The bureaucracy trap

Ascension Andina-Diaz; Francesco Feri; Miguel Angel Melendez

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166

The bureaucracy trap

Ascension Andina-Diaz
, Francesco Feri
, Miguel Angel Melendez

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough.

Original language	English
Article number	111166
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	228
Early online date	11 May 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166
Publication status	Published - Jul 2023

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166

Accepted ManuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 128 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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title = "The bureaucracy trap",

abstract = "We study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough.",

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AB - We study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough.

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