Projects per year
Abstract
In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents and its distance from them on the topology. We study the computational complexity of finding individually rational outcomes; this notion is widely assumed to be the very minimal stability requirement and requires that the utility of every agent in a solution is nonnegative. We perform a comprehensive study of the problem's complexity, and we prove that even in very basic cases, deciding whether an individually rational solution exists is intractable. To reach at least some tractability, one needs to combine multiple restrictions of the input instance, including the number of agents and the topology and the influence of distant agents on the utility.
Original language  English 

Title of host publication  Proceedings of the ThirtyThird International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
Publisher  International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence 
Pages  27822790 
Number of pages  9 
ISBN (Electronic)  9781956792041 
DOIs  
Publication status  Published  Aug 2024 
Projects
 1 Active

NAfANE: New Approaches for Approximate Nash Equilibria
Deligkas, A. (PI)
Eng & Phys Sci Res Council EPSRC
1/01/24 → 31/12/26
Project: Research