Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

Sophie Bade

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012

Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

Sophie Bade

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	257–262
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	165
Early online date	22 Apr 2016
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012
Publication status	Published - Sept 2016

Keywords

random matching mechanisms
group-strategyproof
non-bossy
random serial dictatorship

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012

Accepted ManuscriptAccepted author manuscript, 233 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116300321

Cite this

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abstract = "No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.",

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