Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence

David Levine; Andrea Mattozzi; Salvatore Modica

doi:10.1111/iere.70098

Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence

David Levine
, Andrea Mattozzi
, Salvatore Modica

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.

Original language	English
Journal	International Economic Review
Early online date	25 Aug 2026
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70098
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 25 Aug 2026

Access to Document

10.1111/iere.70098Licence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{42a7a89aa2f749ddb583a1f4c69c70a0,

title = "Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence",

abstract = "We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm. ",

author = "David Levine and Andrea Mattozzi and Salvatore Modica",

year = "2026",

month = aug,

day = "25",

doi = "10.1111/iere.70098",

language = "English",

journal = "International Economic Review",

issn = "0020-6598",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Labor Associations

T2 - The Blue Wall of Silence

AU - Levine, David

AU - Mattozzi, Andrea

AU - Modica, Salvatore

PY - 2026/8/25

Y1 - 2026/8/25

N2 - We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.

AB - We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.

U2 - 10.1111/iere.70098

DO - 10.1111/iere.70098

M3 - Article

SN - 0020-6598

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

ER -