Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round Skinny

Ralph Ankele, Subhadeep Banik, Avik Chakraborti, Eik List, Florian Mendel, Siang Meng Sim, Gaoli Wang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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At CRYPTO'16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with the NSA designs SIMON and SPECK. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft- and hardware and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as tweakey sizes of 64, 128, 192 and 128, 256, 384 bits respectively. This paper presents a related-tweakey impossible-differential attack on up to 23 (out of 36) rounds of SKINNY-64/128 for different tweak sizes. All our attacks can be trivially extended to SKINNY-128/128.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
EditorsDieter Gollmann, Atsuko Miyaji, Hiroaki Kikuchi
Place of PublicationKanazawa, Japan
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-61204-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-61203-4
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer International Publishing AG 2017


  • Symmetric Cryptography
  • Cryptanalysis
  • Tweakable block cipher
  • Impossible differential
  • Lightweight cryptography

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