In light of the fact that "all the ASEAN states have separately indicated their desire for increased U.S. military assistance and for a continuing strategic balance in the Western Pacific favorable to the United States", US officials hoped a Presidential trip to Southeast Asia would reassure ASEAN states of the "continuing major U.S. interest and role in Southeast Asia". The US' role would no longer be focused on Indochina; rather, the desire was to "[d]emonstrate that outside of Indochina, the U.S. remains the permanent friend and preferred power of the ASEAN states". US deterrence would "[u]nderscore to the Chinese, the Soviets, and others, the continuation of a strategic balance favorable to the U.S". Officials hoped President Ford's visit would "boost the confidence and morale of the ASEAN states" and "[p]rovide a self-confident environment for a possible subsequent move of reconciliation with the Indochina states"[222].

The US' intended, and then actual, withdrawal paved the way for regional states to take on the function of diplomatic leadership as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. The US endorsed this because it no longer served as a means to replace external great powers, as had been proposed during the Bandung era, but instead served to support the US' reduced strategic imperatives in the

[221]"Memorandum for the President, Washington, June 13th 1975" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 16.
[222]"Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, September 11th 1975" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 20.

region. Diplomatic leadership had two aspects: first, regional states managed their own relations through regional institution-building and rule-making in their subregion, as well as performing the function of communist counter-insurgency on a bilateral level; second, regional states provided a diplomatic front in support for communist containment in Indochina. For example, during the lead up to the International Conference on Vietnam (ICV) in 1973, US officials discussed how ASEAN could be useful in associating itself with the outcome of the ICV. Key to US hopes for the ICV was securing Hanoi's commitment to recognise South Vietnam's right of self-determination and the independence of Cambodia and Laos. Part of US coordination with ASEAN was to ensure ASEAN's plans to host a 10 nation Southeast Asian summit did not come about until after the ICV[223]. US officials clearly had in mind the way ASEAN could support the ICV agreements through any such summit. As it was, no summit was held and the Indochinese states fell to communism. However, within the context of improving Sino-US relations, the threat to the ASEAN states was reduced. US officials saw ASEAN states' efforts at reconciliation with the Indochinese states as serving the purpose of containing any further threat of externally sponsored subversion[224]. The next chapter documents how ASEAN attempts at reconciliation with Vietnam played out before the Cambodian conflict.

ASEAN's diplomatic leadership also provided a means to demonstrate regional activism, satisfying domestic demands within regional states for autonomy. In this way, the regional division of labour was upheld by mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics. Furthermore, the US' provision of security public goods and, prior to its withdrawal, its 'holding the line function' in Vietnam, provided regional states with access to US aid and assistance and bought time for them to concentrate on economic development and regime consolidation. The failed negotiations over a possible Indonesian military role and indigenous provision of security of the Malacca Straits, put limits on regional states' performance of security functions and reinforced that the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role maintained responsibility for security public goods provision whilst ASEAN performed diplomatic leadership. However, concerns over the extent of the US' disengagement from the region and commitment to continue providing security public goods left some uncertainty over how long the nascent role bargain would be upheld in its current form. The next chapter shows how this uncertainty destabilised the US-ASEAN bargain and led ASEAN to try to negotiate regional order first with Vietnam and then with China.

[223]"Memorandum from Richard Kennedy and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 5th 1973" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol X Doc 8.
[224]"Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, September 11th 1975" *FRUS* 1969-1976 Vol E-12 Doc 20.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that in Southeast Asia in the early Cold War period, the meaning of the great power role was in constant flux. The opposing 'autonomy' and 'containment' grand strategic narratives provided competing pulls on regional states as they emerged from decolonisation, complicating the great power role claims of both the US and Indonesia throughout the role conceptualisation and role enactment phases. After 1966 however, an emerging role bargain consolidated an understanding of order that accommodated both the 'containment' and 'autonomy' narratives and established the legitimate contributions to order of both the US as the 'offshore great power guarantor', and regional states as part of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

In terms of how we understand the great power role in international society, this chapter shows how in a context other than Europe, the great power role operates in a different way. In Southeast Asia diplomatic leadership was decoupled from the great power role and transferred to regional states. This lay the foundations for further role negotiation between China and ASEAN and for the creation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in the post-Cold War period. The fact that the great power role did not include diplomatic leadership provided the space for ASEAN to assert, and extend, its own diplomatic leadership over the whole of Southeast Asia and then into the wider Asia-Pacific. The next chapter shows how this was done in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia.

Chapter Three - Role Taking: China, ASEAN and the Third Indochina Conflict

On Christmas Day 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Within a month, the Vietnamese had overthrown the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and set up a new government. The Vietnamese military occupied Cambodia for a decade, propping up its new rulers. Vietnam's actions ousted a horrific regime that had murdered around a quarter of the Cambodian population. As one Thai diplomat reflected, the Vietnamese had “cut the 'Gordian knot'” by dealing with a “malignant cancer” that had caused problems not just within Cambodia but also for neighbouring Vietnam and Thailand[1]. However, ASEAN did not welcome Vietnam's actions but opposed them on the basis of Vietnam's violation of Cambodia's sovereignty. ASEAN aligned with China in opposition to Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia and in the process aided the ousted Khmer Rouge. Considering its small size and problematic domestic politics, why did ASEAN see Cambodia as so important for regional order? Also, in enacting their mutual containment strategies in Cambodia, both China and Vietnam claimed to be protecting Southeast Asia from the other. Why did ASEAN collectively choose to side with China – an external great power that many within Southeast Asia still felt was the primary threat to regional order - and not Vietnam, a fellow Southeast Asian state? Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia made repeated efforts to reach some kind of regional compromise with Vietnam in resolving the conflict. How do we understand these efforts outside of ASEAN's espoused position on the conflict, and why did Malaysia and Indonesia repeatedly fall back in line with the other ASEAN states?

This chapter answers these questions using role theory. It argues that the China-ASEAN alignment during the Cambodia conflict represented more than just a balance of power approach to a perceived threat to regional security; it constituted a role bargain through which China took on a great power guarantor role in Southeast Asia and ASEAN expanded its 'primary manager' role – previously negotiated with the US – through gaining endorsement from China. The role negotiation framework employed in this chapter helps us go beyond both the realist understanding of the Third Indochina Conflict[2] which focuses solely on security, and the constructivist approach which focuses on norms.

The realist approach posits that the Sino-Soviet split led to two rival communist great

[1] Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14.
[2] 'Third Indochina Conflict' refers here to the period of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia until the Paris Peace Agreement (1978-1991), also known as the 'Cambodian conflict'. The terms are used interchangeably throughout.

powers which competed for influence over other communist movements. Vietnam's relations with China deteriorated as it increasingly chose to align with the Soviets after the Vietnam War. The Khmer Rouge aligned with China to resist the Vietnamese and carry out attacks on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Vietnam drew closer to the Soviet Union to counter Khmer adventurism and assert its hegemony over Indochina – seeking to eliminate the threat from an independent Cambodia and contain Chinese influence in Indochina. China opposed Vietnam's subregional hegemony and sought to contain Soviet influence on its southern borders through putting military pressure on Vietnam. The US aligned with China against what it saw as global Soviet expansionism, engaging in offshore balancing by allowing China to shoulder the military opposition to Vietnam in Indochina. ASEAN also aligned with China in support of Thailand which faced a direct threat from a preponderant Vietnam on its border. This pattern produced a stalemate which remained until Soviet backing for Vietnam ended in the late 1980s leading to Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia[3].

The realist approach is helpful in capturing the international dimensions of the conflict and how it related to Cold War great power rivalry. It is less helpful however when determining ASEAN's response and the significance of Cambodia for Southeast Asian order. The realist focus on material structural dynamics tends to assume that states act in a similar manner when faced with a changing balance of power. It is therefore less accommodating of nuance in ASEAN's response and ASEAN's agency. For example, for realists, ASEAN considered Cambodia important as a buffer between Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam's invasion removed the buffer, shifting the balance of power in mainland Southeast Asia in Vietnam's favour. Thailand aligned with China to balance the Vietnamese threat and ASEAN followed suit because of its members' shared sense of common predicament due to all being weak non-communist states[4]. However, only Thailand faced a direct threat from Vietnam, and Malaysia and Indonesia considered China the principal threat to the region. Indonesia had significant reason to support Vietnam due to its military's sympathy towards the Vietnamese and disdain towards China, and the government's desire to consolidate its hold over East Timor after its own intervention. Why did Malaysia and Indonesia join a balancing coalition that promoted China's military involvement in Southeast Asia and sought to weaken the only credible Southeast Asian military counterweight to China? Even when we consider that ASEAN elites were united in wanting to insulate their own domestic social conflicts from any kind of external support, we still cannot fully account for Indonesia's tacit support for China considering its

[3] Most accounts are empirical but reflect this line of thinking. For example, Elliot (1981), Gordon (1986).
[4] Leifer (1986: 127).

ruling elite's concern over Chinese rather than Vietnamese subversion[5].

We need to look beyond threat perception and balance of power to understand why Cambodia was important and why ASEAN collectively chose to align with China. Likewise, we also need to look beyond balance of power to understand ASEAN's agency. The realist approach assumes that because ASEAN was the weaker partner in the balancing coalition, ASEAN's political objectives were necessarily subservient to China's military objectives. ASEAN therefore failed in its effort to manage the problem the Cambodian conflict posed for regional order[6]. However, rather than viewing the Cambodian conflict as a problem for regional order that could be managed either through ASEAN's associative approach or a traditional balance of power approach, it may be more fruitful to understand ASEAN's response as part of as a process of order *negotiation* as well as management.

Constructivists have thought along these lines. They highlight how for ASEAN the Cambodian conflict was not just about security but also about seeking external recognition of ASEAN norms – particularly non-interference[7]. In this sense, Cambodia was important for ASEAN because it became the theatre for a broader conflict over what type of order would prevail in Southeast Asia. Would a Vietnamese-dominated communist order form in Indochina from which Vietnam could subvert ASEAN's non-communist regimes, or could ASEAN secure its vision of a coexistence order based on the norm of non-interference? The constructivist norm-focused account better captures what was at stake for ASEAN in the Cambodian conflict than a purely security-focused approach. It also better captures the nuance in ASEAN's response, especially the tension between trying to punish Vietnam for violating non-interference and non-use of force through internationalising the conflict (led by Thailand and Singapore) and trying to reach a regional compromise with Vietnam according to the norm of regional autonomy (led by Malaysia and Indonesia)[8]. However, constructivists may focus too much on norms. By analysing how a structure of norms shaped ASEAN's response and then studying what effect the conflict had on those norms, constructivists overlook the wider social implications of the Cambodian conflict. The conflict did not only raise the question of what type of order would prevail in Southeast Asia, but also what part ASEAN, Vietnam and China would play in making and managing regional order. ASEAN did not only seek recognition for its understanding of regional order in Southeast Asia as embodied in its

[5] Jones (2012).
[6] For a sophisticated presentation of this argument see Emmers (2003).
[7] Haacke (2003). See Emmers (2003) and Acharya (2014) for different conclusions on ASEAN's success.
[8] Acharya (2014: 79-96).

norms, but also for its role as the 'primary manager' in Southeast Asia *vis a vis* China, Vietnam and other external great powers. This chapter therefore focuses more specifically on the question of what part each actor would play in making and managing order and how this was negotiated through the processes of role claiming and role endorsement/contestation.

This chapter frames the dynamics of the Cambodian conflict within a process of role negotiation. China and Vietnam sought to legitimise their actions over Cambodia with ASEAN by claiming competing 'great power guarantor' roles. In responding to their claims, ASEAN, as the regional constituency of legitimation, had to take into account: 1) China and Vietnam's respective threats to stability and order through expansionism and support for insurgencies; 2) their potential contributions to securing ASEAN's preferred vision of order, particularly in relation to ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN was divided on the first aspect; although all states recognised Vietnam's potential threat, they differed with respect to whether China constituted a greater threat. On the second aspect however, ASEAN was united. ASEAN collectively endorsed China's role claims because China was willing to recognise ASEAN's vision of a coexistence order based on non-interference and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role within that order. Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia represented its refusal to recognise ASEAN's espoused coexistence order and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

To oppose Vietnam's creation of an alternative communist order under Vietnamese dominance, ASEAN reached a reciprocal role bargain with China, through which China took on the 'regional great power guarantor' role in Southeast Asia and ASEAN upheld its 'primary manager' role. China contributed to regional order as ASEAN understood it through expressing support for non-interference and, by offering a security guarantee to Thailand and the rest of ASEAN as well as backing the Cambodian resistance, performing the function of 'holding the line' against Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism. China was able to use its 'regional great power guarantor' role to carry out its strategy of containing Soviet-Vietnamese influence in Indochina as part of its contribution to regional order and gain access to material and social support from the US, Thailand and ASEAN. ASEAN gained further endorsement for its 'primary manager' role from China and other external partners and was able to use it to assert the salience of its rules and processes over Cambodia in the face of great power involvement. ASEAN led the international campaign against Vietnam's actions within the UN and the Non-aligned Movement ensuring the conflict was defined as an illegal intervention and establishing that Cambodia should be returned to neutral and independent status after Vietnam's withdrawal. The reciprocal legitimacy dynamics that upheld the bargain were that

ASEAN needed China to bolster the Cambodian rebels' military opposition so that it remained credible as a fighting force and China needed ASEAN to perform the diplomatic legitimacy work within international society so that broad-based opposition towards Vietnam could be sustained.

However, Malaysia and Indonesia still considered China the principal threat and made repeated efforts to reach out to Vietnam during the conflict. This represented resistance to China's role-taking in Southeast Asia by trying to undermine the China-ASEAN bargain and hold out the possibility of negotiating an alternative role bargain with Vietnam. However, Vietnam remained intransigent, insisting that the situation in Cambodia was “irreversible”. At the same time however, the ASEAN states were keen to limit China's influence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN asserted the salience of its norms and processes over the whole of Southeast Asia to ensure that China's contribution was limited to the function of 'holding the line', a function specific to the Cambodian conflict. Likewise, key ASEAN states lobbied the US to ensure its continued military engagement in the maritime region and provision of security public goods. The ASEAN states did not want China taking on more general security functions in Southeast Asian order, which they were more comfortable with the US performing. In asserting the salience of its norms and processes in Indochina, ASEAN aimed to secure endorsement from China, as well as other external powers, for it to play the predominant part in order negotiation and management in the whole of Southeast Asia through its 'primary manager' role, after the Cambodian conflict was resolved. In this sense, this chapter shows a transition between ASEAN enacting its 'primary manager' role in its maritime subregion and having the role recognised as operating over the full extent of Southeast Asia. ASEAN would not actually enact its role in the mainland until after the Cambodian conflict was resolved and the Indochinese states recognised ASEAN and its processes as operating in their subregion and indeed sought to join the association. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the 'primary manager' role involved the ASEAN states taking on primary responsibility for managing intra-regional relations through performing diplomatic/normative functions. It did not involve ASEAN taking on security functions. ASEAN could not resolve the Cambodian conflict itself because of the great power interests and rivalry tied up in the conflict, notably the Sino-Soviet dispute. For this reason, Leifer was correct in asserting that ASEAN was not a “security manager in the manner of a dominant power”, and that ASEAN conducted itself as a 'diplomatic community' throughout the conflict[9]. What is interesting in terms of our analysis of role negotiation however, is that ASEAN was able to position itself during the conflict in such a way that it gained endorsement to perform the diplomatic functions of rule-making and regional reconciliation through institution-

[9] Leifer (1989: 86).

building after the great power rivalry was withdrawn from Indochina. It could also continue situating its 'primary manager' role in a division of labour with the US, with the US providing security public goods.

This chapter therefore shows both China's role-taking and the expansion of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. The process of role negotiation in this chapter is analysed in two main parts. The first looks at China and Vietnam's great power role contest, how they conceptualised and claimed their roles and how the US endorsed China's claims to the function of militarily 'holding the line' in Indochina. The second part looks at regional responses to China's claims: regional legitimation from Thailand and ASEAN collectively as it took up its part in the division of labour; regional reticence and resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia as these states pursued individual efforts to reach out to Vietnam outside of the China-ASEAN division of labour. The chapter finishes by looking at how the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the end of the Cold War impacted on China's role-taking and the social foundations laid that would carry into the post-Cold War period.

Before moving onto the main analysis however, the chapter outlines events leading up to the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict to show why Cambodia became a theatre for conflict over what type of order would prevail in Southeast Asia, and what was at stake for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

CONTEXT: ASEAN SEEKS ACCOMMODATION WITH VIETNAM

As we saw in the last chapter, ASEAN established its 'primary manager' role as part of the role bargain reached with the US in the late 1960s/early 1970s. The US-ASEAN role bargain gave the ASEAN states space to demonstrate regional autonomy by managing their regional relations without direct interference, as well as spearheading diplomatic initiatives to legitimise the US-led battle against communism in Indochina. The US provided aid and assistance to ASEAN states and, until 1973, also performed the function of 'holding the line' in Indochina, insulating maritime Southeast Asia from events on the mainland and buying time for the ASEAN regimes to consolidate their domestic power. This role bargain redefined the great power role in the Southeast Asian context by transferring the function of diplomatic leadership to regional states, but keeping the function of security public goods provision for the US. ASEAN therefore performed the function of diplomatic leadership as part of its 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia.

As we also saw, the Sino-US rapprochement and US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 altered the terms of this bargain as the US moved more quickly towards taking on its 'offshore great power guarantor' role. Maritime Southeast Asia was no longer insulated from Indochina; the two previously separate regional security complexes began to merge as there was no longer an external power 'holding the line' against communist Vietnam[10]. Order needed to be negotiated between the merging regional security complexes. The challenge for ASEAN was twofold: first, it needed to commit Vietnam to a 'coexistence order'[11] where all Southeast Asian states recognised each other's sovereignty and sought to promote regional autonomy by not drawing external great powers into regional affairs; second, in the context of US disengagement it needed recognition of its 'primary manager' role from other key actors, especially Vietnam. Thus, between 1973 and 1978 ASEAN sought to negotiate a coexistence order with Vietnam that upheld ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

ASEAN began to reach out to Vietnam after the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. As the ASEAN states were no longer actively backing the fight against communism in Indochina, ASEAN leaders hoped that they could reach agreement with Vietnam on maintaining the status quo. They hoped that in return for ASEAN recognising the legitimacy of the communist government in Hanoi, North Vietnam would recognise the legitimacy of the non-communist regimes within ASEAN states. ASEAN also hoped that Hanoi would recognise ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by endorsing its rule-making in Southeast Asia. ASEAN held out ZOPFAN for Hanoi to subscribe to in spite of not being a member of ASEAN, hoping that the goal of regional autonomy and reducing the influence of great powers in Southeast Asia would resonate with the leadership in Hanoi[12]. However, North Vietnam refused to recognise ASEAN and declined to attend its ministerial meetings. Hanoi viewed ASEAN as a US 'lackey', part of an imperialist project of counter-revolution in Southeast Asia. Hanoi considered ASEAN's concept of 'regional resilience' to be a means to build up military capabilities and engage in defence cooperation to suppress regional revolution[13].

In 1975 the unprotected non-communist regimes in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos fell in quick succession to communist forces. These communist victories reignited domino theory-type concerns within ASEAN that the internal communist insurgencies they were trying to contain would

[10] A regional security complex refers to system of geographically contiguous units whose security cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one another. See Buzan (1991), Buzan and Waever (2003). Also Collins (2003).
[11] Bull (1977: 62-73), Buzan (2004a: 139-160).
[12] Haacke (2003: 61-64).
[13] Nguyen (2006: 111).

be strengthened through access to external material support and invigorated fighting spirit. ASEAN officials perceived Vietnamese leaders as highly arrogant in the wake of their victory over the US. They feared that captured US arms could end up in the hands of communist insurgents as Vietnam sought to subvert the non-communist ASEAN regimes[14]. Vietnamese leaders spoke of supporting the "just and victorious struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress"[15]. ASEAN officials received such comments as an indirect threat to support subversion. Parallel to this, Vietnam seemed intent on developing an Indochinese communist order from which it could launch such subversion. Laos signalled its willingness to fall into Vietnam's sphere of influence by signing a Treaty of Friendship in 1975. However, an independent Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge reassured ASEAN states that Vietnam's efforts to consolidate a Vietnam-led communist order would be frustrated for the time being.

ASEAN's collective response to the communist victories in Indochina was to host its first summit in 1976. The ASEAN members sought to demonstrate their solidarity and commitment to regional cooperation as part of the 'primary manager' role. They also sought to formalise rules governing interaction in Southeast Asia that could be accepted by the new Indochinese states. The ASEAN Concord affirmed ASEAN's intention to expand concrete cooperation in the political, economic and social spheres, whilst the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) established a *modus vivendi* for relations within and outside of ASEAN[16]. The TAC was open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia and ASEAN hoped this would provide a mechanism through which Vietnam could sign up to ASEAN norms – especially non-interference - and thus be co-opted into a coexistence order. This represented both a vision of 'one Southeast Asia' that blurred the lines between communist/non-communist states, and also an attempt to extend ASEAN's resilience narrative to Indochina so as to keep it free of great power alignment and rivalry. Hanoi responded by offering its own Four Point proposal for developing relations, which ostensibly corresponded with ZOPFAN and TAC, but in its call for 'genuine independence and neutrality' suggested that Vietnam did not yet consider the ASEAN states independent or neutral[17].

Hanoi's continued rejection of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role contrasted with the significant boost ASEAN's role received from Western states and Japan. In 1977, ASEAN hosted a second summit where it was joined by a number of new dialogue partners, which all recognised

[14] Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14.
[15] Leifer (1989: 73-74).
[16] Irvine, D (1982).
[17] Nguyen (2006: 116).

ASEAN as a single collective actor. Western states and Japan institutionalised their endorsement of the 'primary manager' role through the Post-ministerial Conference (PMC) and the forum was used for coordinating primarily economic, but also political support for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. For example, in the same year that the PMC was set up, Japan introduced the “Fukuda Doctrine”. This doctrine aligned with ASEAN's aims by seeking to strengthen ASEAN countries' resilience and bolster ASEAN as a regional organisation, as well as promoting coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina[18].

Despite this, ASEAN's need to commit Vietnam to recognising a coexistence order and its 'primary manager' role was made more acute because of lingering doubts over the US' credibility as a provider of security public goods in Southeast Asia. The second half of the 1970s saw a dramatic reduction of US military and economic assistance to ASEAN states as aid conditionality became a feature of the new Carter administration. The US' withdrawal from Vietnam removed its need for regional states to provide diplomatic initiatives in support for its position in Indochina; the narrow concern for containment through bolstering regional non-communist regimes was replaced by President Carter's emphasis on human rights. Anti-communism in itself was therefore no longer sufficient for regional regimes to gain access to US aid and assistance. There was also uncertainty over the future of the US-Philippine bases treaty. Philippine nationalists questioned the usefulness of the bases considering the lack of a direct external threat and resented that the Philippines was shouldering the entire burden of hosting bases upon which other ASEAN states could free-ride. The Philippines demanded that the US end the practice of extraterritoriality and recognise Philippine sovereignty over the bases, support the Philippine government's fight against the Moro rebellion in the south, and provide $1 billion of assistance. Considering the Thai decision to close US bases in 1976 and SEATO's disbandment in 1977, the ongoing US-Philippine negotiations on amending the bases treaty added to the uncertainty over both the US' future commitment to the 'offshore great power guarantor' role and ASEAN states’ commitment to endorse the US’ role by hosting its military presence.

In 1978, ASEAN thought it had received assurance of Vietnam's commitment to a coexistence order in Southeast Asia. Although not accepting the ASEAN process itself, Vietnam made a rhetorical commitment to non-interference in other states’ affairs. This rhetorical commitment seemed credible in the light of Vietnam's struggle to exert influence over a fiercely independent Cambodia. Vietnam was tied down in Indochina, reducing its ability to support

[18] Pressello (2014).

insurgency within ASEAN states. This situation was not to last long, however, as the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict escalated, drawing great power rivalry back into Indochina. The Khmer Rouge aligned with China and the Vietnamese moved closer towards the Soviet Union, pitting China and Vietnam against each other. The next section details how the Sino-Vietnamese conflict played out into a role contest over who would perform the role of great power guarantor in Southeast Asia.

CHINA AND VIETNAM'S GREAT POWER GUARANTOR ROLE CONTEST

This section explores the conceptualisation, claiming and enactment of China and Vietnam's respective role conceptions. China conceived of itself as the 'regional great power guarantor' of Southeast Asian neutrality. Vietnam considered itself revolutionary leader in Indochina, and sought to legitimise this with ASEAN by conceiving the complementary 'indigenous great power buffer' role. China and Vietnam's claims sought to achieve mutual containment: China sought to contain Vietnam and the Soviet Union within the wider Southeast Asian region, and Vietnam sought to contain China within Indochina. China's role conception was more extensive in terms of the scope and domain of enactment – it aimed to be the sole guarantor of the whole of Southeast Asia, whilst Vietnam's was for the most part limited to hegemony over former French Indochina. Both claimed their roles and sought to deny the other's claims through courting the ASEAN states in the lead up to the outbreak of military conflict at the end of 1978. Vietnam enacted its role through military intervention and occupation in Cambodia. China enacted its role in response through its punitive military action against Vietnam in February 1979. The US endorsed China taking on the function of 'holding the line' in Indochina by acquiescing to China's military action, and even providing logistical support. The ASEAN states thus needed to respond not only to Vietnam and China's role claims, but also the US-China division of labour with respect to the Cambodian conflict.

Role conceptualisation and role location

China's 'regional great power guarantor' role

As summarised in Table 7, China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception contained identity elements specific to the Chinese leadership's view of itself in relation to Southeast Asia. Leaders still held 'paternalist' perceptions from previous eras when Beijing was the centre of the Chinese World Order and Southeast Asians paid it tribute[19]. As a consequence, Chinese officials

[19] Fairbank (1968). See also Suzuki (2009), Kang (2010a) and Phillips (2010).

often spoke of China and Southeast Asian states having 'brotherly' relations, using language that implied that China was the older brother[20]. On top of this, the Chinese viewed their country as the leader of the Third World[21]. In this sense there appeared a broad, but inchoate, conception of China providing the function of regional political leadership. This replaced its previous claim to revolutionary political leadership seen through its material and political support for regional communist movements, but maintained an idea of leading and assisting other 'third world' states in resisting superpower hegemonism[22].

China's status as an 'emerging great power' came from its increasing engagement with wider international society. Since gaining UN membership in 1971, the PRC and international society had engaged in 'mutual legitimation' through which China began to see itself, and be recognised by others, as a global great power[23]. The PRC's assumption of the 'China' seat at the UN meant it became a permanent member of the Security Council – the formal expression of the 'legalised hegemony' of the great powers[24]. The Malaysian neutrality proposal, discussed in Chapter Two, also gave China similar status recognition by placing it, along with the US and the Soviet Union, as a great power guarantor of Southeast Asia's neutrality, even before the Sino-US rapprochement. There was initially a security dimension to China's re-engagement with international society; China believed it was in danger of being encircled by Soviet expansion and sought to form an alliance of states to oppose the Soviets. This coalesced with an economic dimension in the late 1970s after Deng Xiaoping and the 'moderates' won the Post-Mao leadership struggle and pursued massive domestic reform in the wake of the cultural revolution. Their policies emphasised “reform and opening up” in order to modernise the country, and required a more moderate foreign policy in order to gain access to Western technology and investment.

China located the 'regional great power guarantor' role principally from Malaysia's neutralisation proposal and ZOPFAN[25]. These provided the language through which to legitimise China's ambitions on ASEAN's terms. Although China did not explicitly describe itself as a 'guarantor', Chinese officials on numerous occasions leading up to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia expressed China's support for ASEAN neutrality and ZOPFAN[26]. Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai

[20] Chang (1987: 189).
[21] Shih (1993).
[22] Shih (1993: 48).
[23] Zhang (1998).
[24] Simpson (2004).
[25] See discussion in Chapter Two.
[26] Chang (1979).

expressed China's support for neutrality in discussion with Malaysian officials as early as 1974 and the *Peking Review*, a PRC mouthpiece, praised ASEAN's economic cooperation and ZOPFAN as efforts to do away with foreign control[27]. This was quite a turnaround for a state that only a few years before had denounced ASEAN as a "tool of US imperialism"[28]. Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua told Malaysian Foreign Minister Rithauddeen in 1978: "I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that the Chinese government and people support the people of all Southeast Asian countries in their just struggle to free themselves from superpower interference and control and to realize their goal of the neutralization of Southeast Asia"[29]. Likewise, they sought to impress on the ASEAN states the danger that Vietnam and the Soviet Union posed to the region through their 'hegemony' and that China would not stand idly by if Vietnam sought to expand its hegemony into Cambodia but would take action[30]. In Bangkok in late 1978, Deng Xiaoping told Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak that China's wanted to "teach Vietnam a lesson" was for the sake of the security and stability of Southeast Asia and especially Thailand[31]. Coupled together, Chinese expressions of support for ASEAN's 'neutrality' and its reassurances that it would not allow Vietnam to achieve its ambitions of regional hegemony, indicate that the China saw itself as a regional guarantor of ASEAN independence and neutrality as expressed in ZOPFAN. China's concern to contain Soviet-Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina, and the fact that Chinese officials promised to check Vietnamese ambitions, shows a commitment to the primary function of balance of power through performing the secondary function of 'holding the line' against any potential Soviet-Vietnamese expansion. China's language of support for Southeast Asian states' efforts to free themselves from superpower influence more generally - rather than strictly Soviet influence - was consistent with China's aim of freeing its near abroad from the dominance of any potentially hostile power. This suggests that China saw itself as the sole great power guarantor of Southeast Asian order when it came the time for the Soviets and the US to withdraw their influence.

[27] Chang (1979:250).
[28] Khaw (1977).
[29] *Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement*, 28th September 1978.
[30] This was the impression left on the Thai and Singaporean Prime Ministers during Deng Xiaoping's visit to Thailand and Singapore in November 1978. See Chanda (1986: 325-327) and Lee (2000: 661-662).
[31] This was reported by a Thai official present at the meeting in an interview to Nayan Chanda. Chanda (1986: 326).

Identity	Status	Function	
		Primary	*Secondary*
'Older brother'	Emerging great power	Regional political leadership	Assistance to groups resisting 'hegemonism'
Leader of the Third World		Balance of power	Holding the line

Table 7 – China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception

Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role

Table 8 shows Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role which was built on its conception of itself as revolutionary leader in Indochina. Vietnam's identity as superior in Indochina came from historical and contemporary factors. Historically, Vietnamese leaders saw their position in Indochina within the Sinic tradition as the seat of the Son of Heaven to which vassals should pay tribute. Vietnam vied with Siam throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to establish tribute relations with the smaller polities in modern day Laos and Cambodia. The logic of Indochina as a political space was then given expression by the French when they established the Indochinese Union in 1887. The French saw the Vietnamese as the dominant group within Indochina and worked to gain their collaboration in the colony. As such, a vast majority of the bureaucrats and administrators working in Vientiane and Phnom Penh during the colonial period were Vietnamese. The communist resistance to French colonial rule replicated and reinforced the Indochinese political space; the concept of an Indochinese Federation, with Vietnam as the dominant partner, was deeply infused in the minds of many Vietnamese communist leaders, reinfocing a sense of superiority[32].

Vietnam's revolutionary status came from the Communist International delegating leadership of the communist revolution in Indochina to the Vietnamese and from its continued struggle to fight imperialism against the French and the Americans. The Indochinese Communist Party established in 1930 consisted wholly of Vietnamese as there were no communist movements within Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese communists saw it as their duty to bring communism to Indochina and were instrumental in developing indigenous communist movements in Laos and Cambodia[33]. They thus performed the primary function of 'revolutionary regional leadership' through the secondary

[32] Goscha (1995), Morris (1999).
[33] Goscha (2006).

function of aid and assistance to revolutionary groups within Indochina. Indochina constituted a single battlefield in the First and Second Indochina wars against the French and the US. After 1975, leaders in Hanoi did not speak of an Indochinese Federation but of the 'special relationship' between Vietnam and the two other states. This was disrupted by the emergence within Cambodia of the anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge which had eliminated the pro-Hanoi elements within its ranks[34]. The victory of the KR in Cambodia before the fall of Saigon prevented the Vietnamese from intervening in Cambodia and ensuring that a pro-Hanoi government was established. The Democratic Kampuchea government was hostile to Vietnam, breaking off relations in 1977 and undertaking military incursions across the border. Within Vietnam's revolutionary leader conception there was no room for an independent and aggressive Cambodia, especially one that was increasingly receiving support from a now hostile China.

It was this China factor that led Vietnamese leaders to seek to legitimise their hegemony within Indochina amongst the other states of Southeast Asia. Vietnam conceived that its dominance in Indochina could perform a balance of power function by acting as a buffer against the further expansion of Chinese influence into Southeast Asia. It built its 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception on its idea of itself as revolutionary leader. Vietnam could guarantee Southeast Asian order against the expansion of an external and aggressive China by performing the primary function of balance of power simply by providing a counterweight to Chinese influence. China's involvement in Cambodia was highlighted as part of aggressive hegemonic strategy which needed to be contained. In contrast to China's 'regional great power guarantor' role conception, Vietnam could use its identity as an indigenous Southeast Asian actor and fit its conception within the narrative of regional autonomy. It also sought to highlight its independent status, achieved through its revolutionary struggles against imperialism. Vietnam hoped that because its 'indigenous great power buffer' role claim was limited to Indochina rather than covering the extent of Southeast Asia, it would not imply any threat to the maritime ASEAN states.

[34] Morris (1999: 59-62). The KR forces also repeatedly attacked Vietnamese forces in an attempt to expel them from Cambodia.

Identity	Status	Function	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Superior in Indochina	Revolutionary	Revolutionary regional leadership	Aid and assistance to revolutionary groups
Indigenous (SEA)	Independent	Balance of power	Counterweight to China

Table 8 – Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception

Role claiming and role denial

In the lead up to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, both China and Vietnam engaged in a discursive contest of role claiming and mutual role denial. This was most clearly evident in the tours of the region undertaken by Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in October and November 1978 respectively.

On his tour, Pham Van Dong sought to reassure ASEAN states of Vietnam's benign intentions and of its value as a counterweight to expanding Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Pham assured ASEAN leaders that Vietnam had no intention of supporting insurgencies. He even laid a wreath at a cemetery in Malaysia that honoured war dead killed fighting the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). He apologised for previous Vietnamese support of the MCP saying that Vietnam was unaware of the internal situation. Alongside this assurance he emphasised China's identity as external to Southeast Asia, meddling in regional affairs by actively supporting such insurgencies and therefore China constituted the principal threat to Southeast Asia. Pham's intention was to sign each state up to a bilateral friendship treaty, again refusing to recognise the collective position of ASEAN. Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak and Pham Van Dong issued a joint communiqué pledging to refrain from subversion but the Thais rejected the inclusion of a 'third country' clause that seemed to be directed towards China's activity in Cambodia[35]. The Thais were keen to commit the Vietnamese to formally reject support for insurgency, but would not reciprocate by signing up to Vietnam's containment of China. In Singapore, Pham was again perceived as being arrogant, stating that the Singaporeans had gained from the Vietnam war and therefore had to

[35] Chanda (1986: 319).

contribute to Vietnam's development[36].

In response, the ASEAN states contested Vietnam's vision of regional order by collectively refusing to sign bilateral non-aggression treaties, perceiving them as an attempt to divide the Association[37]. By coordinating their individual responses to Vietnam in this way, the ASEAN states reasserted ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by holding out ASEAN's collective identity and the salience of its instruments for regional order, ZOPFAN and the TAC. Regional leaders were heartened over Vietnam's assurances of upholding the norm of non-interference however.

In November Deng sought to persuade ASEAN states that China could act as a good neighbour and a force for stability against the 'little hegemonist' Vietnam backed by the 'hegemonist' Soviet Union. His tour came just days after the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and this was used as an example of a Southeast Asian state bringing a hostile external superpower into regional affairs contrary to the spirit of ZOPFAN. Deng then took every opportunity in public forums to express Chinese support for ASEAN and ZOPFAN. He also explained China's distinction between government-to-government and party-to-party relations – ridiculing Pham Van Dong's insincerity with respect to Vietnam giving up support for regional insurgencies[38]. He told his hosts they should not take Vietnamese warnings to support 'genuine independence' lightly but that if Vietnam did begin its quest for hegemony through invading Cambodia, then China would teach it a lesson[39].

In contrast to the unity ASEAN presented during Pham Van Dong's tour, Deng's tour highlighted ASEAN's growing divergences. Thailand accepted China's definition of the unfolding conflict in Indochina and endorsed China's support for the Khmer Rouge by signing an agreement allowing the overflight of Chinese planes destined for Cambodia. In contrast, Malaysia was cautious after Deng could not renounce support for the MCP and Indonesia was not part of the tour and maintained the most reservations regarding Chinese motives. The responses to China and Vietnam's mutual role claiming and role denial highlighted the emerging tensions within ASEAN. These would be heightened by Vietnam and China's moves to enact their role claims.

[36] Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14.
[37] Narine (2002: 41).
[38] Lee (1981) provides a good overview of Deng's tour.
[39] Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14.

Role enactment: Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and China's 'lesson'

Vietnam followed the logic of its role claim through its invasion of Cambodia on 25th December 1978 and subsequent occupation over the next decade. Vietnamese forces were accompanied by a Cambodian faction, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF)[40], and quickly overran Khmer Rouge forces. In January 1979 Hanoi installed a new regime under Heng Samrin called the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Vietnam enacted its role through force but sought to legitimise it through partnership with the KPRAF and then through the PRK regime. Vietnam signed a twenty five year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation modelled on the similar treaty with Laos. The Treaty accepted the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and recognised Vietnam's dominance over Cambodian affairs. Vietnam's intention to establish an Indochinese Federation under its leadership was partially realised.

Internationally Vietnam sought to legitimise its role by arguing that its initial actions were undertaken in self-defence in response to repeated border incursions by the KR and that the overthrow of the Democratic Kampuchea regime was based on humanitarian grounds. This was potentially a powerful argument due to the genocidal policies of the KR under Pol Pot. Vietnam allowed the Western media access to Cambodia in order to witness the extent of the KR atrocities in an attempt to influence international opinion[41]. Had international opinion been swayed to recognise the credentials of the PRK and acquiesced to Vietnam's occupation, then Vietnam would likely have gained endorsement for its revolutionary leadership. Regionally Vietnam sought to legitimise it as part of the 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception. The Indochinese foreign ministers argued that by opposing Vietnam's actions in Cambodia, regional states were taking part in a Chinese plan to expand China's influence and territory into Southeast Asia. Instead they should legitimise Vietnam's dominance by signing non-aggression treaties[42].

Vietnam's claims were unsuccessful, due in a large part to ASEAN's opposition. The means through which Vietnam claimed its role – its use of force against another sovereign state – was highly problematic for ASEAN. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia - despite its assurances of non-interference just weeks earlier – underlined its rejection of ASEAN's espoused coexistence order based on the rule of non-interference and the concepts of regional resilience and autonomy.

[40] Between 1975 and 1989 Cambodia was known as Kampuchea. Cambodia is used throughout the chapter except when specifically referring to names from the time that include Kampuchea.
[41] Chanda (1986: 382).
[42] "Statement of the Conference of Foreign Ministers between Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam," July 18, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114455> accessed 1/9/14.

Regional resilience was undermined by the prospect of new insurgencies sponsored by the Soviet-Vietnamese axis, and regional autonomy encroached upon by the reconfigured great power rivalry. Joint meetings between the Indochinese leaders throughout the 1980s mirrored and challenged ASEAN's corporate position. Vietnam's intransigence was highlighted by the repeated declarations at these meetings that the situation in Cambodia was “irreversible”[43]. ASEAN viewed Vietnam's invasion as removing the Cambodian buffer between Thailand and Vietnam, increasing the risk of revolutionary fervour spreading throughout ASEAN as well as Vietnamese assistance reaching insurgent movements. Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie stated that Vietnam's actions represented for ASEAN “an exercise … in the fulfilment of a committed dream to unite Indochina under one political control as a prelude to turn the rest of Southeast Asia into a sort of Vietnamese comecon[44]”. ASEAN's intervention in the Cambodian conflict thus aimed to tie Vietnam down within Cambodia so that it could not support insurgent movements outside Indochina[45]. On top of this, having failed to co-opt Vietnam to its vision of regional order, ASEAN sought to incorporate Cambodia by asserting that Cambodia came under the purview of its rules. If Vietnam could not be kept out of great power alignment and rivalry, then it should be denied the fruits of its efforts to overrun Cambodia and Cambodia re-established as an independent and neutral buffer between Thailand and Vietnam.

Shortly after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, China carried out its punitive invasion of Vietnam and began its ‘bleeding’ strategy. China's attack involved at least 450,000 troops and lasted one month from February to March 1979. The Chinese captured some of Vietnam's northern-most territory but quickly withdrew in order to keep the action limited. In terms of an isolated military campaign it was a failure due to the high casualty rates and difficulty the PLA faced in overcoming Vietnamese resistance[46]. However, as part of its wider strategy to 'bleed Vietnam white' it showed China's willingness to engage in direct military action and gave credibility to the threat of a 'second lesson'. China justified its punitive invasion in terms of its 'regional great power guarantor' role conception. China's Ambassador to Thailand Zhang Weilei told the *Bangkok Post* that China's military action was a protection against 'hegemonism', claiming that China would protect ASEAN and support neutrality through militarily resisting Soviet-Vietnamese hegemony in the region[47]. Troops were maintained at the Sino-Vietnamese border after the invasion, holding out the threat of another lesson and diverting Vietnamese troops from the Thai-Cambodia border. Pressure was kept

[43] Leifer (1985/86: 627).
[44] Quoted in Haacke (2003: 97).
[45] Jones (2012).
[46] See O'Dowd (2007).
[47] Chang (1979: 254).

on the Vietnamese within Cambodia through supplying the Khmer Rouge with arms so it could maintain military resistance. Through this, China claimed to 'hold the line' as the principal or even sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order.

ASEAN's official response to China's invasion was to call for the removal of all foreign forces in Indochina[48]. This linked China's actions with Vietnam's and indirectly legitimised the presence of Chinese troops in Vietnam as long as the Vietnamese continued to occupy Cambodia. However, having been so outspoken in opposing Vietnam's invasion on the basis of non-intervention, ASEAN could not reasonably endorse China's invasion. As China withdrew after a month this was no longer an issue. Thailand welcomed the credibility China's invasion gave its promise of 'holding the line'. Lee Kuan Yew was apparently thankful that the Chinese had taught Vietnam a lesson but was concerned that if the 'lesson' was too successful it could increase China's regional influence over insurgency movements in the long run[49]. Malaysian and Indonesian suspicions were enhanced by the invasion. Ghazalie Shafie expressed that if China's lesson led to Vietnam losing Indochina forever, then China would be "free to pursue her own 'hegemonism' in Asia"[50]. There was concern regarding the extent of China's claim and the implications of endorsing its use of force against a Southeast Asian state, especially if this led to a significantly weakened Vietnam. Vietnam provided the most credible Southeast Asian military balance against China. These concerns regarding China's potential regional hegemony were heightened by the US' desire to subcontract responsibility for opposing Vietnam to China, to which the chapter now turns.

US endorses China 'holding the line' in Indochina

As we have seen, the process of China's great power role-taking at the international and regional levels was initiated by the Sino-US rapprochement. Over the course of the 1970s the US aligned with China against the Soviets as a way to buttress its policy of détente. US officials hoped this would act as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets and also provide a means to contain Soviet influence[51]. The US-China strategic alignment was exercised in South Asia as early as 1971 when both provided support for Pakistan in its conflict with India. This developing alignment was enabled by the downplaying of the Taiwan issue. In the 'Shanghai Communiqué' released during Nixon's visit to China in 1972, the US acknowledged that there was one China and promised a

[48] Narine (2002: 47).
[49] Ang (2013: 22).
[50] Ang (2013: 22).
[51] Goh (2005) documents the various, and sometimes competing, logics for the pursuit of rapprochement with China and how this was discursively constructed during the Nixon-Kissinger era.

steady reduction of troops from Taiwan. This allowed the US to effectively recognise Beijing as the legitimate government of China even before normalisation in 1979.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the mood in Washington from détente to confrontation and containment of perceived Soviet expansionism. China became even more important in this respect. The fact that China was willing to oppose Vietnam in Southeast Asia militarily meant the US could support containment of the Soviets without direct involvement. It did so by endorsing China's performance of 'holding the line' against Soviet-Vietnamese expansion in Indochina and by extension China's 'regional great power guarantor' role in Southeast Asia. The US performatively endorsed China's role in three ways: 1) prioritising normalisation with China over Vietnam after the Vietnam War; 2) acquiescing to China's punitive invasion of Vietnam and supporting its arming of Cambodian rebels; and 3) providing technology and arms transfers to China in order to further China's military modernisation.

The decision to prioritise normalisation with China over Vietnam (and the Soviet Union) was the prerogative of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Even before normalisation Brzezinski had sought to work out a division of labour with China against the Soviets. On a trip to China in May 1978 he agreed the US would take a tougher stance with the Soviets internationally whilst China took care of Vietnam regionally[52]. Brzezinski informed President Carter that his trip aimed to "deepen our consultations on strategic matters of common concern and, where possible, to make our separate actions in such places as the Horn, Southern Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Japan mutually reinforcing". He suggested that one way the US could reinforce Chinese actions in Indochina was to stop saying that the US wished to normalise relations with Vietnam and to "delete this sentence from its standard descriptions of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia"[53]. Deng Xiaoping's trip to the US in January 1979 finalised normalisation.

Deng's trip also revealed the US' acquiescence to China's 'lesson'. Deng informed Carter of Chinese intentions to conduct the military operation but stated it would be "restricted and limited in scope" and would "not affect the general situation" but "may play a certain role to check the ambitions of Vietnam and … benefit peace and stability of this region". He expected to "have the understanding and support of ... the U.S. Government"[54]. President Carter warned Deng that

[52] Garrett (1981: 202).

[53] "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, 25th May 1978" *FRUS* 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 113.

[54] "Oral Message From Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to President Carter, Undated" *ibid* Doc 212.

military action could have adverse consequences for China's international image and that diplomatic isolation was the best course of action[55]. Deng reassured Carter that international opinion, although negative at first, would turn more favourable because the action would be limited[56]. He also invoked ASEAN states' apparent support for Chinese action saying that “they expressed the hope that China will be able to do something” and that “[s]ome friends even criticized China for being too soft”. Carter replied that “[i]t would be difficult for us to encourage violence. We can give you intelligence briefings. We know of no recent movements of Soviet troops towards your borders”[57]. This position amounted to “[m]ild disapproval shaded into vague, tacit endorsement”[58]. The US was not willing to formally support China's action but was willing to offer intelligence that would directly contribute to such an action.

The reason for the US' quiet support was a fear of being accused by the Soviet Union of complicity in the action. President Carter was keen for Deng's advance warnings to be kept quiet, but also expressed that he felt more sympathy for the Chinese in the conflict and that the US had “a responsibility to protect Chinese confidence in us to inform us of their plans”[59]. Brzezinski apparently met with the Chinese Ambassador every evening of the Chinese punitive action in order to inform him of Soviet troop deployments along the Sino-Soviet border and provide satellite intelligence that would otherwise be unavailable to the Chinese[60]. The US did not want to appear to be directly involved in the affairs of Indochina but was happy to allow China to carry out the military containment of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This was further confirmed by the fact that the Chinese invasion did not affect normalisation. Indeed normalisation allowed China to redeploy troops from Fujian Province (opposite Taiwan) to the Vietnamese and Soviet borders[61].

After China's punitive action, US-China relations continued to improve. In August 1979 Deng told Vice President Walter Mondale that it would take a number of years to see change in Vietnam but until then pressure should be put on Vietnam to isolate it. Deng addressed the US saying: “[o]n your part you should take political and economic measures; on our part, we will add military pressure and after a certain period of time I can say for sure that a change will take place”. Mondale made clear that the US was playing its part, saying that “we never passed up an

[55] “Oral Presentation by President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 30th January 1979” *ibid* Doc 206.
[56] “Memorandum of Conversation, 30th January 1979” *ibid* Doc 207.
[57] “Memorandum of Conversation, 29th January 1979” *ibid* Doc 205.
[58] Kissinger (2011: 365).
[59] “Record of a National Security Council Meeting, 16th February 1979” *FRUS* 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 214.
[60] Menétrey-Monchau (2006: 80).
[61] Garrett (1981: 210).

opportunity to encourage people supplying aid to Vietnam to cease doing so. We had some luck with Australians. We also hope to be able to persuade Swedes to stop. We urged Japan to stop, and I will do so again when in Japan"[62]. Regarding ASEAN he assured that "we have placed major emphasis on the closest consultation with ASEAN countries including improved security assistance to Thailand, more modern planes, more economic assistance and military assistance. I personally traveled to Bangkok to reaffirm the Manila Pact. I went to the Philippines to get the long-stalled negotiations on Subic Bay extended on a permanent basis … This relationship with ASEAN has been a crucial part in the process of increasing stability in the ASEAN and Pacific region"[63]. The US left the function of militarily 'holding the line' in Indochina to China, but assured ASEAN states that it would continue to provide security public goods in the maritime region thus holding the line in non-mainland Southeast Asia and the Rusk-Thanat line, but not beyond.

The third aspect of the US' performative endorsement of China's role was the initiation of defence relations after Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's visit to China in January 1980. Brown made clear that the US saw a distinction between 'arms' and 'military equipment' and although not willing to transfer arms, the US was willing to make military technology available such as surveillance equipment and vehicles as well as dual use civilian equipment[64]. The US was constrained domestically in terms of transferring arms to China but it removed its opposition to arms sales from other NATO allies[65]. In the late 1980s, the US moved to directly transferring arms. Between 1985 and 1987 the US and China agreed to four Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programmes which included the modernisation of artillery ammunition production facilities and the modernisation of avionics in F-8 fighters, as well as the sale of four Mark-46 anti-submarine torpedoes and four AN/TPQ-37 artillery-locating radars[66]. The US was committed to China's military modernisation.

The US' endorsement of China's 'holding the line' clearly showed the ASEAN states where the US stood in relation to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. However, China's 'regional great power guarantor' role claims needed the endorsement of ASEAN as the regional constituency of legitimation in order to become a legitimate social role. We now turn to these regional responses.

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[62] Mondale visited Japan shortly after China.

[63] "Memorandum of Conversation, 28th August 1979" *FRUS* 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 265.

[64] "Memorandum of Conversation, 7th January 1980", "Memorandum for the Record, 7th January 1980", "Memorandum of Conversation, 8th January 1980", "Memorandum of Conversation, 8th January 1980", "Memorandum of Conversation, 9th January 1980" *FRUS* 1977-1980 Vol XIII Doc 290, 291, 292, 293, 294.

[65] Sutter (1981: 188).

[66] Kan (2010: 6).

RESPONSES FROM THE REGIONAL CONSTITUENCY OF LEGITIMATION

The contest between Vietnam and China had serious implications for ASEAN. Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia had a negative effect on sovereignty. It reduced the salience of the norm of non-intervention and the TAC as an instrument for establishing rule-governed order in Southeast Asia. ASEAN had a stake in upholding this norm in opposition to Vietnam because rule-making was a key function of its 'primary manager' role. As we have seen, non-interference was related to the strategic imperative of regime consolidation which was also challenged by a strengthened Vietnam with Soviet backing potentially becoming a new sponsor of communist insurgency. However, China was the traditional source of external support and because it still maintained links with communist parties, it remained the principal threat for some in the region. In the longer term there was also the issue of regional hegemony. There was a concern to check Vietnam's potential hegemony on the mainland, especially for Thailand, but also a long term concern regarding China's potential hegemony over the whole of Southeast Asia. To a certain extent, regional states were united in a common concern for not letting China's influence go too far, especially in the context of improving US-China relations. This gave ASEAN significant impetus to use its 'primary manager' role to establish some control over events in Indochina in order to limit both Vietnam's and China's influence over post-occupation Cambodia. However, this collective effort involved managing the significant differences within ASEAN over Vietnam and China's role claims.

Overall China's 'regional great power guarantor' role was endorsed, meaning China could use it to facilitate its containment of Vietnam and its support for the KR by mobilising resources through Thailand (as the principal endorser) and legitimising its military presence on the Sino-Vietnamese border, poised for a potential second lesson. Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role was contested, meaning that it was unable to use the role for political, social or economic gains. It was bogged down in Cambodia fighting the KR, alienated within international forums and cut off from sources of aid and external support. As a consequence, Vietnam was increasingly reliant on the Soviet Union as its only backer. Ghazali Shafie summed up ASEAN's view of China and Vietnam's attitude to regional order and the part they should play when he described how “Pham Van Dong had, a few days before the Kampuchean adventure, personally assured ASEAN leaders of Vietnam's peaceable attitude. China by that time had already made the oral commitment not to subvert other countries, an abandonment of previous subversive policies. Because of the Vietnamese misleading

assurances [sic], ASEAN was more fearful of the aggression of the Vietnamese kind. In that atmosphere the combined response of ASEAN was solid”[67].

Despite this, disagreements within the regional constituency of legitimation, which had their roots in the perceptions of domestic constituencies, limited the extent of to which China's role claim could be endorsed. For all ASEAN constituencies, aspects of China's role claim were problematic. Its identity as an 'older brother' and the idea that it could provide regional political leadership or be the sole great power guarantor for Southeast Asian order challenged ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by encroaching on ASEAN's diplomatic leadership as part of the role bargain reached with the US. The ASEAN-China role bargain therefore saw China accept its own external (to Southeast Asia) identity and withdraw its claim to regional political leadership, instead committing to non-interference and endorsing ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the whole of Southeast Asia. In return, ASEAN endorsed China's 'holding the line' in the specific circumstances of the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN states also worked to maintain the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role to ensure China was not left as the sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order. This helped to manage the concerns of key constituencies within individual states that alter-cast China as an external, communist state, with a malign status as a subversive potential hegemon, which should perform no function in Southeast Asian order. These same constituencies tended to sympathise with Vietnam's indigenous identity as a Southeast Asian state, its independent status as a nation that had fought against imperialism and accepted that it could perform a balance of power function as a counterweight to China. The differing responses, and how they were managed, will be explored in this section in two parts: regional legitimation from Thailand and ASEAN collectively, and regional reticence and resistance from Malaysia, Indonesia as well as ASEAN.

Regional legitimation

Thailand embraces China

Thailand was the ASEAN state most directly threatened by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. The military was the dominant Thai constituency and since the Vietnam War had feared reprisals by Vietnam for Thailand's support for the US in the conflict. Even left-leaning Thai constituencies feared Vietnam. Previous links established between Thai and Vietnamese groups during the Viet

[67] Ghazali (2000: 127).

Minh's struggle against the French were severed by the Vietnam War[68]. Academics and the press supported a hard-line opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and did not raise any questions regarding Thai support for the KR until the late 1980s[69]. This built on the Thai perception of historical rivalry with Vietnam over the trans-Mekong region. The invasion of Cambodia removed the buffer of the independent Democratic Kampuchea and the presence of a preponderant Vietnam with troops mounted at the Thai-Cambodian border represented for some a direct threat of invasion. In early 1979 there was widespread fear that Vietnam would continue its push westward[70]. This fear dissipated when it became clear Vietnam would be bogged down in Cambodia, but the threat to security remained from border tensions, refugee influx and particularly the transformation of Cambodia into a base for infiltration and support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)[71]. Any debate over whether to accept a *fait accompli* and reach a compromise with Vietnam was quashed by Vietnamese border incursions in 1980[72]. With first General Kriangsak and then General Prem Tinsulanonda in power, and Siddhi Savetsila as Foreign Minister, Thailand took a hard-line against Vietnam.

Thailand intervened in the conflict during the Vietnamese invasion by evacuating Pol Pot's deputy Ieng Sary, preventing his capture. In January 1979, a meeting between Chinese officials and Prime Minister Kriangsak established the basis of the Sino-Thai partnership, with Kriangsak agreeing that Thailand would facilitate the arming of the KR through its territory[73]. Camps were set up along the Thai-Cambodia border where KR soldiers were fed, given treatment and transported back into Cambodia to fight; 15,000 troops were transported in just three days in April 1979[74]. As the conflict went on, refugees were rounded up into camps along the border and put under the control of the DK government. The refugee camps re-established a buffer between Thailand and Vietnam and greatly aided diplomatic efforts as these camps were treated as 'liberated' Cambodian territory under DK control and Vietnamese actions against the camps were condemned[75].

Thailand needed assistance to check Vietnamese expansionism and ensure that Vietnam could not support insurgency within its borders. The Thais knew the US would no longer perform military functions in Indochina, especially having requested the US leave Thailand in 1976 and

[68] Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14.
[69] Rungswasdisab (2004).
[70] Indorf and Suhrke (1981: 67).
[71] Paribatra (1984: 34).
[72] Dawson (1985: 154-156).
[73] Chanda (1986: 348-349).
[74] Jones (2012: 83).
[75] Jones (2012: 84).

considering domestic constraints within the US. President Carter reaffirmed the US' commitment to Thai security under the Manila Pact in 1979 but the credibility of the US as a security guarantor had waned. For this reason Thailand looked to China to provide a countervailing military force on the mainland and entered into a quasi-alliance giving substantive endorsement to China's 'holding the line' function in Indochina. China was second to the US in supplying Thailand with military assistance and weapons sales. However, as stated by former Thai Foreign Ministry official Sukhumbhand Paribatra: “[t]he credibility of China's contribution [was] based on the demonstration in February-March 1979 that alone among the great powers involved in the affairs of Southeast Asia it is prepared to use force, and suffer great losses, to contain Vietnam's expansion”[76]. Thailand facilitated the arming of the Khmer Rouge by China through Thai territory, prolonging the Cambodian conflict and preventing a *fait accompli* in Vietnam's favour. In return for Thai cooperation, China ceased its support for the CPT and offered Thailand a security guarantee in case of Vietnamese invasion. China closed the Voice of the People of Thailand radio station, which had been broadcast from Southern China since 1962, and was seen by Thailand as a symbol of China's aggressive intent[77]. Indeed the Sino-Vietnamese conflict virtually removed the threat from the CPT. The CPT was ejected from its bases in Laos when it chose China over Vietnam, severely weakening its position. In terms of guaranteeing Thai security, China responded to Vietnamese offensives on the Nong Chan and Phom Chat camps in early 1983 with artillery barrage and intermittent shelling at the Sino-Vietnamese border[78]. During the 1984-1985 dry season offensives Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian warned Vietnam to stop its intrusions into Thai territory, saying that China reserved the right to “teach Vietnam a second lesson”[79]. The 'second lesson' did not come, but China maintained constant pressure on Vietnam at the Sino-Vietnamese border.

The Thai policy of embracing China was made easier by the fact that the ethnic Chinese population within Thailand had been successfully assimilated, meaning there was no issue with overseas Chinese and links to China. The removal of the threat from the CPT increased the military and the National Security Council's trust of China. China was no longer considered a malign subversive power, but rather a benign partner. Debate continued however as to whether it was wise to have such close links with China. Officials were keen to make clear that relations were based on mutual benefit with respect to deterrence of Vietnam. As one Thai academic stated in a discussion between academics and officials in 1985: “[w]e should avoid any actions indicating that our

[76] Paribatra (1987: 24-25).
[77] Paribatra (1988: 297).
[78] Van der Kroef (1984: 331).
[79] Van der Kroef (1986a: 259).

relations with China are so close that they begin to take on symbolic meaning of their own, lest we lose support from the public or international community”[80]. The fact that Thailand also maintained strong relations with the US throughout the conflict showed that it was not becoming a client of China.

Over time the Sino-Thai partnership became increasingly institutionalised. John Ciorciari has argued that by 1980 Thailand had entered a “tight alliance” with China[81]. A 'tight alliance' is “an arrangement involving at least two of the following features: a formal defence treaty or widely acknowledged informal pact, semi-permanent or permanent basing rights, joint combat operations, or a significant alliance bureaucracy”[82]. Thailand and China had a widely acknowledged informal pact that China would come to the aid of Thailand in case of Vietnamese aggression and Thailand would facilitate the arming of the KR rebels, as well as a significant alliance bureaucracy based on cooperation and coordination in the arming of rebels. From early 1987, China began supplying equipment at 'friendship prices', including T-69-2 Battle Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and air defence and long range artillery[83]. In January and February 1988 China and Thailand conducted their first formal intelligence exchange exercise and began working out details for a joint war reserve stockpile of Chinese spare parts and ammunition on Thai soil. This was still dwarfed by US assistance which by the mid-1980s included almost $2 billion per annum in FMS credits[84]. The US made regular port visits, initiated the joint military exercise Cobra Gold and offered counter-insurgency training. In October 1985 President Reagan increased US support by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on logistics support[85]. The US also affirmed that its commitment to Thai security through the Manila Pact stood, despite the disbanding of SEATO.

The debate regarding Vietnam was not over however. The military and foreign ministry retained their hard-line throughout the conflict; however, the civilian government of Chatichai Choonhaven elected in 1988 unilaterally initiated a turnaround in Thai policy. The Prime Minister's office, motivated by economic considerations, wanted to accommodate Vietnam and turn the 'battlefield into a marketplace'. Divisions were heightened by political rivalry between Chatichai and his Chart Thai Party and Siddhi and his Social Action Party, the two dominant parties within the

[80] Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University (1985: 62).
[81] Ciorciari (2010: 76).
[82] Ciorciari (2010: 8).
[83] Defence Intelligence Agency Estmiate “Sino-Thai Military Relations, 1988” <http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/foia/pdf/CHINA/SINO-THAI%20MILITARY%20RELATIONS.pdf> Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, Defence Intelligence Agency, accessed 30/9/13.
[84] Funds for the purchase of US military equipment.
[85] Ciorciari (2010: 204-205).

coalition government[86]. This led the foreign ministry to rely on an informal coalition of the US, Singapore, China and Japan to fight its battles in international forums in the later years of the conflict as it was constrained by the PM's office[87]. The MFA brought officials from this informal coalition together in Bangkok before the Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989 and they met regularly during the conference to ensure that pressure was maintained on Vietnam.

The turnaround in Thai policy caused confusion in Beijing, but did not negatively affect relations. The Chinese were initially concerned that Thailand was betraying them and reaching out to the Soviets. Chatichai and his team of advisers visited Beijing in 1989 to clarify the new policy. After Deng lectured Chatichai on the evils of Soviet 'hegemonism', Chatichai assured him that Thailand would always be a friend of China and that the policy was an attempt to advance peace and had nothing to do with the Soviets[88]. The Chinese subsequently acquiesced to Thailand's policy. After the Paris Conference in 1989, a Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Thai Ambassador to Beijing Tej Bunnag that China was happy for Thailand to do what it wanted, as long as it kept China informed[89].

However, the change in policy put strains on ASEAN's solidarity. Indonesia viewed it as a betrayal considering the sacrifice it had made in supporting Thailand's position within ASEAN throughout the conflict. This sacrifice will be discussed in the section looking at regional reticence and resistance. The next section will consider how this collective ASEAN response was exercised in a division of labour with China that legitimised China's 'holding the line' function.

ASEAN's diplomatic leadership

The ASEAN states collectively identified their security with Thailand, stating from 1980 that Vietnamese incursions into Thailand affected the security of all ASEAN member states. In support of Thailand, ASEAN entered into a tacit alliance with China, through which a division of labour emerged with China 'holding the line' and ASEAN providing the legitimacy work internationally through its diplomatic leadership. A relationship of legitimacy interdependence with respect to the conflict emerged as China needed ASEAN to legitimise the struggle internationally and ASEAN needed China to bolster the military opposition to give the championing of the rebel cause

[86] Niksch (1989: 169).
[87] Ang (2013: 129).
[88] Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14.
[89] Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14.

credibility. ASEAN's tacit alliance represented an endorsement of China's 'regional great power guarantor' role expressed through the function of 'holding the line'; however, it was not the case that ASEAN became subservient to Chinese wishes. ASEAN was keen to ensure that China's role was limited to this function. We will see in the section on resistance to China's role-taking how ASEAN used its 'primary manager' role, further endorsed by China and the US within the division of labour, to assert its diplomatic leadership and the salience of its rules within Southeast Asia, and in the process limit the extent of China's great power role-taking. For now we will look at how ASEAN exercised its diplomatic leadership within the division of labour with China in opposition to Vietnam, and what impact this had on ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

ASEAN established its position on the Cambodian conflict in January 1979 at a Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Bangkok. It condemned the armed intervention against Cambodia's sovereignty and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and support for the Cambodian people to determine their future free from interference or influence from outside powers[90]. In determining ASEAN's position, Bangkok was aided by the keen support of Singapore. Foreign ministers Siddhi and Rajaratnam provided a “winning combination” in ASEAN meetings; their firm line prevailed over the Indonesian and Malaysian foreign ministers' wishes to find other ways for ASEAN[91]. The Singapore Foreign Ministry also employed its advocacy, drafting and lobbying skills to great effect in the UN and the NAM[92]. Singaporean officials ensured that delegates at the UN General Assembly were aware of the issues with respect to ASEAN's yearly resolutions and even actively herded delegates into the voting chamber.

Singapore's distance from Indochina meant it did not face a direct threat from either China or Vietnam and had more strategic scope in determining how it would act. Singaporean officials viewed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in global terms as an expression of the Sino-Soviet conflict played out by their proxies. Singapore saw the need to involve the US and other Western powers in the resolution of the conflict. This was consistent with Singapore's general strategy to involve all key powers in regional affairs to offset its sense of vulnerability to regional forces. Indeed, since 1972 Singapore had tried to market itself as a 'global city' in an attempt to “transcend its regional locale”[93]. The principle of non-intervention was also extremely important in this respect and Singaporean officials were most vocal in opposing Vietnam's actions as a violation of non-

[90] Ang (2013: 20-21).
[91] Interview with Tej Bunnag, Thai Red Cross, Bangkok, 24/2/14.
[92] Leifer (2000: 85-88), Ang (2013). Ang (2013) provides an extensive account based on Singaporean archives of Singapore's and ASEAN's diplomatic activism during the Cambodian conflict.
[93] Leifer (2000).

intervention. At the same time however, Singapore was concerned with the sensitivities of its neighbours and wanted to avoid accusations coming from some in Indonesia that Singapore was acting as a 'loudspeaker' for Chinese interests[94]. To distance itself from China, Singapore postponed normalisation of ties with China until after Indonesia. It also expressed its concerns that efforts to oppose Vietnam did not pave the way for the emergence of Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia[95]. To a large extent ASEAN's diplomatic leadership was carried forward by Singapore as it sought to balance Thailand's interests with those of Malaysia and Indonesia. For example, Singapore drafted the International Conference on Kampuchea declaration in a way that would limit Vietnam and China's influence in a post-settlement Cambodia.

ASEAN's response also depended on Indonesia's deference to the Thai stance as Indonesia chose not to assert its own position with respect to China and Vietnam, supporting Thailand in ASEAN joint statements and UN resolutions. As we will see below this was because Suharto and the Foreign Ministry saw solidarity within ASEAN as more important than opposing China and supporting Vietnam. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaadmatja stated: “If it were not for Thailand, the Indonesian reaction [to Vietnam] would have been more flexible”[96].

ASEAN's diplomatic leadership involved three principle achievements with respect to the Cambodian conflict. Firstly, ASEAN was able to internationalise the conflict by successfully defining the fundamental root of the conflict as Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia rather than an internal civil conflict. Defining the conflict in terms of a violation of rule-governed interaction, meant Vietnam's actions could be condemned on the grounds of the UN Charter; it constituted an illegal intervention in another sovereign state rather than as a humanitarian action undertaken in support of the Cambodian people. In late 1979 ASEAN sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly that demanded a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the right of self-determination for the Cambodian people[97]. The resolution passed by a large majority and subsequent resolutions sponsored yearly by ASEAN passed by even larger majorities. Singapore, especially through UN Ambassador Tommy Koh, was particularly active in ensuring that the conflict was internationalised and defined as an illegal intervention - an expression of Soviet-Vietnamese communist expansionism.

[94] Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14.
[95] Ang (2013: 160).
[96] Ba (2009: 87).
[97] The text of the original resolution “The Situation in Kampuchea” A/RES/34/22 can be found on the UN Documents website <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/34/22&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION> accessed 9/10/13.

Secondly, ASEAN denied the legitimacy of the PRK regime in the UN and NAM and maintained recognition for first the Democratic Kampuchea government, and then the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) from 1982. This prevented the *de facto* recognition of the Phnom Penh regime under Vietnamese dominance. Vietnam challenged Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the UN in 1979 and the PRK submitted their credentials to the Credentials Committee of the General Assembly. The Credentials Committee, under pressure from the US and ASEAN, voted to keep the DK in Cambodia's seat without even reviewing the PRK. They submitted their resolution to the General Assembly for a vote which was approved by 71 votes to 35 with 34 abstentions. Before the vote, Tommy Koh successfully thwarted an Indian attempt to amend the resolution to leave the Cambodian seat empty[98]. This politicisation of Cambodian representation at the UN was unprecedented as it was routine to recognise the credentials of new governments in third world states regardless of how they got there[99]. A similar effort to ensure the non-recognition of the PRK was undertaken within the NAM. ASEAN was unable to have the DK recognised but prevented the PRK from being recognised. At the Havana meeting in September 1979 the hosts, also an ally of the Soviet Union, tried to help the Vietnamese by physically preventing the DK representatives from entering the conference hall, thus leaving the Cambodian seat empty[100]. It was to remain empty over the course of the conflict.

Thirdly, ASEAN ensured the social estrangement of Vietnam in international society. Vietnam was denied access to international assistance and forced to depend on the Soviet Union. ASEAN kept the Cambodian conflict on the international agenda throughout the decade by sponsoring yearly resolutions on the situation in Cambodia. In the NAM, Singaporean officials argued that Vietnam was an agent of the Soviets, imposing Soviet alignment on the NAM through invading and occupying a non-aligned country[101]. From 1982, Vietnam no longer tried to oppose ASEAN's UN resolutions, knowing that it had essentially lost the diplomatic battle for recognition. A stalemate ensued diplomatically and militarily despite big dry season offensives in 1984/1985. This military push gave the impetus in February 1985 for ASEAN's most strongly worded joint statement calling on the international community to increase its support for the Khmer people's political and *military* struggle against the Vietnamese[102]. ASEAN also made a direct appeal to the Soviet Union to stop its material support to Vietnam. Indeed, Indonesia had come round to the idea

[98] Widyono (2008: 28-29).
[99] Jones (2012: 80).
[100] Graham (1980).
[101] Ang (2013: 24-28).
[102] This was the first time ASEAN had publicly appealed for support for the military aspect of the struggle.

of the need to bolster the military resistance against Vietnam in 1984 after a series of diplomatic initiatives put forward by Indonesia had failed. Suharto opined that diplomatic initiatives would not work unless military pressure was put on Vietnam. He directed Foreign Minister Mochtar to work out a division of labour with other ASEAN states concerning the resistance with others supporting the military aspect and Indonesia keeping the line open with Vietnam diplomatically. He reasoned that if Indonesia were also to give aid to the non-communist Cambodian factions then no one within ASEAN would be able to talk to Vietnam. Singapore was supportive of this[103].

Along with China, the US strongly endorsed ASEAN's diplomatic leadership on the Cambodian conflict. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke explained in November 1979 that the US supported Thailand and ASEAN, because Thailand was "the key to ASEAN, and ASEAN the key to Southeast Asia"[104]. Secretary of State George Shultz told ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok in June 1983 that "we follow your lead … we know that the chances of persuading Vietnam to change its course are greater if the message comes from its neighbors"[105]. More specifically, subcontracting diplomatic leadership meant that US opposition to Vietnam's actions was easier to sell domestically as it could demote itself to a supporting role whilst also taking up the cause of the refugee issue, relieving the pressure on ASEAN states[106]. This became particularly salient as further revelations of the extent of the Khmer Rouge atrocities surfaced during the 1980s, raising questions within Congress as to how US policy may be supporting the KR. When scrutinised, White House and State Department officials pointed to the fact that they were merely following ASEAN on the issue and that US policy on Cambodia was ultimately about support for ASEAN[107].

ASEAN was unable to resolve the Cambodian conflict through its diplomatic efforts[108]. The ultimate resolution was determined by factors outside of ASEAN, particularly the emerging Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the late 1980s and the removal of Soviet support which forced the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops in 1989 and for the issue to be taken up by the Security Council. Indeed, after 1989 diplomatic leadership on the Cambodian conflict passed to the Security Council. A division of labour was still apparent though as the UNSC focused on a comprehensive framework agreement whilst ASEAN states, particularly Thailand and Indonesia, focused on

[103] Ang (2013: 74-75).
[104] Sodhy (1989: 292).
[105] Van der Kroef (1986a: 252).
[106] Colbert (1982: 81).
[107] Martini (2007: 78-161).
[108] See especially Emmers (2003) but also Leifer (1989), Alagappa (1993) and Haacke (2003).

national reconciliation of the Cambodian factions and the formation of the Supreme National Council (SNC) which would become the Cambodian decision making body during the transition phase[109].

The Cambodian conflict highlighted that, although conflict resolution involving the great powers was beyond the reach of ASEAN, diplomatic leadership as a means for legitimising great power imperatives and roles was further established as a function that ASEAN performed. In this way, ASEAN did not 'manage' regional order and security in the sense of resolving outstanding conflicts and issues. It did however contribute to the negotiation and management of regional order during this period by ensuring the Cambodian conflict was addressed within international society as a violation of the rule of non-intervention – a violation of rule-governed interaction. Furthermore, it was determined as a violation of *ASEAN* rules defined as applicable and salient in the whole of Southeast Asia, not just within non-communist Southeast Asia but also in Indochina. That such a rule was promoted selectively to benefit ASEAN states' interpretation of order as a means for upholding their non-communist regimes is clear from ASEAN's acquiescence or even tacit support for Indonesia's annexation of East Timor[110]. However, this does not take away from the fact that the US and China endorsed ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and the salience of its norms in the region. This endorsement was crucial for how ASEAN used its 'primary manager' role in resisting China's role-taking, considered in the next section.

ASEAN's diplomatic leadership on the Cambodian conflict advanced ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Practically, the need to coordinate policy on the Cambodian issue improved the mechanisms and habits of consultation and cooperation within ASEAN[111]. The fact that ASEAN held together despite its divisions reaffirmed for members the importance of regional unity for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially as the united front ASEAN presented internationally improved its standing as an organisation. Ambassador K Kesavapany, former Singaporean permanent representative to the UN, identified the Cambodian conflict as “ASEAN's greatest success story in the political arena”. Singaporean diplomat Tony Siddique stated that it “put ASEAN on the map, substantively”; ASEAN was suddenly being consulted on a variety of diplomatic initiatives, not just Cambodia[112]. On top of its efforts within the UN, ASEAN's PMC provided another platform for coordinating the opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and

[109] Alagappa (1993: 463-464).
[110] See Jones (2012: 58-74).
[111] Narine (2002: 59).
[112] Jones (2012: 90-91).

discussing the Indochinese refugee problem. It contributed to ASEAN becoming a hub for regional diplomatic activity by providing a formal and regular contact between ASEAN and key external states[113]. This too laid important practical as well as social foundations for the launch of ASEAN-led initiatives in the post-Cold War period, especially as the PMC was used as the venue for launching the ARF in 1993.

This status recognition of ASEAN internationally and regionally provided a mutually reinforcing logic for maintaining ASEAN solidarity during the period, especially for Indonesia. This needed to be managed in a way that reduced the potential for China's long term role-taking whilst also reasserting Indonesia's position within ASEAN. These aspects will be considered below as we turn to regional reticence and resistance to China's role-taking. First we will look more specifically at the perceived threat that China posed to the region, which had an impact on the way Malaysia and Indonesia viewed and responded to China's role claim.

Regional reticence and resistance

A China threat?

In the 1980s there were three major aspects to the perceived China threat: China as a trespasser into maritime Southeast Asia, its ambiguous relationship with overseas ethnic Chinese and its support for regional communist movements[114]. All three compounded its identity as an external actor and for some its status as a malign, subversive potential hegemon.

China was viewed as a trespasser into maritime Southeast Asia because of its claims to nearly the full extent of the South China Sea. China's modernisation entailed a growth in naval capabilities that could lead to it asserting its claims through the use of force. Indeed, China had come into conflict with Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974 when it occupied the Paracel Islands and again in 1988 over the Spratlys, already showing it was willing to use force with respect to these claims.

On top of this direct military threat, there was the issue of China's ambiguous position with respect to overseas Chinese, which concerned Malaysia and Indonesia particularly because their

[113] Emmers (2003: 113).
[114] Yahuda (1986).

ethnic Chinese minorities were much less well assimilated than in Thailand and the Philippines. The perceived business success of the ethnic Chinese bred deep resentment amongst other ethnic groups in Malaysia and Indonesia which led to frequent anti-Chinese protests and riots. Concern was especially acute after the deterioration of Chinese-Vietnamese relations in 1978 over Vietnam's treatment of ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam. China protested vehemently and even sent boats to evacuate ethnic Chinese from Saigon. Indonesian leaders drew a direct parallel with 1959 when China sent boats to Indonesia to evacuate ethnic Chinese after Sukarno brought in discriminatory measures[115].

With respect to China's support for communist insurgencies, the PRC made a distinction between government-to-government relations and part-to-party relations. The former could be established through normal diplomatic channels and entailed the PRC respecting governing regimes as legitimate. The latter were separate and meant that the CCP could maintain its links with other communist parties and provide 'political and moral' support. Chinese officials argued this was necessary so that Southeast Asian communist parties did not look to Vietnam or the Soviet Union for support. This did little to reassure the Malaysian and Indonesian governments.

Lee Kuan Yew expressed to Deng Southeast Asian concerns, explaining in 1978 that China's difficulties mobilising support for an anti-Soviet coalition in Southeast Asia were due to the fact that there were no 'overseas Russians' leading communist insurgencies supported by the Soviets; however, there were 'overseas Chinese' supported by the Chinese Communist Party and government[116]. Lee later made it clear to Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang that China had to make up its mind about its political priorities in Southeast Asia. It could not maintain friendly relations with ASEAN states whilst reserving the right to interfere in their affairs through supporting insurgency movements[117]. China had to accept its external identity and recognise non-interference and ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in order to reverse its status as a subversive potential hegemon.

Some re-conceptualisation of China's role was evident amongst the Chinese leadership. Deng explained to Lee that China wanted to see a strong ASEAN, “the stronger the better”[118]. He also told Lee that China would end its links with communist parties but just needed time to manage the transition[119]. Zhao toured the region in 1981 assuring his hosts that links between the CCP and

[115] Williams (1991: 152).
[116] Lee (2000: 598-599).
[117] Leifer (2000: 116).
[118] Lee (2000: 606).
[119] Interview with Tan Seng Chye and Mushahid Ali, RSIS, Singapore, 5/3/14.

Southeast Asian communist parties were leftovers from the past and that China considered them domestic issues and would not interfere in the internal affairs of ASEAN states. In Malaysia he assured that China had dissociated itself with the MCP and that extant CCP-MCP ties were merely 'political and moral', not substantive[120]. The return of MCP Chairman Musa Ahmad from Beijing to Malaysia the previous November seemed to provide a concrete example of China's intentions[121]. Zhao also provided China's position on a post-conflict Cambodia as example of its benign intentions and lack of any ambition to create a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. He explicitly told his hosts that China supported an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia and had no intention of imposing a communist regime or making Cambodia a Chinese satellite[122]. Despite this, prominent constituencies within Malaysia and Indonesia still regarded China as a significant threat, moving these states to show active resistance towards China's 'regional great power guarantor' role-taking.

Resistance from Malaysia and Indonesia

Malaysia and especially Indonesia were uncomfortable with ASEAN's tacit alliance with China and, although they acquiesced to China's role-taking through ASEAN, they also showed resistance by pursuing alternative diplomatic initiatives. This represented a dual policy of performative endorsement through acquiescence alongside contestation of China's role claims. These states did more than any other to ensure that China's role-taking was limited to the specific circumstances of the Cambodian conflict. Indeed Malaysia and Indonesia pursued alternative diplomatic initiatives that sought to reach out to Vietnam and suggested the possibility of an alternative regional role bargain whereby ASEAN recognised Vietnam's 'indigenous great power buffer' role in return for Vietnam recognising ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Specifically they sought to define the Cambodian conflict in terms of Vietnam's position that it was a civil conflict that could be dealt with through Southeast Asian regional negotiations and Vietnam's legitimate interests in Indochina should be accommodated. In return, Vietnam should withdraw from Cambodia and end its alliance with the Soviet Union, recognising ASEAN's rule-making as applicable to the whole of Southeast Asia. This by definition excluded China and contested China's (as well as Thailand and Singapore's) hard-line position that the root of the conflict was Vietnam's invasion and that no settlement could be negotiated until after Vietnamese withdrawal. It therefore indicated a reconciliation along the lines of the 'autonomy' principles set out in ZOPFAN, which had been sidelined in ASEAN's role

[120] Bahari (1988: 245).
[121] Lee (1981: 73-74).
[122] Chang (1985: 123).

bargain with China. In this way it sought to undermine the China-ASEAN role bargain by removing the *raison d'etre* for China's performance of 'holding the line'. However, Vietnam's intransigence prevented Malaysian and Indonesian initiatives from being successful. They consistently fell back in line with the other ASEAN states for the sake of maintaining the unity necessary to uphold ASEAN's 'primary manager' role.

The domestic context within Malaysia that led to its dual policy lay in its delicate ethnic balance. There was a large minority of ethnic Chinese and the political bargain struck with the Malay majority since the early days of self-government was that the Malays would hold the political power but would not upset the economic position of the ethnic Chinese. This meant an uneasy social balance; widespread Malay resentment towards the perceived wealth of the ethnic Chinese sparked riots in Kuala Lumpur in 1969. On top of this, the authorities were constantly concerned about links between Chinese-Malaysians and China. This was especially so because the Malayan Communist Party was considered predominantly ethnic Chinese. During the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, British and Malayan propaganda had established China as an external threat with links to the MCP and this threat perception became embedded within official thinking[123]. After normalisation in 1974, Malaysia sought to manage MCP-CCP links by operating strict controls on Malaysian citizens travelling to China. However, Malaysian officials believed that the PRC was circumventing Malaysian law by offering permits to ethnic Chinese to visit China and treating them as if they were returning Overseas Chinese by processing them through the Office for Overseas Chinese. This, coupled with the encouragement by China that overseas and ethnic Chinese contribute to China's modernisation through investment and expertise, was viewed as interference in Malaysia's internal affairs in order to promote China's regional interests. Malaysian leaders thus worked hard to block the ethnic Chinese constituency from interaction with China.

Malaysia was also concerned that China's 'regional great power guarantor' claim was merely a means to justify removing other great powers from the region whilst legitimising China as the remaining guarantor. This was dangerous as long as China maintained its support for subversion. Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie stated that “the Chinese global position is circumscribed and *should not be construed to include a role by China as the sole restraining hand for the security of Southeast Asia*” adding that “China has dangerous ambitions of her own in the region which she has refused to renounce”[124]. Malaysia was clearly concerned that its neutrality proposal and ZOPFAN

[123] Hamilton-Hart (2012: 113-115) has documented from interviews with current officials that this link between China and the MCP has become 'historical fact' in Malaysian thinking despite evidence to the contrary.
[124] Ghazali Shafie, keynote address at the Conference on “ASEAN – Today and Tomorrow” at Fletcher School of Law

were not used to justify a guarantor role just for China, but remained applicable to all the great powers.

After Mahathir Mohammed took power in 1981, Malaysia's view of China began to soften. Mahathir's primary focus was economic, introducing a 'Look East' policy that sought to rebalance Malaysia's economic dependence on the West by improving links with Japan and exploring economic ties with China. A domestic business constituency built up that sought to exploit the economic opportunity that an opening China represented. With annual GDP growth rates of around 9 per cent, China was viewed as an important link in Mahathir's policy of diversification. The recession and commodity prices crisis in the mid-1980s further raised economic considerations as the primary driver of foreign policy. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen stated that the foreign ministry became an economic-oriented ministry[125]. Mahathir sought to counter China's status as a subversive hegemon by arguing that China was a benign power, having never tried to colonise Southeast Asia as Western states had done. Mahathir played a key part in changing the nature of China's rise from a threat to an economic opportunity[126]. As part of this, Mahathir made a visit to China in 1985 where discussion of party-to-party relations was avoided in a spirit of 'economic pragmatism'[127]. Mahathir said that “instead of talking about our differences during the visit we should concentrate on our similarities . . . on economic matters where we can achieve more”[128]. In light of this, a more liberalised application process for Malaysian businessmen visiting China was put in place[129]. In the economic sphere, China was seen as more of a legitimate regional actor and the Malaysian business constituency was given special privileges to build economic links with China.

Malaysia's view of Vietnam was generally positive. Having been one of the pioneer ASEAN states reaching out to North Vietnam in the 1970s, the foreign ministry had developed extensive links. Foreign Minister Rithauddeen also developed a good personal relationship with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. In 1979 and 1980 Rithauddeen made a number of trips to Hanoi and was reportedly very much involved in developing the Kuantan Principle in 1980 which sought to respect Vietnam's legitimate interests in Indochina (discussed below). The principle caused controversy within the Malaysian parliament and in the foreign ministry as critics questioned the logic of pursuing a near impossible diplomatic formula at the expense of ASEAN

and Diplomacy, Boston, US. 11th November 1981. Emphasis added.
[125] Jeshurun (2007: 189).
[126] Interview with Lee Poh Ping, Institute of China Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 18/3/14.
[127] Leong (1987).
[128] Leong (1987: 1121).
[129] Leong (1987: 1119).

solidarity and good relations with Singapore[130]. There was therefore a significant domestic constituency that saw relations within ASEAN as far more important than accommodating Vietnam. For the sake of maintaining the unity necessary for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and because Thailand was a front-line state, Malaysia supported the opposition to Vietnam[131]. Malaysia considered Thailand a buffer and needed Thai cooperation to combat MCP guerillas stationed in southern Thailand. Malaysia also realised its strategic proximity to the mainland at this time when in 1978/79 a large number of refugee 'boat people' arrived on its shores fleeing Vietnam and Cambodia. Some Malaysian officials saw the refugee crisis as a deliberate attempt by Vietnam to subvert and destabilise ASEAN states, especially as many of the refugees were ethnic Chinese. In this way it was less costly domestically for Malaysia to support the hard-line position of Thailand and Singapore than Indonesia when it came to presenting ASEAN solidarity.

Indonesia's leadership shared many of the concerns of other ASEAN members regarding the implications of Vietnam's actions but three things in particular prevented Indonesia from taking the same hard-line stance as Thailand and Singapore. Firstly, the military were sympathetic to the Vietnamese and deeply suspicious of China. They viewed Vietnamese communists as essentially nationalist, taking necessary action to defend themselves against China by overthrowing the Chinese-backed KR. China on the other hand was seen as subversive, based on its perceived involvement in the abortive coup in 1965. The Indonesian military was therefore highly sceptical of China's legitimacy claims regarding its 'regional great power guarantor' role. Army Commander-in-Chief General Benny Moerdani favoured a resolution that did not involve China and upheld Vietnam in the 'indigenous great power buffer' role between Southeast Asia and China[132]. Whilst inspecting military installations at the Sino-Vietnamese border on a high profile visit to Vietnam in February 1984, Moerdani stated explicitly that the real threat to Southeast Asia was not from Vietnam[133].

Secondly, part of the Suharto regime's domestic legitimacy lay in its independent and active foreign policy and commitment to realising ZOPFAN. Giving China a great power role in Southeast Asia directly challenged Indonesia's regional leadership and compromised the aim of freeing the region from great power involvement. With the political challenges to the Suharto regime mostly dealt with by the mid-1980s, it was harder to justify Indonesia's 'leading-from-behind' role

[130] Jeshurun (2007: 146-147).
[131] Interview with Lee Poh Ping, Institute of China Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 18/3/14.
[132] Emmers (2003: 102), Jones (2012: 79).
[133] Leifer (1989: 129)

conception. The perception within the military was that the low-key position Indonesia was taking within ASEAN on the Cambodian conflict showed that it had given in to Chinese wishes[134]. The initiatives Indonesia pursued in the late 1980s such as the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) were attempts to satisfy domestic constituencies that called for a more active foreign policy[135]. It was thus principally for domestic reasons that Indonesia showed active resistance to this hard-line. Foreign Minister Mochtar stated: “what is the use for us if for the sake of foreign policy interests then we created domestic problems?”[136].

Thirdly, Indonesia hoped to win acquiescence to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia after its invasion in 1975. In many ways Indonesia's invasion paralleled Vietnam's; both involved foreign powers using local forces to legitimise their occupation[137]. A hard-line opposition based on the principle of non-intervention thus shone a light on Jakarta's own actions. Jakarta also feared that confronting Vietnam would spur Hanoi to support East Timor's guerilla resistance.

To balance these factors, Indonesia's dual policy involved support for a common ASEAN stand against Vietnam's occupation whilst also exploring other channels and initiatives towards Vietnam outside of ASEAN. Indonesia had a huge stake in ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially as the *primus inter pares* within the Association. Indonesian elites saw ASEAN as the mechanism for realising the goal of regional autonomy as well as a key bargaining tool in international society, contributing to Indonesia's own international status and good name[138]. Suharto made the final decision to support ASEAN, even if this meant support for China instead of Vietnam[139]. This showed how important ASEAN’s role was to Indonesia.

One means to maintain ASEAN solidarity but also accommodate domestic opposition to China's regional involvement was to hold out on normalisation. Jakarta officially separated negotiations over a Cambodian settlement from the question of normalisation with China despite the arguments of Adam Malik and Jusuf Wanandi, director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, that Indonesia could not hope to play any role in such a

[134] Sukma (1999) details the divisions within Indonesia during this period and the impact it had on relations between Indonesia and China
[135] MacIntyre (1987: 530). See also Sukma (1999: 147-151).
[136] Sukma (1999: 96)
[137] Jones (2012: 79).
[138] Anwar (1994: 193-232) carried out interviews with a number of Indonesian elites to assess their perceptions of ASEAN.
[139] Wanandi (2012: 139).

settlement without diplomatic relations with China[140]. Indonesia made the admission of Chinese involvement in the abortive 1965 coup and concrete assurances that it would not support communist movements in Indonesia as conditions for normalisation[141]. As China continued to hold the distinction between government-to-government and party-to-party relations, Indonesia refused to normalise. At the same time, the foreign ministry performed a balancing act between slowly opening ties with China whilst appearing to hold a firm line in resisting China's growing influence. For instance, negotiations on direct trade ties opened in 1985 and were carried out by a non-governmental body, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, so as not to appear to be a substantive step towards normalisation[142].

Having covered the domestic reasons for Indonesia and Malaysia's reticence towards China's role-taking, it is necessary to explore the initiatives put forward to undermine the China-ASEAN role bargain and try to reach an alternative bargain with Vietnam. The clearest example of this was the Kuantan Principle articulated in a meeting between Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and President Suharto in March 1980. The Kuantan Principle declared that Vietnam should be neutral between the Soviet Union and China and that the resolution of the Cambodian conflict should be political rather than military, recognising Vietnam's security interests in Cambodia[143]. It suggested that the problem in Indochina was the intrusion of great power rivalry rather than Vietnam's invasion. By acknowledging Vietnam's legitimate interests in the political identity of Cambodia, the principle seemed to endorse Hanoi's hegemony in Indochina and by extension its 'indigenous great power buffer' role[144]. Indonesia and Malaysia thus held out the possibility of a bargain: ASEAN would recognise Vietnam's interests in Indochina if Vietnam recognised ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by acknowledging that ASEAN's rule-making applied to Indochina. Withdrawing from Cambodia would recognise non-interference and ending its links with the Soviet Union would recognise regional autonomy. Vietnam's withdrawal would also remove the *raison d'etre* of China's military guarantee to Thailand and ASEAN, reversing China's 'regional great power guarantor' role-taking. However, the principle made no mention of any reciprocal ASEAN moves to remove the US' military presence, essentially asking Vietnam to accept the role bargain that ASEAN had made with the US.

[140] Wanandi (2012: 168-169) reports that he sent a memo to Suharto in 1983 which discussed the positive changes within China and that it was only practical that Indonesia normalise relations with China, especially if it wanted to play a part in finding a solution to the Cambodian conflict.
[141] Van der Kroef (1986b: 910).
[142] Soesastro (1988: 219)
[143] Van der Kroef (1981: 516).
[144] Leifer (1989: 106).

Thailand and Singapore opposed the Kuantan Principle and Vietnam also rejected it because it failed to mention the US. Vietnamese military incursions into Thailand in 1980 showed they were unwilling to accept a solution on such terms and also reinforced the relevance of China's military guarantee for Thailand. Malaysia and Indonesia fell back in line with the established ASEAN position in support of Thailand, but the logic of the Kuantan Principle underlay further efforts throughout the 1980s to seek a resolution to the conflict outside of the China-ASEAN division of labour.

At the NAM summit in 1983, Malaysia called for 'five plus two' talks between the ASEAN Five, Vietnam and Laos. Thailand and China opposed the talks on the basis that they excluded the CGDK and that accepting such talks would challenge the internationalisation of the conflict. They were unwilling to accept the principle of post-invasion regional talks which Hanoi had previously proposed as an alternative to the ICK[145]. In September 1983 the “ASEAN appeal on Kampuchean Independence” issued by the ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta offered a conciliatory stance to Vietnam by making the demand for Vietnamese withdrawal no longer immediate but phased. By making no mention of the UN, it suggested a regional solution. Hanoi rejected the appeal, fearing that a phased withdrawal would allow the KR to infiltrate back into Cambodia. Malaysia again proposed 'proximity talks' between the PRK and the CGDK via mediators in 1985. Ghazali Shafie considered the Heng Samrin the core of any future regime in Cambodia[146]. The proposal seemed to legitimise the PRK and the idea that the conflict was an internal Cambodian conflict. The CGDK rejected this idea and the proposal was changed to involve talks between Vietnam and the CGDK with the PRK as part of the Vietnamese delegation. This re-established the position that the basis of the conflict was Vietnam's invasion.

In 1984 Indonesia opened up bilateral dialogue with Hanoi. To maintain its solidarity, ASEAN officially recognised Indonesia as ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam, blessing its dual track policy[147]. This was a moderate success for Indonesia in promoting its interests within the ASEAN process and reasserting its independent and active credentials and leadership within ASEAN. Indonesia also maintained its interest in promoting the principles of ZOPFAN as a basis for regional reconciliation throughout the 1980s. To breathe new life into the ZOPFAN formula, Indonesian officials sought to discuss within ASEAN the possibility of Southeast Asia as a Nuclear

[145] Cabellero-Anthony (2005: 94-95).
[146] Haacke (2003: 94).
[147] Weatherbee (2008: 353).

Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in the hope that this would provide a new basis for Vietnam to accept ZOPFAN[148]. However, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines were reluctant to pursue the proposal, which the US adamantly opposed. Indonesia subsequently pursued what was termed 'cocktail diplomacy': informal talks between the Cambodian factions on equal terms but with no political labels. Jakarta hoped this would be followed by talks that included Vietnam and ASEAN. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach agreed to this formula at a meeting with Mochtar in Hanoi in July 1987. The momentum of cocktail diplomacy led to talks between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Paris in December 1987 and January 1988 and the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) held in 1988 and 1989. Singapore noted that the JIM process reflected the Indonesian assessment that Indonesia and Vietnam, as the major indigenous powers, should shape regional order and not let external powers dominate. This worried Singapore which felt that it would need to submit to the wishes of Indonesia[149]. Former Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam was sceptical about any opening on Vietnam's part, seeing this as just the latest trick to continue its spread of communism. He was critical of the JIMs as a forum for Vietnam to manipulate Southeast Asian states to endorse its regional hegemony[150]. Singaporean officials also noted that Indonesia seemed to remain passive throughout the International Conference on Cambodia (ICC) in 1989 despite being a co-chair. They suggested Indonesia had a vested interest in the failure of international negotiations and a resuscitation of the JIM process[151].

These efforts outside of the China-ASEAN division of labour were for the most part unsuccessful because of Vietnam's intransigence and because they diverged too much from the established line that ASEAN had promoted through its 'primary manager' role. Vietnam refused to recognise ASEAN's coexistence order and 'primary manager' role so efforts to promote negotiations towards reaching an alternative regional role bargain did not lead anywhere. More successful resistance however came from within the China-ASEAN division of labour; ASEAN asserted its 'primary manager' role by pushing back against China's military strategy and strong support for the KR and asserting the salience of ASEAN's norms and processes in the whole of Southeast Asia. This served as a means to limit the KR and China's influence over a post-occupation Cambodia.

[148] Haacke (2003: 68).
[149] Ang (2013: 121).
[150] Rajaratnam (1989).
[151] Ang (2013: 136).

Asserting ASEAN's 'primary manager' role

ASEAN's first major attempt to limit the KR's influence in post-occupation Cambodia came during the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) initiated by ASEAN and held in New York in July 1981. As a substantive step towards conflict resolution the conference was a failure because of Vietnam and the Soviet Union's absence. For ASEAN however, it established the terms for which a settlement for Cambodia could be based. The resulting agreement on the ICK framework fell short of ASEAN's original expectations due to Chinese opposition but demonstrated ASEAN's efforts to reduce both Vietnamese and Chinese influence in post-occupation Cambodia and assert the salience of its own rules and processes in Indochina. Lee Kuan Yew was instrumental in developing a draft declaration for the conference which called for the establishment of an interim government, free elections and the disarming of Cambodian factions. The draft acknowledged "the legitimate concerns of neighbouring states of Kampuchea (i.e. Vietnam) that it should not in any way become a threat or be used by any state for subversion or aggression against them"[152]. It implicitly laid some of the blame for the conflict on the KR and its actions against Vietnam and tried to orchestrate a situation where the KR would not dominate Cambodia after a Vietnamese withdrawal.

China opposed the draft and the ASEAN initiative to get non-governmental representation for the Heng Samrin regime at the ICK. ASEAN hoped the US would support its position based on the KR's appalling human rights record. US officials instead put pressure on ASEAN officials to compromise. Secretary of State Haig and Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge told the ASEAN foreign ministers that they should support China because Deng was a moderate under pressure from the left. The US Ambassadors in Bangkok and Manila even contacted Prime Minister Prem and President Marcos respectively to bring their foreign ministers into line[153]. In the resulting ICK declaration, the line about legitimate concerns of neighbouring states was watered down to "recognises the legitimate security concerns of all states of the region" whilst the interim government was changed to "appropriate measures for law and order" and the line on disarming factions changed to "appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections"[154]. Tommy Koh reportedly fought hard on the issue of disarming the factions running up against China's UN Ambassador Lin Qing who tried to defend the KR according to international law. Koh stated that international law did not apply to

[152] Chanda (1986: 387).
[153] Chanda (1986: 389).
[154] The final declaration is printed in *International Legal Materials* (1981). 20(6): 1503-15.

the 'barbarous' KR and proceeded to list the KR's atrocities[155]. The fact that ASEAN gave in to Chinese wishes showed acquiescence to China and the US. However, Koh pointed out that the ICK was a success in demonstrating ASEAN's sincerity in seeking a political solution which would take into account the security concerns of Vietnam, and also that ASEAN was not colluding with China but pursuing its own position[156].

Although ASEAN could not get agreement from China on disarming the Khmer Rouge after a Vietnamese withdrawal, China was willing to accept a neutral Cambodia that was not ruled by the KR. This was a positive step for ASEAN's vision of order; however, the KR was still the dominant force in opposition to the Vietnamese and therefore a non-communist 'third force' was needed that could usurp the KR and gain the support of the majority of the Cambodian population who were opposed to the KR and the Vietnamese. This would reduce the risk of a post-conflict Cambodia becoming a satellite of China. Ghazali Shafie said that “since the Chinese do not want to disarm the KR we'll have to build a countervailing non-communist force”[157]. Because ASEAN had been given diplomatic leadership in the division of labour opposing Vietnam, it was able to use its 'primary manager' role to create a coalition between the Cambodian factions, providing a practical means of diluting the KR's influence, and by extension China's influence. Tony Siddique, the Singaporean diplomat who led the coalition negotiations, reported that this was the long-term aim of the CGDK[158]. The opportunity to do so came when maintaining diplomatic recognition for the Democratic Kampuchean government became difficult as further revelations of KR atrocities emerged. By 1980, the UK and Australia had withdrawn their recognition and India had formally recognised the PRK as the legitimate Cambodian government. On Lee Kuan Yew's visit to Beijing in November 1980 Deng agreed that the Khmer Rouge were detrimental to the legitimacy of the DK and so a coalition should be sought. Deng agreed to support and encourage the establishment of a non-communist force and that it would accept the emergence of an independent Cambodian government even if China did not have special influence[159].

Singapore led the coalition negotiations involving the KR, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) led by Son Sann and the faction loyal to Prince Sihanouk known as the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC). Singapore offered the non-communist factions assistance if they joined

[155] Chanda (1986: 388).
[156] Ang (2013: 41).
[157] Chanda (1986: 390).
[158] Jones (2012: 87).
[159] Lee (2000: 607).

the coalition and then publicly denounced them when they stalled negotiations. They were warned that they risked legitimising the PRK if they did not unite. An agreement was brokered in Singapore in October 1981 with Sihanouk serving as President, Son Sann as Prime Minister and the Khieu Samphan of the KR serving as Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. Malaysia also offered material assistance to the coalition should a full agreement be reached. After negotiations again stalled, ASEAN stoked speculation that the DK would lose its UN seat. The formation of the CGDK was finally announced in Kuala Lumpur in June 1982[160]. Lee Kuan Yew informed Sihanouk that it was essential for the non-communists to create a countervailing force to the KR and that Sihanouk and other non-communists in the CGDK should go on a diplomatic offensive to rally support as well as encourage their forces to fight as the KR fight. This would give them more credibility in the search for aid[161]. Securing China's agreement on the CGDK went some way to making up for the compromises made at the ICK. However, the ASEAN states realised the task of bolstering the non-communist Cambodian resistance factions would require the US assistance.

Keeping the US as the 'offshore great power guarantor'

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were also keen to maintain the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role so that China did not *de facto* become the sole guarantor of Southeast Asian order. They tried to bring the US into the plan to bolster the non-communist factions within the CGDK. Tommy Koh revealed that Singapore lobbied aggressively in Washington for the US to provide aid[162]. Lee Kuan Yew similarly stated that he and S Rajaratnam had worked hard to ensure the US remained interested in the region[163]. He found the Americans reluctant to be involved in a guerilla war on the Asian mainland but that Singaporean officials were able to get them to provide modest aid. In June 1981 Lee reported to President Reagan how Deng had assured that China did not want any satellites in Southeast Asia and would respect whoever won a free vote. This helped win Reagan's support and in August 1982, US officials committed $4 million of non-lethal aid to non-communist groups. In July 1984 Lee sought more support from the US, warning Secretary of State George Shultz that China was benefiting from the current arrangement because it was receiving political support for its arming of the KR. The US should consider increased aid to the non-communists because they had shown promise on the battlefield and were enjoying more support from the people[164]. There seemed to be hope when in 1985 Reagan announced a new doctrine of

[160] Jones (2012: 86).
[161] Ang (2013: 59).
[162] Koh (1998: 189).
[163] Lee (2000: 336)
[164] Lee (2000: 337-338).

support for “freedom fighters” battling against Soviet proxies around the world[165]. A Thai-Malaysian-Singapore-US group was set up to coordinate aid to the non-communist Cambodians, but opposition in the US Congress prevented the US from providing large amounts of aid. The group's Singaporean representative estimated that the US dispensed $150 million in covert and overt aid to the non-communists with the Southeast Asian states providing a further $65 million. This was dwarfed by China's $100 million to non-communist forces and $1 billion to the KR[166]. However, the assistance to the non-communist factions buttressed the diplomatic initiative of creating the CGDK, which by extension was aimed at reducing China's influence in Cambodia.

Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia also worked to maintain US provision of security public goods through its military presence in the maritime sub-region and assistance to ASEAN states. As mentioned above, the Carter administration reduced assistance to ASEAN states between 1975 and 1979. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia reignited US concern to bolster the ASEAN states with increased economic and military aid in the face of the intruding Sino-Soviet conflict. It also provided further impetus to the US-Philippines bases treaty negotiations, concluded just days after Vietnam began its invasion. The Philippines accepted only half the amount of aid Marcos had requested and there were no new US commitments to Philippine security. Marcos accepted this less favourable offer - which he had previously rejected in 1976 - because of pressure from other ASEAN states[167].

However, there remained concerns that the US was overlooking ASEAN in its efforts to improve ties with China. This became especially acute after the US' decision to consider selling arms to China in June 1981 without any prior consultation with Indonesia or Malaysia, as well as its decision to support China rather than ASEAN in their disagreements over the ICK declaration[168]. Specifically it was feared that any efforts to enhance China's modernisation would increase the CCP's capability to support subversion. For Suharto this added to concerns that Indonesia was being shunned by the US as a regional leader in favour of China[169]. Suharto addressed this issue on a state visit to the US in October 1982. US officials hoped the visit would symbolise “U.S. recognition of Indonesia as a major Asian power”[170] and allay fears that the US would sacrifice ASEAN interests

[165] Martini (2007: 108).
[166] Lee (2000: 338).
[167] Simon (1982: 8).
[168] Buszynski (1983: 241-242).
[169] Haacke (2003: 105).
[170] Memorandum to the President from Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth W Dam, “Your meeting with President Soeharto of Indonesia, October 12 1982” October 1st 1982. <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19821000_briefingpaper.pdf> accessed 30/9/13.

in pursuing ties with China. Suharto told President Reagan of his concerns regarding China and said that in US efforts to modernise China, attention should also be paid to assisting ASEAN in combating subversion. Reagan replied that Indonesia had "[the US'] full cooperation to maintain stability in Southeast Asia and not to disturb it through [US] policies towards China"[171].

Suharto brought up the issue again with Vice President George H. W Bush in May 1984 in the wake of President Reagan's trip to China. Bush reiterated that the improvement of US-China ties would not be pursued at ASEAN's expense and went further to state that "if [the US] saw evidence of Chinese support to insurgencies within ASEAN [it] would voice [its] opposition to the Chinese immediately". He reported that the Chinese had learnt from Reagan's visit that the US would "not turn away from old friends like Taiwan, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries" and assured that "[t]he PRC respects this". He expressed the US' desire for an "inward-looking China with improved trade and economic ties … but not armed so as to threaten its neighbours". Suharto was apparently reassured and said that he would pass these views along to other ASEAN leaders who had instructed him to raise these concerns[172]. To show that it was committed to Indonesia's modernisation as well as China's, in 1986 the US approved a record breaking $300 million dollars' worth of military sales to Indonesia including a batch of twelve F-16 fighter jets.

Indonesia also took steps to involve the US more directly in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. In 1985 Mochtar tried to appeal to Vietnam's desire to normalise ties with the US by linking a resolution to the conflict to US-Vietnamese normalisation. Chinese Foreign Minister Wu reportedly agreed to the proposal which constituted a softening of China's approach towards a political rather than military resolution[173]. Although there was no official US response to the proposal, Reagan seemed to indicate a more active US involvement in regional conflicts in a speech to the UN General Assembly shortly afterwards. He called on the Soviet Union to be more active with the US in negotiating such conflicts. Nothing materialised at the time, but in 1988 at the US-Soviet summit meeting Reagan indicated that the two leaders would discuss Cambodia and that he would urge the Soviets to encourage Vietnam to be more responsive to efforts at conflict resolution[174]. This mainly took on momentum in the late 1980s as the great power environment became more amenable to conflict resolution rather than being a direct result of Indonesian efforts.

[171] Memorandum of Conversation, "Summary of President's plenary session with President Soeharto" October 12th 1982 <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19821000_summary_plenary.pdf> accessed 30/9/13
[172] Memorandum from the Embassy in Jakarta to the White House, "Vice President's meeting with President Suharto" 12th May 1984 <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19840512.pdf> accessed 30/9/13.
[173] Van der Kroef (1986c: 41-42).
[174] Sodhy (1989: 305).

Indonesia's activism clearly reflected its desire for status recognition regarding its own position within ASEAN and the wider region. However, Indonesia was unable to do more to retain the US' engagement through its military presence than merely express concerns privately and hope that the US would acknowledge them. The difficulty in publicly declaring such support became apparent after the fall of Marcos in 1986 reopened the debate on US bases in the Philippines. Nationalist Philippine constituencies were far more critical of US bases, making the task of negotiating with the US more difficult for the new Aquino government. Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus sought to legitimise the US military presence by eliciting a public ASEAN expression of its benefits and possibly redistributing military facilities throughout Southeast Asia. Manglapus argued that the bases were for wider regional security and to protect 'choke points' which were not in the Philippines but rather in the straits abutting Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore[175]. The other ASEAN states considered such a declaration of support as too public. This was especially so for Indonesia as it was considered to compromise *bebas actif* and ZOPFAN, which would incite nationalist opinion[176]. The reluctance of leaders to engage in public debate on the US' presence again highlighted how sensitive certain domestic constituencies were to links with external powers. This raised difficulties in terms of ensuring the maintenance of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role if the bases in the Philippines were closed. As we will see in the next chapter, these uncertainties were heightened as the Cold War came to an end and the strategic logic for US bases throughout the region was removed.

Implications for China's 'regional great power guarantor' and ASEAN's 'primary manager' roles

As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, roles help us capture the relationships of legitimacy between actors that are constitutive of power[177]. By successfully claiming a legitimate social role, an actor is enabled to use the role as a resource to facilitate political and social action[178]. This is because through negotiation the role becomes associated with certain order functions that contribute to the management of regional order. They have a shared existence within international society and contribute to maintaining the shared rules that govern interaction, which in turn enable actors to pursue their private and collective goals. Through becoming a performer of a particular role, the

[175] Manglapus (1988: 52).
[176] Ba (2009: 162-165).
[177] Bukovansky et al (2012).
[178] Baker and Faulkner (1991), Callero (1994).

actor can legitimately mobilise material and social resources in the performance of these associated functions.

The response to China’s role claims took two broad forms: regional legitimation and regional reticence and resistance. The legitimation of China's role included Thailand's substantive endorsement through its quasi-alliance with China and ASEAN's borderline performative/substantive endorsement through providing diplomatic leadership that complimented China's 'holding the line' function. This provided the cumulative endorsement that gave China’s 'regional great power guarantor' role legitimacy. The endorsement of China's role claim by the US and ASEAN enabled it to employ political and military action to enact its containment strategy. This is because through negotiation between the US, China and ASEAN states, the function of 'militarily holding the line' against *Vietnamese-Soviet* expansionism became a shared order function intrinsic to the 'regional great power guarantor' role. China's performance of this function was viewed by ASEAN and the US as contributing to the management of regional order. China's punitive invasion of Vietnam and its support for the KR as part of its strategy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' were facilitated by China’s successful framing of these actions as part of its military guarantee. It was using the 'regional great power guarantor' role as a resource to gain access to material, logistical and political support, particularly from the US and Thailand but also less directly from the other ASEAN states and other key actors such as Japan.

In contrast, the denial of Vietnam's claim to the 'indigenous great power buffer' role was a major constraint. Its strategy was made far more costly in terms of material resources and also socially. It could not achieve recognition for the PRK in Cambodia, was bogged down within Cambodia fighting the strengthened KR resistance and was alienated in international forums cutting it off from sources of external aid and assistance. It became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and as such, when Soviet aid and assistance was withdrawn in the late 1980s, it had to abandon its strategy and its 'indigenous great power buffer' role conception experienced role death. This was despite the fact that Vietnam's role claim appealed to some constituencies within the region - particularly in Indonesia - that identified China as a threat. The indigenous character of Vietnam's claim resonated with the Indonesian understanding of ZOPFAN as insulating Southeast Asia from great power involvement. The means through which Vietnam claimed its role – alignment with a great power in order to use force against another state, coupled with a blatant rejection of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and apparent establishment of an alternative communist regional order - meant that even constituencies sympathetic to Vietnam could not sway

the opinion of the majority of ASEAN stakeholders.

The degree of endorsement for China's role was circumscribed by the regional reticence and resistance to China's role-taking that came from Malaysia and Indonesia. This was driven by concern that endorsement of China's 'regional great power guarantor' role would contribute to Chinese hegemony in the longer term. Considering the scope of China's 'regional great power guarantor' role claim - as a military guarantee for the region - and in the context of its military modernisation, there was a danger that the US might subcontract security public goods in general to China and that ASEAN may *de facto* endorse China's sole guarantor role in Southeast Asia. However, China's legitimacy as a regional great power turned not just on its provision of military functions in Indochina but more crucially on its support for regional insurgency movements, its position on overseas Chinese and its long term interests and behaviour in view of its modernisation. That these last three aspects remained uncertain created a sense in the region of a 'China threat'.

The efforts to reach out to Vietnam and try to resolve the conflict in a way that excluded China and established an ASEAN-Vietnam role bargain failed both because of Vietnamese intransigence and because maintaining ASEAN unity in the performance of its 'primary manager' role within the China-ASEAN bargain was considered more important. The overall result was the limiting of China's 'regional great power guarantor' role to the specific circumstances of the Cambodian conflict and the assertion of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in providing diplomatic leadership as a means to secure its vision of regional order over the full extent of Southeast Asia. ASEAN subsumed Cambodia within its own vision of regional order through ensuring a post-occupation Cambodia remained independent and that the influence of the KR (and by extension China) was diluted. ASEAN was able to fully enact its role in mainland Southeast Asia after the Cambodian conflict was resolved and the Indochinese states committed to the process of joining ASEAN. China's role-taking was limited to the functional aspects specific to the Cambodian conflict rather than a full great power role-taking at a structural level[179]. The push to maintain the US' engagement in the region, its military presence in maritime Southeast Asia and provision of security public goods, aimed at ensuring that the US' endorsement of China performing security functions did not go too far and that the US remained the 'offshore great power guarantor'. Events in 1989 relieved some of the pressure in this respect, although the end of the Cold War and resolution of the Cambodian conflict created further uncertainties.

[179] We can think of a more structural level role-taking in terms of Thies' (2012) socialisation game whereby a successful socialisation occurs when a state is socialised into a 'meta role' that accords with the structural distribution of capabilities as well as the normative structure. See chapter One.

The end of the Cold War and resolution of the Cambodian conflict

The years 1989-1990 presented a certain paradox with respect to China's role-taking. The normalisation of relations between Indonesia and China removed the last major obstacle to the recognition of the PRC as a legitimate actor in Southeast Asia. It represented the downgrading of the threat from communist subversion and the decoupling of the question of relations with China from internal ethnic Chinese issues. At the same time, the resolution of the Cambodian conflict removed the basis for role-taking thus far and delegitimised China's military activity in Southeast Asia[180]. China's 'regional great power guarantor' role was no longer relevant because there was no longer a 'holding the line' function to perform.

Despite this, relations with China were much improved as two of the major issues regarding the China threat were no longer particularly relevant. Communist insurgencies no longer threatened regime stability. The MCP ended its insurgency against the Malaysian government in 1989 and Chin Peng's reappearance at the Thai-Malaysian border was seen by many to have been encouraged by China[181]. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen promised Suharto in February 1989 that China would no longer support communist parties in Southeast Asia and Indonesia's Minister of State for the State Secretariat Moerdiono expressed his conviction that China's commitment to non-interference meant both non-interference from the government and the CCP[182]. Similarly, the ethnic Chinese issue was also downgraded when in 1989 China signed the Law of Citizenship which essentially severed ties with overseas Chinese. This resolved the issue of China's residual status as a subversive communist state.

On top of this, the June 1989 Tiananmen crackdown reduced fears regarding improving Sino-US relations; sanctions stopped US military exports to China and the event highlighted China's domestic problems which would keep it preoccupied and inward-looking. The international condemnation of China in the wake of Tiananmen made ASEAN states more wary that their own domestic policies could be subject to scrutiny by the West as the strategic imperatives of the Cold War were removed. This was a particular concern because of dependence on Western foreign investment and exports to Western markets. For this reason ASEAN made a point of not joining the condemnation of China.

[180] Alagappa (1989: 7).
[181] Wang (1990: 72).
[182] Sukma (1999: 156, 159).

There thus arose a perceived need to reduce economic dependence on the West. In this respect China increasingly came to be seen as an economic opportunity. Indeed economic considerations were prominent in the Indonesian decision to pursue normalisation. Until the early 1980*s* Indonesia's economy had enjoyed sustained growth. This was seriously affected by the decline of oil prices which made up 80 per cent of Indonesia's exports and 70 per cent of government revenue[183]. In this context, the opening and reforming China provided an opportunity for diversifying Indonesia's export markets and boosting non-oil exports. The business community pushed throughout the 1980s for Indonesia to gain access to Chinese markets. Normalisation was made more imperative by the fact that the Suharto regime's domestic legitimacy increasingly relied on its ability to provide economic growth and development. It could no longer rely on its claim to be maintaining stability because the myth of an imminent threat from communist subversion was no longer credible[184]. A similar logic motivated other regional leaderships as we saw with Mahathir's administration. With subversion no longer a serious threat, China and Vietnam could both contribute to, and have a stake in, regional order through economic links. Indeed, Vietnam would enthusiastically pursue the path to membership within ASEAN.

Despite this, concerns regarding China's potential hegemony and claims to the South China Sea became more salient as China continued its military modernisation and as the end of the Cold War and Philippine nationalism threatened the withdrawal of the US' military presence in Southeast Asia. US retrenchment had significant implications for regional order as the ASEAN states would be left alone to face a rising China and a potentially resurgent Japan. Within this strategic uncertainty, the ASEAN states, individually and collectively, took steps to provide a new basis for legitimising not only the US' engagement, but also the engagement of other great powers within the region. This involved ASEAN's creation of its 'regional conductor' role which the next chapter will turn to.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how the Third Indochina Conflict can be viewed within a broader negotiation of social roles in Southeast Asia. It showed how the key negotiation was China's 'regional great power guarantor' role-taking in opposition to Vietnam's role claim, but also how

[183] Sukma (1999: 144).
[184] Vatikiotis (1993: 106).

ASEAN asserted its own 'primary manager' role in an effort to limits China's role-taking. China's 'regional great power guarantor' role was based on the specific circumstances of the Cambodian conflict. The negotiations focused quite specifically around the Third Indochina Conflict and the guarantee was based on protecting non-communist Southeast Asia from Soviet-Vietnamese expansion. With this threat gone, there was no longer a basis for China's military guarantee.

Coming to the end of the period there remained many uncertainties as to China's long term aims. Despite this, social foundations were laid. China as a regional great power was here to stay. It no longer posed the same threat of subversion and offered an economic opportunity for regional states seeking to diversify their economic dependence. China's role would increasingly take on this economic aspect but as a broader great power. China needed a new basis for its legitimacy to be negotiated. Also, ASEAN members further realised the value of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role and the importance of unity for this role. This, together with the fact that this period affirmed for external powers that ASEAN, and not the great powers, performed the function of diplomatic leadership in the region, provided social foundations from which ASEAN engaged in creating its 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN would attempt to use the role to address post-Cold War uncertainties and provide a legitimate basis for a new bargain on a post-Cold War division of labour to shape the emerging order.

Chapter Four - Role creation: ASEAN and post-Cold War East Asia

In the last two chapters we saw how a key aspect of the role bargains reached between ASEAN and the US and China was ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's performance of diplomatic leadership as part of its 'primary manager' role served to legitimise the common goal of containment, firstly of communism more generally, and then more specifically Soviet-Vietnamese communism during the Cambodian conflict. The US and subsequently China, performed the function of 'holding the line' within Indochina as part of their respective great power guarantor roles. However, the end of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 1991 removed the need for containment and thus the basis upon which the previous role bargains had been built. There was no longer a threat to hold the line against and there was no longer the common goal of containment which the great powers required ASEAN to legitimise through its diplomatic initiatives. How would ASEAN cope in a context where the strategic rationale for the division of labour between itself and the US and China was removed? It was possible that ASEAN would become irrelevant in the emerging order.

Yet, since the end of the Cold War ASEAN has been central to negotiations over regional cooperation not just in Southeast Asia, but in Asia more generally. In the early 1990s ASEAN supplied an inclusive forum to bring together all the major regional powers and players, something that other actors were unable to do. Through this process all powers agreed to ASEAN's TAC as a regional code of conduct, and to dialogue as a key aspect of regional strategic engagement, no mean feat considering the US' and China's scepticism and opposition to multilateralism in the initial post-Cold War years. Since then, despite challenges, ASEAN has remained central to further negotiations over regional institutions, regional trade agreements and the broader regional agenda. All the great powers and regional players have participated in ASEAN processes and have acceded to the TAC, committing themselves to rules defined by ASEAN. ASEAN has thus extended its diplomatic leadership beyond its own subregion into the wider Asia-Pacific. ASEAN is no longer just legitimising great power imperatives with respect to common causes such as in the Indochina conflicts, but actually leading great powers in shaping institutions and establishing rules in the wider region. Considering ASEAN's limited material resources, it seems that it has had too much of a say in how regional order should look and be managed. This chapter argues that this extension of ASEAN's diplomatic leadership is part of its newly created 'regional conductor' role, built on the foundations of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN developed an institutional and normative framework through its diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia. This gave ASEAN a platform

for practically engaging the great powers in the post-Cold War years, but also a basis for ASEAN to claim its competence to perform similar functions at the wider Asia-Pacific level.

ASEAN's post-Cold War diplomatic leadership takes us right back to the central puzzle that this thesis began with: why have a group of small to medium sized states played such a prominent part in order negotiation and management during times of transition and crisis? The thesis' introduction highlighted how the role negotiation framework addresses this puzzle in a more comprehensive and nuanced manner than realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, which all ultimately end up relying on a structural argument for ASEAN's prominence, whether material or normative[1]. Realism roots ASEAN's prominence in a material-structural explanation of great power rivalry: the great powers had subcontracted institution-building and norm provision to ASEAN because it is too costly to do so themselves[2]. As already outlined, this explanation does not account for ASEAN's agency nor the ebb and flow of great power endorsement and contestation for ASEAN's prominence. Likewise, Kawasaki's argument does not account for these either as his 'assurance game' also relies on players remaining in a particular context whereby making reassuring moves is considered beneficial[3]. If they begin to defect then ASEAN will no longer be relevant. He also relies on an analysis of the ARF rather than a broader analysis of ASEAN-led institutions. Acharya's constructivist approach looks extensively at ASEAN's agency in building a number of institutions and promoting its norms[4]. Ultimately however, Acharya also relies on a structural explanation for ASEAN's prominence: ASEAN has developed a normative structure in the region that supports its leadership. As we saw, the evidence for the existence of such an ASEAN-determined normative structure can be questioned, especially in light of great power rivalry and ASEAN states' own deviation from established norms[5]. It is necessary to apply a framework that is less rigid and can thereby better accommodate ASEAN and great power agency in determining the shape of the region. The role negotiation framework can do this by capturing the mutual understandings ASEAN and the great powers develop in terms of their role bargains. This chapter builds on the analysis of Chapter Two and Three and argues that ASEAN has created a 'regional conductor' role in the wider Asia-Pacific region that is embedded within a division of labour that includes complementary functions for the US, China and Japan. ASEAN has been able to use its

[1] See the 'Alternative Explanations' discussion in the Introduction to the thesis.
[2] Tow (2012). See also Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003).
[3] Kawasaki (2006).
[4] Acharya (2009, 2014). Ba's (2009) account is not structural but looks at 'complex interaction'. She does not look at ASEAN-great power negotiations over the performance of functions in the region however, focusing mostly on ASEAN's identity and status.
[5] See Jones (2012).

'regional conductor' role to keep itself central at key points of order negotiation and management because it has been able to successfully re-conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate the legitimacy of its role. ASEAN has also sought to steer negotiations over functions in a way that maintains, and further entrenches, a division of labour which includes: the US continuing to provide security public goods, but maintaining its identity as the 'offshore great power guarantor'; China providing regional economic public goods but also strategic restraint, emphasising its “responsible” identity as the 'responsible regional great power'; Japan performing regional economic and financial public goods through its 'regional economic great power' role; and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as the 'regional conductor'.

This chapter proceeds by analysing role negotiation between the great powers and ASEAN to see how ASEAN created its 'regional conductor' role, and how ASEAN has used the role to maintain its position in regional order negotiation and management. The chapter has three key findings.

First, a division of labour can be identified in the post-Cold War period. ASEAN has upheld its 'regional conductor role' and negotiated great powers into complementary roles that utilise their material capabilities in performing regional order functions. For example, the US' superior military capabilities for security public goods provision and Japan and China's economic resources for regional financial public goods. However, this has been realised through a series of transitional role bargains and therefore, the post-Cold War period has lacked the clear role bargains of the previous chapters. The post-Cold War bargains have been transitional because they have only served to manage the challenges of that particular phase of negotiation and therefore the tentative mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics are soon challenged, making a new round of negotiation necessary. In particular, the US' tendency towards interference in terms of human rights, democracy promotion, economic liberalisation and doctrine of 'pre-emption' during the War on Terrorism, has challenged the 'offshore' identity of its great power guarantor role and ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. China's desire to institutionalise regionalism that excludes the US challenges ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' function and suggests it wants to take on diplomatic leadership for itself. China's actions in the South China Sea also raise questions over whether it will be a 'responsible' regional great power and contest ASEAN's rule-making function in the SCS. The legitimacy of ASEAN's role has to constantly be fought for.

Second, the 'regional conductor' role has been maintained despite challenges because

ASEAN has been able to re-conceptualise, reclaim and renegotiate the legitimacy of the role at each of these junctures of role negotiation. At times of challenge from one constituency of legitimation - when role deterioration seemed possible - ASEAN leveraged off endorsement from another constituency to use its role to negotiate another transitional role bargain. However, to keep receiving endorsement from different constituencies, ASEAN has had to balance competing role expectations; this avoids role deterioration on the one hand, but also precludes role consolidation on the other. For its Chinese constituency, ASEAN has had to maintain informality and a pace comfortable for all, as well as keeping the ASEAN Plus Three exclusive regionalism open to channel China's attention and interest. To satisfy its Western constituency, ASEAN has had to pursue internal reforms led by liberal constituencies within ASEAN. These reforms have sought to uphold ASEAN's status as a successful manager of intra-Southeast Asian relations by taking on functions such as democracy and human rights promotion as part of the 'primary manager' role. As in the previous chapters, we therefore see how the 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles need to accommodate or advance great power agendas. This is made all the more complicated however by ASEAN's perceived neutral status. Unlike in the previous two chapters - when ASEAN exercised its diplomatic leadership to legitimise great power strategic imperatives, clearly taking sides in conflict - in the post-Cold War context, ASEAN's diplomatic leadership has been based on it explicitly *not* taking sides. ASEAN's efforts to appear neutral hinder its ability to take substantive positions on regional issues as it could be accused of taking sides[6]. This ostensibly keeps ASEAN as the only actor able to accommodate all the great powers' interests, but at the same time undermines ASEAN's claims to its 'centrality' in regional affairs as it cannot address substantive issues between the great powers.

Third, ASEAN has created the 'regional conductor' role to try to shape the regional order outside of Southeast Asia, whilst maintaining the 'primary manager' role with respect to intra-Southeast Asian order. The two roles are linked by the fact that the perceived competence of ASEAN to perform functions at the wider East Asian/Asia-Pacific level depends on its perceived success as the 'primary manager' within Southeast Asian order. This has created a tension between the two roles as the 'primary manager' role seeks to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference whereas the 'regional conductor' role requires ASEAN reform norms such as non-interference in order to give the impression to liberal domestic constituencies and Western states that it is acting as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. Newer members in particular have viewed ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the narrow sense of insulating regimes from external

[6] Interview with Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.

pressure for political liberalisation. Older members see the necessity of seeking to shape the wider East Asia/Asia-Pacific region to maximise ASEAN's autonomy and avoid domination and marginalisation. The need for ASEAN unity has meant that the less progressive views within ASEAN have needed to be accommodated within ASEAN agreements. This results in dissatisfaction for liberal domestic constituencies and Western constituencies as reform falls well short of that anticipated, showing ASEAN up as a rather *un*succesful manager of Southeast Asian order when it comes to promoting liberal norms and values.

This chapter explores three phases of role negotiation that have brought about cumulative transitional role bargains, as well as corresponding re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's identity. First, the 'regional conductor' role was created between 1989 and 1994 through early negotiations over the US' military presence in Southeast Asia, how to manage China and the ARF. This established the first transitional role bargain by improving the context for US engagement with East Asian states through its 'offshore great power guarantor' role, providing a forum for the on-going negotiation over China's emerging 'responsible regional great power' role and creating ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role.

The second phase between 1997 and 2005 saw ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role threatened with deterioration and possible death by Western contestation and the Asian Financial Crisis. ASEAN leveraged off Japanese and Chinese endorsement to institutionalise East Asian regionalism, establishing mechanisms through which to channel Sino-Japanese competition over the provision of regional economic and financial order functions and a vision for regional community. When Sino-Japanese competition came to a head over the East Asia Summit, ASEAN reasserted its control over the direction of regionalism by brokering a compromise with itself at the centre. ASEAN thus ended this phase by further entrenching its 'regional conductor' role within an East Asian transitional role bargain.

These challenges were followed by major re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's identity as it enlarged to encompass all 10 states of Southeast Asia and committed to creating an ASEAN Community. Through enlargement, ASEAN increased its collective clout but also came under significant pressure from the US and the EU to not admit Myanmar. ASEAN asserted its autonomy as 'primary manager' by admitting Myanmar, but to address its legitimacy deficit with the West, also took responsibility for democracy and human rights promotion in Southeast Asia. Through the ASEAN Community initiative, ASEAN more clearly took on the responsibility for democracy and

human rights promotion as well as some security functions; however, different understandings of ASEAN's 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles by different members hindered progress.

The final phase saw ASEAN expand its 'regional conductor' role after 2008 by seeing off other proposals for new regional architecture, receiving renewed endorsement from the US and developing additional forums with which it performed the 'inclusive engagement' function. Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the US rebalance to Asia complicated the performance of ASEAN's role however because great power rivalry began to test ASEAN unity and neutrality. The final re-conceptualisation was therefore concerned with maintaining ASEAN's united identity and collective neutrality with respect to great power politics.

This chapter concludes with the wider implications of these negotiations for East Asian regional order in the post-Cold War period. In particular these negotiations show that ASEAN's performance of its 'regional conductor' role is not entirely satisfying to any constituency of legitimation, within ASEAN or external to ASEAN. The fact that there is periodic contestation and, at most, performative endorsement of the role as opposed to substantive endorsement, means that it sits in a precarious balance between consolidation and deterioration. In this way, ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is limited in its impact on regional order. ASEAN cannot address a foundational bargain over order and great power roles, which must be agreed between the great powers themselves.

CREATING THE REGIONAL CONDUCTOR ROLE: 1989-1994

This section shows how ASEAN addressed the uncertainty surrounding social roles in the initial post-Cold War years through engaging the US and China and establishing the ARF. Through doing so, ASEAN was able to legitimise the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the post-Cold War context, begin a process of socialising China into a 'responsible regional great power' role and, most notably, create its own 'regional conductor' role.

Post-Cold War uncertainty

With the end of the Cold War and Cambodian conflict, ASEAN's most acute concern was possible US retrenchment, which would represent a reneging of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role

based on the provision of security public goods[7]. The end of the Cold War removed the rationale for the US' military presence and domestic pressure within the US raised questions over the necessity of maintaining military commitments to East Asian states that were considered economic competitors. Japan in particular was accused of free-riding on the US' security guarantee – allowing the US to bear the cost of security whilst it reaped the benefits of an economic strategy - and the US' trade deficit with Japan was a source of friction. With the US' commitment to alliances in doubt, ASEAN states saw the need to provide a sound basis for US strategic and military engagement in East and Southeast Asia in order to ensure the continued provision of security public goods.

A rising China also needed a legitimate basis for its involvement in the region after the end of the Cambodian conflict. Unlike the US, China was in the region to stay. China's opening and growing economy posed a challenge for ASEAN states as it could serve to divert investment away from Southeast Asia. However, the Chinese market also represented an economic opportunity for ASEAN investment. There was thus potential for China to contribute to regional economic development. Strategically, China still represented a possible threat because of its sheer size and the uncertainty surrounding its claims to the South China Sea (SCS). In 1992 it passed the Law on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas through which it formally asserted its claim to over 80 per cent of the South China Sea and stipulated the right to use force to protect its sovereignty over islands in the Spratly and Paracel groups. This represented a southern expansion of China's sovereign rights deep into the heart of Southeast Asia and meant its claims overlapped with ASEAN states including Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, as well as a future member, Vietnam. Considering its use of force against Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, ASEAN states feared that China could seek to secure its claims through coercion and the use of force to the detriment of rule-governed order within Southeast Asia. They were especially concerned considering the US' withdrawal from the Philippines. ASEAN needed to negotiate China's emerging role in a way that would prevent it seeking hegemony or asserting its claims to the SCS through use of force and coercion.

On top of this was the potential irrelevance of ASEAN in the emerging order. With the Cold War and the Cambodian conflict over, the goal of 'containment' was no longer relevant and there was less need for the great powers to use ASEAN to legitimise their strategic imperatives. ASEAN's 'primary manager' role thus no longer had the same strategic import as it had once had. Unlike in

[7] For post-Cold War uncertainty in Southeast Asia see Khong (2004) and Goh (2014b).

previous decades, the principal conflicts and issues in Asia were not concentrated in Southeast Asia and so ASEAN faced being marginalised within regional discussions on security. ASEAN needed to find a means of ensuring its continued relevance, avoiding marginalisation on the one hand and domination on the other.

The US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role: places not bases

To ensure the US' continued provision of security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor', the ASEAN states came to a consensus on the basis upon which the US presence could be accommodated. As we saw in the previous chapter, in the late 1980s an open debate on the benefits of the US' military presence was impossible for Malaysian and Indonesian leaders committed to the principles of ZOPFAN. In the early 1990s however, the closure of US bases in the Philippines meant that Malaysian and Indonesian leaders could no longer officially espouse a non-aligned stance whilst relying on the US presence in the Philippines.

This shift was seen particularly in the contrasting responses to Singapore's moves to increase its ties with the US in 1990 and 1992 and offer the US logistical alternatives for its military presence in place of Philippine base closures. In 1990, Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the US, offering access to Sembawang Dockyard, training facilities at Paya Lebar Airport as well as allowing some US service personnel to be stationed in Singapore. This provoked a strong response from Malaysian and Indonesian officials who criticised the move as undermining regional resilience. The response to a second MOU in 1992 however, was one of support[8]. Singapore offered to host the US' logistics command for the western Pacific and, by this point, there was a significant rolling deployment of US naval and air personnel coming through the city state[9]. Malaysia and Indonesia began pursuing their own access agreements with the US, accompanied by explicit expressions of support for the US presence. Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak stated that Malaysia “would like to see a fair degree of American military presence in the region” and that he was “happy [with] an expanding military relationship with Washington”[10]. Ambassadors from ASEAN states stationed in Washington organised the ASEAN Washington Committee (AWC) and lobbied the Clinton administration to show that, despite the Philippines asking the Americans to leave, Southeast Asians wanted the US’ military presence in the region[11].

[8] Ba (2009: 165-168).
[9] Ciorciari (2010: 98).
[10] Quoted in Ciorciari (2010: 99).
[11] Nathan (2011: 573-574).

Despite this, the establishment of new bases was unacceptable to ASEAN states. For example, Thailand rejected a US proposal to host a navy flotilla depot in the Gulf of Thailand. The new consensus within ASEAN over types of security arrangement acceptable within Southeast Asia became known as “places not bases”. Permanent forces stationed in the region was not appropriate, but a steady rotation of US naval capabilities was. Through this, the ASEAN states signalled their substantive endorsement of the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the post-Cold War context and provided a practical basis for the US' provision of security public goods. However, the Clinton administration still needed to persuade domestic constituencies within the US of the importance of continued engagement in Asia, without at the same time alienating regional states by appearing to be too assertive in pushing a regional agenda. A broader political basis upon which the US could be invited into the region, was considered by US officials to be useful in this context[12].

China: engagement towards a 'responsible regional great power'

The ASEAN states, individually and collectively, chose to engage China with the hope of reaping the benefits of an economic opportunity and 'socialising' China into considering itself a 'responsible regional great power' rather than a revisionist power or regional hegemon[13]. ASEAN sought to do so by drawing China into a pattern of cooperative regional interaction and persuading Chinese leaders of the benefits of abiding by international and regional norms[14]. Essentially, the ASEAN states perceived that if China was given status recognition as a 'responsible regional great power', it would begin to see itself as having a 'responsible great power' identity and act accordingly. For example, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong reflected the hope ASEAN had in the socialisation effects of this engagement when he stated that “it's not preordained that China's military power will turn into a threat"[15].

In 1990, Indonesia and Singapore normalised ties with China, meaning that all ASEAN states had normal diplomatic relations with the Chinese. Collectively, ASEAN recognised China as a “consultative partner” in July 1991 in disregard to Western attempts to isolate the CCP leadership after the crackdown on protesters in Tienanmen. ASEAN recognised the legitimacy of the CCP

[12] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.
[13] See Wanandi (1996), Deng (1998), Cheng (2001: 423).
[14] Goh (2014b: 470).
[15] “Treading Softly”, *Far Eastern Economic Review* 3 Aug. 1995: l6-20.

regime despite its domestic politics, demonstrating its commitment to the norm of non-interference. The ASEAN states, led by Indonesia, also engaged China in informal workshops on the issue of overlapping claims in the South China Sea. This was the start of ASEAN's attempts at rule-making in the South China Sea, getting claimants to avoid the issue of sovereignty and focus on the management of resources, navigation, communications and shipping, and pollution control[16]. ASEAN's response to China's Law on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas was to issue its own declaration on the South China Sea calling on all parties to the SCS dispute to exercise restraint and to apply the principles of the TAC as a basis for a SCS code of conduct[17]. China's willingness to manage these disputes in a cooperative way, exercising restraint, adhering to ASEAN's norms and not asserting its claims through threat or use of force, were key aspects of its 'responsible regional great power' role for ASEAN[18].

The ASEAN states also pressed the case for engagement with China in the US, particularly through the AWC. Former Singaporean Ambassador to the US, S R Nathan reported that the AWC lobbied Congress during the debate over China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. President Clinton had promised to link any extension of China's MFN status to progress in human rights. The AWC argued that "China had made progress and … believed that acknowledgement of that fact was helpful to peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia" reasoning that being closer to China geographically, Southeast Asians were able to see that such changes were significant[19]. Whether or not the AWC had any impact on Clinton's decision to extend MFN status in 1994 - considering pressure from American business constituencies eager to invest in the Chinese economy - the fact that ASEAN states were seeking to sway the US towards engagement of China, showed their commitment to this strategy as the key to guiding China into a 'responsible regional great power' role.

ASEAN's relevance: Conceptualising and claiming the 'regional conductor' role

Although ASEAN could address the US' and China's roles through bilateral channels, it could not secure its own relevance in the evolving regional order without responding to the widespread calls within the Asia-Pacific for a post-Cold War regional security dialogue. By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia had put forward proposals that challenged ASEAN's previously

[16] Singh (1992: 9).
[17] ASEAN (1992a).
[18] Goh (2013: 100).
[19] Nathan (2011: 575-576).

negotiated diplomatic leadership by threatening to marginalise ASEAN by either excluding it, or subsuming it within a broader regional agenda dominated by Western states. The Australian and Canadian proposals were also made at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), a forum that had been used for coordinating external support for ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. ASEAN was able however to use the PMC for rebutting the proposals from other actors, and for launching its own regional security dialogue. Through debating and rejecting external proposals, and establishing its own proposal based on the ASEAN model, ASEAN began to articulate and claim its conception of the 'regional conductor' role.

Conceptualising the 'regional conductor' role

As described in the Introduction to this thesis, the 'regional conductor' role is based on an analogy that sees the region as an orchestra where the different great powers make up the different sections (brass, percussion etc). They possess the instruments which represent the material capabilities (military hardware, economic and financial resources etc); it is they that essentially 'make the music'. The problem of great power rivalry however means that the different sections want the orchestra to play their own musical score (their own vision of regional order) and thus exist in a state of competition. Instead, the 'regional conductor', analogous to a musical conductor who does not possess any instrument (lacks material capabilities), steps up to provide a score for the orchestra to play: a framework of norms, rules and institutions within which the region can operate. The provision of a mutually agreeable 'score' is the conductor's key contribution. It is able to do so because it is universally acknowledged as neutral and competent.

As shown in Table 9 below, when we apply this to ASEAN we see that ASEAN's neutral status as a collective actor (despite individual members having various alignments) and its competence - based on its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order - gives it the legitimacy to claim the 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN already developed mechanisms and experience in convening meetings and developing norms for mutual restraint and cooperation[20]. Its legitimacy is also based on its indigenous identity as an 'Asian' actor, as well as its unity, being able to maintain a common position when acting collectively.

[20] See Eaton and Stubbs (2006) on ASEAN's 'competence power'.

Identity	**Status**	**Function**	
		Primary	*Secondary*
Indigenous	Neutral	Diplomatic Leadership	Inclusive engagement
United	Successful manager of Southeast Asian order		Rule-making (score)

Table 9 – ASEAN's 'Regional Conductor' Role

The Introduction to this thesis discussed how understanding ASEAN's role as a 'regional conductor' adds value because it captures the two secondary functions ASEAN performs for regional order: 1) convening all major powers and players together through the 'inclusive engagement' function and 2) providing a 'score' that all players can agree to through its 'rule-making' function. It also argued that it avoids the ambiguity of the commonly used 'ASEAN driver' role. Likewise, the analogy of the 'orchestra' helps us understand when ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is relevant: when the full orchestra is convened. Smaller groupings are possible (such as US-led alliances or coalitions) that may play more sophisticated 'Chamber music' because the members share common visions of regional order and values, but these are generally not seen as a threat within ASEAN to its 'regional conductor' role. However, when it comes to large-scale cooperative security that involves all the major powers, ASEAN takes the lead as the 'regional conductor', and jealously guards its role. This section will now outline how ASEAN conceptualised and claimed the different identity and status aspects of the 'regional conductor' role.

Indigenous identity ASEAN emphasised its indigenous identity by rejecting external proposals for security dialogue as inappropriate for Asian culture and instead promoting its model of dialogue based on consultation and consensus because it better suited the 'Asian' context. The initial proposals for post-Cold War security dialogue put forward by the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia were based on the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Canadian proposal envisaged a North Pacific dialogue which did not include Southeast Asia but was based on a cooperative security model, whereas the Soviet and Australian proposals were inclusive but based on common security with more formal confidence-building mechanisms and broader agenda linking issues such as human rights to security[21]. The ASEAN states accepted that some form of confidence-building measures could be beneficial but that a formal structure like the CSCE did not

[21] See Dewitt (1994).

fit within an Asian context. Indicative of this was Tommy Koh's explanation that “[t]he Asian preference, unlike the Western preference, is to take a very non-legalistic approach to things. We take actions step by step and allow things to evolve, rather than to sit down and say, *a priori*, we want to create an institution, this is our character, this is our mission statement"[22].

United identity The Singapore summit in 1992 saw ASEAN push to shore up its identity as a united actor. This served both as a continued assertion of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in Southeast Asian order and as a means for boosting ASEAN's credibility and competence within wider forums. ASEAN agreed to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to increase its attractiveness to foreign investors and present ASEAN as a united actor within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. ASEAN also enhanced its institutional make-up by giving the Secretariat new stature to initiate, propose and supervise policies and action plans and upgrading the office of Secretary-General to Secretary-General of *ASEAN* rather than just of the Secretariat. ASEAN also gave a formal schedule to summit meetings, to take place every three years rather than on an *ad hoc* basis[23]. These amounted to symbolic claims regarding ASEAN's unity and competence to extend its diplomatic leadership.

Neutrality ASEAN made claims about its neutral status primarily through its design of the emerging security dialogue. It was keen to assert that regional security dialogue would be based on the 'ASEAN way': informal dialogue, moving at a pace comfortable to all, with all decisions based on consensus[24]. The 'ASEAN way' has been described as ‘counter-realpolitik’[25] because it makes all participants equal rather than according larger actors more of a say. This ensured that the process would not be dominated by any single power, showing that ASEAN was not favouring any single great power but instead acting as a neutral facilitator of inclusive security dialogue. ASEAN was therefore claiming that it was a 'non-threatening' actor, because it had no 'hidden agenda'[26].

Status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order ASEAN's promotion of its own model and its use of the PMC to launch regional security dialogue showed that ASEAN was also making a statement about the success of its existing processes in managing regional relations at the Southeast Asian level. As we saw in the previous chapters, ASEAN's 'primary manager' role involved ASEAN taking on responsibility for diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia through

[22] Antolik (1994: 118).
[23] See Antolik (1992).
[24] See Acharya (1997).
[25] Johnston (2003).
[26] Almonte (1997/98: 81).

which it engaged in regional reconciliation and rule-making around the core norm of non-interference. Through promoting such reconciliation, and acting collectively provide the diplomatic vanguard for the opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, ASEAN had gained much credibility. ASEAN therefore was making a statement about how it had already demonstrated its competence to perform key diplomatic/normative functions through performing the 'primary manager' role within Southeast Asian order. As early as 1988, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar recommended ASEAN's model for the wider Asia-Pacific, arguing that ASEAN had provided the "much needed structure for mutual understanding, confidence, trust and goodwill among the ... member states ... [and had] ... enabled the [member] states to resolve differences between them"[27]. In 1991 ASEAN-ISIS, a grouping of nationally-affiliated think tanks, proposed using the PMC as the basis for a regional security dialogue that could extend the existing diplomatic practice of ASEAN without the need to create a new institution. At the Singapore summit in January 1992, the ASEAN leaders declared that "ASEAN could use established fora to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region … ASEAN should intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC)"[28]. Singaporean Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng made the link between ASEAN's model and regional peace by stating that it "builds confidence … while minimizing conflict. It is this approach, of broadly engaging our neighbours in Southeast Asia and others in the larger Asia-Pacific that will help promote and strengthen conditions for regional peace and stability"[29].

Performative claims to 'inclusive engagement'

In 1992, ASEAN began making performative claims to the function of 'inclusive engagement' by inviting China and Russia to attend the ASEAN AMM as guests. At the AMM, Vietnam and Laos also signed the TAC. States that had previously rejected ASEAN were now embracing its norms and processes. Singapore, as the most enthusiastic proponent of the ARF, injected momentum into the process when it took up the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee in 1992-1993. Singaporean officials were influenced by the CSCE and saw security dialogue as a way to get all the regional stakeholders together in the post-Cold War context[30]. Singapore hosted the first ever meeting of PMC Senior Officials in May 1993 where participants agreed that a multilateral process of security dialogue should be established and that China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea

[27] Katsumata (2009b: 59).
[28] ASEAN (1992b).
[29] Reginald Chua and Mary Kwang, "Signing of Pact by Vietnam, Laos Will Boost Peace, Stability." *Straits Times* 23/7/1992.
[30] Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 7/3/14.

should be invited. Singapore proposed the name *ASEAN* Regional Forum for the new dialogue process[31]. Some preferred 'Asian' Regional Forum, but Singapore's insistence on the latter provided a clear symbol of ASEAN's control over the emerging security dialogue. The SOM Chairman's statement outlined the rationale of 'inclusive engagement', stating that "[t]he continuing presence of the United States, as well as stable relationships among the United States, Japan and China, and other states of the region would contribute to regional stability" and called on "ASEAN and its dialogue partners to work with other regional states to evolve a predictable and constructive pattern of relationships in the Asia-Pacific"[32]. At an informal dinner after the July 1993 PMC, ASEAN hosted all the major players where they agreed to convene the first ARF meeting in Bangkok the following year.

By extending its diplomatic leadership through performing this new function of 'inclusive engagement', not only could ASEAN engage the great powers itself, but also foster an environment where the great powers could engage with each other. This could occur within a context of mutual commitment to ASEAN rules and norms, particularly as ASEAN introduced the TAC as a code of conduct for the emerging dialogue. In this way, we see the emergence of the conception of ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', providing the forum for the full orchestra to assemble as well as the normative score from which they could all play by. ASEAN leaders highlighted the hierarchy within the ARF, already alluded to with respect to its name, by pointing out that it was ASEAN taking the initiative to invite other powers to be involved in regional dialogue. Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan stated that "ASEAN is still at the helm. ASEAN is in the driver's seat. ASEAN will be in the chair at the Forum; others are coming in as interested bystanders -they won't be in the driver's seat"[33]. These were ambitious claims, but they needed to be endorsed in order for the role to be firmly established.

Responses from constituencies of legitimation

The US endorsed ASEAN's claims to perform the function of 'inclusive engagement' because of ASEAN's indigenous identity, its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order and because doing so suited US domestic and foreign policy aims. Although initially reluctant to join any multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, by 1993 the US had come to support regional

[31] Caballero-Anthony (2005: 126).
[32] Emmers (2003: 115).
[33] Yang Razali Kassim, "When Asean becomes a player on the world stage: interview with Surin Pitsuwan." *Business Times* (Singapore), 3/8/94.

security dialogue as a supplement to the 'hub and spokes' system of bilateral alliances. The priority for the incoming Clinton administration was to highlight the stakes the US had in Asia for its domestic population and to convince regional states of the US' staying power. The administration raised APEC to the summit level – meaning the US president would travel to Asia almost every year – and called for the creation of a Pacific Community "built on shared strength, shared prosperity and a shared commitment to democratic values"[34]. Officials within the State Department were concerned however that the US had overstepped its mark as it experienced resistance to its push for a Pacific Community and promotion of democracy and human rights. This revealed the tension created when the US, as an external actor, appeared to be claiming its own diplomatic leadership.

State Department officials working on Asia thus saw participation in the ARF under ASEAN's indigenous leadership as necessary to demonstrate the US' engagement on the region's terms, forestalling any attempts to develop an exclusive Asian grouping. In a memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia Winston Lord stated how participation in ASEAN meetings like the ARF could help assuage regional concerns that the US was acting like an "international nanny". He stated that "[w]hile Asians want us engaged, they are increasingly conscious and proud of their accomplishments, in contrast to trends in other regions. Their growing prosperity and power require that our relations be seen as founded on equality. We need a sophisticated diplomacy that is better calibrated to the changing Asian environment"[35]. US officials also regarded ASEAN as competent based on its performance of diplomatic functions in managing Southeast Asian order. State Department official David Brown reflected that "because of its economic success and its diplomatic contribution, ASEAN was quite highly regarded in that period"[36]. Participation was made easier as the ARF was a low-stakes commitment only involving the Secretary of State, with no treaties to sign and no secretariat to contribute towards[37]. An official in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau at the time summed up the feeling within the US that "the U.S. had nothing to lose and potentially something to gain over the long term by getting people together and seeing if they couldn't build "habits of cooperation" as we put it then. To talk about security issues, to understand each other's concerns and fears and build habits of cooperation where they had not existed before"[38]. For those officials working on Asia, the ARF provided a means to ensure

[34] President William Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Address to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea." Seoul, Korea. 10/7/1993.
[35] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training "Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98" *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.
[36] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training "Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03" *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.
[37] Goh (2004).
[38] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training "Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03" *Foreign Affairs Oral*

regular Secretary of State visits to Asia[39]. This aspect was key for the US' endorsement of the 'inclusive engagement' function that ASEAN could perform. The Secretary of State could build into his/her visit to the region meetings with other foreign ministers at a bilateral level. This was especially important with respect to China.

However, the US did not endorse ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' unconditionally. US criticism of ASEAN's leadership with respect to decisions over ARF membership showed that it viewed some regimes as unworthy of engagement. The US reacted angrily to ASEAN's decision to admit Myanmar in 1996 without extensive consultation[40]. This reflected its general view that ASEAN's 'constructive engagement' with the Myanmar junta was not working and that the regime should be isolated. Outside of the ARF, the US, to a certain extent, contested ASEAN's role as a collective actor by preferring to deal with states individually.

Australia's attempts to initiate regional dialogue showed that it felt it could perform a similar role to ASEAN based on its own diplomatic experience and non-threatening identity as well as its activism in initiating APEC. After the opposition to their proposals however, Australian officials came to realise that a new organisation could not be created. Since the ASEAN states shared the imperative of keeping the US engaged in Asia, it was best as a first step to support grafting the ARF onto ASEAN[41].

As a result, the US and Western states recognised ASEAN's ability to convene dialogue because of its indigenous identity and status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order – ASEAN's 'competence power'[42]. In conceding to ASEAN by endorsing its role claims however, certain role expectations emerged from this key constituency of legitimation. If ASEAN was to be the 'regional conductor', the US and other Western states expected it to provide more formal and concrete functional cooperation, rather than cooperation based merely on process. For example, the repeated emphasis on Weapons of Mass Destruction, notably by Secretary of State Winston Lord at the ASEAN PMC in July 1993, showed that the US was keen to develop effective mechanisms to tackle specific security issues[43].

History Project <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.

[39] Ashizawa (2013: 183).

[40] Haacke (2003: 144).

[41] Smith (2007).

[42] Eaton and Stubbs (2006).

[43] Glosserman (2010: 39).

Japan showed strong endorsement of the ARF and ASEAN's leadership in these early years. Japan supported Singapore during its chairmanship of the Standing Committee in pushing for a consensus within ASEAN on a regional security dialogue. It also played an important part in bringing the US round to supporting the dialogue. In June 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa made a speech in Washington DC in which he called for a two-track approach to regional security: one being sub-regional initiatives to address specific security issues and the other a broad security dialogue to enhance the sense of regional reassurance[44]. The Miyazawa proposal sought to impress on the US that the 'hub and spokes' system by itself was not enough to address post-Cold War security issues. Japan saw a regional security dialogue as a means to address its concerns regarding China as well as a means for ensuring US regional engagement. It was also seen as a way exercise a more assertive regional policy, but within a context that would reassure regional states. Providing behind-the-scenes support for ASEAN's initiative on the issue ensured that a dialogue could indeed be set up but without Japan taking the lead. This was significant considering the unsuccessful attempt by Prime Minister Mahathir to promote Japanese leadership within an exclusive East Asian economic bloc in 1990[45]. The US had successfully blocked this idea and Japan and other ASEAN states instead supported APEC.

China showed reluctance to participate in regional security dialogue in the early years of the post-Cold War period. Chinese officials were sceptical about multilateralism, seeing it as another means to contain China in the wake of the Tienanmen Square killings. ASEAN was keen to emphasise the need for the dialogue to be informal with any decision-making being based on consensus. Decisions would be non-binding, with discussion moving at a pace comfortable to all. This was reassuring to China because it knew that within this structure it could not be singled out as 'recalcitrant' and it also would not have to line up voting coalitions to reject motions it felt went against its interests[46]. The fact that ASEAN was to lead the process also assured China. Many leaders of ASEAN states had championed "Asian values" in the early 1990s, appealing to China's resistance to the Western human rights agenda. That the ASEAN states were willing to defy Western states on the issue of human rights, and promote the norm of non-interference, meant that it was less likely the ARF could be used by Western states to push their normative agenda. China therefore viewed ASEAN's indigenous identity and neutral status as the most important aspects in endorsing ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. China also saw support for ASEAN as part of its quest for a

[44] Yuzawa (2007: 40).
[45] Known as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG).
[46] Foot (1998: 428).

multi-polar world through diluting US influence in the region[47].

The attendance of these major powers at the inaugural ARF dinner in 1993 gave performative endorsement for ASEAN's claims to perform the new function of 'inclusive engagement'. This conferred legitimacy on ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, meaning it had taken on a shared existence within regional society and could now be used by ASEAN.

Role enactment

ASEAN enacted its 'regional conductor' role by establishing the ARF, its membership, institutional form and agenda over the first few years of its existence. It convened the first full regional 'orchestra' involving all the regional powers and players. Through this, ASEAN provided a new basis for its own relevance in the emerging post-Cold War context by providing the function of 'inclusive engagement'. ASEAN also provided the 'score' for the regional 'orchestra'; the TAC was accepted in the ARF Concept Paper "as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation"[48]. ASEAN therefore contributed to the emerging Asia-Pacific regional order by ensuring that it would be norm-governed, based on ASEAN norms provided in the TAC. A discursive commitment to adhere to the 'score' of the TAC was sufficient at this stage for membership within the regional 'orchestra'. This served to assuage Indonesian concerns that opening up the TAC to be signed by the great powers would invite more interference into Southeast Asia by external powers because of the provisions on the High Council within the TAC. Agreed to by all members of the ARF, the Concept Paper also formally recognised ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order due to its "demonstrable record of enhancing regional cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific" and that "[t]he annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants"[49]. The member states agreed to three stages with which the ARF was to evolve: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and finally elaboration of approaches to conflicts. The fact that this represented greater institutionalisation than ASEAN itself may have reflected a concession to the Western participants which desired more

[47] Cheng (1999).
[48] ASEAN (1995).
[49] ASEAN (1995).

formal cooperation[50]. Certainly the wording of the third stage, watered down from 'conflict resolution mechanisms', represented a concession to China which objected to the original wording[51]. ASEAN also gave all member states a stake in the ARF process through co-chairing Inter-sessional groups, which met in between ARF meetings to discuss different aspects of the ARF agenda. The importance of ASEAN's diplomatic leadership through 'inclusive engagement' was further highlighted by India's efforts to gain full dialogue partnership status and membership of the ARF. According to former Indian Ambassador to Indonesia Sudhir Devare, Indian officials lobbied hard in Jakarta and elsewhere to gain membership. Indian officials celebrated their admission in 1996 as an important step in breaking out of South Asia and strategically entering the Asia-Pacific[52]. This highlighted the importance regional players attached to ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role and the way it could act as a gatekeeper for membership in the Asia-Pacific 'orchestra'.

First transitional role bargain

ASEAN situated its 'regional conductor' role within reciprocal role bargains with the US and China. The reciprocal role bargain between ASEAN and the US legitimised the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role and ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. The US continued to provide security public goods through its renewed bilateral alliances and relationships, whilst ASEAN provided the function of 'inclusive engagement'. The US supported ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in return for ASEAN not challenging the US' bilateral alliances through its proposed security dialogue, nor 'drawing a line down the Pacific' by developing an exclusive East Asian regional grouping. This bargain was upheld by reciprocal legitimacy dynamics: ASEAN was able to demonstrate regional autonomy in shaping the emerging regional order in a way that maintained its relevance; the US, by being invited to engage the region in security dialogue, was able to better sell its Asia-focused foreign policy domestically in a way that did not alienate regional states through appearing as an 'international nanny'. The ARF also provided the US with a forum for engaging states with which it had troubled bilateral ties. This was especially true of China. For example, after the downturn in bilateral relations following the visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to the US in 1995, the ARF provided a politically neutral forum for China-US bilateral engagement. Former office director of the US State Department's desk on Regional Security Policy for East Asia Pacific, Ernestine Heck, reported that the ARF meeting in 1996 "was really the first decent chance for us to engage the Chinese at the level of Secretary of State in the course of what had been almost a year. So it was

[50] This point was expressed by Ralf Emmers in conversation with the author, RSIS, Singapore, 4/3/14.
[51] Emmers (2003: 32).
[52] Devare (2011).

very important to us from the bilateral point of view"[53]. This lack of engagement between China and the US reflected the US' failure to clearly provide a convincing strategic rationale for rapprochement and engagement with China, meaning the relationship was held hostage to competing domestic constituencies within the US: those that reviled China's human rights violations on the one hand and business constituencies that opposed sanctions against China on the other. Winston Lord reportedly pushed hard for Clinton to give a speech dedicated to presenting a "strategic approach to China laid out to the public in a broader framework, so that these constant problems that we had on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, trade, and Taiwan wouldn't be the only things that people noticed. These issues could be put in a broader context of the need for engagement on some of the more positive aspects of the agenda"[54]. Clinton failed to do so in his first term and Lord believed the US paid the price with respect to encouraging reform within China because the PRC was able to take advantage of the clear divisions within Washington[55].

ASEAN contributed in this context by using its new role to provide a mechanism through which to engage China in a way that would reassure Beijing that its rise would not be contained and at the same time socialise it into a 'responsible regional great power' role. The ARF therefore added another layer to ASEAN's engagement of China and established a ASEAN-China role bargain. In return for China recognising ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', ASEAN recognised China's interests as the 'responsible regional great power', but China needed to adhere to regional norms and show strategic restraint. For example, ASEAN accommodated China's concerns by emphasising the informality of the ARF, not inviting Taiwan to join the ARF and keeping the Taiwan issue off the ARF agenda. Early signs that China was showing restraint appeared to be positive, with the notable exceptions of the Mischief Reef incident and the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1995 and 1996. China published a Defence White Paper and also acquiesced to the South China Sea conflict being discussed at the second ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995. The Brunei meeting came just months after Mischief Reef and through doing so China indicated for the first time that it would abide by international law in sovereignty negotiations with other claimants to the Spratly islands. This represented a major concession as previously China had just insisted that the Spratlys were Chinese territory[56]. The ability of ASEAN to persuade China to discuss the issue at the ARF showed the benefit of ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement'. A US state department official reported

[53] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training "Interview with Ernestine S Heck, 11/12/97" *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Heck,%20Ernestine%20S.toc.pdf> accessed 19/5/14.
[54] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training "Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98" *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 9/9/14.
[55] *ibid*
[56] Cheng (1999: 190).

that “this was one of the things that convinced people that having the ASEAN Regional Forum was a useful forum. The ARF couldn’t challenge the Chinese, but it could put a certain amount of pressure on the Chinese and force the Chinese to take opinions in the region into account in ways that the Chinese wouldn't have had to do if the organization didn't exist. Winston [Lord] and [Warren] Christopher were all really very pleased with the way this worked out. One year after its creation, the ARF was serving as a significant forum for discussion”[57].

Creating the 'regional conductor' role enabled ASEAN to extend the primary function of diplomatic leadership to the wider Asia-Pacific, this time through 'inclusive engagement' and rule-making. This built directly on ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially through the use of the PMC for launching the ARF, and the two roles were fundamentally linked: the 'regional conductor' role consisted of the status of being a successful manager of Southeast Asian order and thus relied on the perceived performance of ASEAN's 'primary manager' role. Questions would soon be raised regarding ASEAN's performance of its 'primary manager' role, which would threaten its new 'regional conductor' role with deterioration.

AVOIDING ROLE DETERIORATION: 1997-2005

The first transitional role bargain only lasted until the late 1990s when severe economic crisis hit the region. The crisis had a negative impact on ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order, which, when added to frustrations within the ARF, led to growing contestation from Western constituencies of legitimation. This threatened ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role with deterioration and possible role death. After the attacks of September 11th 2001, when US foreign policy became focused on a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), ASEAN faced further irrelevance to advancing US strategic objectives. By 2005 however, ASEAN had reasserted its 'regional conductor' role in the latest incarnation of the regional 'orchestra', the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS was a leader-led forum where formal accession to ASEAN's 'score' (TAC) was a condition for membership. This section shows how ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role went from possible deterioration to being further entrenched within an East Asian transitional role bargain.

[57] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with David G. Brown, 28/1/03” *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Brown,%20David%20G.toc.pdf> accessed 18/5/14.

Western challenge to ASEAN's status as a successful manager

Western contestation mainly centred on the US' concerns regarding ASEAN's usefulness and competence. The US was frustrated with the lack of progress within the ARF and critical of ASEAN's inability to address the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The US' actions during the AFC and during the GWOT after 2001, engendered a sense within Southeast Asia that the US was neglecting ASEAN and acting in ways that served its own interests without consideration for ASEAN's concerns. The US appeared to be a major soloist that would not submit to ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', destabilising the first transitional role bargain.

The ARF and AFC

Western frustration with the ARF in the late 1990s challenged the need for the function of 'inclusive engagement' and revealed Western expectations that the ARF produce more concrete outcomes. The US was also critical of the ARF's inability to address the North Korean nuclear issue and its silence on the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996. US officials were also frustrated with the failure to move from confidence-building measures to preventative diplomacy. They tended to view military transparency as key to confidence-building and considered preventive diplomacy as effective if backed up by the thereat of the use of force[58]. US officials were therefore unimpressed by the limited steps taken within the ARF towards confidence-building, which included the voluntary publication of defence White Papers. To encourage institutional progress, the US supported Australia's proposal to establish an 'ARF Troika' consisting of the ARF chair and a non-ASEAN ARF member. In 1995, US Secretary of Defence William Perry spoke out in favour of formal multilateral security discussions within APEC as it was seen as less encumbered by the 'ASEAN way'. There were also quiet proposals to change the name of the ARF from ASEAN Regional Forum to Asian Regional Forum[59]. This reflected more general discontent over ASEAN's monopoly on deciding membership and form of the regional dialogue. US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that the "ARF's non-members now outnumber its ASEAN creators, and so some means must be devised to reflect this, perhaps by permitting an equitable sharing of the privileges and responsibilities of chairmanship"[60]. His predecessor, Winston Lord, reported that US officials met with other non-ASEAN members of the ARF regularly to align their strategies so that the agenda would not be

[58] Haacke (2003: 153).
[59] Haacke (2003: 150).
[60] Quoted in Haacke (2003: 154).

dominated by ASEAN[61].

Even Japan, a strong supporter of the ARF and ASEAN's leadership within the process, became disillusioned with the lack of progress by the late 1990s. Japanese officials tried to introduce concrete CBMs such as the publication of defence white papers and participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA) as a means to bridge the gap between Western members and China and ASEAN members that preferred informal and voluntary CBMs[62]. In this task Japan was joined by Singapore which also saw the need to advance the ARF's progress in order to maintain its credibility as an effective forum. However, even the CBMs that were agreed to were not fully implemented over the course of the first few years because of resistance from reluctant members.

Western frustrations challenged ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role; if major regional states like the US and Japan did not see their own security interests being addressed within the ARF, then this increased the risk of ASEAN being marginalised as these states sought other mechanisms to address security issues. Indeed, the revision of the US-Japan alliance in 1996/97 further underlined that the US' alliances were the primary focus for US engagement in the region. US attention for the ARF depended on the degree to which it could be useful in selling Clinton's engagement strategy towards China domestically[63]. If it was not clear that the ARF could evolve beyond confidence-building, and show that China was evolving with it, then this reduced the efficacy of the argument for the importance of the ARF within the US' strategy[64]. On top of this were bureaucratic and scheduling pressures which meant the ARF had to compete with other events and forums for US attention.

A more fundamental challenge for ASEAN however was that the Asian Financial Crisis and the transboundary haze problem revealed ASEAN's inability to deal with internal Southeast Asian issues, severely affecting its perceived competence as the 'primary manager'. The AFC began in Thailand and quickly spread around the region as individual states took preventative measures that tended to exacerbate the crisis. The US and the EU blamed the crisis on poor macroeconomic

[61] Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training “Interview with Winston Lord, 28/4/98” *Foreign Affairs Oral History Project* <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf> accessed 8/5/14.
[62] Yuzawa (2010).
[63] Goh (2004).
[64] The principal multilateral mechanisms through which the US was engaging China were economic: the WTO and APEC. These reflected the interests of the major engagement lobby within the US that sought economic opportunities in a liberalising Chinese market.

management and insufficient financial liberalisation mixed with crony capitalism, corruption and bad governance. The necessary response was to pursue structural adjustment under the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Managing Director of the IMF Michel Camdessus described the AFC as a “blessing in disguise” allowing a window of opportunity to sweep away crony capitalism and open up Asian markets along Western lines[65]. In contrast, ASEAN leaders viewed the crisis as a result of unregulated global financial markets, which allowed for unaccountable behaviour, especially by currency speculators who could play off the weaknesses of Southeast Asian states. A strong negative perception of the US' involvement in the crisis developed. Regional states accused the US of taking advantage of Southeast Asia's weakness and asserting US interests through the IMF. There was bitter resentment towards the IMF reforms that were seen as promoting economic liberalisation but providing no mechanism to regulate and supervise markets. ASEAN states also resented the US blocking Japan's 1997 proposal to provide emergency liquidity through an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). In Indonesia for instance there was a growing fear that an unrestrained US would use issues such as human rights, as well as institutions like the IMF, for political subversion[66].

This fear was especially acute as the legitimacy Southeast Asian regimes had built on their capacity to provide continued economic development crumbled in the face of financial and economic chaos. Indonesia was the worst affected where widespread protests brought down the Suharto regime in 1998 and provoked communal unrest, targeted mostly at the economically dominant ethnic Chinese. The economic crisis also sparked fragmentation as independence movements re-emerged in East Timor and Aceh. This was a major blow to ASEAN as Suharto had personally been associated with Indonesia’s commitment and leadership within ASEAN. His downfall and the ensuing instability created a leadership deficit within the Association[67]. This instability also exacerbated the transboundary haze crisis as it affected the Indonesian government's ability to address the forest fires that were causing the damaging haze, which engulfed large areas of Southeast Asia in 1997/98. The lack of a regional mechanism to deal with the problem, and the norm of non-interference, which appeared to act as a barrier to establishing and implementing such a mechanism, further highlighted for Western critics ASEAN's lack of competence as the 'primary manager'.

[65] Higgot and Phillips (2000: 360).
[66] Novotny (2010: 123-126).
[67] Smith (1999).

The Global War on Terrorism

Just as regional states began their recovery after the AFC, the US-led GWOT served to exacerbate existing concerns regarding the US' neglect of ASEAN and tendency towards unilateralism. Although all Southeast Asian states took advantage of the new strategic context by further developing bilateral ties and gaining access to military assistance, the Bush administration's narrow security focus on counter-terrorism led it to further question the usefulness of ASEAN's processes. Indicative of this was Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's failure to attend the ARF in 2005 and 2007 and US officials' attempts to introduce security matters into APEC. There was no mention of multilateral initiatives in the Quadrennial Defence Review and only mention with regards to economics in the National Security Strategy 2002. Although supportive of the ARF overall, former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific Stanley Roth stated that one of the ways the ARF could realise its real potential would be for ASEAN to give up some of its control[68]. The US' frustration with the ARF in the late 1990s had turned into a tendency to bypass the ARF altogether. This was a major contestation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role because it showed the apparent irrelevance of ASEAN to the US as it pursued its primary strategic imperative of counter-terrorism. This undermined the initial goal of the creation of the ARF as a means to ensure and maintain the US' broad engagement in the region as the 'offshore great power guarantor', disrupting the reciprocal legitimacy dynamics of the first post-Cold War role bargain. The US was in this sense unavailable to balance the perceived growing influence of China. One Singaporean diplomat stated that "[t]he United States may still dominate the [regional] balance of power, but not the balance of influence"[69].

On top of this there were more specific concerns regarding the Bush administration's unilateralism and apparent "crusade" against Islam. This was especially acute because the administration's doctrine of 'pre-emption' maintained that the US could unilaterally act to pre-empt any kind of terrorist attack. This could involve military strikes against terrorist groups operating within other states' territories, undermining not only ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, but also individual states' authority within their own territories. It suggested that the US no longer saw the need to retain the 'offshore' aspect of its great power role, but take necessary actions unilaterally regardless of the wishes of regional states. Within Malaysia and Indonesia in particular there was a growing political challenge from Islamic parties as well as large Islamic constituencies within the population that were bitterly opposed to US policy. Malaysian and Indonesian leaders were able to

[68] Glosserman (2010: 42-44).
[69] Shambaugh (2004/05: 66).

counter this to a certain extent after the Bali bombings in 2002, by pointing to a clear threat to the region from Muslim extremist groups[70]. However, these states remained highly sensitive to US policy, especially if the US conducted pre-emptive strikes against Southeast Asian terrorists. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia condemned US interference in regional affairs when the Indonesian press mistakenly reported that the US wanted to position US Special Operation Forces in the Malacca Straits as part of a Regional Maritime Surveillance Initiative (RMSI) proposal in 2004[71]. Despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's efforts to reassure Malaysia and Indonesia that RMSI proposed cooperation between the US and Southeast Asian states to address transnational security threats within existing international and domestic law, their opposition killed the proposal.

Institutionalising East Asia

With the US apparently acting as a 'soloist' ignoring ASEAN as the 'regional conductor', ASEAN took steps to convene an 'East Asian' regional 'orchestra' as a hedge against the perceived excesses of US unilateralism and uphold ASEAN's role as the 'regional conductor'. In the wake of the crises ASEAN faced in the late 1990s, ASEAN leaders were determined to stick together. Then ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino reflected that "ASEAN's attitude at that time was: we had to have political cohesion, economic integration, regional cooperation, if each of us is going to survive"[72]. Regional unity was imperative, as was the need to address ASEAN's shortcomings so as to present ASEAN as a credible institution[73]. However, ASEAN remained dependent on external partners for economic and security public goods. As noted by one ASEAN official, the AFC exposed what was already known within ASEAN: ASEAN was weak and needed help from external partners. In the context of the US' perceived neglect of ASEAN, Japan and China became more important partners to draw on for external support. Indeed, through the AFC "[ASEAN] found who could help [it] and who could not"[74]. The US' behaviour contrasted with Japan's willingness to provide emergency funds and China's decision to not devalue its currency during the AFC (which would have improved the competitiveness of its exports hurting Southeast Asia's exports). China also offered loans to regional states with few conditions. Even though China was acting in its own interests, this confirmed for many states that China was moving towards being a 'responsible regional great power' and put it in a better position to be negotiated into performing economic functions within an East Asian framework. Prior to this, China had mostly been viewed as an

[70] Chin (2003: 11).
[71] Storey (2009: 40).
[72] Interview with Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
[73] Singh (2000: 4).
[74] Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.

economic competitor and threat to the regional economy[75].

Japanese and Chinese willingness to engage with and support ASEAN, meant ASEAN was able to keep its 'regional conductor' role from deteriorating. Indeed, ASEAN used its 'regional conductor' role to channel emerging Sino-Japanese competition into two order-building processes: negotiating regional order functions and providing a 'vision' for regional 'community'. ASEAN did so through its ASEAN Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) frameworks, which ASEAN raised to the Summit level by inviting China, Japan and South Korea to the Kuala Lumpur informal summit in December 1997[76]. In Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN convened its own summit first, then 'plus one' summits with each Northeast Asian partner individually before convening the APT. The APT was the first exclusive East Asia-only grouping, giving institutional form to an 'East Asian' region that did not include the US. ASEAN nested the APT within the ASEAN process rather than creating a strictly independent institution meaning it was able to maintain control over how the process developed[77]. This again demonstrated ASEAN's capacity to convene large-scale meetings despite its limited material capabilities. As stated by one prominent ASEAN watcher, the AFC and its aftermath produced "[t]he realisation of ASEAN's limitation, as well as the usefulness of ASEAN because it was the ASEAN mechanism that you could develop, to develop an ASEAN Plus Three"[78]. The eventual outcome of negotiations over regional order functions and a vision for East Asian community was an East Asian transitional role bargain within which ASEAN further embedded its 'regional conductor' role.

Regional order functions

The key regional order functions that ASEAN has negotiated with China and Japan have been trade agreements, development assistance and investment, and financial leadership.

Trade ASEAN has channelled Sino-Japanese competition over trade agreements primarily through its ASEAN Plus One processes. Trade is a key aspect of order because it provides connections between states, which contribute to a sense of interdependence, but also because it is an area of interaction in international society that is significantly rule-governed. Trade agreements can also boost economic growth in participating states by providing access to new markets. In 2000 China proposed a free trade agreement with ASEAN and the two sides agreed to the China-ASEAN

[75] Ba (2003).
[76] Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
[77] Dent (2010: 8).
[78] Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.

Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2002. CAFTA proposed creating a free trade area by 2010. This was the first time an external power had treated ASEAN as a single economic actor. It was also a turnaround in China's trade policy as it had previously focused on global negotiations within the WTO. In 2003, China introduced the Early Harvest Programme within CAFTA by eliminating tariffs on certain products, further highlighting its benign intentions towards ASEAN. Japanese officials saw China's policy, especially CAFTA, as potentially marginalising Japan in East Asian economic and political cooperation[79]. To counter this, Japan hosted a commemorative Summit with ASEAN in Tokyo in December 2003, which was the first summit meeting held outside of an ASEAN member state. Japan also proposed a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership, emphasising the complimentary economies of itself and ASEAN in contrast to the generally competitive economies of China and ASEAN. Analysts have questioned the extent to which these trade agreements have added substantive economic value in terms of reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, as many states have continued to protect key industries. However, these agreements have taken on a political and symbolic significance for demonstrating regional benevolence[80]. By channelling this competition through its processes, ASEAN has contributed to order by putting in place frameworks within which Japan and China can compete to show their benignity and also where further trade negotiation can develop[81].

Development assistance and investment These are key for economic growth and development in the region, which in turn is considered crucial for security and regime legitimacy in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has shown concern for narrowing the gap between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia through promoting economic development in the CLMV states. China and Japan have been crucial in this respect and ASEAN has again channelled Sino-Japanese competition into commitments to support ASEAN’s integration and the development of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). China has made significant investments in mainland Southeast Asia and agreed to cancel the debts of the newer members of ASEAN citing its support for the Initiative for ASEAN Integration[82]. China has also participated in the GMS Economic Cooperation Programme and ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) forum, providing infrastructure investment including developing a network of highways and railways to link its southern provinces physically with Southeast Asia[83]. Chinese leaders sought to dispel fears that China was taking

[79] Terada (2010: 80).
[80] See Ravenhill (2010).
[81] Goh (2007/08) shows how such competition still constitutes power balancing, but channelled through less conflictual arenas.
[82] Hourn and Chanto (2005).
[83] See Goh (2007). For an analysis of China’s use of infrastructure investment to increase influence see Holstag (2010).

foreign direct investment (FDI) away from Southeast Asia by promising at the Bali Summit in 2003 that China would increase its own commitment to invest in the region. By 2007, China's ODA and FDI into the CLMV consisted of just over US$2 billion[84].

Whereas China's investment in ASEAN started from a low base, Japan has long been Southeast Asia's largest source of overseas development assistance (ODA) and one of the top sources of FDI. In recent years, Japan's attention has also turned towards supporting ASEAN's economic integration and development of the Mekong region. At the ASEAN-Japan ministerial meeting in 2000, Japan announced its special commitment to the GMS. At the 2003 Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit a new 'Mekong Region Development' concept was announced where Japan committed to expand cooperation with ASEAN to promote trade and investment and sustainable economic growth in the Mekong region[85]. In 2009, Japan hosted the first Japan-Mekong Summit with Thailand and the CLMV. At the 4th Japan-Mekong Summit meeting in 2012 these states adopted the 'Tokyo Strategy for Mekong-Japan Cooperation' and Japan committed ¥600 billion (US$7.5 billion) in ODA[86].

Regional financial leadership This comes in the form of liquidity provision and acting as a 'lender of last resort' during times of crisis. Such leadership was deemed important on a regional basis after the AFC and the perceived bullying of crisis-hit states by the US and the IMF. Financial regionalism has mostly developed within the APT through the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). The APT finance ministers agreed to the CMI in 2000, partly realising the abortive AMF. Through the AMF Japan proposed providing a fund of $100 billion based on a pooling of currency reserves by regional states, of which Japan would provide the predominant share[87]. The CMI also worked on the basis of pooling resources through a series of bilateral currency swaps. By 2007 16 bilateral agreements had been set up amounting to $82.5 billion[88]. It has since developed into a multilateral (CMIM) arrangement with a reserve pooling of $120 billion consisting of contributions from all APT members. China and Japan competed over the amount that each would contribute, seeing this as symbolic for establishing financial leadership within the region. The compromise was to give China and Japan equal contributions of 32 per cent each, South Korea 16 per cent and ASEAN 20

[84] Hao (2008).
[85] Thuzar (2014: 77).
[86] Japanese MOFA "Tokyo Strategy 2012 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation" <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/mekong/summit04/joint_statement_en.html> accessed 6/10/14.
[87] Dent (2008b: 155).
[88] Dent (2008b: 157).

per cent[89]. The ASEAN states boosted their weight within CMIM by contributing collectively; however, even collectively, ASEAN's share of 20 per cent highlights it lack of financial capacity relative to its Northeast Asian neighbours. To maintain some centrality within the CMIM ASEAN successfully lobbied for the surveillance mechanism for CMIM, known as the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), to be located Singapore in 2011[90]. The CMI is the most developed aspect of East Asian financial regionalism and has provided the most explicit example of negotiation over regional contributions to financial order functions.

On top of regional economic public goods, China and Japan have competed to show commitment to ASEAN's 'score'. China agreed to sign onto the protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty in 1999, the first nuclear weapon state to agree to do so. In 2002 China even agreed to negotiate with ASEAN as a group on the South China Sea conflict signing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea. During the early 2000s China made no attempt to seize further disputed features in the Spratlys[91]. This was followed in 2003 by China becoming the first great power to sign the TAC. Japan also signed the TAC in 2004 after refusing to do so for years. This created a lot of good will within ASEAN, especially with respect to China. ASEAN officials were optimistic that the strategy to socialise China into a 'responsible regional great power' role was paying off[92]. A notable example of this sea change was the Strategic Partnership announced between Indonesia and China in 2005, a major achievement considering the long-held suspicions within Indonesia regarding China[93].

Vision for East Asian community

The second aspect of Sino-Japanese competition that ASEAN channelled through its “ASEAN Plus” processes was competition over a vision for an 'East Asian Community' (EAC). The APT-appointed East Asia Study Group (EASG) submitted in their report of 2001 that the APT members should develop an EAC as a long-term aim. Japan then initiated competition over the form of an EAC when in 2002 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that it should comprise the APT members and also Australia and New Zealand as 'core members'[94]. The Japanese hoped the

[89] See Grimes (2011).
[90] Yoshimatsu (2014: 183).
[91] Emmers (2010: 127).
[92] Ba (2006) highlights how the process of engagement and reassurance worked both ways raising the question of who was socialising whom within the ASEAN-China relationship.
[93] Novotny (2010) notes still widespread uncertainty within Indonesia regarding China’s rise and growing nationalism within China. He also notes the positive view of China’s rise, that China provides a needed check on US unilateralism.
[94] Terada (2010).

inclusion of other economically developed US allies would help check the potential dominance of China. Japan subsequently insisted that the East Asia Summit (EAS), recommended as a medium-term objective by the EASG, be based on “open regionalism” and that membership be extended to Australia, New Zealand and India.

In contrast, China saw East Asian community-building as based on an 'Asian' identity and so the Caucasian nations were necessarily excluded. China proposed that the EAS should represent the evolution of the APT, with the same membership and a rotating chair, and that China should host the first summit. China's proposal challenged ASEAN's monopoly on hosting East Asian regionalism. Without US involvement, China saw no need for ASEAN's diplomatic leadership and was staking a claim to perform the function itself.

At the 2004 APT meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi proposed moving ahead with the EAS. China was immediately supportive and secured Badawi's support for China to host the second summit in return for China’s support for the inaugural summit to take place in Kuala Lumpur in 2005[95]. Japan responded by offering to co-chair the first summit in KL, which the Chinese opposed, advocating that only the host country could chair the summit.

Indonesia reacted negatively to Malaysia's proposal as it was reticent about evolution to the EAS. Establishing East Asian regionalism based on 'community' would subsume ASEAN and minimise Indonesia’s own role in Southeast Asia[96]. Indonesia was however persuaded of the necessity of establishing an EAS because of the economic rationale. China and India's rapid growth raised concerns in ASEAN that these states would emerge as major competitors to ASEAN. ASEAN needed to take the initiative quickly to establish a mechanism for engagement with these neighbours so that it could increase its economic leverage with them and avoid being marginalised. As then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong reported, the prevailing view at the time was that “[e]ither you join them, or you will be left by the wayside”[97]. Indonesia remained opposed to an EAS based on the membership of the APT however, as such a grouping would be dominated by China. Indonesian officials held that, if a wider grouping was necessary, then it should be opened up and not be exclusive[98]. Singaporean officials agreed, believing that no power could check China

[95] Terada (2006: 8).
[96] Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
[97] *Ibid*.
[98] Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.

within an APT-based EAS[99]. Malaysia was persuaded by Indonesian and Singaporean pressure to invite India, Australia and New Zealand to the first summit[100].

China and Malaysia subsequently asserted that there should be a two-tier “ASEAN+3+3”, with a 'core' APT basis for an East Asian Community and a peripheral place for the other three states[101]. On the eve of the summit, China proposed that the APT remain the core group for establishing an EAC, which was apparently supported by not just Malaysia but also South Korea, Myanmar and Thailand[102]. The two-tier EAS was opposed by Japan, Indonesia and Singapore which wanted the increased pro-US membership to be equally involved and a link left open for other future members (such as the US) and for coordination with global economic institutions. This was aimed at diluting China's influence by blocking the exclusive APT-based East Asian community initiative, within which China would have a dominant position.

As China and Japan seemed intent on blocking each other's proposals for the EAS, ASEAN was granted an opportunity to use its 'regional conductor' role to take control for itself. ASEAN had previously conceded to alternate hosting the EAS between ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, but instead rejected China's offer to host the second EAS, insisted on expanded membership and also insisted on hosting all summits within Southeast Asia alongside the other yearly summit meetings[103]. The move to take control of the EAS was justified by the argument that Sino-Japanese competition endangered the community-building project and therefore ASEAN needed to keep it on track[104]. To hold the regional 'orchestra' together, ASEAN used its prerogative as 'regional conductor' to convene the EAS as part of its existing ASEAN-led processes and put forward its own criteria for membership. ASEAN's criteria were reportedly inserted by Singapore as a means to give ASEAN ownership over the process[105]. The conditions were: 1) signing of the TAC, 2) official dialogue partner status, 3) substantial relations with ASEAN and 4) agreement of all ASEAN members.

By making the TAC one of the criteria for membership in the new forum, ASEAN further politicised the treaty making it more difficult for states not the accede. ASEAN thus further claimed its rule-making function in the region; membership in the regional 'orchestra' now required a formal

[99] Terada (2010: 76-77).
[100] Kim et al (2011: 393).
[101] Interview with Professor Lee Poh Ping, Institute of China Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 18/3/14.
[102] Malik (2006).
[103] Emmers et al (2010).
[104] Terada (2006: 9).
[105] Chuenboran (2011).

commitment to ASEAN's 'score'. Arguments (such as Japan's and the US') that accession could not be achieved because of legal reasons were now less useful against the potential loss of influence through the symbolic rejection of ASEAN 'score' and potential alienation from the premier leader-led regional summit. For example, Australian Prime Minister Howard's remark that the TAC reflected "a mind-set that we've really got to move on from" offended not just the ASEAN states, but also the Northeast Asian states that had signed the TAC. Prime Minister Badawi rebuked Howard, stating that members of the East Asian community had "a role to play and standards to uphold"; Australia's acceptance within the EAS depended on it upholding ASEAN's 'score'[106]. Australia reluctantly signed the TAC a week before the first EAS meeting in Kuala Lumpur, giving symbolic endorsement to ASEAN's rule-making. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer described the signing as "the price we paid" for Australia to be involved[107]. A key western state, that had previously been critical of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role within the ARF, was now submitting to ASEAN's authority as 'regional conductor' as the price for membership in the regional 'orchestra'.

China and Japan both acquiesced to ASEAN's EAS proposal because it partially fulfilled their respective regional visions, but also because giving ASEAN control meant blocking the other's chance at taking the lead. ASEAN's neutral status and its proven competence in convening such meetings made it an acceptable leader. China and Japan refrained from pushing their proposals any further, giving performative endorsement to ASEAN's continued performance of 'inclusive engagement'. ASEAN agreed that, rather than the APT evolving into the EAS, the APT should remain as the primary vehicle for East Asian Community-building alongside the EAS. This represented a concession to China but also assuaged concerns of a China-dominated exclusive regionalism because the APT would remain ASEAN-led. Indeed the APT continued as a forum for negotiation over East Asian provision of regional economic and financial public goods (as seen above in the evolution of the CMI/CMIM). By keeping the APT alongside the EAS, ASEAN was able to accommodate both China and Japan's visions for East Asian regionalism by offering alternative forums for them to pursue their goals. This was seen in China's promotion of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) within the APT and Japan's promotion of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) within the EAS.

[106] Kerr and Tow (2008: 178).
[107] Kerr and Tow (2008: 181).

Second transitional role bargain

The negotiations between 1997 and 2005 produced a transitional role bargain at the East Asian level. The developing links between Southeast Asian states and China at an individual and collective level, further legitimised China's 'responsible regional great power' role through increasing the economic and financial functions China was to perform. However, the result of negotiations over the EAS underlined that this role did not include the function of diplomatic leadership in an exclusive regionalism. The negotiations also further legitimised Japan in its 'regional economic great power' role and it joined ASEAN in opposing China's diplomatic leadership. ASEAN kept diplomatic leadership through ensuring the EAS was “open and outward-looking” and based on ASEAN leadership. ASEAN thus reasserted its 'inclusive engagement' function at the summit level and its 'rule-making' symbolised through EAS membership being dependent on accession to ASEAN's TAC. ASEAN thus further consolidated its 'regional conductor' role in the latest incarnation of the regional 'orchestra', and commitment to its 'score' was the major criterion for membership in the 'orchestra'. However, this bargain was necessarily transitional because it essentially delayed any fundamental agreement between China and Japan over the future of East Asian regionalism. It was also problematic in the sense that it did not include the US. However, the fact that membership in the EAS regional 'orchestra' was left open to those states willing to make a formal commitment to ASEAN's 'score', meant that the US was welcome to join if it gave up its resistance to signing the TAC. It would take a new administration within the US for this to take place. In the meantime ASEAN worked on re-conceptualising its own identity to boost its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order.

RE-CONCEPTUALISING: ASEAN ENLARGEMENT AND COMMUNITY

Although ASEAN was able to avoid role deterioration by negotiating its place in an East Asian division of labour, it still depended on Western endorsement to further consolidate its 'regional conductor' role and therefore it was imperative to address the legitimacy deficit with Western constituencies. Also, to protect its 'primary manager' role, ASEAN needed to take on new functions to avert interference in Southeast Asian affairs by the US and other Western states, especially in the context of Western promotion of democracy and human rights and the US' war on terrorism. ASEAN's re-conceptualisation of its 'primary manager' role involved enlargement to include all the states of Southeast Asia, as well as moves towards building an ASEAN Community.

Enlargement and Myanmar

Through including the CLMV[108] states between 1995 and 1999, ASEAN went from a collective of non-communist states to an Association that spoke for 'One Southeast Asia'. The idea of 'One Southeast Asia' had been espoused since the Association's creation and, as we saw in the last chapter, provided the basis for ASEAN's assertion of its rules and processes in Indochina before and during the Cambodian conflict. Enlargement bolstered the collective weight of ASEAN and further asserted ASEAN's internal role as the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order.

A problematic issue for ASEAN's enlargement however was Myanmar's membership. Myanmar was ruled by a military junta that took control after the National League of Democracy's (NLD) election victory in 1990. Since then, the junta had suppressed dissent and kept many NLD leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, under arrest. Western sanctions and diplomatic pressure had sought to isolate the junta but ASEAN instead sought to encourage change through a Thai-led strategy of 'constructive engagement'. When ASEAN offered Myanmar membership, the US and the EU applied pressure on ASEAN to reverse its decision. By doing so, the US and the EU challenged ASEAN's right to determine its own membership and by extension ASEAN's autonomy within Southeast Asia. Western pressure signalled the end of the role bargain that we saw reached between the US and ASEAN during the Cold War based on the common imperative of containment of communist insurgency. The US was reneging on its commitment not to interfere in the management of ASEAN affairs so that ASEAN states could show their autonomy to domestic constituencies. This had also been apparent in the US' post-Cold War requirement that US provision of military assistance be based on a commitment to democracy and human rights. In the early 1990s, both Thailand and Indonesia found themselves subject to the withdrawal of military assistance because of domestic politics. In this context, ASEAN autonomy was now exercised in actively resisting these Western pressures.

This became clear in the turnaround in Malaysia and Indonesia's position on Myanmar's admission. They initially opposed Thai proposals in the early 1990s to have Myanmar join the AMM as an observer due to the junta's treatment of Rohingya Muslims. However, increased criticism from Western dialogue partners over ASEAN's 'constructive engagement' policy had the effect of changing the minds of constituencies in Malaysia and Indonesia towards Myanmar's early admission. This added to concerns regarding Myanmar's links to China and how China could gain

[108] Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam.

access to the Andaman Sea via naval ports in Myanmar. ASEAN hoped Myanmar's membership in ASEAN would mean the junta would adhere to ASEAN's norm against hosting bases for external powers. Blocking Myanmar's entry into ASEAN on the other hand could potentially drive it closer into China's sphere of influence[109].

In 1995, Bangkok succeeded in securing Ang San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, enabling Myanmar to sign the TAC and then formally apply for membership. This was shortly followed by a junta crackdown on the NLD in 1996. Despite this, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir took advantage of his chairmanship of ASEAN to unilaterally advance Myanmar's membership to 1997[110]. Thai, Philippine and Singaporean officials expressed doubts about admitting Myanmar so soon. Philippine President Fidel Ramos went on record to express his desire to see membership postponed and Singapore's President Goh Chok Tong also expressed reservations, although he argued that Myanmar was not ready to be part of AFTA rather than pointing to political developments[111]. The hastened moves towards admitting Myanmar led to further criticism from the West, reflecting the US' and the EU's desire to perform the functions of democracy and human rights promotion globally in the post-Cold War context. The US, EU and Japan applied sanctions on Myanmar and the EU indicated that if Myanmar joined ASEAN, then Myanmar would not be allowed to take part in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) if it was hosted by an EU member and the EU would not attend an ASEM meeting hosted by Myanmar. US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said that the US was "trying to use our influence to make the point that Burma should be given a stiff message that it is not welcome [in ASEAN]"[112]. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright personally wrote to the ASEAN leaders urging them to delay Myanmar's admission and even suggested that admitting Myanmar may affect the US' participation in the ARF[113]. This amounted to a major challenge to ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role because there would be no 'orchestra' for ASEAN to conduct if key players refused to engage with the Association. More than this however, Western partners were undermining ASEAN's 'primary manager' role by challenging ASEAN's regional autonomy within Southeast Asia.

Western pressure thus had the contrary effect of galvanising ASEAN states into realising 'One Southeast Asia' at the 30th Anniversary meeting in 1997 as an act of regional self-determination. However, by asserting its 'primary manager' role and insisting that external powers

[109] This was especially salient for the Indonesians whose concerns also extended to Thailand.
[110] Moller (1998).
[111] Intra-ASEAN debates over Myanmar's membership are dealt with extensively by Ba (2009: 117-124).
[112] Moller (1998: 1092).
[113] Kavi chongkittavorn "Asean to push back new admission to December" *The Nation* 30/5/97.

not interfere in regional affairs, ASEAN was taking responsibility for the reform process in Myanmar. Consequently there was pressure to reform the norm of non-interference as it applied to intra-ASEAN affairs so that ASEAN could prove its competence in encouraging reform within Myanmar[114]. This was spearheaded in the late 1990s by liberal constituencies within Thailand and the Philippines in particular. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim initiated the debate however when he argued with respect to the Cambodian coup in 1997 that ASEAN should apply a principle of “constructive intervention” because its prior non-involvement had contributed to the collapse of national reconciliation. The principle of “constructive intervention” was picked up by Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan who re-branded it as “flexible engagement” and argued that it should be a general principle covering areas where domestic issues in one member state have an effect on the wider region[115].

This revision was a sign of frustration within Thailand at the failure of 'constructive engagement' to bring about meaningful reform within Myanmar. It was also viewed by Thai officials as a means for Thailand to take on regional leadership. Indeed, despite the rejection of the proposal by other ASEAN states – who watered it down to “enhanced interaction” - Thai policy-makers thought the process reflected positively on Thailand. Former Ambassador to Vietnam Surapong Jayanama, who was prominent in the negotiations over Myanmar's entry into ASEAN, said that “Thailand wanted to play a leading role in Southeast Asia. We had the potential to do so. It was the politics of identity-making and we needed to show clearly that we could lead on democracy and human rights issues”[116]. This highlights the tension over individual states' identity and ambitions and the collective identity of ASEAN. ASEAN unity was a crucial aspect of ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role and maintaining the appearance of unity was seen as crucial if ASEAN wanted to maintain its role. It seemed however that Thailand wanted to claim the functions of democracy and human rights promotion within Southeast Asia to get status recognition from external partners, perhaps over and above ASEAN. Thailand even aligned with external actors in pressuring Myanmar's regime to reform. Together with the Philippines it was part of a 'contact group' including the US, Japan and the UK trying to find ways to leverage the regime through aid[117]. Thailand also broke ranks with other ASEAN states at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2000. It refused to join them in helping Myanmar avoid sanctions regarding its use of forced labour by voting against amendments to the ILO resolution that would have postponed the ILO's

[114] Jones (2012: 104).
[115] Ramcharan (2000).
[116] Busbarat (2012: 140).
[117] Henderson (1999: 53).

decision and given Myanmar more time to satisfy the ILO's criteria[118]. However, the advent of the Thaksin administration in 2001, driven by Thai business constituencies with interests in Myanmar, brought Thailand's espousal of liberal values to an end.

ASEAN's willingness to debate non-interference and to formally introduce a mild revision to the principle amounted to a legitimacy claim regarding its credibility and competence in dealing with Myanmar. Older members of ASEAN recognised that Myanmar "truly stands out like a sore thumb" and that there was a need for some kind of interference[119]. An informal ASEAN retreat in Sentosa in 1999 was publicised by ASEAN as representing implementation of 'enhanced interaction'. ASEAN leaders reported that they had had "frank discussions" and Singaporean Foreign Minister Jayajumar stated: "I have never come across discussions with such candour. The Foreign Ministers spoke of views which they told me they would not have expressed, if not for the retreat"[120]. This was accompanied by the setting up of an ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism with respect to economic integration as well as the agreement on an ASEAN Troika in July 2000[121]. The Troika was intended to provide a mechanism for preventive diplomacy within Southeast Asia so that ASEAN could respond to crises within member states that may have a detrimental effect on ASEAN as a whole. This was potentially a mechanism for interference, boosting ASEAN's status as a manager of Southeast Asian order by showing its ability to respond to crises and reducing the need for external interference in the region. Indonesia proposed using the Troika in the wake of attacks on Suu Kyi and NLD members by agents of the junta government in 2003. However, Myanmar instead accepted 'bilateral crisis diplomacy' with select countries including China, Japan and Thailand[122]. ASEAN willingness to introduce institutional mechanisms represented symbolic claims to competence in performing the functions of democracy and human rights promotion and regional monitoring. However ASEAN's reluctance to use such mechanisms, showed it was unwilling to substantiate these claims.

In the end, the US and the EU acquiesced to Myanmar's admission into ASEAN but made it clear that they would hold ASEAN accountable for the reform process within Myanmar. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that "by admitting Burma as a member, ASEAN assumes a greater responsibility, for Burma's problems now become ASEAN's problems"[123]. Likewise, a *quid pro quo* was struck between ASEAN and the EU in 2000. The EU agreed to resume the Asia-

[118] Jones (2012: 194).
[119] Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14.
[120] Singh (2000: 7).
[121] See Haacke (2003: 191-213).
[122] Roberts (2010: 116).
[123] Jones (2012: 191).

Europe Meeting (ASEM) and offer support for ASEAN, as long as Myanmar was represented by lower-ranking officials in meetings and that the Myanmar regime resumed talks with the NLD. The EU made clear that it was up to ASEAN to ensure Myanmar kept its word[124]. ASEAN was subsequently explicit in noting discussion of Myanmar's political situation and ASEAN's encouragement of 'national reconciliation' and 'transition to democracy' in joint communiques released after ministerial meetings in the early 2000s. Much of these discussions took place at the informal ASEAN 'retreats' and the fact that they were mentioned in the joint communiques - which would have needed Myanmar's agreement - shows how ASEAN was keen to demonstrate that it was actively trying to promote reform in Myanmar[125].

All this represented a new agreement over ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, which mirrored the earlier role bargain where ASEAN's diplomatic leadership within Southeast Asia provided the legitimacy work for external powers' regional imperatives. This time it was not a battle against communism however but democracy and human rights promotion. The difficulty with this particular bargain was that the imperatives of democracy and human rights promotion were not shared between ASEAN states and Western states in the same way that the counter-revolutionary struggle against communism was. ASEAN states were more concerned with reducing interference in their region and boosting ASEAN's status as a successful manager rather than reform in itself. This was problematic as Western expectations of ASEAN's progress in this area would not be fulfilled, limiting the degree of endorsement these partners would give. This was also true of domestic constituencies within ASEAN that advocated reform within Myanmar. As stated by the former president of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, Kraisak Choonhaven: "If Burma keeps on going in an opposite direction and does not improve at all politically, ASEAN will never grow into a decent, world class organisation that we can look up to"[126]. This revealed the tension between the imperative of the 'primary manager' role to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference, and the need to meet external expectations regarding what constituted 'success' in managing Southeast Asian order in order to show competence to perform the 'regional conductor' role. This tension would be further exacerbated during moves to create an ASEAN Community.

[124] Jones (2008: 277), Jones (2012: 196-197).
[125] See Severino (2006: 138-140).
[126] Interview with Kraisak Choonhaven, Chatichai Foundation, Bangkok, 25/2/14.

ASEAN Community

This section shows how negotiations over establishing an ASEAN Community clearly revealed the tension between the 'regional conductor' role and the 'primary manager' role, rooted in the different understanding of ASEAN's roles amongst member states. Older members more concerned with demonstrating ASEAN's competence as a successful manager have sought to introduce practical cooperation and liberal values into the ASEAN framework. Newer members have opposed deeper cooperation and especially any ASEAN responsibility for democracy and human rights promotion, holding strongly to the traditional concern for insulating domestic regimes from external interference. This has limited the substance of ASEAN's claims to be a successful manager to merely discursive claims. The more productive aspect of ASEAN's re-conceptulisation was to put in place frameworks for engagement on new issues such as defence dialogue, which ASEAN was able to expand in the final phase of role negotiation this thesis deals with.

In 2003, ASEAN agreed to create an ‘ASEAN Community’ consisting of three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (renamed ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) in 2007), ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community. This section focuses on the APSC pillar, which has been the site of the most significant re-conceptualisation of ASEAN's 'primary manger' role, and therefore the most contentious. Indonesia has been the principle driving force behind the APSC, seeking to bolster ASEAN 'primary manager' role and demonstrate competence as the 'regional conductor' by taking on more regional order functions, as well as reinstating Indonesia's own ASEAN leadership in the post-Suharto era. Indonesia introduced the APSC initiative during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003-2004. The idea of a Comprehensive Security Community came from a paper by Rizal Sukma, based at the Jakarta think-tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). It envisioned developing ASEAN mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflicts[127]. A plan of action for achieving a security community was yet to be outlined, but the ASEAN states agreed in the Bali Concord II in 2003 to “explore innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which include, *inter alia*, the following elements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building”[128]. There have subsequently been two major aspects to ASEAN's re-conceptualisation as a security community. Firstly, there has been a more conscious effort to take on security functions such as peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and security

[127] Acharya (2014: 226-227).
[128] ASEAN (2003).

of sea lanes in response to the GWOT. Secondly, there has been a further push to take on responsibility for the functions of democracy and human rights promotion as part of the ASEAN community-building project.

Security functions

Peacekeeping Indonesia promoted a peacekeeping function for ASEAN as a means to avoid external intervention as had happened in East Timor. Indonesia included an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre in its draft plan of action towards achieving a security community in 2004. The other ASEAN states rejected the proposal, raising a number of concerns regarding differing defence capabilities, command control, whether it would be ASEAN helmets or national, whether force could be used and whether consensus would be needed[129]. However, ASEAN did establish the ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting (ADMM) in 2006, a significant development considering the previous norm within ASEAN where defence cooperation and formal dialogue were restricted to the bilateral or trilateral level. Institutionalising defence dialogue reflected a sense amongst the ASEAN leaders that ASEAN could not become a single community without having in place a complete set of ministerial dialogues[130]. The ADMM became a forum for discussing the possibility of an ASEAN peacekeeping function and ASEAN adopted a concept paper on the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN) in 2011. The concept paper put forward short-term aims of information-sharing and capacity-building and the long-term aim of developing a “formal framework for collaboration among Member States in developing a common standby arrangement to support peacekeeping operations”[131]. The APCN held its first meeting the following year. ASEAN thus put in place a process for establishing its performance of the function of regional peacekeeping, even if this remained a long-term aim. Considering ASEAN's subsequent decision to expand the ADMM process to include its dialogue partners (discussed below), there is scope for negotiating external partners into supporting ASEAN's performance of peacekeeping function through funding and capacity-building.

Counter-terrorism The APSC also specifically mentioned counter-terrorism cooperation as part of its aims. This is significant considering the US' concern for terrorism and showed ASEAN again adopting a great power's strategic agenda as part of its 'primary manager' role. This allowed ASEAN to deflect opportunities for US interference and also try to define what 'counter-terrorism'

[129] See Weatherbee (2005).
[130] Tan (2012: 237).
[131] ASEAN (2011a).

would mean in a Southeast Asian context. For example, ASEAN signed the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism in 2007, emphasising that counter-terrorism cooperation would be undertaken in a manner consistent with sovereignty and territorial integrity – a clear response to the US' previous discussion of 'pre-emptive' strikes. ASEAN also signed a series of joint declarations on counter-terrorism with its dialogue partners also emphasising sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latter have focused on external partners providing capacity-building to ASEAN states[132]. However, most of the practical cooperation was left to the bilateral or trilateral level, in partnership with the US. Other ASEAN members were still concerned about giving ASEAN, and perhaps Indonesia, too much control over regional security. ASEAN states were more comfortable with external powers providing security public goods[133].

Security of sea lanes In the context of the GWOT and US unilateralism however, there were limits to what was considered acceptable for the US as the 'offshore great power guarantor', as we saw above with respect to the controversy over the Regional Maritime Security Initiative. This is also true of Malaysia and Indonesia's opposition to the operational implementation of the US' Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which allows the US and its allies to interdict ships suspected of carrying WMD[134]. The US' provision of security public goods did not mean that it could unilaterally undertake operations in an area littoral states considered under their responsibility. Indeed, the RMSI provided an opportunity for regional states to claim responsibility for security of sea lanes in the Malacca Straits where they had previously failed in the 1970s (see Chapter Two). Indonesia proposed coordinated patrols of the Malacca Straits by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, where each state was responsible for patrolling its section of the Straits. In 2006 the three states signed the terms of reference and standard operating procedures of the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP). This included the Malacca Straits Surface Patrols (MSSP), the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) which provided aerial surveillance, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) which itself developed the Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-IS) to improve coordination and situational awareness at sea among the three countries. Thailand joined the MSP in 2008. This indigenous effort to perform the function of security of sea lanes in the Malacca Straits was supplemented by a broader multilateral mechanism promoted by Japan called the Regional Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP came into force in 2004 and includes as signatories the 10 ASEAN states as well as Japan, China, South Korea, India and the US, among others. In 2006 an Information Sharing Center (ISC) was set

[132] See Hafidz (2009).
[133] Haacke (2005).
[134] Newman and Williams (2006: 118-119).

up in Singapore to facilitate the sharing of information and expertise[135]. Information sharing became ReCAAP's substantive contribution to combating piracy; incidents of piracy detected by ReCAAP were passed onto the nearest maritime authority, which in the case of the Malacca Straits was usually one of the MSP participants. Indonesia and Malaysia have so far refused to ratify the ReCAAP agreement citing concerns over sovereignty, but this has not prevented their involvement, especially as incidents of piracy in the Malacca Straits have risen dramatically. Through the MSP and ReCAAP, littoral states have had the endorsement, and significant funding and support for capacity-building, of the US and Japan. Although not part of the ASEAN framework, the MSP-ReCAAP division of labour with respect to security of sea lanes in the Malacca Straits provides a boost to ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, especially as the MSP could be 'scaled up' to an institutionalised ASEAN maritime security mechanism[136].

As can be seen, ASEAN has sought to position the newly claimed security functions as part of its 'primary manager' role within a division of labour with external partners. This follows a similar pattern to that developed during the Cold War with respect to counter-insurgency. ASEAN collectively, or ASEAN states on a subregional level, have sought to avoid interference in regional affairs by taking responsibility for security functions, whilst also taking advantage of the capabilities external partners have for boosting ASEAN states' own ability to manage security issues within Southeast Asia.

Democracy and human rights promotion

The push for ASEAN to more formally take on the functions of democracy and human rights promotion has more clearly been aimed at improving ASEAN's credibility as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. However, newer ASEAN members have resisted this process. Indonesia's position when introducing these functions into the community-building initiative was that in order to have a more integrated and cohesive ASEAN, members needed to develop a common perspective on fundamental matters such as the relationship between state and society[137]. The newer members wanted to insulate themselves from dissenting views, within and outside of their own borders. For example, the CLMV states insisted that the mention of 'democracy' in the Bali Concord II be accompanied by 'harmony', leading to the document stating: “[t]he ASEAN Security Community is

[135] For a recent discussion of Japan’s interests and involvement in maritime security in the South China Sea, see Storey (2013).
[136] See Koh (2013).
[137] Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Secretariat of the Vice President, Jakarta, 11/3/14.

envisaged to bring ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment"[138]. Likewise, Indonesia's subsequent draft plan of action that described democracy and human rights as 'shared ASEAN values' was also watered down in the final plan adopted at the Vientiane summit in 2004. ASEAN listed democracy as a 'common value' alongside peace, stability and prosperity. Also, where Indonesia had drafted that ASEAN would not tolerate unconstitutional or undemocratic political change, the final plan said that ASEAN should not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic change, adding that ASEAN members' territory should not be used to undermine peace, security and stability of another member[139]. The less democratic regimes upheld the traditional concern for non-interference alongside any references to democracy to ensure that other ASEAN states did not provide refuge or support for dissidents and political opponents. Indeed, the virtual silence of ASEAN over the two coups in Thailand in 2006 and 2014 showed that ASEAN *would* tolerate unconstitutional political change.

The ASEAN Charter, which sought to turn ASEAN from an Association based on 'soft' regionalism to one that is rules-based, again revealed the tension between member states' different understandings of the functions ASEAN should perform. The Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter, charged with proposing major steps towards achieving the ASEAN Community, suggested ambitious reforms to decision-making procedures, dispute settlement mechanisms and monitoring – including procedures for sanctions[140]. They sought to establish a 'responsibility to cooperate' by ensuring that members did not use the non-interference norm in a way that damaged the Association and the 'regional interest'[141]. However, the High Level Task Force (HLTF), who drafted the Charter under the supervision of the foreign ministers, rejected many of the bolder proposals from the EPG[142]. The major point of controversy was the article referring to setting up a human rights mechanism. The CLMV members opposed its inclusion with Myanmar's participant Aung Bwa stating that human rights was "a very delicate and sensitive issue, and could be politicised" and required "caution against double standards". He criticised other participants for adopting a "holier-than-the-Pope" attitude and cautioned that "[t]hose who live in glass houses should not throw stones"[143]. Similarly, the participant from Laos, Bounkeut Sangsomak, noted the

[138] ASEAN (2003), Emmerson (2005: 179).
[139] Acharya (2014: 229-230).
[140] "Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter", December 2006. <http://www.asean.org/archive/19247.pdf> accessed 14/1/14.
[141] Jones (2012: 207-208).
[142] Reports on the drafting negotiations by members of the HLTF can be found in Koh et al (2009).
[143] Aung Bwa (2009: 32-33).

differences surrounding the concept of human rights, with some emphasising ASEAN should adhere to their universal value, while others thought ASEAN should uphold the value of "Southeast Asia" as a region with weak political institutions still engaging in nation-building[144]. During the drafting process the newer members repeatedly threatened to walk out[145].

The CLMV's resistance to human rights revealed their narrow understanding of ASEAN's role as providing protection from external interference. By more explicitly taking on democracy and human rights promotion functions, ASEAN would no longer be a form of protection but perhaps itself be a source of interference. ASEAN overcame this resistance however by reaching a compromise that upheld the rights of *states* along with the rights of individuals. For example, the Charter stated that one of the purposes of ASEAN was "[t]o strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN"[146]. This upheld the idea that the norms of sovereignty and non-interference were themselves rights that needed to be balanced against the espoused liberal values[147].

Despite the differences over human rights, the foreign ministers realised the need to develop a human rights body due to the reputation costs of not having one for ASEAN's status as a successful manager[148]. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who served on the EPG, asked: "how can we avoid having [a human rights body] when all other regional organisations have one already?"[149]. The Chair of the HLTF Rosario Manalo said that the establishment of a human rights body would "keep ASEAN relevant. It will announce to the world that ASEAN honors its human rights commitments"[150]. As a result, ASEAN created the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. This again represented a compromise; ASEAN's approach to human rights promotion and protection would be 'evolutionary' and consistent with the norm of non-interference[151]. The AICHR was intergovernmental with decisions based on consultation and consensus, meaning it remained in the control of member states, with each having an effective veto. The AICHR was criticised by civil society groups within Southeast Asia for

[144]Sangsomak (2009: 164-165).
[145]Jones (2012: 208).
[146] ASEAN (2007). Article 1(7).
[147] Ciorciari (2012: 712).
[148] Patra (2009: 13).
[149] Salim Osman, "Alatas lauds new human rights body" *Straits Times* 6/8/07.
[150] Speech at the Sixth Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, Manila, 17/7/07 <http://www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/Ambassador%20Manalo%20speech.pdf> accessed 14/1/14.
[151] ASEAN (2009).

effectively excluding civil society from participating[152]. Likewise, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights adopted in November 2012, also drew widespread criticism for emphasising that human rights promotion should recognise the national and cultural context. The US expressed concern over this 'cultural relativism', and stated that “we are deeply concerned that many of the ASEAN Declaration’s principles and articles could weaken and erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms”[153]. ASEAN defended the Charter and the ADHR by describing them as 'living documents', not an end in themselves but part of a continuing evolutionary process. The fact that the US encouraged ASEAN to engage with civil society in revising the declaration however, showed that a major constituency of legitimation did not buy ASEAN's legitimacy claims.

The fact that ASEAN adopted the Charter during the height of international attention over the Myanmar government's crackdown on protesters in 2007, also seemed to show that its claims to democracy and human rights promotion were merely symbolic at this stage. ASEAN had previously stepped up its rhetoric in criticising Myanmar. Indonesia called on Myanmar to “exercise maximum restraint and desist from any acts that could cause further violence” and Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo, as ASEAN chair, expressed ASEAN's “revulsion” to Myanmar's Foreign Minister Nyan Win[154]. The issue of Myanmar hung over the summit meetings in November 2007. The US Senate passed a resolution calling on ASEAN to expel Myanmar and the US' Trade Representative Susan Schwab cited the political situation in Myanmar as hindering negotiations over a US-ASEAN FTA. She reiterated the common refrain that "[t]he reputation and credibility of ASEAN as an organization has been called into question because of the situation in Burma"[155]. Myanmar prevented the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor Ibrihim Gambari from briefing the EAS on the situation in Myanmar. Singaporean Foreign Minister Yeo's response as ASEAN Chair was to declare that Myanmar was on its own in dealing with the UN until the Junta was ready to accept ASEAN's help. ASEAN also changed its language from calling for “national reconciliation” to actively calling for the peaceful transition to democracy and implementation of free and fair elections. However, the lack of any significant sanctions against Myanmar, and its presence at the signing of the ASEAN Charter, showed the lack of substance to ASEAN’s claims to competence at democracy and human rights promotion. As a consequence, the high expectations that had been raised regarding the Charter were not met[156].

[152] Ciorciari (2012: 718-720).
[153] US Department of State press statement “ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights” 20/11/12 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200915.htm> accessed 9/4/14.
[154] Quoted in Davies (2012: 9).
[155] Wayne Arnold, “Myanmar crackdown tests a core value of Asean.” *New York Times* 19/11/07 <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/asia/19iht-asean.1.8388055.html?_r=0> accessed 29/1/14.
[156] Cabellero-Anthony (2008).

Results of ASEAN's re-conceptualisation of the 'primary manager' role

ASEAN's re-conceptualisation had two aims: to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference through bolstering ASEAN's 'primary manager' role, and to address the legitimacy deficit ASEAN faced with respect to Western constituencies by demonstrating its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. ASEAN has been more effective on the first count by taking on some security functions as part of its 'primary manager' role within a division of labour with external partners. Although only nascent at this point, as instutionalised security functions as part of the ASEAN framework still involves major re-conceptualisation of ASEAN norms against formal security and defence cooperation, there is potential for this to develop. ASEAN and external partners have been able to identity common threats from issues such as piracy and terrorism, and a division of labour between them towards addressing such issues is emerging. Such a division of labour has taken a similar form of that which we saw developed during the Cold War in Chapters Two and Three with respect to counter-insurgency: ASEAN states providing the vanguard, with the US and other external partners providing funding and support for capacity-building.

ASEAN has been less effective in addressing its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order through taking on the functions of democracy and human rights promotion. This is due to the gulf between the older and newer members' understanding of ASEAN's roles. Older members have shown more concern for ASEAN’s 'regional conductor' role as a means to maximise autonomy and thus credibility is important. They have therefore seen the need to more explicitly demonstrate the performance of the functions of democracy and human rights promotion as part of the ASEAN framework. Newer members have generally viewed ASEAN’s roles more narrowly as providing some form of protection from external pressures for liberalisation and political reform. The resulting consensus on ASEAN agreements as part of the community-building project has reflected the balance between the need for unity and the need for demonstrating ASEAN’s status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. The changes ASEAN has made to its framework amount to merely discursive – at most symbolic - claims to this status and therefore its competence as the 'regional conductor'. This made it difficult for Western constituencies to give more than discursive or symbolic endorsement to the process. The grand ideas also had the effect of raising expectations among civil society, which were not met by the reality of the Charter, AICHR or ADHR. ASEAN officials insisted however that the point is the process in itself and how, by putting these things in motion, ASEAN claims to be a credible institution that partners can work with. Indeed, this may have been the principal achievement of ASEAN's re-conceptualisation: ASEAN

established processes which can be worked with and built upon, reducing the need for creating alternative institutions.

This way of thinking was revealed in the development within ASEAN circles of the concept of 'ASEAN centrality'. ASEAN saw itself as the central core upon which open and inclusive regional architecture would be built. ASEAN centrality was enshrined in ASEAN's Charter as one of the principles of ASEAN, and maintaining this centrality was enshrined as one of the purposes of ASEAN[157]. It was directed at external actors but also at domestic constituencies within ASEAN states to support a common ASEAN position in negotiations with larger powers (rather than demanding dogged adherence to a national position). ASEAN represented each member state and ASEAN's centrality meant that a better deal for each individual member state could be reached if they held a common position as a group[158]. ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role was now formalised as part of its corporate identity and 'ASEAN centrality', as pointed out by ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General of Community and Corporate Affairs AKP Mochtan, has become “sacred” to ASEAN[159]. ASEAN's 'centrality', its unity and neutrality, would all be challenged and defended in the final phase of role negotiation dealt with in this chapter.

PROTECTING AND EXPANDING THE CONDUCTOR ROLE: 2008-PRESENT

The latest phase in ASEAN's role negotiation began with Australia's challenge to the 'regional conductor' role when it proposed new regional architecture based on the leadership of the great powers. ASEAN was able to successfully defeat the proposal and gained significant endorsement for its 'regional conductor' role from the new Obama administration in the US that was keen to demonstrate its re-engagement with Asia on the region's terms. ASEAN was subsequently able to expand its role by developing new ASEAN-led forums within which to exercise its diplomatic leadership. However, 2009 also saw an escalation of tensions in the South China Sea with ASEAN struggling to employ its 'regional conductor' role to negotiate a code of conduct with China. Escalating great power rivalry over maritime disputes and the US' 'rebalancing' have complicated ASEAN's task of staying united and neutral, posing significant challenges for the future of the 'regional conductor' role.

[157] ASEAN (2007). Article 1(15) refers to the purpose and Article 2(2)(m) refers to the principle.
[158] Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
[159] Interview with AKP Mochtan, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 12/3/14.

APC: challenging ASEAN's diplomatic leadership

In 2008 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd presented another vision for the region through his Asia-Pacific Community (APC) proposal. The proposal was part of the Rudd government's attempt to claim a more proactive middle power role in Asia and break away from the US 'deputy sheriff' image Australia acquired under the previous Howard government[160]. Rudd argued that none of the existing regional mechanisms were capable of achieving the substantive goals of developing a security community, the capacity to deal with transnational security issues, open trading regimes across the region as well as providing long-term energy, resource and food security[161]. Instead, a more coordinated, outcomes-based mechanism was needed, led by a 'core group' of states. This group included the US, China, Japan, India and Indonesia together with unspecified "other countries"[162]. The list notably did not include ASEAN. This contestation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role had two levels. Firstly, there was an explicit challenge: Australia proposed re-organising the regional 'orchestra' under great power leadership, dispensing with ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. Secondly, there was a more implicit challenge as Australia itself was making a claim to the function of multilateral institution-building, usurping ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. Although some in Indonesia were intrigued by the status given to their country within the APC proposal, overall the ASEAN states opposed it. Singapore's Ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh was highly vocal, criticising the idea of having a core group of leading states as being "anti-democratic and elitest" and saying that it would have the effect of marginalising ASEAN[163]. For Koh, the deficit of trust amongst the great powers means *only* ASEAN, because of its independence and neutrality, can lead regional institution-building[164]. This pointed straight back to ASEAN's unique ability to 'conduct' the 'orchestra' by convening all major players together and providing a mutually agreeable 'score' to play from.

As had happened with respect to the PMC in the early 1990s, the EAS meeting in 2009 was used by Australia, as well as Japan, as an opportunity to map out visions for evolving regional cooperation. By this point, the APC proposal had accommodated ASEAN by removing the great power 'core' grouping of states. However, it died out both because the successful opposition of ASEAN and also the lack of interest of key players such as the US. However, according to former Political-Security Director at the ASEAN Secretariat Termsak Chalermpalanupap, "it stimulated

[160] Baba and Kaya (2014).
[161] Frost (2009: 6).
[162] Kraft (2012: 65).
[163] Tommy Koh "Australia must respect ASEAN's role." *The Straits Times* 24/6/09.
[164] Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 7/3/14.

ASEAN to examine ourself and to redouble our efforts to make good our claim ... to be the primary leading force of all these regional processes for dialogue and cooperation”[165]. This was boosted by renewed endorsement from the US, which also came with further expectations, increasing the need for ASEAN to demonstrate its claim to 'centrality'.

US re-engagement: endorsement with new challenges

The Obama administration's 2009 re-engagement with Asia constituted an attempt to reverse the sense of neglect engendered by the actions of the previous administration. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton made sure her first official trip was to Asia, during which she made a point of publicising that the US was ‘back’. The tour included an unprecedented visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. Clinton signed the TAC in July 2009 stating that, although potential disagreements could not be ruled out, US admission to the treaty reflected its “commitment to an honest and open dialogue”[166]. The US had now formally acceded to ASEAN's 'score', meaning it was eligible for membership in the EAS. However, the US signed the TAC on the stated condition that TAC provisions would not limit action the US considered necessary to address a threat to its own national interests[167]. This showed that although the US was symbolically willing to submit to ASEAN's authority as the 'regional conductor', it did not wish for its commitment to ASEAN's 'score' to limit its strategic mobility[168]. In November 2009, Barack Obama attended the first US-ASEAN Summit where he announced the US would open a mission at ASEAN with a serving Ambassador. This showed the US' willingness to have a summit with all ASEAN members together rather than just select members. The US reversed the perceived neglect of previous years by re-engaging on ASEAN’s terms, offering firm symbolic and even performative endorsement of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. Indeed, there was a sense within ASEAN that Obama had given Southeast Asia the same priority as Northeast Asia, the first US president to do so since the Vietnam War[169].

The US' engagement and support for “ASEAN's continuing role in multilateral efforts where ASEAN has a growing ability to make a contribution”[170] also came with expectations. In 2010 Clinton set out the US' principles regarding regional architecture. These included the reaffirmation

[165] Interview with Termsak Chalermpalanupap, ISEAS, Singapore, 3/3/14.
[166] Ali (2012: 120).
[167] Crook (2009: 741).
[168] All the great powers signed the TAC on terms that limited its applicability.
[169] Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 7/3/14.
[170] ASEAN (2009). *Joint Statement - 1st ASEAN-US Leader's Meeting: Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity* Singapore, 15th November 2009.

of alliances as the cornerstone of US engagement, but also stated that regional institutions needed to address concrete issues and be effective in delivering results. The US also expected regional states to choose the premier grouping from existing institutions, with the EAS and APEC as contenders[171]. This presented a challenge to ASEAN to work with the US and others in developing existing institutions to be more effective rather than supplying the region with more ASEAN Plus initiatives.

Another challenge to ASEAN was the US' promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP represents a more exclusive and 'high quality' trade pact for the region than previous proposals such as China's East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) based on ASEAN Plus Three and Japan's Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) based on ASEAN Plus Six. The intrusive terms of the TPP, such as the elimination of all exemptions to tariff reductions, require domestic reform in most states and have complicated negotiations; even the US Congress has significant reservations regarding the TPP. China initially criticised the TPP as a US attempt at economic containment. However, the internal Chinese debate is ongoing and there are also voices arguing that China should join negotiations[172]. As four ASEAN states have joined negotiations - Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam – there has been concern of a split within ASEAN regarding the right approach forward for a free trade area.

ASEAN's Response

In response to the challenges raised by the APC proposal and the US' strategic and economic 're-engagement' of Asia, ASEAN expanded its 'regional conductor' role by increasing the number of forums within which ASEAN convened the regional 'orchestra' and provided the 'score'. By putting in place further forums where ASEAN performed the 'regional conductor' role, ASEAN closed off opportunities for other actors to set up alternative forums that could bypass ASEAN. Specifically ASEAN: ended the debate over regional architecture by making the EAS the primary leader-led forum in the region through including the US and Russia; prevented the Shangri La Dialogue from being formalised by expanding the ADMM to include all major players; and protected its control over the pace of trade negotiations by providing an inclusive regional trade agreement as an alternative to an East Asia-only free trade pact, and the more intrusive trade pacts of CEPEA and TPP.

[171] Ali (2012: 122).
[172] See Paul Bowles "China debates the TPP." *East Asia Forum* 20/3/14 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/20/china-debates-the-tpp/> accessed 2/4/14.

Directly in response to the challenge of the APC in proposing to re-organise the regional 'orchestra' and dispense with ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, the ASEAN foreign ministers announced in July 2010 that Russia and the US would join the EAS in 2011. There were reportedly two options on the table in the run up to the announcement: an ASEAN Plus 8 that could meet whenever the APEC summit was in Asia whilst the extant EAS met annually, and an expanded EAS. Singapore strongly pushed for the ASEAN Plus 8 as it felt that the US' inclusion in the EAS would negatively affect free trade negotiations based on EAS membership. It also saw the ASEAN Plus 8 putting less pressure on the US president to attend annually, avoiding the embarrassment of the president being unable to attend. Indonesia and Malaysia pushed for the expanded EAS because it meant there was no need to create a new framework and provided a means to balance the influence of China within the EAS[173]. Singapore could not rally strong support for its proposal, and the US made known its preference for full EAS membership, so ASEAN chose the expanded EAS. By doing so, ASEAN ended the debate over visions for regional community. The US and Russia were now members of the primary leader-led forum of the regional 'orchestra' and had both formally committed to ASEAN's 'score' by signing the TAC. This partially fulfilled the APC proposal for an inclusive leaders' meeting but removed the 'great power concert' aspect and instead reasserted ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. This made it more difficult to argue the case for 'new' regional architecture; ASEAN had already put the necessary forums in place and regional states should work within them[174]. In demonstration of its policy shift, Australia appointed a full-time Ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat and stated its official endorsement of ASEAN's 'centrality' to regional cooperation in Asia[175].

In a similar vein ASEAN initiated wider Asia-Pacific formal defence dialogue in the ADMM Plus, expanding its performance of 'inclusive engagement' into the defence sphere and forestalling challenges from elsewhere to set up defence dialogue[176]. In particular the Shangri-la Dialogue (SLD), an unofficial forum organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) involving regional defence and military officials, had served as a platform for increased regional defence dialogue. In 2002 Japanese Defence Agency Director General Nakatani Gen proposed turning the SLD into a formal Asian Defence Ministerial Meeting, which ASEAN rejected[177].

[173] Graeme Dobell "Scoop: ASEAN's Divide on US" *The Interpreter* 16/10/10 <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/16/Scoop-ASEANs-divide-on-US.aspx> accessed 8/7/14.
[174] See Emmerson (2010).
[175] Foreign Minister Bob Carr, "Already Half Way to a Shared Asian Vision" *The Australian* 29/10/12 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/already-halfway-to-a-shared-asian-vision/story-e6frgd0x-1226504863670#> accessed 19/2/14.
[176] Capie (2013).
[177] See Tan (2012) on 'defence diplomacy' within, and extended beyond, ASEAN in the Cold War and post-Cold War

However, the growing prominence of the SLD in the yearly calendar of meetings showed ASEAN leaders that the region was ready for defence dialogue and that ASEAN should take the initiative to include external partners in the ADMM process before any further proposals to formalise the SLD. Formalising the SLD threatened the ARF as the premier regional security dialogue and by extension also threatened ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role by developing mechanisms for regional actors to discuss security that bypassed ASEAN. If formalised defence dialogue was going to be set up, it was going to meet as part of the full regional 'orchestra' under ASEAN's authority as the 'regional conductor'.Having previously inaugurated the ADMM, as well as convening the ARF Defence Officials Dialogue (ARF-DOD), ASEAN showed that it had competence in promoting formal defence dialogue. Indeed, from the start the ADMM was promoted as "outward-looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners" and that "ASEAN shall be in the driver's seat in the ADMM's interactions with ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Defence Officials should take the lead in ADMM process"[178].

At the May 2010 ADMM, ASEAN adopted two concept papers on the 'configuration and composition' and 'modalities and procedures' of the ADMM Plus. As with the EAS in 2005, ASEAN provided criteria for membership within the new defence track of the regional 'orchestra': full dialogue partner status, significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defence establishments and ability to work with the ADMM to build capacity and enhance security[179]. ASEAN invited Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and the US to join the process. ASEAN determined that the ADMM Plus chair would follow the ADMM chair, and so be limited to ASEAN members, and that the chair, with ASEAN consensus, would hold the prerogative of inviting the dialogue partners to participate[180]. ASEAN's 'centrality' within the process, and prerogative to determine the composition and development of the ADMM Plus, was safeguarded as ASEAN would have control from the beginning. All the invitees accepted and joined the ASEAN defence ministers in Hanoi in October 2010. The Joint Statement of the first ADMM Plus meeting reaffirmed ASEAN's centrality and described the forum as "the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues among the ASEAN member states and the eight 'Plus' countries"[181]. The meeting in Hanoi also provided an opportunity for bilateral defence talks between China and the US as well as Japan and China, significant

periods.
[178] ASEAN (2006).
[179] ASEAN (2010a).
[180] ASEAN (2010b).
[181] "Hanoi Joint Declaration on the First ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus." Hanoi 12/10/10 <http://admm.org.vn/sites/eng/Pages/jointdeclarationonthefirstadmm-nd-14709.html?cid=141> accessed 30/1/14.

considering their clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands the month before.

In a similar pattern to the ARF, the non-ASEAN countries were given a stake in the ADMM Plus process through co-chairing Expert Working Groups with an ASEAN member. These were tasked with promoting practical cooperation on a range of non-traditional security issues. The outcome of the first round of EWGs were a series of training exercises, including the ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Military Medicine exercise in Brunei in June 2013. This exercise included approximately 3200 personnel, seven ships, 15 helicopters as well as military medical, engineering and search and rescue teams and assets from the 18 member states of ADMM Plus[182] . Admiral Locklear, chief of PACOM, called it a “substantial” achievement[183]. ASEAN has thus sought to embed the ADMM Plus within a division of labour with the ARF and SLD. The ADMM Plus' focus on practical cooperation is considered to complement the ARF's focus on strategic-level consultations and the SLD's “track 1.5” nature, where defence ministers attend in an 'unofficial' capacity[184]. The latter ostensibly allows for less restrained sharing of views on traditional and non-traditional security, as well as the clarification of states' security positions.

On top of the EAS and ADMM Plus, ASEAN also captured the process of negotiating a regional trade agreement through its proposal for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This was a notable response considering the US' expressed preference for economic issues to be kept off the EAS agenda and addressed within APEC (and the TPP) whilst the EAS focused on broader security issues[185]. China and Japan had previously offered competing proposals, with China pushing for an EAFTA based on APT membership, and Japan proposing a CEPEA based on ASEAN Plus 6. These, together with RCEP, were subject to a series of expert group studies into their feasibility. At a meeting of EAS Economic Ministers in August 2011, China and Japan made a joint proposal on speeding up the establishment of EAFTA and CEPEA and the ministers acknowledged that ASEAN was working on a proposal for an ASEAN ++ FTA[186]. Speeding up Chinese and Japanese-led proposals could have taken the pace of trade negotiation out of ASEAN's

[182] Official Press Release of the Singapore Government, “SAF and Other Militaries Conclude the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM Exercise .” <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2013/jun/20jun13_nr.html#.UtPQcvRdUQh> accessed 13/1/14.

[183] Mukherjee, A., “ADMM-Plus: Talk Shop or Key to Asia-Pacific Security?” *The Diplomat* 22/8/13 <http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/admm-plus-talk-shop-or-key-to-asia-pacific-security/1/> accessed 13/1/14.

[184] Tan (2012: 243-244).

[185] Heng (2012).

[186] ASEAN (2011a).

hands, which ASEAN had managed through its various ASEAN Plus One PTAs[187]. ASEAN therefore took charge of the process by dropping references to the EAFTA and CEPEA and announcing a framework for RCEP at the ASEAN summit in November 2011. RCEP was promoted as a means to link together the existing ASEAN Plus One PTAs into an overarching agreement. It was however based on openness, allowing members to join if they desired. In November 2012 ASEAN, together with Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand signed a declaration to begin negotiations on the RCEP which concluded their third round in Malaysia in January 2014. The declaration recognised ASEAN's centrality in the regional economic integration process.

By intersecting the RCEP proposal in-between the Chinese and Japanese proposals, ASEAN was again able to exploit the rivalry between China and Japan to gain endorsement for its 'regional conductor' role in the economic sphere. It also provides a more inclusive pathway towards regional trade liberalisation than the TPP. This is notable considering China's absence from TPP negotiations and China has been keen to give its endorsement to the RCEP negotiations[188]. RCEP serves to accommodate China as a major economic partner and performer of key economic functions and provides a pathway to regional free trade that is inclusive of developing Asian states concerned by the intrusive measures of the TPP. For ASEAN members engaged in TPP negotiations, it serves as a hedge as well as a complement to TPP and most of all, keeps ASEAN's position as the hub of regional trade negotiations. Some ASEAN members maintain that RCEP and TPP negotiations are compatible because of RCEP's focus on border barriers (i.e. tariffs) and TPP's focus on behind-the-border barriers including intellectual property rights, labour standards, competition policy, investment rules, the environment and the role of state-owned enterprises. RCEP negotiations are due to end in 2015, with TPP negotiations predicted to go on for another number of years. Indonesia has indicated that it could join TPP negotiations if RCEP negotiations go well[189].

Through expanding the remit of its 'regional conductor' role, ASEAN was able to begin addressing the challenges to its role posed by the APC and US re-engagement. A more significant challenge emerged however due to renewed great power tension in the South China Sea, severely straining ASEAN's unity and neutrality and thus its ability to manage the dispute.

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[187] These include ASEAN-China (2002), ASEAN-South Korea (2007), ASEAN-Japan (2008), ASEAN-India (2010) and ASEAN-Australia and New Zealand (2010).

[188] Jianmin Jin "TPP vs RCEP." *Fujitsu Research Institute* 22/2/13 <http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/message/2013/2013-02-22.html> accessed 3/2/14.

[189] "Indonesia Ponders TPP Membership." *ASEAN Briefing* 8/5/13 <http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2013/05/08/indonesia-ponders-tpp-membership.html> accessed 3/2/14.

Chinese assertiveness: SCS and the limits of the 'regional conductor' role

Since 2009, tensions in the SCS have increased. The UN set 2009 as a deadline for the submission of claims for extended continental shelves. China protested Vietnam and the Philippines' submissions and submitted its own nine-dashed line map, which stakes an historical claim to over 80 per cent of the South China Sea. Thereafter, there have been a number of low-level clashes as claimant states seek to consolidate their jurisdiction over disputed waters. This has included land reclamation and building on occupied features, with China conducting the most extensive upgrading including the building of an air strip on Fiery Cross Reef capable of accommodating the full range of Chinese aircraft and thereby improving China's power projection in the area[190]. Southeast Asian claimants have blamed China's assertive behaviour for increased tensions and the Chinese blame Vietnam and the Philippines' provocative moves in collusion with the US[191]. The South China Sea dispute has therefore been a major stumbling block for negotiating China into the 'responsible regional great power' role, and a serious challenge for ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role. China's assertiveness represents a substantive challenge to three aspects of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role: ASEAN's rule-making in the SCS, ASEAN's neutral status and ASEAN's united identity. China has insisted that negotiations over management of the dispute be restricted to the China-ASEAN context. ASEAN's dilemma is that it cannot wield its authority as the 'regional conductor' in the ASEAN-China context because it cannot gain leverage from the support of another great power; however, ASEAN compromises any perceived neutrality with respect to the dispute when bringing the issue before the full regional 'orchestra' within the ARF or EAS as China accuses it of siding with the US in an effort to contain China. This has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN between members that want to challenge China and those that want to accommodate China, affecting ASEAN's ability to take a united stance. Protecting ASEAN's collective unity and seeking to present ASEAN neutrality has thus become a key challenge for maintaining ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in the context of renewed great power rivalry.

Rule-making ASEAN has tried to expand its rule-making into the SCS conflict by focusing on conflict avoidance, having claimants shelve the question of sovereignty and negotiate rules to manage the dispute peacefully, until the disputes themselves can be resolved[192]. This has produced the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea agreed between ASEAN and

[190] Michael S Chase and Ben Purser "Fiery Cross Reef: Why China's New South China Sea Airstrip Matters" *National Interest* 5/8/15 <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/fiery-cross-reef-why-chinas-new-south-china-sea-airstrip-13497> accessed 11/8/15.
[191] Li (2012).
[192] Goh (2013: 98-117).

China in November 2002. The DoC stipulated the parties' adherence to the TAC and Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It represented a commitment to discuss the development of a code of conduct but did not lead to a halt in the building of structures on islets by various claimants. Through expanding its rule-making, ASEAN has tried to commit China to a policy of restraint, which is seen as even more salient due to the growing asymmetry between China's naval capabilities and those of regional claimants. In previous decades, China was limited in its projection of naval capabilities into the South China Sea. Since 2010 however, China has conducted military exercises involving North, East and South Sea Fleets (previously only the South Sea Fleet had operated in SCS) and has further developed the Yalong Bay naval base in Hainan. These developments suggest China is able to project and sustain its naval capabilities further South for longer periods of time. Regional actors fear that as China's relative military strength grows, it may be even less willing to be bound by ASEAN's normative framework[193]. This is exacerbated by the apparent insensitivity of Chinese officials towards Southeast Asian neighbours that stood in stark contrast to the reassurances offered a few years earlier. In 2010, the SCS was reportedly listed as a 'core' interest alongside Taiwan and Tibet by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai, and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also stated that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact"[194].

China has however pursued an inconsistent strategy with respect to negotiations with ASEAN, showing at times a willingness to engage ASEAN, but more often resisting and demanding that negotiations take place at the bilateral level. This suggests that ASEAN is unable to wield the authority of its 'regional conductor' role in China-ASEAN relations because there is less of an opportunity to leverage off another great power. China's inconsistency is part of a delaying strategy with respect to any agreement over the disputes, buying time for China to consolidate its claims through shoring up jurisdiction over waters[195]. China's insistence on bilateral negotiations ostensibly shows a willingness to negotiate without having to actually engage in negotiations because it knows other claimants will not accept such terms[196]. Having signed the TAC, China has taken the position that its norms do not apply to maritime areas, showing that ASEAN's 'score' is not particularly relevant in this context[197].

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193 Emmers (2010).
194 John Pomfret "US takes tougher tone with China." *Washington Post* 30/7/10 < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html> accessed 3/2/14.
195 Fravel (2011).
196 Fravel (2011: 300).
197 Mak (2009).

Neutrality As a result of this, some ASEAN members have sought to bring the SCS issue before the full regional 'orchestra' and use the US and Japan as leverage in trying to commit China to strategic restraint. In recent years the US and Japan have accused China of increased assertiveness in its claims not only to the SCS but also in the East China Sea[198]. They have therefore endorsed ASEAN's rule-making with regard to the SCS as part of an effort to constrain China. Japan has shown its support for ASEAN in creating maritime rules in the South China Sea, even calling a special ASEAN-Japan summit to strengthen maritime security cooperation[199]. The US has recently been vocal in its support for negotiations on the issue and has been firm in stating its interest in the freedom of navigation, especially since USNS *Impeccable* came into conflict with Chinese patrol boats 120km off the coast of Hainan in 2009. The US is concerned about China's challenge to its traditional dominance in the maritime sphere, with these fears being amplified since the discovery of China's extensive land reclamation activities on its occupied features in late 2014. These concerns increasingly overlap with Southeast Asian concerns, providing an opening for the US to "multilateralize and thus legitimate its specific security concerns through existing regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), as it did in 2010"[200].

The US' outspoken support for negotiations on a CoC shows endorsement of ASEAN's rule-making, but further highlights the problem of ASEAN's supposed neutrality in the disputes. From the Chinese perspective, ASEAN is not neutral because its calls to resolve the conflict in accordance with international law, conflict with China's sovereignty claims based on historical interpretation rather than being rooted in modern international law. ASEAN's position therefore necessarily rejects China's claim and in particular the nine dash line. When viewed in light of US support for ASEAN's rule-making, ASEAN appears even less neutral from the Chinese perspective especially as rivalry between China and the US increases. If China views ASEAN as taking the side of the US it may be even less likely to engage in multilateral negotiations. China has tried to delegitimise any US diplomatic intervention into the dispute by stating that it is exclusively for claimants to resolve and has lobbied to keep the SCS off the agenda of multilateral meetings such as the ARF and the EAS, away from the full regional 'orchestra'[201]. Vietnam and the Philippines have been keen to discuss the issue in these wider fora however whilst also developing security ties with the US. In August 2014, the Philippines' called for a "triple action" plan on the SCS at the ARF meeting. The plan included a

[198] For a sceptical analysis of 'Chinese assertiveness' see Johnston (2013).
[199] Valencia (2012).
[200] Ba (2011: 282).
[201] Weatherbee (2012: 9).

moratorium on any activities that could escalate tensions, the full implementation of the DoC and negotiation on a CoC and the use of arbitration to settle the disputes. The US and EU supported the plan with Secretary of State John Kerry making the most forceful diplomatic intervention into the dispute so far. ASEAN was split over the plan: only Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam supported it, whereas ASEAN members more willing to accommodate China did not support it. In August 2015, in the context of China's reclamation and building work, a 'freeze' on undertaking any activities on occupied features was again brought up at the ARF. Despite ASEAN foreign ministers warming to the idea, China rejected the proposal meaning it did not go anywhere[202]. However, the meeting revealed that certain member states such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, were becoming more willing to confront China on the issue in light of its reclamation activities.

The US' more assertive diplomatic posture, and strategic 'rebalancing' to Asia - which included a commitment to position a rotation of 2500 marines in Darwin, deploy up to four littoral combat ships in Singapore and shift sixty percent of US naval forces to Asia by 2020 - has given Vietnam and the Philippines new confidence in challenging China on the SCS. This has worried ASEAN officials due to the impact such alignment may have on ASEAN's efforts to maintain an apparent neutral status as a collective actor. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam have begun to push ASEAN to support a more assertive position against China. Indeed, they have lobbied to have ASEAN specifically name China as the source of increased tensions. ASEAN has so far avoided this; however, Secretary-General Le Luong Minh's public comment that ASEAN should "get [China] out of the territorial waters of Vietnam" again upset the collective appearance of neutrality[203]. In 2015, ASEAN offered its most strongly worded statements to date. At the August 2015 round of ASEAN and ARF foreign ministers' meetings, despite China expressing beforehand that the SCS should be off the agenda, ASEAN discussed it “extensively” and stated that land reclamation activities had “eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea” in both the AMM joint communiqué and the ARF chairman's statement[204]. Coupled with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's call for ASEAN to take a more active role in resolving the SCS dispute and other regional issues, it appears ASEAN may be beginning to take a more assertive stance[205]. Despite continuing to not name China

[202] Shannon Tiezzi “Southeast Asian Countries Warm to US-Proposed Freeze on South China Sea Land Reclamation” *The Diplomat* 5/8/15 <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/southeast-asian-countries-warm-to-us-proposed-freeze-on-south-china-sea-land-reclamation/> accessed 11/8/15.
[203] Mark Valencia “Asean caught uncomfortably in the middle of US-China regional conflict” *South China Morning Post* 30/5/14 <http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1521930/asean-caught-uncomfortably-middle-us-china-regional-conflict> accessed 10/7/14.
[204] ASEAN (2015a, 2015b).
[205]Trefor Moss “Asean Urged to Stand Up to Beijing Over South China Sea” *The Wall Street Journal* 4/8/15

in its statements, the fact that ASEAN continues to deliberately defy China to discuss the SCS issue, shows that the ASEAN states may have given up on the pretence of ASEAN appearing to be neutral. Indeed, on an individual basis most ASEAN states have endorsed the US' rebalance because it provides further access to US assistance, although publicly they have expressed some concern. For example, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa criticised the US' announcement of a rotation of 2500 US marines in northern Australia as potentially provoking a "vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust"[206]. This was despite the Indonesian military supporting the idea that they could interact with US Marines stationed nearby in Darwin[207]. There has also been a split between maritime and continental states in terms of supporting the US' rebalance[208], which is also evident in approaches to challenging or accommodating China on the SCS issue.

United identity ASEAN disunity over the SCS was no more evident than in July 2012 when the ASEAN states were unable to agree on the wording of a joint declaration at their AMM for the first time in ASEAN's history. Although they agreed on an outline for a proposed CoC, Cambodia as chair objected to the mention of the Scarborough Shoal incident and China's decision to award drilling rights to a foreign company in Vietnam's EEZ. Many analysts believe China directly influenced Cambodia's refusal to offer a joint statement based on its objection to this paragraph[209]. Mutual recriminations followed, making the ASEAN disagreement highly public. This has increased fears within Southeast Asia that ASEAN may not be able to present a united stand in negotiations on a CoC with China. If so, then the Philippines and Vietnam may increasingly see their interests served in starker balance of power strategies by further aligning with the US. Indeed, the Philippines has already stepped up security cooperation with the US, signing an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement in April 2014 which provides for increased rotation of US forces through the Philippines. It has also submitted a case against China's 'nine dash line' at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at The Hague. Even Malaysia, which has traditionally downplayed its disputed claims with China, has recently been reassessing its policy in the light of Chinese naval exercises near James Shoal. In October 2013 it announced that a naval base would be developed near James Shoal and that Marine Corps would be established to provide amphibious capabilities in the SCS. Malaysian officials also became more active in ASEAN consultations in the lead up to ASEAN-China negotiations on a CoC[210]. Indonesia has also recently formally

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/asean-urged-to-stand-up-to-beijing-over-south-china-sea-1438690560> accessed 12/8/15.

[206] Graham (2013: 322).

[207] Anwar (2013).

[208] See Graham (2013).

[209] See Thayer (2012).

[210] Carl Thayer "'Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick': What is Malaysia Playing At?" *The Diplomat* 28/2/14

acknowledged that China's extensive claims overlap with Indonesia's sovereignty over Riau province including the Natuna islands[211].

In 2013, China's new Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that China was willing to begin negotiations with ASEAN on a CoC, but on the condition that ASEAN eliminate outside 'interference' which Wang blamed for holding up previous discussions[212]. Wang's reference to 'interference' meant specifically US interference. This suggested a *quid pro quo*: China would show the restraint ASEAN desired by engaging in negotiations over a CoC, if ASEAN agreed not to draw the US into the dispute. This is becoming less likely however, as revelations of Chinese land reclamation and ASEAN's defiance of China's requests not to discuss the issue at the 2015 ARF show. Despite the new leadership in Beijing declaring the renewal of China's 'good neighbour' policy during President Xi Jinping's and Premier Li Keqiang's respective tours of Southeast Asia in October 2013, China's recent behaviour has raised further questions in Southeast Asia over China's willingness to take on a 'responsible regional great power' role. For example, China's declaration in late 2013 of its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea raised regional tensions in Northeast Asia and alarmed Southeast Asian states. This was compounded when China's ambassador in Manila stated China's right to declare a similar ADIZ over the SCS[213]. In early 2014, China also announced the unilateral imposition of a fishery law in disputed waters, stating that fishermen needed to request permission from Chinese authorities before fishing in the area. On top of this, in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated parts of the Philippines in November 2013, China appeared to punish Manila by offering an initial contribution of $100,000, although this was eventually raised to $1.4 million and included the dispatch of a hospital ship. In contrast, the US offered $37 million in aid and dispatched Osprey helicopters, the USS George Washington carrier group and had up to 13,000 military personnel providing relief. Likewise, Japan offered a $52 million aid package and dispatched 1000 Self Defence Forces personnel[214]. This raised questions regarding China's ability to transcend political issues to provide regional public goods such as humanitarian relief. Chinese officials' claims that their land reclamation and upgrading activities have the aim of improving China's ability to provide such goods as humanitarian assistance, have done little to reassure ASEAN states[215]. In the context of uncertainty over China's

<http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/speak-softly-and-carry-a-big-stick-what-is-malaysia-playing-at/> accessed 4/4/14.
[211] Ann Marie Murphy "The end of strategic ambiguity: Indonesia formally announces its dispute with China in the South China Sea" *PacNet* 26, 1/4/14.
[212] Thayer (2013).
[213] Nguyen (2013).
[214] Cossa and Glosserman (2014).
[215] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Wang Yi on the South China Sea Issue At the ASEAN Regional Forum" 6/8/15 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1287277.shtml> accessed 12/8/15.

'responsible regional great power' role, ASEAN states may see the US' provision of security public goods as even more salient as a check against the expansion of the Chinese security presence.

Third transitional role bargain

Events since 2008 have seen an evolving, but incomplete, transitional role bargain. The US has returned to a similar role bargain with ASEAN as was reached in the early 1990s. The US continues to provide security public goods through its renewed strategic engagement and presence both in bilateral and multilateral channels, further legitimising its 'offshore great power guarantor' role in the context of China's rising regional and global profile. In return the US has endorsed ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role and agreed to participate in ASEAN's processes, but also made clear it expects more concrete results. This has been a boon for ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role as the former 'soloist' has returned to the regional 'orchestra' under ASEAN's authority. ASEAN has subsequently expanded the forums within which it performs the 'regional conductor' role and had all major players commit to its 'score' by signing onto the TAC. It now performs the function of 'inclusive engagement' in defence sphere (ADMM Plus), trade negotiations (RCEP) and the expanded EAS. In these forums, it has more discursive endorsement now from the key constituencies than ever before.

However, the US' strategic re-engagement/re-balancing towards the region has aggravated China, which fears possible containment and has become more assertive in its claims to the SCS. China's behaviour has raised questions regarding its 'responsible regional great power' role as its lack of restraint has served to heighten tension in the region rather than contribute to stability. ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role has therefore seen limits to its expansion; China endorses ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role in the context of convening the full 'orchestra' including Japan and the US, but contests ASEAN's attempts to use the 'regional conductor' role with respect to the SCS dispute. ASEAN has been unable to successfully use its 'regional conductor' role to commit China to a policy of restraint through its rule-making. China has contested ASEAN's rule-making in this area and the dispute has contributed to raising great power tensions in the region as states such as the Philippines and Vietnam turn towards the US for support. In the context of renewed great power tensions, ASEAN's 'inclusive engagement' potentially has even more relevance in providing forums for dialogue and mediation. However, pressure from great powers for ASEAN to take sides in the developing tensions has impacted ASEAN's united identity and neutral status[216]. As unity and

[216] This sentiment was expressed repeatedly by regional officials and academics in discussion with the author during

neutrality are key aspects of the 'regional conductor' role, this could have implications for ASEAN's ability to continue to perform the role. For this reason, recent internal efforts have focused on trying to maintain this unity and neutrality.

Re-conceptualisation: Maintaining ASEAN's unity and neutrality?

The failure to present a united front at the 2012 AMM was a shock to ASEAN officials, and as Singapore's Ambassador-at-Large Tommy Koh pointed out, served as "an example of our fragility and of the risk that ASEAN may no longer be united, and will be split apart … If that happens we can no longer play the regional role we do"[217]. Indonesia has worked more than others to maintain ASEAN's unity and collective neutrality. This was clearly seen in the aftermath of the AMM in Cambodia when Marty Natalegawa engaged in 'shuttle diplomacy' around ASEAN capitals to re-establish a common ASEAN position on the SCS dispute. The result was a six point proposal, which acted as a face-saving alternative to the failed AMM declaration. It was also seen the year before in Natalegawa's efforts to mediate the Thai-Cambodia border conflict which had broken out into military exchanges of fire. At the ASEAN Summit in May 2014, ASEAN was also determined to show a united stance. The summit was overshadowed by Sino-Vietnamese tensions over China's decision to place an oil rig in disputed waters. The ASEAN foreign ministers released a separate statement on the South China Sea rather than embedding a paragraph within the larger joint statement. The statement made no direct mention of China in an effort to show neutrality, but the fact that a separate statement was issued sought to serve notice that ASEAN was not divided in the way it was in 2012. However, the recent two day delay in ASEAN issuing a joint communiqué from its 2015 AMM, shows that the divisions over how to deal with the China and the SCS issue remain[218].

Indonesia's goal to promote ASEAN unity was also seen in its request to chair ASEAN in 2011 in place of Brunei, rather than 2013 as scheduled. It sought to push for the further implementation of the APSC and promote a common ASEAN position on global issues[219]. The resulting Bali Concord III entitled "ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations" determined that ASEAN would forge such a common position by the time of Indonesia's next

fieldwork in Southeast Asia February and March 2014.

[217] Interview with Tommy Koh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 7/3/14.

[218] Kristine Kwok "Beijing's South China Sea island building has polarised Asean nations" *South China Morning Post* 9/8/15 <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1847875/beijings-south-china-sea-island-building-has-polarised> accessed 11/8/15.

[219] Emmers (2014: 557).

chairmanship in 2022[220]. Indonesia faces problems of its own in terms of its focus on ASEAN however. There have been questions raised within Indonesia over whether ASEAN should remain the cornerstone of foreign policy considering its potential to play a larger role in its own right[221]. This has come in response to status recognition of Indonesia's global importance through its membership in the G20, as well as it being given a place amongst other major powers within Kevin Rudd's APC proposal. The process of democratisation has also impacted on Indonesia's ability to lead within ASEAN as the pressures of the general public force the government to focus on domestic issues and not commit extensive energy or resources on foreign policy[222]. The Foreign Ministry firmly believes in ASEAN however, and newly elected President Jokowi's intention to prioritise the ASEAN Summit over the G20 in the face of a busy domestic agenda, suggests that Indonesia will keep ASEAN as a high priority[223].

Another initiative to promote ASEAN unity has been a concern to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat and increase the mandate of the ASEAN Secretary-General as the basis of the institutional identity of ASEAN. ASEAN's dependence on the rotating Chair means that its ability to deal with issues and crises that arise depend on whether there is a strong Chair at that time. In this respect, Cambodia was a weak chair allowing internal divisions, which should remain behind closed doors, to impact ASEAN's projected unity. Former Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong has pointed out one practical measure of expanding the Secretary-General's mandate such that he/she is able to issue statements on behalf of ASEAN[224]. This would reduce the lag time of a Chair trying to get agreement from all members on the wording of a statement. In terms of the Secretariat, a High Level Task Force was set up to review the ASEAN organs and to assess ways of better coordinating organs and strengthening the Secretariat as a whole. They had their first meeting in March 2014 and are due to submit their report at the AMM at the of 2014[225]. We will perhaps need to wait until 2015 and the full announcement of the post-2015 agenda to see where ASEAN will go but, regardless of the specifics, member states will need to address the issue of unity and neutrality if they want ASEAN to continue to perform the 'regional conductor' role.

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[220] ASEAN (2011b).
[221] Hadi (2012).
[222] Interview with Lina Alexander and Dr Shafiah Muhibat, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 11/3/14.
[223] "Jokowi to attend ASEAN summit, may skip G-20 meet" *The Jakarta Post* 8/10/14 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/08/jokowi-attend-asean-summit-may-skip-g-20-meet.html> accessed 17/10/14.
[224] Interview with Ong Keng Yong, Singapore High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 19/3/14.
[225] Interview with AKP Mochtan, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 12/3/14.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how, through a series of negotiations, ASEAN has created and maintained its 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN created its role in order to maximise its own autonomy and voice and avoid domination on the one hand and marginalisation on the other. It has sought to place itself in the centre of broader negotiations over regional order and the regional division of labour. It has negotiated transitional role bargains at the functional level facilitating regional great power competition for influence through the provision of functions, a means for avoiding more competitive balance of power competition. As has been shown, these bargains are for the most part transitional and functional, highlighting ASEAN's inability to address substantive issues between great powers. They work to stave off more overt competition but also delay addressing the more substantive great power issues[226]. They work towards entrenching a division of labour with the US providing security public goods through its 'offshore great power role', China providing regional economic public goods and restraint through its 'responsible regional great power' role, Japan providing regional economic and financial public goods through the 'regional economic great power' role, and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as the 'regional conductor'.

The problem is the extent to which the great powers - as the key constituencies of legitimation - endorse their own role or each others' roles. Indeed, the last section of the chapter showed how recent Chinese assertiveness suggested that its own role conception may not align with ASEAN's idea of China's “responsible” role. Similarly, the US' reassertion of its presence may see it becoming less of an “offshore” great power. Also, domestic debate in Japan is currently reassessing Japan's own idea of its regional role and whether it wants to remain merely an economic great power or try to a take on more of a strategic role. This indicates the precarious nature of the mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics of the post-Cold War division of labour. A full account of all these factors is beyond the limit of this study; however, it shows that the transitional bargains that ASEAN has brokered do not fundamentally and fully address the underlying structural dynamics of shifting capabilities. To the extent that they do, they perpetuate US hegemony with regional powers being negotiated into lower ranking positions in what has been termed a 'layered hierarchy'[227]. That this has been negotiated primarily vertically between ASEAN and the respective great powers, rather than horizontally between the great powers themselves, raises questions regarding the durability of this structure considering the potential for competition over rank[228].

[226] Goh (2011).
[227] Goh (2013).
[228] See the concluding chapter in Goh (2013). For discussion of the dynamics of legitimacy with respect to the

There is no foundational bargain over respective distributions of capabilities and how these should be employed with respect to a great power-agreed division of labour.

Notwithstanding the limits of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, this chapter shows how social roles can enable actors with limited material capabilities to play an important part in regional order negotiation and management. Whereas the previous two chapters dealt primarily with the redefinition of the 'great power' role – a role that had a prior existence in international and regional society - this chapter shows the creation of ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role, a new role in regional society. ASEAN created its 'regional conductor' role, giving it a shared existence within regional society, and ASEAN has since been able to use its role to keep itself central to negotiations over regional order and management. Specifically, each time the 'regional conductor' role's legitimacy has been challenged, ASEAN has developed a new basis for the role by using existing ASEAN-led forums to launch new initiatives with ASEAN at the centre. ASEAN would have been unable to do this without initially creating the 'regional conductor' role in the early 1990s. However, it remains to be seen how long ASEAN can continue to use the 'regional conductor' role in the face of the great powers' dissatisfaction over their own roles within the transitional role bargains. For the regional 'orchestra' to play more beautiful music, the great powers themselves will have to negotiate a more complicated 'score' and establish mutually acceptable parts for each of them to play.

negotiation of hegemony, see Clark (2011).

Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the puzzle of the prominent part ASEAN has played in negotiating and managing regional order in East Asia during times of transition and crisis. As a group of small to medium sized states, operating in a region that contains numerous great powers and major regional players, ASEAN has contributed more to the negotiation and management of East Asian order than IR theory would expect. This thesis has shown that ASEAN's unusually prominent contribution is not merely an accident of the structural dynamics of great power competition and rivalry, but rather results from the cumulative role negotiation that Southeast Asian states and great powers have engaged in since the early Cold War years. This thesis explored this role negotiation through three empirical chapters that covered early negotiations between the US and newly independent Southeast Asian states, China's negotiations with ASEAN during the Cambodian conflict and ASEAN's negotiations with the great powers since the end of the Cold War. This concluding chapter outlines the key findings of the thesis and situates the thesis' contribution to the literature on ASEAN, the English School and role theory. It also discusses the limitations of this thesis, but shows how these same limitations also provide opportunities for further research.

FINDINGS

This thesis has four key findings related to ASEAN's place in East Asian regional order. First, *ASEAN's prominence in East Asian order negotiation and management is due to its 'regional conductor' role*. ASEAN's prominence is not merely a result of the structural conditions of great power competition within East Asia, nor the unique normative context of Asia; rather, it is based on the cumulative negotiations over what type of order should prevail in Southeast and East Asia and which actors will perform which functions in upholding that order. As we saw in the Chapter Two, the US and ASEAN agreed that order in Southeast Asia would serve the twin goals of 'containment' and 'autonomy'. The US-ASEAN reciprocal role bargain that upheld this order saw the US provide security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor' in return for the ASEAN states managing their own relations through regional institution-building and rule-making and providing diplomatic initiatives to legitimise the US' position in Indochina. Through this role bargain the great power role was redefined in Southeast Asia. The primary function of diplomatic leadership – a key function of the European great power role – was decoupled from the great power role and transferred to ASEAN.

Similarly, in Chapter Three we saw that ASEAN's collective decision to align with China and oppose Vietnam during the Cambodian conflict, was based on the fact that China was willing to recognise ASEAN's understanding of order in Southeast Asia based on rules of coexistence, as well as ASEAN's part in making and managing that order as the 'primary manager'. The China-ASEAN role bargain, through which China took on the 'regional great power guarantor' role, further reinforced the redefinition of the great power role that resulted from earlier negotiations between ASEAN and the US. China endorsed ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in the whole of Southeast Asia by recognising the salience of ASEAN's norms and processes in Cambodia. Through the China-ASEAN bargain, ASEAN expanded its 'primary manager' role.

Chapter Four showed how the redefinition of the great power role and ASEAN's assumption of diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, provided practical and social foundations from which ASEAN was able to create its 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN used its Post-Ministerial Conference to launch the ARF and made arguments regarding its supposed neutrality and competence as the only actor able to bring all regional great powers and major players together. ASEAN won endorsement for its TAC as the regional 'score'. When challenged by one constituency of legitimation, ASEAN skilfully leveraged off the endorsement from another constituency to save its role from deterioration. This was most clearly demonstrated after the AFC and how ASEAN channelled Sino-Japanese competition in a way that contributed to order and enabled it to broker an East Asian bargain that further consolidated its 'regional conductor' role. ASEAN successfully asserted that accession to its TAC was one of the key criteria for membership in the regional orchestra, which the US then joined as a key element of its re-engagement of Asia.

The second finding of this thesis is that, *ASEAN's 'regional conductor' role is nested within a mutually beneficial, if tentative, role bargain with the great powers*. In the post-Cold War period ASEAN has not only tried to maintain its own 'regional conductor' role but also negotiate great powers into complementary roles that utilise their material capabilities in performing regional order functions. ASEAN legitimised the US' use of its superior military capabilities for security public goods provision and Japan and China's economic resources for regional financial public goods. However, ASEAN has done so through brokering a series of transitional role bargains which have only served to manage the challenges of that particular phase of negotiation. The tentative mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics of the transitional bargains are soon challenged, making a new round of negotiation necessary. In particular, the US' tendency towards interference in terms of

human rights, democracy promotion, economic liberalisation and doctrine of 'pre-emption' during the War on Terrorism, has challenged the 'offshore' identity of its great power guarantor role and ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. China's desire to institutionalise regionalism that excludes the US challenges ASEAN's performance of 'inclusive engagement' function and suggests it wants to take on diplomatic leadership for itself. China's actions in the South China Sea also raise questions over whether it will be a 'responsible' regional great power and contest ASEAN's rule-making function in the SCS. The legitimacy of ASEAN's role has to constantly be fought for. This contrasts with the US-ASEAN and China-ASEAN role bargains during the Cold War which were much more stable as they had clearer goals and mutually reinforcing legitimacy dynamics.

This finding regarding ASEAN-great power divisions of labour, better captures the basis for ASEAN's roles over time, and how this has been negotiated/re-negotiated, than the more fixed explanations that see ASEAN's role as rooted in great power rivalry/buck passing or the region's normative structure[1]. It is indeed the case that ASEAN has been highly active in promoting its norms and processes in the region. However, in contrast to previous constructivist work that has focused on whether ASEAN has successfully socialised great powers into the norms themselves through its institutions, this thesis shows that ASEAN's institution-building and norm provision (rule-making) are *functions* that ASEAN performs – functions that are considered by the great powers as legitimate for ASEAN to perform. The focus on legitimacy and ASEAN's ability to nest its performance of such functions in a division of labour, takes our focus away from the norms themselves and, in a sense, 'lowers the bar' with regard to analysing great power endorsement. We do not need to show that the great powers have internalised ASEAN norms, but instead look for the instrumental and normative reasons for why the great powers consider ASEAN's performance of diplomatic/normative functions as legitimate. At the same time as this finding tempers some of the conclusions of previous constructivist scholars, it also provides a 'thicker' understanding than realist conclusions regarding great power rivalry. Great power rivalry has (so far) not diminished great power attention in ASEAN – indeed, it may have increased such attention, particularly on the part of the US – showing that the great powers have more of a stake in ASEAN's diplomatic leadership than we might expect based on an analysis that primarily focuses on material balance of power. This thesis has shown that ASEAN's diplomatic leadership has served to legitimise great power imperatives from the early days of the 'primary manager' role. ASEAN has also managed so far to be useful to all great powers in respect to legitimising their identities and strategies in the post-Cold

[1] On the former, Tow (2012), also Leifer (1996), Emmers (2003). On the latter Acharya (2014).

War period within the prevailing political and normative context[2].

Third, *ASEAN's impact on regional order is limited because of its inability to take substantive positions on key regional issues and because great power rivalry threatens its unity and neutrality.* ASEAN cannot address, and often seeks to avoid, divisive issues between the great powers to avoid being accused of taking sides and to avoid internal splits because of its members diverse security perspectives. However, without being able to address the principal issues over which the great powers disagree, ASEAN can only really maintain the status quo. This finding is consistent with Goh's analysis of ASEAN's impact on regional order through its brokerage of 'minimalist institutional bargains' in the region, but inability to broker a 'grand bargain' between the great powers[3].

Fourth, *ASEAN's difficulties in presenting a united and neutral position are exacerbated by the inherent tensions between ASEAN's 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor' roles.* The two roles are linked by the fact that the perceived competence of ASEAN to perform functions at the wider East Asian/Asia-Pacific level depends on its perceived success as the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order. However, the 'primary manager' role seeks to insulate Southeast Asia from external interference whereas the 'regional conductor' role requires ASEAN reform its norms such as non-interference in order to uphold its status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. Newer members view ASEAN's 'primary manager' role in the narrow sense of insulating regimes from external pressure for political liberalisation. Older members see the necessity of seeking to shape the wider East Asia/Asia-Pacific region to maximise ASEAN's autonomy and avoid domination and marginalisation. In trying to maintain ASEAN unity, older members have accommodated the less progressive views within ASEAN agreements. This results in dissatisfaction for liberal domestic constituencies and Western constituencies as reform falls well short of that anticipated, limiting ASEAN's status as a successful manager of Southeast Asian order. This finding aligns with that of other scholars, who have noted the effect ASEAN's expansion and its external relations have had on the Association. Acharya again focuses on the impact on ASEAN's norms rather than ASEAN's role *per se*. He notes that the burdens taken on by ASEAN through its expansion and its responsibility for driving East Asian/Asia-Pacific regionalism might impact “the sanctity of ASEAN's norms and the credibility of the ASEAN Way” - the very aspects from which it has previously drawn strength as a potential 'security community'[4]. Likewise, for Ba, ASEAN's

[2] See Goh (2011).
[3] Goh (2011, 2013).
[4] Acharya (2014: 262).

relations with external powers, especially the US, have acted as a trigger for reassessing ideas about regional identity and regionalism. This is evident in ASEAN's efforts to branch into exclusive East Asian regionalism. In practice though, this branching out has challenged the very idea of 'Southeast Asia' as a distinctive political space[5]. Ba therefore goes further than this thesis, and also Acharya. For Ba, ASEAN's efforts to develop its unity and strengthen its processes through the community-building process and Charter are not merely about upholding its status to maintain its roles or its norms; they are about strengthening 'Southeast Asia' as a founding idea that can hold its own alongside other regional conceptions such as East Asia, Asia-Pacifc and Indo-Pacific[6].

CONTRIBUTION

This thesis makes three key contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on ASEAN by bringing a new perspective to ASEAN's part in regional order negotiation and management in East Asia. As we have seen, realists tend to downplay ASEAN's contribution to regional order because they regard material capabilities as the primary variable in explaining international outcomes. For this reason, great power relations – and particularly the balance of power between the great powers - is the most important aspect of regional order. ASEAN, as a group of states with limited material capabilities, cannot have a significant impact on the regional balance of power aside from the choices individual states make in terms of their alignment with any particular great power. Constructivists on the other hand tend to be too optimistic regarding ASEAN's agency in developing regional norms and socialising great powers into those norms. Trying to ascertain whether norms have been internalised and have changed great power interests and identities is increasingly difficult, especially considering East Asia's tendency to revert to more 'traditional' great power politics. Role theory provides a good middle ground that enables us to get at the negotiations between the great powers and ASEAN over regional order and what part different actors will play in making and managing order.

Secondly, this thesis contributes to the English School literature by introducing a framework for understanding role negotiation in international society. The English School has long emphasised the relational aspect of states interactions and has shown how states' relations are governed not merely by impersonal systemic processes, but rather by the rules and institutions states develop through negotiation. Although English School scholars have had a lot to say about the great powers

[5] Ba (2009).
[6] Ba (2009: 246).

and their 'special responsibilities' in international society[7], they have had less to say about other types of actors and especially small powers. This thesis provides a framework for exploring how social roles may be negotiated within international society between different types of actors. It situates role negotiation within the English School institution of 'order management' – a reworking of 'great power management'. Understood more broadly as 'order management', this key institution of international society need not be limited to the role of great powers but could be expanded through studies that explore the various functions that different actors perform in negotiating and managing global order and regional order[8].

Thirdly, this thesis contributes to role theory in IR by providing a framework to analyse how roles can be created and redefined within the actual interactions of states. In doing so, this thesis transcends the largely theoretical debate over whether to locate roles within the social structure of international society or within states' own subjectivity and allows us to look at how states negotiate roles that serve particular order functions within a particular social context.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

A key advantage of this thesis is its scope and its ability to trace role negotiation over a number of decades. However, this scope is also a limitation in that it reduces the depth at which the thesis can go into each case study. This was somewhat inevitable considering the limited space available within the thesis. However, this provides an opportunity for future research. More time and focus could be given to each of the three periods as part of a bigger project. This would help us make even firmer conclusions on the nature of respective actors' roles in Southeast and East Asia at each period, and more clearly identify the links between each period. In particular, an interesting future study could use the role negotiation framework to focus on the US, China and Japan's roles in post-Cold War East Asia. This would compliment this thesis' focus on ASEAN's role and help us better understand the extent to which a mutual understanding exists a on division of labour not just between ASEAN and the great powers, but also between the great powers themselves. This would contribute to our understanding of the foundations of regional order in East Asia[9].

Another limitation is the lack of access to Southeast Asian primary sources. Southeast Asian archives remain mostly closed to scholars studying the diplomatic history of the region. For this

[7] Bull (1995), Buzan (2004b), Clark (2011), Bukovansky et al (2012), Aslam (2013).
[8] Bukovansky et al (2012) provides the clearest example to date of this scholars taking this step.
[9] The most comprehensive study so far in this vein is Goh (2013).

reason, the historical chapters have mostly relied on US documents. This is helpful in building up a picture of how US officials perceived Southeast Asian positions and what Southeast Asian officials said to US officials. However, access to Southeast Asian sources would provide a more accurate and nuanced picture of what key actors within Southeast Asian states thought of their own country's or other countries' roles. Again, this also provides a clear avenue for future research in case regional archives become more widely accessible to scholars[10]. As part of a bigger research programme, an in-depth insight into key states' role conceptions and role expectations of other states could be built up through exploring the archives of individual Southeast Asian states. Although access to historical archives would help develop the historical aspects of this project, it would not necessarily help with the contemporary post-Cold War period. A limitation for this thesis with respect to the post-Cold War period was the limited time available for interviews with key regional officials and academics. A more extensive programme of interviews with more focused questioning based on the findings from this thesis, could constitute a key aspect of future research. This would allow for a broader pool of primary source material and enable a more in-depth empirical study into negotiations that have taken place since the end of the Cold War.

The final and less significant limitation of this thesis is that it is based on the study of a single region. This means that its findings are primarily limited to Southeast/East Asia rather than generalisable to other regions or the global level. As stated in the introduction and Chapter One of the thesis however, the role negotiation framework provides a tool for getting at complex negotiations in international society. In this sense, the framework itself should be transferable to other regions and contexts. Future research could apply the role negotiation framework developed in this thesis to other regions to see what kinds of roles have been developed in different social contexts. This would enable comparison with East Asia and would allow us to draw more conclusive implications for our understanding of roles in international relations more generally. In particular it would help us build a more comprehensive picture of great power and small power roles which could expand our understanding of the English School institution of 'order management'.

[10] Ang (2013) provides a major contribution to regional diplomatic history based on his unprecedented access to Singaporean archives.

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