Physical Attestation and Authentication to Detect Cheating in Resource Constrained Smart Micro-grids

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


We present a physical attestation and authentication approach to detecting cheating in resource constrained smart micro-grids. A multi-user smart micro-grid (SMG) architecture supported by a low cost and unreliable communications network, forms our application scenario. In this scenario, a malicious adversary can cheat by manipulating the measured power consumption/generation data. In doing so, the reward is access to more than the per user allocated power quota. Cheating discourages user participation and results in grid destabilisation and a breakdown of the grid in the worst case. Detecting cheating attacks is thus essential for secure and resilient SMG management, but is also a challenging problem. We address this problem with a cheating detection scheme that integrates the idea of physical attestation and authentication via on control signals to assess whether or not the SMG system is under attack. A theoretical analysis demonstrates the efficiency and correctness of our proposed scheme for constrained SMGs.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Second International Workshop on Security of Industrial Control Systems and Cyber-Physical Systems (CyberICPS 2016)
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-61437-3
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-61436-6
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jun 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743


  • Smart micro-grid Replay attacks Data injection Power consumption misreporting Critical infrastructure Lossy networks

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