On Cheryl Misak’s Modest Pragmatism

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This paper examines Cheryl Misak's "modest" version of pragmatism. One of the advantages Misak sees in this position is that it addresses the deficiencies she finds in the work of writers such as Habermas and Rorty. Focusing on her reformulation of Peirce’s account of truth, I argue that Misak has not succeeded in identifying a position which is modest in the sense she claims. I suggest further that Misak's objections to Habermas' Kantian pragmatism should lead her to share the unqualified acceptance of contingency she thinks characteristic of "radical" pragmatists.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-105
Number of pages11
JournalContemporary Pragmatism
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2014

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