Philosophy of Mind: Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism

Neil Gascoigne

doi:10.1007/978-3-658-16260-3_36-1

Philosophy of Mind: Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism

Neil Gascoigne

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Abstract

A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Handbuch Richard Rorty
Editors	Martin Müller
Publisher	Springer
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-658-16260-3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-16260-3_36-1
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 9 Oct 2022

Keywords

Eliminative Materialism
Conceptual Change
Mind-Body Identity Theory
Reductive Materialism

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-658-16260-3_36-1

Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative MaterialismSubmitted manuscript, 264 KB

Cite this

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