Abstract
I argue that §103 of Schelling’s Philosophie der Kunst— particularly the use therein of the categories of the ‘umgekehrt Symbolische’ and ‘das Entgegengesetzte der Idee’—poses challenges for the identity philosophy. Indeed, I argue that this section presents what looks, at first blush, like a scandal for the very identity philosophy itself, and that even after extensive reconstruction, it is still one of the identity philosophy’s most radical statements.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 199-213 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Schelling-Studien |
| Volume | 7 |
| Publication status | Published - 25 Nov 2019 |
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