Abstract
We present a physical attestation and authentication approach to detecting cheating in resource constrained smart micro-grids. A multi-user smart micro-grid (SMG) architecture supported by a low cost and unreliable communications network, forms our application scenario. In this scenario, a malicious adversary can cheat by manipulating the measured power consumption/generation data. In doing so, the reward is access to more than the per user allocated power quota. Cheating discourages user participation and results in grid destabilisation and a breakdown of the grid in the worst case. Detecting cheating attacks is thus essential for secure and resilient SMG management, but is also a challenging problem. We address this problem with a cheating detection scheme that integrates the idea of physical attestation and authentication via on control signals to assess whether or not the SMG system is under attack. A theoretical analysis demonstrates the efficiency and correctness of our proposed scheme for constrained SMGs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Security of Industrial Control Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems (CyberICPS 2016) |
| Publisher | Springer-Verlag |
| Pages | 52-68 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-319-61437-3 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-319-61436-6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 10 Jun 2017 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer-Verlag |
| Volume | 10166 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy
Keywords
- Smart micro-grid Replay attacks Data injection Power consumption misreporting Critical infrastructure Lossy networks
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