Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents

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@article{ec805fe828d141a2b5f92f502563090a,

title = "Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents",

keywords = "Mechanism Design, Budget Constraints, Welfare Maximization, Revenue Maximization, Continuum Economy",

author = "Michael Richter",

year = "2019",

month = may,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009",

language = "English",

volume = "115",

pages = "30--47",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents

AU - Richter, Michael

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

KW - Mechanism Design

KW - Budget Constraints

KW - Welfare Maximization

KW - Revenue Maximization

KW - Continuum Economy

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

M3 - Article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 115

SP - 30

EP - 47

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -