The Evolution of Resilience

David Levine

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078

The Evolution of Resilience

David Levine

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.

Original language	English
Article number	106078
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	230
Early online date	11 Sept 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078
Publication status	Published - Dec 2025

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10.1016/j.jet.2025.106078Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "The Evolution of Resilience",

abstract = "I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.",

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