We look into determinants (volatility, crises, sentiment and the U.S. ‘fear ’ index) of herding using BRICS as our sample. Investors herd selectively to crises and herding is a short-lived phe- nomenon. Herding was highest during the global ﬁnancial crisis (only China was affected). There was no herding during the European debt crisis and COVID. With regard to the relationship between volatility and CSAD (cross sectional absolute deviation)/herding, a lower CSAD (movement in a speciﬁc direction) brings about less volatility. However, a high volatility ampliﬁes herding (reduces CSAD), especially in China. Russia and South Africa are unresponsive to volatility levels (low/high) and herding. We also observe volatility heterogeneity. Different volatility measures have different effects on different markets. There is limited evidence to suggest that sentiment (based on principal component) Granger causes herding/CSAD. Herding is a period and market variant and unrelated to crises. The U.S. ‘fear ’ index has a short-lived, limited effect on CSAD/herding (during COVID only) for all countries except China. In addition, Granger causality analysis indicates a two-way relationship between the U.S. ‘fear ’ index and CSAD/herding, unrelated to crises.
- herding; volatility; sentiment; principal component; crises; COVID; U.S. ‘fear ’; BRICS