Philosophy of Mind: Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism

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A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, ‘eliminativist’ attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does not fall foul of the ‘irreducible properties objection’ (the thought that if mental states are brain states then the latter must exhibit the same properties as the former). An explanation is offered of why Rorty continued to describe himself as a materialist/physicalist despite having come to reject any version of mind-body identity.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbuch Richard Rorty
EditorsMartin Müller
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-658-16260-3
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 9 Oct 2022


  • Eliminative Materialism
  • Conceptual Change
  • Mind-Body Identity Theory
  • Reductive Materialism

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