The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems

Mehari Msgna; Konstantinos Markantonakis; Keith Mayes

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18

The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems

Mehari Msgna, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Keith Mayes

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The security of an embedded system is often compromised when a “trusted” program is subverted to behave differently. Such as executing maliciously crafted code and/or skipping legitimate parts of a “trusted” program. Several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature to counteract these behavioural changes of a program. A common underlying theme in most of them is to define security policies at the lower level of the system in an independent manner and then check for security violations either statically or dynamically at runtime. In this paper we propose a novel method that verifies a program’s behaviour, such as the control flow, by using the device’s side channel leakage.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Security and Privacy in Communication Networks
Subtitle of host publication	9th International ICST Conference
Place of Publication	Sydney, Australia
Pages	288-304
Number of pages	16
Volume	127
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18
Publication status	Published - 25 Sept 2013

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering
Publisher	Springer
Volume	127

Keywords

Side Channel Leakage
Power Consumption
Program’s Control Flow
Hidden Markov Model
Principal Components Analysis
Linear Discriminant Analysis

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18

http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18

Cite this

Msgna, M., Markantonakis, K., & Mayes, K. (2013). The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. In Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference (Vol. 127, pp. 288-304). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering; Vol. 127).. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18

Msgna, Mehari ; Markantonakis, Konstantinos ; Mayes, Keith. / The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference. Vol. 127 Sydney, Australia, 2013. pp. 288-304 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering).

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Msgna, M, Markantonakis, K & Mayes, K 2013, The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. in Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference. vol. 127, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering, vol. 127, Sydney, Australia, pp. 288-304. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18

The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. / Msgna, Mehari; Markantonakis, Konstantinos ; Mayes, Keith.
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference. Vol. 127 Sydney, Australia, 2013. p. 288-304 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering; Vol. 127).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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Msgna M, Markantonakis K , Mayes K. The B-Side of Side Channel Leakage: Control Flow Security in Embedded Systems. In Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 9th International ICST Conference. Vol. 127. Sydney, Australia. 2013. p. 288-304. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Information and Telecommunication Engineering). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-04283-1_18