Abstract
In a much-cited paper Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) suggest that public
spending on higher education is politically sustained by middle- and high
income groups voting for a policy which is positive but not generous enough
to allow lower income families to overcome the financial constraints that
prevent their participation. Using a quantitative model, calibrated to the
UK economy, we find that current public spending on post compulsory
education corresponds to a political equilibrium. Support for the
equilibrium policy comes primarily from low- and middle income groups,
indicating that the policy needn't be highly regressive. Credit constraints
play a minor role.
spending on higher education is politically sustained by middle- and high
income groups voting for a policy which is positive but not generous enough
to allow lower income families to overcome the financial constraints that
prevent their participation. Using a quantitative model, calibrated to the
UK economy, we find that current public spending on post compulsory
education corresponds to a political equilibrium. Support for the
equilibrium policy comes primarily from low- and middle income groups,
indicating that the policy needn't be highly regressive. Credit constraints
play a minor role.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 134-150 |
Journal | European Journal of Political Economy |
Volume | 29 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Keywords
- Post-compulsory education, Participation, Voting