Reduced Normal Forms Are Not Extensive Forms

Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

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Abstract

Fundamental results in the theory of extensive form games have singled out the reduced normal form as the key representation of a game in terms of strategic equivalence. In a precise sense, the reduced normal form contains all strategically relevant information. This note shows that a difficulty with the concept has been overlooked so far: given a reduced normal form alone, it may be impossible to reconstruct the game’s extensive form representation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-288
Number of pages8
JournalEconomic Theory Bulletin
Volume8
Early online date4 Jun 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Jun 2020

Keywords

  • reduced normal form, extensive form games

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