Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

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Abstract

No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257–262
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume165
Early online date22 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2016

Keywords

  • random matching mechanisms
  • group-strategyproof
  • non-bossy
  • random serial dictatorship

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